Planning as a form of enclosure
The ambiguities of nonproductive accumulation in the West Wales countryside

Elaine Forde

Abstract: Enclosure, a historic and contemporary accumulation regime, is part of a global conversation about what resources are, who may use them, and for what purpose. Here, it is suggested that spatial planning extends the practice of enclosure in its approach to land use. This article focuses on Wales's strategy for sustainable development (OPD), which theoretically promotes low-impact developments. Ethnographic research explored how OPD applicants navigate different people and organizations with a stake in the character of land, and how OPD applications are rarely approved. The data reveals a tension between the notions of self-provisioning and planned development, but indicates how activists circumvent and adapt the planning system. This article extends the notion of what counts as accumulation by focusing on the nonproductive value of an unspoiled countryside, a notion central to debates about the production of the countryside as leisure space and the enclosure of nature under global sustainable development regimes.

Keywords: development, enclosure, planning, provisioning, Wales

Planning in the age of enclosure: Preservation, provisioning, and low-impact development

The possibility of enclosure of genetic material and intellectual property has generated renewed interest in the notion of the commons (Harvey 2011). Enclosure is a historic model of accumulation, but is equally relevant to contemporary debates about the preservation of a diverse array of resources. While regimes of primitive accumulation focused on appropriating the means of production in order to consolidate power and fiscal capital, capital accumulation continues in the imperative to secure surplus value (Marx [1867] 1976). The role of planning in capital accumulation has been extensively discussed (Harvey 1993; A. Scott 2007), but less attention has been paid to nonproductive accumulation. I shall argue that the notion of accumulation may conceivably be extended; as spatial planning strategies nominally designate areas of land for either development or preservation, large-scale questions about political economy are raised in local contexts. Planning decisions directly enable the accumulation of fiscal capital, but also increasingly enclose and accumulate values of other sorts.

To better understand how planning may be read as a form of enclosure, specifically in this case in the accumulation of nonproductivist values, this article focuses on low-impact development (LID) in rural Wales. LID is a development model promoting sustainable land use, typically ecobuilding projects in conjunction with land-based provisioning. The Welsh Assembly government supports LIDs under a new policy for sustainable development, One Planet Development, or OPD (WAG 2009, WAG 2010). LID/OPD is defined in policy as development that by its low ecological footprint enhances or does not significantly diminish its environment. LID practitioners differ widely but generally interpret this to mean small-scale, self-built homes comprising natural materials, with on-site provision for electricity, water and waste, and land-based subsistence. In spite of their promotion in policy, LIDs usually fail to gain planning permission; most LIDs I encountered during research were built illicitly, a practice I characterize as autonomous dwelling.[1] The dialogue between LID activists and planners highlights a tension between development and provisioning in terms of land use planning. Narotzky's "provisioning approach" reveals how material, political, and cultural factors of the entire provisioning process (not just separate economic realms) are a product of specific histories (2005: 91). As such, by examining the different power relations that have shaped the planning process for LIDs in West Wales, I hope to reveal the relevance of enclosure as an analytic tool. In this context certain values take precedence over others; accumulation occurs as a matrix of heritage, conservation, and aesthetic values prioritized over production by organizations at different levels of governance, but firmly pitched against the (low-impact) development of the countryside. What emerges is a picture of people adopting alternative, marginal, and illicit dwelling practices, in preference to dealing with a repressive planning regime.

As planning restricts what land may be used for, so it prioritizes certain other qualities. As arbiters of the concept of sustainable development,

planners and planning departments prioritize, preserve, and enclose the resource potential of undeveloped land, whether as biodiverse habitat for offsetting (Hannis and Sullivan 2012) or for carbon sequestering (Dalsgaard 2013). Planning for sustainable development realizes global issues in localities via existing planning structures; enclosure is imagined as an effective strategy to ensure sustainability. Research data shows that planning in West Wales operates in a repressive manner (Yiftachel 1998) vis-à-vis LID proposals; LID practitioners I encountered sought ways to remain undetected and outside of the planning system. Whereas large-scale enclosures are perceived as sustainable, LIDs and provisioning are not typically regarded as such, in spite of new policy. Planning therefore stabilizes the existing social and economic order in rural West Wales, as it preserves a market for land with development potential. To some extent this keeps peripheral farmland out of circulation—without a similarly high market value, farms are preserved intact and people kept in place (Pine 1996: 450); the effect is the preservation of an "unspoiled" quality in the Welsh countryside.

