Opportunities and challenges in institutionalising participatory development: The case of rural Zimbabwe.

Chatiza, Kudzai

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Opportunities and Challenges in Institutionalising Participatory Development: the case of Rural Zimbabwe.

Kudzai Chatiza.

Thesis Submitted for the Degree Scheme of Doctorate in Development Studies.

Swansea University (Wales-UK). Centre for Development Studies. School of Environment and Society.
Dedication

To my wife Edwina and our three daughters (Tariro, Tatenda, and Rutendo) and son (Tinashe) for the immense support and sacrifice during my studies.
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed ..................................... (candidate) Date 3/01/98

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s).

Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

Signed ..................................... (candidate) Date 3/01/98

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Signed ..................................... (candidate) Date 3/01/98

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ABSTRACT

This study explores opportunities and challenges for institutionalising participatory development in rural Zimbabwe and compares them with Zambia’s experiences. It defines participatory development in terms of ordinary people’s relations with the variety of organisations involved in development. The study finds that the main factors facilitating participatory development relate to inter-organisational interactions and the coordination of development activities. The interactions occur in joint and separate institutional spaces as organisations facilitate development. Initiators, regulators and participants of the interactions are many, formal and informal, local and external. Governments influence and participate in the interactions through policy formulation and direct implementation of programme activities but generally under-fund local governance institutions. Such Government involvement strengthens but also distorts local relations. Distortion is increasingly the situation in Zimbabwe. The study also finds that people’s participation constitutes the bottom-up influence needed to make organisational interaction locally meaningful. The crisis in Zimbabwe has put a strain on organisational relations and capabilities to facilitate participatory development. Decentralisation theory does not hold much promise for Zimbabwe considering that there is little left to transfer and governance structures already exist. What remains is for local governance institutions to strengthen horizontal relationships, positively constrain political parties and allow definition and pursuit of development based more on local than external material resources. Such a development ethos does not preclude the importance of external support. In development theory, the thesis’ concerns lie between policy and legislative issues on one hand and participatory appraisal methods and actual development activities on the other. I suggest that this area has been given limited attention despite being the ‘Pandora’s Box’ in participatory development. While primarily based on Zimbabwe with some comparative analysis of Zambian experiences, the conclusions of this thesis are arguably applicable to many situations even where poverty and institutional stress are lower.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I benefited immensely from Villagers and local leaders, District Council and Government officials, Councilors, my research assistants in both Zimbabwe and Zambia, provincial and national local government authorities. Their insights taught me a lot about local governance and development in the two countries. Analyses, conclusions and errors herein are my own. I mention some people here without belittling the help of those I do not mention.

My mentors, Alan R. Thomas (Professor) and Helen Hintjens (PhD) played a major part in shaping my ideas and writing. Words like ‘this is not a consultancy report, you are being too wordy’ and short yet complex questions like ‘what is your thesis?’ rang in my mind throughout a very rewarding and warm relationship. By welcoming me into their Mumbles home for intermittent periods, amounting to eight months, Alan and his wife Marilyn contributed not just to the costs of my studies. Insightful discussions with Centre for Development Studies faculty members, notably Tim J Bowyer, Jeremy Holland and Gerard Clarke were also very useful. My interaction with the Welsh Network of Development Researchers where I presented papers created a platform for shaping my research.

The Ministry of Local Government in Zimbabwe helped in making the study a success. The Permanent Secretary (Mr. Munyoro), his Deputies Mr. Mpingo and Mr. Mukwaira and an Under-Secretary in the Rural Local Authorities section (Mr. L. Kuwanda) provided clearance, information and guidance. In Zambia, the Local Government Association of Zambia and SNV Zambia helpfully arranged relevant contacts and fieldwork in Lusaka, Solwezi and Kasempa for the study. Despite personnel changes in Zimbabwe, I enjoyed Ministry of Local Government support throughout the course of the study for which I am thankful. National contact smoothed sub-national fieldwork in the Manicaland and Mashonaland Provinces where Provincial Administrators, District Administrators (DAs) and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and their teams were very helpful. The DAs of the study Districts (Mrs. Chigidji for Seke/Manyame and Mr. Chivavaya for Mutare) and the CEOs of Mutare (Mr. Chinaka) and Seke/Manyame (Mrs. Guta) were instrumental in
facilitating the study. They were important key informants themselves who provided, arranged participation in relevant events, access to sub-District areas, access to relevant information from technical staff and identified other informants for my study. During my study I had interviews with officials from and programme exposure to NGOs notably CADEC Mutare, Plan International Mutare, Seke Rural Home-Based Care in Seke/Manyame, Women for Change, KEPA Zambia and CCJP in Zambia. This considerably enriched the research experience.

Funding for my studies was mainly from the family ‘piggy bank’ complemented by a James Callaghan scholarship and SNV Zimbabwe. For forgoing a number of things to finance my education and being such an inspiration the whole time, I remain indebted to the four women in my life. SNV Zimbabwe (Eastern Portfolio) and Zambia (North Western Province) specifically Coordinators Corjan van der Jagt, Jonathan Kagoro and Rik Overmars in Zimbabwe and Sibongile Mauye in Zambia supported my studies in many ways. Staff in these two Portfolios and more indirectly those from other SNV teams also contributed to my study through lively exchanges. I consulted to a number of organisations before and during my doctoral research. These interfaces shaped my thoughts and the passion for the research subject.

I am sincerely humbled by my multiple-experiences over the life of this work.

Thank you to all.

Kudzai Chatiza.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB;</td>
<td>African Development Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC;</td>
<td>Area Development Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARDCZ;</td>
<td>Association of Rural District Councils of Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREX;</td>
<td>Agricultural Research and Extension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADEC;</td>
<td>Catholic Development Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPFIRE;</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP;</td>
<td>Community Action Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBCC;</td>
<td>Capacity Building Coordinating Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF;</td>
<td>Constituency Development Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIA;</td>
<td>Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO;</td>
<td>Central Statistical Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWAC;</td>
<td>Community Welfare Assistance Committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZI;</td>
<td>Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDF;</td>
<td>District Development Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDP;</td>
<td>Dairy Development Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC/A;</td>
<td>District Commissioner/Administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI;</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID;</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP;</td>
<td>Department of Physical Planning (Zimbabwe).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPPH;</td>
<td>Department of Physical Planning and Housing (Zambia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU;</td>
<td>European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FODEP;</td>
<td>Forum for Democracy and Peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRZ;</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS;</td>
<td>Institute of Development Studies (Sussex University, UK).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO;</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation (UN organisation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[I]NGOs;</td>
<td>[International] Non-Governmental Organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRWSS;</td>
<td>Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZF;</td>
<td>Kepa Zambia Foundation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGAZ;</td>
<td>Local Government Association of Zambia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMD;</td>
<td>Movement for Multi-party Democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP;</td>
<td>Member of Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD;</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD;</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASS;</td>
<td>Poverty Assessment Study Survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC/RDDC;</td>
<td>Provincial Development Committee/Rural District Development Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/DDCC;</td>
<td>Provincial/District Development Coordinating Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDSP;</td>
<td>Pilot District Support Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLGH;</td>
<td>Provincial Local Government and Housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLGO;</td>
<td>Provincial Local Government Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA;</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIP;</td>
<td>Public Sector Investment Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCDF/RDF;</td>
<td>Rural Capital Development Fund/Rural Development Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCDCBP;</td>
<td><strong>Rural District Council</strong> Capacity Building Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPOA;</td>
<td>Research on Poverty Alleviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFIRE;</td>
<td>Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPES;</td>
<td>Southern African Political Economy Series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDAP;</td>
<td>South East Dry Areas Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOGs;</td>
<td>Safe Motherhood Groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCDF;</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP;</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECA;</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Habitat;</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRISD;</td>
<td>United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIP;</td>
<td>United National Independence Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/VIDCO;</td>
<td>Ward/Village Development Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMCA;</td>
<td>Young Males Christian Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMSIF;</td>
<td>Zambia Social Investment Fund.</td>
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The thesis is divided into two Parts. Part 1 has four Chapters (1 to 4) and the second has three (Chapters 5 to 7). As the Part that combines all Chapters through the methodology, Part 1 therefore lays out the key themes, literature discussion, conceptual framework and the methodology. Part two presents the findings and concludes the thesis with a discussion.

Chapter 1 is an overview of the study. It introduces the main themes, research problem, question and the case study countries. Chapter 2 discusses literature and explores key arguments on participation, participatory development and decentralisation. It discusses in part the question of whether ‘real’ participation occurs in popular organisations, decentralised structures, is based on stakeholder institutions or different shades of all these. This discussion extends aspects of the research question summarised in Chapter 1 providing a base for further elaboration of the research problem in Chapter 3.

Chapter (3) restates the research problem and presents the conceptual framework for the study. In a way, it (Chapter 3) bridges the literature chapter (2) and the methodology chapter (4), synthesizes the debate, explains the broad study approach and identifies key institutions critical in facilitating participation. Chapter 4 presents the methodology, methods, research sites, the general fieldwork experiences and issues posed by the methodology and methods.
CHAPTER 1: INSTITUTIONALISING PARTICIPATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1. Introduction

This thesis concerns the institutionalisation of participation in rural development. In the thesis, I define participation as the taking of meaningful and voluntary action in development spaces, structures and processes. Participation can be direct, through local organisations, stakeholder institutions or through elected, appointed and/or traditional, religious and other categories of representatives. Where pursued through the latter, the representatives have to have some form of contact with those they represent. I return to this in Chapter 2 but suffice to emphasize that the thesis is not about which form or channel of participation is better than the other. My focus is on how participation occurs and the role organisational interaction plays in initiating and sustaining it. Development (the improvement of life conditions) does not have a straightforward relationship with participation. However, as discussed in Chapter 2 and from a normative perspective, participation is desirable for development to occur (see African Charter 1990).

The study is about opportunities and challenges for institutionalising participation in rural Zimbabwe. The study did a comparative analysis of Zambia to broaden the evidence base for the discussion. Zimbabwe is in a deepening socio-economic and political crisis since 2000. I return to the causes and manifestations of the crisis briefly in sections 1.5 and 1.8 but suffice to observe that studying Zimbabwe has presented theoretical and practical challenges. In theory, questions about the generalisability of the findings and conclusions were critical. I adopted two viewpoints. First, was that Zimbabwe’s crisis is not unique. Other countries have had similar or worse crises. Crises per se do not render studies inadmissible. Secondly, Zimbabwe’s crisis presents exciting aspects regarding participation and organisational interaction. Some procedures, structures and organisational relations are changing irretrievably, which is critical for institutionalising participation or doing development generally. The study captures some of these for use in building development theory. I have not naively assumed away that I was studying and living in a country in crisis.
but have embraced this reality. This realization explains the inclusion of Zambia as a comparator.

The study analyses rural development institutions and processes as provided for by the laws of the two countries and in terms of practical experiences. Rural District Councils and other development organisations involved in planning and managing rural development activities and the communities they serve (in doing development) were key sources of the data used in the discussion. I see the doing of development in two ways. One is social mobilization organised through social and political structures, processes or organisations. The other is actual generation and distribution of benefits. Social mobilization and generation of benefits are not mutually exclusive. Development occurs (is done) in particular physical and social spaces with determinate or physical but also fuzzy or socio-economic boundaries. Absence or presence of some development organisations in an area affects doing development in form and process because of the relations that emerge between and amongst development organisations on the one hand and with people on the other.

I define institutionalising participation as the taking of formal and informal actions to ensure that ordinary people have access to or control structures and processes affecting their lives. As process and experience, it has a long history within and outside government (Thompson 1995; Krishna et al 1997; Uphoff et al 1998). Participation can be (externally) facilitated or (internally) directly accessed. Facilitators of participation include Councilors, NGOs, government staff, local leaders and various types of local champions, socio-economic and political groupings (see Krishna et al 1997; Uphoff et al 1998). Support for and criticism of participatory methods, like with decentralisation arises from diverse intentions, imperatives and agendas (see Conyers 2003; Cooke and Kothari 2001). Before discussing the history

---

2 Persons, families and communities not in positions of authority.
3 In Zimbabwe and Zambia structures include Committees, Task Forces and other sub-components of an organisation through which they function. A structure can therefore be part of one organisation or may have multi-organisational membership. This is the sense in which the concept is mainly used more than in terms of the sociological notion as defined by Giddens (1984), see section 1.3.
of participation, I connect with the issue of organisational interaction as the central theme of the thesis.

Interactions amongst development organisations and between them and communities occur in spaces and structures created through policy frameworks and programmes. Analyzing policy intentions and practical outcomes of participation often exposes the dominance of externally over locally defined agendas or spaces (see Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Chambers 1983; Ayittey 2005; Krishna et al 1997; Cooke and Kothari 2001). Power differentials are critical in defining problems, implementing solutions and sustaining actions (see Haidari and White 2001; Nelson and Wright 1997; Green 2002; Hammar 2003; Francis and James 2003). However, as people participate in external organisations' interventions they also live their lives and exercise agency (see Mercer 2002; Essof 2005; Ayittey 2005; Green 2000; 2002; Kamete 2002; Mapedza and Mandondo 2002; Hintjens 2000; Mbembe 2001). External development organisations thus equally participate in local processes. This two-way interface transforms ways of thinking and doing development.

I argue in this study that inter-organisational relationships and the interaction between ordinary people and development organisations are critical in defining and furthering participation. Further, I note that local spaces and institutions tend to be oriented more up and out than in for resources to address challenges or to seize opportunities. The looking up and out reinforces weaknesses amongst local institutions. Limited strategic support from national institutions compounds the situation discussed above (see Mukamuri et al 2003; Mbaku 2004; Engberg-Pedersen 1997; Calderisi 2006; Ayittey 2005). Inter-organisational friction and friction between development organisations and communities is often externally-promp ted. The thesis further explores these issues in later Chapters. I however need to highlight that there are considerable opportunities for strengthening historical traditions of locally-anchored participatory processes in both Zimbabwe and Zambia. This may perhaps be true of other countries with comparable rural socio-economic and governance architectures. The findings and conclusions of the study are to a degree applicable to countries other than crisis ones like Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s crisis has acted more to deepen the severity of factors stressing local institutions than to make these same factors peculiar to it.
In this Chapter, I present the focus of the study in the sections that follow. The starting point is laying out the different histories and trajectories of participation, followed by a discussion of the theoretical frameworks used in approaching the study i.e. participation and decentralisation. These theories are further elaborated on in Chapter 2. The focus and evolution of the study, the contours of the Research Question and the methodological approach are also discussed in this introductory Chapter before I introduce the case study countries.

1.2. Contested histories and trajectories of participation

Different development approaches use participation as a basis for locally meaningful action (see Uphoff 1996; Krishna et al 1997; Uphoff et al 1998; Chambers 1983; Tilakaratna 1987; Nyoni 1987; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Eversole 2003; Green 2002). Participation has been used in community development, colonial Indirect Rule and post-colonial development administration (see Turner and Hulme 1997), and has underpinned populist development approaches (see Brand 1991; Makombe 1993; Makumbe 1996; 1998). It is seen as emancipatory and an anchor for social capital and participatory governance (see Houtzager et al 2003; Gaventa 2005; Cornwall 2002). In theory and practice, participation is malleable. Some commentators argue that this malleability is a sign of strength rather than weakness. I do not downplay the ‘tyranny thesis’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001), the abuses of participation and the ‘myth of community’ (Guijt and Shah 1998) but seek to highlight the opportunities and controversies associated with the concept in practice especially in Zimbabwe.

Participation gained an amplified impetus in the 1980s although it has a longer history (Eyben and Ladbury 1997; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Widespread agreement on the failure of top-down approaches and disillusionment with development in most of the South particularly towards and after attainment of political independence are some of the factors explaining the rising appeal of participation (Olowu 1990; 2001; Enemuo 2000) especially within the framework of decentralisation policies (Ndegwa 2002; Ndegwa and Levy 2003; Conyers 2003; 2007). The fight for Zimbabwe’s independence especially from the late 1960s saw significant mobilisation of ordinary people.

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4 From 1893 throughout most of the 20th century upto 1980 notable uprisings and low-key resistance towards the colonial authorities in Zimbabwe were witnessed. The most protracted phase of the struggle for independence was however from the late 1960s.
people including women and youths. Articulation of the causes for the struggle and promises\(^5\) made regarding the post-independence nation state motivated people to participate in the liberation struggle. In the process people formed expectations which have had an enduring effect on their perception of the state and what it can (or should) do for and with them. Zimbabweans also attained socio-political, organisational and economic skills at the grassroots level. The liberation movements and processes therefore made participation in all fundamental facets of people’s life an important goal (see Kriger 1992). The process of attaining independence thus shaped people’s views of participation and the different actors critical for the development process.

The shift, especially by non-governmental development organisations (including NGOs\(^6\), church-related welfare organisations etc) from welfarist approaches towards self-sufficiency and empowerment explain the increased interest in participation (see Nyoni 1987; Korten; 1987). Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) policies/programmes in the 1980s and 1990s also gave further impetus to the use of participatory approaches. ESAP in Zimbabwe started in 1991 and was characterised by significant ‘state-roll-back’ and tightening of social spending (see Abrahamsen 2000; Mukamuri et al 2003; Nyangoro 1999; Bernstein 2007). ESAP policy options placed a premium on self-sufficiency and community efforts to compensate for the withdrawal of state subsidies in education, health, agriculture and other basic services (see Davies and Rattso 2000; GRZ 1991; 1998). Cost-sharing and co-production of services became important modes of participation. Worker participation was also enhanced alongside the liberalisation of labour laws at a time when companies were downsizing through, mainly, worker retrenchments. This contributed to the growth in civil society activity in the form of labour unions (active in collective bargaining

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\(^5\) In Zimbabwe these included rights to health, education, housing, employment, the vote, access to state machinery and resources hitherto the preserve of a (white) minority, land and a generally egalitarian society.

\(^6\) These are organisations not formed or directly controlled (but regulated) by government, not private sector-owned or run. They operate beyond and are not formed by a single community. NGOs are not community groups and while they work with other organisations (public, private and community structures) they maintain operational independence from but are strategically influenced by these other organisations. NGOs secure resources for their work from within but mainly outside the communities and countries they serve or work in, they can be membership or non-membership based, they do not focus on making profit although some run commercial activities usually to raise funds for their activities. The activities done by NGOs are often complex and include both social mobilization and delivery of actual services (health, water and sanitation etc). The delivery methods vary from but borrow significantly from both the private and public sector. In Zimbabwe NGOs are registered as private-voluntary organisations (which defines what they are perceived legally as) and in Zambia they register as Societies.
processes, worker buy-out of struggling companies etc) and statutory community-based organisations (Health, Water, Neighborhood and School Committees) through which communities took part in the management of services hitherto exclusively managed by the state. As Anheier (2004) notes partnerships between the state and non-profit organisations, in developed countries, became the locus of increased civil society activity within the framework of new public administration. Some of these ideas found their way into adjusting countries particularly where public sector reforms were an important component of the reform package (see Therkildsen 2001; Makumbe 1998).

A number of studies have been undertaken on participation in practice (see Uphoff 1996, Uphoff et al 1998; Krishna et al 1997; Green 2000; Haidari and Wright 2001; Mercer 2002; Jackson 1997) as well as theoretical engagement with the subject (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004, Cornwall 2000; 2002; Chambers 1983; 1989; 1997). Some of the studies have focused on the policy and legislative frameworks for participation (Makumbe 1998; McGee et al 2003; Blackburn and De Toma 1998; Lisk 1985; Majeres 1985; Chambers 1989). Others have looked at recognized successes in applying participatory approaches (Krishna et al 197; Uphoff et al 1998). Robert Chambers and others have been associated with tracing the genealogy of participation, developing and popularizing tools that enable ordinary people to take greater charge of knowledge generation, analysis and decision-making i.e. entrenchment of people’s participation in development planning and management (see Brock and Pettit 2007; Chambers 1994a).

Synergies between participation and decentralisation have also been explored (see Conyers 2003; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991; Brand 1991), for instance in the light of the changing role of the state (see Abrahamsen 2000; Bernstein 2007; Tendler 1997), the relationships between local government and non-state actors (Krishna 2003) and in relation to the democratization of development (see African Charter 1990; Clark 1991; Fisher 1998; Staudt 1991). Co-governance (Ackerman 2004), i.e. the participation of social actors in core state activities, extended the range of practical applications of the concept of participation, among others. Issues of managing and negotiating relationships, interests, goals and outcomes have been cited as constraints to the transformation of the existing development paradigm to a more democratic one.
The role of NGOs in developing, applying and perhaps popularizing participatory approaches has been highlighted (Eyben and Ladbury 1997; World Bank 1994; Nyangoro 1999) alongside other mechanisms and organisations for improving participation like the localization of Millennium Development Goals (see UNDP 2003). I return to these in Chapter 2 and expand on them in Chapters 5 and 6.

The above perspectives of participation are not mutually exclusive. They provide different insights or guidelines for institutionalising participation. Analyses informed by the different perspectives illuminate comparative advantages of different approaches and the promoting organisations. Belief in any one of them as a starting point or best strategy has informed policy options at different times and in different countries. For instance, the diminishing role of the central state under neo-liberal approaches (Abrahamsen 2000; Bernstein 2007) has seen the ascendancy of decentralisation strategies as well as the programme visibility of NGOs (see Moyo et al 2000; Mungate 1993; Anheier 2004). I acknowledge the different perspectives above particularly the shifts in the currency of the ideas. For instance the role of the developmental state or a ‘working state system’ (Ayittey 2005) is regaining currency (see also Booth 2003; Gasper 2002; Fritz and Menocal 2007; Abrahamsen 2000). That said, in this study I juxtapose participation and decentralisation since state established structures and non-state actions are important in institutionalising participation.

1.3. Theoretical context of the study and key concepts

The study draws on participation and decentralisation literature. These two are presented as being about structures and power distribution in relation to planning and managing development. While decentralisation and participation may enable empowerment of the poor, they are not fool-proof or ‘fail-safe’ frameworks to this end, let alone for development generally. The two are used as critical lenses through which institutional arrangements for development are viewed and analyzed. In other words, participation and decentralisation are not of concern in this study in themselves but as filters for discussing and understanding the governance of local development and the importance of inter-organisational relations.
In undertaking this study, key concepts applied relate to structures, agencies/actors and the processes through which development is planned and implemented. Such a conceptualisation relates to Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration (see Bentzon et al 1998). Structures (committees, organisations, laws, plans, programmes, terms of reference etc) enable or constrain organisational activities internally and in working with other organisations on the one hand and in terms of working with communities when they think and do development on the other (see Chapter 5). However, development organisations and ordinary people are not passive agents. They act within, to influence or resist structures. As Bentzon et al (1998) put it ‘social and legal change takes place through interaction between human beings...not some abstract medium such as the law’ (1998:101). In their exhortation of lived experiences and legal pluralism, Bentzon et al (1998) dichotomize local/internal and external influences to interaction. In this thesis intra and inter-organisational structures as further elaborated in Chapter 3, constitute the areas where change occurs. Using Eade and Williams’ (1995:9) definition of participation as ‘...the process of transforming lives and transforming society’ the thesis argues that the transformation results from interactions enabled or constrained by developmental structures.

Agency refers to capacity to act often within existing structures but also as part of changing same (see Giddens 1984; Bentzon et al 1998). In Chapter 3, I refer to streams and stores of influence, which depict this usage of the concept of agency. However, development organisations are often referred to as agencies perhaps in recognition of the fact that they act (in thinking and doing development) and their actions are largely defined by existing structures. To avoid confusion I use the term agency mainly to refer to capacity to act (see Chapter 6) rather than to organisations.

Another concept used in the thesis is that of civil society. Civil society organisations (CSOs), like NGOs, have a contested distinctiveness from say the state and private sector (see Tandon and Mohanty 2003) and the three ‘interpenetrate’ (Raftopoulos and Sachikonye 2001). CSOs cover the broad range of associational life and encompass cultural, economic, social and political associations, institutions and relations outside the state (Abrahamsen 2000). For Anheier (2004) CSOs are located between state-led and market led development paradigms focusing on expressions of democracy, citizenship, individual freedom, social participation and responsibility.
The re-discovery of the concept of civil society is seen as coinciding with the increasing importance of non-profit provision of health, social, educational and cultural services (Ibid). In Africa civil society rebirth and renewal is seen as a 1990s phenomenon (Nyangoro 1999) particularly as the post-colonial state experienced legitimacy challenges and weakening authority alongside its inability to provide enough social and economic services (Dixon 2002; see also CPIA 2005; Hall 1995).

I use civil society to include NGOs (but not donors), voluntary socio-economic clubs or associations and groups, solidarity networks, faith-based groups/organisations, membership networks, professional bodies, social movements (students, women), labour bodies and farmers' unions, various political formations and employers' groupings. CSOs form around and articulate specific interests (e.g. land movements) on which they lobby others to recognize and respect. In Zimbabwe, organisations that are defined (or define themselves) as CSOs include registered and unregistered entities. For those registered, the registration is through different ways. Trusts are registered at the High Court while NGOs are registered by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Public Service and still others are registered by other arms of Government. Civil society in its broader sense is less active in development structures than local and international NGOs. Hall (1995) for instance, questions NGOs’ record of alliance building arguing that supporting them does not lead to civil society strengthening. However, it cannot be denied that NGOs are the ones most visible and active in development. As such, the thesis proceeds by making regular reference to NGOs using the term non-governmental development organisations. Smaller sub-District organizations are referred to in the thesis either as community-based organizations (CBOs) or local groups to avoid confusing CSOs with NGOs.

1.4. Focus and evolution of the study

The dynamics of inter-organisational interaction in thinking and doing development are critical to participation. These dynamics are influenced by structures and policies and in turn, relationships influence these same structures and policies in ways that are important in institutionalising participation. In my view, participation becomes about building and living relations, which resonates with Eade and Williams' (1995) transformation of lives and societies. How the living and building of relations is done
and why it is important to the study is detailed in Chapter 3. Critical though is that the living and building of relations is a dynamic process.

The research focus is informed by a metaphorical cul-de-sac concerning whether the state should take a lead in development (Fritz and Menocal 2007; Chambers 1989; Berner and Phillips 2005; Nyangoro 1999), particularly in Africa where the state is considered to be in crisis (see Vaughan 2005; Zack-Williams et al 2002; Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006). Such a debate on leadership of development has greater pertinence when NGO (or non-state) prominence is seen as a panacea as can be gleaned from the work of some analysts (see Staudt 1991; Fisher 1998; Krishna et al 1998; Bernstein 2007). The 1980s saw a growing perception that governments were an obstacle to development, debarred ordinary people from political or economic participation and constituted a corrupt structure of power (Enemuo 2000, Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006; Mbaku 2004; Dixon 2002; Ndegwa 2002). Ayittey (2005) for instances characterises the modern African state as presided over by ‘...the vampire parasitic elite minority’ (2005:21) In many ways this was tied in with movement away from state to market-led development (see Abrahamsen 2000). The fright brought upon the state through proposals of multiple power centers particularly emphasizing civil society growth (see Nyangoro 1999; Abrahamsen 2000; Dixon 2002) often makes state and non-state relations unhealthy. From the year 2000 Zimbabwe went through such a frightening experience, which has polarized society.

The idea of a strong government that enables, provides and protects even when it expands is gaining currency (Ayittey 2005; Fritz and Menocal 2007). Arguments that aid for poverty reduction chronically undermines its conditions for success by weakening governmental capacities are getting louder (see Booth 2003; Moss et al 2006). Other analysts caution against favoring anti-government local institutions (see Ribot 2001) e.g. in terms of channeling aid (EU 2007). They note that this may undermine good and accountable governance systems and thus unsustainable in the long run. The realization that there are some problems that are too big for any institution except government is also influencing policy and institutional development (see Chambers 1989; Annis 1987). In short, emerging from the metaphorical cul-de-sac presents challenges for state and non-state mutuality considering that there have always been questions about the effectiveness and sustainability of non-state
development organisations’ programmes particularly in the South where their support is mainly from external sources (see Moyo et al 2000, Mararike 1995; Eyben and Ladbury 1997; Nyoni 1987). Institutional mutuality does not come naturally even where beneficial for participation, and potentially for both sides. The relationship between government and non-governmental development organisations in most developing countries is often tenuous (Nyangoro 1999; Tandon and Mohanty 2003; Dixon 2002; Pankhurst 2002; Bangura 1999; Mungate 1993; Berner and Phillips 2005). This study analyzed the mechanisms for the transfer (or blocking) of participatory cultures between organisations. Chapters 3, 5 and 6 illuminate prospects for while engaging with constraints to institutional mutuality.

I initially viewed the Zimbabwean rural institutional environment as complex and having too many organisations. From planning to implementation, different types and levels of government interact and overlap on their own and with other actors and the community. Over-populated and complex, I generally viewed the terrain as unwieldy and often misaligned in comparison to a much less complex urban governance\(^7\) terrain. This view remains strong and is corroborated by some literature on Zimbabwe (see Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991; GRZ 1994a; Mararike 1995; Makumbe 2001; Gasper 1997), which points to perennial local governance challenges. Having worked for twelve years in and with the NGO sector, I observed limited engagement with the role of NGOs, in spite of their growing importance i.e. programmatic and numerical visibility. In this vein, the research proceeded as an exploration of mechanisms for ‘thinning’ the rural institutional maze. Although the study has challenged the ‘thinning quick fix’, a concern with finding ways to deal with

\(^7\) Urban Councils generally enjoyed relative autonomy and capacity to deliver (Makumbe 2001) as central government did not have as much presence through line Ministries and Departments as in Rural District Council areas. However the situation has changed in recent years. This is seen partly as Government’s response to the upsurge in opposition-controlled Urban Councils. The establishment of Metropolitan Provinces (Harare and Bulawayo) with Provincial Governors and Administrators, Central Government’s increasing exertion of control through assigning service delivery responsibilities to Parastatals (Water), dissolution of Councils (Harare and Mutare) and instituting much closer supervision reflects the changing urban governance situation. Urban Councils and residents have resisted e.g. Mutare City Council refused to allow a Government employee to sit on its Executive Committee as directed by the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development (*The Manica Post*, 8-14 July 2005) although Government eventually prevailed through dissolving Council. In Harare, the Combined Harare Residents Association has taken Government to Court on several occasions on civic matters including seeking Council reinstatement (dissolved in 2003). Bulawayo City Council remains adamant (September 2007) that its water and sewerage functions cannot be taken over by the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) a Parastatal.
institutional clutter or what I call avoidable duplication, building capacities and the unwieldy maze of overlapping jurisdictions has remained. What has also emerged as more critical are issues of inter-organisational relations.

In some cases, organisations seem to be able to work well together. However, this seems more the exception than the norm in Zimbabwe. A number of development organisations working in agricultural development in Zimbabwe developed the motto ‘we all serve the same farmer’. The premise of the motto is organisational collaboration to ensure that the farmer’s needs are met in a coordinated manner. There is little emphasis on farmers’ determination of how development organisations work with them. Other cases of inter-organisational co-operation include collaboration amongst NGOs and with local authorities on HIV and AIDS issues. Though such collaborative work is limited, it suggests important lessons. This study explored whether such experiences are being extended in the two countries i.e. promoting partnerships amongst development organisations.

1.5. Importance of studying Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has a land area of about 39 million hectares in five agro-ecological regions (see Maps in Chapter 4). Regions 4 and 5 constitute about 64.5% of the country, have the least potential for intensive agro-based livelihoods because of limited rainfall, poor, and generally overworked soils. These regions however hold much of Zimbabwe’s rural population by virtue of being the areas where colonial administrators created reserves (tribal trust land areas) to which Africans were resettled to give way to commercial agriculture and other socio-economic activities conducted in European areas. Regions 1 to 3 have better natural factors to support intensive agro-based livelihoods and until 2000 constituted the heart of the commercial farmland in the hands of largely white farmers. The main land categories

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8 Like other countries Zimbabwe has a National AIDS Council (NAC) that coordinates the national AIDS response. NAC manages the National AIDS Trust Fund as well as other funds channelled through it e.g. from the Global Fund for Malaria, TB and AIDS. Its structures include Provincial, District, Ward and Village AIDS Action Committees. District AIDS Action Committees were mostly based at Rural District and Urban Council offices and in some Provinces Council Executives chaired the committees allowing AIDS Service Organisations (NGOs, CBOs etc) to directly interface with Council and other players. Recent changes (late 2006) to make the Committees more independent of Councils are yet to be fully institutionalized and it is therefore difficult to ascertain whether and how they will affect the management of the HIV and AIDS responses.
in Zimbabwe are commercial farming areas (large/small-scale), resettlement areas (pre/post 2000 generally referred to as old and new respectively) and communal areas.

The persistence and depth of poverty in Zimbabwe has been associated with semi-arid areas that are remote from urban economic nodes and with limited geographic/natural capital (Bird and Shepherd 2003). The institutional structures for planning and managing development in the main land categories noted above differ but since 2000, Government has extended the jurisdiction of traditional leaders, hitherto only present in communal areas to resettlement areas, both old and new. Communal areas have generally experienced socio-political marginalization (Ibid) and as such have the highest concentration of poor households. Poverty has increased in Zimbabwe in recent years across the rural and urban divide. The proportion of households below the Food Poverty Line (very poor) increased from 29% in 1995\(^9\) to 58% in 2003 while those below the Total Consumption Poverty Line (very poor and poor) increased from 42% to 63% in the same period (GRZ 2003c). Although poverty remains higher in rural areas the rate of increase has been higher in urban than rural areas. The number of households below the total consumption poverty line (TCPL) in urban areas increased by 65% compared to 42% in rural areas between 1995 and 2003 (Ibid). Land occupations since 2000 triggered changes mainly in large-scale commercial farming areas and the ongoing economic and political challenges faced in the country have increasingly become important in explaining the causes and distribution of poverty in Zimbabwe than agro-ecological factors.

The current crisis that Zimbabwe is facing is complex. Government has generally accepted its existence since about 2003 (GRZ 2002a) where its budget presentation for the year 2003 touched on economic shrinkage, agricultural underperformance (Ibid) and de-industrialization (see Pankhurst 2002; Carmody and Taylor 2003). What has however not been publicly agreed are the causes. In this section, I share my perspective on the crisis. A series of events and policy choices since the mid to late 1990s collectively contributed to the crisis. I cite here the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), compensation for War Veterans\(^{10}\), participation in the

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\(^9\) This is the year the first Poverty Assessment Analysis Study (PASS 1) was undertaken.

\(^{10}\) This refers to the men and women who were combatants during Zimbabwe’s 1960s and 1970s war of liberation, originally estimated to be about 50 000 (figure used at the time the compensation perks were
war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (see Carmody and Taylor 2003; Bond and Manyanya 2003; Pankhurst 2003; Davies and Rattso 2000) and the handling of the land question.

Regarding ESAP, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported structural reforms met with limited success. The first ESAP phase between 1991 and 1995 missed key targets in part because of the 1991-2 drought and policy inconsistencies. Some analysts (CPIA 2005; Bond and Manyanya 2003; Davies and Rattso 2000) note that policy inconsistencies were always in existence since independence and ‘...the system of economic governance has been marred by a number of flaws...policies adopted from independence to present failed to achieve expected results’ (CPIA 2005:139). For Davies and Rattso (2000) one hallmark of such policy inconsistencies was what they call ‘fiscal populism’ defined as budget-based poverty reduction measures, which are susceptible to reversal if macro-economic instability sets in. ESAP’s attempts to address the policy or structural challenges in the economy did not yield much (see Davies and Rattso 2000; Bond and Manyanya 2003). The economy shrunk discernibly, workers lost employment and social services (education and health) became increasingly inaccessible as government subsidies were removed. Poverty levels started rising (Bond and Manyanya 2003). The reasons why ESAP failed vary. For instance, Pankhurst (2002) argues that World Bank measures were too harsh to be productive while Carmody and Taylor (2003) blame ESAP’s own design weaknesses citing for instance the autonomous growth of the trade and financial sectors in ways detrimental to production. The movement from state-based planning and control to a market-based economy was therefore unable to address the fundamental weaknesses of Zimbabwe’s economy. Subsequent phases of socio-economic transformation from 1996 proceeded without WB, IMF and other donor support, which saw Zimbabwe’s balance of payments position worsening (Bond and Manyanya 2003). In recent times direct state control of the economy including through ‘operations’ like Sunrise (currency change-over), Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle (housing), agricultural mechanisation and the army-led distributed). However some ruling party activists, ordinary members and people who were non-combatants increasingly assume the identity of War Veteran making it more of a movement than a direct reference to the combatant identity. Establishment of actual numbers and identity has become difficult. Non-combatants who were involved in the struggle belong to War Collaborators, Ex-Detainees and Ex-Restrictees. The latter two were banned from Zimbabwe and stayed in refugee camps and other areas outside the country.
operation Maguta/Inala (food security), among others, reflect reintroduction of controls and state-led planning and management of development processes that ESAP sought to reduce.

As the economy declined the population became restive, which some analysts link to the growth of civil society (CPIA 2005; Nyangoro 1999; Pankhurst 2002). One group that increasingly demanded recognition and support was the War Veterans. Government was forced to respond by making unbudgeted payments to War Veterans on 14th November 1997 (Black Friday), which precipitated currency devaluation, inflation and economic decline (Bond and Manyanya 2003). In my view, this was one key policy decision that significantly changed the country. While ESAP was a suite of policies, this was a response to one social group. Apart from financial costs, War Veterans also asserted themselves socially and politically. This visibility was subsequently captured by the ruling party to address its waning support more so with the advent of a strong labour-based opposition party (Movement for Democratic Change) in 1999 (see Raftopoulos and Savage 2004).

War Veterans were able to achieve and retain access to public resources, spaces and institutions including leadership of the land occupations from 2000. In short, compensating War Veterans was not bad public policy per se but the process of arriving at it, the amounts and the institutional momentum it engendered precipitated institutional and policy dissonance. More demands from War Veterans and other sections of society (e.g. former War Collaborators, Detainees and Restrictees) also followed generally making the state insecure.

The third major event was Zimbabwe’s participation in the war in the DRC. Although the cost of the country’s participation in the war remains undisclosed it nevertheless was a significant investment in terms of financial, human resources and equipment. In short, the war blew a deep hole in the national purse and Zimbabwe is yet to recover (see Pankhurst 2002).
The fourth set of circumstances related to the manner in which Zimbabwe’s land question\textsuperscript{11} was handled. During the first one and a half decades of independence Zimbabwe implemented market-based land reform and resettlement initiatives in keeping with the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution and related compromises, which gave white minority capital a decade of consolidation and effectively defined state consolidation (Raftopoulos and Savage 2004). As noted by Moyo (1995), Government forcefully and legally resisted radicalisation of land reforms up to 1998. Although the first phase of land reform and resettlement (1980 to 1998) missed its targets in terms of number of families/households resettled and land acquired (see Masiiwa 2004) it is fair to observe that the livelihoods of those resettled especially in Region 3 improved (see GRZ 1994a; Moyo 1995). In addition, most of the people targeted, persons internally displaced by the liberation war, returning refugees, people from over-crowded communal areas and communities who took over abandoned farms contiguous to their communal areas, were deserving cases.

The second phase of land reforms started with the September 1998 (international donors’) Land Conference, which was however unsuccessful in terms of coming up with a broadly supported plan for resolving the land question. Although some capacity building and other institutional support was committed and in fact provided\textsuperscript{12}, stakeholders’ inability to raise money for land purchase when Government lacked resources allowed land reform to be politicised. This is not to downplay the growing community agitation and spontaneous land conflicts and occupations that Marongwe (2002) notes but to highlight that the capture of the land movement first by War Veterans and then the ruling party and Government created a different and violent trajectory. Under the post-2000 land reform programme land was acquired without immediately compensating farmers, valuation was only for improvements not the land, new farmers were emplaced before proper planning and without social and economic infrastructure, institutional structures and extension

\textsuperscript{11} The historical inequities in land ownership or distribution, in terms landholding size and agro-ecological endowment along racial lines, is what is referred to in Zimbabwe as the ‘land question’.

\textsuperscript{12} An example was USAID’s Land Reform and Resettlement Research facility which generated comparative research evidence for the Land Reform Program. I managed the last 14 months of the facility (May 2002 to June 2003). Researchers from the Land Tenure Centre (University of Wisconsin-Madison), the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (University of Zimbabwe, UZ) worked on key themes (land markets, subdivision policy, alternative resettlement models, land administration and geographical information systems) and interacted with the public, private and civil society sectors.
services largely because the state lacked resources and the programme was ‘fast track’\textsuperscript{13}. As has now become evident, the land reform programme has contributed to Zimbabwe’s 8-year economic shrinkage (CZI 2007) characterised by reduced agricultural productivity in an agro-dependent economy, food deficits and raw material shortages. However, the food insecurity situation has to be understood as a product of the economic decline since the 1990s compounded by labour shortage in communal areas more than merely a result of the post-2000 land reform programme. This is because from the ESAP period loss of formal employment meant that incomes that usually supported smallholder food production through the purchase of farm inputs were no longer available. Other ESAP-related developments were reduced government funding for agricultural research, extension and input subsidies. HIV and AIDS has also acted to reduce labor availability and productivity in agriculture thereby also affecting food security.

In constructing the above triggers of Zimbabwe’s crisis the way I do above, my aim is to link them to the question of local governance and local development. The role of local governance institutions has tended to be debated at the national level, perhaps in recognition of the high degree of centralisation that exists in Zimbabwe. However, this has obscured the reality that development mainly takes place at District level. The extent to which District level dialogue can enable the thinking and doing of development in such an environment is an open one. As stated in section 1.4 the study engaged with how the understanding of sub-national institutional mutuality or its absence (including and beyond governmental structures) can aid participation and development in Zimbabwe today. Whether the theory and practice of participation applies to Zimbabwe remained a question I was confronted with. My view is that if the theory and practice of participation do not apply to a crisis like Zimbabwe’s, they may not apply to many countries at all. This is because most countries are in, about to enter or recovering from one crisis or another. More importantly, the crisis in Zimbabwe could benefit from the kind of analysis projected in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{13} Fast Track is a term used to define the ‘front-to-back’ nature of the program where people self-mobilized to occupy farms and the hurried pace of acquisition (gazetting) of land often with little room for legal contestation with the formal processes of land pegging, settler regularization, planning of services (schools etc) and other modalities following later.
The crisis that Zimbabwe is going through in part reflects the limitations of the country’s post-independence (post-conflict) governance and development trajectory. Configuring and managing institutions and processes, people’s expectations and reliance (or lack of) on the state, the trust in public institutions and the decay evident in such institutions are important aspects in studying participation and development theory. Similarly, the country stands to benefit from the study insights as it engages with practical challenges being faced on the ground. However, I need to highlight that direct demonstration of the study’s importance or the value of studying Zimbabwe, are not principal aims of the study.

1.6. Framing the research question

Poor people’s fight against poverty is often constrained (or made possible) by the institutional relationships within which they live. Governance\(^{14}\) institutions in Zimbabwe and Zambia have the challenge of facilitating development activities with poor and generally powerless people. The question is then about whether existing institutions see it as part of their mandate to facilitate participation. In the event that they do, the mechanisms they deploy become as critical as the responses or perceptions of the poor people themselves to such facilitation of participation. The interaction between central and local governance structures as defined in law and in practice can enhance or constrain the effectiveness of Councils. Local authorities’ ability to facilitate participatory development will depend to some extent on central government support. There are cases where local authorities are seen as presenting opportunities for institutionalising participation (Schroeder 2000) although other instances show weaknesses in this respect. In Chapters 5 through 7, I present and analyze the research evidence to show whether and to what extent Councils and other local governance institutions in Zimbabwe and Zambia facilitate participation.

Various state and quasi-state actors mediate the institutional landscape for NGO-state relations. Since independence, Zimbabwe has sought to establish effective working arrangements for these clusters of players, with ordinary people and with NGOs (see Plan Afric 1997; Nyangoro 1999). Although NGOs mobilize communities and deliver actual services they often lack inter-NGO coordination and clear identities other than

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\(^{14}\) This relates to the manner (traditions, institutions and processes) of ruling, controlling, determining or directing public affairs (CPIA 2005).
being perceived as either opposed to or an extension of the state. NGOs operate within donor-imposed constraints prompting Governments to criticize them as technically shallow and donor rather than locally-driven (see Moyo et al 2000; Green 2000; 2002; Eyben and Ladbury 1997).

In Zimbabwe, non-governmental organisations including UN-related organisations are receiving the lion’s share of the available donor funding (personal contact with key organisations and Programme staff). For instance, DFID has been supporting a Protracted Relief Programme, which is entering a second 5-year phase worth at least £50 million to be disbursed through non-governmental actors and managed by a Managing, Technical Learning Coordination Unit. Together with other major donors, USAID and DFID have pooled their resources since 2005 into a Programme of Support (POS) ‘basket’ administered by UNICEF towards the implementation of the National Action Plan for Orphan and Vulnerable Children (NAP-OVC) through NGOs (technically called Implementing Partners). The EU is also implementing a Food Security Programme and its other activities through NGOs and the UN. Food and non-food humanitarian programmes in Zimbabwe are being managed through the Office of the Commission for Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). While different Government organisations are involved in planning and implementation, financial and other resources are being channeled through non-state channels. I will return to some of these issues in later Chapters but suffice to reinforce the point that this aid structure affects state and non-state interface in different ways e.g. some Implementing Partners have to offer logistical support (office supplies, transport, fuel etc) to their Government partners without which their programmes would suffer.

