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Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and
the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure†

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Abstract: We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity
(Cournot) contract in the presence of a vertically related upstream market for input. We find
that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-
part-tariff pricing contract is determined through centralised Nash bargaining. We further
show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market
competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot).

Key Words: Bargaining; Bertrand; Cournot; Two-part tariffs; Vertical pricing; Welfare
JEL Classification: D43; L13; L14

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1. Introduction

There is a well-established line of research analysing the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on profit and social welfare. In a seminal paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that choosing quantity (price) contract is the dominant strategy for both firms when the goods are substitutes (complements). Furthermore, firms’ profits are higher under Cournot competition whereas Bertrand competition yields higher social welfare when the input markets are competitive\(^1\). However, it is often found that input suppliers and the final goods producers are involved in two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts (Berto Villa-Boas, 2007 and Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). Alipranti et al. (2014) show that when a monopoly input supplier and two final goods producers determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts through a decentralised generalised Nash bargaining process, the equilibrium profits of the final goods producers and social welfare are higher under Cournot competition.

We, on the other hand, aim to revisit the classic question of price and quantity contract where the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining\(^2\) with an upstream input supplier to determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts. We show that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for the downstream firms and both Bertrand and Cournot entail equal welfare level. López and Naylor (2004), López (2007), Mukherjee et al. (2012) also consider the implications of Bertrand and Cournot competition in isolation, under strategic input-price determination. Their results mostly confirm Singh and Vives’ (1984) findings and hence, our results are in stark contrast with the existing literature.

2. The model

We consider an economy with two downstream firms, denoted by \(D_i\), producing differentiated products where \(i, j = 1, 2\) and \(i \neq j\). The downstream firms require a critical input for production that they purchase from a monopoly input supplier, \(U\), through two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee and a per-unit price. \(U\) produces the inputs at a constant marginal cost of production, \(c\) which we assume to be zero. We assume that one unit of input is required to produce one unit of the output, and \(D_i\) and \(D_j\) can convert the inputs to the final goods without incurring any further cost.

\(^1\)See Delbono and Denicolò (1990), Qiu (1997) and Häckner (2000) for some works on Bertrand and Cournot competition under competitive input markets.

\(^2\)The implications of centralised bargaining is justifiable in most continental European countries, such as Germany (Hirsch et al. (2014)). In the context of strategic input-price determination Calmfors and Driffill (1998), Danthine and Hunt (1994) argue that collective bargaining is more widely accepted as it internalises various negative externalities, such as unemployment. Also, see Flanagan (2003), Boeri and Burda (2009) for a critical survey on this strand of literature.
We develop a model of three stage game. At stage 1, each downstream firm simultaneously chooses whether to adopt *quantity contract* or *price contract*. At stage 2, $U$ is involved in a centralised bargaining with a representative of $D_1$ and $D_2$ to determine the terms of the two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee, $F_i$, and a per-unit price, $w_i$, $i=1,2$. At stage 3, firms compete contingent to the decisions made in stage 1. We solve the game through backward induction.

Hence, we start our discussion at stage 3. To this extent we consider four possible constellations, $\{ \rho = qq, pp, pq, qp \}$; that attribute to the following properties:

- $(\rho = qq)$: where both firms adopt quantity contracts
- $(\rho = pp)$: where both firms adopt price contracts
- $(\rho = pq)$: where $D_1$ chooses price contract and $D_2$ chooses quantity contract
- $(\rho = qp)$: where $D_1$ chooses quantity contract and $D_2$ chooses price contract.

We work out the equilibrium outcomes under each of these strategy combinations.

At stage 2 $U$, the monopoly input supplier and a representative of $D_1$ and $D_2$ determine the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximising the following generalised Nash bargaining expression

$$
\max_{F_i^\rho, w_i^\rho} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} (w_i^\rho q_i^\rho + F_i^\rho)^\beta \right]^\frac{1}{1-\beta} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} (\pi_i^\rho - F_i^\rho) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}
$$

where $q_i^\rho$ and $(\pi_i^\rho - F_i^\rho)$ denote the output and net profit of the downstream firms and $\beta$ (resp. $(1-\beta)$) shows the bargaining power of the input supplier (resp. final goods producers).