This article is divided into four further sections. The first introduces the region and specific research context: land activists in rural West Wales and the implementation of OPD. I present OPD policy and its forerunner, LID (Policy 52), and contextualize the current research in terms of prior and ongoing planning conflicts over LIDs to illustrate the tensions that OPD/LID policy has highlighted. I discuss how planning has the potential to become repressive, and how LID activism challenges this. The second section presents in greater detail how the tension between development and provisioning has played out in West Wales. I then contextualize enclosure historically, exploring how the same principle of accumulation is pursued today in diverse ways. This section establishes the specific way that the concept of enclosure is mobilized in this article, as a planning strategy. In the final section I argue for several ways in which planning may be read as a form of enclo-

sure. I demonstrate how enclosure is a tool for the management of certain resources, and how this can be part of a preservationist approach to planning.

Research context: Autonomous dwelling(s), land activism, and the land in West Wales

This article is based on ethnographic research in ecovillages and with low-impact dwellers in rural West Wales, conducted between 2010 and 2011, and periodically afterward. West Wales is a rural region characterized by pastoral farming; rich valley bottoms are more readily productive of dairy and perhaps even agricultural crops than rough, barren hilltops more suited to sheep raising (Caplan 2010: 14, 2012: 17) or, more recently, carbon sequestering. Family farming and tourism are central to the region's economy (Hutson 2003). This part of Wales is considered culturally and linguistically distinct (WLB 2008), part of *Y Fro Gymraeg,* the Welsh heartland (Balsom 1985: 6), but has seen a steady rise in in-migration. James (2003) notes that "incomers" are typically English (ibid.: 51), retirees (Robinson 2007: 113), and those who have been referred to as "alternatives" (J. Williams 2003: 153). Regarding rural Brittany—another region imagined as "Celtic"—Maynard (1997) has demonstrated that ethnic and rural identities are mutually reinforcing categories that are imagined as rustic and folkloric, thus appealing to an emerging taste for rusticity among the urban middle classes.

My research supports this portrayal of West Wales; in-migration combined with the relative availability of farmland and an interest in Wales's "Celtic" heritage (Harvey et al. 2002: 2) has seen several land-based ecovillages emerge in the region, typically populated by middle-class adults, generally over thirty years of age, English in origin,[2] and pursuing alternative lifestyles. Types of ecovillage vary; some are concerned with self-sufficiency, some with "low-impact" living. I conducted research with a variety of participants

with differing approaches to low-impact dwelling, from those in formal co-operatives or looser informal groupings to families and individuals. In all cases, people expressed a commitment to provisioning in a direct relationship with what they refer to as *the land*. In this context, *the land* generally consists of peripheral farmland or woodland. The ecovillages I researched are all situated remotely. Some, such as Brithdir Mawr or Tir y Gafel, roughly equate to existing farms. Others, such as Y Mynydd (a pseudonym), were acquired in piecemeal fashion; existing farm holdings have regrouped into different configurations of ownership, occupation, and access rights.

Wales has a particular history of autonomous dwelling. The *Ty Unnos* (one night house, pl. *Tai Unnos*) is popularly imagined as a traditional Welsh right, granted by the medieval king Hywel Dda and never repealed. During fieldwork I heard many times about this idea; a peasant may occupy a dwelling built in one night, as long as a wisp of smoke is seen emerging from the chimney by sunrise. Upon throwing an ax from the doorstep they may claim the land up to the ax's landing place. Although Ward (2002) places *Tai Unnos* squarely in the realm of folklore, it remains a key folk model in West Wales; there are many examples of LIDs in the *Ty Unnos* tradition (most more elaborate and taking longer than a night) that remain hidden from planners.

I note parallels between Victorian land activism in Wales and modern LIDs that demonstrate that autonomous dwelling is an emblematic if peripheral aspect of Welsh culture and folklore. Landholding in Wales must be seen as a product of a specific history: secure tenancies in small holdings kept within families wherever possible, with cultural, not economic, differences between landlord and tenant framed as the key issue. Cragoe (2010) notes that traditionally, Welsh farms tended to be small. A system of partible inheritance meant that by the time of the "parliamentary inclosures" (mid- to late Victorian period), the average holding was 47 acres (ibid.: 94); this makes farms harder to split and remain viable, particularly under the current industrial

agriculture regime. Jenkins's historical ethnography of a Welsh parish at the turn of the nineteenth century indicates that families split holdings so that the younger generation could "start their world" (1971: 140). In more recent years, industrialization and migration has seen the reamalgamation of previously split farms. It is quite often the case that farmhouses are available for sale or to rent, whereas land is not so easily obtained. Even so, research participants perceived land as more available in Wales compared to England. At Tir y Gafel, Pete (from Leeds) discusses the acquisition of land with Craig:

> Pete: I mean, *how* are you supposed to get *land*? (rhetorically)
>
> Craig: The best place to start is to look in the local press.
>
> Pete: No, but I mean, you can't just *buy* land?! It's all owned by families what go back as far as Domesday. … It's all *estates*. At least it is where I'm from.
>
> Craig: Wales. Anyway, you could never get something like OPD in England. It would never happen. It has to be Wales.

It has been the case that small acreages sell for much more per acre than large farms, and it is easier for new purchasers to acquire whole farms rather than small parcels of land. Collective groups are therefore at an advantage over separate households in this regard. In particular, Lammas's approach, as a not-for-profit industrial and provident society that promoted the ecohamlet model, is, as we shall see, most suited to the purchase of land with the intention of splitting into separate, low-impact households and gaining planning permission.

I have portrayed the Lammas group as an activist movement (Lee 2013) in the same tradition as the nineteenth-century Chartists. The Chartists' Land Plan was a scheme to allow lower-class men to run for Parliament, a privilege reserved for landowners. The plan was to settle members on four-acre smallholdings, lo-

cated in a network of colonies throughout the country. From 70,000 subscribers at its peak, 234 were actually settled through the Land Plan (Chase 2010: 57–58). The sort of activism encompassed within Lammas is part of a historical stance against an unproductive countryside and the few people seen to benefit from this. While demonstrating a critique on the relationship between production and consumption, ecohamleting, as represented by Lammas, is also seen as antilandlord and antiownership, and is imagined as culturally Welsh. Lammas's aim is to offer a successful blueprint for other groups to emulate. Lammas activism extends to supporting other groups with their planning cases, such as the Underwood application, discussed below, one of the first applications under the new OPD framework.

Conflict and repression: Professional planning and informal development

Planning in West Wales takes a preservationist rationality, which contains underlying notions about an inherently valuable empty countryside. During research this became apparent as LID applications were evaluated using the same terms as ordinary development. In this section I discuss how planning has become pitched against small-scale independent rural development, and ways in which activists undermine the system. Ward notes that before planning was legislated (1947), or indeed a professionalized activity, it was part of the anarchist movement of the early twentieth century (1976: 117, 136). Pioneers of the movement, such as Patrick Geddes and William Lethaby, advocated strategies that Ward describes as "too simple for people to understand" (ibid.: 101), such as direct actions known as "town-tidying"; such actions differed greatly from the ambitious strategies characteristic of professionalized planning (Abram 2011: 120). Metropolitan improvement and public health legislation of the nineteenth century changed planning's scope to something that "sought to make the crooked places straight, to

iron out the kinks, to eliminate non-conforming users, and in short, to impose geometry upon urban geography" (Ward 1976: 133). In calling for a body of research based on explanatory and substantive planning theory, with a shift of focus from the planner to the interplay of space and society, Yiftachel notes how the discipline of planning has codeveloped with the technologies of the built environment and an increasingly professionalizing academy (2001: 5–7). Murdoch and Abram (2002) consider that this process—a spatialization of planning policy—has begun in earnest; with a clear link to the notion of sustainable development (ibid.: 13), OPD must be seen as part of this emerging planning rationality.

Abram and Weszkalnys acknowledge the "many faces" of planning (2011: 5); certainly the repressive potential of planning (Yiftachel 1998) is borne out in the way that planners in West Wales have dealt with unpermitted autonomous dwelling. Lengthy planning disputes are commonplace. If planners issue an "enforcement notice", autonomous dwellers are expected to either appeal or cease to occupy their dwelling; "noncompliance" risks fines and/ or the mandatory destruction of the dwelling. My research participants in autonomous dwellings opted to remain anonymous; one told me that "if they [planners] don't want you, they don't demolish your home, that would be bad for image. What they do is take you to court, they slap fines on you until you have no option but to sell up; they get you out that way."