Sections 1.1 through 1.5 raise questions that are relevant to the debate on the prospects for and challenges faced in institutionalising participation. The central research theme for this study concerns institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions towards development. The key research question is therefore as follows; what are the key institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions to participatory development at District level? I explored this question in the context of contemporary Zimbabwe. Subsidiary concerns for this research related to whether people’s participation matters, how such participation is facilitated and the instruments used to initiate and sustain people’s participation at the District level. Put
differently the key research question is about whether people’s participation strengthens the institutional factors supportive of development (i.e. weaken the inhibitions). The research also sought to ask whether institutional mutuality matters in the initiation and sustenance of participation. By asking these questions and seeking to find some of the answers (and more questions), I contribute to the debate on development and local (District) governance particularly in Zimbabwe. The research questions are operationalised further through the research problem, which is introduced below and further discussed in section 3.2

1.7. Research problem and study methodology

Parts of section 1.1 engaged with what participation is and how it occurs citing that it occurs directly or via the facilitation of different development organisations. Institutionalising participation depends on the knowledge, skills and attitudes of both ordinary people and the facilitators of participation. The research question was therefore explored through gathering data on key variables pertaining to these two sides of participation. The research problem is further discussed in section 3.2. The study is a qualitative and exploratory analysis of institutional relations and their effect on development. However, I need to highlight that the study used the case study approach. This involved two Rural District Council areas in Zimbabwe and one in Zambia with data gathered at both the District and sub-District levels (Wards). The study also drew on historical and contemporary literature.

The main fieldwork was done between April and December 2004 in Zimbabwe and between January and March 2005 in Zambia. In terms of literature (which included some grey literature and published material), the study made use of existing Acts of Parliament and Government policy directives which were further interrogated in the light of the lived experiences of ordinary people. People’s lived experiences were also captured as they relate to developmental interactions i.e. in relation to projects, policies, physical and organisational spaces and in time. I explored the complex effects on participation of these multiple and dynamic processes.

In undertaking the study, I often found myself reflecting on my work experience since 1994 when I started working as Project Officer in the NGO sector. From 1994, I have been involved in NGO management, development research and advisory work across
different sectors and with different governmental and non-governmental organisations. The different development interventions and relationships that I was involved in before embarking on my doctoral research shaped my views in different ways. These insights found their way into the study from choice of research area and sites through reflecting on actual cases. The methodological implications of my experiences are discussed in section 4.2 but suffice to note that fieldwork in particular challenged and validated some of my experiences.

In keeping with the traditions of qualitative research, the study adopted a multi-method and pragmatic approach (see Marshall and Rossman 1999) as explained in Chapter 4. What has been termed relational analysis is the over-arching framework within which a range of methods were used to access and interpret the interactions of development organizations on one hand and with ordinary people on the other. This way I was able to explore the extent of lived experiences (see DeVault 1999; Lincoln 2003; Marshall and Rossman 1999). Actual methods used included a household survey, key informant interviews, use of community diaries, analysis of documents, attendance of relevant events and a focus group discussion. As discussed in Chapter 4, the household survey was essentially a community entry tool also used to identify issues eventually explored using more qualitative methods. The different methods were used iteratively and flexibly. A multi-stakeholder approach to defining institutional relevance and competence emerges as critical methodologically and regarding discussion of results. The research framework applied allows me to contribute to cross-organisational definition of expectations and community perceptions, in ways useful to define and pursue institutional mutuality.

1.8. The case study countries

The study focuses on Zimbabwe and uses Zambia for comparative purposes. The two countries share a colonial and post-colonial history. By the time Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980, the Federation (of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) had long collapsed but not before benefiting Southern Rhodesia. Under the Federation, Salisbury (now Harare) was the de-facto capital of British Central Africa with Southern Rhodesia receiving most of the investment. Zimbabweans and Zambians have strong social ties established during colonialism, the liberation

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15Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).
struggles and after independence. There are Zimbabwean communities in Zambia and vice versa. Zambians (and Malawians) came into Zimbabwe during the colonial period to work in the farming, mining, manufacturing and other urban sectors of Southern Rhodesia. The British ‘Empire’ in Central Africa collapsed with Zambian and Malawian independence both in 1964 and Southern Rhodesia’s 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) further deepened the separation. Stronger ties with South Africa bolstered Zimbabwe’s economic architecture at a time of economic de-linking for Zambia (from Zimbabwe and South Africa), which was significant in effect as the Zambian economy had been structured in a dependent fashion to the two. However, good world copper prices enabled Zambia to develop its socio-economic infrastructure until the oil crisis of the early 1970s and the slump in commodity prices (Chikulo 1981). Thereafter Zambia experienced an economic downturn and governance challenges through the late 1980s costing then President Kaunda and his party’s hold on power in 1991 when the Movement for Multi-party Democracy won elections.

Post-independent Zimbabwe, despite starting positively compared to Zambia, has followed the Zambian post-colonial trajectory of economic collapse, political polarization and social malaise. It is however misleading to paint a picture of total similarity for the two countries. Attaining independence at different times also meant that implementation of decentralisation and participation policies, among other programmes, occurred at different times. Zambia pursued decentralisation at a time when centralised (state) planning was fashionable unlike Zimbabwe. At Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, expectations were high because of its good economic infrastructure and human capital. Zimbabwe had more University graduates because it had hosted the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (see Chikulo 1981; Browne 2007). Naturally, the disappointment with the resultant development performance, internal and external factors considered has tended to be higher.

Zimbabwe has repeated certain mistakes made by say Tanzania and Zambia. Examples include the way it carried out centralised planning, the cooperative movement and other socialist-style institutional arrangements, which I discuss in Chapter 2. Centralisation, cooperatives and socialism are not inherently bad policy or institutional frameworks if effectively regulated and supported. The lack of such
support and regulation in Zimbabwe explains the less-than-optimum performance of
say the cooperatives (see Mararike 1995; Makumbe 1996). For instance, most
cooperators abandoned cooperatives to pursue individual goals. It would appear that
by being privately capitalist despite the public socialist rhetoric, business and political
leaders undermined socialism. Similarly, re-centralisation appears to invoke memories
of colonial administrative processes amongst ordinary people. Currently official
pronouncements on decentralisation seem hollow, as real public administration is
centralistic considering the range and frequency of government-run programmes. It is
important to explore such policy inconsistencies (see Moyo 1995, Raftopoulos and
Savage 2004; Makumbe 2001; Bond and Manyanya 2003; Ayittey 2005; Davies and
Ratsso 2000) and their implications for participation. The Table below summarises
some of the key features of the two countries. Zambia was chosen as a comparator
more for its similarities to Zimbabwe and (spatial) proximity than its differences.

**Table 1; Basic facts about Zimbabwe and Zambia:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Size</td>
<td>391 000 square kilometers</td>
<td>753 000 square kilometers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altitude (min to max)</td>
<td>162 to 2 592 meters</td>
<td>329 to 2 301 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>12.7 million</td>
<td>11.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate</td>
<td>0.51% per annum</td>
<td>2.12% per annum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
<td>39.13 years</td>
<td>39.7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality</td>
<td>68/1000 live births</td>
<td>88/1000 live births</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below Poverty Datum Line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Type</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Government</td>
<td>Executive President</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>21st December 1979 (17 changes</td>
<td>24th December 1964 (a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>since 1980, 18th change under</td>
<td>Commission concluding draft,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage</td>
<td>18 years</td>
<td>18 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Structures:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>10 (2 urban and 8 rural).</td>
<td>9 (1 mainly urban; Lusaka).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authorities (both Urban and Rural)</td>
<td>86 (28 urban &amp; 58 rural).</td>
<td>72 (most cover rural &amp; urban).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-35% urbanized.</td>
<td>38-40% urbanized.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The economic fortunes of the two countries are moving in different directions. Zimbabwe’s inflation was at 590% in December 2005 (4530% in May 2007 and
7634% in July, RBZ1 6  2007) according to the CSO compared to 19% for Zambia in 2005. Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita was above the African average in 1990 and 1991 but has been consistently lower since then and despite recovering between 1993 and 1996 it has been going done since 1997 from USD700 to USD371 in 2001 (ADB and OECD 2003) and USD363 compared to USD471 for Zambia (UNDP 2006). In 2001 Zimbabwe was a medium HD (human development) category country falling to low HD category by 2003 (UNDP 2003, 2006). South Africa is a main trading partner for both countries. Zambia currently receives considerable foreign direct investment and aid, while Zimbabwe is experiencing international isolation. Zimbabwe’s agricultural productivity has slumped while Zambia is experiencing a boom.

Table 2: Economic factors-Zimbabwe and Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector Debt.</td>
<td>30.1% of GDP.</td>
<td>104.2% of GDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth Rate.</td>
<td>-4% (2005).</td>
<td>5.8% (estimate for 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP by Sector.</td>
<td>17.9% agriculture, 24.3% Industry and 57.9% Services.</td>
<td>21.7% agriculture, 29.5% Industry and 48.8% Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita.</td>
<td>$363.</td>
<td>$471.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate.</td>
<td>1.3% of GDP.</td>
<td>6.2% of GDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment.</td>
<td>60%.</td>
<td>50%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force by Sector.</td>
<td>66% Agriculture, 10% Industry &amp; 24% Service.</td>
<td>85% Agriculture, 6% Industry &amp; 9% Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import Partners (least and most important).</td>
<td>UK 3.4% and South Africa 46.9%.</td>
<td>Zimbabwe 6% and South Africa 46.2%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Partners (least and most important).</td>
<td>Germany 4.3% and South Africa 31.5%.</td>
<td>Zimbabwe 5.8% and South Africa 25.6%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Telephone (and Mobile Phone) Lines.</td>
<td>300 900 (379 100) in 2003.</td>
<td>88 400 (241 000) in 2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook; UNDP 2006; EU 2007 (NB: where dates are not indicated figures are estimates for 2005).

Tables 1 and 2 reflect the development positions and performance of the two countries. The tables also show the challenges faced by the two nations. From the above it is fair to say that the two countries share a lot of commonalities in terms of their basic facts. For instance, the two countries have both experienced significant declines in social indicators like life expectancy at birth. For Zambia, the drop was from 47.2 years (1970-75) to 40.5 years (1995-2000) while Zimbabwe dropped from

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\(^{16}\) Monthly Statement by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for July 2007.

\(^{17}\) Humanitarian Aid from the EU, USAID, DFID and others for Zimbabwe excluded from this figure.
56 to 42.9 years during the same period (Afrol News\textsuperscript{18} 2002). Recent figures show a decline to 36.6 years for Zimbabwe and 37.7 years for Zambia (UNDP 2006). The effects of HIV and AIDS have been used to explain the declining social indicators. The greatest decline occurred in Zimbabwe and like its economy, the rate and direction of decline have been different from regional trends. In terms of human and poverty rankings, the countries are number 88 for Zimbabwe and 87 for Zambia (UNDP 2006). The same source gives the percentage of Zimbabwes living on less than USD1/day as 56.1% and 75.8% Zambians suggesting deeper poverty levels for Zambia than Zimbabwe. Anecdotal evidence however suggests poverty levels in the 80% region for Zimbabwe and the difference could be attributed to problems with availability of official statistics in recent years.

The two countries also share a dependency on South Africa’s economy in terms of imports and exports. Zimbabwe’s economy fares worse than Zambia’s in all macro-economic fundamentals like public debt, inflation and GDP. According to Browne (2007), Zambia is emerging from decades of bilaterally-assisted economic mismanagement to take charge of its development agenda although it remains low on the state fragility matrix. Aid to Zimbabwe e.g. the EU’s Euro193.3 million (including bilateral assistance) is managed through restrictive policies where donors target social sectors as a means of directly supporting the population (EU 2007) while Zambia receives aid through direct budgetary support (see Browne 2007).

1.9. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is presented in seven main Chapters. The next Chapter (2) discusses the literature used in articulating the research area and question. It engages with participation and decentralisation separately and makes some theoretical connections to illuminate the focal points of the study. Chapter 3 presents the research problem and conceptual framework. The Chapter explains how the institutional terrain creates constraints and opportunities for participation. The constraints are further articulated to illuminate the research problem. The Chapter justifies the specific units of analysis, which are further elaborated on in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 discusses the methods used and details the experience of carrying out the research. Chapters 5 and 6 are

\textsuperscript{18} http://www.aegis.org/news/afrol/2002/A00207704.html
presentations of the research findings. Chapter 5 presents the institutional structures, their relations and implications for participation. Chapter 6 discusses popular perceptions and uses of institutional spaces and structures. The issues and opportunities observed are presented to illuminate arrangements that work and areas for improvement to ensure access to and control of relevant institutional spaces by ordinary people. The last Chapter (7) draws together discussions and presents conclusions from the study and raises additional questions for further exploration.

1.10. Conclusion

In this Chapter, I discussed the focus and structure of the thesis including how the research idea evolved. The key questions as they relate to formal and informal processes of ensuring access to and control of development spaces were discussed. These processes include setting up of organisational structures and coming up with policies to guide planning and management of development activities (see Brand 1991; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991), funding (see EU 2007; Browne 2007; Booth 2003) and discussed questions relevant to the debate on participation (see Mararike 1995; Makumbe 1996; 1998; 2001). I return to discuss these processes in Chapter 2 using literature. Chapter 1 also introduced the methodology used to explore the research question, which concerns spaces and structures for inter-organisational relations. I elaborate this further in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 1 has laid out the general contours of the study, sketched the basic theoretical arguments in relation to participation and decentralisation. Decentralisation and participation will be explored further in Chapters 2 and 3 to detail the research question and approach.
CHAPTER 2: THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT

2.1. Introduction

This Chapter proceeds from the foundation laid in Chapter 1. I explore participation, participatory development and decentralisation in some detail and link participation and decentralisation asking whether participation is anchored in popular organisations, decentralised structures, stakeholder institutions or different shades of all (section 2.3). In discussing decentralisation, I explore its implications for and relationships with participation, which sheds some light on the research problem. Some of the bases of, mechanisms for and key constraints to ‘genuine’ participation and decentralisation are discussed. The experiences of Zimbabwe and Zambia are discussed as part of applying the literature to the case study countries and to further ground the research questions. A number of commentators’ work is used without any one of them being singled out as holding a particular sway on the analysis. These include Conyers (2003), Ndewa (2002) Olowu (2001), and Makumbe (1996) on decentralisation, Zack-Williams (2002), Ayittey (2005), Calderisi (2006), and Vaughan (2005) on the African state in/and development and Chambers (1983), Berner and Phillips (2005), Brand (1991), Charlick (2001), Craig and Porter (1997) on participation. In selecting the literature, an important filter was Craig and Porter’s (1997) concept of ‘framers’ of participation, which explains the concern with local level state-society nexus (local governance).

Participation is given considerable weight compared to decentralisation. The intention is to keep the focus on the institutionalisation of participation as decentralisation can be seen as one of the means to that end. The terms participation and participatory development are deliberately interwoven. Participation is the taking of meaningful and voluntary part and achieving control of development processes and spaces. In the context of Zimbabwe and perhaps other post-colonial countries, the emphasis on voluntary is important for two reasons. One is because pre-independence community development programmes had elements of coercion and hard labor. Public Works included making of contours and other conservation works, roads and establishment of dip tanks all of which were labour-intensive (Chanaiwa 1981; see Bowman 1973). Some of the people involved in public works were convicts and thus the work was
regarded as punishment. Second is that local governance institutions involved in the programmes were equally forced to ‘facilitate’ the activities making them generally unpopular with ordinary citizens. As such, the institutions and products of the programmes were perceived and experienced as extensions of a repressive central state (see Wekwete 1990; Mamdani 1996; Makumbe 1998). This is one reason why some of the institutions (traditional leaders, Mission centers) and programmes (schools, bridges and clinics) were targets during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Given this context, participation can only be meaningful and voluntary if the financial, socio-political or organisational, technical and administrative mechanisms in place allow the involvement of ordinary people and their institutions. A development approach that provides such mechanisms is what I refer to as participatory development. There is a two-way relationship between people and institutional arrangements on the one hand and the approaches to development on the other regarding the nature, quality and extent of participation. This explains why I start this Chapter by discussing structures and spaces for participation and return to these using the theory and practice of decentralisation in the two countries. In section 2.5, I further discuss the definitions of participation, development and participatory development originally introduced in section 1.1.

2.2. Structures and spaces for participation

Structures as defined in section 1.3 can be governmental, non-governmental, popular or traditional. They can be committees, whole organisations, institutions like that of chieftainship, or networks set up to act as vehicles for pursuing certain goals or representing specific interests (see Essof 2005 on women’s movements in Zimbabwe). In this study my concern is with structures that are set up or exist in specific sub-national locations whose boundaries are defined by central government or traditional authorities. In the context of Zimbabwe and Zambia the sub-national spaces of concern to the study are Provinces, Districts, Wards and Villages. As stated in section 1.1 these are at once physical, social, economic and political spaces. Much of the data for this study was gathered in the Districts, Wards and Villages where ordinary people live and interact more closely with existing structures to pursue socio-economic and other goals. The organisations in these spaces include Provincial and District Governments, Development Committees, Councils, Councilors, NGOs,
traditional leaders and community groups. The organisations and the structures they work in provide the links and act as forums for decision-making processes.

The notion of space is critical because it bestows identity on the people living within the defined area, the culture and norms affecting socio-political interaction, the legitimacy of the structures and the use of the spaces as administrative or planning units. Even in the definition of poverty and actual provision of services (physical or social) spaces are critical. In keeping with the above introductory definition of participation and participatory development, spaces and structures thus provide a practical context within which approaches to facilitate (or frustrate) people’s access to, control of or to influence present or future courses of action are deployed. The discussions that follow relate to spaces (sub-national to international) and structures of various forms as well as the interventions in terms of the extent to which they enable (or disable) participation. I return to the case study countries’ spaces and structures in later sections in this Chapter. Below I discuss the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation adopted in Arusha, Tanzania in 1990 and proceeds to draw on related work to pick issues and study variables.

2.3. The African Charter for Popular Participation


‘...concern for the serious deterioration in the human and economic conditions in Africa in ... the 1980s...(and the) lack of progress in achieving popular participation and the lack of full appreciation of the role popular participation plays in the process of recovery and development’ (African Charter 1990:2-3).

The Charter makes a connection between popular participation and Africa’s economic recovery. It defines the African social, economic, legal, human and political crisis as unprecedented and unacceptable. It further notes that development takes place in a politically over-centralised context that impedes participation, argues that resolving the crisis requires altering structures, the pattern and political context of the development process and advocates for human-centered and participatory
development. Popular participation is defined as the empowerment of people to involve themselves effectively in creating structures, designing policies and programmes serving people's interests and sharing benefits equitably. This requires opening up of political processes to increase freedoms, tolerance, accept consensus and ensure participation of people, their organisations and associations.

This study adopted some of the principles of the Charter. The interest in poverty reduction is an important part of the analysis recognizing that participation as defined in the Charter is concerned with dealing with Africa's socio-economic crises. Another critical aspect drawn into the analysis relates to the arenas for participation. The framing of participation in the Charter resonates with Arnstein's argument that:

...citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set...benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out (Arnstein 1969: 216).

By raising issues about people's full and effective participation through their organisations, the Charter reflects rungs 6 through 8 of Arnstein's ladder of participation (partnership, delegated power and citizen control). The eight-rung ladder starts with manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and ends with citizen control (Arnstein 1969:217). In essence, the Charter mapped a discourse of participation that engages political issues fully. The Charter places responsibility for ensuring meaningful and constructive participation on the people, governments and international organisations, proposing that political systems needed to be democratized (see Clark 1991). This also ties in with the observations of Berner and Phillips who argue that '...no development strategy can opt out of the realities of power' (Berner and Phillips 2005:25; see Lyons et al 2001; Shah 1998; Nelson and Wright 1997; Guijt and Shah 1998).

Starting with the African Charter is not meant to foreclose other debates but lays a basis for further discussing the institutionalisation of participation. Analytical models like the ones by Arnstein (1969), White (1996) and Pretty et al 19 (1995) reflect different forms of participation. For instance White's framework distinguishes views

19 Pretty et al (1995:61) present a spectrum of participation starting with passive (lowest), information giving, consultation, for material incentives, functional, interactive and ending with self-mobilization (highest).
and interests or aspirations from a top-down or a bottom-up perspective i.e. outsiders, officials, project planners (those at the top) and the poor or local people in general (those at the bottom). Except in transformative situations, coincidence of interest between those at the top and those at the bottom is rare. Pretty et al’s (1995) forms of participation run from passive to self-mobilization. The latter is the highest form where people take initiative and partner others on their terms. It is my assessment that higher or better forms of participation (which-ever framework one selects) require changes or improvements to existing power/political systems. However, the categories or stages constructed in the analytical models are not necessarily followed closely in change processes. Also, as shown with the examples of programmes implemented in Zimbabwe (Table 3 in this Chapter), individual organisations do not exclusively and always reflect the same level of participation in their dealings with the public or other development organisations. As such it is possible in a change process to move from Arnstein’s rung 3 (informing) to 6 (partnership) or higher i.e. enjoy one rung on some issues and another on different issues and at different times.

Other analysts engage with who is participating. Normatively, such a question focuses on who would participate if different mechanisms for and approaches to participation existed (see Houtzager et al 2003; Nyoni 1987; Blackburn and de Toma 1998; Malhotra 2005; Dixon 2002; Kar 2003; Kamete 2002; Johnson and Wilson 2000; Lyons et al 2001; Mbaku 2004; Mbeki 2005; McCall 1998; Mararike 1995; Mercer 2002). Generally, more informed, self-aware and organised communities are less likely to take part in nominal or lower forms of participation. A related question is whether participation is by insiders (locals) in outsider-led interventions, outsiders in insiders/local people’s everyday lives or varying shades of both (Green 2002; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Eversole 2003). I return later to this fundamental question. Suffice to say that if outsiders respect local realities (see Chambers 1983) then it becomes a case of them consciously intervening in locals’ existence and in insider-led participation. This perspective of participation (outsiders in locals’ life worlds) alters power relations between outsiders and insiders. Eversole (2003) extends the question of who participates by asking why, how and whose interests certain external development organisations advance through their interventions. The reversals (to use Chambers’ term) require at one level changes at higher and lower levels i.e. outsiders and insiders. My use of the decentralisation literature allows counter-balancing the
popular and representative (democratic) structures on the one hand with a myriad of alternative mechanisms e.g. stakeholders (see MacArthur 1997; World Bank 1994) and interest groups (see Ribot 2001).

The African Charter is mostly about popular or direct participation through people’s organisations. However, participation can also be through representatives (elected or appointed). A third vehicle is stakeholder participation e.g. where NGOs (or other CSOs as defined earlier) articulate specific interests on behalf of distinct constituencies. Stakeholder institutions may also facilitate direct participation where they enable ordinary people to access spaces they would otherwise not be able to make use of. None of these three channels inherently guarantees participation that goes beyond the nominal i.e. genuine participation. However, the bigger the spaces (social, political, organisational and/or physical) in which to participate the more logistically difficult it becomes to achieve direct participation and even the participation of certain stakeholder categories. The creation of structures or organisations and use of technology (print, web-based and electronic media, telecommunication etc) are essentially meant to enhance the logistical feasibility of participation. Below I undertake a partial tracing of the history of participation before defining participation and development as well as looking at mechanisms for institutionalising it.

2.4. An historical analysis of participation

The application of participation in development theory and practice has a long history and varied genealogy (Eyben and Ladbury 1997; Lane 1997; Rahman 1995; Friedman 1992; Brohman 1996; Cornwall 2000, 2002; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Participatory approaches and programmes are shaped by diverse and often contradictory imperatives. This is true for both participation and decentralisation because of varying institutional agendas (Conyers 2002, 2003, 2007; Olowu 1990, 2001; Ndegwa 2002; Wunsch and Olowu 1990; Cornwall 2000, 2002; Hickey and Mohan 2004; Green

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20 One example is the closed nature of the processes by which debates on the African Union Government before, during and after the 1-3 July 2007, 9th AU Ordinary Session (Ghana 2007) proceeded. Civil Society organisations felt excluded and argued for broadening the discussion. Another is the 27th SADC Summit (18th August 2007 in Zambia) where issues on Zimbabwe and other regional integration issues proceeded through parallel Heads of Government and civil society sessions. Heads of Government sessions were behind closed doors and civil society organisations ran parallel sessions making frantic yet generally unsuccessful efforts to access that space and its outcomes.
Robb (2002) separates participation as used by social scientists in *project work* from participation to influence *policy-makers* for instance in Participatory Poverty Assessments or PPAs. The author defines PPAs as dialoguing with the poor to influence policy. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) also fall into this category. Participation to influence policy is more recent than participation in project work (*Ibid*). However, participation is perhaps as old as organised society. Eras identifiable since the 1930s deal more with better documented cases and available institutional memories than the discovery of participation.

Participation has been central to different development approaches. Hickey and Mohan 2004 cite colonial and post-colonial community development, political participation, emancipatory participation, alternative development, populism, participation in development, social capital, participatory governance and citizenship as some of the approaches. These strands are ascribed to distinct promoters and periods. For instance ‘participation in development’ since the 1980s is ascribed to development professionals, NGOs, the World Bank Participation Learning Group, UN development organisations (notably ILO and UNRISD) as well as commentators and development practitioners like Robert Chambers, Peter Oakley and others. Participation and participatory development have become widespread and for some time represented a new orthodoxy in development circles (Blackburn and de Toma 1998; Green 2000).

The value attached to participation varies from ‘good-practice applications’ by NGOs to national policy insistence including constitutional guarantees as in Iran (Haidari and Wright 2001), donor guidelines (DFID 2000), government resolutions (Pijnenburg and Nhantumbo 2002) and legislative provisions as in Zimbabwe (Makumbe 1996, 1998) and Bolivia (Blackburn and de Toma 1998). The adequacy of legislative provisions to entrench participation is doubted by some (McGee et al 2003)
especially where traditions of grassroots participation are weak. This skepticism resonates with the African Charter’s focus on both the policy arena and people’s organisations. Participation discourse in the 1980s and 1990s looked more at community consultation methods to improve local people’s input into development programmes on the one hand and outsiders’ understanding of and attitudes towards local realities on the other (see Chambers 1983, 1994a, 1994b, 1997; Kar 2003; Kar and Pasteur 2005). As an example, Mozambique saw an upsurge in participatory processes in 1990s after the civil war (Pijnenburg and Nhantumbo 2002).

It is important to highlight that people’s organisational in poorer societies was neither discovered by nor awaited the arrival of missionaries or community developers with their interventions from the 1930s onwards. Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) argue that some development processes disrupt poor people’s sources of livelihood, security and social cohesion. The participation current, while not new per se, has concerned itself with reversing such trends of marginalizing the poor which development itself tended to exacerbate (Ibid). However, resurgence in the concept of participation since the late 1980s has generated a great deal of academic and practitioner interest. The 1980s coincided with the mainstreaming of participation by development organisations like the World Bank and the entrenchment of NGOs as serious development actors (Clark 1991; Moyo et al 2000) as they scaled up their work (Edwards and Hulme 1992). NGO application of participatory methods has been noted to be exemplary (World Bank 1994; Lane 1997; Krishna et al 1997 and Mungate 1993).

My consideration of participation engages with the widespread application and growing role of non-state actors (especially NGOs) in applying participation. In the process, I analyse the implications of inter-organisational interaction for participation. There are differences in versions of and approaches to enhancing participation in relation to poor people’s interests. In Zimbabwe at present, NGOs and the state often quarrel over who has the greatest legitimacy to make claims for and with the poor. The question ceases to be about methods and issues but about institutional ownership of the participation agenda.

Faith in participatory development as a panacea for past development failure has grown over the years (Nelson and Wright 1997; McGee 2002; Brohman 1996;
Eversole 2003; Cooke and Kothari 2001). This faith has been inspired by the need for alternative, people-centered and popular development approaches (Brohman 1996; Friedmann 1992; African Charter 1990). There is generally nothing new about participation but there is a new passion, which has more to do with institutions promoting the approach, links with democracy and issues of rights than the developmental results that participation may bring. I have highlighted in this section concern with spaces for people’s own organisations versus outsiders. Using Robb (2002) I have shown there is a strand of participation in relation to projects on the one hand and another relating to policy influence using locals’ insights. These two do not substitute for greater and continuous capacity to advance own interests, which is in the realm of participation as an end. I return to the different conceptions of participation below.

2.5. Defining participation and development

In section 2.1 above the definitions of participation and participatory development were introduced. In this section I return to these and link them to the concept of development. My point of reference is the design and implementation of interventions in people’s lives. Participation and participatory development are seen as an alternative to top-down and expert-led development processes where outsiders play a more prominent role than local people’s perspectives is (see Cooke and Kothari 2001). Related is the emphasis placed on approaches that start from local realities.

Participation is used in this study to refer to taking direct, meaningful and voluntary part and achieving control of development processes and spaces (see African Charter 1990; Chambers 1983; 1997; Chatiza 2003; Cornwall 2002; Haidari and White 2001). It covers having a role in creating the necessary structures, designing policies and implementing programmes the serve a community’s interests. The making of effective and voluntary contributions to a development process and sharing in the resulting benefits are critical aspects of participation. In relation to the discussion in section 1.6, the study looked at what allows ordinary people to take part in development activities. This conceptualization of participation is influenced by analysts like Haidari and Wright (2001) and, among others, Stiefel and Wolfe (1994). Haidari and Wright (2001) highlight the importance of decision-making and control by ‘insiders’ (see Eversole 2003). Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) define participation as ‘...organised efforts
to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control’ (1994:5). For DFID (2000) participation involves enabling people to realize their rights and to access information relevant to deciding on their lives.

Projects play an important role in participation. However, their effectiveness in promoting participation is contested. The transformative effects of projects are often reduced by wider policy instruments and processes occurring through social relations outside project control (Green 2002). Such spheres of interaction govern and transform decision-making and benefit distribution. At the same time project-related structures may replicate existing social divisions (Ibid). However, shifts of power may result as people respond (react) in innovative ways to project realities (Mapedza and Mandondo 200221; Kamete 200222; see also Giddens 1984). I suggest that the introduction of projects in communities leads to three interpenetrating realities emerging, which have a bearing on participation. These are the ‘project’ reality, the ‘without-project’ reality and the ‘plus project’ reality. The project and plus project realities are new. The first introduces changes to existing relations and processes while the plus-project reality adapts project and existing realities to create new forms of interaction. Projects generate participation at two levels. One is as a means of getting things done while the other is as an end in itself (see Nelson and Wright 1997). As means, participation concerns efficiently, effectively and perhaps cheaply accomplishing a project or refining a policy. As end or goal of an intervention, participation enhances capacities and control over social realities (see Nelson and Wright1997; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Pijnenburg and Nhantumbo 2002).

Participatory development is an approach with financial, socio-political or organisational, technical and administrative mechanisms that allow people to directly, meaningfully and voluntarily participate in their development. All things being equal, this enables attainment of the capacities that Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) refer to relying on existing technical, political and administrative institutions and resources. As noted by McCall

21 Mapedza and Mandondo analysed responses to Forestry Company of Zimbabwe changes in a State Forest, showing community adaptations to/of institutions governing resource access and use.
22 Kamete observed that Harare authorities always follow behind ‘Harare’s poor’ i.e. they govern reactively.
(1988), this version of participation focuses on the ideological end of promoting self-development, self-confidence, local capabilities and control.

I now turn to the conception of development used in this thesis and reflect on some of the implications for participation. Annis (1987) defines development as ‘a cultivated field’ in reference to direct intervention. Cowen and Shenton (1996) show that the evolution of development as concept can be linked to the post-World War II Marshall Plan. Development is also seen as the official practices of developed countries mainly since the 1970s in dealing with ‘poverty and unemployment’ in developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America (Ibid) but also in their own countries’ deprived areas. Because ‘development’ has some colonial heritage it does not exclusively owe its conception and application to the Marshall Plan. During the colonial era development proceeded on a modernisation slant while after World War II the focus was on restoring order and reconstructing. Cowen and Shenton (1996) trace this focus to ameliorating the disorder of the industrial capitalist era (late 18th and early 19th Century) characterised by rapid urban migration and poverty, squalor and unemployment. Applied outside the industrialized context, development becomes about ‘improving conditions’ in areas that are under-developed. Ameliorating disorder and ‘catching up’ are two different versions of conceptions of development applying to different socio-economic contexts. Catching up suggests a comparison with a developed other whereas ameliorating disorder relates to addressing ‘faults’ occurring in the same context. In a post-colonial context like Zimbabwe it is possible to relate the ameliorating disorder conception of development to ameliorating colonial chaos and neglect (see Thomas 2001). Colonial community development programmes were steeped in the catching up model of development. Critics of development as catching up argue that it ignores the role that local mobilization plays in attaining local objectives (Esteva 1992). Adebayo Adeleji is associated with a search for indigenous development paradigms, agendas and strategies (Cline-Cole 2006). Seen in this way development neither assumes outside intervention nor is it residually defined. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as a continental development philosophy and programme espouses both African initiatives while also tapping into developed countries’ experiences and resources through partnerships. It thus has territory-based development ambitions but looks up and out for material support for its implementation, which is one source of its criticism (see Ayittey 2005).
In defining and pursuing development there are analysts who do not smell the proverbial rat. For instance Sen (1999) defines development as different dimensions of freedom while Thomas (1996, 1999 and 2001) looks at development as an historical change process, deliberate efforts at progress and an orientation towards progressive change. For Mosse (2004) the question is not about whether but how development works. These are more pragmatic views, which however do not downplay the controversies evoked by the concept and practice of development. Although their views are converging, the World Bank and UNDP in the past had some important differences in conceiving and measuring development. The former has used economic criteria while the latter used human development indices. Thomas’ (1996) reference to value-based conflicts in defining development management captures a key basis for controversies in development practice.

For this study a simpler and practical definition of development is adopted from the Government of Zimbabwe. Development is ‘...aiming at improving the social and economic conditions of people’ (Government of Zimbabwe-GRZ 1991:95). The definition is read within the context of the development challenge at independence in 1980 where GDP disparities between the modern and monetized white-controlled sector averaged 20 times GDP per capita for black rural households (GRZ 1982). Makombe defines development in a related manner but emphasizes the ‘creation of conditions that improve access to goods and services...incomes, jobs, education, health facilities’ (1993:4). Given the marginalization of rural Zimbabwe before and expectations that people had at independence, development discourse highlighted direct material provisions more than ‘creating conditions’. This is however despite the socialist-inspired institutional (re)-arrangements that the ZANU PF government promoted to transform society e.g. the cooperative movement.

Participatory development is a way of thinking and doing development (an approach). Rahman (1995) defines it as collective action by socio-economically marginalized people to improve their life (see Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Shah 1998; Guijt and Shah 1998). Rahman does not directly engage with the role of external agents like the state and NGOs in such collective action. However, other analysts argue that most of the incentives that foster grassroots growth come from the state even through the state
and societal groupings maybe in adversarial relationships (Annis 1987). As Berner and Phillips (2005) put it ‘...governments and NGOs need to make themselves responsive to, not absent from poorer communities’ (Berner and Phillips 2005: 23). As the same authors remind us ‘...the purpose of empowerment is not to make beneficiaries independent but ...more powerful’ (Ibid: 23).

Collective action as stated by Rahman has connotations of activities outside the personal domain i.e. community arena, which is another contested term. An important point to reinforce relates to the role of ordinary people and their organisations rather than outside facilitators in the definition of participatory development. This brings me to a point that is ably articulated by Mosse (2004) who contends that development or policy ideas do not have a life of their own outside institutions, persons and intentions. Institutions and social relations are critical (see Cornwall and Brock 2005; Gaventa 2005). In reality the life breathed into development policies and ideas by outsiders tend to shape thinking and doing development more than locals’ efforts. For Gaventa (2005) and Cornwall and Brock (2005), spaces are neither neutral nor of a single type in form or governance. The different types of spaces include closed, invited and claimed occurring at local, national and global levels (Gaventa 2005). Some actors have access to and influence over the different spaces while others have a limited reach due to power and resources differentials. In Chapter 6 I return to issues of accessing and influencing spaces highlighting the covert and overt strategies ordinary people use to exercise their agency.

In using the term community above no assumptions are made about homogeneity, power neutrality or harmony. Berner and Phillips (2005) problematize the concept of community for its conflation of the administrative, spatial and social. They argue that this is an oversimplification of reality and often constrains proper examination of local power dynamics. In this study community refers to spatial and social contiguity that makes acting together and defining common interests possible. The geographical spaces used in this as reference points include the Village, Ward and District reflecting the sub-national focus of the analysis. In these spaces, structures and institutions exist. Power held by different players affects processes, outcomes and institutional relations. In these institutional spaces there are cases where participatory approaches have been used in a manipulative and often top-down manner (Cooke and
Kothari 2001; Mosse 2001; Green 2000, 2002) and glossing over community and gender differences (Guijt and Shah 1998). Manipulative uses of participatory approaches have arisen in part from use by big development organisations (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999; Mercer 2002) unable to respond to local dynamics. Section 2.6 below deals with some of these issues using examples.

In this section so far I have defined participation, development and participatory development. These definitions are helpful in elaborating why and how the contests over approaches emerge. The role of the state is critical in defining and providing resources for development. However, the wide endorsement of participatory development has not seen real structural reforms away from mainstream social and political interests and structures (Rahman 1995). Participation's triumph in influencing orthodoxy appears more to imply cooption. This is because in practice participatory development approaches do not always yield expected practical results. In short the redistribution of power essential for institutionalising participation (African Charter 1990; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Nelson and Wright 1997; Rahman 1995; Haidari and Wright 2001; Triantafillou and Nielsen 2001) is not occurring. Commenting on the role of social movements Mitlin and Bebbington (2006) observe that while their work is critical in the chronic poverty agenda the combined effects of neo-liberalism and internal constraints limit their capacities to shift the fundamental processes of exploitation particularly those underpinning capitalism.

A number of mechanisms have been applied to extend participation. In discussing these mechanisms I show the roles played by different actors, particularly state and state-related development organisations. I also show in the process that the different mechanisms have been attempted by a broad spectrum of actors.

2.6. Mechanisms for institutionalising participation

In this section, I discuss examples of how participatory development (the approach) has been institutionalized. The section does not cover all mechanisms but sheds light on different contexts, methods and issues. Those issues central to the study are identified at the end of the section. The role that organisational interaction plays is discussed to illuminate opportunities and challenges for institutionalising participation. Examples include co-governance (Ackerman 2004) and Participatory
Budgeting (Houtzager et al 2003). The latter approach has been used in Brazil’s Porto Alegre where institutionally embedded actors participate more and that organisational forms affect the extent and nature of participation (Houtzager et al 2003). Civil society organisations introduced new forms of representation different from local government mechanisms.

The community development approach in colonial times accompanied by the establishment of semi-autonomous local government systems (Turner and Hulme 1997; Enemuo 2000; Hickey and Mohan 2004) allowed people to participate but largely in top-down programmes. This made the programmes and associated local institutions unpopular. The examples of Participatory Budgeting and colonial Community Development show the different institutional spaces provided, the different actors involved and their effect on people’s participation. Gaventa (2005) makes important observations about how shifting constructions and repositories of power that affect access to policy-making arenas. These shifts often confuse debates on participation and inclusion in terms of processes and levels or places, actors and outcomes (see Cornwall and Brock 2005; Robb 2002; Churches in Manicaland 2006).

2.6.1. International development organisations: role in promoting participation

International development organisations provide funding for development activities, dissemination of new ideas and exchange of staff. Their policy guidelines, funding conditions, technical assistance and staff provide scope for the promotion (or inhibition) of participation. Funders influence choice of development priorities through research grants and disseminating results of such research, new approaches, supporting policy/programme development e.g. PRSPs and the UN on MDGs. Policy beliefs or values underpin support frameworks e.g. DFID’s argument that achieving the MDGs requires engaging the poor in decisions and processes affecting their lives (DFID 2000). This informs the rights-based approach that DFID implemented through Country and Institutional Strategy Papers.

The World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategies also address issues of participation. Other organisations channel programme support towards processes based on credible consultation (see DFID 2000; UNDP 2003). The World Bank has supported Participatory Poverty Assessments or PPAs (Robb 2002), funded many Community-
Driven Development projects and other specific programmes that extend participatory approaches e.g. Zimbabwe’s Community Action Project and Zambia’s Social Investment Fund. The UN family has led relevant global initiatives culminating in the MDGs. The UNDP’s observation that entrenched groups’ resistance of policies that reallocate resources to the poorest will undermine MDGs (UNDP 2003) reflects the kinds of threats that need to be addressed (see African Charter 1990; Gaventa 2005). The organisation further argues that MDG success should be based on finding ‘...avenues for citizens to participate in decision-making’ (Ibid 2003:134; see DFID 2000).

However, the activities of international development organisations can be controversial. Where new structures are created or foreign funders intervene in national policy spaces, questions about sovereignty may be raised. Sankore (2005) raises such questions over the participation of Oxfam GB and Action Aid alongside USAID, JICA, the EU, UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO in President Obasanjo’s Millennium Development Committee23. The two INGOs replied in the October 2005 issue of The New African (p7, N° 444) that they were not members of the Committee although Oxfam stated its interest in and direct support to debt relief work by civil society. The perception that INGOs act as the new officials running post-colonies reminiscent of Indirect Rule is evident. Sankore further observes increasing NGO programme shifts towards policy execution through participation in Budgetary Committees and Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs). National NGOs rarely access the spaces that INGOs and donor organisations do for political and capacity reasons. Other commentators argue that external support itself weakens domestic accountability and institution building (Booth 2003; Browne 2007; Moss et al 2006; McGee and Norton 2000), may offer false hope, dampen development initiatives based on local resources and simply ‘calms Western consciences while dulling them to even greater horrors that lie ahead’ (Calderisi 2006:209). In short, aid or external support may act to undermine participation (see Kar 2003; Kar and Pasteur 2005). Cornwall and Brock (2005) note that PRSP implementation, for instance, narrowly conceives participation, that consultative processes may follow externally-dictated

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23 The Committee was set up to monitor the use of proposed Paris Club debt relief packages.
timetables and processes often vary from domestic policy-making rhythms (see Booth 2003).

From the above questions about whether donors sufficiently mainstream citizen or broader community involvement in development processes beyond and in addition to aid-supported interventions arise. As with projects generally (Green 2002), state-society interface is not confined to aid-supported activities. Other questions include who participates (national governments, international players, nationals). What form, culture or rhythm does participation take? Why do governments accept donor-supported participation? How can such participation be sustained? Where participation in donor-supported interventions remains confined to national capitals questions about the transfer of experiences to local governance institutions also arise. Essentially, the issue is about whether donors extend existing or create new forms of and platforms for participation given local and non-local value-based conflicts (see Thomas 1996). Related are issues of cultural, material (resource) and political sustenance of forms of participation. Because underlying socio-economic and political circumstances determine possibilities for international support to participation, a polarized environment with relatively closed democratic spaces like Zimbabwe limits the effectiveness of such support. In Chapter 5, the limited financial and general capacity support for local institutions in Zimbabwe and Zambia is highlighted to reflect the challenges international development organizations face regarding the sustenance of their efforts once they withdraw. Where external support is perceived as, interference options for promoting participation effectively remain limited.

2.6.2. Use of national policies, the law and institution building

Participation has been institutionalized through policy and legislative provisions. Planning and other legislation in most countries provide for public consultations. In Zimbabwe settlement layouts, by-laws, Council budgets and planning applications go through a legal process whereby public objections are sought and considered as part of the plan approval process (see Brand 1991; Wekwete 1990). The Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984 and subsequent legislation that gave it formal force also defined

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24 Zimbabwean Local Government Laws, the Regional Town and Country Planning Act and the Environmental Management Act provide for public participation. Zambia’s Local Government Act, Village Registration Act and National Decentralisation Policy also provide for people’s participation. In both countries laws detail the process, structures and recourse procedures.
structures and processes for participation (Plan Afric 1997; Brand 1991; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). However, there are often challenges in terms of limited public understanding of plans, access to officials for lodging objections and following up to ensure that objections are considered. Most Zimbabwean Councils especially on budget consultations seem to hold the view that residents object to everything they propose (*The Standard* 26th August 2007). Since it is the Minister of Local Government and not the residents who approve budgets, Councils tend to lend more weight to Ministry Directives than resident input. A High Court case where business people in Gwanda Rural District Council unsuccessfully sought to interdict Council from increasing rates by 1000% reflects this institutional dilemma. The Court ruled that section 76 of the RDC Act does not make budget consultations a legal requirement but a forum to allow ratepayers to lobby Council (*The Standard* 26th August 2007).

Other international examples include Bolivia’s Law of Popular Participation (LPP) of May 1994. The LPP provided for local institutions (Municipalities) as practical spaces for participation without de-linking from the state (Blackburn and de Toma 1998). Partly because of diligent implementation of the LPP Bolivia’s decentralisation programme is considered to have increased indigenous people’s participation (UNDP 2003). However, the emergence of peasant communities, indigenous people’s and neighborhood councils collectively known as OTBs (Organizacion Territorial de Base) created challenges. Complex relationships amongst the OTBs and with existing civil society organisations posed challenges in entrenching participation.

A study by McGee et al (2003) of legal frameworks for participation in 19 countries in all continents provides some insights into why legislative and policy provisions while essential may not be sufficient to entrench participation. The study concluded that the processes of creating the frameworks, extent of fiscal decentralisation, and level of commitment to participation, state-citizen relationship and allied legislation are also very critical. Where these processes are weak a ‘good policy (on participation) may become unimplementable’ to borrow a phrase from Mosse (2004). It is my view that the LPP challenges and aspects highlighted above are relevant to Zimbabwe particularly aspects of institutional relationships.