We restrict our analysis to $\beta \in (0, 1)$.

Maximising the above with respect to $F_i$ gives the following\(^3\)

$$
F_i^\rho = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \beta \sum_{i=1}^{2} \pi_i^\rho - (1-\beta) \sum_{i=1}^{2} w_i^\rho q_i^\rho \right]
$$

Substituting (2) in (1), we get the maximisation problem as

$$
\max_{w_i^\rho} \left[ \beta \sum_{i=1}^{2} (\pi_i^\rho + w_i^\rho q_i^\rho)^\beta \right]^\frac{1}{1-\beta} \left[ (1-\beta) \sum_{i=1}^{2} (\pi_i^\rho + w_i^\rho q_i^\rho) \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}
$$

Eq. (3) shows that the per-unit input price is determined to maximise the industry profit (i.e., the total profits of $U$, $D_1$ and $D_2$), since

\[^3\]Like Aliprant et al. (2014) we also allow negative fixed-fees, which occurs for a small $\beta$. The upstream firm, in this case, subsidises downstream's production via fixed-fee.
\[ \sum_{i=1}^{2} (\pi_i^p + w_i^p q_i^p) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} ((p_i^p - w_i^p) q_i^p + w_i^p q_i^p) \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{2} p_i^p q_i^p \]

which is the profit of a monopoly final goods producer, producing both the products at zero marginal cost of production. Hence, it is intuitive that the centralised bargaining entails same level of output, consumer surplus and social welfare irrespective of the mode of the contract (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot) chosen by the final goods producers.

**Corollary 1:** If the final goods producers and a monopoly input supplier involve in centralised generalised Nash bargaining to determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contract, the outcomes yield equal level of output, consumer surplus and social welfare irrespective of the type of the product market competition.

3. **Equilibrium outcomes**

We now find out the equilibrium outcomes under a specific (inverse) demand function: \( P_i = 1 - q_i - \gamma q_j \), similar to Alipranti et al. (2014) with an exception that we normalise the demand intercept to unity for simplicity. \( \gamma \in (0,1) \) measures the degree of product differentiation. If \( \gamma = 1 \), the goods are perfect substitutes, and if \( \gamma = 0 \), the goods are isolated.

3.1 **(q-q) contract**

Downstream firm’s profit motive yields

\[
\text{Max}_{q_i} \quad D\pi_i^{qq} = \pi_i^{qq} - F_i = \left(1 - q_i - \gamma q_j - w_i\right)q_i - F_i \tag{4}
\]

Solving the first order conditions we obtain the equilibrium output of the \( i^{th} \) firm

\[
q_i^{qq} = \frac{(2 - \gamma) - 2w_i + \gamma w_j}{4 - \gamma^2} \tag{5}
\]

Given (5), the profit equation in (4) reduces to

\[
D\pi_i^{qq} = (q_i)^2 - F_i \tag{6}
\]

Maximising (3) subject to (5) and (6) gives the equilibrium per-unit input price and upfront fixed fee as

\[
w_i^{qq} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \right)
\]

3.
Given the per-unit input price, the equilibrium fixed-fees gives

\[ P_i^{qq} = \frac{(\beta - \gamma + \beta \gamma)}{4(1 + \gamma)^2} \]

The equilibrium downstream profit is

\[ D\pi_i^{qq} = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{1 + \gamma} \right) \]  

(7)

Next, we work out the consumer surplus and social welfare, are respectively as

\[ CS^{qq} = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad SW^{qq} = \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \right) \]  

(8)

3.2 \((p-p)\) contract

In order to solve the Bertrand game we derive the direct demand function

\[ q_i = \frac{(1 - \gamma) - P_i + \gamma P_j}{1 - \gamma^2}. \]

Accordingly, the representative downstream firm maximises the following

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{P_i} \quad & D\pi_i^{pp} = \pi_i^{pp} - F_i \\
\text{subject to} \quad & P_i = w_i \left( \frac{(1 - \gamma) - P_i + \gamma P_j}{1 - \gamma^2} \right) - F_i
\end{align*}
\]

(9)