This research participant was in the midst of a planning dispute for a discrete off-grid home, a mile from a small village in which a new housing estate was being developed. Although not significantly altering the external appearance of the existing farm building, and using a planning loophole to mount a domestic wind turbine on a moveable trailer, my participant had recently received his second planning enforcement notice; the first had been dismissed on appeal. Yiftachel argues that planning, far from being a benevolent "good thing", is an elite practice serving only specific elite interests; we might extend this notion to the above example by considering the nearby property developer's advantage over my participant. For Yiftachel, "the very same tools ostensibly introduced to assist social reform and improve people's quality of life can be used to control and repress peripheral groups," and "policies of control, especially when based on more subtle and malleable social boundaries (such as class, gender or locality) may face little resistance" (1998: 400, 401). I argue instead that repressive planning in West Wales *is* resisted, though seldom challenged. While Yiftachel argues that the formulation of planning policy is a dialectical process, alternately oppressive and reforming in nature (ibid.: 400), I will show that planning can be both of these things at once with an overview of some LID planning cases, focusing on Lammas.

Examples of planning battles concerning autonomous dwellings in West Wales include a 13-year dispute over a pair of tipis on grazing land and enforcement action against a self-built roundhouse took over ten years to resolve. My research participants report on a cycle of conflicts with planners that tend to be decided in the dwellers' favor, only for planners to resume enforcement action after a hiatus. Protracted planning disputes muddle perceptions about entitlement to dwell somewhere; participants have quoted four, seven, ten, and twelve years as increments for automatic retrospective planning permission. The Holtsfield case serves as a germane illustration of the opacity of laws regarding property, tenancy, and planning. In the late 1990s, residents of Holtsfield, a chalet site in South Wales, were evicted by a new landowner planning to develop the site. Planning permission was refused for the proposed development, but the landowner pursued the evictions. Different courts ruled in favor of both the residents and the landlord; the residents were redefined as tenants, but subsequently the chalets were deemed to be temporary structures, so not tenantable. Presently there is no definitive decision for every Holtsfield resident; however, many are able to stay securely. Though not entirely a planning issue, Holtsfield exemplifies what Yiftachel

calls the "state-space-society nexus" (1998: 396); in other words, the case reveals, in a Foucauldian sense, how technologies of power favor elite groups.

Planning promotes tacit notions of progress, expressed in rules and standards for "proper" dwellings. Underwood provides a good example, as it reveals differences in perception between activists and the state exemplifying how in planning disputes the state retains control over its aims (Abram 1998: 6). Underwood is a woodland-based LID on ten acres consisting of two small families, seven people in total. In the decision on the Underwood OPD application, ideas about what accommodation ought to provide are shown to be markedly different:

[T]he proposed reliance on external sanitary and bathing facilities would mean that residents would at times be exposed to excessive cold, and the provision of facilities for personal hygiene would be inadequate by any reasonable standards. … The proposed straw bale house would also provide inadequate living and sleeping space for a family, and being a single undivided space, would provide inadequate privacy, particularly as adults and children would live and sleep in the same space. It has not been shown that there would be adequate provision for the storage and preparation of food. I therefore do not consider that the proposed accommodation would meet even basic habitable standards.

[T]o meet the essential characteristics of One Planet Development residents may have to live quite differently (much more sustainably) than is the norm in the 21st century.* However, this does not mean that poor quality homes are acceptable … a home is a vital part of people's lives; it affects their health and well-being and their quality of life. Whilst a home within a One Planet Development may be highly unconventional, for the reasons above, I do not consider that the appeal proposal would result in good quality homes that would provide adequate facilities for the health and well being of occupants. (Poulter 2012: 3)[3]

In the case of OPDs, planning and building regulations are intertwined, as in the Underwood case; if an OPD cannot meet building regulations, planning won't approve it. What must be demonstrated, then, is not the need for a proposed development, but the suitability of the proposed mode of dwelling. Tacit assumptions about health and well-being derived from the material conditions of a dwelling underpin the inspectors' response to the proposed dwellings at Underwood.

Research participants, many of whom had already lived in unconventional homes, agreed that official notions of the suitability of dwellings were quite removed from their own ideas. Mitch, from Tir y Gafel, who has successfully planned a low-impact family home, summed this up in the following comment:

The proportion of people in the world who live, or have ever lived, in the sort of homes that planners demand is so minute. The lifestyle they promote, it really is unsustainable. Development shouldn't be about refining the same thing that doesn't work—that's not developing—and we can prove now that it doesn't work. Development actually means doing something different, something better.