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Institution-building is one important strategy for ensuring participation. It involves creation of procedures for decision-making and enabling their appropriate application. It may cover creation of actual organisations or ‘refurbishing’ existing ones. Lisk (1985) and Majeres (1985) note that structural changes, i.e. shifts in socio-economic systems and institutional arrangements, provide meaning to participation. Institutional arrangements, procedures and relationships can be changed nationally or at sub-national levels simultaneously or in phases. Often institution-building is rushed, imposed or both leading to non-use which reduces institutional efficacy. Analysts agree that governments are critical to social development and promotion of participation (Annis 1987; Friedmann 1992; Brohman 1996; Blackburn and de Toma 1998) considering the structural nature of poverty (Friedmann 1992; Chambers 1989; Berner and Phillips 2005). Governments play this role through institution-building.

Examples of challenges faced in institution building for participation include Ethiopia’s mid-1970s land reform programme. Through its 1975 land reforms, government established peasant associations empowered to redistribute expropriated land, establish cooperatives and encourage local infrastructural development and villagization (Lisk 1985; Abbink 2005). The government deployed 60 000 ‘Zemecha’ (facilitators) consisting mainly of urban-based students and state functionaries to implement the process. These facilitators ended up controlling the process and implemented centrally pre-conceived ideas with consequences for institutional and programme sustainability.

Another example is Tanzania’s 1960s policy of self-reliance or villagisation/ujamaa. It saw a significant conceptual chasm between the state and the people (Wignaraja 1993). This difference and the popular intransigence it inspired, among other factors, resulted in the eventual abandonment of the programme. Zimbabwe supported farmers’ groups and cooperatives after independence (GRZ 1981) as did Zambia during President Kaunda’s reign. The demise of some of the Zimbabwean cooperatives followed dwindling state support and the decline of cooperatives as a mode of socio-economic organisation (Mararike 1995; Makumbe 1996). Zimbabwe’s land reform programmes (past and present) have often seen national and sub-national level institutional confusion (see Adams et al 1996; GRZ 1994a; Chatiza 2003). In the post-2000 programme, local spaces were captured by War Veterans in Committees of
Seven affecting participation forms and channels. What is important to reiterate is the point that institutional conflict or inappropriateness is not always accidental but may be deliberate and purposeful (see Engberg-Pedersen 1997; Mbaku 2004; Hammar 2003; Mbeki 2005).

This section has shown how policies and laws alone may not fully provide for participation. At the same time, it has shown that state structures alone or together with popular structures may be difficult to coordinate for effective participation. State support or its absence, central and local institutional differences and policy imperatives all affect participation. Concern with mandates explains why institution-building is often associated with specific interventions. As with projects, institution building tends to have objectives other than participation per se or as an overall goal. However, with project-related institution-building gains may be abandoned on project completion. Policies, legislation and institution-building programmes are not always explicitly about participation but have a bearing on its entrenchment. Similarly, some projects may not be about policy, legislative and institutional changes but may eventually support such processes. The following section discusses how project implementation dynamics may support or inhibit participation.

2.6.3. Participation in/and projects or programmes

Participatory methods have also been institutionalized through programmes and projects. Project implementation is the practical realm for participation (Krishna et al 1997; Kothari and Minogue 2002). Projects are social and physical spaces for organisational interaction and interaction with ordinary people. The interactions affect organisations and communities differently. Projects are often used as incentives to influence behavior (see also section 2.6.1 above). They may catalyze changes within an organisation through exposing implementing organisations or partners to realities that allow forging of new partnerships, access to information, scrutiny and feedback. In this section, I explore how projects are used to institutionalize participation. I highlight the scope projects provide for participation before, during and after their life cycles. Additionally I engage with the difference project ‘promoters’ make in terms of participation and whether the nature of a project and its management processes matter.

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Krishna et al (1997) explain that projects *per se* cannot be faulted if participation is lacking. They are critical of the way that government and donor organisations rigidly design and implement projects within tight and predetermined schedules. The authors argue that this limits project delivery and potential responsiveness to socio-economic changes. Iterative and reflective experimentation backed by supportive and flexible policy contexts are seen as critical for participation and sustainability. However, most project sponsors neither have the time nor the inclination to be patient. Often they apply approaches inconsistent with local capacities and realities. Zimbabwe’s Capacity Building Coordinating Committee (CBCC) identified some of these problems in donor and Government of Zimbabwe supported rural development programmes (GRZ 1999). The CBCC study concluded, among other things, that many programmes actually undermined the capacities of established structures (see Booth 2003; Browne 2007; Moss et al 2006), created ineffective monitoring and evaluation processes and excluded the provincial tier of government.

The list of programmes in the table is not exhaustive but shows how programmes in Zimbabwe have been used to enhance participation from institutional design, resource deployment to benefit extraction and distribution. Other national programmes not included in this analysis include the Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (IRWSS), District Environmental Action Planning (DEAP) and Land Reforms (Phases I through 1999 and II since 2000), among others. However, the analysis provides a balanced assessment of both achievements and challenges. Suffice to highlight that I was directly involved in terms of commissioned work under the Community Action Project (CAP) in 1999 and 2000 as well as IRWSS in 2004, notwithstanding working in Districts where these programmes were implemented.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme.</th>
<th>Focus and achievements.</th>
<th>Implications for Participation.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Communal Area Management Programme</strong> (CAMPFIRE)</td>
<td>Flagship programme of Zimbabwe’s Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (Parastatal) initiated in the mid-1970s and approved in 1988. Devolved natural resource management and use to communal area residents and set up support inter-organisational structures. Initial concept was for communities as land/asset management associations (producer communities) but later Appropriate Authority status assigned to Councils (2 in 1989, 21 in 1991 &amp; 4 others in 1995). Success attributed to governmental, academic, NGO enthusiasts &amp; community leadership. Communities with ‘big five’ benefited from tourism-related revenue used for school and health centre construction, sharing dividends and handicraft sales.</td>
<td>Change from producer communities &amp; restrictions on Councils limited programme performance. As income source, CAMPFIRE compares poorly to alternative land uses. Recent slump in tourists/hunters and land reform induced wildlife and wildlife habitat losses have affected the programme. Inter-organisational conflicts have also affected CAMPFIRE.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Pilot District Support Programme</strong> (PDSP); 1989 to 1995.</td>
<td>Improving development planning from Province to local levels. Piloted in 2 Midlands Districts (Mberengwa and Gokwe/Cheziya) with block grants for inter-sectoral plans complemented by local revenue collected by traditional leaders. Linking local needs and local revenue increased collection efficiency from 10 to 70%. Council capacities built in monitoring, financial management, planning and supervising activities.</td>
<td>Elite domination; Village to Council (see Makombe 1993). Focus on infrastructure not socio-economic changes. Weak continuity management i.e. rushing to new projects, weak support for Councils to deepen lessons.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. Community Action Project</strong> (CAP) 1999-2002.</td>
<td>Part of Government’s Enhanced Social Protection Programme (ESS25) supported by the World Bank. Targeted 26 of the poorest Districts after the 1995 Poverty Study (PASS I) &amp; directly gave funds to boost community poverty coping mechanisms, met 80% of project costs (Communities 20%), built community capacities in participatory needs assessment, prioritization, planning and implementation, managing and maintaining investments. CAP encouraged collaboration with NGOs and private sector. In-District targeting followed Notional Poverty Maps indicating most deprived localities.</td>
<td>Discontinuance of direct resource disbursement to communities and use of the notional poverty map (NPM). The objectivity in resource allocation that the NPM enabled has been lost.</td>
</tr>
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Source: Adapted from Makombe (1993); King and Cutshall (1994); Conyers (2003); Plan Afric (1997); Chatiza (2003); GRZ (2000c, 2000b) and personal experiences.

25 Other components included the Basic Educational Assistance Module (BEAM), Public Assistance, CAP and SDF: SDF funded micro-enterprise development and poverty monitoring, CAP community development, BEAM provided fees and other school needs for children from poor households and the Public Assistance program paid cash allowances to poor families.
The programmes were pre-cursors of and gave scope to the implementation of decentralisation policies, enabling delivery of practical services while establishing new or building capacities of existing institutions. In the main, they show varying levels to which government has devolved authority as with CAMPFIRE and resource disbursement arrangements (CAP). In the different programmes different clusters of actors within and outside government supported genuine participation while others did not and used different methods to define and govern participation e.g. the guidelines used by the Parks and Wildlife Authority to determine wildlife off-take in a given season. In the CAMPFIRE case the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG26), later CAMPFIRE Association represents such a coalescing of interests supportive of participation. Coalitions occur at the level of individuals within institutions making it difficult to label whole institutions supportive or unsupportive of participation.

However, let me emphasize that projects tend to provide safer spaces for individual professionals and/or policy-makers to change procedures, policies and generally to work with and in new realities. To use Gaventa’s (2005) terms, projects allow ‘claiming of and being invited to’ spaces otherwise closed. Projects also allow the changing of institutional mandates and procedures. CAP funding arrangements and the PDSP and RDCCBP grants made it possible to provide funding to Districts and communities using more flexible and timely procedures than comparable central government systems allow. The challenge however with projects relates to sustaining lessons and successful approaches. The above cases paint a picture of limited scope for continuing with some of the good practices. The issue of external resources to finance innovations is also critical. All the programmes including IRWSS and previous Land Reforms have had considerable external support e.g. 80% of IRWSS operational and infrastructure costs (GRZ 2000b).

The World Bank’s Community-Driven Development Projects (CDD)27 since the 1990s have generally aimed at strengthening the poor’s livelihoods through higher incomes and access to basic services like education, health, roads and water (Malhotra

26 The Parks and Wildlife Authority, Zimbabwe Trust, Ministry of Local Government, CAMPFIRE Districts, WWF and Centre for Applied Social Sciences (University of Zimbabwe).
27 Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) in Indonesia since 1998, National Rural Support Programmes in Pakistan since 1982, Brazil’s portfolio of CDD initiatives in North-Eastern States since 1985 and Social Funds in Malawi, Zambia and Yemen.
However, Mansuri and Rao (2004) note that CDD projects were not effective at targeting the poor and most were dominated by elites despite expressly focusing on empowerment of the poor. Grants and facilitation of community-grounded planning and monitoring processes, standardization of procedures, cross-border learning, scaling up using different institutional avenues (local governments and state funding) and offering alternatives to state-based service provision all transform development processes. However, analysts note that political economy questions are critical to the sustenance of CDD innovations and where decentralisation is tentative withdrawal of grants (World Bank in this case) almost always signal the end of the innovations (Malhotra 2005; see Green 2002; Mercer 2002).

The ‘Southern Case Studies’ by Krishna et al (1997) argue for well thought out and adaptable initiatives ‘...conceived by leadership that persisted and shared credit widely, by melding so-called traditional and modern features into new and attractive combinations...' and also offering 'the promise of change that is transformative, not just incremental' (1997:6). This is presented as an alternative to a blueprint development approach. Critical aspects in this conception of projects and participation include flexibility, direct support, and use of local resources, transformative changes and localization of interventions. This requires considerable local initiative and resource deployment. It looks at development as both continuous and endemic. This does not preclude external support but creates a basis for an insider-outsider relationship premised on the agenda, institutional and development processes determined by insiders. The challenge is about attaining and replicating this ideal. This raises questions about development organisations and the policy environments they experiment in regarding promoting participation.

This section has shown how and why projects are important in influencing or enabling institutional interactions and innovations supportive of participation. This is in part through creation of spaces that make changing procedures safe as well as freeing provision of resources from certain bureaucratic inhibitions. Organisations and individuals are provided with space within which to innovate before and during but not so much beyond the life-cycle of interventions. Multi-stakeholder project implementation platforms seem to provide more space for questioning non-participatory practices more so where there are individual champions. Sustenance of
institutional gains enabled by projects seems to be predicated on the underlying political economy of a particular context, which resonates with the observation by Green (2002) about underlying social realities not fully accessible to project dynamics.

2.6.4. The role of NGOs in promoting participation

NGOs plan and implement projects some of which are innovative. They build institutional capacities at different levels through direct training, transfer of lessons and working in partnerships (Charlick 2001; Johnson and Wilson 2000; Krishna 2003). At times, they set up structures for managing projects. Where the structures are parallel, NGOs may be accused of by-passing and undermining formal structures (GRZ 1999; Sankore 2005). NGOs undertake research and analysis to inform their programmes or lobby governments, among others, to attend to issues considered critical. They thus can be or create a voice for the poor and marginalized, lead or participate in efforts aimed at increasing accountability and may participate in conflict resolution within and between communities and development organisations. These diverse activity arenas provide scope for the promotion and direct application of participation. As a result, NGOs have been commended for their substantial experience with participation (World Bank, 1994).

Lane (1997) observes that available evidence on NGO's participatoriness is contradictory and partial while Ebrahim (2003) raises internal accountability questions and notes weak self-regulation. There is also growing critical literature challenging NGOs at the level of their identity i.e. whether NGOs (and the civil society of which they are part) are separate from the state (Tandon and Mohanty 2003) as some of the organisations are state dependent (Ibid; Bangura 1999). The other relates to the extent of NGO transfer of power to the people they work with. Doubts are also expressed in relation to their management capabilities, the replicability of their interventions, the small-scale nature of their interventions, unclear levels and durations of NGO support and questions of sustainability (Pijnenburg and Nhamtumbo 2002; Pretty and Scoones 1997; Riddell et al 1995; Mungate 1993; Moyo 2002; Nyangoro 1999). In this regard, I would like to note that power, including NGO power might also constrain participation. As NGOs work in and with poor communities, their relations with the latter are not of equality. By virtue
of being in a position to support grassroots interventions while also engaging with government and other external stakeholders usually inaccessible to locals, NGOs become powerful actors in relation to communities.

The ephemeral nature of NGO-community contact through time-bound interventions cannot be a firm basis for entrenching participation. Lane (1997:189) argues that ‘NGO projects in general do not guarantee either the high intensity or wide scope of participation implied by the empowerment approach’ (see Nyangoro 1999’s good, bad and ugly; Mararike 1995; Dixon 2002). Pretty and Scoones (1997) acknowledge the many successes in community-based and participatory approaches by NGOs but note that these tend to remain local. The reasons some NGO success stories remain localized despite their promise requires investigation within the context of finding avenues for scaling up in specific contexts. Perhaps more work is needed to detail Edwards and Hulme’s (1992) multiplicative and diffusive strategies of scaling up particularly regarding the form and extent of lateral transfer of influence.

Limited documentary evidence and the above arguments notwithstanding, NGOs generally reach out to the poor innovatively (Clark 1991), emphasize processes through which people learn and gain control over their lives rather than execution of tasks. NGOs apply flexible, small-scale and experiment-based development interventions. NGOs’ claims to innovation and flexibility (i.e. being non-bureaucratic) do have some foundation in reality (Lane 1997; see Krishna et al 1997; Pretty and Scoones 1997; Uphoff et al 1998; Uphoff 1996; Brohman 1996; Johnson and Wilson 2000). The autonomy and independence from political pressure, patronage and the grip of local elites are other potential advantages that NGOs have. This enables them to promote participation. Grassroots NGO operations tend to increase people’s demand for participatory interventions (Lane 1997), often creating problems for the state (see Blackburn and de Toma 1998). Nyangoro (1999) observes that in East and Southern Africa ‘NGOs have come to symbolise opposition to current regimes and the galvanisation of civil society’ (1999:9).

Let me conclude section 2.6 by summing up some of the key issues raised. First, is the reality that different clusters of actors (state-related agencies, international development organisations, NGOs and local level organisations) promote
participation singularly as well as through interacting with others. Such promotion of participation is affected by the internal uniqueness of the actors as well as their relations with others as was discussed with international development organisations and the sovereignty debate (see Sankore 2005). Actor-specific questions posed include around the implications of the limited replicability of NGO experiences with participation. Second, were issues of ‘contextual participatoriness’. Given that most available evidence is tentative, of contestable generalizability and that NGOs alone cannot entrench participation, what other options exist? Which institutions have the comparative advantages for promoting participation i.e. breadth and depth? What role can local government structures play in this respect? Can their more commonplace and legislated existence (Schroeder 2000) be mobilized to structure participation more sustainably? What would be the implications for relationships amongst local governance institutions (including the different state structures) and the people? However, NGO experiences are crucial in institutionalising participation. Despite weak recognition as legitimate local governance institutions in Zimbabwe, NGOs have played a critical role. That NGOs are not linked to formal development structures and systems in some countries creates challenges. On their part, some NGOs feel accountable to communities while others do not. Principally funded from outside, NGO legitimacy is often questioned by the state (see Nyangoro 1999). Outside accountability is perceived as outweighing local accountability making NGOs doubtful participation promoters.

Mechanisms for institutionalising participation benefit from both state and non-state facilitated processes. State leadership of the promotion of participation, while indispensable, has been seen as proceeding in starts and stops trapping policy innovations in top-down frameworks (Haidari and Wright 2001; Makumbe 1998). In institutionalising participation, the form of state leadership remains critical (Fritz and Menocal 2007). Issues of local-level consciousness and self-reliance (Tilakaratna 1987; Nyoni 1987; Kar 2003) and whether poor people can ever be left alone (Berner and Phillips 2005; Aniss 1987) also emerge as critical. On the other hand, does it matter if projects are ‘top-down’ as long as they use means accessible to the poor and yield benefits to them (see Schumacher 1973)? This is an important question considering that poor people robustly respond to ‘imposed’ processes and institutions
Another question relates to the role of policy-making and institution-building. If policy and legislative provisions alone are inadequate (McGee et al 2003; Blackburn and de Toma 1998) how can the other dimensions (fiscal decentralisation, commitment to participation from above etc) be addressed? Is participation to focus on global, national policy formulation processes and spaces or sub-national ones (Booth 2003; Moss et al 2006; Browne 2007; Sankore 2005; Makumbe 2001; UNDP 2003; Robb 2002)? A point to be made is that none of the mechanisms can singularly address all participation challenges. While the role of government is critical in creating a supportive policy, legislative and institutional environment, other actors make participation work by practicing it on the ground. The discussion that follows focuses on some of these issues.

2.7. Constraints and dynamics in institutionalising participation

Institutionalising participation faces a number of problems. The main ones are in four groups as follows:

2.7.1. Factors related to poor people themselves

These include literacy levels, levels of organisation and leadership, technical skills and ability to exert political influence (Lisk 1985; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Majeres 1985; Esman and Uphoff 1984; Friedmann 1992), which are usually lower or weaker amongst the poor compared to the rich. However, some analysts deny that the poor lack initiative arguing that they are active and organised (Chambers 1983, 1997; Uphoff et al 1998; Nyoni 1987; Tilakaratna 1987; Robb 2002). Based on her experiences with a Zimbabwean NGO

Sithembiso Nyoni is a founder member of the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) based in Bulawayo and working with poor people’s groups in Western Zimbabwe.
2.7.2. Economic Factors
Participation has a cost and often a high one in terms of people’s time and material resources. As a result, those with the resources tend to participate ahead of those without resources. In addition, some organisations lack resources to facilitate participation e.g. holding consultative meetings (see Mukamuri et al 2003). Where people do not perceive benefits, the likelihood of participation is low. The delivery of benefits from an intervention at times brings people together to develop common interests (Eyben and Ladbury 1997; World Bank 1994) and thus facilitates participation.

2.7.3. The role of professionals and organisations
As noted by Eyben and Ladbury (1997:196) ‘the professional training and culture of some sector specialists militates against an emphasis on participation’. Nyoni (1987:53) makes a relevant point thus,

‘...interveners have to know that they are often more dangerous than they are helpful to the rural poor...they often pretend to represent the fashionable and universally acceptable development ideas, knowledge and skills. Great pressure is put on the poor to comply with certain universal conditions’.

Chambers’ reversals discourse is also informed by the reality that professionals often lack the inclination to initiate and sustain participation (Chambers 1983, 1997). Craig and Porter (1997) argue that projects, professionals and organisations are essentially instruments of control rather than of participation and that, they frame or determine the form and extent of participation. Jackson (1997) notes that field-workers as professionals use their experiences to mediate between projects and people and in the process shape participation. Organisational capacities, procedures or processes play an important part in participation (World Bank 1994).

2.7.4. Political and institutional dynamics
Apart from the extent of organisation amongst the poor, broader institutional processes and structures may block or facilitate participation. In some communities, power disparities play out in such a way that other powerful groups make it impossible for weaker ones to articulate, promote and protect their interests (see Green 2002; Narayan et al 2000; Mukamuri et al 2003). Political polarization, as currently in Zimbabwe, may constrain active participation for fear of victimization. In South Africa, the increasing strength of representative democracy (Lyons et al 2001) is negatively shifting the nature of the participatory process with the state
repositioning itself as a critical actor and conduit for resources and re-configuring its relations particularly with NGOs/CBOs. Porter and Onyach-Olaa (1999) caution against over-valuing representative (democratic) structures citing the social, technical and economic distance between elected officials and the electorate. These dynamics have implications for participation spaces and processes i.e. ‘doing development’. A related argument is the politicization of local administrative staff, often making public servants’ accountability difficult leading to three distinct voices emerging i.e. politicians, administrators/technocrats and the public (Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999). These three internally heterogeneous clusters are critical in terms of determining the form and extent of participation.

Enhancing effective participation is attempted through different mechanisms and interventions. Success is mediated by specific stakeholders, their internal characteristics and motivations but also the external circumstances including policies and power dynamics. External factors may be unique to individual development organisations or common to all stakeholders in an intervention, but the key may rest with value-based interpretations. I return to this point in Chapter 3, Figure 1. The quality and nature of participation is thus affected by a myriad of factors and organisational systems, mandates and development visions. Field tensions, central-local government dynamics, NGO-state relationships and North-South divide all play a part. Below I discuss institutional structures based on decentralisation literature. The idea is to deepen understanding of the opportunities for and constraints to participation in decentralised governance and development management.

2.8. Decentralising for participation: theoretical issues and case study country experiences

This section does two things. It extends and contextualizes the theoretical discussion started above, focusing on decentralisation, and then grounds it in the experiences of Zimbabwe and Zambia. Theories of participation discussed in previous sections, are dealt with again only insofar as they relate to the case study countries to connect participation and decentralisation. As noted in section 2.1 the idea is to show whether participation is anchored in decentralised (usually state-created), popular structures, stakeholders, or is based on different combinations of all these. I link the literature on
participation to the experiences of the case study countries to help situate and provide a rationale for the statement of the research problem and research methodology in Chapters 3 and 4. Common issues, lessons and positive experiences from decentralisation in both countries are also discussed.

The underlying rationale for adopting and implementing decentralisation in both countries has been to enhance people’s participation in development and local governance generally. As such the main question in this section is what lessons can be drawn from the two case study countries about the extent to which decentralisation has expanded the possibilities for more participatory forms of development to be institutionalized at the local level. Whether decentralisation or participation comes first is not my focus. The emphasis is on clarifying the practical and theoretical symbiosis between them. Within the African context, the theoretical and practical rationale of the two concepts is shared. Related is the hope that simultaneously adopting and applying decentralisation and participation addresses the problems of limited development (see African Charter 1990).

2.8.1. Conceptualising decentralisation and its connections with participation

Decentralisation concerns changes in the administrative and political relationship between the state and its organs. For Turner and Hulme (1997) decentralisation entails a search for a balance between central control and local autonomy that satisfies regime needs and popular demands but it is not the opposite of centralisation. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983:9) refer to decentralisation in terms of ‘...the degree of control that central governments can and should have over development planning and administration’. For Conyers (2002) it involves a process whereby functions previously undertaken by central government institutions become the responsibility of governmental and non-governmental institutions at sub-national levels.

Decentralisation has been applied in different policy environments and by governments and international development organisations with varied backgrounds and interests (Conyers 2002). The issue of costs for providing public services is also central in decentralisation processes. In virtually all instances, decentralisation proceeds on the basis of specific policies or legal instruments to guide the changes. Often, institutional structures, procedures and relationships are altered as part of

Decentralisation’s diverse appeal is both fascinating and a concern. Its popularity might be interpreted as showing beneficial potential. However, some decentralisation policies have ended up being strategies for deepening central control (see Brand 1991; Conyers 2003; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991; Shah and Thomson 2004) suggesting that we should have serious doubts about the impact of decentralisation. The poverty-reduction agenda has also been regarded as one that could benefit from decentralisation (Conyers 2007; GRZ 2004; LGAZ 1998; King and Cutshall 1994). Doubts are however beginning to be expressed about this link, which is not always straightforward. Decentralisation appeals both to genuine decentralisers and centralists cloaking their autocratic tendencies (Crook and Manor 1998). Tensions over expectations often breed conflicts over the pursuit of decentralisation.

As discussed in previous sections, taking direct part in development is often mediated through socio-economic or political organisations notwithstanding participation on an individual basis, through representatives or stakeholders. I focus in this section on participation facilitated through or by organisational structures because this brings out the issue of how organisational arrangements and functions affect people’s participation. Because decentralisation concerns defining what is done at what level and the attendant organisational frameworks it can leverage participation. On the other hand participation may enable decentralisation in cases where active participation increases the capacity of an organisation (or individuals) to a point where it becomes possible to formally assume (or be assigned) more roles and powers. It is possible to argue that decentralisation enables participation and participation sustains decentralisation. As will be argued later, this symbiotic relationship is at once apparent and latent depending on contextual factors, the form of decentralisation and objectives being pursued. It will be further argued that, all forms of decentralisation can yield spaces for heightening participation (citizen
power). In this section, I adopt the view that participation is about speaking to and interacting with power. The further away those with power are i.e. the more centralised the structures and processes, the more limited participation becomes (see African Charter 1990).

Decentralisation has recurred in Africa since independence (Ndegwa 2002) although it also has a pre-independence history (Turner and Hulme 1997, Enemuo, 2000) e.g. Britain’s Indirect Rule Policy and the establishment of local government systems in colonies after the Second World War. For British territories the 1947 Colonial Office Dispatch (Turner and Hulme 1997) officially communicated this slant. British colonies in East Africa (Kenya and Uganda) and Central Africa (Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi) bear the footprints of this policy history as much as those of subsequent decentralisation phases. Two further decentralisation phases can be noted. The first is the post-1960s wave inspired by the attainment of independence and the second is the post-1980s phase intricately tied to political and economic liberalisation programmes.

Three main forms of decentralisation are generally noted in the literature i.e. de-concentration, delegation and devolution (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983; Turner and Hulme 1997). I briefly define these in turn below largely based on the views of Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) as they have relevance to the discussion that follows. *De-concentration* is shifting workload within central government institutions from head to field offices. De-concentrated institutions owe allegiance more to their institutional hierarchies than to local stakeholders. One of the more specific reasons for de-concentrating is to ensure central government closeness to the people. *Delegation* relates to the transfer of functions to semi-autonomous development organisations or Parastatals not under the direct control of central government. However, the Parastatals are linked to a ‘parent Ministry’ monitoring or supervising them. *Devolution* entails creation or strengthening of independent levels or units of (local) government that are outside the direct control of central government and to which it (central government) relinquishes certain functions. The local governments operate within legally recognizable spatial boundaries, have a corporate status and powers to secure resources, perform public functions within their areas and interact reciprocally with other units of government. To many, devolution is seen as the ideal type of decentralisation (Turner and Hulme 1997).
Ndegwa and Levy (2003) present a framework (Table 4) depicting decentralisation phases from initiation to sustenance, juxtaposed to key stakeholders. In assessing any decentralisation policy their variables and questions are important.

Table 4: Analytical framework for assessing decentralisation

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Engaging Decentralisation</td>
<td>How strong is the elite political consensus in favor of decentralisation?</td>
<td>To what extent is the decentralisation discourse underpinned by technical and comparative analysis?</td>
<td>How strong is bottom-up pressure for local empowerment?</td>
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<td>Initiating.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detailing Decentralisation</td>
<td>How engaged is the political elite in ensuring that the details of decentralisation are consistent with political intent?</td>
<td>How cooperative is the bureaucracy in developing and implementing new decentralised systems of governance?</td>
<td>How involved are civil society organisations in defining their entry points and their level of involvement in contemplated technical details?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning etc.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustaining Decentralisation</td>
<td>To what extent do elite political and bureaucratic stakeholders seek to re-assert central control over authority and resources?</td>
<td>How capable are communities of enforcing downward accountability on local elites?</td>
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Source: Ndegwa and Levy 2003:6 (see McGee et al 2003 on role of bottom up demand for participation, Porter and Onyach-Olai 1999 on community tracking of decisions).

2.8.2. Reasons for decentralising

Sub-Saharan African countries have pursued decentralisation mainly for nation-building, in response to democratization pressures and, among other reasons, to make service delivery more responsive. Olowu (2001) cites at least four motivating factors for democratic decentralisation from the mid-1970s. These are economic, fiscal and political crises resulting from failing centralised public sector management, non-state domestic pressures, pressure from external donors, and growing urbanization. Some of these factors closely relate to the reasons and mechanisms for institutionalising participation in section 2.6 above. Economic reform policies, especially the aspects relating to cost-sharing and removal of social sector subsidies, have played a part in making decentralisation popular. Decentralising service delivery has been seen as a panacea to the withdrawal of the state from specific sectors. It has often been criticized as ‘dumping down’ functions mainly to local government bodies without the commensurate resources for the delivery of such services. The discussion of decentralisation motivations is expanded in each of the country sub-sections below.
2.8.3. Decentralising for participation in Zimbabwe

Decentralisation has been a major policy thrust in Zimbabwe from independence as an integral part of nation-building (Makumbe 1996; 1998; Brand 1991; Wekwete 1990; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). For rural local governance, four main phases can be identified which coincided with the enactment of key legislation or policy instruments guiding decentralisation. First was the establishment of District Councils in 1980 through the District Councils Act. Second was the 1984 Prime Minister’s Directive closely linked to and given legal force by the Provincial Councils and Administration Act of 1985. Third was the amalgamation of District and Rural Councils from 1993 although the enabling legislation, the Rural District Councils Act had been passed in 1988. The final changes were introduced through the Traditional Leaders’ Act of 2000. Each phase is discussed below emphasizing the essential features and their effects on the structures.

The immediate post-independence decentralisation era was influenced by the policy desire to undo the racial white-settler colonial government policies of separate development and governance structures in rural and urban areas (dualism29). African rural areas (Tribal Trust Lands) were governed by traditional leaders (Chiefs) who were salaried based on their grades (dependent on numbers of tax-paying adults) and reported to Native Commissioners in the Department of Native Affairs. At least 220 African Councils existed at independence (Hammar 2003; Plan Afric 1997). The District Councils Act created 55 District Councils by amalgamating the African Councils. The administrative head of Council was a District Administrator (Ministry of Local Government and Housing) while elected Councilors chose their Chair from amongst themselves. The District Councils co-existed with 45 Rural Councils, which administered mainly white commercial farming areas (former European areas). Phase one saw the bringing of all local government issues (in former European and African as well as in rural and urban areas) under one Ministry of Local Government and Housing (African Councils had hitherto been the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Traditional leaders were sidelined and one of the justifications for this was their alleged collaboration with the white settler regime before independence.

29 In urban areas the dual city (white and black sections) was also progressively abolished. Capacity building programmes with a focus on infrastructure, human and financial management components were implemented with significant bilateral and multilateral support.
The second phase of the local governance reforms saw the appointment of eight Provincial Governors with Ministerial powers under the Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984. The Directive launched the development planning policy, sought to integrate District with provincial and national planning structures and formalized ZANU PF institutions. It also entrenched the sidelining of traditional structures (see Gasper 1997; Plan Afric 1997; Brand 1991). Governors’ brief related to coordinating and implementing development planning in their provinces using a consultative approach. Elected Ward and Village Development Committees (WADCOs and VIDCOs) were created to facilitate people’s participation in sub-District development planning while Provincial and District Development Committees (mainly made up of government officials) at District and Provincial levels were created for the participation of field (government) administrators and local authorities otherwise operating parallel to each other. In terms of planning five-year and annual planning cycles were introduced. Village through Provincial Development Committees were to facilitate inclusion of people’s priorities in National Development Plans. The policy had disappointing results at Ward and Village levels because of capacity, financial, organisational and other general support limitations (Gasper 1997).

The 1988 RDC Act amalgamated District and Rural Councils to form Rural District Councils (RDCs), ending the rural local government dualism (Feltoe 2006). The Act was however kept in abeyance until 1993 when the Rural and District Councils were amalgamated to establish 55 RDCs (58 by 2005 due to subdivisions to ease administration). The Act defines 64 functions that the RDCs can perform. Most of these functions are however performed by central government departments with deferred and often long transfer processes. A Rural Development Forum in the early 1990s did preparatory work undertaking studies to ensure trouble-free amalgamation. The same period coincided with the implementation of pilot programmes for rural local authority capacity building e.g. the Pilot District Support Programme (PDSP). One of the principal outputs of the Rural Development Forum was the Strategic Plan for Capacity Building of 1994 later the Rural District Council Capacity Building Programme (RDCCBP) implemented between 1996 and 2001. In the same period, Government also came up with 13 principles of decentralisation defining the policy direction and implementation modalities particularly ministerial transfer of functions.
and staff to RDCs, building their capacities, the division of functions between the centre and Councils and the channeling of resources (GRZ 1998). The principles were the clearest government got in terms of committing itself to giving Councils more developmental responsibilities. The promise to transfer functions to RDCs raised expectations amongst RDCs and provided momentum for RDC capacity building (the RDCCBP). This acted as an incentive for government to re-launch the decentralisation programme in 1996 alongside implementing the RDCCBP. In a way, the efficacy of the Development Committees seemed to become doubtful by this time.

The last phase saw the enactment of the Traditional Leaders’ Act in 2000 and Statutory Instrument 15 of 2001 with the intention of harmonizing elected and traditional leadership in rural local governance. The legislation focused on the sub-District structures where traditional leaders had been excluded (see also Abbink 2005) from the process in previous phases. Problems arising from traditional leaders’ retention of influence (see Nugent 2004; Odotei 2005; Mukamuri et al 2003) caused operational anxieties especially for elected officials. From about 2 functions before the new Act, traditional leaders now have at least 14 functions and receive significant government allowances. Harmonization of traditional and elected leaders (see also Ray et al 1997; GRZ 1994a; UNECA 2005; Zack-Williams et al 2002) has been seen as a way of ensuring effective local governance. This is based on the notion that traditional leaders ‘own’ the people, are a legitimating, unifying or socially stabilizing force and wield significant power arising from performing local land administration functions. As such their involvement is seen as critical to bridging the gap between ‘their people’ and external development organisations (Councils, government etc). Ray et al (1997) argues that the political legitimacy of traditional leaders should be added to that of local government to strengthen the latter and expand its capacity.

Arguments for incorporating traditional leaders in local government are generally persuasive but also arise from the serious dilemmas that local people have regarding the different actors (Oomen 2002). Quoting a young woman in Sekhukhune, South Africa, Oomen (2002) notes that ‘...traditional leaders are not capable, the elected Councilors not reliable and the government is far away and does not listen to us. So for now let’s just keep the traditional leaders’ (Oomen 2002:2). In Zimbabwe, the payment of traditional leaders, colonial and post-colonial association with the ruling
party and government in a generally polarized environment all make local governance difficult. The payment of allowances to traditional leaders in Zimbabwe is seen as a reward for or inducement to support the ruling party (CPIA 2005). The challenges associated with the place and role of traditional leadership institutions across Africa is one legacy of colonialism. Nugent (2004) characterises the legacy in relation to the perverse effect of colonial contradictions on the state and society (see Mbembe 2001; Mamdani 1996), the contradictions associated with post-colonial continuities and changes particularly the simultaneous transfers of power from Europeans to African political elites and from Chiefs to elected officials. As observed by Nugent,

‘Traditional rulers did not take rejection lightly and...often fought a rearguard action to capture political voice... They argued that ...they embodied a deeper legitimacy than politicians...they [were] duty-bound to speak out on behalf of their people when the politicians got it wrong’ (Nugent 2004:107; see also Ray et al 1997).

WADCOs and VIDCOs created in line with the 1984 and 1985 Prime Minister’s Directives and chaired by elected officials who were mainly ZANU PF cadres (Brand 1991; Hammar 2003) have been changed to Assemblies presided over by traditional leaders. Headmen chair Ward while Village Heads chair Village Assemblies. Village Assemblies comprise of all villagers above 18 years while Ward Assemblies are made up of all Village Heads, Headmen and the Councilor of the respective Ward. The Assemblies are assisted by Development Committees chaired by a Village Head and a Councilor for the Village and Ward Committees respectively. Councils have become visible actors in development with some of the functions transferred especially social welfare, health and roads with grants from the centre for implementing activities through relevant sector Ministries. The Rural District Development Committee (formerly District Development Committee), is chaired by the DA and brings together field administrators, NGOs and other development actors. Although the RDDC is a Committee of Council, that the DA (its chair) is a senior Government official makes it more powerful than other Council Committees made up of Councilors and serviced by Council executives.

Decentralisation in Zimbabwe has experienced stops, starts and detours. New institutions created experienced resistance e.g. the pre-2000 WADCOs and VIDCOs as well as ongoing friction between traditional leaders and Councilors despite the

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creation of Assemblies. Institutional friction/overlaps (see Nugent 2004; Engberg-Pedersen 1997), lack of resources and capacities to take on more responsibilities and the unwieldy nature of the structures have acted to constrain their effectiveness (Gasper 1997; Chiwewe 199731; GRZ 1994a). New structures appear to have had more of a mandate to implement national programmes than to steer meaningful local participation. Others have observed that Zimbabwe’s decentralisation was not properly synchronized with capacity building of local institutions (Chikate 199732). Some local institutions are given similar mandates e.g. Councilors and traditional leaders (both) are often defined as ‘community entry points’ for use by outside development organisations. This has caused confusion for outsiders and friction between the two.

Weak horizontal coordination and the center’s reluctance to cede power (see Makombe 1993; Feltoe 2006; World Bank 2002; Enemuo 2000) have also been experienced in Zimbabwe’s decentralisation. Some weaknesses arise from the caliber of people who participate in spaces like the RDDC. Brand (1991) and Mutizwa-Mangiza (1991) noted that RDDCs were weak because junior staff attended meetings and were unable to make key decisions or offer adequate advice. The Minister of Local Government and Urban Development observed in 2004 that ‘...it is painful that since 1984...we have not posted meaningful progress in regard to decentralisation. We continue to witness centrist tendencies in the management of business...integrated development has been difficult to achieve’ (Chombo 2004:333). At the level of creating structures, Zimbabwe’s decentralisation policies have thus seen some success (see Conyers 2007). The smooth functioning and relationships remain weak. Ironically, spaces with political, legal and administrative security seem operationally weak. Because of legal enshrinement (RDC Act) and being chaired by the DA, the RDDC wields significant power but is not effective in most cases. I return to these issues particularly in Chapter 5. However, the shifts and legitimacy questions regarding key District actors, which have not been consolidated, appear to stifle participation (see Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006; Feltoe 2006).

31 Official opening speech as Permanent Secretary of Local Government at an ARDCZ workshop on decentralization and capacity building (Harare).
32 Chief Executive of ARDCZ’s address at the decentralization and capacity building workshop
33 Keynote address to a workshop for Heads of Departments (in the Ministry), Provincial Administrators, Provincial Planning Officers, Public Works Officers, DAs, 1-2 April 2004 at the Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration and Management (ZIPAM).
2.8.4. Decentralising for participation in Zambia

Post-independence decentralisation trends in Zambia have a longer history than in Zimbabwe by virtue of the country having attained independence earlier. Principal legislative milestones include the repeal of the Native Authority Ordinance by the Local Government Act of 1965, which ushered in Rural Councils. Between 1964 and 1979, Zambia focused on dismantling the colonial legacy by creating structures for development at all levels starting with the National Planning Commission, Provincial Development and District Development Committees (P/DDC). The existence of parallel central and local government was seen as a duplication of effort, expensive and a source of institutional conflict. Furthermore, the PDCs and DDCs had no power to make decisions or source funds. Features of the UNIP government’s ‘decentralised centralism’ or one-party participatory democracy included strengthening party control of the bureaucracy and centrally appointing leaders for local party structures. As such, there was no decentralisation within sector Ministries. Throughout the UNIP era, local authorities remained sidelined (Chikulo 1981; Government of Zambia 1995; 2003; 2004).

The 1979 Village Development and Registration Act created Ward and Village Development Committees (WADCOs and VIDCOs) with villages becoming the primary focus for local development. The 1980 to 1990 period saw high levels of political interference as the one-party state took root. This was done under the Local Administration Act (LAA) of 1980, which repealed the Local Government Act of 1965. The LAA abolished local government elections, resulted in ‘stuffed Councils’ as the party placed cadres to run Council business and functions were transferred from central to local government without commensurate resources. This era effectively saw the merger of Councils/local government with the party administration. Local and central government were also conflated until the LAA was repealed by the Local Government Act of 1991 under the MMD Government (see Government of Zambia 2003).

The Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ) observed that, through running electricity undertaking and receiving predetermined grants from the centre, Councils operated smoothly (LGAZ 1998). However, between 1973 and 1980,
Councils lost some government grants, revenue-generating undertakings like electricity and sources like land tax making it difficult for Councils to provide services. Local Government staff received hefty government-negotiated salaries, which further depleted Council resources. The trend continued after 1991. Government grants further declined (LGAZ 1998) and Acts of Parliament further reducing their revenue generation and related powers. Examples include the withdrawal of vehicle licensing functions, the sale of Council houses and the increase in properties exempted from taxation, among others. This trend and the increasing poverty in both rural and urban Zambia makes it increasingly hard for Councils to provide services. Although the national decentralisation policy is clear on the role of local government such emphasis is not backed by existing legislation and previous processes that have left Councils weak.

A Cabinet Circular of 1995 created Development Coordinating Committees at national, provincial and District levels spelling out the functions, membership, procedures, reporting and administrative arrangements for these structures (Government of Zambia 1995). Government has facilitated the setting up of Area Development Committees (ADCs) in rural areas and Resident Development Committees (RDCs) in urban areas since the early 1990s as structures for citizen participation. Ward-level institutions promote people’s involvement in decision-making. Chiefs and Councilors are not directly involved in ADCs and RDCs but through representatives and as ex-officio respectively. These changes are currently picking up implementation pace since the adoption of the Decentralisation Policy in 2003 and are therefore yet to bear fruit let alone settle into the Zambian local governance terrain. The force and effect of the 1995 Circular has been widespread and significant in terms of shaping Zambian local governance. The decentralisation policy (to be implemented over ten years) is a culmination of MMD government initiatives since 1991 and further supports the 1995 Circular by defining government’s long-term vision of a decentralised and democratically elected system of governance (Government of Zambia 2003). The policy highlights effective local community participation in decision-making, development and administration through maintaining sufficient core-periphery linkages (Ibid: 1).
Generally, Zambia's decentralisation experiences failed to create strong local institutions. ADCs, RDCs and heightened implementation of the 2003 Decentralisation Policy provide hope that emerging institutions will be rallying points for citizen participation. What remains is providing these structures with adequate resources and building their capacities to operate smoothly. Anxieties remain about centralist tendencies but positive economic performance appears to underpin people's capacity to participate. As with the sub-section on Zimbabwe, the rest of the thesis discusses whether the structures discussed here can enhance participation.

2.8.5. Does decentralisation engender participation?

The implementation of decentralisation has been determined by political factors in both countries. Challenges faced relate to technical issues, local capacity questions, and the role of ruling party interests, bureaucratic inertia and local institutional dynamics (see Ndegwa 2002; Olowu 1990; Conyers 2002, 2003; World Bank 2002, 2003; Enemuo 2000). While the general intention of decentralisation is to get government closer to the people it would appear in the two countries centralised government is what has been taken to the people. In earlier periods both Zimbabwe and Zambia used party structures to reach the people. Both countries have generally not empowered Councils enough to entrench participation.

To be fair however, some level of participation has been enabled through structures like traditional leaders and the Development Committees which did not exist before independence (see Conyers 2007). Support to cooperatives and other people's organisations also increased. The advent of NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) also increased participation avenues in both countries. Awareness of development processes and use of participatory approaches by field administrators (see Eyben and Ladbury, 1997, Pretty and Scoones 1997, Thompson 1995) have occurred in the two countries. On balance, despite serious challenges that remain, considerable ground has been covered. I explore how and why these aspects present themselves in the next Chapter and also discuss the findings from the field to show the extent to which the decentralised structures (my units of data collection and analysis) are acting to deepen or frustrate participation.
2.9. Conclusion

The research question was framed as follows; what are the key institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions to participatory development at District level? I proceeded to pose subsidiary questions on whether people’s participation mattered and how facilitation methods (and facilitators) mattered. The sections in this Chapter engaged with issues that necessitate the posing of additional questions. One such set of questions include the form and effect of organisational interaction, the place of ordinary people in such interactions and how organisational interaction affects people’s participation in development activities. Participation and decentralisation have some form of symbiotic relationship. Government-established structures in Zimbabwe and Zambia present genuine opportunities for entrenching participation.

However, challenges related to centralist tendencies and stop-start implementation of decentralisation, exist. I highlighted internal challenges, for instance those experienced by RDDCs (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991) and sub-District Committees (Brand 1991), inter-organisational conflicts between elected and traditional leaders (see Vaughan 2005; CPIA 2005), NGOs and the state (see Nyangoro 1999; Dixon 2002) and citizens’ constrained access to public institutions (World Bank 2002; Aslop and Kurey 2005; Ayittey 2005). These challenges confound attempts at creating participatory structures and processes. Some commentators raise questions about the post-colonial African state (and allied institutions of governance) regarding legitimacy, capacity and overall relevance considering the serious development challenges on the continent (see Mbeki 2005; Ayittey 2005; Vaughan 2005; Mbaku 2004; Mencobe 2001).