The equilibrium price and output of the \(i^{th}\) firm can be found as

\[ P_i^{pp} = \frac{(1 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma) + 2w_i + \gamma w_j}{4 - \gamma^2} \]

\[ q_i^{pp} = \frac{(1 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma) - (2 - \gamma^2)w_i + \gamma w_j}{(4 - \gamma^2)(1 - \gamma^2)} \]  

(10)

Given the above, downstream's profit maximisation problem in (9) reads as

\[ D\pi_i^{pp} = (1 - \gamma^2)(q_i)^2 - F_i \]  

(11)

Maximising (3) subject to (9) and (10) gives the equilibrium per-unit input price and fixed fees

\[ w_i^{pp} = \frac{\gamma}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad P_i^{pp} = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{\beta - \gamma}{1 + \gamma} \right) \]

The net equilibrium profits of \(D_1\) and \(D_2\) are

\[ D\pi_i^{pp} = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{1 + \gamma} \right) \]  

(12)

We find the consumer surplus and social welfare as below

\[ CS^{pp} = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad SW^{pp} = \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \right) \]  

(13)
Next consider the situation where $D_1$ chooses the price contract and $D_2$ chooses the quantity contract. The maximisation problem of the downstream firms yield

$$\begin{align*}
\max_{p_1} \quad & D\pi_1^{pq} = \pi_1^{pq} - F_1 \\
= & (P_1 - w_1)(1 - P_1 - \gamma q_2) - F_1 \\
\text{(14. a)}
\end{align*}$$

and,

$$\begin{align*}
\max_{q_2} \quad & D\pi_2^{pq} = \pi_2^{pq} - F_2 \\
= & (1 - q_2 - \gamma(1 - P_1 - \gamma q_2) - w_2)q_2 - F_2 \\
\text{(14. b)}
\end{align*}$$

Maximising (14.a) and (14.b) determines the equilibrium price charged by $D_1$ and the corresponding output level of $D_2$ respectively.

$$\begin{align*}
p_1^{pq} &= \frac{(1 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma) + 2(1 - \gamma^2)w_1 + \gamma w_2}{4 - 3\gamma^2} \\
q_2^{pq} &= \frac{(2 - \gamma) + \gamma w_1 - 2w_2}{4 - 3\gamma^2}
\end{align*}$$

(15)

Hence, the profit equations in (14) and (15) reduce to

$$\begin{align*}
D\pi_1^{pq} &= (q_1)^2 - F_1 \\
\text{(16. a)}
\end{align*}$$

$$\begin{align*}
D\pi_2^{pq} &= (1 - \gamma^2)(q_2)^2 - F_2 \\
\text{(16. b)}
\end{align*}$$

We derive the per-unit input price and upfront fixed fees by generalised Nash bargaining

$$\begin{align*}
w_1^{pq} &= \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad w_2^{pq} = \frac{\gamma}{2}
\end{align*}$$

and

$$\begin{align*}
F_1^{pq} &= F_2^{pq} = \frac{2\beta - 2\gamma + 2\beta\gamma - \gamma^2}{8(1 + \gamma)^2}
\end{align*}$$

The net equilibrium profits of $D_1$ and $D_2$ are

$$\begin{align*}
D\pi_1^{pq} &= \frac{2 - 2\beta + 2\gamma - 2\beta\gamma + \gamma^2}{8(1 + \gamma)^2} \quad \text{and} \quad D\pi_2^{pq} = \frac{2 - 2\beta + 2\gamma - 2\beta\gamma - \gamma^2}{8(1 + \gamma)^2} \\
\text{(17)}
\end{align*}$$

The equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare are respectively

$$\begin{align*}
CS^{pq} &= \frac{1}{4}\left(\frac{1}{1 + \gamma}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad SW^{pq} = \frac{3}{4}\left(\frac{1}{1 + \gamma}\right)
\end{align*}$$

(18)

### 3.4 ($q-p$) contract

Now consider the case where $D_1$ chooses the quantity contract and $D_2$ chooses the price contract. The maximisation problem of the downstream firms yield
\[
\text{Max } q_1 \quad D\pi_1^{qp} = \pi_1^{qp} - F_1 = (1 - q_1 - \gamma(1 - P_2 - \gamma q_1) - w_1)q_1 - F_1 \quad (19. a)
\]

and,

\[
\text{Max } p_2 \quad D\pi_2^{qp} = \pi_2^{qp} - F_2 = (P_2 - w_2)(1 - P_2 - \gamma q_1) - F_2 \quad (19. b)
\]