Mitch articulates a strong critique on the biases contained within planners' ideas about development, and indicates how planning stops people from determining the form of their own development (e.g., Escobar 1995; Abram 1998: 12–13). In Mitch's view, planning's notions about development are tied to a very narrow concept of progress, a trajectory that he clearly regards as unsustainable. Nevertheless, within the confines of planning rules, participants were able to achieve a modicum of autonomy by adopt-

ing technologies to obscure their dwelling and provisioning activity; once a dwelling is demonstrated to have achieved longevity without complaint, planners must allow it retrospectively. The risk is often more attractive than the bureaucratic approach.

Lammas has exemplified an unusual approach to LID by engaging openly and directly with planning. At the start of fieldwork in 2010 Lammas had just won planning permission for an ecohamlet of nine households on 75 acres in Pembrokeshire. Rather than apply for planning permission retrospectively, this group applied in advance, under Policy 52 of Pembrokeshire County Council's (PCC) Unitary Development Plan 2000–2016 (PCC and PCNPA 2006). Policy 52 permits low-impact development where (among other things):

> v) the proposal requires a countryside location and is tied directly to the land on which it is located, and involves agriculture, forestry or horticulture; and
> vi) the proposal will provide sufficient livelihood for and substantially meet the needs of residents on the site; (ibid.: 66)

To be considered "low-impact", each dwelling must be "zero-carbon" to build and in everyday use, and be "off-grid"—entirely responsible for its own water, power, and waste. Research participants interpreted this by adopting ecobuilding techniques, using materials like straw bales, locally sourced timber, roundwood (not milled), earth plasters, and so forth. Much of this technology was beyond the experience of building inspectors used to standardized, commercial "zero-carbon" materials. Each plot has up to seven acres, from which residents must derive a significant part of their needs. The five-year permission process was not straightforward. Initially refused by the local council, the development was permitted after an inquiry by the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG).

Lammas's direct approach to planning was rare in the research field. Abram notes that participation in development processes usually means

that ideologies must be adapted to the specific structures of planning (1998: 6). In order to obtain planning permission, Lammas created a vast paper trail, which included management and business plans, architects' drawings, and many surveys and statements. Tir y Gafel residents are now locked in to a formal reporting system. In addition to receiving inspections from planning and building officers, residents are required to make annual monitoring reports to prove the efficacy of their business plans. Difficulties in translating ecobuilding practice for building inspections has meant that several residents have been taken to court. This sort of engagement with bureaucracy is anathema to most of my research participants.

Despite this willingness to interact with planners in an officially recognized manner, however, like other low-impact and autonomous dwellers in West Wales, Lammas's permission was refused in the first instance. While planning permission for a low-impact development is possible in theory, in practice, the mainstream adoption of peripheral and alternative dwelling practices has created a new, repressive planning regime that most low-impact or autonomous dwellers are not equipped to deal with. Following Abram (1998: 6), OPD can be viewed as a case of the WAG giving ground on small issues, but retaining overall control over its aims—by February 2015 only two OPD applications had been successful, again involving an initial refusal. OPD represents a spatialization of planning policy, but the fact that OPDs are rarely approved despite government support illustrates Murdoch and Abram's view that planning consists of structures for accommodating either preservationist or developmental rationalities, and is not equipped for policies that address both (2002: 40). This discussion augments Yiftachel's notion of a reforming-oppressing dialectic in planning; in reconfiguring under a sustainable development rationality, planning has produced a repressive bureaucratic system. On the other hand, autonomous low-impact dwellers continue to find ways to circumvent the bureaucracy of planning, simultaneously

mobilizing it to their advantage. LID practice in West Wales demonstrates some ways in which informal dwelling practices underpin and thrive beneath the nexus of formal planning (J. Scott 1998: 310).

Planning and enclosure intertwined in the diminishing history of land-based provisioning

Planning in rural Wales is primarily preservationist, preserving a particular notion of historicity and reinforcing the objectification of the countryside. In this section we shall see further how enclosure and planning have accompanied one another, and how planning for an unproductive landscape is as important as planning for a productive landscape. I shall present a brief history of land enclosures in the UK to illustrate a tension between provisioning on the one hand, and either development or conservation on the other. Since the earliest recorded wave of enclosure, the strategy may be viewed not only as an attack on provisioning, but also a tool for the accumulation of value. This article, which of course is about land use planning, will necessarily focus on the enclosure of land, beginning with the notion of property. If property can be viewed as a bundle of rights (Hann 1998), then I suggest that these rights are distinctly layered, an analogy that translates well to the example of land; even when land in the UK is privately owned, the nominal landowner may not own all the rights. Sporting, wayfaring, and mineral rights may be retained by other parties, as may the right to access for utilities or amenities. The right to occupy land is controlled by planning authorities, which dictate where buildings, especially dwellings, may be placed, effectively another layer of rights.