Using insights from Mapedza and Mandondo (2002) and Kamete (2002) I highlighted that in their dealings with institutions ordinary people robustly create additional space for themselves (see Green 2002; Mercer 2002; Nyoni 1987). Communities observe and directly experience inter-organisational interaction for instance between central and local government. Their observations and experiences inform the depth and breadth of participation. The assessment of the CBCC (GRZ 1999; see Chombo 2004; Chikulo 1981) and the discussion following presentation of Table 3 reflected that even government processes and programmes do not always support participation.
Development institutions relate to each other within legally defined structures and spaces, in projects and other non-formal spaces. Governmental and non-governmental development organisations use different spaces and opportunities to influence each other, which has a bearing on participation. Approaches and principles like participation and participatory development are useful in shaping expectations regarding the ends not just the means of development. This is why asking about who participates, how and why is critical because participation is at the heart of development politics and development is a by-product of it.

In this Chapter I explored the theoretical issues relating to participation and development separately and jointly using the concept of participatory development. I further looked at how and whether decentralisation provides for participation drawing a number of important points. These include that participation takes different forms. It is also governed differently. Project promoters steer policy changes while delivering material benefits and securing alliances critical for their work. Institutional interface is largely structured by centrally-formulated regulations moderated by local dynamics. However, in Zimbabwe and Zambia it is important to interrogate why it appears that central signals hold greater sway than local ingenuity in local governance. What appear to be legally, politically and institutionally secure spaces like RDDCs, PDCs and state-related development organisations remain operationally ineffective, which perhaps suggests structural flaws (see Davies and Ratsso 2000, Bond and Manyanya 2003; CPIA 2005) and general state failure (see Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006).

Participation and participatory development are not a 1990s invention. As concepts they are not only old but complex. Thus, the importance of concepts and practices of participatory development was discussed with reference to their widespread application at many levels, by diverse development organisations and from grassroots up to international development organisations, including at the state and local government levels. Some gaps affecting the application of participation in practice were noted. At one level the gaps or questions are about location and the application of experiences from different actors and settings. In addition, some questions were raised in the Chapter about entry points, scale and implementation of participation, for example through projects, policy influence and changes to structures.
The Chapter further showed how conceptualising and applying participation can be problematic. Some of the problems were shown to relate to who was expected to participate. Others were shown to be more a matter of external realities, in that problems may rest with development and other development organisations that the poor may interact with. It has been shown that whilst these development organisations create an exciting terrain, this can create complications, which may also frustrate participation. Some of the literature shows that both state and non-state development organisations tend to define and influence the nature and extent of participation and participatory development. At the very least, this makes universalizing the overall approach difficult. In Chapter 3, I elaborate on how structures influence defining and practicing participation.

The state, at least in Zimbabwe, but perhaps more generally, has lost its previously unquestioned favored status regarding promoting development. However, the question about whether the state should be the favored institution in specific national settings remains a key one (see Fritz and Menocal 2007). Regarding participatory development, it has become fashionable to give central place to non-governmental development organisations, especially NGOs. In this Chapter, what has emerged is that the role of the state (central and local) remains critical in supporting any meaningful form of participatory practice. This is increasingly recognized in the literature, where the state has been brought back in from ‘the cold’ and is being restored to some kind of centrality in the political process and in development.

Empirical evidence reviewed suggested that the important lesson of recent experiences has been that what works best is in fact synergy between state and non-state actors, and collaboration through various forms of partnership. Obstacles to this exist, of course, but an optimism grounded in well-founded successes does provide hope. Early steps in this direction include the creation and strengthening of new institutional structures and procedures for partnership relations. In some instances, it has been shown that this may entail refurbishing existing relations between the state and non-governmental development organisations. In other cases, such relationships need complete re-definition in terms of new roles and responsibilities that can foster participation. The project approach remains central to participatory development.
processes; that much is evident from the literature. However, the ways in which projects are conceived, implemented and managed overall is clearly in need of considerable rethinking. Critics of the project-based approach to participatory development emphasize the importance of ensuring that people ‘do not get lost in them’ and that projects need to remain means and instruments rather than becoming ends in themselves. Life in any community does not stop or start with a project, after all, and outsiders are as much active social change agents as insiders are, and need to acknowledge their responsibilities for the outcomes of project-based initiatives.

Finally, I looked at the link between participatory development and decentralisation in the cases of Zimbabwe and Zambia. The review of the literature suggested that one important way in which participation can become entrenched in practice relates to decentralising of central government structures to make them accessible to people at grassroots level. It was shown that decentralisation gives meaning to participation in state structures and processes inclusive of policy formulation and implementation. The section contextualised the discussion of participation within governmental efforts generally and in the context of Zimbabwe and Zambia particularly. This was linked back to the reality that the study anchored the analysis in local government, whose existence and sustenance is a function of central government. The mechanisms for institutionalising participation, decentralisation experiences and its connections with participation were discussed and linked to the research problem (see conclusion to section 2.6, section 2.7 and 2.8.5), which is further elaborated in Chapter 3.

There are questions of capacity limitations in Councils and other local institutions. Another problem noted is the weak linkages between local government structures and community organisations. The effectiveness of Councils in nurturing democratic practice remains weak, which is a missing link in participatory development. It can be noted that although there is agreement on the value of decentralisation as a policy option in Africa, it exists within the context of the general resilience of highly centralised governance processes, as has been observed, for example, by Porter and Onyach-Olaa (1999).

The hosting of national programmes by Councils remains difficult where Councils are under-funded and properly staffed. It is contradictory that decentralisation policies are
framed and implemented alongside programmes and processes that retain central control. The discussion of research findings elaborates the problems faced in implementing and institutionalising participation in extremely difficult policy contexts of this kind. The problem deepens in circumstances where poverty is growing. Zimbabwean and Zambian experiences show that a number of good programme practices (e.g. the Community Action Project 1995-2000 and ZAMSIF\textsuperscript{34}) previously implemented through Councils were later discontinued with few alternatives available. If funding for innovative programmes supportive of decentralisation stops then the lessons learnt may not be applied. As Mbaku observes, ‘...most of the so called policy mistakes committed in the majority of African countries...have actually been deliberate and purposeful programmes designed and implemented by opportunistic politicians and civil servants’ (2004:267; see Engberg-Pedersen 1997). Mbaku further adds that many of the obstacles to development are a reflection of weak, poor and inappropriate institutions. In Chapter 3 I explore the institutional context in Zimbabwe to show the how levels and forms of interaction affect policy and programme performance.

\textsuperscript{34} Zambia Social Investment Fund (funded by the World Bank and Government of Zambia).
CHAPTER 3: RESTATING RESEARCH PROBLEM & PRESENTING CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

In this Chapter I conclude the last two Chapters and re-emphasize points and questions being taken forward in the thesis. The Chapter defines the main lines of the research problem and extends the research question looking at modes of analyzing institutional interconnections. Based on the institutional map on which this study focuses, I discuss spaces and structures as they obtain in Zimbabwe, the streams of influence at each node of interface and throughout the wider system. For all practical purposes, what I present in section 3.3 is a product of my understanding of the institutional connections between and amongst key players in Zimbabwe’s development. In other words it is a simplified model of the institutional relationships. The model allows me to discuss the existing formal and informal access to and control of spaces and structures that manage development in Zimbabwe.

Knowledge of how these spaces work, and the attitudes and capabilities of actual and potential users of the spaces on one hand and the spaces themselves (i.e. institutions) on the other determine the form and extent of participation. Section 2.6 touched on the different mechanisms that are used to ensure that ordinary people access and control spaces for policy and decision-making, in short participate. Four groups of factors critical in this regard were discussed in section 2.7. These were cited as factors relating to professionals and organizations, to the poor themselves, to economic issues and lastly to political and institutional dynamics.

This Chapter lays out how the analysis of the research question was organised using the existing rural institutional terrain for (thinking and doing) development. The question was; **what are the key institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions to participatory development at District level?** Subsidiary questions related to:

1. The form and effect of organisational interaction including issues of institutional mutuality and/or its lack.
2. The place of people's participation in organisational interaction i.e. the instruments and methods through which development organisations facilitate participation.
3. The effect of the two (organisational interaction and facilitation of participation) on development activities.
4. People's perceptions of and dealings with development organisations.
5. The effect of such perceptions on participation.
6. Relations between central and local government viz participation.

The Chapter begins by exploring the key elements of the research problem elaborating on the questions before detailing key development actors with a role to institutionalize participation as defined in sections 1.1 and 2.5. This builds on discussions in Chapter 2 and draws on the main case study country (Zimbabwe). Drawing on Zimbabwe and to an extent Zambia was part of selecting and refining the specific methodology in relation to preliminary findings discussed in Chapter 4. After laying the broad contours of the institutional terrain studied, the Chapter presents the framework used to distil critical aspects of the topic; participatory development at District level.

As already shown, the environment for participatory development in rural areas has changed quite dramatically in recent years in Zimbabwe, but less so in Zambia. Whereas in Zimbabwe there have been shifts in institutional actors in Zambia there has been modest change since the 1990s. One of the enduring results of institutional changes in both countries includes a lack of capacity amongst rural local governance institutions including Councils. The other is the continuance of direct control by central government over local development activities.

3.2. Elaborating the research problem

The ideologies of participatory development promoted by development organisations in Tanzania are at odds with popular aspirations (Green 2000:67).

Ministries' continuing top-down approach and the weakness of local institutions inhibits understanding of what the differential and gendered impacts...ideas of what would constitute development (Haidari and Wright 2001:53).

The above quotations are helpful in distinguishing between participation promoted through popular and external institutions. Chapter 2 elaborated on this using available literature and noted that it is not possible to generalise easily. That notwithstanding, three points can be drawn from the quotations to problematise participation and participatory development both in practice and conceptually. First is that participatory development approaches used by development organisations do not necessarily capture ordinary people's aspirations. It is as if the inherent human spirit of self-reliance (Tilakaratna 1987) is not respected. The second is that state and other big
The first of the three points introduced in section 3.1 above speaks to a disjuncture between ordinary people’s active, careful and strategic actions on the one hand and the attitudes underlying official development efforts on the other. However, this kind of institutional dissonance is not entirely negative as it can inspire further (potentially active, careful and strategic) actions by those who seek inclusion. Institutional dissonance may also not be accidental. For Engberg-Pedersen (1997), institutions relate to different domains of life with partly incompatible ones co-existing or being deliberately made to co-exist and contradict. Green’s (2000) argument in the first quotation above touches on the models of development that individuals or households pursue based on their cultural and historical backgrounds. The study engaged with some of the underlying causes and practical manifestations of institutional contradictions regarding why (and how) they arise and are sustained.

The second point relates to observations, also discussed in some detail in Chapter 2, that state institutions are generally unable or unwilling to foster participation. They often apply top-down approaches. Staudt observes thus:

‘...aside from nongovernmental organisations, many institutions house staff who are distant and alienated from the people on whose behalf they are working. These staff get entangled in the procedure and process of their institutions that often thwart rather than enhance partnership with people in their development’ (Staudt 1991:272).

The culture in most state institutions is one of control. Existing participation mechanisms are largely accessible to a minority, which is also highlighted in The African Charter (African Charter 1990; see World Bank 2002; Mansuri and Rao 2004). Thomson’s (1995) study of participatory approaches in government bureaucracies underscored the need for learning systems sustained through long-term financial commitments, flexible funding, strong leadership and better monitoring and evaluation (Thompson 1995; see Krishna et al 1997). Often these areas are weak in most public institutions. The decentralisation experiences of Zimbabwe and Zambia discussed in Chapter 2 also show an inability to deal with this challenge. Public sector reforms in many countries have also failed to address the challenge. A study by Therkildsen (2001) noted the existence of fragmented administrative systems (see Booth 2003; Adams et al 1996; Ayittey 2005; Chatiza 2003; Enemuo 2000).
study also highlighted how donor-dependency makes donors a *de facto* part of policy-making and budgetary processes e.g. in Zambia and Mozambique (see Sankore 2005; Calderisi 2006; Browne 2007; McGee and Norton 2000). Local interest groups and state elites may play second fiddle to donors and experts (consultants) in shaping the reform process and outcomes (Therkildsen 2001). Reforms become less responsive to ordinary people’s expectations. How then can bureaucracies facilitate participation where decentralisation and New Public Management (NPM) reforms do not go far enough? In his analysis of South African and international experiences in public management, Gasper (2002) notes a disjuncture between meeting developmental needs and applying a management culture in the public sector.

The third point relates to local institutions’ lack of capacity to promote participation from below. Local institutions face serious capacity challenges, which Esman and Uphoff (1984) categorize into resistance, subordination, internal division, ineffectiveness and malpractice. Despite the reality that some local customs, social relations and power structures act to entrench marginalization of certain groups e.g. women and children, young unmarried adults and certain castes, poor people trust and depend on these local institutions (Narayan et al 2000). The relationships between local organisations and outsiders often limit their transformative performance (*Ibid*). While they may represent an appropriate, accessible and effective framework for interest articulation, local institutions insufficiently address structural causes of poverty and deprivation. In the light of the weaknesses of local organisations outlined here the question is how local organisations can provide bottom-up pressure for local empowerment and in sustaining participation (see Table 4 last column above).

The three points above present a weak front for institutionalising participation in development. I use them here to clarify the research focus. The points sum up forms of institutional interaction and development ideas pursued by state or other formal organisations. The research gathered data on these three issues to establish how they expressed themselves in the study Districts. The different institutions studied are important because they harness local input into planning, service delivery and evaluation. They also mediate the resourcing of development and accord space for articulating local aspirations. Responses to the challenges discussed above have been varied. For instance NGOs have tended to boycott some structures or spaces by
creating parallel structures through selective engagement. The use of alternative structures by NGOs has led to project-based community organisation, which often falters with the end of NGO support (Moyo et al 2000, GRZ 1999). The responses of the state have also been varied. These have included issuance of guidelines and directives (GRZ 2003a). The full range has been from repression to mutually beneficial relationships (Mungate 1993; Fisher 1998). However, the study also sought to identify positive or innovative measures that extend participation.

Institutional relations have become more varied with the growth of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe and Zambia. The institutional terrain for rural development is populated by more actors operating from often divergent value premises (see Thomas 1996). The different local actors are politicians, traditional leaders, Government Departments, Councils, private sector and NGOs. In some instances, the first three can act as an extension of Central Government. In the study countries, the rural private sector is weak and not represented in local governance spaces despite providing critical goods, services and paying rates and licenses that sustain Council operations.

### Table 5: NGO activity thrusts over time in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Major thrust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-1981</td>
<td>Welfare orientation as well as growth of women’s clubs. Some NGOs linked to ZANU PF and competing for constituencies. Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs' main anchor point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1986</td>
<td>Some development activities (second generation). Income generation activities and production sector activities in agriculture. Support and activities mainly to/women. Beginning of women’s movement (e.g. Women’s Action Group 1983).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1990</td>
<td>Growth of service sector NGOs. Increasing networking including at regional level. Some lobbying and advocacy work. Slump in donor funding experienced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995+</td>
<td>Clearer political advocacy and lobbying agendas around economic and constitutional issues heightening tensions with the state. Human rights (lobbying around conventions etc). Burgeoning HIV and AIDS sector and food insecurity responses. Rio+ 10 (World Summit on Sustainable Development) and MDGs as clear frameworks for activities of NGO sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source; Adapted from Moyo et al (2000).

35 Re-introduced in 2005 after an absence of about 15 years.
36 Some adaptation made based on personal experience of the sector.
The NGO sector has grown in terms of numbers and programme visibility. NGOs mainly depend on donor support. Moyo et al (2000) identify roughly five periods for their analysis of NGO activity in Zimbabwe (Table 5). NGO personnel and projects are an important part of the development process (Craig and Porter 1997; Jackson 1997). There are instances where NGO activities facilitate or obstruct those of Councilors and vice versa raising relationship challenges. This often stretches Councilors’ capacities regarding anticipating and managing conflicts as they facilitate the work of different development organisations in Council areas. NGOs place demands on central and local state structures for information, political support and protection in doing their development work. Central Government in Zimbabwe and Zambia often complains about weak, unaccountable and donor-driven NGOs (The Sunday Times of Zambia 31st January 2005; see Moyo et al 2000; Mungate 1993; Ebrahim 2003). The accusations and counter-accusations may be political gamesmanship as in Zimbabwe. However, state-NGO tensions form the reality in which the study was undertaken. Some of the national programmes discussed in section 2.6 above were theatres where these tensions were discussed and cooperation modalities forged, as was the case under CAP and CAMPFIRE. In the following section, I discuss the framework used to explore the relationship issues articulated here. The intention is to elaborate the research problem and to frame the methodological discussion in Chapter 4.

3.3. The framework: strategic institutional analysis

The development of the framework was guided by a search for the enabling and constraining factors for participation in practice. The guiding notion was that what one organisation does affects other organisations and, directly or indirectly, people’s participation as well. In other words the conceptual framework was about exploring institutional influences to participation i.e. how does participation occur (or does not) when institutions interact in doing development? Looking at implications of interactions provided a rationale for using communities’ lived experiences as they relate to development processes. The figure below illustrates the conceptual framework for the study. I discuss in detail the interconnections between and amongst the arenas of influence after presenting the model. Although the data for the study was mainly collected at the District level, the model is applicable at different levels from local through international. Looking at institutional interaction in this way allowed me
to be conscious about or acknowledge the intra and extra-District influences or factors relevant for participation. Figure 1 is the main framework. An adapted version (Figure 2) is used to illustrate certain points based on insights gathered during fieldwork.

**Figure 1: Locating influences on District participatory development**

![Diagram](image.png)

The critical influences on participatory development flow through the centre, from Government to the people via development spaces and activities i.e. left-right arrow. The flow as represented by the main arrows in Figure 1 is at once back-forth and circular within specific levels. Formal and informal feedback mechanisms from grassroots up exist through people’s organisations, Councilors and other community leaders but as discussed earlier this is generally weak, hence a thinner right-left arrow. Feedback is anchored in the local context. Some changes in practice, institutional interaction and interpretation of policies and programmes are informed by such feedback. This vertical (back and forth, top-down/down-top) relationship or dynamic is however affected by other micro-level or horizontal dynamics at each level. While the vertical relations are the principal axis for change, localized dynamics emerging from practice also play a part. I envisage about three levels as will be discussed below. In short, influences on participatory development can be explored from the field up, from the centre-down and myriad other intermediate starting points for analysis. In other words, the field/grassroots-up stream is weaker and does not usually reach national decision-making spaces.
3.3.1. Level one

The Governmental sphere: This is at the level of Government and other national institutions e.g. Parliament. For this study Government was the focus and issues of how policy dissemination to others and application by government agents affect participation. At the same time the ability of government, through its own actions or via persuasion can cause certain things (positive or negative) to happen in pursuance of participation outside its realm. This is what influence refers to.

3.3.2. Level two

The Sub-National sphere: In this sphere, there are individual development organisations (Organisation 1-N) both governmental and non-governmental. State-related development organisations are directly controlled by national government, manage sub-national joint structures, and accordingly influence other actors. Sub-national development organisations are at once joined up and separate. They are joined up through common spaces for dialogue, planning and as in Zimbabwe and Zambia structures and processes provided for at law or policy directives for organisational interaction. Joining up occurs in terms of partnerships on specific tasks/programmes or because of relationships that exist e.g. NGOs working with a sector organisation or networking around say environmental, small to medium size enterprise development, vulnerable children and women’s issues. These development organisations are however separate in as far as they are individual entities often with distinct stakeholders, programmes and accountability structures. The spaces and processes joining them up and their distinct realities affect participation.

3.3.3. Level three

The third level relates to interface between organisations (Development organisations 1-N in Figure 1) and communities through programme activities i.e. development activities in District spaces. The joined up spaces, relationships and distinct identities are often replicated here. Development organisations that work together at the level of planning may also be seen jointly implementing activities while those working independently do the same on the ground. The community or development space (where say a borehole is sunk) is therefore an arena for intra-community, community-development organisation and inter-organisational interface.
The strands of influence, power inequalities, social relations and their impact on participatory development are numerous. All the levels are inter-connected. Some actors like Government have a presence at all of them while others are more active in specific locations. Councils, because of their development planning and coordination functions are visible from level two to three. Communities on the other hand are predominantly at level three and struggle to get their feedback high up to influence government let alone the international donors and other players at that level. It is as if development organisations come too far down for communities to find time for upward influence. Their time is spent managing project level and inter-organisational dynamics in their areas. There are however cases where communities or individuals organise themselves or link up beyond the District to articulate their issues. The Zimbabwe National Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (ZNNP+) is one such national movement connecting its members effectively and recently influenced Government to ensure that 70% of National AIDS Trust Fund resources be allocated towards purchase of anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs (The Standard 15-21 October 2006 and October 29th to November 4th).

3.3.4. The extra-national sphere
In this respect what happens at global level filters to the local through national government, International NGOs (represented by Organisation N) or through funding of joint platforms or policy processes as with Zimbabwe’s RDCCBP and MDG localization processes, PPAs as well as PRSPs in other countries. Critical influences arise from organisation-based interpretations or applications. Like with level two, interpretations of external compulsions are at once shared and divergent.

Other points taken into account in using the framework include that participatory development is about influence and interaction. The two occur simultaneously and in separate domains. They occur at different intervals in the course of an organisation’s participation in development spaces. Secondly there are various ‘streams of influence’ bearing on an organisation, situation or community. Participatory development is about discerning, responding and counter-influencing. When a community threatens to withdraw from working with an organisation it reverses that organisation’s stream of influence, which affects that organisation’s standing alongside others. If the organisation resolves the conflict by involving other development organisations, it re-
establishes its influence. Where a community works with an organisation, the organisation increases its ability to influence. As an example, Plan International has been implementing multi-million dollar activities in Mutare District for some time. This way Plan has built a considerable store of influence in Mutare’s development process. Analyses of participatory development need to identify these streams and stores of influence. There is need to acknowledge that organisational autonomy and the weakness of communities are a function of the extent of local connectedness i.e. resource and capacity transfers made possible by available spaces. However, other outsiders may be drawn upon to increase influence e.g. Members of Parliament and politicians to boost influence and capacities.

The model was useful in approaching the study from an institutional interaction perspective. Participatory development was conceived of as both product of and process within the interactions. Product in as far it can be an outcome of or deliverable from the interface amongst the different actors. Process in as far as it informs the way certain things get done along the way (e.g. in planning, community entry etc) to producing specific socio-economic outcomes.

3.4. Applying the model to Zimbabwe

**Figure 2: Flows, levels and spaces for participatory development**

| **LEGEND:** | **1. Blue Line:** Represents curtailed Development Funding contact between GRZ and International Development Organisations.  
**2. Red Arrows:** Flow of Public Sector Development resources.  
**3. Green Arrows:** Flow of International Development funding. |

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Unlike Zambia, Tanzania or Mozambique, Zimbabwe is currently not receiving direct budget support, sector-wide, PRSP or major non-humanitarian assistance (see section 1.8). The bulk of the development assistance is coming through local and international organisations (green arrows in the model) while government support for rural development activities through sector Ministries and the consolidated Rural Capital Development Fund, among others is flowing through government structures (red arrows). The blue line symbolizes curtailed development and funding interface between the international community and the Government of Zimbabwe since 2000.

The architecture of rural development funding has a strong bearing on the relationships amongst and between the key development actors. Some bilateral donor organisations (e.g. the Danish International Development Agency) and embassies (e.g. Embassy of Belgium) have relocated from Zimbabwe and in the process programmes, which they were supporting have been rolled back. As noted earlier those bilateral and donor organisations still active in Zimbabwe (the EU, DFID, USAID, CIDA, SIDA and JICA among others) are channeling their assistance through International NGOs and the UN. Since implementing activities in Districts requires sufficient central and local government presence NGOs, among other non-governmental actors make efforts to link up. The reality on the ground is that with limited public funding and a generally suspicious attitude the relations between key development organisations are unsupportive of participation. From Chapters 5 to 7, I provide evidence on how different actors address the issues with both positive and negative consequences for participatory practice and general institutional viability.

3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has returned to the central research problem elaborated in terms of failure of the development approaches used by development organisations to capture ordinary people’s aspirations, inability of state and other big institutions to promote participation partly because of rigid systems and local organisations’ lack of capacity to promote participation from below. I elaborated on these aspects of the research problem and presented a conceptual framework for the study. The framework was used to highlight why (and how) institutional interaction can never be neutral. Different organisations bring their values and contextual interpretations to spaces in which they interface with others. Participatory development becomes about
interaction and influence in similar or different spaces creating what I called streams and stores of influence. Organisational influence is policy-based, resource-dependent and/or socio-politically underpinned (networks and contacts). Through dynamic cycles of discerning and responding to influences arising from interactions, organisations create and deploy their stores of influence. Therefore, in theory and practice becomes a process and product of inter-organisational interaction on the one hand and organisations’ engagement with people as they think and do development.

Inter-organisational interaction is a proxy for participation, first because organisations work with groups or individuals and second because they have specific mandates over certain areas/territories. The latter is true of central and local government. Chapter 3 showed that organisational interaction occurs in spaces at different levels. This implies that interaction is informed from imperatives internal and external to the interacting organisations, the spaces hosting them and the people benefiting from the agenda of such interaction. This makes interaction space and level sensitive. To use Gaventa (2005) and Cornwall and Brock (2005) interaction varies from closed to open, invited to claimed spaces and from local to global levels. The analyses by Craig and Porter (1997), Jackson (1997), Lyons et al (2001), Porter and Onyach-Olaa (1999), among others also indicate this space and level sensitivity of participation largely because of differentiating factors like power (see Nelson and Wright 1997) knowledge (Chambers 1997) and gender (Guijt and Shah 1998). The Chapter also showed the level at which the research problem was conceived and researched (District) vis-à-vis others. It also showed that meaningful institutional analysis proceeds from unpacking the vertical and horizontal connections in law or policy and in practice, which was further elaborated through the conceptual framework.

The study was approached as being about relationships between and amongst development actors to explore how their different encounters present opportunities and challenges for participation. I extend this discussion in Chapter 4. Suffice however to note that the framework drew from some literature and realities from/on Zimbabwe to illustrate how the relationships were arranged for analysis. Chapter 3 thus set the levels of analysis, their interconnections and the structures within which they relate forming the basis for discussing the research methodology below.
CHAPTER 4: MAPPING INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE FIELD: METHODOLOGY AND REFLECTIONS

4.1. Introduction

In this Chapter, I present the research methodology, introduce the general research results and discuss fieldwork experiences. I also profile the research sites, the institutions studied and their interactions. In doing so, I discuss issues posed by the methodology and methods used laying a platform for the detailed presentation of research findings in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 4 also discusses here my research experience and share insights on aspects of methodology. In the process, I also share some answers to the central research question in as far as researching institutional structures goes and raise questions on my approach.

As shown in Chapter 3 (Figures 1 and 2) the study proceeded by looking at all levels but focusing on the District (including the sub-District) level. This is because in Zimbabwe and Zambia the District is the location for development activities, i.e. the ‘doing level’. The District is governed by a democratically elected body, Council. It is at this level where services are delivered and local legislation (bylaws) made. Service delivery and making bylaws, among other Council activities, are guided by national policies. Councils have tax collection and revenue dispensing powers towards development priorities agreed at local level. As local governments, they have some measure of permanency that allows them to take and follow-up decisions over longer time horizons than say community groups or NGOs. I need to acknowledge the reality that individual politicians (Councilors) may be outlived by certain organisations and that they make and execute decisions based on personal interests. However, the notion of Council permanency relates more to the institution and its mandate than the individual Councilors and Council Executives.

Organisations that facilitate development processes in communities are located at District level and are organised differently in terms of extent of decentralisation beyond the District centre. The organisations are both governmental and non-governmental. The inquiry focused on the interface within and amongst these
organisations and with the community level. As discussed in Chapter 3 these are the second and third levels of the conceptual model.

In terms of structure, the Chapter starts by elaborating the methodology and methods, which combine personal experience and interest on the one hand and the nature of the research question on the other. In this first section, the focal points of the analysis are discussed in terms of development spaces and anchor institutions. The reasoning behind using institutions (in the broad sense) as units of analysis is also elaborated. The section on fieldwork presents the study sites (Districts, Wards and communities). The discussion of the research sites paves the way for looking at the actual methods used for data collection and analysis as well as reflections thereon.

4.2. Research methodology

The study was designed as a qualitative and exploratory study of institutional relations using comparative case study methodology. The choice of methodology recognised the complexity of social interaction and the myriad meanings participants attach to such interaction (see Marshall and Rossman 1999). Two Zimbabwean Districts and one Zambian District were chosen purposively as discussed in detail in section 4.4 below. Three Wards were selected in each of the Zimbabwean Districts covering the three main land categories of old resettlement, new resettlement and communal areas. Two Wards and three communities (one in one Ward and two in another) were selected in Kasempa (Zambia). The focus on the District to sub-District did not preclude gathering data at Province and National levels although the study gathered data mainly from the District and sub-District levels. At these levels Council (Councilors and Council Executives), traditional leaders, individuals in the Wards selected, key socio-economic groups and government extension staff were sources of data. Gathering data from Provincial authorities was to the extent that they play a supportive role to the District institutions in facilitating development. Overall, the organisations from which informants were drawn were both governmental and non-governmental. What is also important is to discuss the concept of representativeness. The selection of Wards and the different informants was done to ensure that the broadest possible range of views on the subject could be gathered (see Marshall and Rossman 1999). It was not about statistical representativeness. In discussing the survey results, the weight attached to the results is more in relation to the socio-
economic and other characteristics of those who shared their views with me not how many they were vis-à-vis the Ward or Village populations. I proceeded this way first, as a personal choice not to create the impression that the study was quantitative and, second, the lack of a sampling frame and third lack of resources to undertake an extensive household survey. In accessing and interpreting people's lived experiences in local governance, I sought to be pragmatic about methodology and methods (see Marshall and Rossman 1999; DeVault 1999). I return to this issue below as well as in Chapters 5 and 6 where I use some of the results of the survey undertaken in Zimbabwe as part of the study.

A suite of qualitative research and analysis methods was used. The main ones included focus group discussions, keeping community diaries (only in Zambia), semi-structured or key informant interviews, document analysis and attendance of meetings and/or events (section 4.3). In addition to these five qualitative methods, I also did a survey in Zimbabwe in all the six study Wards to increase the depth and range of sub-District insights. The community diaries served a similar purpose in Zambia. These six methods were used with officials or leaders and community members. Records/documents were mainly from organisations with a few from community members. It is therefore important to highlight the fact that the study looked for evidence both from ordinary people and organisations. Gathering insights to answer the research question from these two dimensions was meant to enhance balance in the assessment of the opportunities and challenges to participation.

All the six methods are discussed in section 4.3 but suffice to highlight that the survey was a community entry tool to establish rapport and to solidify my identity as a student researcher on the one hand and to gather people's perspectives on the research issues on the other. As it turned out both objectives of using the survey were attained without unduly making the study a quantitative analysis of institutional relations. The questions and their analysis adopted a qualitative slant throughout. The diaries were useful considering my inability to speak the local language in Kasempa. Assigning Research Assistants to keep the diaries for a month in each Ward addressed this handicap. The six methods were used iteratively to reinforce each other. I discuss in section 4.3 for instance how document analysis allowed me to come up with issues for
exploration in key informant interviews. In this way, I was able to triangulate my results at the level of methods as well as in terms of actual data sources.

The comparative analysis of institutional interactions and experiences was in terms of policies and procedures. The study followed a critical tradition in social science research (Hammersley 2000), focusing on problems and policy as well as seeking to contribute to solutions for the challenges identified or deepening understanding of the issues at hand. By approaching the study as a question of relationships between and amongst development actors, I explored the different ways in which encounters present opportunities or challenges for participation. However, while opportunities for feeding the findings into strategic discussions will be sought there is no presumption that this study will lead to changes in the policies governing local development situations in Zimbabwe or Zambia let alone other countries.

4.2.1. Elaborating the research approach

Many organisational capacity building interventions focus more on internal organisational spaces than on joint or inter-organisational ones. However, inter-organisational spaces are critical to organisational effectiveness. An approach that engages with the spaces in which organisations interface as a basis for developing organisational capacity, which I call a relational approach, can address some of the issues I discussed in section 2.7 and at the end of Chapter 3. Using a relational approach, linkages and strategic capacities become the focus of a change process. For instance, questions were asked from two perspectives in key informant interviews, on one hand questions about a respondent’s organisation and on the other about other organisations. In Figure 1, the influences to participatory development were also discussed to highlight these relational aspects.

Essential questions to operationalize a relational approach include who to relate to, what the relationship is about or rather why relate, where and how the relationship/interaction takes place, what the instruments of the interaction are etc. Answers to some of these questions are codified (in laws, policies, directives), written in programme memoranda, contracts or proposals and still others are informal and rarely written as succinctly as laws would. Such fluidity can be by design or default but whichever it is, it governs particular spaces and relations. An example of a space,
discussed later in this thesis is the District Assembly in Mutare. The Assembly does not have any policy or legal backing but its importance and sustenance is based on the challenges of observed disharmony between elected and traditional officials.

To operationalize the relational approach the study identified four key influences on an organisation’s ability to facilitate participatory development. These are regulators (central government mainly and local government), community or other service recipients, resource providers or other stakeholders and institutional spaces and structures. It is easier to map institutional relationships when an anchor organisation or programme/project is identified. In the context of the study, the anchor organisation was local government or Council including Council-coordinated spaces and structures. Organisational interaction is largely in Council-related spaces (spatial and institutional) and structures but also community level programmes.

For relationships to be effective and to provide for participatory development some competencies are needed. The critical ones explored through the study are relational awareness, relational capacity, community signals/feedback and stakeholder influence/feedback. I will now discuss each of these in turn and how variables for the study were derived and operationalized in terms of data collection.

Relational awareness covers issues of organisational roles, capacities, expectations, operational constraints and decision cycles. People or organisations’ awareness of these aspects regarding relevant development actors allows them to formulate realistic expectations around which to establish workable partnerships.

Relational capacity is a concept used in this study to refer to the quality of horizontal and vertical relationships that individual organisations or a collective are able to generate and sustain for the benefit of their work and general organisational profile. In practice, relational capacity is deployed through joint action using mutual strengths or capacities. This draws on relational awareness i.e. identification and optimum use of organisational comparative advantages. The study explored the quality of relationships through analyzing bottlenecks (perceived and actual) to interface.
Feedback was explored in terms of vertical and horizontal articulation of interests to known and unknown organisations (or representatives). The nature, timing, communication and frequency of feedback were also explored. This was also looked at in terms of its implications for relationships between communities and development organisations. People’s awareness of organisational roles was explored (relational awareness) because this has a bearing on people’s use of, organisations’ relational capacity regarding communities and the quality of community feedback. In a way, therefore the study sought to establish whether and how the depth, breadth and sustainability of participation depended on institutional interaction. In choosing Council as the anchor institution and including others like traditional leaders, the idea was to explore whether semi or permanent institutions play a more critical role in initiating and sustaining participation than ephemeral ones like some NGOs.

During fieldwork, I participated in and observed some inter-organisational meetings where stakeholder feedback/influence was at play. The quote below is drawn from, such meeting which involved some UN organisations, the EU and SNV Zimbabwe. The meeting was part of a process to establish a collaborative framework for combined education sector support to ten Rural Districts in Zimbabwe. The process had been going on for at least seven months. ‘I did not realize that working together is so difficult... nothing seems to be working... the (planning) input from the organisations is still vertical...’ (UNICEF Education Officer, Education Working Group meeting, 10th March 2005). Having the benefit of both the verbal and non-verbal aspects of the quote frustration was a feeling that captured it. Oftentimes development organisations seek ways of complementing others based on the spatial and/or sectoral determination of common interests. In spatial terms, sub-national spaces like the region or District can be organising units. In sectoral terms, the organising units are often key organisations or sector policies.

In institutionalising participatory development reference points regarding organisations and spaces are important. Council (organisation) and the District (spatial area) were chosen. The choice was made conscious of the debate about the weaknesses of Councils. However, Councils’ ineffectiveness needs to be acknowledged mindful of the weaknesses of communities and other development organisations. Councils play the dual role of implementing development activities
themselves from Council or Government resources and facilitating or regulating the development activities of others like NGOs. In the latter role, they often stand between communities and these other development organisations. In discussing opportunities and challenges for participatory development, these interconnected roles need careful consideration.

There is growing interest in institutional analysis and development studies generally in making institutions more pro-poor (see UNDP 2003; Robb 2002; World Bank 2002; Ayittey 2005). This is because unless institutions are challenged, influenced or outright forced (e.g. through direct stakeholder demands), it is not automatic that they will meet even the minimum agreed expectations\(^{37}\). Much of Chapter 2 explored similar issues of power to influence, challenge or demand services from institutions. To challenge an institution presupposes a minimum appreciation of the functions, form and operational realities of the targeted institution. Understanding also covers what the institutions are able to deliver based on an historical analysis.

It is important to highlight that the articulation of the gap between what institutions are delivering and what they could potentially deliver is value-laden. This is why no two institutional analyses of the same arrangements done by different analysts yield the same conclusions. It therefore becomes critical to clarify the value-premises of any analysis. This was discussed in Chapter 1 and I elaborate how personal interests and practical considerations influenced the choice of methods. Although many institutional analysts use the ‘pro-poor’ position this does not preclude controversy over results as bias is only reduced but not completely removed. Different value-premises, which are neither neutral nor uncontested, have implications for development goals, processes and outcomes (see Thomas 1996).

### 4.2.2. Researcher interest and influence

In undertaking this study, the debate on objectivity was taken into account in relation to the importance of social researchers’ views. For instance, Cox (1998) argues that knowledge is socially located and our understanding of the world is based on our experiences and interests. Cox also asserts that knowing the world entails practical

\(^{37}\) For public institutions minimum expectations could be as stipulated in their enabling legislation and mission statements and client charters for private and non-state organisations.
intervention and further notes that ‘we only know the world in so far as we engage with it and we only engage with it from the point of view of particular interests’ (Cox 1998:12). Other commentators categorically assert that social research is political (see Hammersley 2000; Resnik 2001; Lincoln 2003; Burawoy 1998; Mobilized Investigation 2003; Hintjens and Jarman 2002; Hintjens 2000). Approaching research from clear standpoints is also evident in feminist methodology (De Vault 1999) and according to Lincoln:

‘There is no gold standard method and inquiry. There are only studies which are open and above board about their findings, about the logic which led to their conclusions, about the standpoints of their authors, about their limitations. There are studies which possess validity because those from whom the findings were gathered assent to their credibility, their match with the respondents’ lived experience’ (Lincoln 2003:15-16).

To research lived experiences implies engagement with the life worlds of participants and thus moving beyond objectivity to committed engagement. Researchers using race and ethnic standpoints, feminist theory, post-colonial theory and indigenous voice standpoints approach research, establish and present findings based on clear positions of interest i.e. go beyond the disinterest implied in objectivity. This corresponds to Burawoy’s (1998) notion of inter-subjectivity between participant and observer, elevating dialogue rather than objectivity as a defining principle. This ‘enjoins participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation and its field location, folk theory and academic theory’ (Burawoy 1998:14; see Davies 1999).

From the onset, therefore my selection of the specific area of study was premised on an interest in contributing to the debate on strengthening participation in development. The choice was based on professional interest in the subject principally from a planner’s perspective but more broadly from exposure to a diverse range of development settings. In interacting with communities and key informants and in analyzing documents, these interests were often declared and made apparent. The discussion of the methodology and methods will reflect the use of mainly qualitative methods. However, it is important to reiterate that a quantitative tool (the survey) was used principally to enlist qualitative data. Chapter 6 is largely based on the quantitative data from the survey analyzed using qualitative insights. The qualitative emphasis is not in any way a reflection of methodological problems with quantitative analysis. Instead of dwelling on the merits or otherwise of the two overlapping
methodological approaches I place myself in view in this Chapter and discuss how this affected access to the reality explored and how the conclusions discussed in this study were arrived at.

4.2.3. Revisiting the analytical focal points

In Chapter 3, I discussed the institutional map of concern to this study. I discussed details of the operational aspects of the study in section 4.2. Here I detail the points of reference. The starting point was the actors or organisations i.e. organisations, groups and individuals. In this instance, the units of analysis were the actors. Such an analysis yielded a deeper understanding of the levels, extent and outcomes of the player interactions at individual and collective levels. Within existing resource constrains for the study, it was not possible to look at the whole gamut of players involved in the District space. However, key ones were looked at. The second level of analysis related to the bases of the rules/institutions. This was in terms of the contexts, processes and outcomes. Latent and manifest contestations over the rules were also elaborated. Here the rules were the units of analysis. Relevant Acts of Parliament, decentralisation policies and programmes were analysed to show their effect on organisational interaction. For instance in Chapter 5 I discuss cases of conflict between elected and traditional officials in Ward 18 of Seke/Manyame where issues of legitimacy were raised. In discussing this case I reflect on the actors and the *de facto* and *de jure* rules governing their interface. The ADCs, Assemblies and District Committees in Zambia are also discussed in a way that shows these two sides of institutional interaction to shed light on institutionalisation of participation.

However, it is conceptually clear but practically difficult to separate players from rules. Institutional analyses from the second point of view may adopt specific organisational premises despite the policy/institution being the unit of analysis. Hybrid analyses are therefore more common. Policies like decentralisation are often looked at starting from the rules before bringing in cases (countries, sub-national spaces etc) to validate the performance or otherwise of the specific rules under scrutiny. Previous Chapters and more specifically Chapter 3 show how the analysis combined actors and the rules as will further become clear in Chapters 5 and 6. Before discussing the actual study sites, I turn below to the actual methods.
4.3. The research methods

The research tools applied were consciously selected. The range was wide to increase options as well as in response to situations or opportunities as they arose (see Marshall and Rossman 1999). The challenge emerged when discussions about gathering data from the sub-District level were entered into with District level authorities in mid-2004. Being a period leading to the 2005 General or Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe (hereinafter the elections) there was a general concern that a study on participatory development might be construed as overly political to a point where it could be deemed opposition sponsored. The District Administrator (DA) in both Zimbabwean Districts was the reference point for the clearance process. This was despite the fact that the Chief Executive Officers and their Council Chairpersons had already written letters of support for the planned research. In Seke District, getting the DA’s support was easy. In Mutare, I was referred to the Province where I was further referred to the Ministry responsible for local government (national).

Using my Government contacts, the request was quickly approved with the caveat that I would not be involved in political activity. This was largely understood to mean that in interacting with respondents, the study would refrain from discussing the two main political parties in the country. Operationalising the approval conditions for fieldwork meant that the important starting point was to establish relationships with community leaders. In a way, this was the stage when de-facto approval was sought with the de jure approval being used for community entry. At the same time, other strategies were used to gain the trust and confidence of the community. In one instance, I offered free transport services to an HIV and AIDS group for their food and medical provisions from the premises of an NGO supporting them. This opened up opportunities for repeated interaction with the community including being introduced to other relevant stakeholders.

The study thus proceeded slowly in terms of accessing field sites, which was a bit frustrating. In terms of implementation, interaction with the sub-District level generated issues and themes explored with District level organisations and structures i.e. grounding the inquiry. That notwithstanding, the study proceeded smoothly once the approvals were secured. Suffice however to note that the delayed approval for
fieldwork and the touchy nature of some stakeholders held me back in practical terms. Two ways around this were investment of more time into document analysis and use of the survey method. As further elaborated below the survey had an additional advantage (beyond data gathering) of confirming me as student to the community.

4.3.1. Document analysis

The interaction between organisations on the one hand and with communities on the other is partly captured in documents (reports, minutes, letters, archival material, and other documents). Substantial grey literature on the themes covered by this study was accessed from development organisations and communities. NGO, Council and Government constituted main sources of the documents. As May (1997:157) puts it documents are ‘…sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform and structure the decisions…tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the period to which they refer and describe places and social relationships’. For O’Laughlin (2007) documents are part of institutional discourse and further notes that the poor are often not represented (see also Mosse 2004; Ferguson 1994).

In analyzing documents care was taken to account for the authors, timing, context, objectives, content (what is in and out) as well as the relationships between the authors and the targeted audience (see Gasper 2000; May 1997). Some of the analyses looked at organisational activities (current and past), Commissions of Inquiry, decisions taken, the nature of participants at meetings and the issues commonly covered in community-Council communications for instance. The analyses highlighted problems as well as successes regarding participation (structures, procedures and policies). Document Analysis was useful for the study in terms of defining research issues and analytical focal points. It was also critical in analyzing or comparing policy and practice. In most instances analysis of documents led to the identification of additional sources of information and complemented other methods used in the study (see May 1997), which was important given time, cost and data access constraints. Document Analysis also helped in bridging the national-local divide in terms of empirical evidence since some of the questionnaire respondents were relatively inarticulate beyond the local level.
A number of problems were encountered in using this method. First, was one of access (see Makumbe 1996 regarding ‘classified information and cooperatives’ refusal with their records; Homan 1991). For public institutions, the Official Secrets Act was often cited as the basis for refusing access to some documents. Confidentiality regarding data at the level of territory and transactions i.e. ‘private space and private data’ (Homan 1991) was a problem initially. This was because of lack of trust and past experiences with ‘lost documents’. Over time, the problem declined as trust grew and documents provided were returned. Second, were contradictions on factual matters with respect to documents written at different times and by different organisations. Some of the contradictions were quite illuminating while others had to be reconciled through field checks and key informant interviews. Third, was inability to access relevant documents referred to, either because they were lost or they became unavailable. Such vital documents were invariably on specific issues raised in interviews. This resulted in me being referred to other development organisations where at times the documents in question would not be available or the persons referred to would not have the time to help. Fourth, was poor document accessibility. Some of the documents were in poor condition making them hard to copy or were accessed in locations where copying facilities were unavailable. In some instances, the documents were not always carefully filed making it difficult to access them easily and thus made the whole search for relevant material quite tedious and time-consuming. Fifth, was the time-intensive nature of document search and analysis and the possibility of it being perpetually ongoing.