Maximising (19.a) and (19.b) and solving the first order conditions give the equilibrium price and quantity of \( D_1 \) and \( D_2 \) respectively.

\[
q_1^{qp} = \frac{(2 - \gamma) - 2w_1 + \gamma w_2}{4 - 3\gamma^2}
\]

\[
p_2^{qp} = \frac{(1 - \gamma)(2 + \gamma) + \gamma w_1 + 2(1 - \gamma^2)w_2}{4 - 3\gamma^2}
\]

Hence, the profit equations in (19) give

\[
D\pi_1^{qp} = (1 - \gamma^2)(q_1)^2 - F_1 \quad (21. a)
\]

\[
D\pi_2^{qp} = (q_2)^2 - F_2 \quad (21. b)
\]

and the following outcomes

\[
w_1^{qp} = \frac{\gamma}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad w_2^{qp} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \right)
\]

\[
F_1^{qp} = F_2^{qp} = \frac{2\beta - 2\gamma + 2\beta \gamma - \gamma^2}{8(1 + \gamma)^2}
\]

The net equilibrium profits of \( D_1 \) and \( D_2 \) are

\[
D\pi_1^{qp} = \frac{2 - 2\beta + 2\gamma - 2\beta \gamma - \gamma^2}{8(1 + \gamma)^2} \quad \text{and} \quad D\pi_2^{qp} = \frac{2 - 2\beta + 2\gamma - 2\beta \gamma + \gamma^2}{8(1 + \gamma)^2} \quad (22)
\]

The equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare are respectively

\[
CS^{qp} = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad SW^{qp} = \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \right) \quad (23)
\]

4. Results

We now analyse the first stage of the game where the downstream firms decide whether to choose price contract or quantity contract. Table 1 summarises the possible strategies of each firm and the realised profit under the respective scenarios.
The closed form solutions of firms' pay-offs under \( \rho = qq, pp, pq, qp \) are reported in equations (7), (12), (17) and (22) respectively. Straightforward calculations give the following.

\[
D\pi_1^{qq} - D\pi_1^{pq} = D\pi_1^{pp} - D\pi_1^{q} = D\pi_2^{qq} - D\pi_2^{pq} = D\pi_2^{pp} - D\pi_2^{q} = -\frac{1}{8} \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \right)^2 < 0
\]

The proposition below is immediate from the above.

**Proposition 1:** Assume that \( \gamma \in (0,1) \), choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for both firms.

The intuition goes as follows. Each final goods producer's profit motive is driven by the amount of input price and upfront fixed fee payable to the upstream agent. First, assume that firm 2 (firm 1) chooses the quantity contract. When \( \beta \) is significantly high, meaning that the input supplier's opportunistic behaviour is more pronounced; firm 1's (firm 2's) output loss following an increase in its own input price is larger under quantity contract than under price contract. Furthermore, the fixed fee being higher under quantity contract \( \nu_i = F_i^{qq} > F_i^{pq} \) (\( F_2^{qq} > F_2^{qp} \)), firm 1 (firm 2) finds it profitable to choose price contract. Next, if firm 2 (firm 1) chooses a price contract firm 1 (firm 2) again prefers a price contract over a quantity contract as the latter generates a greater loss in its own output level and it involves a higher fixed fee; \( F_1^{qp} > F_1^{pp} \) (\( F_2^{pq} > F_2^{pp} \)). Hence, choosing price contract becomes the dominant strategy for both downstream firms. However, when \( \beta \) is significantly small, the input suppliers offer a lump-sum subsidy to the downstream firms (see footnote 3). The opportunistic behaviour being less significant, in this case, the downstream firms only combat the output reducing effect by choosing price contract (as alluded above).

### 5. Conclusion

Allowing a centralised generalised Nash bargaining between the input supplier and the final goods producers, we show the social welfare are the same under Bertrand and Cournot
competition. Our result that adopting price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream duopoly irrespective of the type of the product attracts renewed interest in the bargaining literature.

References