Different waves of enclosure, planning included, have addressed different layers of land rights. Raymond Williams notes that in tracing the history of enclosure it is easy to adopt the formulaic interpretation of some sort of "fall" from an idyllic rural state into a disharmonious industrial existence (1975: 96). Instead, it is my intention to illustrate how successive waves of enclosure intertwine with the key rationalities of planning (Murdoch and Abram 2002): preservation, development, and now sustainable development. In terms of land and subsistence, the concept of "the commons" is derived from the two thirteenth-century charters, the Magna Carta and Charter of the Forest (Linebaugh 2008: 6), whereas two later thirteenth-century statutes, the Statute of Merton and the Statute of Westminster, began to allow for the enclosure of manorial lands. Dyer (2006) notes that this thirteenth-century enclosure movement was highly contentious, large in scale, and had implications for the emergence of property rights. I therefore take this as a useful starting point for this discussion while acknowledging that enclosure of the commons is a widespread practice with many manifestations, no definitive start, and no foreseeable end point (Rousseau 1973; Harvey 2011).

The earliest recorded enclosures during the early years of Norman rule established the Royal Forest. Not necessarily referring to treescapes, afforestation was a way to preserve the king's hunting and sporting grounds, the prey as well as the habitat that sustained it; this was an early example of using enclosure as a way to preserve natural resources. Subsequent waves of enclosure had a clearer link to economic development. Tudor enclosures, for instance, were connected to the peak of the wool trade; extensive grazing for sheep became a priority to the detriment of everyday provisioning. In the early eighteenth century Malthus politely condemned enclosure, blaming the shortfall in productive land on gentrification—an upper-class penchant for "butcher's meat" and keeping horses for pleasure (1798: XVI.13–14). Enclosure of land peaked during the mid- to late Victorian period as a result of a new set of legislation called Parliamentary Inclosure [sic] Acts; Raymond Williams notes, however, that legislating for enclosure only represents a change of *method* in the long and historic process of accumulation (1975: 96–97). At the end of the

nineteenth century, Kropotkin, commenting on a sparse and unproductive British countryside, lamented the extent of land accumulated by the richest landowners, mostly reserved for leisure pursuits (1912: 44).

In practice, enclosure has meant the separation of people from their means of provision, coupled with gradual industrialization and migration to cities, and on the other hand a process of increasing gentrification based on "primitive accumulation". Perelman notes that the idea of *primitive* accumulation is a misnomer, for the process continues apace today (2000: 25). According to Perelman, the violence inherent in primitive accumulation betrayed the laissez-faire image that theorists of classical political economy had cultivated: "At a time when self-provisioning was a serious barrier to the extension of the capitalist mode of production, classical political economy expressed an unremitting hostility toward conditions that would support the working-class household's ability to provide for itself" (ibid.: 81). The tension between planned production and provisioning is apparent; enclosures, vagrancy laws, and game laws (ibid.: 35) combined to create an available proletariat by the advent of the Industrial Revolution and—crucially—a sparse and unproductive countryside (Kropotkin 1912: 41). Neeson (1996) explains that according to the prevailing opinion, once commoners became dependent, care should be taken to prevent any form of independence. This passage is so remarkable that it is worth quoting in full:

> Even planting new hedgerows required careful thought. Medlars (mespilus germanica), for example, should never be used because "it is bad policy to increase temptations to theft; the idle among the poor are already too prone to depredation, and would still be less inclined to work, if every hedge furnished the means of support." Equally, cottage gardens should in no circumstance be large enough to take the laborer away from wage work. (Rudge 1807: 97, 50, quoted in Neeson 1996: 29)

Here, it is clear that provisioning is opposed to wage work, and it is clear that superficially spatial practices (such as planting hedges) are mediated through the logic of capital accumulation. Planning is no exception, and I shall discuss this further in the fourth section using Harvey's notion of "spatio-temporal fixes."