All considered document analysis presents a number of advantages compared to other methods. One is that document analysis does not raise as many ethical questions as other methods of primary data collection (Homan 1991). In my case, the method provided insights on past successes and failures, and conflicting interpretations of these. In some cases, initial assumptions made were changed in the process. One example was the Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984, generally regarded as a unique starting point for analysing Zimbabwe’s decentralisation policies (see Brand 1991; Wekwete 1990). However, it has been found to have similarities with a 1965 Prime Minister’s Directive by the Smith regime under the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Relevant Zambian experiments under the country’s 1970s decentralisation policies also influenced the Directive. In a way, any analyses of post-
independence participatory structures in Zimbabwe that accord ground-breaking status to the 1984 Directive can be as ahistorical as they can be misleading. This is because the 1984 Directive is a past policy experiment particularly on issues relating to coordination of sector Ministries, their role in facilitating development at sub-national levels and the selection of state-affiliated structures as bases for organising rural local governance. The uniqueness of the Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984 perhaps lies in the independence euphoria, the broadening of participation structures in hitherto disenfranchised communal areas and the radical sidelining of traditional institutions. However, analyzing policies ahistorically passes up opportunities to explore why certain policy experiments keep cropping up under different governance regimes despite past failures. Accessing archival and unpublished material allows deeper understanding of how policies change, but also note elements of continuity.

4.3.2. Key informant interviews

Fifty key informants were interviewed (Annex 1). Some were interviewed once while others were interviewed up to three times over the duration of the study. The identification of informants was incremental, based on issues raised in some interviews and documents as well as being referred by other interviewees. No attempt was made to limit the number of key informants. The first principal guide was spatial i.e. people living, working or in a significant way involved in the development activities in the selected Districts. The second was issue-based, which in a lot of ways related to the ‘chain-referral’ or snow-ball technique alluded to above. Key informants were drawn from those working on local governance issues mainly at the sub-national levels i.e. traditional leaders, Councilors, NGOs and other people who were members of spaces or participated in recognized programmes.

One question about key informants is their representativeness regarding the subject under study. In both Zimbabwe and Zambia, it is fair to say that some measure of representativeness was attained. Through complex and iterative cross-checking and use of counter-referrals, most of the key decision-makers and implementers of programme activities were identified and interviewed. For this study, key informants were defined as those people informed about the issues under inquiry. Some of the principal uses to which key informant interviews were put was to test alternative policy recommendations (asking why an option has worked or might (not) work),
cross-check certain pieces of information and to gather new evidence using semi-structured question guides (see Annex 2.3). One general guide was developed for flexible use with different informants. Guides were at times sent in advance to allow key informants to prepare. Some interviews were done over more than one session. Most key informants were selected for specific themes but others were 'generalists'.

Initial problems largely arose from potential respondents' fear of talking to strangers on a subject (participation), which surprisingly to me was considered sensitive. The process of offering views – it was sometimes felt - could create certain problems for interviewees. A separate problem was one of availability of time especially for District Administrators given their direct involvement in the land reform programme.

Another problem with interviews was the tendency to externalize problems: typically by being critical of all other development organisations but one’s own concerning contribution to institutionalisation of participatory development. This forced me in some instances to use positive confrontation using evidence from previous interviews with the same or different informants. As Pryke (2004) argues, as a researcher it is at times important to question the evidence from an interview to avoid colluding in the creation of falsehoods (see Hammersley 2000). This was however not about falsehoods but getting balanced views from informants through critical dialogue.

4.3.3. Attending relevant events

During the fieldwork period, a number of strategic events took place. I took the opportunity to participate at these events in different capacities. Attending events allowed for direct interaction with (and observation of) participants in near-natural contexts (see DeVault 1999; Marshall and Rossman 1999). In some, I went as a student while in others an independent consultant identity was used. Some of the key events attended included the re-launch of the national decentralisation policy (August 2003 in Harare), the annual congresses of the Association of Rural District Councils of Zimbabwe (ARDCZ) and the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) in August and September 2004 respectively. I also took part in a Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ) brainstorm session focusing on the establishment of Area Development Committees in addition to full Council and Ward meetings, joint
Council and District government meetings, a Land Dialogue meeting in Manicaland Province and a District Development Coordinating Committee meeting in Kasempa.

These events acted as ‘theatres’ for institutional interactions. Except for two instances where participant observation was used (mainly asking questions) at all the others I was an observer. The two were the LGAZ brainstorming session and the DDCC meeting both in Zambia. The latter was partly convened at my request but lasted only 1 hour focusing principally on the roles of different development organisations and the challenges faced by the DDCC structure. Joint meetings of this nature normally last at least half a day. Generally, participating in events enabled application of mixed methods. Besides observation, informal interviews and discussions were undertaken on the sidelines. A detailed research diary was kept with observations and insights gained from these events. According to Davies (1999), participant observation is better conceived as a research strategy not a single method. For Bentzon et al (1998) observation shifts between passive and totally participant or involved.

Events organised by others are important research sites for at least three reasons. First, it felt easy for those involved not to notice my presence, as they got engrossed in discussions with each other. During the study participation in events worked well in cases where I sat in the meetings at strategic positions (e.g. not on the high table) and did not generate undue attention (e.g. sustaining a relatively stable note-taking pace). As participants got engrossed in their deliberations and focused on achieving the agenda of the day my presence often became less of an influence and went unnoticed for reasonable lengths of time. At bigger gatherings e.g. the Congresses attended, I was not even introduced so it was easy to flow with the process without attracting attention. Except for the representatives of the study Councils in attendance at the ARDCZ congress, no other delegates knew me in a research capacity.

Second, events allowed me to gain contacts and follow up insights from publicly pronounced positions on relevant issues. Papers presented and speeches made detailed people’s views on key issues while they also acted as grey material that was subsequently analyzed. The context set by the speeches and papers was also used in follow-on interviews with relevant key informants not necessarily the presenters. The third advantage realized from participating in events related to ‘being introduced’ to
many people without necessarily going through the formalities that preceded the survey or other community entry processes. Where formally introduced it was a simple process of ‘...and today we have a research student who asked to be in our meeting...ignore him as he is here to learn from our process. I was introduced as powerless and insignificant, which helped to put people at ease when I met them again later. Being introduced also de-politicized my presence particularly the associated confirmation that key people had already sanctioned my participation in events.

However, there were instances where power shifts occurred during the observation of meetings and events. In one NGO-Council-Government meeting in Mutare, the very introduction as a student resulted in my being assigned the minute-taking role. After being encouraged to write on flip-chart, a glaring (genuine) spelling mistake attracted attention. The sarcasm following this mistake from the participants prompted the Chair (Council CEO) to revisit the introductions adding that I was a doctoral student. The emphasis on doctoral shifted the relationship significantly as participants had initially taken me as an undergraduate student on attachment. The shift was however positive in that while there was some power assigned to me as a result it opened more doors and new contacts as participants began to accord me significantly more respect. So an event that started with me in the background ended up changing focus making me an uncomfortable point of reference (my cover had been blown).

4.3.4. Focus group discussions

Four focus group discussions were done, one each in Kasempa and Mutare and two in Seke/Manyame. One discussion was with a Seke/Manyame newly resettled community to explore socio-economic activities and the relations with Council and other development organisations. The focus group discussion was also used to refine the research agenda, identify key informants and deepen understanding of Ward 15. Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) refer to focus group discussions or group depth interviews as a widely used method in social science research best applied at the start of a study for exploration and conceptualisation but also useful at confirming findings. In undertaking the Ward 15 focus group discussion, low-intensity moderation was adopted largely because some of the participants were not known to me and as it was a fast track area, I did not want to risk antagonising them. As such,
beyond introducing major topics through semi-structured questions, I did not interfere in the discussions. Bentzon et al (1998) note that open conversations, which focus group discussions represent, require that a researcher be familiar with cultural nuances of the study community. Such familiarity or in my case low intensity moderation increases chances of gathering *emic* without necessarily precluding gathering *etic* data. *emic* data are data that arise in a natural or indigenous form while *etic* data arises from a researcher’s imposed view (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990). However the same authors note that there is no data that are exclusively *emic* or *etic* (see also Lincoln 2003) and neither data are better or worse than the other but simply differ. The limited use of the method was because at this phase of the study specific issues were yet to be distilled. In addition, focus group discussions appeared risky at the time because the chances of being politicized were high. As a method Focus Group Discussion helped in grounding the analysis and cross-checking data already gathered.

### 4.3.5. Community diaries and follow-ups

To deepen understanding of the socio-economic activities and the type of local institutions at the sub-District level in the Zambian District two research assistants were engaged and spent a month in two Wards with two different communities (total of three communities in the two Wards). The communities (Fwandanya Village in Kalombe Ward and Kalima and Kima Villages in Kelongwa Ward) were identified in consultation with local authorities including an NGO working in the area. In each of the Wards, one community considered relatively rich and another poor were studied. The selection was based on available District poverty data on poverty indicators from Kepa Zambia Foundation, Council and the DC’s office. The two locally identified assistants observed the activities and interactions over the month using a checklist (Annex 2.2) that I developed.

After the one-month stay with the communities, the diaries were sent to me. Resource constraints made it difficult to make a second visit to the District. However, information from the diaries was analyzed with follow-up questions raised with representatives of the NGO, local government, the District Commissioner’s Office and other stakeholders cited in the diaries by telephone contact. The choice of the method (Community Diaries) was largely influenced by language constraints on my
part. The sparse population in the District would also have increased logistical costs for me and as such, the community diaries came up as an effective substitute. Community Diaries were in addition to the Focus Group Discussion conducted with District Development Coordinating Committee members and semi-structured interviews with Council staff, SNV North Western and other officials (see Annex 1).

4.3.6. Questionnaire survey

In view of field entry challenges in Zimbabwe, it took me four months before I could get into communities. By the time I got field clearance, I was becoming anxious about my ability to conduct realistic fieldwork. The anxiety was compounded by the reality that things were changing very fast due to population movements especially in resettlement areas targeted for inclusion in the study, the economic crisis and the threat of a worsening of the political environment as we drew nearer to the March 2005 elections. To capture the situation at sub-District level I used a household questionnaire to ‘freeze’ reality as it were.

The survey was also a good tool to establish my identity as a bona fide student. Someone clutching papers on a clip-board and asking questions is the image most communities have of student researchers. Sitting under a tree with a group of respondents is viewed more as a political meeting. Under some of the recent legislations in the country, a researcher would need police clearance to hold meetings. In this context, the informality of some participatory methods (some of which had been intended) could have easily been viewed with some suspicion until trust was built. However, once my researcher image was confirmed the more informal meetings became easier to hold enabling use of more group-based participatory methods.

Six research assistants were recruited from the University of Zimbabwe and trained in the administration of the questionnaire (Annex 2.1). The survey was undertaken over a three week period in August and September 2004. I took part in the fieldwork, administering questionnaires as well and conducting key informant discussions in selected communities. After each courtesy call, the assistants would be distributed in the Ward and on average, each assistant completed three questionnaires a day. Respondents were those households where adults were found at homesteads along the
way a research assistant was traveling. Only in Ward 15 Seke/Manyame were people waiting for a ZANU PF rally interviewed.

Research assistants were involved in evening discussion sessions with me. These were based on insights and highlights from the day’s questionnaire administration. I used these insights to develop lists of key informants, project interventions and other activities that were subsequently followed up. At the end of the three weeks survey period a day long review of the process was done with all the research assistants. I facilitated the reflections capturing the assistants’ experiences. These focused on interviews that stood out, discussions with ‘guides’ and general observations, stories and preliminary analyses of issues being collated. This saw a broadening of the process such that the survey enabled both data gathering from individuals and entry into Wards. The survey ended up being a multi-objective tool, which allowed me to capture considerable qualitative insights.

Prior to entering communities for questionnaire administration I would visit communities to inform community leaders, mainly Councilors, traditional leaders and others especially political leaders to whom I was almost always referred. Homan (1991) calls them gatekeepers. They combine those with or without legal empowerment or status but generally control spatial access. Those with legal power require formally approaches so that they approve community entry. In one instance in Mutare District, I spent at least forty minutes in one such pre-meeting with a state security agent. Despite having all the relevant papers and the Councilor for the Ward being in attendance and fully aware of the study the state agent ‘lectured’ me on how naughty researchers can be. Citing some examples, which were more of political narratives than reality he re-emphasized why it was important for me to avoid getting entangled in politics. In a way this constitutes what in hindsight can be called ‘productive inconvenience’ as I was able to understand the local dynamics and the local-provincial to national imperatives. Although some of these interfaces with ‘inquisitive gatekeepers’ were unsettling from a personal security point of view they shed some light on the power issues in communities.

However, the same (productive inconvenience) cannot be said of an experience in Ward 7, Mutare District, when two of the research assistants were detained by a War
Veteran for at least one-and-half hours with their survey material taken. The completed questionnaires were returned after negotiations facilitated by the local Councilor. Fortunately, the research assistants were not harmed but were naturally shaken by the event. This prompted a discontinuance of the survey process in that Ward after some 15 questionnaires had been completed. To the extent that the experience demonstrated the power games that War Veterans are known to play in the Ward (according to the Councilor) the experience was therefore insightful. Apart from the potential risk to the assistants, the event itself was thus a source of data.

125 questionnaires were administered in the two Zimbabwean Districts, 71 in Seke/Manyame and 54 in Mutare. The household survey instrument (see Annex 2.1) had 72 main questions in 8 main sections as follows:

a) General socio-demographic information about the respondent and their household.
b) Information on existing local level organisations of importance to the household.
c) Village governance data (structures and processes).
d) Financial services, agricultural input and production support.
e) Community projects in the Village or Ward both externally and locally supported.
f) Council-Community interface and Development Planning experiences/processes including appreciation of existing development organisations and their relationships.
g) Household assets, land resources and livelihood.
h) Extra questions for resettlement households (pre and post-2000).

The survey was not meant to be statistically representative. The analysis of the results focused on the insights generated from the 125 respondents. As such when I say high or low in relation to these results the reference remains n=125 or a specified sub-set thereof. Of the 125 respondents, 65 were male and 60 females with 76 (61.8%) being household heads, 37 (30.1%) spouses, 5 (4.1%) in-laws and the balance spread between children (3) and 1 each worker and sister of the household heads. Of these 87 (61.4%) were 36 years or above with the remainder being between 19 to 35 years. 104 respondents or 83.9% had stayed in their communities for at least four years (48 months). At the time new resettlement schemes were drafted into the study it had been feared that, the significant movements would affect eventual respondents’ knowledge of the dynamics in their communities and between communities and District structures. However, given that the land rights of newly resettled people were largely validated based on length of stay/occupation it is possible respondents rushed for the higher end of the scale provided in the questionnaire. It is also important to acknowledge that the questionnaire was rather long and relatively complex. The range
of questions was broadened beyond the focus of the immediate study to create some baseline data for future work and to ensure that the study was taken seriously. These factors notwithstanding, the survey captured a significant number of household heads and people who had stayed in the community for reasonably long enough to provide dependable data. Also regarding age, mature people with enough understanding of the issues being studied were interviewed. Household like family is a contested sociological concept. Gaidzanwa’s (2001) definition of a family as people who live under one roof, cook and eat from the same pot approximates the operationalisation of the concept in the study. Furthermore, household was largely self-defined with the homestead being used to distinguish between households. A homestead is a cluster of houses belonging to one family and is physically and socially distinct from other homesteads.

4.4. Describing the study sites

Fieldwork for the study was undertaken between February 2004 and September 2005 with intermittent follow-ups after this period. As discussed in section 4.3 above a number of methods were used to gather data for the study. In section 4.5 below I reflect on fieldwork experiences in some detail but below I detail the study sites. A District in Zimbabwe is an administrative area within a Province as shown in the Maps below whose administration is assigned to an elected Council.

4.4.1. The study Districts

The Districts of Mutare (1 of 7 in Manicaland Province), Seke/Manyame (1 of 9 in Mashonaland East Province) in Zimbabwe, and Kasempa (1 of 7 in North Western Province) in Zambia were chosen for the study. The Maps below show the regional location of the two Zimbabwean Districts, their agro-ecological and administrative structures. Selecting Districts was based on a combination of personal knowledge and interest, costs, and the proximity to (or remoteness from) provincial and national government. Another factor was spatial co-existence of Council and central government especially DA (most senior civil servant in a District) or its lack. In Mashonaland East (Harare area) Seke/Manyame is the nearest with a Council office 1-2 hours from District Government Offices (not in same location). Unlike Mutare, Seke/Manyame’s Council offices are not in the provincial capital, Marondera. On the other hand, Mutare Rural District Council Offices are in the provincial capital and
within walking distance of District and Provincial Government. Given the level of interaction between the offices of DA and Council Chief Executive Officer, distance is a practical constraint. Of the two Zimbabwean Districts, Mutare has a larger portion of communal area compared to Seke/Manyame. Before the 2000 land occupations, Seke/Manyame was predominantly large-scale commercial farming area, two small areas for small-scale commercial farming (African Purchase Areas before independence) and about 15% communal land area with one Chief. Seke/Manyame’s pre-2000 agrarian and social structure contrasted with Mutare with at least 60% communal land area and two Chiefs. Because of proximity to the Harare Metropolitan area (Harare, Chitungwiza, Ruwa, Epworth and Norton) Seke/Manyame’s social structure changed radically as land occupiers from the nearby towns benefited from the land redistribution process. The Maps below show the Administrative and Agro-ecological structure of Zimbabwe as well as the study Districts (shaded in yellow stripes on the second Map of Zimbabwe). The Maps of the two study Districts are also shown indicating the Administrative structure (Ward boundaries and Numbers) as well as the land-use categories (large and small-scale commercial farming areas, old resettlement and communal). As noted earlier the large-scale commercial farming areas are where the new (post-2000) resettlement areas are found. The Figures below show the following:

- **Map 1**: Administrative structure of Zimbabwe (Provinces and Districts).
- **Map 2**: Agro-ecological structure of the country and shows study Districts (etched in yellow).
- **Map 3**: Seke Administrative District (Wards and the land categories, note study Wards VII, XV and XVIII).
- **Map 4**: Mutare Administrative District (Wards and the land categories, note study Wards 7, 22 and 24).

The selection of Kasempa was more out of convenience in that SNV Zimbabwe with which I was associated during the tenure of the study supported a field trip to North Western Province-Zambia. Kasempa was receiving capacity building support from SNV Zambia and was regarded (by SNV Zambia) as one of the most successful recipients of such support. At the national level, the District was also 1 of 8 that had achieved success under ZAMSIF and as such, it made a good and convenient choice for the study. Kasempa is one of seven Districts in Zambia’s North Western Province.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mutare (Zimbabwe)</th>
<th>Seke/Manyame (Zimbabwe)</th>
<th>Kasemps (Zambia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provinclal Location</td>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>North Western Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Size Estimate in square kilometers</td>
<td>5,895.53 sq km.</td>
<td>2,691.4 sq km.</td>
<td>21,000 sq km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>222,383.</td>
<td>76,923.</td>
<td>55,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>37 people/sq km.</td>
<td>28 people/sq km.</td>
<td>2 people/sq km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Wards</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Ecology</td>
<td>Regions 1-5 bulk in 3-5</td>
<td>Natural Regions 3-4</td>
<td>Natural Regions 2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Economy</td>
<td>Agriculture; High value crops are coffee, tea, bananas and other fruits, tobacco, wheat, dairy and maize in all land areas. Timber plantations and smallholder irrigation. Horticultural produce sales &amp; off-farm products. Tourism sector. Diverse retail sector. Cross-border trade.</td>
<td>Agriculture; High value crops are tobacco, maize &amp; wheat, dairy activities and horticulture sector supplying Chitungwiza &amp; Harare. Diverse retail sector. Subsistence farming in the communal sector with strong horticultural component.</td>
<td>Agriculture; 90% Small-scale, 10% Commercial Farms within 25 kms of Kasempa town. Subsistence agriculture, high shifting cultivation. Maize major cash crop &amp; some cotton. Natural resource extraction, tourism potential: District forms part of Kafue National Park (Zambia’s largest) &amp; 2 Game Management Areas of Lunga-Busanga and Lunga-Luwishi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Land Classification.</td>
<td>Approx 70% communal, 30% covered by old/new resettlement, small/large scale commercial farms &amp; plantation land.</td>
<td>Approx 30% communal, 70% new resettlement &amp; small/large scale commercial farms.</td>
<td>60% small-scale farming, 25% indigenous Forest Land and 15% commercial farms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Government</td>
<td>District Administrator.</td>
<td>District Administrator.</td>
<td>District Commissioner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data
Table 7: Reasons for District selection (Zimbabwe)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Reasons for selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutare</td>
<td>▪ Researcher’s(^{38}) past experience implementing projects in the District.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Based in provincial capital (near the seat of Provincial Government).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ First substantive Council CEO in the country (longest serving CEO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ District Government and Council near each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ District has all the five agro-ecological regions and land categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seke/Manyame</td>
<td>▪ Researcher involved in a land administration study in District(^{39}) (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Closeness to researcher’s base, furthest research site 2 hours away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Closeness to central but 2-3 hours from Provincial Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Council and Government offices not in one settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Recent administrative turbulence with frequent changes at CEO level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Most Council run Departments Acting Heads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Recent relocation of Head Office (from 60 km away).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data.

Notwithstanding the reasons given in Table 7, it is also important to note the poverty profiles of the study Districts as shown in Map 5. Mutare is a Medium Poverty District while Seke/Manyame is a Low Poverty District (GRZ 2003c).

\(^{38}\) I worked in Mutare (among other Districts) between 1994 and 1995 as an NGO Project Officer.

\(^{39}\) In 2002 I was a member of a Team of Land Reform and Resettlement Researchers which did a study of land administration issues and practices in this District and two others in different Provinces in addition to a study tour of Tanzania and Botswana.
4.4.2. Selection of the study Wards:

The selection of Wards was purposive in that the research had to be undertaken in all three principal land tenure categories of communal, new and old resettlement areas. However, once this was settled the actual Wards were selected using a combination of factors summarised in Table 8 below. Suffice however to note that the document analysis, community meetings and key interviews with Council staff and some Councilors by this time were useful in determining the choices of Wards.

Some Wards were suggested during interviews, not all of which were considered. The factors used to make actual Ward choices included poverty perceptions, problems either attributed to a Councilor or development organisations and cases of Wards ‘where nothing has happened before’ were volunteered as part of Council’s equitable distribution of opportunities. In instances where choices were problem-related a feeling that the research was seen as a possible way of corroborating evidence already available or helping in the solving of problems made me anxious. In some instances Councilors invited me to their Wards through the CEO e.g. Ward 7 Mutare. The rationale for volunteering one’s Ward was often part of making a Ward visible ahead of others besides genuine interest in hosting a research process for a Councilor’s own development management processes. In Table 8 (below) I show the characteristics of the study Wards and discuss aspects of the selection process.

Within Wards, the selection of communities especially for the survey was partly guided by the location of the community leaders who were to be seen before the team would start moving in the Ward. The leaders (political and traditional) gave ‘guides’ to the research team. The guides did not control household choices. However, with only one car for field travel in Wards that range between 20 to 50km wide and at a time when fuel shortages were being experienced in Zimbabwe, resource limitations played a part in determining intra-Ward travel. Notwithstanding this constraint, deliberate efforts were made to drop research assistants in pairs further from the Councilor or Traditional Leaders’ homesteads. The drop-off points and directions were planned strategically to balance coverage. Follow-up visits and the use of a multi-method approach helped to reduce the biasing effects of these challenges. The selection of the communities in Kasempa followed the same consultative process as
was used in Zimbabwe where District Council officials, the District Commissioner’s Office and an NGO (KEPA Zambia) implementing community-based natural resource management projects in the District were involved.

**Table 8: Characteristics of study Wards (Zimbabwe)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutare Ward 7.</td>
<td>1. New resettlement scheme Ward which until recently was entirely a commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>farming area (banana and tobacco growing area).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Bordering with Mozambique with parts inaccessible due to land-mines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Close to provincial capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Councilor volunteered when study was announced to full Council (in absence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of researcher).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Young and educated Councilor who is an ex-soldier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutare Ward 24.</td>
<td>1. Clustering of NGOs in area implementing different programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Considered by Council as one of the poorest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Furthest Ward in District on dirt road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Communal area in regions four and five (drought prone and stressed livelihoods, water shortage etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutare Ward 22.</td>
<td>1. An old resettlement scheme Ward with governance challenges as new (hitherto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absent) traditional leaders are being appointed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Abutting Ward in which researcher implemented a project 10 years prior to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fieldwork (1994-5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Served by one of the longest-serving Councilors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seke/Manyame Ward 7.</td>
<td>1. Communal area bordering Chitungwiza Town with considerable land conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Council volunteered the Ward as the Councilor is seen as very organised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The Ward has sub-Ward structures (devolved Ward governance).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Educated, relatively wealthy and internationally exposed Councilor who used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to work in an NGO (YMCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seke/Manyame Ward 15.</td>
<td>1. Councilor suspended a year prior to commencement of study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Site of considerable land occupation-related violence and bulk of unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>land allocation puzzles (Eden Farm).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Active and formally recognized HIV and AIDS support groups known to researcher from start of study (not prior).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Other farmer organisations in existence (only one in newly resettled areas in District) formed around an older section of the Ward where farmers were settled in 1995 (combination of late Phase I land reform and post-2000 land reform).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seke/Manyame Ward 18.</td>
<td>1. Relatively old Councilor facing challenges from traditional leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Regarded by Council as ineffective (‘…we wonder how he won this time’, CEO, Interview 10 June 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Researcher invited to a community meeting in Ward before survey. The issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>identified for follow up merited inclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Old resettlement scheme with land conflict issues (informal allocation of grazing land by a villager who claimed to be a village head- dethroned at the community meeting referred to above).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, 2007

**4.5. Methodological discussion**

This discussion reflects on all the main parts of this Chapter. The starting of the research got delayed considerably because of the need to secure formal approval. This was despite my having secured the ‘in-principle’ concurrence of the heads of the Council areas. Government sanction was needed and initially it was felt that the District level was critical. In Seke/Manyame District, this was not a problem but in
Mutare the DA suggested that a provincial approval was needed, which subsequently ended up being an approval at national level. Two lessons were drawn. One was that Councils do not yet fully control what happens in their territories. There is considerable deference to central government. Even the central government officers at District levels do not always have full confidence that the decisions they take will be sanctioned subsequently by higher offices. Suffice however to acknowledge that by the time the chain-referral for formal approval started in Mutare there had been a change of DAs within three months. The first DA had even written an introductory letter, which was however deemed inadequate by his successor without a provincial attachment. By the time the approval was secured an additional two months later, a third DA was in post. As a substantive and more established official, the new DA was more self-assured. Personnel changes in government accounted for the delays. For a swift process of approval of access to the field, starting at the national level would have been the best. However, from a research point of view some piloting and District-level inquiry was critical before launching the full study.

Accessing the field is an important part of research. Gate-keeping varies from normal concern with research ethics (see Homan 1991; Marshall and Rossman 1999) to informal ways of controlling field access. Based on pre- and post-2000 personal research experience in Zimbabwe, the latter period was more difficult in terms of securing access to the field. As noted by Marongwe (2002), ‘...the politically sensitive nature of land conflicts meant that primary data collection...remained very random and no sampling was done. Ability to access an area largely dictated the choice of farms for field data collection’ (2002:17). The conditions imposed by the Ministry responsible for local government also reflect the research reality. Although the conditions did not deter my work, they raised fundamental questions about how politics is defined. This influenced the study in as much as it increased my curiosity. One way of dealing with this was by exploring the nature of Councillorship in the two countries. The emergent research theme was the political and partisan nature of the institution, which has far reaching implications for community relations. Conditions that might be imposed on a study present both opportunities and constraints.

The second lesson was that the formal approval process involving officials at District and national levels was one layer of power, which however was inadequate on its
own. Other approval processes below the District were needed for smooth implementation of the study. The nature of politics in Zimbabwe before, during and after fieldwork remained unpredictable. Papers from higher offices worked to secure entry into a community but other localized processes were needed to satisfy community leaders (formal and informal). These were critical to securing actual or practical access to the field. The informal leaders like those of socio-economic groups, religious and traditional leaders, party cadres and local technical staff (government employees) often hold sway in terms of actual access to communities. They also control access to data including community-level ‘official records’ and sanction access to such material. The experience in Ward 7 (Mutare) where survey materials were confiscated (but later returned) and research assistants detained is a case in point. Accessing the field has therefore these two aspects to it. Without exhorting the formal process, it is important to highlight that time is needed to prepare so that the research is not delayed. However, this is as useful as a passport is when one is going to a country where they need a visa. The passport on its own is inadequate without a visa. Moreover, like passports and visas, the two are not issued by the same authorities. The official approval granted by national authorities in Zimbabwe enabled the study to proceed up to the community where gate-keepers authorized actual entry into the field. Some of the gatekeepers (Councilors, traditional leaders, party cadres etc) practically facilitated the study through nominating their representatives who acted as ‘field guides’. Other more specific reflections on the research experience are discussed below.

4.5.1. Accessing institutional spaces and demonstrating value

A critical aspect to the study was access into institutions, which was not easy. Entering into institutional spaces can be through two ways. One is where official sanction is secured from higher authorities (see Homan 1991) and the lower institutional layers simply have to oblige because of the authority granted. The other is where specific organisations are identified as entry points. At a practical level, I found myself having to offer transport at least twice to Council and Government officials to enable them to undertake their work while I also observed their work. In Mutare and Seke/Manyame District, offering transport assistance allowed more time with Council Chairpersons. Beyond assistance without going out of my way, the study proceeded on the hope that a presentation would be made to the stakeholders and that
once completed the results would be available to them particularly the local authorities. This would be useful for their work to the extent that they will be able to find aspects that can be adopted or adapted for use. Beyond such optimistic expectations, there are practical challenges entailed in doing this.

Having said the above, the research experience shows how important it is for researchers to demonstrate value for the time they spend in institutions. It seems that institutions expect that a development research process will lead to some positive outcome (see Thomas and Mohan 2007; Makumbe 1996; DeVault 1999). This conforms to Belshaw’s (1976) observation that society rewards researchers whose work assists in solving problems. This explains the expectations of institutions hosting researchers. In my case, I felt that key informants and gate-keepers behaved as if they had something to hide from me or considered my research to be controversial (see Warwick 1983). Society’s rewarding of research that solves problems might also imply that it (society) might be unkind to situations that create the problems in the first place or obstruct their solution, which may be considered a corollary to Belshaw’s (1976) observation. To deal with both expectations and an inclination to deny access into institutions a researcher can focus their questions on a participating organisation’s challenges and ambitions. Doing this does not have to affect the integrity of the research or make it a participatory action research but at least to identify short-term gains that participating organisations may be able to realize. This research provided some space for exchange of practices between the two countries and the Districts in Zimbabwe. One concrete example was in relation to Council Chairs’ management of what were referred to as ‘errant Councilors’. Experiences from Mutare were shared with Seke/Manyame and vice versa with their consent and at the Chairs’ request.

The use of a multi-method approach helped in securing access to institutions especially the combination of key informant interviews, participating in events and document analysis (see Marshall and Rossman 1999; Bulmer and Warwick 1983). Where objections were raised to certain material being used this was respected. However, with growing trust, heads of institutions and other staff became more comfortable having me around and assisting. A challenge often not adequately discussed is exiting the institutional spaces on conclusion of the study. Desai and
Potter (2006) discuss this in relation to researchers’ tendency to ‘take the data and run’ (see Thomas and Mohan 2007). A relevant dimension of the same issue is what Whyte and Whyte (1984) refer to as field relations. However, since finishing fieldwork I have not had significant contact with ‘my field’. Perhaps, presenting findings and discussing a way forward on how the institutions can practically address issues identified by the study could be a realistic way of giving back (see DeVault 1999; Belshaw 1976). At the same time, some clarity at the start of a study is required so that no promises of ‘changing the world’ are made.

4.5.2. Rewarding or assisting: the ethics of acknowledging and rendering assistance during research

Researching in a context where institutions are under diverse forms of stress presents challenges. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, some institutions are facing considerable strategic and operational challenges. Access into an organisation is invariably governed by the host organisation’s perception of possible benefits. In some cases, access is based on professional courtesy. With respect to the former, the study did not make undue promises to participating organisations. However, in some cases offering transport to facilitate field travel for Council or central government staff acted as some form of contribution. Free advice on pertinent issues was offered where requested without necessarily going overboard. This was through identifying possible processes, sources of information or support rather than offering specific technical input. Going beyond this would have been unethical for two reasons. First, my role would change and second the situation being observed would be significantly influenced. Some of the requests, however, could not be met because of time and ethical considerations. It is however important to acknowledge the tensions associated with receiving and considering requests for assistance.

Another ethical dilemma related to the guides, Councilors and other people whose time was devoted to facilitating community entry. These people made a considerable contribution to the study. In Mutare District’s Ward 7, the Councilor took the opportunity during the survey to ask me to accompany him to other parts of the Ward he is unable to reach because of transport constraints. This request was complied with and combined with questionnaire administration and interviewing the Councilor. This presented both opportunities and constraints. Opportunities included interviewing the
Councilor and observing him while in the Ward allowing me to understand how he administers the Ward. At the same time, the choice of households was affected and his presence within ear-shot of some of the questionnaire administration sessions might have affected responses.

Undertaking the research was looked at as building a relationship with the community and institutions. In this respect, offering support without going overboard was considered part of being human and realistic. The possible biasing effect was controlled through using different data collection methods, data sources and flexible or iterative processes. This does not however remove the questions of whether and how to justify and compensate for the time of the people who participated in the study. Related is whether actual material compensation would not create problems for the study as well as others' in future. The questions from my research experience, while not adequately answered, are not unique (see Thomas and Mohan 2007; DeVault 1999, Marshall and Rossman 1999; Desai and Potter 2006). However, it is possible to retreat to the notion above of relationship building (see Whyte and Whyte 1984). When doing research among fellow human beings and institutions small bits of support make a difference and are essentially about being humane. I proceeded on this basis and feel this did not affect the research findings and the conclusions drawn.

4.5.3. Researcher identity and field-level flexibility

Throughout the study, I identified myself as a researcher. This went some way in making it easy for people to relate and share their views. My other identities as consultant for instance were rarely used. During the first day of questionnaire administration in Ward 15 Seke/Manyame District, the team was confronted with a dilemma when on entering the targeted Ward a ZANU PF meeting was in progress and local people were being mobilised to attend. Some of the research assistants expressed doubts about proceeding but I felt this would be an opportunity to interact with one important institution in rural Zimbabwe. After some careful negotiations, I was allowed to administer the questionnaires while the people waited for a senior politician who was to address the meeting. The image of a clip-board clutching researcher worked wonderfully in this instance and secured us entry into a group that would have been difficult to engage.
Twelve questionnaires were administered at this meeting. I proceeded to do a detailed semi-structured interview with the Ward Coordinator (a civil servant). No related opportunity presented itself with respect to the major opposition party MDC raising questions about whether a deliberate seeking out of opposition followers was necessary. However, the people in attendance at the ZANU PF meeting might have been actively encouraged if not forced to attend and as such it is conceivable that the meeting had a more complex stakeholding than the convening institution would suggest. Responses to the questions were quite robust further reducing the risk of bias.

As fieldwork progressed, opportunities presented themselves where evidence from previous and different interviews, sources or from literature analyzed began to creep into discussions and subsequent interviews. This resulted in instances where such information was used, raising questions about the extent to which this influenced the direction of interviews, the quality of data and the interview relations. Although care was taken to conceal the sources where these were people, it is possible that respondents could construct their own images of the sources raising issues of confidentiality. The iteration between specific forays into the field and analysis, mixing methods and interacting with diverse socio-economic groups in the targeted Wards helped in terms of depth and breadth of data collected. At the same time, the use of a Community Diary in Zambia created a mix of data completing the District and sub-District range of perspectives on institutionalising participation.

4.6. Conclusion

To conclude, the research experience involved mainly iterative processes of investigation on the ground, using a multi-method approach. This was possible in spite of frustrating experiences which somewhat restricted both access and progress. The different experiences and research emotions e.g. anxiety, uncertainty, concern at expectations of the research, shaped the process in positive ways as well. Researching institutions is a complex process as it essentially means looking into issues of power. The decision to facilitate a research process by gate-keepers reflects who feels comfortable with a researcher or perceives some potential benefit (see Bulmer and Warwick 1983; Belshaw 1976; Homan 1991; Marshall and Rossman 1999). Organisational culture can also play a role, as in the case of Zambia, where
professional courtesy seemed to play an important role in opening doors perhaps precisely because I was not familiar. That raised questions about whether undertaking research in another country can be easier than undertaking research in one's own (see Desai and Potter 2006). For a start, the familiar home contexts can breed complacency and people (potential respondents) might not have the same desire to accord a researcher adequate space. In some cases, they may fear that the research might uncover hidden issues that they would rather not disclose (see Bulmer and Warwick 1983). Related is the possible loss of analytical rigor arising from accessing data that would not have been part of the study if it had been conducted in an unfamiliar setting. This occurs where respondents digress to familiar issues. Notwithstanding these challenges, the study was done in a disciplined manner.

Approaching the study from a relational perspective was illuminating. The structures observed are theatres for interaction and interconnections. To this extent, therefore it is fair to say that interactions or relations need to be a feature of both analysis and action to make participation effective. This is what the next sections deal with i.e. what emerged from the analysis. In the next two Chapters, I discuss the empirical evidence from the research. The first looks at the findings as they relate to interactions while the second engages with people's perceptions.
PART II; RESEARCH FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This part of the thesis is presented in three Chapters (5, 6 and 7). Chapters 5 and 6 are both on findings. The first deals with institutional interaction while the second discusses people’s perceptions of and responses to institutions. In these two Chapters, I detail the manifestations of the opportunities and challenges for participatory development based on the empirical observations of Zimbabwe and Zambia. In the process, the implications (of the opportunities and challenges) for institutionalising participatory development are shown. Findings are presented and discussed based on the conceptual framework (Chapter 3) and specifically Figure 1, which visualizes the overall analytical framework in terms of the spaces and places for interaction. For instance the influence of the external context e.g. donors can take the form of new planning methodologies or choice of some development organisations over others as implementing partners.

The analysis of the findings engages with the opportunities and challenges inherent in inter-organisational interface. The most critical issues arising from inter-organisational interactions are discussed in Chapter 5 as they relate to structures and spaces. The creation of effective communication mechanisms and improving support to sub-national structures and processes are central to enhancing participation and the performance of the institutions involved in facilitating participation. The defining feature of the sub-national institutions on which the analysis focuses is the facilitation and actual undertaking of development activities. Chapter 6 presents ordinary people’s perceptions of development organisations and responses to their development contexts. Combined, the two Chapters illuminate the ways in which participation is facilitated or obstructed in practice from these different perspectives. The findings relate to data gathered using all the methods discussed in Chapter 4.

Suffice to reiterate that Councils and other governmental institutions co-manage the processes of development that the study observed but with increasing non-governmental presence and funding. Chapter 7 pulls together the key discussions and concludes the thesis. I use the findings to contribute to answering the research question and to comment on the theoretical framework.
CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION AS DEVELOPMENT FACILITATION

5.1. Introduction

Development organisations interact as they perform their functions. The functions are defined from top-down, bottom-up and various combinations of both. Organisations attempt to make their activities relevant to community needs and to other actors operating in the same spaces. As such, these diverse interactions inform the thinking and doing of development. In this Chapter, I talk about institutional interaction as development facilitation and further show that the quality of such interaction is critical for doing development. Note here that institutional interaction is used broadly to cover inter-organisational and organisation-community (as groups, individuals or other formations) interface. In thinking and doing development, priorities are important. The study explored development priorities or agendas from the perspectives of ordinary people and key informants. However, development priorities are often contested by both ordinary people and development organisations.

Chapter 5 is about analyzing the inter-organisational interactions as these allow the surfacing of issues in relation to individual organisational performance, relationships and the role of coalitions or associations, how policy frameworks are utilized and/or interpreted and how higher level support enables performance by lower level institutions. At the same time interactions amongst organisations, allow the building of collective capacities, access to useful information and managing organisational-community interface. Key informants raised some of these issues and opportunities during interviews. Events that I attended also enabled me to observe how some of the issues arise and play out. Organisations and spaces cited in this Chapter and the rest of the thesis are in no way exhaustive but suffice for exploring the research question and may guide or themselves require further inquiry.

An example of support from higher level to leverage performance at lower levels (Council in this case) concerns the Government of Zimbabwe’s proposal to pay salaries to three top Council Executives (ARDCZ Congress August 2004) and thus enable Rural District Councils to retain Chief Executive Officers, Treasurers and
Engineers. It is expected that securing continuity at this level will enhance Council performance. However, some key informants observed that this could result in Councils losing their autonomy as key executives inevitably fall more under direct central government control. On a related issue, the Chief Executive Officer of Seke/Manyame District (Zimbabwe) observed that the fact that Council nurses were paid by the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare at times presented problems in terms of managing them. A community meeting at a clinic, which I attended and cited later in Seke/Manyame exposed some of these challenges. I will elaborate on some of these issues in the sections below but suffice to observe that inter-organisational interaction is often around a development agenda whose setting and pursuance creates or blocks participation. The section below engages with this aspect of agenda or priority setting.

5.2. What development? Reflecting on agenda setting

Participatory development enthusiasts argue that the determination and pursuit of development priorities should rest with the people (see Chambers 1983; Ayittey 2005). As such, I posed the question on development priorities to survey respondents and key informants. The idea was that in poor countries like Zimbabwe it should be generally easy to identify what has to be done. This section explores the development priorities highlighted by the respondents and informants. By assessing communities’ development ambitions and comparing these to those of development officials, the study established the extent of overlap. For the questionnaire survey, the Village was the planning unit while for key informants I often used the District with a satisfactory level of sub-District grounding of their responses.

The focus of development activities (what is done) can be as important as the planning processes, development structures and implementation (how development is thought through and done). This is because people are more inclined to take an active part in activities they perceive more important to their livelihoods than in those where they are unable to see benefits. An uninspiring development agenda facilitated by uninspiring institutions threatens participation. Development priorities form the content of development plans. Securing respect for those priorities by higher level organisations and officials in the eventual plans is critical for participation.
Survey results indicate that agricultural development, water and sanitation are critical development needs in Zimbabwe's rural areas. Key informants defined development in relation to food security, household incomes and community facilities like health and education services. In response to the question on the key development priority, 31.1% (n=125) of the survey respondents indicated that agricultural development was a top priority and 22.7% indicated water and sanitation. Other priorities ranging in terms of frequency between 2% and 10% included micro-projects, energy development, communication infrastructure, and health and education services. The majority of the respondents (83.6%) indicated that their key priorities (different by Ward) had been included in the Ward Development Plans. Based on experience slightly above half (54.4%) believed that the priorities would not be respected.

Having priorities in Ward Plans shows hope in the planning system but the skepticism regarding actual implementation at 54.4% is high. 43.3% attributed their skepticism to doubtful quality of local leadership, 33.3% to bad track record and 23.4% other factors including level of community contribution and recognition that funding was generally unavailable (n=68). In the event that the need is not included in the District Plans 36.8% of the respondents indicated they would do nothing, 26.4% would try again, 20.6% indicated that they would raise issues with authorities and 16.2% would seek own funding (n=125). The option of raising issues with the authorities relates closely to the percentage of people who indicated having personally approached an official or institution with a development need (33.9%, see section 6.6).

From the foregoing, it is safe to say that controversies in development may not be so much about priorities. Rather the challenges seem to be about how development is done and that it is often seen as not being done. The overlap between official and community perspectives on priorities seemed to bear this out. In the case of the communities included in the study, the feeling that development (vis-à-vis their priorities) was not happening at all in their areas came through. Priorities and needs may vary in terms of order rather than the broad sectors in which people's needs fall. Given recent droughts and the national economic crisis in Zimbabwe agricultural development or food security issues almost came naturally as an important area. The research also established that people generally have faith in the structures and processes established to identify their needs. However, their perception, borne of lived
experiences is that these processes and structures are not delivering. That very development activities are implemented appears to be a major source of frustration. The gap between what is planned and what is implemented (development deficit) is acknowledged from the level of Councilor upwards and is often used as a justification for not consulting people. Unfortunately, this lack of consultation (on the assumption that what needs to be done is already known) limits the institutionalisation of participation at lower levels. A question can be asked about whether greater consultations may address more strategic issues about why existing local governance institutions are not delivering. This would lift participation beyond consultation about defining development needs.

The above makes discussion about local development agendas critical. A local development agenda reflects priorities that people in geographically defined spaces commit themselves to implementing. Such an agenda can be based on the local poverty context. Internal or external facilitators can help unearth people's expectations and problems i.e. their poverty experiences. External facilitation may influence articulations of development needs to fit what a community feels the organisations may or can provide for. This is what Whyte and Whyte (1984) refer to as formalized explanations (see Stewart and Shamdasani 1990 viz etic data). In defining development priorities, key informants often used the mandate of their organisations. As such, AREX prioritised food security, DDF spoke of water and sanitation while Councils talked about services and community infrastructure. External organisations e.g. NGOs facilitate community use of existing potential but also bring or market new approaches in accordance with their missions/mandates. A development idea may be expressed as an obligation to meet extra-community expectations e.g. a community labeled a bread basket ends up with an obligation to produce for own consumption and ‘export’. Whether internally defined or ‘marketed’ local development agendas are articulated expectations. The agenda is local to the extent that its pursuit is spatially local, it generates benefits and uses as much local resources as is possible.

The nature of linkages amongst local institutions and with outside organisations is important for local development agendas. Development organisations link up vertically or laterally with others in similar sectors (say agriculture or health) or of the
same type (e.g. governmental or non-governmental). The linkages may also be across sectors and institutional types. In terms of Figure 1, this relates to the extent of linkages between Organisations 1-N on the one hand and their embeddedness in local contexts on the other i.e. do popular organisations and the grassroots access and control development regimes? Implementation of local development agendas requires more horizontal collaboration and coordination. The totality of processes, institutional structures and procedures involved in the development process in an area make up a development regime. That regime defines the form and extent of interactions, nature of the development agenda and affects development outcomes. Ordinary people’s skepticism about the security of their development aspirations as they go to higher institutions indicates their limited influence over spaces beyond the Ward.

To summarise, there is little difficulty in defining what the development priorities of a community are. People have clear priorities based on the local poverty context, development activities and development regimes. Figure 3 below represents these as three ‘pillars’ of local development agendas. Localness of the agenda is not necessarily community-driven since development ideas may come from outside a community. What is spatially local are the execution and benefit distribution processes. The importance of the three pillars varies with localities and overall macro-economic and socio-political dynamics. What is important is that if people’s core priorities are not secured they will perceive development as not being done even where some other processes are going on. Asked about whether a new project had been brought to respondents’ communities 61.6% said No and 32% answered Yes (n=125 with a 6.4% not applicable response).

Figure 3: Pillars of local development agendas
This Figure (8) elaborates the differences in interpretation and resultantly the approaches that development actors (including ordinary people) adopt in what the framework of Figure 1 represented as Joint Structures and Development Activities. It is also important to highlight that without necessarily using the terms in Figure 8, survey respondents answered questions in ways that related to the poverty issues they experience, the activities around them and the organisations they are aware of. Similarly, key informants also addressed issues of context, activities and actors (see section 5.4, Boxes 1 and 5 and sections 5.5.3, 5.5.5 and 6.5).

5.3. Planning and participation

Plans are important in development. How they are developed, their content and implementation arrangements are critical (see Brand 1991; Wekwete 1990; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). The planning and implementation stages provide scope for involving people and for development organisations to interact. This section looks at the institutional arrangements for managing the planning process as these have a bearing on the extent to which people can get involved. The development planning process in Zimbabwe has been in a state of change over the years in terms of main players. During the era of Development Committees (mid 1980s to late 1990s), the process came up with ‘shopping lists’, which did not receive adequate funding for the planning processes, the planning institutions and the plans (Gasper 1997; see Francis and James 2003). Integrated plans focusing on specific geographical areas were also developed mainly by NGOs working in specific parts of given Districts.

Data gathered through key informant interviews indicated how planning cycles had changed during the RDCCBP era (after 1996) from national 5-year, District and Provincial Annual Development Plans to 3-year Rolling Plans. The latter have a component each of a review of a previous plan, an annual programme and proposed plan covering one year. The review contains achievements and incomplete activities to be carried over, while the annual programme covers activities for a given year with assured funding and future plans contain relevant activities (new and carry-overs) but not assured of funding. ‘Rolling’ arises from the realization that with reduced funding many relevant projects remain unimplemented. It made little sense to engage in rigorous re-planning rather than just reviewing existing plans and carrying over relevant aspects while realistically including new initiatives. Projects that some
communities in Zimbabwe complain about are still on plans rolled over repeatedly. Besides three-year rolling plans there are also strategic corporate plans that Councils in Zimbabwe are encouraged to develop. These constitute the most recent approach to planning although there are concerns about lack of adequate capacities in Councils to develop and implement them. The Ministry of Local Government and other development organisations are currently promoting strategic planning approaches with Zimbabwean Councils. Key informants confirmed that public sector planning processes are under-resourced and hence are stressed structurally and procedurally.

Although the overall vision of ensuring grassroots participation has been maintained, the reality reflects a less satisfactory situation. The approaches employed in coming up with the plans vary. Some Councils use a Ward-to-Ward approach, others simply convene stakeholder (usually leadership) meetings to come up with plans there and then. Where participatory methods, e.g. PRAs, are used, they are rarely completed because of high time and financial costs. In Mashonaland East Province, three Districts have had partial PRA-based studies (Hwedza, Marondera and Goromonzi), which did not cover entire Districts. As such, the planning was not fully informed by these studies. Incomplete consultations result in Council Strategic Plans that are lacking in shared ownership and usually end up being done by consultants on a short-term basis, i.e. not in-depth. Under SEDAP\(^4\) (1999-2003), Mutare Council’s planning in the 5 Wards targeted was PRA-based. The programme supported livestock restocking, environmental management, well-sinking and other project areas that communities prioritised. SEDAP also supported District institutions in terms of internalizing use of participatory methods. However, Council was not able to roll-out SEDAP experiences to other Wards during and after the tenure of the project.

5.3.1. Technical support towards planning

Council planning processes in both countries are supported by central government organisations as discussed in the section on structures below. Some sector-specific plans are developed outside the Committee framework. For instance, Physical Plans are supported by the Department of Physical Planning (DPP- Ministry of Local Government), agricultural development by AREX, health and education plans

\(^4\) An International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and Government of Zimbabwe funded project supporting, using participatory methods, agro-related development projects in communal areas in drier parts of the South-Eastern part of Zimbabwe hence its name: South-East Dry Areas Project (SEDAP).
likewise. The difference between DPP and other central government institutions is that they do not have staff at District level. They are provincially based and come into Council areas on invitation. The plans they assist Councils in developing are essentially implemented by the Councils. However, other government departments and Ministries are present at District levels and below. They have their own Ministerial programmes, alongside participation in Council-managed ones. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, the District levels have planning structures either relevant Sub-Committees of RDDC/DDCC or Council Planning Units like in Zambia. As such, planning expertise is more decentralised in Zambia than in Zimbabwe.

It has been observed that while DPP offers technical support for plan preparation it has no other scope for influencing or guaranteeing implementation of the plans. Unlike in Zambia, Zimbabwe’s RDCs do not have District Planners. Interviews with the CEOs of the study Districts and Provincial Officials it was learnt that some RDCs employ Engineers and other single-sector specialists. However, these were unable to lead multi-stakeholder planning and visioning processes. For instance, the Provincial Planner for Manicaland indicated that the development plans that Councils prepare with the help of RDDCs are both delayed and often of poor quality (Interview 8th September 2004). He also indicated that once prepared plans faced funding problems as they lacked institutional champions. In terms of technical support towards Council-level development planning, the study learnt of cases where support has been lacking from the Province41, slow42 and confusing (LGAZ brainstorming session, February 24th 2005). The confusion often comes from introduction of different planning approaches and cycles by different organisations, in different sectors and often changing these without any continuity. This divergence in planning systems and the plans is elaborated below.

5.3.2. Clarity over plans and the planners
The process of coming up with plans and implementing them provides opportunities for people’s participation. The spaces in and cycles through which planning takes place constitute important areas where institutionalisation of participation can be implemented. The study observed opportunities and challenges in the planning

42 Mutare RDC (2000); Chief Executive Officer’s Report to the RDCCBP District Review Meeting.
processes and products, which are discussed in this section. My analysis of the planning process from the village up established that there are many routes for Villagers’ priorities. These routes may lead towards implementation or the ‘dust-bin’. In Zimbabwe the main routes include the Parliamentary Constituency route, Member of Parliament and Presidential calls, District or Council-based processes, NGO planning avenues and, among other things, through farmers’ groups or associations. I discuss some of these in this section to illuminate organisational interaction and the opportunities and constraints to institutionalising participation.

In the 2000-2005 Zimbabwe Parliamentary Session the community of Ward 15 (and six others) in Seke/Manyame kept submitting project proposals under the grant scheme administered by the Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation without success (Interview with Ward 15 Coordinator43, 15th August 2004). The project funding is on a constituency basis in Zimbabwe although, unlike in Zambia, there is no designated Constituency Development Fund. Their Member of Parliament and the Constituency Office for submitting applications is in another administrative District (constituency straddles two Districts). The projects, developed with the assistance of the Ward Coordinators were not being forwarded back to the Seke/Manyame office of the Ministry. In the interview, the Coordinator said submissions were often lost as Ministry officials promoted funding of groups in their part of the constituency. Ward 15 groups were no longer keen on submitting applications. Furthermore, the local MP was considered uninterested in this part of the constituency since he came from the adjacent District (Ibid). The Ministry staff in the two Districts had not discussed these in any detail. This is just one case where a political constituency straddles more than one District and where weak intra-organisational coordination stifles participation.

However, the main planning structures are the Ward and Village Assemblies in Zimbabwe and Area Development Committees in Zambia. Assemblies continue to relate to the Councils in ‘shopping-list mode’, and Councilors keep bringing requests for inclusion into Council plans. This is because people have some faith in the system

43 Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation (now split in two, the other is Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development since March 2005) employs Ward Coordinators and the key informant in this case was an employee serving two Wards of Seke/Manyame (see also Section 5.4.1).
as discussed above. There is therefore a disjuncture between the grassroots and RDC level planning realities. Plans are developed for sending to the national level not necessarily to Council. Council effectiveness is difficult to measure considering that Council acts as a route for people’s needs to the national level. Councils and Councilors can pass the blame upwards for lack of development since plans are being submitted to ‘someone’. Council success or otherwise is not directly associated with District let alone sub-District structures. The ‘someone’ is generally seen as government. As the buck gets passed up and down, the question becomes; whose plans are they? Are they community, Council or Government plans? When a community brings up priorities what expectations does it have of themselves and others regarding plan execution? Do local government structures (or other planners) pose as ‘father Christmases’ or development facilitators (see Kar 2003, Tilakaratna 1987)? Ownership of planning processes and products is weak in both countries reducing accountability in/for development at community and organisational levels.

Other alternative planning processes may divert attention from Council plans or even contradict them. The first one is that of Members of Parliament (MPs) who often act as ‘planners’ in their constituencies. They often plan and implement programme activities during election campaigns. Some of these activities might not be in the Council development plans and are rarely implemented with direct Council support. Problems often arise when MPs’ projects are not completed. In most cases, the need to hand over such projects to Council is not consciously thought about at the planning stage. In other cases where a local Council is unable to raise resources to complete projects, the result can often be friction between the Council and the community on the one hand and the MP on the other.

Despite these problems, MPs are an important source of development support and information. Box 1 shows one project in Marange, Mutare District established with the local MP’s efforts. It has some of the challenges discussed above although positively changing the lives of some of the participating households. A number of questions were explored using this Dairy Project. Important questions include; Why/how did such a project, which is sensitive to agro-ecological conditions, find its way into a region evidently unsuited and with such inadequate infrastructural support? Since DDP, the main project sponsor has run out of funds and Plan International (a
potential funder) may not respond soon, what happens to the project? Should the project completely fail who is to blame? Is it the resource poor farmers and their local institutions or the MP? Could it be Council, technical support organisations or the project funders? Alternatively, is it all of these?

**Box 1: Marange Dairy Project (Mutare District Zimbabwe)**

This is a smallholder dairy project implemented under a national Dairy Development Programme (DDP), a unit of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA a Parastatal). DDP (working with others) offers technical and financial services to dairy farmers. DDP placed an Officer but during fieldwork, the project was not staffed. The Marange Project started in January 2002 and was introduced by the MP for Mutare West. Initial membership was 110 both males and females (35-40 active) within 40kms of the Milk Collection Centre (MCC). The number of active farmers has not changed but total registered members was 350 in mid 2005 (time of fieldwork). DDP fully funded construction of the MCC and it is almost complete (roofed, plastered, electric tubing and flooring) with painting, ceiling, ablution block and fitting of window panes awaiting completion. The milk processing plant and water facilities are outstanding. Promises in 2004 by Plan International (an NGO) to help with funds for the milk processing equipment were yet to materialize. Hand-dug wells did not reach water table and group was to contract a professional well-sinker.

At project inception (2002), 6 farmers received 2 in-calf (Red-Dane) heifers each from ARDA’s Livestock Input Scheme. 4 died the same year from tick borne diseases. The cows have also shown poor reproductive performance (low conception rates, Contagious Abortion (CA) and high calf mortalities; 5 out of 12 survived) which hinder performance of the enterprise. Project members' asset-base: average land ownership is 4 ha per farmer, with indigenous cattle, which they are intending to cross-breed for milk production. The 190 registered farmers in 2003 had among them 250 cows and heifers, which were tested and found to be suitable for use as dairy cows. To improve productivity DDP purchased dairy bulls (farmers contributed 50% of bull cost) and 10 have been delivered.

The Marange area is mainly ecological regions 3 to 5 with low levels of fodder production. Most farmers rely on veldt grazing for their cows, which only works in summer (+-5 months). Less than 10 farmers have meaningful fodder banks with only 3 farmers having small plots (about half a hectare) of Bana grass, some multi-purpose legume trees (leucaena, sesbania and acacia species), which is inadequate to support viable milk production during the dry period. Farmers’ summer fields are not fenced making it difficult to maintain the small plots of multi-purpose trees established during the dry season. Recurrent droughts worsen the situation in an area with inadequate water supplies. Most of the individual wells dry up during the dry season making shortage of feed a major problem for the project, which has reduced milk output per cow to below optimum levels. DDP has run out of resources before the project has been completed. It is hoped that Plan International will provide resources to complete the project.

Farmers receive seeds for multi-purpose trees from the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) and from the Department of Livestock Production and Development (Government of Zimbabwe-DLPD). All farmers received basic training in dairy husbandry courses facilitated by DDP with resource support from DLPD, Veterinary Services and other NGOs. The project has a Committee and operates as a fully developed association holding meetings monthly. There are some political differences amongst the members, which sometimes threaten to tear the group apart taking them away from productive matters. One expert informant who is very familiar with the project observed that: ‘...the area is too dry to support viable dairy activities moreover dairy is for the poor not the poorest...' (Interview 9th March 2005).

Source; Decoded from Project Documents, summarised from Field Visit and Interviews, March 2005.
What is fair to say is that MPs generally mean well when they out-wit their colleagues to get something (or anything) available nationally for their communities. Even when they do it out of self-interest to gain votes, this could be the only means available for some communities to receive support. In the early 1990s, I was involved in an NGO-managed grazing scheme\textsuperscript{44} project in Mutare District. 13 years on, I realise the community accepted it largely because refusing meant missing out on interacting with ‘development people’. As such, I may argue that the resource-poor farmers may not be to blame for some of the project failures but the institutions (including MPs) bringing the projects. However, the difference between the grazing scheme and the dairy project is that the grazing scheme was in the Council Annual Development Plan. While the questions raised, about involvement of MPs (and other players) in direct project planning and management require more project cases for more conclusive answers, in the context of this study I make the point that the complexity of project delivery channels and actors stretches District level planning. I acknowledge that the myriad avenues may serve to increase available options but they unfortunately limit institutional interaction necessary for effective and equitable participation.

The research observed that after Presidential or other national elections calls for project applications are made in connection with campaign promises. Most electioneering promises are neither originated by nor incorporated into RDC plans (Interview with Mash. East, Local Government Key Informant 27\textsuperscript{th} May 2004). The 2005 national election campaign in Zimbabwe was characterised, among other things, by the President’s high profile donation of computers to secondary schools. Given the acute shortage of learning and teaching materials, classrooms and other educational necessities there may be a basis to question whether computers were a priority. Further, a question may arise as to how well-informed national politicians are about local aspirations, and whether processes of local need identification mean anything in practice at national level. However, there is an alternative view that some macro initiatives require a strategic rather than a localised thrust.

Apart from politicians-cum-planners, sector Ministries and Government Departments also have a role in planning processes. District Development Plans are expected to

\textsuperscript{44} The scheme (Gwarada) never got completed and at the time of fieldwork the fence in sections that had been completed had been removed and the area partially settled i.e. project abandoned.
integrate Ministry plans. RDDC and PDC processes facilitate the development of District plans for Council adoption, which plans become a guide for other development organisations working in the District or Province. However, District and Provincial key informants indicated challenges with contradictory submissions from Councils and line Ministry staff. At times, District level line Ministry staff and their provincial colleagues differ in their submissions. Ministries submit different plans through the two systems i.e. their line Ministry and the RDDC process. This can ruin the chances of a District Plan successfully attracting funding from the national budgetary process at a time when local government grants and local revenue are low.

In terms of implementation processes, Box 2 shows some of the challenges that curtail full and effective participation.

**Box 2: Mutare Community-Based (water-point) Maintenance (CBM)**

In Mutare, the District Development Fund-Water section under the Ministry of Rural Resources and Infrastructural Development implemented a programme of water-point rehabilitation and flushing without the full knowledge or direct involvement of Council in 2004. Councilors from a number of Wards raised objections to this in a full Council meeting of 14th December 2004. They particularly raised issue with the selection, training and replacement of Village Pump Minders (VPMs). Councilors and other stakeholders felt Water Point Committees that had been created under an NGO-supported District-wide programme in 2003 should have been used. Under this arrangement, tools and equipment for borehole repairs were kept by Councilors. Village Pump Minders would collect these for use and return. In the event of a Pump Minder leaving (through death or transferring from the Village/Ward) Councilors would facilitate selection and replacement in consultation with relevant Water-Point Committees i.e. representatives of the water-user communities. Instead of this system DDF was selecting VPM replacements and allowing them to keep tools and equipment, which Councilors felt exposed the assets to abuse. Councilors also felt that the accountability of VPMs was becoming questionable and that performance in most Wards was declining. They attributed this to DDF’s approach and attitude. In response, the DDF representative felt that Councilors were interfering with his work.

This is a case where the interface between DDF-Water and Council (at District) and between DDF-Water Field staff and Councilors (at Sub-District) reflected tensions that were stifling community-based water point maintenance and safe-keeping of tools and equipment provided under an NGO-supported project. The arrangement where VPMs were selected and supervised locally, equipment and tools kept by the community and a water-point maintenance programme agreed at local level was being threatened. Because the three organisations were not represented in the meeting, it was not possible to get their views during the meeting. Subsequent follow-ups with all three organisations elicited different perspectives on the subject. However, they generally agreed that this reflected both community ownership and Council capacity challenges, which they encountered in their other different interventions.

Source: Summary of notes made from a Full Council meeting of 14th December 2004

At the 2004 ARDCZ Congress, Councils raised issues of deliberate institutional overlap (see Mbaku 2004; Engberg-Pedersen 1997; Ayittey 2005). One organisation cited was District Development Fund-Roads section. Councils alleged that DDF was
duplicating Council road works. Clearly, the Fund has the authority to maintain roads and water points, but the lack of coordination and communication can increase costs and reduce outputs. Organisational effectiveness also suffers while Council plans are ignored. One predicament cited in relation to weak institutional interaction as shown in the above examples was the power that line Ministries have. Council executives and chairpersons, the RDDC and PDC chairs (Zimbabwe’s District and Provincial Administrators) do not have the power to force line Ministries to respect District and Provincial Plans. Although the Provincial Council has the powers of approving the Provincial Plans and District Council Chairs have occasion to defend plans, the Chair of the Provincial Council (the Governor) has no budget. Decentralised plans have no national level link marketing the plans. The advantages of taking District Plans for collation into Provincial Plans are therefore not very evident given the limitations of the Provincial Plan as a fundraising tool.

Some avenues may have restricted accessibility e.g. constituency grants (perceived as favoring pro-ZANU PF applicants), but a District picture needs to be developed. Concerns about the equitability of such funds are an important agenda in Zimbabwe.

In Zambia, there is a plan to convert the Constituency Development Fund into a Ward Development Fund administered through a Ward Account (Interview with LGAZ Executive Secretary February 1st 2005). The pressure to proceed in this direction arises from the politicization of the fund. In Western Province’s Kaoma District, a member of an NGO (Women for Change45) in Mangango Area Association was nominated to be Treasurer on the District Committee disbursing the CDF resources. A local ruling party branch made an application purporting to be a community-based organisation entitled to CDF resources but the Committee refused their application. When political pressure was applied the Women for Change activist was sold out by the other Committee members resulting in her ouster. To save the CDF she eventually had to resign from the Committee (Interview with WFC Acting Director, February 1st 2005).

To summarise this section, two points can be made. Firstly, spatial units for planning and development facilitation are many. They are at once distinct and overlapping.

45 Women for Change is a Zambian NGO working on gender, human rights and social development.
Where no deliberate synchronization is done, they may result in inequitable resource
deployment while also making development management difficult. The opportunities
presented by a myriad of funding options may not lead to more participation.
However, there are some cases where Councils have been in constant communication
with other stakeholders that facilitate development. Related is the fact that while
seemingly unwieldy, the many planning and delivery channels offer choices that are
important for people’s participation. The channels allow use of different ideas and the
whole framework as depicted in Figure 1. My view is that the challenges faced in
using the planning and development management structures do not constitute a
rationale for ‘throwing the baby with the bath water’. It is also critical to appreciate
that communities accept and participate in these different processes with good
reasons. In some cases, there is a perception that each opportunity could be the last.

The second point is that there is scope for better coordination of the planning channels
at District level, which is not being fully exploited. While it appears incumbent upon
Council to do this, the situation in the study countries indicates serious weaknesses.
Study findings suggest that the performance of Council in service delivery and
relating to development actors is weak. Legal provisions confer upon Councils the
responsibilities of collating relevant planning data, plans and the responsibility to
monitor development within their areas including sustaining interventions started by
other players. In reality, Councils are unable to hold the different actors accountable
for their actions. As a GTZ official put it, ‘...people helping Districts to plan are not
helping them (Councils) to achieve their (Council) plans ...they introduce more
planning cycles and fund unplanned activities’ (LGAZ brainstorm session, February
24th 2005). The Marange Dairy Project example, particularly the approaching of an
NGO, shows the serious challenges that exist.

Decentralisation literature engages with the type of challenges observed by this study
particularly the fiscal decentralisation perspective (see Ndegwa 2002; Olowu 1990;
Conyers 2003; Crook and Manor 1998). Often devolution is what is advocated for,
and in the case of Zimbabwe this considered as critical to addressing budgetary
challenges faced by the decentralised development planning process (see Makumbe
1998; 1996; GRZ 2004). However, more devolution has to be balanced with growing
recognition of the role a developmental state can play in development (see Fritz and
Menocal 2007). Read in the context of Kar’s (2003) self-respect and local innovations cited by Kamete (2002) and Mapedza and Mandondo (2002), the constraints faced in the Zimbabwean and perhaps Zambian situation perhaps cannot be dealt with through decentralisation-based initiatives. This brings me to the point discussed below, which builds on the importance of Council facilitation of development planning and organisational interaction.

5.4. Defining the effectiveness of Councils

In this section, I turn to the effectiveness of Councils from the perspectives of key informants and survey respondents. The section provides a context for ensuing sections by laying out how Councils, as pivotal institutions in local development activities, are perceived and how they conduct their business. A key informant defined an effective Council as follows:

‘One which articulates development in their areas for the people to be self-sufficient, works hand in hand with donor organisations who are there for development and creates a good working relationship with Ministries working in the Council area for smooth development’ (Interview January 7th 2005).

As an aspiration-based definition, it is not typical but raises important points around Council-community relations on one hand and with donors and government departments on the other. The reference to self-sufficiency defines the ends of development. Considering the diverse needs and capacities of any community, development in this conception is a moving target making Council effectiveness difficult to define let alone measure. Clarifying this may be based on the content of development as shown in Figure 3, the way Councils interact with communities, and how this gradually engenders local ownership and control of the development cycle. Interaction provides mechanisms for defining and acting upon aspirations. The Council Chair for Mutare argued that:

‘...an effective Council is one able to offer adequate services to the people living in its administrative area. These services include roads, clinics and schools’ (Interview 6th January 2005).

The Chair’s views imply that the services are already specified. Since there is legislation that defines Council functions, his definition of Council effectiveness can therefore be regarded as legalistic. On the other hand, the key informant’s view above touches on issues of process. He also touched on facilitation and catalyzing
development as something an effective Council would do. However, self-sufficiency covers a lot of issues from material needs to spiritual well-being. Council functions as provided in the RDC Act cover a wide variety of sectors, which often results in clashes mainly with government departments. Another question explored with the Mutare Council Chair was about Council’s role in defining the development agenda. His response was that:

‘...elected representatives (Councilors) have a role to inform the communities of what they can demand from Council to enable them to develop relevant plans’ (Interview 6th January 2005).

An impression is created that a Council is positioned to both directly address development challenges (the Council Chair’s view) on its own and in partnership with others. The second view of the Council Chair confirmed the legal position that there is already a menu of services to offer. These views, while mutually inclusive, have different implications on how communities and other development actors interact with Council. There are traditional services that RDCs offer to residents, like running health and education facilities, refuse collection in semi-urban settlements and providing water and sanitation services. However, in Zimbabwe these services are principally provided by Government Ministries and Departments (staffing, policy-making, grants for drugs in clinics and per capita grants in schools) leaving Councils to play a peripheral role. In section 5.5.4, I highlight how Councils are constrained to a point where they are unable to provide the services they should ordinarily provide.

The use of Councilors in facilitating development, while important, affects the type of development needs brought to Council. If a development plan already exists, do other organisations work with Council based on that plan or do they go directly to the community? Issues of resource channeling, communication structures and community perceptions of Council become important. Articulating needs and exerting demands for services generally depend on information flow and conceptualization of Council roles. Council effectiveness can therefore be measured in relation to service provision. These services are as defined in local government legislation. However, residents and development organisations interfacing with Council relate more directly to plans and programmes, not the Act. Plans and programmes constitute spaces in which they interact with Council. As discussed in section 5.3 above the planning processes and products are often outside Council control. Councils’ ability to facilitate effective
participation is a product of the operating environment including the structures they operate in. I discuss these in this section to explore the challenges cited.

5.4.1 Operating environment and Council communication channels

The Ministries responsible for local government in both Zambia and Zimbabwe monitor Councils to ensure compliance with relevant legislation and policies. However, Councils often voice concern about the number of directives and the degree of oversight. The examples in section 1.4 illustrate some of the cases where Councils consider the directives excessive interference. At the local level, local government functionaries observe and have to do their work with an awareness of the growing resentment of this form of central control. This kind of tension is important for my discussion in two ways. One is that Government monitoring of local institutions is one way of ensuring that they perform their duties effectively. Ineffectiveness on Government’s part may result in underperforming local institutions. The second is that if monitoring indeed results in interference, then Councils may lose local autonomy while also becoming upwardly accountable i.e. not worrying much about local accountability. Again, the example of budget approval processes in Zimbabwe reflects this dilemma. Key informants in the Provincial Local Government Offices (Provincial Local Government and Housing Office, PLGHO and Department of Physical Planning and Housing, DPPH) in Solwezi46 observed that local authorities at times just listen to advice without following through on the advice given (Interviews, February 3rd 2005). This was surprising to the officials and was given as a reason behind weak performance by some Councils in the Province. The suggestion was that one of the roles of the Province is to support Councils in understanding Government policies. Councils that do not following government policies will be considered to be failing in their duties. The impression this view creates is that policy formulation excludes Council resolutions and activities. Only policies from central government are treated with respect rather than what Councils come up with.

An interview with a provincial employee of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development in Mashonaland East (Zimbabwe) also raised similar concerns about the relationship between the Province and Councils (Interview, 27th

46 The capital of North Western Province (Zambia).
May 2004). The informant’s observation was that staff members in the Ministry at Provincial and District level were finding it difficult to monitor Councils. In Zambian in becoming more assertive and adopting policy-making as practice, Councils are taking more responsibility for policy outcomes and implementation. This implies that central government (from District up) has to find new ways of interacting with Councils. In Zimbabwe, the changes are attributed to fear of political reprisals and Council claims to autonomy. In both cases, Councils are perceived by central government not to be listening to advice as they used to. The same Zimbabwean official asserted that Ministry staff often end up doing things they ordinarily asked Councils to do as monitoring Councils involves making and following up politically sensitive decisions (Interview, 27th May 2004).

In both countries, another reason for the disillusionment amongst sub-national local government staff relates to the time lapse between reports being made and the Ministry taking action. The delays are creating two sets of problems. First, is that time lapses result in lost opportunities on the part of Council and second is demoralization. The Zambian key informants referred to above also felt that the flow of information on national development processes was getting patchy from the centre forcing them to rely more on Councils than on the centre. Essentially, they felt cut out of the communication channel putting them in an awkward position. Ordinarily, they felt that they should be more knowledgeable than the local level structures, to which they were now resorting for information. This brings the relevance of the provincial tier of local government into question. Makombe (1993) raised similar issues in the case of Zimbabwe. Apart from the communication dimension, the cost of maintaining a provincial tier of local government has also been discussed in Zimbabwe. This debate has proceeded alongside the one on the need to sort out District level overlaps.

RDCCBP facilitators who regularly visited Districts identified problems early and facilitated solutions. The situation now is different as only Local Government officials monitor Councils. The discontinuation of the facilitation model and its perceived replacement with policing often involving politicians has caused some centre-local friction. Zimbabwean Councils perceive the monitoring system as having become too political. Citing frequent invoking of Ministerial powers, key informants argued that this distorts relations and under the circumstances, the Ministry has found itself
frequently descending to the District directly or using Commissions of Inquiry to obtain information or correct anomalies. However, the Ministry of Local Government, like other government organisations in Zimbabwe faces resource constraints, making it only able to monitor Councils infrequently (Interview with Ministry official, 14th July 2004). One of the major challenges raised in the interviews was that Councilors were unable to administer Wards effectively let alone monitor Council executives. Except Ward 7 in Seke/Manyame, none of the other Wards where the survey was conducted in Zimbabwe have decentralised Ward structures. The perceived Ministry interference will likely continue until Ward and Council administration improve. Councilor capacity was cited as the limiting factor. Since Councilors come through political parties addressing this challenge may require involving political parties, which is a far-reaching change in the political cultures of the two countries.

Box 3: Overlapping Ministry and Council functions

Some sector Ministry functions and staff are also seen as interfering with Council and Councillor functions through their sub-District staff and activities. An advertisement for Ward Coordinators placed in *The Herald* of August 25th 2005 by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development illustrates this point reasonably well. The functions of the position were given as follows;

- Facilitate communication in the Ward
- Identify needs of the community
- Sensitize communities on gender issues
- Collect, keep and update records
- Mobilize communities for the establishment of income generating projects
- Mobilize women to form and maintain Village Banks and Clubs
- Mobilize communities for agro-industries and conservation
- Mobilize communities for non-formal education
- Monitor and evaluate activities at Village and Ward level
- Network with government departments, NGOs and local leadership, and
- Coordinate Village level activities of NGO and other development organisations.

The functions in italics constitute those where Councils are legally expected to take a lead in accordance with their mandate. Assigning these functions to an employee in a sector Ministry creates overlaps between Councilors and sector Ministry staff.


The challenge is more with ‘political Ministries’ e.g. Youth Development and Women’s Affairs than technical ones like say Agriculture. This is because Ministry staff performs Councillor-like functions. In the process, unsophisticated and unsalaried Councilors are pitted against civil servants line-managed outside Council and relatively well-resourced in terms of logistical support. The level of resources available for supporting participatory processes and the different cadres deployed to
perform this function creates an environment, which at once presents opportunities while also creating avoidable duplication.

5.4.2. Zimbabwean local governance structures and comparison with Zambia

Table 9 shows the District level policy-making and development management structures in Zimbabwe. These constitute the framework for sub-national governance as they define the institutional relationships and contexts for decision-making. A row is added to show provincial structures, which mainly act as a support tier. Effective communication requires support in terms of traditions of organisational interaction as discussed above in relation to the Ministries of Local Government in Zimbabwe and Zambia. Information generation, processing, storage and dissemination by organisations working with Councils and actual implementation of programmes complement such traditions. This section discusses some of the differences using the existing structures to draw out issues that affect participation.

Table 9: Local government structures in Zimbabwe

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Provincial Council (Chaired by Governor) made up of Chairpersons of Councils in Province plus ruling party Chair.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Provincial Development Committee chaired by Provincial Administrator NGOs and Private Sector usually attend by invitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Full Council (Chaired by a Council Chair)47.</td>
<td>Council Committees made up of Councilors with technical support from Heads of Council Departments (Staff). 48</td>
<td>Rural District Development Committee (RDDC) chaired by the District Administrator. NGOs and Private Sector usually attend on invitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward</td>
<td>Ward Assembly (Chaired by a Headman)49.</td>
<td>50Ward Development Committee chaired by Ward Councilor.</td>
<td>Government Extension staff and NGO Programme staff at this level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Village Assembly (Chaired by Village Head).</td>
<td>Village Development Committee chaired by Village Head.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Source: Based on Author's understanding of legislation and practice.

47 This was one principal focus of Zimbabwe's RDCCBP (with some attention to the RDDC) to enable reduce role of government at District and Province as Councils' performance improved.
48 Council Committees (supported by Heads of Departments) overlap in terms of advising Council with the RDDC. Councils with adequate staff the technical advice given by RDDC members may not be needed. But not all Councils are at this stage in the two countries.
49 Assemblies not there before 2000, there were Development Committees (WADCOS/VIDCOs) chaired by elected officials. Though sharing similar acronyms current WADCOS/VIDCOs are different.
50 Councils do not have technical staff at this level. That gap is occupied by government staff.
Zimbabwean and Zambian systems differ in four ways. These differences reflect some institutional contradictions (see Engberg-Pedersen 1997; Mbaku 2004). In Zambia MPs, sit in Council. The DA and DC chair the Committees in Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively. Chiefs sit in Council in Zimbabwe, but are represented in Zambia. A Governor, who is a political appointee, heads the Province while a Permanent Secretary, a civil servant, heads the Province in Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively.

The inclusion of MPs in Full Council (in Zambia) brings the national and District policy-making spaces and policy-makers in contact enabling timely communication. This may explain why Provincial local government staff felt Councils were often more informed than them. Zimbabwe’s case is different as political hierarchies are retained. Second, the Zambian District Commissioner (DC) reports to the President’s Office whereas the Zimbabwean District Administrator (DA) is a Ministry of Local Government official. The DC appears to have a politically stronger mandate and store of influence than the DA. These two chair the Development Coordination Committees (DDCC in Zambia and RDDC in Zimbabwe).

**Box 4: Functions of the RDDC (Zimbabwe) and DDCC (Zambia)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RDDC Zimbabwe:</th>
<th>DDCC: Zambia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Consider Ward plans submitted to it.</td>
<td>- Be a dialogue &amp; development coordination forum between Council, line departments, donors and NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Make recommendations on matters to be included in Annual or other Long-term Plans of Council.</td>
<td>- Receive project proposals from development organisations in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prepare Annual District Plan for Council approval.</td>
<td>- On request, recommend feasibility studies for projects accessing discretionary finance e.g. Constituency Development Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- On Council instruction, investigate implementation of Annual and other Plans of Council.</td>
<td>- Receive financial reports on such (above) projects from Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exercise other Council-assigned functions in relation to the Annual and other Council Plans.</td>
<td>- Consolidate draft plans for Council consideration and adoption.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from the RDC Act (Cap 29:13, section 60:5a-e) 1996. **Source:** Government of Zambia 1995:2 and Government of Zambia & ODA 1993.
However, Cabinet Circular Number 1 indicates that DDCCs are chaired by Council Secretaries (rural) or Town Clerks (urban) with the Director of Planning (urban) or District Planning Officer (rural) as Secretary (Government of Zambia 1995). Zimbabwe's DA chairs the RDDC as stipulated in the RDC Act. The Committees perform practically similar functions. However, concerning policies establishing them, the Zimbabwean one emphasizes an advisory role frequently refers to Council taking a lead in terms of instructing or requesting the Committee to offer specific services. The RDC Act emphasizes Council's use of the Committee as a pool of consultants. On the other hand, Zambia defines the Committee as a forum but assigns more managerial than consultative functions and powers e.g. receiving project proposals, Council financial reports, monitoring sub-District planning and ensuring that reports reach Council (Ibid). Zambian policy assigns considerable power to the forum. Besides the RDC Act, there are no other specific guidelines for the RDDC.

From the above, it is fair to say that in law the RDDC is dependent on the strength and leadership of Council. It is possible to argue that there is a contradiction in that the client (Council) does not chair their (RDDC) processes. Zambia's defining of the DDCC as a forum and stipulating that Council is chair theoretically addresses the Zimbabwean problem. However, in practice, the DC and not Council Secretary chair the DDCC. Key informants noted that the DC has the necessary legitimacy to convene the forum with Council deputising. The Local Government Association of Zambia and other stakeholders who took part in a Lusaka brainstorm session on ADCs argued for the policy position to ensure Councils take charge of development processes in their areas (see Government of Zambia and ODA 1993).

The argument was that the position of DC overshadows Council and is therefore unnecessary. A focus discussion with senior Kasempa Council staff members confirmed the existence of tensions between the offices of the DC and that of Council Secretary on matters of leading development (Focus Discussion, 8th February 2005). As DDCC head, the DC coordinates the development process. The participation of a broader membership encompassing NGOs and all government organisations at District level bestows considerable power and control on the DC. The DDCC discusses and makes recommendations on technical and practical issues in more detail.
than Council does. This materially shifts the planning function from the office of the Council Secretary to that of the DC.

The question of who is or should be ‘boss’ of the District is a critical one in the two countries. It has a bearing on communication and the effectiveness of the structures in their consultative form (Zimbabwe) or their managerial role (Zambia). In Zimbabwe, the lack of capacity at Council level is often given as justification for having support structures. Numbers of staff and skills are often cited. In both Zimbabwean study Districts central government employees far outnumber Council staff and government plays a key role in coordinating how its departments and Ministries work with Council. One important question is how Councils can increasingly become the leader in relevant processes. In both countries, it is unlikely that legislated transfers of central government functions to Councils will proceed, any faster than recently. The question is therefore how, not whether Councils make the best of the limited powers that they have vis-à-vis central government. Tendler’s (1997) work based on Brazil, where the state successfully implemented programs with local government in a lead role, demonstrates possibilities worth exploring in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. In the two countries, Councils appear to explain their weak performance on disabling centre-local relations. While legitimate, concern with centre-local relations ignores the reality of weak horizontal coordination, which is within the reach of Councils.

A fundamental question is whether forums outside Council duplicate Council ones. Do they act as counter-attractions that distract Council capacity development and functioning? How do they work in ways that ensure that they transfer their capacities to Council while also tapping Council capacities? Should they cease and if so why? The perception amongst Council and Local Government Association informants is that the structures duplicate Council ones. One delegate at a land administration workshop that I facilitated in February 2003 observed that some of the existing structures (for land administration in that case) had too many members to be effective (Workshop 4th February 2003). He dramatized this by equating it to decision-making by fans at a soccer match. Coupled with overlaps and tensions between technical and political players (the latter mainly Councilors) the institutional environment becomes difficult for promoters of participation. With Councilors acquiring more and better functional competencies through exposure and training (especially those with more
than one term), the gap between Councilors and some sub-District government staff might be closing\textsuperscript{51}. However, as noted above, Councils have left a sub-District staffing gap in which central government is entrenched. A relevant question becomes whether Councilors should double up as policy makers in Council and implementers at Ward level. Answers may lie in Councilor capacities vis-à-vis government staff or by looking at organisational structures. Regarding the latter, suggestions in Zimbabwe at some point were for all District government staff to fall under Council (GRZ 1996). The competency gap between Councilors and sub-District government staff is narrowing in part due to loss of experienced staff. As an example, a District delegate at a land dialogue\textsuperscript{52} told the meeting that the calibre of some agricultural extension staff was below the local farmers’ knowledge (Land Dialogue, October 14-15\textsuperscript{th} 2004, Mutare). Other delegates including senior Ministry of Agriculture officials noted that this was because of the brain drain at a time when the demand for staff was expanding (with the land reform). The Ministry deploys inexperienced and inadequately trained staff unable to advise effectively. As such, the overstatement of the competency gap between Councilors and technical staff perpetuates the overlap.

The third difference relates to the role of traditional leaders. Chiefs in Zimbabwe sit in Council while in Zambia chiefs nominate a representative to sit in Council on their behalf. The traditional leadership and elected systems in Zimbabwe are therefore highly integrated. The Ward/Village Assemblies are presided over by traditional leaders. However, although they are integrated, traditional leaders and Councilors are managed differently in Zimbabwe. Chiefs receive monthly allowances from central government. Chieftainships, numbering about 264 (Hlatshwayo 1998) with about 195 substantive Chiefs in 2005 (Interview with Ministry of Local Government, 13\textsuperscript{th} January 2005) receive at least 10 times a Councilor’s sitting allowance. Since 2003, Chiefs are entitled to a government car loan and home improvement support (water, road infrastructure, housing, electricity etc). At District level, traditional leaders are managed by the DA’s Office. The issues perks and reporting formalities have often created conflicts. Some of the conflicts are played out in the field where Councilors

\textsuperscript{51} Community HIV and AIDS work and Participatory Research and Extension methods (in agriculture) used by AIDS Service Organisations and other development organisations employ local people’s skills to facilitate development.

\textsuperscript{52} Convened by the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Rural Resettlement at Rowa Training Centre (outside Mutare).
Plan International and Mutare RDC have partnered to address some of these challenges by supporting joint sessions through a District Assembly. This Assembly is neither a part of the local government system nor is it in other Districts of the country.

Box 5: Participation in areas with tense relations amongst community leaders

In the 2001, local government elections ZANU PF deployed a strategy of using War Veterans and other party cadres considered 'strong' enough to stand against the opposition. While there was internal dissent in the party members compromised in acknowledgement of the threat posed by the Movement for Democratic Change. In both Mutare and Seke/Manyame, this process of bringing War Veterans into Council was highly successful. On the ground however, the War Veterans' campaign trails resurfaced conflicts with traditional leaders partly a legacy of the liberation struggle where traditional leaders were seen as collaborators with the oppressors. Related was also the general unpopularity of War Veterans because of images of being violent and also because at the time they had benefited from the War Victims' Compensation Fund (1996-8), pay-outs to War Veterans, Health Insurance and Pension Scheme (1997) and the land reform. Because of this element of grievance against War Veterans, local relations between elected officials and traditional leaders were bad. Mutare Rural District Council had also received requests for support from NGOs and other development actors on tensions amongst community leaders. Also through its orientation programmes on the Traditional Leaders Act done with SEDAP support, the issue of conflicts and tensions had come up as frustrating development.

Council and Plan International, together with other development organisations agreed to set up a District Assembly. Plan International funded the Assembly, which aims to create a conducive environment. This was pursued through holding annual dialogue sessions (two-day workshops outside the District) where the roles of the different players were explored, relationships ironed out and collaborative strategies developed. The active support of Council, Plan International and other development organisations particularly Government Departments acted to deepen mutual understanding and cooperation. On the ground, the relations have improved. In an interview with Headman Mafararikwa and all Councilors in the study Wards, reference was made to the District Assembly as having helped to resolve tensions and remove local level polarization. At the height of the polarization ordinary people were finding it difficult to attend public meetings, interface with NGOs and other development activities as 'camps' had emerged. Tensions between or amongst organisations or community leaders can be a powerful basis for social exclusion (inclusion) based on alignment (perceived or actual).

Source: Interviews with CEO, Councilors, traditional leaders and Plan International.

The fourth difference is that at provincial level in Zimbabwe a Governor is in charge while in Zambia there is a Provincial Secretary. The Zimbabwean Governor is a Presidential or political appointee and has Ministerial status. However, lack of a budget and the small size of the Governor's Office in terms of staff numbers have reduced its effectiveness (see Makombe 1993). Councils communicate with their Ministry through the DA/DC structure, which in turn links into the provincial local government offices. Often the Governor and the Provincial Secretary are not involved, as the principal audience is the Ministry of Local Government. The Province rarely acts as a distinct stand-alone planning and development management
sphere in both countries. It is constrained by lack of a development budget, the existing structures and weak communication channels (see Government of Zimbabwe 1994b). Although politically omnipresent in Zimbabwe, the development management reality is less reflective of the power of the Governor.

In summary, the local governance structures in the two countries have four clusters of key players. These are Councils (with internal structures), central government (different departments and Ministries), traditional leaders and NGOs. The last category has no legislated place in the structures but because of the existence of a number of NGOs and donors, Zambia specifically provides for them in the development forums (Committees). They also play a part by providing development resources but also burdening or stressing the system through placing demands for information, coordination needs and general support. Zimbabwe and Zambia do not differ significantly in regarding the structures provided for inter-organisational interaction. The above analysis has looked at this using the Council as a point of reference. Some of the questions that the analysis has raised include whether there is (or should be) a ‘District boss’ and whether non-Council structures duplicate Council processes. Answers to these questions are both affirmative and negative with qualifications based on the evidence gathered. Suffice to observe that the operating environment determines inter-organisational interaction. Overlaps cited between or amongst organisational structures at the District level, help but can hinder participation. Questions raised about the Zimbabwean and Zambian local governance structures reflect existing challenges i.e. the areas where action to institutionalise participation is needed. I also presented one case where some action was taken to address inter-organisational challenges for the better of participation (the Mutate District Assembly), which although not backed by statutes, is an informal space where positive inter-organisational interaction is occurring.

5.5. Facilitating participation: the role of Councils
In this section I discuss Council level avenues for participation. Council level accountability mechanisms, practical support towards development and accessibility of records by the public form the focus of this part of the section. I then move to the role of Council in relation to other players particularly NGOs to explore how the partnerships work to advance participation.
5.5.1. Council as spaces for participation

The quality and participatoriness of decision-making processes in individual organisations remain limited (see Chatiza 2003; Conyers 2003). This is true of many public organisations (see Thompson 1995) and the study confirmed challenges in Councils as well. The study noted examples of good practice and bad practice as well as indifference. Decision-making mechanisms are generally inaccessible in physical and conceptual terms. There is little information about decisions, and few means of analysis to allow us to understand them fully. Council minutes and reports are rarely published though relevant legislation formally allows access.