Productive and nonproductive accumulation: The role of planning as a mediating institution

Planning is a key tool for the accumulation and stabilization of capital; it is an institution that designates how values are geographically distributed, in whose favor, and to what end. Harvey (2004) refers to the practice of manipulating the fixed capital embedded in the built environment as "spatio-temporal fixes," strategies used by governments to address crises of overaccumulation—which would otherwise lead to the devaluation of both capital and labor resources (ibid.: 64–65). Harvey demonstrates how crises in housing markets have been at the core of some of the most catastrophic economic busts in the last 30 years; Harvey's 2004 observation preempts the 2008 market collapse. As a technology of the built environment, planning (for dwellings in particular) is by no means a benign aspect of financial markets; it is clearly linked to accumulation. In Harvey's view, by using geographical expansion to correct crises of overaccumulation, capital produces its own landscapes. Planning policy and frameworks thus mediate this process, and "are productive of, as well as products of, the dynamics of capital accumulation" (ibid.: 70). Planning is reproduced by the very housing market that it produces, by allocating and distributing a wildly differing range of values over the landscape.

It becomes clear that a bureaucratic system at the center of a very powerful market can be off-limits to those in marginal positions. Developers and other built environment professionals are somewhat better placed to interface with the institution of planning than, say, a typical

low-impact dweller; thus, the benefits of this sort of accumulation remain out of reach for all but a very few elite groups (Yiftachel 1998). This is not an entirely new observation; in *Capital,* Marx commented on the tension between provisioning and development, focusing in particular on the market for land, which does not reflect supply and demand. Rather, for Marx, "This 'sufficient price for the land' is nothing but a euphemistic circumlocution for the ransom which the labourer pays to the capitalist for leave to retire from the wage labour market to the land" ([1867] 1976: 939). There is certainly a parallel between the situation regarding LIDs in West Wales and Marx's comments, and planning plays a mediating role. LIDs and autonomous dwellings would not be as controversial if they were proposed for ordinary building plots. Of course, low-impact dwellers looking to make a livelihood from land-based subsistence activities would find most building plots inadequately small, and extensive farms with planning permission are prohibitively expensive. In Marx's terms, most of the people that I encountered who were living in or contemplating low-impact dwelling could not afford the "ransom" for land with the correct permission for dwelling.

Planning is an obstacle for those without the backing of capital as it insists on adherence to certain standards of living and character of the built environment. Low-impact and autonomous dwellers' use of ecobuilding techniques and nonstandard materials challenge this orthodoxy, but the court cases indicate that planning and building regulations are immovable. The Underwood case shows us that underlying this position is a specific sociocultural notion of proper development and a proper lifestyle, something that low-impact dwellers challenge on a moral basis. The morality of development is central to the long-standing tension between development and provisioning and is evident in modern enclosure regimes as a means to manage resources, now under the rubric of "sustainability".

Laura Rival discusses the enclosure of Amazonian rainforest, arguably the most iconic of the worlds' "commons", as Westerners are regularly told that tropical rainforests are the world's lungs. The mandate to conserve such commons takes precedent over any other arguments for its use, even though Rival notes that there is a misperception about what is known as the "pristine" rainforest (2006: S82). Trekking Amazonian groups are in fact revisiting productive fruit and nut groves established by their ancestors. Revisiting these sites is a part of provisioning, and it reproduces society over time (ibid.: S89). Underlying this enclosure regime is a tension between conservation and provisioning; subsistence use is forbidden, which raises the question of who should decide what values to prioritize. Narotzky's approach to provisioning systems emphasizes that chains of provisioning are politically influenced; the powerful are able to "create and institute particular meanings as cultural values that have wide impact" (2005: 81–82). In the case of planning, elites shape the notion of social progress. In the case of preservation planning, local interests (for example, the forest produce that Narotzky and Rival both discuss) are subordinated to a global conservation agenda in spite of evidence that this is not an effective management strategy (Rival 2006). In the example I have discussed, decisions are made by elites about the character of the countryside, acceptable standards for a home and lifestyle, and notions of sustainable practice, all of which differ from the actual low-impact dwelling practiced in West Wales. This differential attribution of meaning serves to discriminate among people based on their consumption habits, further polarizing planners and low-impact dwellers. The notion of a global commons in habitat demonstrates one way in which enclosure works to accumulate nonproductive values. In fact, as the notion of biodiversity offsetting becomes part of planning regimes for sustainable development, a new set of values is attached to areas of landscape. The enclosure of habitat in the name of conservation and biodiversity demonstrates how the logic of accumulation and enclosure as a tool operate even in contexts where capital is not apparent.