The public is not invited to Council meetings although the law provides for public attendance and access to minutes. Dates and agendas are rarely publicised and the way in which the meetings are held does not facilitate public access. It is fair to conclude that the public is also generally unaware of how to contribute to Council business and Councils equally lack the traditions, capacities and inclination to facilitate such participation (see World Bank 2002). The nature and kind of possible public contributions are not detailed in the legislation neither is it compulsory that Councils facilitate participation in their business. In effect, the public does not exercise its right to participate in Council processes.

The reality in both Zimbabwe and Zambia is that Councils and other organisations lack the financial and technical capacity to facilitate consultations or engagement of the public. While this might be attributed to the limited culture of public probity which also afflicts central government processes it is important to note that no public institution is tasked with the role of ensuring public participation. In the event, no specific public institution sees this as its core business on the basis of which it is evaluated. As the World Bank (2002) notes some public officials in local authorities view the public as a nuisance. On the other hand, the Zimbabwean public is sometimes accused by those working in Councils of being ill-prepared to engage Councils constructively. According to the Chipinge Town Council Secretary, local Residents Associations are often unable to draw the line between genuinely holding Councils to account and interfering in local Council affairs (Interview, 1st September 2004). At a NEPAD local government consultative meeting in Harare, the Town
Clerk for Gweru expressed a similar view with regards to NGO practitioners (Workshop, 21-23rd July 2003). In expressing such views, Council officials seem to consider participation would be possible without interference, which imposes challenges enhancing participation particularly in terms of demanding accountability.

5.5.2 Resident/citizen demands for accountability as participation

A businessperson at Kasempa town narrated attempts his Association made to seek Council accountability. As members of a local Market Association where Council collects funds, they raised complaints about inadequate services (refuse collection, water and sanitation). Council responded with threats of license withdrawal. The Association remained adamant and considered using political pressure including through local MP, which forced Council retreat (Interview 8th February 2005).

In Mutare and Seke/Manyame, the research revealed that Councils often received written complaints. These were not always dealt with in a systematic manner and few people know enough of this mechanism. For example, in one case I observed that a community had complained about a Councilor for not addressing problems with their boreholes but nothing had been done. This suggests a second strategy, not intimidation but indifference to complaints. More generally, the problem observed was that Councils have no structured system of responding to, or encouraging communication from the public about their concerns.

However, cases of good practice exist where complaints systems are in place and operating reasonably well. Interviews with the Council Chair and the Chief Executive Officer of Mutare, clarified that there were procedures for responding to public complaints. Most of the written communication was about Councilors either being corrupt, ineffective or inactive. Both interviewees explained that the Council Chair convened meetings with affected Councilors encouraging them to address issues raised without intimidating complainants. It seems that the letters and public comments were not ignored, or at least not routinely. I attended two Ward meetings in Seke/Manyame called on the back of written community complaints. The anonymous letter is another instrument that is sometimes used in Seke/Manyame to advise the Council of Ward problems, which the Council might not be aware of. In Chapter 6, I discuss how villagers directly approach development organisations, which shows that
while letter-writing may be low other methods are being used. The challenge remains that Councils do not seem to have structured response mechanisms.

5.5.3. Requesting support as a space for interfacing with Councils

The procedure for seeking project assistance from Council affects participation and reflects the extent of interaction between Councils and residents. The case of Mutare is used here but some of the procedures are similar to those used in Seke/Manyame. The process starts at community/Village level. The Village Head liaises with the local Councilor who in turn compiles and submits a Motion Paper to Council. The Motion Paper is forwarded to the relevant committee of Council for deliberation and recommendation to Full Council. Presently, in Mutare the options for support are mainly donor organisations and NGOs with the response being conveyed through full Council then the traditional leadership institution or representative of a relevant group. Requests for public transport services are made directly to private operators through the Ward Councilor on Council stationery. Once the transport operator agrees to take up a route, a letter of recommendation is written to Council for adoption. Other examples reviewed from Council minutes include the following:

1. Through a Motion Number R3/99 Chigodora Ward made a request to have a road (Mt Dangare-Burna Valley) rehabilitated. Council responded saying that the amount of money (levies) collected from the Ward was insufficient for the project. The motion was submitted in January and the reply came in March of the same year. The levies paid constituted only 2% of the amount required (Mutare Rural District Council 1999). Council advised the community that the road had been put on top priority under the District Development Fund Rural Road Programme and set aside ZW$24 000 for maintenance. However, the community had to pay up their levies before Council could provide assistance.

2. The same principle was applied to another road rehabilitation request from Ward 25; Mabvengwa School access (Mutare RDC 2001) as the community only had a balance of 22% of total project cost in their Ward account.

3. In cases where individuals or groups seek assistance from donors or NGOs without Council knowledge they are advised to go through their Councilor and to ensure that the organisations they are approaching have been vetted. A Mr. Mangezi of Ward 5 made a request, on behalf of his community for support with a footbridge across Sakubva River. A communication from Council dated August 4th 2003 reads in part ‘... all development projects in the Ward are coordinated through the Ward Councilor and that all donors should be vetted by government before they participate in any development activities’.

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53 Note however in common grassroots usage donors and NGOs are perceived as the same and the term used is often 'Vemadono' (Shona for those from the donors).
54 Minutes of an RDDC Meeting No. 1 of 2001.
4. The Taga community in Ward 15 in Seke/Manyame used the letter method through their Councilor to request for water and road infrastructure in their area. Council did not formally acknowledge receipt of the request. However, they were able to meet Council at a budget consultation meeting as they raised objections to the 2004 Council budget. Council acknowledged that they had received their request, was unable to meet their needs but that rates and levies would still be collected (FGD, 15th January 2005).

As shown above and discussed earlier, Councils use a variety of methods to deal with requests for assistance. Records of written requests were however more in Mutare than in Seke/Manyame. Mutare RDC in some cases also provides support for project applications to outside organisations initiated by groups. The mix of responses that Councils use as shown above assist us in understanding the methods of institutionalising participation. For instance linking Council assistance to residents’ responsibility to contribute to Council revenue may strengthen the relationship between the two. Residents become more aware of the operational realities within which services are provided. However, refusal to link the two as in the Seke/Manyame case may reinforce the perception that Councils are self-serving. Mutare RDC’s promotion of “pay-up to get service” facilitates development from own resources. Building and applying that culture in allocating development resources, including NGO supported interventions, encourages residents to meet their obligations and own development processes. That way support from and by non-Council sources does not undermine Council processes.

However, questions arise where local resources might never be enough (see Berner and Phillips 2005; Schneider and Baquero 2006) or where communities are too poor. The research established that decentralised information management systems are not in place. Communities rarely know their potential or actual contribution to development. Councils may add value to their work and that of other development organisations. For instance, timely provision of data on the local poverty context may save NGOs the resources they usually invest in baseline and feasibility studies. Such resource savings may enable NGOs and other actors to do more.

5.5.4. Poor means: (im)possibilities of Council development support

The functions of Councils are defined in relevant legislation in both countries. Because of the shared colonial history, 64 functions are scheduled in the relevant Acts
of Parliament in both countries. The Government of Zambia (2002:1) defines the objective of Councils as:

‘...to provide services as stipulated in Section 61 of the Local Government Act Cap 281 .... However, some of the functions have been transferred like water and sanitation from Councils to commercial utilities and maintenance of urban roads is being funded by the National Roads Board of which most of the money is paid directly to contractors...’.

The mission statement of Mutare Rural District Council also captures the essential functions of Zimbabwean Councils. It (mission statement) is as follows:

‘...to diligently provide services to the Council inhabitants through planning, controlling and regulating development with a view to facilitate the improvement of their social and economic standards of living. Council also wishes to cooperate with central government, non-governmental organisations in providing essential services such as health, education, roads etc to the people of Mutare District. Account for public funds efficiently and transparently. To be the link between central government and the people, and to assist central government in their administration of education services’ (Mutare RDC 2004).

Mutare RDC has broken down its mission into seven key areas (Box 6) which are still in keeping with its mandate as provided for in the Rural District Councils Act. The quote from the Government of Zambia and the Mutare RDC mission statement show the general framework within which Councils provide services. The focus (aim) for the service provision is clarified in the mission statement. The transfer of certain legislated functions from Councils to other organisations and the cooperation (with other organisations) referred to in the Mutare mission statement confirm that Councils’ responsibilities are now performed alongside or completely by others. These others may be brought in by central government or invited by Council. Here I highlight some of the cases of overlap in performance of tasks or outright transfer of functions from Council. Such processes may act to curtail Council effectiveness but may also ensure service delivery. The complaints about water-points above (Box 2) constitute an example of challenges arising from the transfer of Council functions to organisations not directly accountable to Council but to central government. First, transfers of functions do not proceed through any change of the enabling legislation. As such, the responsibility to plan and provide the services
remains a Council one. Councils in both countries find it difficult to exert their influence on the planning, delivery and sustenance of the transferred services. Residents keep complaining through their Councilors. Second, the transfers are largely because Councils lack financial resources to provide services. Table 10 presents the situation for Kasempa compared with the national picture.

Table 10: Expenditure trends 2000-2002 National versus Kasempa Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Costs</td>
<td>61.</td>
<td>81.</td>
<td>47.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>10.</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Expenses</td>
<td>29.</td>
<td>13.</td>
<td>37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>100.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For each line on the General Rate Fund, Kasempa’s performance was worse than the national average for all three years. Its personnel costs consistently took up above 81% of the Fund whereas the national highest was 61% in 2000. Such expenditure heavily skewed towards personnel costs naturally left meager resources for service provision and other expenses. According to the Council Secretary ‘…Council is financially limping’ (Interview 8th February 2005). However, even the national average (of 12%) reflects that service provision expenditure is low in all Councils in Zambia. Kasempa Council’s deep financial distress is shown that, its staff salary arrears run into years. The highest in February 2005 was fifty (50) months for the Director of Works followed by the Deputy Planner at 40 months (Ibid). Senior Kasempa staff members thus operate in a difficult environment and it is possible to wonders for how much longer they can hold on. The question becomes; what is keeping them in the job? When I posed this question, the response was commitment. An interview in the Kasempa town suggested that at least for the Council Secretary free accommodation and upkeep at the Council Guest House was covering some of the core costs. For Mutare RDC salary, arrears have never occurred while for Seke/Manyame delays in payment have been experienced in recent years. The delayed salary payments extended at most 15 days beyond the scheduled pay day.

Salary arrears lead to reduced staff commitment to work, morale and public confidence. The Kasempa Market Association representative referred to above (section 5.5.2) highlighted that some business people are no longer keen to offer
services to Council fearing that they would not be paid. As such, residents’ confidence in Council is low. It is however important to observe that civil service conditions in Zambia, as in Zimbabwe are generally bad such that Council staff may be better off than civil servants in terms of access to non-salary benefits like land. This is what often then results in Councils retaining senior staff. Councils also lack capital and operational equipment, which is a major problem. Government grants do not show signs of improvement implying that the situation of Councils remains bleak. National figures for expenditure in service provision were not readily available for Zimbabwe. However, the Governor for Mashonaland East Province shed some light by observing that ‘...concern still exists that Councils are managing very limited projects with internally generated funds’ (Karimanzira 2002:6; GRZ 2004). He also noted that external assistance was no longer forthcoming. GRZ (2004) highlighted the need to look at Council financing as a government-wide obligation to curb perceptions where other Ministries saw Councils as a Ministry of Local Government responsibility.

Key informants also confirmed that Councils were receiving ever smaller grants from central government and support from donors. For instance in 2002 Rural District Councils did not receive any resources under the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) a source of cheap finance for Councils in Zimbabwe (Interview, 14th July 2004). Ministry of Local Government records indicate that in 2003 and 2004 only 5 and 3 out of Councils respectively got funding under the PSIP (Interview with Ministry Official September 1st 2005). Resource disbursement towards service provision has dropped alongside the proportion of local revenue. The DA for Mutare referred to the situation as ‘milking a dying cow’ where Council residents are very poor (Interview 3rd June 2004). Others however observe that Councils are failing to collect available revenue. Tables 11 and 12 show the proportion of local to total income i.e. including external grant income, for Mutare and Seke/Manyame for the 2001-2003 period. The data reflect the resource strain under which the Councils operate. Mutare reflects a relatively higher dependence on external sources than Seke/Manyame. Mutare shows a slight surge while Seke/Manyame has seen a slight

55 Governor for Mashonaland East Province’s speech at the 8th Provincial Review Meeting.
decline in local revenue contribution to overall budget partly explained by loss of unit tax from farmland, which has recently changed hands.

Table 11: Mutare RDC, local as percentage of total revenue (in ZWD ‘000’)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZWD’000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>ZWD’000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>16 187</td>
<td>25.</td>
<td>42 648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>48 582</td>
<td>75.</td>
<td>125 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64 749</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>167 814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source; Mutare RDC 2004.

Table 12: Seke/Manyame, local as percentage of total revenue (ZWD 000’)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZWD’000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>ZWD’000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>23 564</td>
<td>53.6.</td>
<td>171 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>20 434</td>
<td>46.4.</td>
<td>197 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43 998</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>368 355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source; Seke/Manyame RDC, 2004.

The Mutare RDC Treasurer indicated that most of the local revenue was spent on administrative expenses like salaries and maintenance (Interview 18th June 2005). Mutare links Ward-based development by ploughing back 70% of development levy collected from households towards a development activity approved by the Ward Assembly. However, the yields from such local sources are inadequate for the service demands placed upon Councils (see section 5.5.3). Apart from the effects of poverty on Councils’ local revenue streams, delays in grant disbursement, inflation induced budget overruns and upheavals (political and economic), which have reduced revenue collection also affect budget performance. Since 2000, changes in Council revenue streams have been observed. A Ministry of Local Government analysis of 16 RDCs’ year 2000 budgets and 18 RDCs’ year 2001 income indicated that donor grants were 29% (actual) compared to 24% for government grants in 2000 with the figures increasing for donors to 35% but dropping for government to 20% in 2001. Despite committing itself to 100% funding of transferred functions government has consistently fallen behind. For instance the City of Gweru got 83% of its health entitlement in 1980/1 but this declined to 3% for the 1994-96 period before marginally climbing to 9% in 2001 and then dropping to 5% in 2003 (GRZ 2004:9). Donor and government resources have dropped to insignificant levels. The former are mainly funding humanitarian work through the UN system and NGOs. What is significant is that Government is aware of Councils’ resource challenges (Ibid). Table
shows local revenue and grant income shortfalls and surpluses for the year 2000. Except for the health grant where actual allocation was 36.9% more than the estimate, the state grant for the Capital Account was 21% below estimate while for the Roads and Works Account no allocation was made. On the local revenue side, the highest shortfall was for the Capital Account (89.2%) followed by 16.9% the Roads and Works Account, 16.5% for Odzi Township and 13.4% for the Health Account.

Table 13: Budget performance as at 31st July 2000, Mutare RDC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account and budget lines</th>
<th>ZWD 000’ Budget Estimates</th>
<th>ZWD 000’ Actual. Revenue (Shortfalls) and Surpluses.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roads and Works Account</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Income; a) Local Revenue.</td>
<td>3 477</td>
<td>2 889 (588) or 16.9%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) State Grant.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Grant income not disbursed (41).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expenditure.</td>
<td>2 420</td>
<td>2 928 (508) or 21% over expenditure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital Account</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Income; a) Local Revenue.</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>58 (477) or 89.2%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) State Grant.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79 (21) or 21%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expenditure.</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>194 773.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odzi Township Account</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Income; a) Local Revenue.</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>355 (70) or 16.5%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) State Grant.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expenditure.</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>325 86.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Account</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Income; a) Local Revenue.</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>201 (31) or 13.4%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) State Grant.</td>
<td>4 191</td>
<td>5 737 1 546 or 36.9%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expenditure.</td>
<td>3 973</td>
<td>5 634 (1 661).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source; Mutare RDC 2000 and own calculations.

Based on available evidence, it is safe to conclude that Councils are unable to provide meaningful services limiting opportunities for facilitating participation. The proportion of local revenue to grant income reflects challenges with local resource mobilization. Weak revenue affects Councils’ engagement with communities, which leaves other actors to perform functions that Councils should. In the process this creates a cycle of exclusion from residents/citizens’ livelihoods for Council. The resultant inter-organisational interaction becomes problematic for Council-based facilitation of participation. One way of addressing the resource challenges is through NGO partnerships, discussed in the next sub-section. The situation of Kasempa Council reflects a paradox where Council attained level 5 in the ZAMSIF capacity and performance ladder entitling it to receive bigger grants while under-performing in
terms of local revenue generation. That it is possible for outsiders to see an institution as effective when locals are unhappy about the same institution raises questions about the models and sustainability of local governance systems in Zambia and Zimbabwe.

5.5.5. NGO presence: opportunities and challenges for participation

The study established that there were a number of programme activities run by outside organisations in the three Districts. International and national NGOs like Care International, Plan International, CADEC, The Zimbabwe Red Cross, World Vision, Seke Home-Based Care and Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe have activities in the two Zambianwean Districts. For Kasempa SNV Zambia, UNICEF, GTZ, KZF-IFAD and DCI were the main ones. These organisations are invited either by Government, individual Councils or communities. The study also observed a growing tendency for Councils to refer requests for assistance to NGOs. In Mutare, referring communities to NGOs has become a distinctive feature of Council policy. This was identified from an analysis of the documents provided on the management of project requests. Box 7 shows one such case looked at closely.

Box 7: Handling project requests: the case of Ward 10, Mutare RDC

In 2003, the Councillor for Ward 10 submitted a motion to Council requesting support in exploiting an aquifer for irrigation purposes to address drought-induced food insecurity. The area identified has viable underground water resources but is in agro-ecological regions four and five. Rough technical details of the project were provided, which included electricity powered pumps, boreholes, water tanks and a 100 hectare irrigation scheme benefiting about 200 households.

Council acknowledged the viability of the water source and proceeded to suggest that the community needed the technical advice of AREX (the department responsible for agricultural research and extension) so that the total number of community gardens that could be established would be determined, the beneficiaries and a sketch map. Council further advised that its (policy) preference was for consolidated community gardens (CCGs). Despite changes to the project idea and the suggestion that the community needed to liaise with AREX Council was supportive of the initiative. There was thus agreement on the objectives (livelihood improvement) and confirmation of the need for the project.

Council promised to look for funding from NGOs, as they had no resources of their own. However, they were going to look for resources for the CCG i.e. fencing material, pipes and tanks.


Counter-reference amongst development organisations is an important way of ensuring services are delivered and that people’s identified needs are met. That this is happening in Mutare is a proxy indicator of good inter-organisational relations. It has
to be added though that the positive effects of counter-reference can be increased if organisations are more conscious of it and agree levels of support. I am guided in making this point by my basic knowledge of patient referral systems between medical institutions or professionals where certain minimum information is exchanged. As noted in Chapter 4, complementarity is largely based on relational awareness. However, basing counter-reference on an organisation’s inability to do their core business raises serious legitimacy and credibility problems. Loss of confidence forces people to use alternative processes, which increasingly overshadow Councils and cuts them out of the development loop of provision, accountability and funding. In some of the reviewed documents, Councils advised communities to approach NGOs citing Council inability to meet their requests for support. In the case in Box 7 Council made suggestions about sources of funding and technical support. This reflects good practice that the research observed in both Zimbabwean Councils. Also giving a community the respect of a written response to a request is commendable. The AREX link-up could have been a Council responsibility i.e. Council opportunity to facilitate community-organisation interaction. Such counter-referral may cost Council its credibility as a development facilitator. It is likely that in future the community and Councilor may not bother approaching Council but instead approach other organisations directly. The change of project idea from an irrigation scheme to consolidated community gardens (CCGs) and requesting for further community consultations could be interpreted as delaying tactics. Such a project re-design change may affect participation. In this instance, Council deliberately reinforced the parallel structures that weaken its position.

Box 2 presented Council and DDF-Water interface. Below I use three examples to show how inter-organisational interaction involving Councils and NGOs worked out. The first is a Mutare District the water sector, the other two are from Seke/Manyame.
Box 8: Inter-organisational interaction at work: cases from the field

1. Council-DDF and three NGOs.
Mutare RDC implemented a CBM programme in 2003-4 in partnership with three NGOs and DDF-Water as the Government organisation with a mandate for the sector. The NGOs (Plan International, Catholic Development Commission-CADEC and the Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources-SAFIRE) funded training, tools and equipment as well as Council administrative costs. In an interview the District Head for DDF highlighted the project as one of the most successful interventions he had been involved in citing timely availability of resources and the effective coordination that Council was able to accomplish as key success factors (Interview 7th January 2005).

In one of the project Wards (24, also a study Ward), CADEC worked closely with traditional leaders in the sanitation component of the same programme. In Nyamadzavo village the Village Head’s son was directly involved in facilitating the project (social mobilization, tracking project implementation and supervising distribution of building materials) on behalf of the Village Assembly. In a project-visit-interview, a CADEC Officer indicated how use of traditional leaders in their component of the programme reduced pilfering of project materials and contributed to overall project performance (Interview 17th August 2005).

2. Council-DA’s Office and Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe.
As part of its programme activities the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ) a registered NGO, has been working to alleviate the negative effects of the land reform programme on Farm Workers. One such programme involved distribution of foodstuffs, clothing and household utensils. The distribution was implemented on the back of clearance by national and provincial authorities. In the second quarter of 2004 the organisation had problems at one of its distribution centers in Ward 15 of Seke/Manyame where local communities under the leadership of ‘War Veterans’ demanded inclusion failing which they were threatening to forcibly take the consignment. A report was made to the District Authorities who were not immediately able to help, as they were also unaware of the programme modalities. While the unwillingness to help may have been more a result of the sensitivities associated with helping Farm Workers (i.e. the political narrative that helping former commercial farmers and displaced employees was opposing land reform) than lack of involvement in the programme it is fair to conclude that;
a) FCTZ’s relations with the local community leaders appeared weak.
b) Its interface with District Authorities on the programme was also weak.
c) Consequent to the weak relations between FCTZ and the two local governance layers the participation of Farm Workers (FCTZ’s target group) was threatened.
d) The threats to FCTZ’s programme intricately combined the politicization of their target group and the institutional polarization around the post-2000 land reforms.
The intervention of the District Authorities eventually enabled successful implementation of the activities with modifications to the beneficiary targeting.

ZERO identified and worked with farmer groups in Ward 18 Seke/Manyame, among other communities. The organisation distributed farm inputs in 2003 to groups based on a revolving loan fund model combining use of group savings and sale of the farm inputs to raise group loan capital to support income generating projects. In Village 4, a ZERO-supported group experienced losses due to the Village Head having allegedly misappropriated both funds and inputs. The organisation was neither able to recover the lost resources nor to resuscitate the group resulting the other five groups in the area subsequently collapsing. At the ward Meeting of 26th May 2004, these allegations were given as one of the reasons why the Village Head was being suspended. ZERO’s activities in the area had already reduced. One question this case raises relates to the extent to which NGOs can benefit existing institutional monitoring structures in this instance provided by Council and the DA’s office to ensure the effectiveness of their programmes. To what extent would this reduce their costs of routine intervention monitoring? Equally critical is whether NGOs trust these structures (and vice versa)? A concern that can be raised from this regarding participation is the image created for this community and how ZERO may have inadvertently played a part in nurturing it by effectively engaging with other organisations.

Source: Fieldwork.
The interfaces represented above show a number of spaces and levels of interaction pertinent to institutionalising participation. The first case shows a considerably strong relationship at both the District and sub-District levels despite the fact that the three NGOs were getting their funding from the international sphere. Case two shows interaction at the national and provincial levels and circumventing of the District to go directly to the grassroots. Granted existing macro-level conflicts may have played a hand in the challenges the NGO faced it may also be noted that to involve all levels from national through grassroots may in fact be time consuming and expensive. I discussed this regarding the approval process for my study in Chapter 4. The questions raised on the third case are at the centre of this study. No conclusive answers exist except to refer to the partial evidence that seems to indicate the importance of District and sub-District organisational interface in dealing with issues of inclusion and exclusion.

In Kasempa, the support of UNICEF, SNV and KZF has enabled Council to implement a number of programmes. UNICEF is working with Council on child-focused development while SNV has supported water and sanitation initiatives in the past and currently provides capacity building services. KZF is the implementing partner for a 6 year IFAD funded Forestry Resources Project, which was in its third year at the time of the study. The project is also supported with grants from the Government of Zambia, Development Cooperation Ireland and GTZ (Germany). The project aims to improve people’s livelihoods. It was introduced via the Province in 2002 although actual implementation started in January 2003. The selection of working areas was done through the District Development Coordinating Committee.

Some of the NGOs operating in the two Zimbabwean Councils work based on partnerships with central government departments. In some instances, an NGO project establishes a distinct structure in which Council may only be a member. Some NGOs have principal partnerships with Ministries for programmes they then implement in a Council area. In such cases, it becomes the partnering Ministry with the responsibility to link up with Council to ensure that Council plans and policies are adhered to. In Mutare, Plan International assisted the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare’s Environmental Health Department with finances for their Malaria Control (spraying)
Programme in 2003 and 2004. In both years, the Department sprayed the same number of Wards. A full Council meeting on 14th December 2004, Councilors quizzed Plan International over the exclusion of deserving areas. The Environmental Health Department's District Head explained that they used information on hand like clinic admissions to prioritize since resources were inadequate to cover the whole District. Councilors remained unconvinced and cited corrupt practices by the Department's staff. Council felt they should have been directly involved in the project.

Other NGOs e.g. KZF in Kasempa anchor Project Committees at Council. The rest of the KZF project structure starting at the grassroots level includes Village Resource Management Committees (VRMCs) and Producer Groups involved in actual natural resource extraction e.g. honey and craft producers. A cluster of villages in a 15 km radius establishes a Working Area Committee consisting of both VRMCs and Producer Groups. The communities included in the study had these producer groups. In the Kalombe, Kalima and Kima areas the Producer Groups were involved in craft and carpentry, honey production using modern bee-hives, reed-mat making and making tie n’ dye material from tree barks. Areas covered by Working Area Committees do not always coincide with Ward boundaries but the link is made through the District Forest Resource Management Committee at Council. This is made up of Council Heads of Departments, representatives of the Ministry of Community Development, the Zambia Wildlife Authority, Department of Agriculture and other relevant non-governmental development organisations. Traditional leaders take part through their representatives who are members of the Working Area Committees. At the operational level, Council and the DDCC take part through the Area Development Committees. These structures are considered non-political planners of development based on identified needs and opportunities. The planning is based on information gathered through project-facilitated participatory analyses.

KZF’s roles include capacity building in community management of forestry resources and supporting sustainable income generating projects. There are components under the project which are sub-contracted e.g. feeder road rehabilitation, social infrastructure rehabilitation and rural credit facility management for the benefit of Producer Groups. The rehabilitation of feeder roads is based on an assessment done
in 2004 and local contractors play a key part in this activity. The areas around the Kasempa town are not in the project. The three working areas were selected based on levels of nutrition, state of the roads, availability of forestry resources, proportion of single (female) headed households and poor economic activities. Areas with the worst indicators in terms of these variables were targeted.

In both countries, it would seem that the partnerships between NGOs and Councils are mainly indirect. The study explored some of the reasons why this occurs. In the majority of cases, provincial and national NGOs negotiate their programmes and entry strategies with central government officials and only get into Council areas to implement. By the time they get to Councils, they already have rigid plans of action and budgets. In other cases, direct community appeals to NGOs result in partnerships that initially circumvent Council. Even where the NGO-Government relations are entered into at District (e.g. the Environmental Health Programme in Mutare) Council appears a ‘junior partner’. NGO-Council relations remain weaker in comparison to the relations involving the NGO, the community and government extension staff. It is therefore often the case that a project relationship gets into government department and NGO reports before Council learns of it. To improve coordination, Mutare RDC extended a ‘standing’ invitation to all NGOs operating in the District to attend RDDC meetings (Minutes of RDDC meeting) at the start of 2001.

Councils do not have sufficient staff to manage relationships with NGOs and to maintain updated records of NGO activities. Mutare and Seke/Manyame both have Engineers and Project Officers. Because these are essentially one-man teams unable to track NGO and Government activities in their areas. At field level, Councils rely on Councilors to mobilize communities and monitor development. This results in Councilors getting involved in activities that may be beyond their capacity while also the volume of work may become unwieldy. It becomes difficult to separate policy-making and implementing roles of Councilors i.e. conflation of policy making and project implementation. Council thinness at sub-District level leaves room for NGO-Government interface more than with Council, which affects Council’s interaction with other development actors (Figure 1 Level 3 issues).
The research did not come across evidence of regular NGO reporting or updating of Councils on their activities in the two countries. Analysis of District Development Committee minutes also indicated that NGOs do not attend these meetings regularly. It would appear therefore that NGO-Council partnerships are inadequately developed yet they could be an important basis for building Council planning, outreach and service provision capacities. Direct NGO-Council partnership cases however exist where NGOs seek out and develop them. NGOs exist in the three Districts, systems of counter-referring communities are in place and Council-NGO partnerships were observed e.g. in Mutare and Kasempa that sponsored opportunities for participation of different communities and development organisations. However, presence or absence of development organisations is a key aspect that presents challenges for participation. The Mutare-DDF Water case in Box 2 above touched on some of these.

What appears to be missing from a Council perspective is a detailing of comparative advantages and services that would attract NGOs to a Council area. While some Councils in Zimbabwe have policies on how NGOs should operate, these seem to be more of rules to be observed rather than benefits that an NGO can expect from Council. Box 9 shows one example from Nyanga (Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe). It is possible to conclude that in Zimbabwe at least, policies made in relation to managing state-NGO relations are premised on a view that NGOs are generally up to no good. Guidelines create a policing rather than a collaborative framework as they detail what Council expects from NGOs. Areas like sources of funding, audited statements, details of staff and future programme plans bring a security dimension. The Government of Zimbabwe (Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare) came up with an Operational Manual to guide the operations of NGOs in the humanitarian and development sector. Clause 2.1 of the Manual states the purpose as:

‘...to ensure effective harmonization of governmental structures and NGO operations at all levels in line with government policy. This will ensure that NGOs play a significant role in complementing government and local authority efforts as well as empower communities to manage the distribution of humanitarian assistance’ (Government of Zimbabwe 2003a:1).
The Manual further states that, since NGOs complement government they should follow government approaches and strategies, use governmental and traditional structures and that NGOs or individuals should not take advantage of the emergency situation to advance their interests ([Ibid 2003, Clause 4.1, iii to iv]). The same Manual directed that NGOs should not communicate directly (e.g. setting up a meeting) with lower levels of government without authority from higher levels of government (Clause 8.1-2). The Ministry of Local Government had also come up with a relevant instruction in March 2003. Generally, the Manual guides organisational interaction and ensures governmental control or coordination of the interaction. The slant is more towards control than facilitation, which prompted non-governmental development organisations resentment.

Subsequent processes of coming up with an NGO Bill perceived to be repressive further highlighted strained state-NGO relations unhelpful to inter-organisational interaction and participation. Minutes of AREX sub-District staff indicated dissatisfaction with ‘NGOs that burden us with their work without any incentives’ (AREX staff meeting of 04th April 2005, Marange area) reflecting different tensions at sub-national level. Challenges regarding inter-organisational interaction thus exist at all levels. Councils need to identify and address these to entrench participatory development in their areas.

Council partnerships with NGOs are common-place in the two countries and deliver practical opportunities for participation by ordinary people. However, it would seem that the partnerships are generally informed by central government guidelines rather than local initiatives. The Plan International-Mutare RDC District Assembly and other working arrangements are all governed more from the centre than local realities. It makes the actors in such relationships more accountable to the centre than the locality. To use the conceptual framework (Figure 1) the spaces and activities they are
NGOs are able to offer incentives to Councils and government organisations as part of enabling them to do their work e.g. offering transport to the field. However, there are cases where the NGOs are unable to justify to their funders why they may need extra costs to facilitate Council and government involvement in development activities. Budgetary limitations and lack of funding for joint spaces and processes discussed above constitute critical constraints to participation observed in the two countries. This is not to take away the myriad opportunities presented by the partnerships that exist but to highlight one of the reasons why the partnerships fail after NGO support. It would seem from the study that other factors that strain partnerships include high material and skill competency gaps, ineffective local non-state forums, beneficiary selection ‘politics’, unfinished projects and NGOs’ quest for uniqueness versus standardized approaches preferred by governmental organisations. Material resources e.g. timely disbursement of resources for activities appears to play an important part in NGO-state partnerships at both central and local levels. Other issues include trust, track record, personalities involved and the macro context especially Zimbabwe where politics has had a pervasive effect.

5.6. Anchoring national programmes in Councils

Generally, national programmes are either state or donor supported. Here I use both to show how inter-organisational relations particularly between Councils and central government influence participation. As discussed in section 2.6 the national programmes provide a conduit for participation in policy formulation, communication and implementation. National programmes are an addition to Councils’ direct support for activities, NGO partnerships and sector grants. For instance, ZAMSIF was instrumental in boosting development activities in Kasempa, among other Councils in Zambia. Resources came through Council to support community projects. Kasempa Council also received capacity building support enabling it to climb the ZAMSIF capacity building ladder to level 5 (the highest). However, the management of the projects and process was largely through the DDCC with sector organisations leading initiatives depending on the sector in which a ZAMSIF-supported project was. This meant that Council was not always managing programme implementation. For instance, expansion of Kasempa District Hospital was managed by the Health Ministry. ZAMSIF capacity building focused on project implementation and
coordination for DDCC and Council. If the conclusion of ZAMSIF is not followed up with another major programme, Council will not be able to meet the expectations generated by the project.

Apart from the programmes discussed in section 2.6.3, Table 3, Zimbabwe has had a Rural Development Fund (RDF) since 1999 (Box 10). This Fund has been consolidated with the inclusion of IRWSS, CAP and SEDAP into a Rural Capital Development Fund (RCDF). RDCCBP, CAP, RDF and SEDAP are some of the major national programmes implemented in Zimbabwe with Council participation. Mutare RDC participated in all four while Seke/Manyame hosted RDCCBP and RDF. Mutare RDC employed a Poverty Assessment Action Plan (PAAP) Officer for the management of and received the last tranche of resources in 2002. During CAP’s four year life Council implemented a number of projects like borehole drilling, fitting of a windmill at a Primary School and repairs to classroom blocks (Mutare RDC records).

The RDF is administered under the Ministry of Rural Resources and Infrastructural Development. It was established in 1999 to plug gaps in the funding of rural development left by the PSIP, which is government’s main vehicle for infrastructural funding albeit facing capitalization challenges as discussed above. From 2004, the Fund grew through the collapsing of CAP, the Dry Areas Development Programme (DADP) and the Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (IRWSS) Programme into RCDF. The merging of the programmes was meant to reduce duplication. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Rural Resources and Infrastructure Development stressed that this was also to increase government visibility compared to

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Box 10: Objectives of RDF/RCDF

1. To promote and accelerate rural development by addressing social and economic needs of rural people based on their initiatives.
2. To redress disparities and imbalances in the levels of development in the rural areas through an equitable system of resource allocation.
3. To stimulate rural people’s resourcefulness and self-reliance in rural development by promoting their participation.
4. To provide funding for rural infrastructure inclusive of dams, roads, dip tanks, schools, clinics and clean water supplies.
5. To promote creation of employment for rural folk.

Source: Adapted from Government of Zimbabwe, 2004.  

56 RCDF Annual Report for the period covering January to December 2004.
NGOs (Workshop Presentation December 1st 2004, Mutare). My research did not come across any Council-NGO partnership on an RCDF-project perhaps confirming that the project counteracted NGO visibility.

All Districts in the country can access RCDF pursuant to its equalization thrust (objective 2 Box 10). The policy is that each Council gets at least one and at most five project grants per year. Projects submitted for funding are technically appraised at Council with the help of relevant government departments (RDDC). Once a project is recommended for funding a submission is made to the Ministry, which then funds the project’s core costs (no administration costs). Because most of the projects are infrastructural (road-making, borehole sinking, putting up or repairing buildings etc) payments are made to contractors directly on the back of a Council issued Certificate of Completion. These are procedures similar to what the National Roads Board (NRB-Zambia) uses for supporting road construction or rehabilitation in Council areas. In interviews with the Chief Executive Officers of Mutare and Seke/Manyame, concern was raised over delays in disbursements and the Ministry’s perceived refusal to decentralise the Fund (Interviews June 7th and 10th 2004). At the time of the interviews, the Ministry did not have provincial representatives but established these in 2005 although the actual financial disbursements remained in Harare. In an interview (20th July 2006) the Deputy Director of the Infrastructure Department of the Fund emphasized that Councils:

- Lacked the capacity to absorb more Fund resources and to come up with proper technical designs and Bills of Quantities.
- Were shifting to PSIP-type (infrastructure) instead of community projects.
- Failed to complete projects on time leading to cost escalations.

The second of the above points resonates with those of the then Minister (Mrs. Mujuru, now Second Vice President of Zimbabwe) as communicated in her foreword to the Fund’s 2002 Annual Report. She highlighted the 2003 focus of the Fund as ‘Food Enhancement Schemes’ and proceeded to emphasize:

‘...I therefore call on all Local Authorities to develop small community irrigation schemes in order to strengthen food security at household level...We need to integrate many programmes...If we integrate these programmes we will reduce expenditure on each irrigation scheme enabling us to do more for the people’ (GRZ 2002c:2).
The Annual Reports for the Fund for 2002 through 2004 detail the support received by RDCs. Mutare received support for 1 road in 2002, 1 irrigation scheme in 2003 and a clinic, a cottage industry project at a Rural Service Centre and a community water harvesting project in 2004 (GRZ 2002, 2003, 200457). During the same period, Seke/Manyame received funding for a water supply augmentation project at Beatrice (the Growth Centre where Council is based) and 1 clinic (Makanyazingwa58) for the 2002-2004 period (Ibid).

Not all Government programmes are managed through Councils. Zimbabwe’s agricultural input loan scheme accessed through the Land Bank is an example. At the December 14th meeting, Mutare Councilors inquired whether any farmers had benefited from the scheme. Farmers had opened accounts with the Bank before submitting applications. The applications were developed with assistance from AREX for a fee. The Land Bank and AREX are part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Councilors felt the organisations were making money from their poor constituents and complained about lack of information making it difficult for them to explain to the people. In a way, weak interaction between Council and these two programmes constrained effective Councilor participation and that of their constituents.

Implementation of national programmes through Councils has its challenges. The example of the Drought Relief Programme in Zimbabwe (2003-04) illustrates some of the tensions over approaches and expectations. Councils were chosen to implement this emergency programme in recognition of their reach and socio-political infrastructure for mobilizing people and delivering programmes. The Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare (accounting institution) transferred resources to Councils for the two components, one involving purchasing and distributing food and another involving payment of able-bodied beneficiaries for public works undertaken in their areas as well as paying out public assistance funds. Implementation was guided by a Memorandum of Understanding. The District

57 RDF Annual Reports, Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development.
58 An estimated 40 000 people will benefit from this clinic now (2005) operating although work is still in progress. Project co-funded EU Micro-Projects Program during the same period (2002 to 2004). At the time of fieldwork Council and DDF were disagreeing over siting of a new borehole or rehabilitating an existing water point.
Drought Relief Committee, chaired by the DA was responsible for general programme management. Secondment of Social Welfare Officers to Council by the Ministry meant that technical implementation was fully anchored at Council. However, during implementation, some Councils allegedly abused/diverted funds, used interest earned and submitted returns late. In response, the Ministry instructed Councils to include Social Welfare Officers as signatories to the drought relief accounts. Councils resisted the Ministry instruction arguing it was in violation of the RDC Act and was tantamount to interference in the running of Council affairs. The instruction was also viewed as rushed, an example of recentralisation, Ministerial bullying and using Councils as a scapegoat for programme challenges not of their making. Although accepting that some Councils had erred, ARDCZ argued that blanket withdrawal of the account and programme was inappropriate because errant Councils should have been dealt with using relevant procedures.

Councils’ refusal to accept the Ministry’s position was based on a number of points59. One was that the Ministry acted in an uninformed manner and had unrealistic expectations particularly regarding the time within which accounts were expected. Based on District sizes and distances covered to pay programme beneficiaries Councils felt they were doing their best. Delays were also because beneficiaries were mainly the elderly, infirm, poor and other vulnerable members of communities unable to travel long distances to receive their benefits making it impossible for Councils to reduce payment points. This meant more centers and hence more time to pay out and submit returns. Councils also cited transport problems and argued that the programme over-relied on Councils’ meager resources and therefore delays had to be accepted because of that choice. They were thus unable to understand the expectations of ‘miracles’ given this reality. They and most government departments in the country lack transport resources and public transport is unreliable for a programme with an insufficient administration grant (8% of transferred resources). Given sacrifices made to mobilize their meager vehicles, staff and other resources, Councils argued they did their best. In fact, the Councils were incurring deficits, which would cripple Council operations. Councils noted that the programme was embarked on without careful planning, was poorly managed and under-provided. They had accepted it purely

59 Summarised from notes taken at the 2004 ARDCZ Congress.
because of its emergency nature. The Ministry responded to Council arguments by asserting the legitimacy and bases of its decisions. This case draws out some of the tensions associated with ‘acting in the people’s interest’ where central and local governments claim being best placed. Government funded national programmes seem to end up being means for central control over the local.

Accusations and counter-accusations aside research evidence suggests that as models of service provision national programmes show some promise. National programmes are not necessarily anathema to participation. Government provision of project funding for supporting local development plays an important role. In the case of RCDF, each Council is assured of at least one project per year (and more should the government resource situation improve). However, Councils are often not provided with sufficient resources and information to manage the relations with communities and other organisations. The challenge arises from lack of resources within Councils for complementing these efforts. Lack of information, as in the Land Bank case above, may leave Council unable to help their residents and perhaps perceived as irrelevant to communities. Levels of support and discontinuance of good practice between projects is another cause for concern. The extent to which participation can be catalyzed by the few projects supported in this way may be very limited. Another point relates to central government’s influence in terms of policy direction and institutional arrangements through project/programme support. The flexibility shown under CAP, DADP and IRWSSP in Zimbabwe regarding resource disbursement and coordinated implementation appear not to have been transferred to RCDF. SEDAP and DADP initiatives in Mutare, are presently suffering some neglect as a result.

In Zambia, there are hopes that lessons learnt under the ZAMSIF will be carried forward. At least in the case of Zimbabwe, past experience suggests that government is unlikely to increase disbursement of resources directly to Councils or in a manner as flexible as CAP or ZAMSIF. This is not to suggest that some of these projects did not have shortcomings but to urge identification and application of lessons. Indeed as LGAZ noted in a Parliamentary submission in relation to the 2006 budget ZAMSIF, for instance had some serious shortcomings. These were cited as working directly through Provincial Facilitators without adequately building decentralised local government capacities and using the capacity building ladder as a sanction tool.
focused on internal capacity rather than service delivery orientation. That less than 8 of the 72 Councils reached the highest point (5) in the capacity building ladder confirms LGAZ’s assertion on capacity building. The LGAZ brainstorm session observed that perhaps ZAMSIF used a bottle-neck system to limit the number of Councils reaching level 5 i.e. claiming more funds.

The Zambian decentralisation policy has raised hope for a devolution framework. It is hoped that local government’s position will be entrenched in the development process and existing sub-District problems will be addressed. However, having taken ten years discussing it the hope and enthusiasm needs to be guarded. A Decentralisation Implementation Strategy has been drafted and adopted but awaits implementation. Meanwhile, ZAMSIF and the Decentralisation Secretariat are shifting their institutional homes from Finance and Cabinet Office respectively to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. While considered strategic in terms of institutional responsibilities for decentralisation, moving away from the money (Ministry of Finance) and power (President’s Office) may slow the implementation of decentralisation. A general point to make is that macro power dynamics and institutional choices have an enduring effect on delivery and institutional interactions in implementing national programmes at sub-national level.

5.7. Traditional leadership structures and processes

There is a growing meshing of party political and Chieftainship issues affecting the functioning and perception of traditional leadership, which government acknowledged (GRZ 2002b) in relation to a succession dispute in the Nyamukoho Chieftainship, Mudzi District, Mashonaland East Province. Chief-making traditions rooted in local customs were observed to be in competition with government employees, politicians and other local interest groups in promoting or influencing chiefly candidates. The Chigodora Chieftainship in Mutare District is one other, among a few more cases, of Chieftainships whose succession disputes have exposed problems within the institution.

These cases (Nyamukoho and Chigodora) are not used to generalise about Chieftainships in Zimbabwe. They are used to highlight some of the emerging questions about the legitimacy of the institution, which affect people’s participation...
since traditional leaders play a part in development structures and processes. Traditional leaders exist in all the study Districts as indicated by 91% of the survey respondents including Zimbabwe’s new resettlement areas. They are also a relatively well established institution in rural areas. Their tenure generally lasts longer than other office bearers e.g. Councilors and staff of development organisations. For instance in the six Wards of Seke/Manyame and Mutare 59.5% of the respondents had Village Heads installed after 2000, 24.3% between 1991 and 2000, 2.7% between 1981 and 1990 with 13.5% before 1980. The higher figure for the 2000 period coincides with the land reform programme and passing of the Traditional Leaders Act, which brought resettlement areas under traditional leaders’ governance structures.