I suggest that OPD is primarily an enclosure regime. As part of a policy on sustainable development, OPD answers questions about global environmental issues through domestic household practices. This reinforces the idea that private consumption is a public issue, as in the case of forest products. To develop on *our* countryside, low-impact dwellers must demonstrate compliance with sustainability models (less so, actual sustainability). It is theoretically possible for OPD applications to be approved, but in practice, it proves too difficult for small-scale householders due to differences in approach to the question of what counts as sustainable practice, as in the case of Underwood. What is preserved when an OPD is refused, however, is difficult to evaluate. The idea that agricultural production is only viable at an industrial scale; an artificially empty and nonproductive countryside sustained by farming subsidies; farm holdings kept together with no financial incentive to split; a housing market with prices set artificially high. These consequences of the planning regime in West Wales must be seen as forms of accumulation. The existing sociocultural network is stabilized; moreover, the existing financial order is preserved. As Harvey has explained, this latter point is crucial for a stable economy, and it is in this way that the full extent of planning as a form of enclosure is realized.

Conclusion: Enclosure as a form of planning?

Planning was a pivotal part of research into low-impact dwelling; it was a key reference point for almost every research participant in the construction of activist and subversive identities and the use of certain technologies to conceal dwellings. Many participants had direct encounters with planning, which was constantly revealed as operating in opposition to the way most participants imagined was rational. Indeed, the frequency with which I encountered autonomous dwellers who had opted not to approach planners suggests not just a reluctance to deal with bureaucratic practice, but also the notion that it is somehow impossible to get planning permission for a small-scale, self-built, off-grid dwelling.

The reasons for the difficulty in getting planning permission for any sort of rural development stem from the preservationist rationality behind land use planning in rural Wales. In this way, planning articulates ideas about proper dwelling and dwellings, supports the concentration of people in centers, and keeps peripheral land out of circulation somewhat. This accords with customary patterns of land use and inheritance in Wales, which favor the maintenance of family holdings. Under a preservationist rationality, the values that planning preserves are nonproductive, concerned with aesthetic and cultural features of the landscape. This is certainly made possible by a rural economy based largely on subsidized farming and tourism. Sustainable development is an emergent rubric in planning that seeks to bridge preservationist and developmental rationalities; as my material shows, however, this leads to ambiguities that in turn can lead to lengthy planning disputes.

While modern planning regimes are not conspicuously concerned with capital accumulation, the institution of planning may be said to mediate accumulation. As well as capital accumulation afforded to elite groups by planning's close links to the housing market, I have put forward examples of other sorts of accumulation. The notion of global commons such as rainforests that are enclosed under conservation regimes make a powerful case that nonproductive values can be part of accumulation strategies.

By identifying some of the major themes in policy and, conversely, by outlining some of the problems that losers in the planning system have faced, it is possible to suggest where and how planning regimes benefit certain parties and not others and how this is precisely in line with enclosure as an approach to resource management. Here I have argued that planning encloses one of the most intangible of property rights—the manner in which one may occupy property. Planning encloses this right to all but

the relatively few who have entered and exited the market, or in Marx's terms, paid their ransom.

To that end, it may be useful to ask not just whether planning may be read as a form of enclosure, but how far enclosure is a form of planning. Enclosure is a common management approach to an array of resources that shows no sign of falling away as a strategy. Whether, in the case of rural Wales, OPDs will begin to upset this trend as a new rationality of planning will require a translation of informal low-impact knowledge and practice for the formal structure of professional planning. As the Lammas case has shown, this will require low-impact and autonomous dwellers to break the convention that favors the riskier strategy of illicit autonomous dwelling.

Autonomous dwelling is a marginal but emblematic part of Welsh history, and its examples feed into wider-ranging debates about the tension between development and provisioning. I have suggested that enclosure is a useful lens through which to view this part of the debate, because it is not only development but conservation that challenges land-based provisioning strategies. The example I have discussed in West Wales is one version of a scenario that unfolds in the many diverse contexts where we find enclosure. Planning, when considered as a form of enclosure, must be seen as a way to restrict who may access land and for what purpose, which problematizes the presence of people and their dwellings in the landscape.

Acknowledgments

Elaine Forde is a research student in the Department of Anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London. Her research focuses on West Wales and the interplay of environment, economy, and development planning through the example of alternative "ecocommunities", the practice of "low-impact" dwelling, and the encounter between environmental activists and the state.
Email: anp01ef@gold.ac.uk

Notes

1. "Autonomous" here refers to such dwellings' material autonomy, off-grid and in remote places, as well as the conceptual autonomy of refusing to engage with planning.
2. Not exclusively so.
3. The note in this quote refers the reader to the *One Planet Development practice guidance* (WAG 2012), section 1.10.

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