However, the DA for Seke/Manyame indicated that there are no traditional leaders in new resettlement schemes in the District (Interview 8th June 2004) while in Mutare Council was urging the Ministry of Local Government to address boundary and other structural issues affecting traditional leaders (Mutare RDC 200460) a factor also noted at the ARDCZ Congress of 2004. This seems to suggest that on the ground people already have recognized Village Heads yet to be formally appointed by the Ministry of Local Government. In both Districts, conflicts between traditional and elected leaders were acknowledged. In Mutare’s Ward 22 (old resettlement scheme) some traditional leaders selected by the residents had not received formal appointment letters/certificates from the DA’s Office because they had not been agreed to by the relevant Headman. Those nominated by the Headman had since received their formal letters/certificates from the DA (Ministry of Local Government). The fluid nature of the appointment of traditional leaders also affects old resettlement schemes in Seke/Manyame where community selections were still to be validated by the Ministry at the time of fieldwork in 2004-5. Seke/Manyame Ward 15 respondents (without a) Councilor61 indicated having Village Heads but without the proper certification.

60 Minutes of a Full Council Meeting No. 4 of 2004.
61 Councilor was suspended in 2003 by the DA on the instruction of the Governor without consulting residents. Field discussions suggested that the Councilor was dismissed for informal land allocations and protection of some farmers targeted for eviction under the post-2000 land reform program (Interview with Ward Coordinator 15th August 2004, FGD 15th January 2005).
During land occupations, people created their own informal Committees, consisting of seven elected individuals. When government announced that resettlement communities were to be administered under the nearest Chief, communities had to constitute traditional structures. Most communities opted to select Village Heads from amongst the Committees of Seven. As such, these Committees, which spearheaded land occupations and governed specific farms, provided most of the traditional leaders. Often the Chairpersons were appointed as Village Heads unless if the Chief/Headman selected their own or it was felt that there was someone in the community with a lineage traceable to the nearest Chieftainship. The new traditional leaders have however not established Village Assemblies and Development Committees while some communities have repeatedly changed their choices.

Traditional leaders are ordinarily hereditary not elected. However, in old (pre-2000) and new (post-2000) resettlement schemes the popular vote has been used in some instances. 36.2% of the respondents indicated having a villager-selected head, 32.1% Headman-appointed, 30.1% inherited, which was mainly in communal areas and 1.6% a volunteer head (n=125). The phenomenon of villager-selected Village Heads raises prospects for the democratization of traditional leadership. In both Zambia and Zimbabwe Chieftainship or traditional leadership generally is regarded as conservative and autocratic (see Mamdani 1996).

In parts of Zimbabwe and Zambia traditional leaders have been accused of promoting resuscitation of cultural practices seen as oppressive by women’s rights activists e.g. compulsory virginity tests, widow cleansing, circumcision, early marriages, property grabbing from widows and orphans. In Mashonaland East, a Chief was accused by District and Provincial Government Authorities of allocating land without consulting the local Council and not distributing inputs provided under the Zunde RaMambo scheme (The Sunday Mail July 11, 2004). The payment of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe has also led to questions about the effect such a policy has on their integrity and impartiality. These issues touch on legitimacy and perhaps appropriateness of the institution as a mechanism for deepening participation. The

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62 Zunde is Shona for field and Mambo is Chief. Zunde RaMambo is a portion of a traditional leaders’ land where a community traditionally worked throughout the season with the produce being harvested into a Chief’s granary and used to feed disadvantaged members of that community. Concept now adapted as response to plight of HIV and AIDS infected and affected (orphans, widows etc).
questions notwithstanding, Government acknowledges the importance of traditional leaders. Vice President Msika (2004) observed that their role in:

`...supervising development planning structures (the Assemblies) ...and as the linkage between the people and their elected leadership...a synergy quite vital for the successful development of our rural areas` (2004:8 see UNECA 2005).

Addressing an annual congress of traditional leaders in 2005, Zimbabwe’s Second Vice President, Mrs. J. T. Mujuru outlined the roles of traditional leaders as follows:

`...they support government programmes (identification and implementation), perform traditional rituals to enable smooth passage of development programmes (planning and implementation stages) act as the entry point for government programmes, operationalize development structures at Village and Ward level, ensure people’s development ideas are respected in national programmes, look after the vulnerable in society guaranteeing their welfare needs are catered for and provide information on existing programmes to enable (their) people to take advantage of such` (The Herald July 23, 2005).

The above quotes reflect the central role assigned to traditional leaders in development in Zimbabwe. Presence in Council, leading sub-District structures and government-recognized provincial and national Chiefs’ Councils evidence this growing significance. These realities determine how traditional and elected officials relate. Their interface forms the context within which legitimacy and effectiveness in facilitating development and other development organisations can be explored. Often traditional leaders’ new power and recognition by government as community gate keepers is seen as excessive. This creates the impression that all other development organisations need the blessing of traditional leaders for whatever they do in or with communities. Councilors are particularly affected by this perception, as some traditional leaders practice this.

Comments attributed to Mrs. Mujuru by The Herald give the impression that government expects traditional leaders to identify and incorporate the development needs of their subjects in government programmes. The expectation confirms that Council and government programmes may not always be the same and that traditional leaders are accorded a direct link with central government. This entrenches ambiguity in the relationship between Councils/Councilors and traditional leaders. In their role in Ward/Village Assemblies traditional leaders are expected to be the lowest tiers of local government and therefore link up with Council-facilitated planning, which often contradicts the central government link suggested in the quotation above. Both

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63 Official address to the ARDCZ congress, 18th August 2004, Montclair Hotel Nyanga.
Councilors and traditional leaders fall under the Ministry of Local Government. However, the two institutions enjoy different statuses and are managed separately. Such 'overlapping separateness' is a source of tension as further discussed below.

Notwithstanding reservations in relation to their capacities, traditional leaders perform valuable functions in communities. The case of Kasempa demonstrates the importance of traditional leaders in programme implementation and general community maintenance. Chief Kasempa visits his subjects in their communities at least once a year to receive complaints on land disputes and other conflicts that may be occurring. Those that can be resolved on the ground are dealt with while others are dealt with after the visits. During the visits, the Chief also encourages people to take advantage of existing programmes in their areas (governmental and non-governmental) and provides information on opportunities not known to visited communities. Chief Kasempa is managing an HIV and AIDS grant from the Community Responses to AIDS (CRAIDS) a national programme that provides funding for community efforts to fight HIV and AIDS. PACT Zambia and the Southern African AIDS Trust are some of the international donors that support the project. The activities implemented include counseling, training and sensitization of communities, traditional healers and traditional birth attendants on HIV and AIDS, care-giving and counseling. These are implemented by a registered community-based organisation (the Royal Establishment Kubalisa Project) which has full-time staff and a Board of Trustees separate but with the regular support of the Chief (Interviews with the DC, District AIDS Task Force and Council Officials, February and March 2005). The Zunde RaMambo in Zimbabwe is generally more widespread and is largely funded by the National AIDS Council a government Parastatal unlike the Royal Establishment Kubalisa Project, which is different in that it receives external support. Both cases however show the role that traditional leaders play in local development and governance. CADEC's relationship with traditional leaders discussed above and Plan International’s work in Mutare reflects the extent of the opportunities that traditional structures present regarding facilitating participation.

Rural communities in the two study countries are governed by traditional systems at the primary (village) level and at the level of a chieftainship, which may cover more than one administrative Ward, e.g. Chief Seke's area covers about 8 Wards, Chief
Marange at least 15 and Chief Zimunya about 10 Wards. At Ward level elected leadership come onto the scene and interface with traditional leaders. Despite differences in structures through which traditional leaders participate in local government processes, these are very important structures in the two countries including direct management of development programmes. The Governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe have had a history of relating to traditional leaders since independence that is not uniform. For Zambia during the Kaunda era Chiefs were Councilors and controlled development outcomes directly (Interviews in Kasempa 7th February 2005).

Regarding rural local governance, Zimbabwe appears to have proceeded on two extremes after 1980. First, sidelining traditional leaders through 1999 and then what can be referred to as near-complete capture and entrenchment in local government structures and ruling party politics since 2000. Using traditional leaders as communication channels for government and other organisations introduces a low-cost and innovative means of engaging with rural populations in the two countries and indeed most of Africa. In Zambia, it is fair to say that the traditional leadership structure has retained some distance from Government and the party unlike in Zimbabwe (see GRZ 2002b). In these different settings, traditional leaders remain critical in participation and development. They affect the functioning of Councils particularly in terms of community entry. The next section discusses relationships amongst sub-District structures from the premise that none of the key players at present is unlikely to be removed. I show and discuss the positive and negative experiences regarding institutionalising participation that the study observed.

5.8. Sub-District: some opportunities and challenges presented

The sections above set the context within which sub-District local government structures relate amongst themselves in ‘doing development’. Some themes affecting the relationships have been discussed, among them perceived or actual politicization of some of the structures and the duplication of services. Mixed experiences of the sub-District inform different policy initiatives e.g. ADC establishment in Zambia and the Assemblies in Zimbabwe. Existing structures created under the Village Productivity Act and the Local Administration Act (1970s and 1980s) heavily politicized the structures (Government of Zambia 2003, Interviews February and
March 2005). Zimbabwe’s 1984 Prime Minister’s Directive, which formalized ZANU PF structures (comparable to Uganda’s regularization of Resistance Councils, Porter and Onyach-Olal 1999; Francis and James 2003), led to tensions with traditional leaders, which frustrated development in Zimbabwe (see Brand 1991). These scenarios suggest an underlying effort at de-politicizing, and in the case of ADCs departing sub-District development structures. By creating Assemblies Zimbabwe’s experiences suggest that political parties need to be curtailed in this case by traditional power centers. De-parting local governance structures may thus democratise development processes with aspirations of minorities being respected alongside those of major political parties. However, given the party-political nature of local government in both countries (and elsewhere) it appears that a party-neutral lower tier existing, let alone working, under a distinctly party-political higher tier may be unachievable. This is more tenuous in a winner-take-all political system. Therefore seeking to departy local government, while perhaps desirable may be difficult. Party politics is however not the only fuel for institutional tensions. Tensions remain between traditional and elected officials, more in Zimbabwe’s resettlement than communal areas in spite of changes instituted. That tensions still exist became evident at a Ward meeting held in May 2004 in Seke/Manyame District. Key issues on the relationship between the two were discussed.

Table 14: Areas of Councilor-traditional leader conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village.</th>
<th>Issues raised against the Councilor.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.       | - Delayed payments under the Council-administered Public Works Programme.  
            - Councilor not giving sufficient feedback to traditional leaders. |
| 2.       | - Councilor by-passing the Village Head going to Village Committees to get reports or to give instructions.  
            - Late Public Works payments. |
| 3.       | - Getting information on development activities much later than other villages.  
            - Community boreholes were not being repaired. |
| 4.       | - Friction with Village Head who had contested & lost Councillorship.  
            - Village Head’s proposals as Chair of Clinic Committee opposed by Councilor.  
            - Councilor holds meetings in village without the village head.  
            - Labeling Village Head an opposition politician.  
            - The Village Head was accused of illegally allocating land in the village’s grazing area without Council approval. |
| 5.       | - Community boreholes were not being repaired.  
            - Communication break-down with Councilor.  
            - Councilor not attending meetings in the village (Village Head and subjects not satisfied with Councilor’s excuses). |
| 6.       | - Councilor accused of gossip, deliberately misplacing Public Works registers.  
            - Village head (female) not clear of the role differences and mandates.  
            - Councilor accused of ‘loading development in own village’ including under the Public Works Programme. |

Source; Fieldwork (Ward 18 Meeting, Seke/Manyame, May 26th 2004).
The meeting was called by Council and the DA following written complains about the Councilor received by both offices. Other government department attended to listen to community needs and respond to queries raised about their work. The DA and the Council Chair co-chaired the meeting. During the meeting, each of the six Village Heads in the Ward was given a chance to raise the issues they had with the Councilor and on development issues generally. The Ward Councilor was not asked to respond although the rest of the community (in attendance) was invited to make comments. Conflict areas cited include Councilor’s inability to timely and satisfactorily communicate Council and broader government policy and delayed Public Works payments. Delays due to changes in programme policy for selecting beneficiaries especially the total number and proportion of able-bodied to those (elderly, infirm etc) receiving free benefits per village was not fully understood by the community. Cuts made to the programme meant numbers were reduced and the Councilor was having difficulty explaining these. The conflict also arose from local power dynamics, as Village Heads were new in this mid-1980s resettlement scheme that had existed for at least 15 years without traditional leaders.

The challenges of reconciling the roles of Councilors in their own villages and at Ward level were also evident in this case. Accusing the Councilor of circumventing the Village Heads created the impression that Councilors can only operate through Village Heads, something some Councilors are not comfortable with in both Mutare and Seke/Manyame. They argue that it slows their work. On victimization and favoring their village, anecdotal evidence from community members seemed to reinforce this perception. During interviews, cases cited were of input distribution where the Councilor’s village is perceived to have had adequate inputs ahead of the rest of the Ward. The allegations against the Councilor reflected a deep mistrust but could have been political gamesmanship in the presence of public officials. In Zimbabwe, traditional and elected leaders derive their legitimacies and influence from different sources (see Nugent 2004) and pieces of legislation. Colonial methods of ‘stabilizing alien rule’ by using traditional institutions to administer Native Areas (Indirect Rule) created a negative institutional legacy (Mamdani 1996; Abbink 2005).
However, both sets of leaders are unavoidably brought into contact by the institutions of Ward and Village Assemblies, which in this case did not seem to be functioning very well. Given that the Councilor heads the Ward Development Committee and their election and term runs concurrent to that of Village Development Committees it is fair to assume that they are the boss of such committees. Village Heads’ resentment of being led by elected Councilors has serious implications for development activities. Unlike in communal areas where traditional leaders are not elected, in resettlement areas the source of legitimacy and authority of both Village Heads and Councilors reside in the electorate (is not hereditary). The operationalization of a communal area-type traditional leader in resettlement schemes is questionable at least for most of the current generation of resettlement area Village Heads.

It would appear from this study that the uneasy marriage of elected and traditional leadership systems may act to constrain participation in development. Institutionalisation of participation needs an anchor at this level for it to exist let alone to work effectively. The Mutare District Assembly discussed elsewhere in this thesis appears to be generating some positive results. However, general guidelines may be needed to ensure that roles are understood and relationships are improved. As discussed in the section on structures, there may well be a need to assign the responsibility to improving the relationships between these two bodies to a distinct institution and that it remains a continuous process.

In Zambia ADCs are replacing Ward Development Committees considered legacies of the Kaunda era where the party controlled all development and civic affairs. As such the ADC controversially proposes Councilors and traditional leaders be ex-officio and represented respectively. The ADC is viewed both as the planning link to the DDCC while Councils look at the ADC as a link into Council, which creates tension in terms of the effectiveness of ADCs in acting as a mechanism for integrated development planning. Some key informants referred to ADCs as for ‘service delivery’, which is the forte of Council and thus ADCs may need to link more directly with Council than the DC-controlled DDCC. Whether ADCs will work effectively when the institutions above them are facing serious problems or whether they (ADCs) are a means for addressing the development planning malaise remains a key question. The type of support needed for ADCs or their equivalent in Zimbabwe to steer a
bottom-up improvement of the development process also remains unclear. The provision of such support also appears generally unstructured.

ADCs will be constituted via the vote as opposed to the Assemblies in Zimbabwe, which are already prescribed in law as the preserve of traditional leaders in terms of leadership. This makes the issuance of mandate and representation quite direct for ADCs. However, there is a danger of exposing the ADC (and any other local organisations) to partisan politicking. The popular vote has been known to sideline women, youths and other interest groups raising the need to look at an interest or sector-based quota system following participatorily agreed criteria. Such an option may be essential given that in both Zambia and Zimbabwe local government (form, capacity building and relevant policies) has been held prisoner to political whims with more detrimental stops than starts (e.g. decentralisation programmes) against a background of weak local non-governmental development organisations.

Role definition and smoothening relationships are important but not adequate for institutionalising participation. The same meeting (Table 14) brought out issues that related to local institutions’ capacity, funding and horizontal-vertical linkages. These are crucial to the facilitation of development as they may act to constrain effectiveness of these structures if absent (capacity and funding) and unclear or weak (linkages). While there is strength in diversity, a myriad of under-funded, incapacitated and un-coordinated institutions may end up defeating the very purposes for establishing them. This is not to suggest that the answer lies in dropping some but to highlight the fact that the overlaps and conflicts may in fact arise from lack of capacities and enough resources to be effective.

5.9. Sub-District organisations’ performance of own functions

In Seke/Manyame District, only two of the twenty-one Wards held a Councilor-convened Ward development committee meeting with minutes in 2004. Documents reviewed and interviews conducted in the District would suggest that Ward development meetings are held at the instigation of District officials. They appear to have become more of an instrument for District-to-Ward not Ward level communication. Proceedings of such meetings are recorded and kept by District officials and rarely send back to the Ward. When sent they are addressed to
Councilors who may have neither the resources nor the inclination to disseminate
them. Big Wards with poor communication infrastructure are often blamed as
constraints to effective administration (Mutare RDC 2004, and ARDCZ Congress
Discussions 18-20th August 2004). Bad communication infrastructure and traditions in
a context of already low participation, this does not bode well for institutionalising
participatory development. Granted the meeting is not the only means for
participation, but it is important to note that other methods, such as letters, petitions,
lobbying are socially exclusive and expensive. In Seke/Manyame District, it may be
that institutionalising participation has not been helped by the frequent changes of
Executive Officers and high number of Acting Heads of Departments in recent years.

Mutare District uses different arrangements where Ward clusters of five each meet bi-
monthly while individual Councilors are expected to meet their constituents more
regularly. This enables cluster issues to be consolidated for the quarterly full Council
meeting. The difficulty for me was to gauge the significance of debate and
participation within these meetings, since no records of the cluster meetings were
available at the Council Offices. However, one significant finding was that the cluster
meetings were centered on conservation issues and as such were issue-specific. On a
more positive note, this seems to have allowed for some form of galvanization as
clusters shared related environmental management issues and concerns in a practical
manner. The evidence might suggest that the incidence and quality of sub-District
interaction in the communities is low in both Seke/Manyame and Mutare Districts.
However, in Mutare one can detect that mobilizing people around local environmental
issues has arisen out of a longer-term process of institutionalized participation. The
main problem seems to be one of record-keeping.

ADCs were being established in Kasempa during fieldwork and it seems too early to
assess their performance in managing or facilitating sub-District interaction. Key
informants suggested that Councilors in the District were committed, continuing to
attend meetings at a time when Council was not paying allowances (Interviews 8th
February 2005). They noted that NGO/donor-funded programmes had provided
opportunities for Councilor participation in development activities. However, DDCC
members noted that Councilors serving in Ward Committees that have existed in the
past faced difficulties arising from distances Councilors cover in their Wards (Focus
Discussion 8th February 2005). Because of this, Ward meetings tended to be based on District rather than local initiatives as in Zimbabwe. The situation in Kasempa therefore reflects a similar trend as in Zimbabwe.

In general, therefore, it would seem that conflicts exist at sub-District level especially between elected and traditional leaders more in Zimbabwe than in Zambia. The nature of the local government structures in these two countries plays a role in this respect particularly the way in which traditional leaders are involved. Evidence seems to suggest limited interaction amongst sub-District structures without District facilitation. Written records are not readily available suggesting alternative inquiry methods are needed to uncover the extent of interaction. From what was reviewed and interviews undertaken it would be reasonable to suggest that the effect of local institutional capacity and operational resources on interaction and performance is an area that has received limited treatment.

5.10. Conclusion

This Chapter has presented and partially discussed the main findings of the study. The other part of the findings is in the next Chapter after which the main discussion then follows. Suffice to note that a number of opportunities exist for ensuring that people take a defined role in development through the work of specific institutions i.e. through the facilitation of District and sub-District level actors. This is because the structures and groups at sub-District level are often linked to or facilitated by one external organisation or other. Central government and NGO programmes seem to be major avenues through which development activities are undertaken in the three Council areas. Councils may articulate a niche focusing on facilitating other development actors as they lack resources of their own for development activities. Scope exists for such Council level facilitation in their areas and legal provisions in the two countries appear supportive. This explains why this Chapter was given the title of ‘institutional interaction as development facilitation’ to advance the argument that opportunities and challenges for institutionalising participation need institutional steering, a role considered to be adaptable to Council functions.

What seems to be a key challenge is lack of coordinated support to communities. The limited capacity of Councils to close some of the facilitation gaps at sub-District level
is an important aspect emerging from the research. Councilors end up performing practical development facilitation functions, which often takes them away from their policy-making role. At the same time, they rarely have adequate information to be able to perform well in practical development facilitation. Other challenges include lack of material resources and some inter-organisational conflicts. The institutional relationships therefore seem to provide, at once, immense opportunities and some constraints to institutionalising participation. Organisational conflict, planning overlaps and communication problems are some of the major issues that affect interaction and hence the opportunities (and challenges) for institutionalising participation. Because of weak funding and non-funding support to local institutions, the above assessment of Councilors is largely true of other institutions.

This Chapter attempted to keep Council at the centre of the discussion. Council as a concept was used in different ways. First, as the collective body of Councilors, the Executive and Councilors at sub-District level. In most instances, the Executive (which actually delivers services) was the one referred to although the other two came into focus. It is therefore important to highlight, at least in brief, that choosing ‘the Council as Executive’ variant was because most of the opportunities and constraints lie in what can and perhaps should be done by Council staff more than by Councilors.

It would appear that central governments in both countries have an enduring effect on the District and sub-District institutional dynamics preferring one actor ahead of another (e.g. traditional leaders versus Councilors, NGOs versus Council etc) at any given moment. The ‘favored’ ones are assigned more space and powers to lead development processes and act as mechanisms of central control of the periphery. Central control and overall influence often weakens horizontal linkages, frustrating integrated local governance. I return to some of these issues in Chapter 7 but in the next (Chapter 6) I present findings as they relate to people’s perceptions of ‘institutional interaction as development facilitation’.
CHAPTER 6: PEOPLES’ AGENCY: PERCEIVING AND USING DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS

6.1. Introduction
In ‘doing development’ ordinary people interface with development organisations (local District and other, governmental and non-governmental) in the spaces I indicated as the local context, popular organisations and ‘development activities in District spaces’ (Figure 1). In some instances, the range and complexity of the development organisations that people engage with may be overwhelming as are the myriad practices the development organisations use as they interface with local people. Whereas in Chapter 5 I looked at organisational interaction as development facilitation, in this Chapter I look at people’s perceptions and use of institutions as the other part of the equation without which development remains incomplete or theoretical. Most of the evidence used in this Chapter was drawn from the questionnaire survey. However, key informant interviews, evidence from events and data from the Community Diaries (Zambia) are also used.

This Chapter includes exploration of people’s understanding of the available structures and spaces for development facilitation, analysis of their perceptions of inter-organisational relationships and pulling together the different rationales and mechanisms for use of institutions. These aspects have a bearing on institutionalising participation based on the strength and endurance of bottom-up processes. The analysis in this Chapter attempts to show the extent to which bottom-up and top-down processes influence the institutionalisation of participation. Some aspects discussed regarding Council effectiveness e.g. public resistance to payment of rates or levies can be explained by some of the findings presented in this Chapter. Regarding rates resistance, Hlatshwayo (1998) observes that the challenge is one of ensuring that community members commit to participating in existing structures.

The Chapter is structured into seven sections excluding the introductory and concluding parts. It starts off by discussing people’s appreciation of the roles of the institutions they work with before exploring their perceptions of the relationships amongst key development organisations. These two sections illuminate issues of knowledge of existing structures, which is a prelude to issues of use and evaluation of
relationships. The third main section in this Chapter draws out factors that communities use to assess the performance of Councilors. Section four engages with Community-Councilor interface to establish processes and issues. The discussions in these first four sections are briefly pulled together in the fifth, which engages people’s use of institutions and officials and their (people’s) perceptions of the helpfulness or otherwise of the institutions. Section 6.7 presents and discusses findings on people’s attendance of development meetings at Village and Ward levels to shed further light on the relevance of these spaces. Lastly I touch on ordinary people’s responses to opportunities and challenges to participation.

6.2. Understanding the roles of key institutions

The manner and extent of relations between development organisations and the community rest on community understanding of institutional roles. Community perception of whether their needs will be met, usually based on experience, is critical. As suggested elsewhere in this Chapter, many people do not have much faith that development organisations will help them. Nevertheless, they still participate in the processes facilitated by these institutions. Although they find their Councilors helpful, this may not be of any consequence, as Councilors do not have any resources to address the needs brought to their attention. They simply take requests and pass them on to those above them. The table below summarises respondents’ perceptions of the responsibilities of key development institutions in Zimbabwe.

These perceptions seem to indicate a fair understanding of the roles of the institutions involved. One area of overlap is land allocation seen as a function of Government Departments, the DA and Council. In terms of the law, Council is the land authority. However, in practice particularly under the land reform programme the DA’s office took general leadership of the programme with government departments involved in actual land parceling out. As such, these development organisations featured more than Council. Ward land allocation, de facto, is performed by traditional leaders although de jure it is a Council function. As discussed above, there are cases where traditional leaders allocate land without consulting Council often resulting in problems. As such, the effectiveness of an institution is dependent on both context and issues at hand. This explains why on matters of land and food distribution given the current context in Zimbabwe the central state has been in the lead.
Another function where actors overlap is that of leading communities (Ward) performed by traditional leaders and Councilors. In principle, a Village Head operates at a spatial unit lower than the Councilor and therefore there ought to be no major problem. However, Councilors monitor development activities in Wards and in doing this they encounter Village Heads. The DAs for the two Zimbabwean Districts indicated that the role differences lie in that Village Heads cover customary issues while the Councilor leads the Ward community on development issues. Zimbabwean Wards have a minimum of 6 villages and no Councilor can manage to monitor all developments especially activities like land allocation in a Ward. Overlap thus occurs as gap-filling and is accepted until major problems are noticed.

Another interesting aspect was on the role of coordinating infrastructure development perceived to be both a Council and DA role. The reality on the ground confirms this as both development organisations play a role depending on whether a project is funded by Council or central government. Also as discussed earlier some NGOs have partnerships with government institutions and as such, Council will be less visible in such projects. As the most senior government official at District level, the DA is often

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Table 15: Perceived roles of different development institutions

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<tr>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collecting levies.</td>
<td>Receiving levies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting levies.</td>
<td>Receiving levies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting levies.</td>
<td>Receiving levies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving social conflicts.</td>
<td>Resolving conflicts and improving security.</td>
<td>Making laws.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representing people in Council.</td>
<td>Representing people to government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with village heads.</td>
<td>Monitoring Councilors and village heads.</td>
<td>‘Owner of District’ coordinating other organisations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data.
involved in officiating at community projects and functions making them more visible than say the Council Executive. The representation role was also split between the institutions of Councilor and DA (local and central government respectively).

People’s perceptions of the roles of different public institutions seemed to vary from legally stated roles of concerned institutions. Popular understanding of roles appears functional or de facto confirming the importance of lived experiences in how people relate to institutions. It is important however to observe that the perceptions were not far off from the stipulated roles. These perceptions have a bearing on the expectations placed upon an institution and may result in role encroachment. An example is where a government employee takes on the representative role of a Councilor through passing community requests or issues to Council. Up to a point, a Councilor may tolerate it until they begin to feel sidelined. Role encroachment, especially where District coordination is weak, may result in duplication and institutional conflict. Perhaps a point made about institutional visibility on the ground may be repeated here as well. The institution of Village Head is more commonplace than any other local governance institution. This creates the expectation that Village Heads should perform all conceivable functions at the lowest level. Notwithstanding advantages, problems as discussed in the next section often arise.

Cooperation, role encroachment or other forms of organisational conflicts may be played out at District level away from the field (community) but could also be expressed at community level. These help communities understand which development organisations work well together and which ones do not. The sub-section that follows is based on an analysis of survey results where respondents were asked how they perceived the relationships between each of the development organisations in Table 15.

6.3. Perceptions of relationships amongst development organisations

Table 16 shows the views that respondents expressed about the working relations of different development organisations. A pair-wise ranking method was used in asking the question so that pairs of institutions were compared in turn. This is a relatively common technique used in PRA to establish priorities or choices.
Table 16: Perceived quality of organisational relationships (n=125)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Perceived quality of relationship.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village Head-Councilor.</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Head-Council.</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Head-DA.</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Head-Government Departments.</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilor-Council.</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilor-DA.</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councilor-Government Departments.</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council-DA.</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council-Government Departments.</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA-Government Departments.</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data, 2004

Two general points can be made about these data. First, the percentages are aggregate valuations. The category ‘Government Departments’ represents at least six different line Ministries, departments and Parastatals. For Village Heads it is equally a diverse range of institutions given the areas covered by the study. Second, the percentages are generally within the 20-30% range thereby representing less of major variations except in the case of Village Heads and Councilors. The study attached a lot of importance to these perceptions because they were based on lived experiences. Respondents often gave examples of why they perceived certain relations to be either bad or good. Key informant interviews, grey literature reviewed and the events that I attended also seemed to confirm these perceptions. Interviews with AREX and DDF in Mutare highlighted a perception amongst technical people that politicians were constraining their performance. For instance, the head of AREX in Mutare stated that:

‘...politicians should increase distance from projects to create room for the technical people to do proper project implementation. The RDDC at times works better (because of fewer Councilors) than full Council where focus is often limited’,

(Interview 12th January 2005).

As such, the fact that more respondents perceived the relations between government departments and other development institutions as very bad consistently more than they perceived other relations is an important finding. Minutes of Council meetings in Mutare also reflect the uneasiness between Councilors and thus Council and civil servants with reports of problematic extension staff (Mutare RDC 2004). The same minutes in this case acknowledged that reports (about a particular officer) had been made repeatedly. In both Zambia and Zimbabwe, Councils and the DA/DC do not
have the power to intervene in relation to civil servants. An interview with a CADEC Officer and a Ministry of Health Environmental Health Officer highlighted that development organisations were aware of community machinations to exploit inter-organisational differences for their benefit (Interview 17th August 2005). Both shared the view that development organisations should work together so that communities do not come between them. This constitutes an acknowledgement of the power that community perceptions and actions have on inter-organisational relations. As such, communities may exploit differences and partnerships to their advantage.

Any process of institutionalising participation may do well to look at institutional relations. This can be done using different methods. Exploring people’s perceptions is an important area of inquiry because institutional relations are shaped by community perceptions, which define how communities behave when dealing with institutions. Cooperation and conflict may actually result from perceived similarities and differences that a community brings to the attention of development organisations.

6.4. Assessing Councils: community views

The survey indicated that 44% of the respondents perceive their Councils’ performance as very poor, 45% as average and 11% as high (n=125). Table 17 shows some of the reasons why these perceptions are held. Suffice to highlight that the corruption and ineffectiveness factor was the highest (47.4%). This perception is not restricted to communities as some key informants also indicated its existence. A new DA for Mutare observed that:

‘...the mentality amongst communities that their money is abused by Council is justified to some extent. Council needs to play its part. Mutare has adopted a 70% plough-back policy to allay such fears but other Councils do nothing’, (Interview 11th January 2005).

The perception cannot be totally dismissed. Kasempa Council’s audit was two years behind in 2005. The example of Kasempa Market Association discussed in Chapter 5 is also relevant in this regard where Council was not providing commensurate services. In the Focus Group Discussion in Ward 15, Seke/Manyame District participants voiced dissatisfaction with Council over use of public resources. The factors used in the assessment or to justify rating of performance (Table 17) were about services that Councils provide (or do not) and the quality of relations. Negative comments from respondents about their Councils included:
they don’t work with people...only come to collect taxes...we are totally neglected...very little is being done...we have water problems...they are far from us...they delay in providing services...no feedback...roads impassable’ (Quotes adapted from questionnaire returns).

Positive comments included:
‘...Council gave us stands...sourced donors...periodically visit on land issues...reacts timely to problems...clinic fully operational...bridge constructed...maintain road’ (Quotes adapted from questionnaire returns).

Table 17: Factors used by respondents to assess Council (n=125)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and ineffectiveness</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaknesses in establishing and maintaining facilities</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to work with people</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of establishment (Council considered newly established)</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faces problems (transport)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data

The perception of corruption may explain the resistance to pay rates reported in the Zimbabwean Districts. A University of Zambia study on governance also established relevant perceptions regarding Councils in Zambia. The study concludes that, the public has lost trust in public officials and rated Councils among the least honest and providers of the poorest services (Government of Zambia 2004). The high number of survey respondents rating Council performance as poor in Zimbabwe is linked to the reality that Councils lack resources as discussed in Chapter 5 i.e. Councilors not bringing something to the community. Given that Councilors bring little from Council this assessment appears an accurate one. Key informant interviews also confirmed the perception that Councils lack ideas and are doing nothing. This is both a ‘street’ narrative and a reality in Zimbabwe with which many people identify.

A second possible explanation for the low rating of Councils, particularly if compared to the rating of Councilors, is the effects of the practical and conceptual distances between the community (respondents) and Council (see Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999). This distance makes it difficult for ordinary people to offer informed bases for their ratings of Council beyond referring to services. Notwithstanding this caveat, it is revealing that the rating of Councils is low not only from the respondents’ perspectives as it has been validated from other sources. Like with Councilors, respondents focused on tangible developmental variables to justify their assessments.
6.5. Community-Councilor interface

A constituent’s knowledge of their Councilor or other community leaders is a proxy indicator for participation in community activities. Knowledge is however not adequate, as people’s direct engagement with or actual benefits from the development process may flow from other means. Suffice however, to note that 96% (n=120) of the survey respondents indicated knowing their local Councilors. For the 4% (n=5) who did not know their Councilor reasons ranged from not caring to know or living far away from the Councilor. If the number of respondents knowing their Councilor can be used as an indicator of the level of activity of Councilors then at least in the six study Wards in Zimbabwe they may be considered active. This (knowledge) is however not an adequate basis for Councilor performance assessment.

In terms of performance assessment 46.4% of the respondents rated Councilors highly, 33.6% average and 18.4% very poor with 1.6% nil response (n=125). The performance of the Councilors is therefore perceived as relatively good in the two Districts. The bases for Councilor assessment combined specific development aspects like roads and drought relief, which outweighed other reasons like personality. The Mutare and Seke/Manyame cases where residents write letters or verbally complain to the Council about their Councilors’ performance are no longer unusual, and seems to be generating some kind of positive feedback loop between the Council and the public (Interviews with Mutare Council Chair 6th January 2005 and Seke/Manyame CEO 10th June 2004). I can also confirm the importance of personality, development agendas, institutional and skills constraints more generally in the interface between the Councilor and the community. This also occurs in Seke/Manyame. The Councils manage complaints differently.

In Mutare, the Council Chair often intervenes when complaints are received. He does this either by making an impromptu Ward visit or having a formal meeting with the affected Councilor. In 2003, the Councilor for Ward 5 in Mutare was reported to be refusing people access to his home arguing it was not a public office. He advised constituents to wait for community meetings, which was difficult for those needing a Councilor’s signature for a variety of needs. Repeated requests did not help. Eventually the Council Chair visited the Ward following a case of indecent assault.
involving the Councilor. This forced the Councilor to resign. The relationship between Councilors may also be mediated through religious, other political and traditional leaders. Errant Councilors may be reported to traditional leaders who may choose to intervene or influence the choice of an alternative candidate in future elections. In the 1996 local government elections traditional leaders in Mutare’s Ward 24 worked to ensure that the serving Councilor was ousted at the polls. They successfully influenced their subjects to vote an alternative candidate.

The Council Chair, traditional leaders, specific interest groups and informed citizens are at the forefront of reining in Councilors and ensuring that they remain accountable to the public. However, 48% of the respondents did not rate their Councilors indicating that either they were happy with their Councilors’ performance or were suffering in silence. Perhaps the 48% who responded to the questionnaire saying that they had no complains about their Councilors and thus had no rationale for their rating fall into this category. The study found that there are no systematic ways for managing Councilor-community relations. Councilor monitoring is left to the Council Chair in the majority of cases. Since Councilors do not have performance targets. Personality and political considerations are central in Councilor monitoring systems. On the other hand, communities value development deliverables more than other variables. However, that Councilors’ development facilitation is conceived and funded by other non-Council development organisations means their facilitation is instrumental not transformative. Unfortunately, with no Councilor appraisal processes in place in Zambia and Zimbabwe a gap exists, which if addressed could considerably advance participation.

The Mutare Council Chair observed that new Councilors are often the ones caught up in problems, as they come into the Council with expectations of directly and personally benefiting through Councillorship. He noted that there are schemes contrived by some Councilors to gain personal benefits while performing their normal duties e.g. in facilitating access to grain and other services where the approval of the Councilor would be needed. A Councilor in Ward 17, Seke/Manyame was alleged to have misappropriated some funds meant for independence celebrations in 2004. Although the affected Councilor had what appeared to be a valid explanation the question became one of trust and whether he should have handled the money despite
being the head of the Ward. The Council Chairs of both Zimbabwean study Districts acknowledged these types of temptations. They both highlighted that they generally advise their colleagues to appoint and oversee committees, which can directly perform such tasks instead of controlling decisions themselves. Seke/Manyame’s Ward 7 Councilor has established a decentralised structure that helps in Ward administration.

6.6. People’s use of development institutions

In terms of people’s use of development organisations 33.9% (n=42) of the respondents indicated that they had personally approached their Councilor, local Council, the DA, an NGO or a government department over a development need. At face value, 33.9% using direct advocacy approach may seem low but it is significant compared to the figure of two-thirds legally stipulated minimum attendance for Village Assembly meetings. Therefore, if as many as half the people expected to attend meetings use the direct approach then participation is considerable. The Councilor was the most frequently approached, followed by state departments including the DA, and other institutions e.g. NGOs. It appears that Council (at District level) was the least approached.

It seems that institutions were mostly approached for micro-level and short term needs like food aid and information for accessing services rather than for community infrastructure or other bigger development agendas, which naturally require more formal and community-wide consultations and plans. Compared to answers to the question on development priorities where respondents answered at vision level, when approaching officials, people go with practical needs e.g. inputs not agricultural development. While generally the direct approach is less frequently used this cannot be read as lack of active participation. What it may mean is that development organisations that use formal instruments like the letter will not interact with as many people as those using alternative methods like the meeting. Because of closeness to the people, it is not surprising that the institution of Councilor is approached the most.

When people approach development organisations, self-interest creeps into the articulation of development needs. The need is refined and communicated as bigger than personal. The person approaching a development organisation is usually passionate about or directly affected by the need for which they seek assistance.
Groups and individuals define needs from different vantage points, depending on their perception of the organisation or official being approached. The study gathered data (Table 18) on community perceptions regarding the helpfulness of development organisations. Responses were based on experiences of working with and approaching development organisations for specific needs.

Table 18: Perceived helpfulness of development organisations (n=42)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Need Approached Over.</th>
<th>Helpfulness Perception.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Administrator.</td>
<td>Comm. Infra. Domestic Problem. Plans.</td>
<td>Food Aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Department.</td>
<td>Comm. Infra. Farming Issues.</td>
<td>Micro-Projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey data

The needs over which development organisations are approached also show some resemblance to the perceived roles. For instance community infrastructure (schools, clinics etc) features on all three institutions in the above table although this is a Council function according to legislation. Communities perceive Government Departments as least helpful, although they are seen to be as helpful as Council. The survey results show that Council is more lukewarm than the DA, which might explain why it is the least approached. Community infrastructure seems to cut across all three main development organisations but the majority approach Council. This spread may suggest people’s need to increase options but perhaps confirms an underlying understanding of the role of Council. Going to other development organisations with the same need may also be a way of bringing those development organisations’ influence to bear on the organisation with the responsibility to provide the service.

6.7. Attendance of Village and Ward meetings as participation

Attendance of Village and Ward level development meetings is a useful indicator of participation. Attendance also shows the confidence and value that communities place in relevant institutions. At the same time, attendance allows interface, which is the basis for the making of contributions (by the relevant institutions) to people’s lives. However, attendance of meetings may be different reasons. At times, they are forced
to attend against their will, as was the case with some participants at the ZANU PF meeting discussed in section 4.5.3. Some respondents at this meeting told me that their security of tenure for the land they had been allocated depended on participation in party activities. Frequency of formal meetings and of household attendance may help us account for these possible negative interpretations. Besides Assembly meetings, communities also meet at religious gatherings, funerals, beer parties, school-assembly meetings and many others depending on time of year and type of society. By considering the different reasons why people attend formal meetings alongside the other non-formal ones, it is possible for researchers to develop balanced assessments of the quality of developmental dialogue and household participation therein. 22.9% of the respondents indicated that no Village Assembly-convened development meetings were held in their communities in 2005, 7.6% noted that the meetings had only been held once, 30.5% twice and 27.6% more than twice while 11.4% could not remember the frequency. The law states that the Village Assembly should convene at least once per quarter. The responses indicate a measure of inactivity. If the 22.9% who indicated that no Village Assembly meetings were held are believed then the institution appears to be underdeveloped.

In terms of attendance 51.5% of the households were always represented at the meetings, 25.2% rarely and 23.3% never took part (n=107 excluding those who said the Village Assemblies never took place). Discounting the fact that attendance of the meetings could be a ritualistic fulfillment of community expectations, the attendance falls short of the ‘all adult villagers i.e. above 18 years’ as defined in the Traditional Leaders Act of 2000. Those who do not attend Village Assembly meetings do so because of personal commitments or because they feel that the meetings have become politicized. Villagers who attend mostly go to get ideas, feel inspired by existing leadership, are leaders themselves, to resolve conflicts or to monitor progress on activities underway. As a space for participation, Village meetings are becoming less important in terms of their primary purposes of development planning (see Makombe 1993, Plan Afric 1997; Brand 1991).

Compared to village development meetings Ward meetings were held more frequently. 53.9% of the respondents indicated these had been held three to four times, 34.9% once or twice and 1.1% more often while 10.1% noted that these had not
been held at all. The Ward meetings were attended by a higher proportion of the
respondents at 75.4%, this despite the grey literature and key informant interviews
having highlighted a relatively infrequent convening of the Ward meetings. The
explanation given for this discrepancy is that the Ward meetings that respondents
referred to are called for District-to-Ward dialogue rather than Ward level dialogue
and it was difficult to separate these in interviews. Notwithstanding this change in
focus, Ward meetings appeared to be attended by more household representatives than
village development meetings. 76.1% of the respondents who attended indicated
making contributions at the meetings with 60.8% of them perceiving their
contributions to have been taken seriously. In effect, the institution of the Ward
development meeting is alive but may have changed in terms of its focus.

6.8. People’s responses: filling gaps, exit or voice?

6.8.1. ‘Games’ people and officials play

This section does two things. It presents some of the interactions that were observed
between communities and development organisations of relevance to the discussion.
It also discusses some of the groups and initiatives that communities establish with or
without the support of development organisations. First, some experiences witnessed
after a community meeting attended and facilitated by government officials in Mutare
District’s Ward 2. A villager borrowed a neighbor’s bicycle to get the official some
indigenous vegetables out of season at that time of year. After catching up with him, I
gave him transport in my vehicle so that we could all get to the garden at the same
time. However, there were no indigenous vegetables in the garden and all he had
wanted was for the officials to see his garden to enhance his chances of securing
support generally and in relation to a cassava project the Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, Gender and Community Development had promoted at the meeting.

At another farmer’s smallholder irrigation plot visited on the same day the senior of
the Ministry officials told the farmer that her Ministry had embarked on a national
cassava growing programme. The cassava project was suggested to the farmer as an
alternative to the crops currently being grown, as they need more watering compared
to cassava. Not quoted verbatim, the discussion went like this:

‘Are you willing to grow cassava?’ (Government Official-GO).
‘But are the soil conditions here suitable for that crop?’ (Farmer-F).
'We will provide all the inputs, all you provide is your land' (GO).
'Yes I would like to take part' (F).
'Of course we will work with AREX' (GO).

The discussion between the government official and the farmer above is not necessarily typical but it struck me as one way in which project imposition may result. It is not used to generalize the interaction but to discuss points of pertinence to institutionalising participatory development. First is the urgency with which officials and outsiders may seek to secure acceptance of ideas they consider useful for local people. This urgency is not about disrespecting locals, but often concern to impart knowledge and enthusiasm regarding new ideas. The urgent search for pilot sites as in the above case may short-circuit consultation processes, feasibility studies or assessments and stakeholder engagement.

Second, the time to discuss details might not be available (as was the case here). The process of selecting beneficiaries for a project might already be past forcing officials to visit groups or individuals they consider suitable. In a way, the selected person or persons have no immediate say in why they are selected. Third, the ‘frontline officials’ might have little knowledge of what they are promoting but are busy responding to directives from above and trying to meet deadlines. Oftentimes the good intentions of the outsiders in ‘imposing ideas’ are assumed away and regarded as anathema to participation when in some cases it is a workable strategy for addressing local knowledge gaps. Fourth, there may be no resources to support the development of an idea including exposing would-be beneficiaries to successful cases as a basis for ensuring informed buy-in (see Box 1).

On the part of the farmer\textsuperscript{64}, the responses and questions typified a risk-averse decision-maker. In the above case, the new project appeared to be a diversion from his real needs (assistance to fence his land and buy more irrigation pipes). However, the manner in which the discussion proceeded sounded as if refusing the new project would jeopardize the existing relationship and its potential to generate more benefits. The farmer might have realized the new project could be taken elsewhere denying

\textsuperscript{64} The farmer has a 3 hectare gravity-fed irrigation scheme drawing water from an earth dam established before resettlement in the mid-1980s, successfully grows dryland tobacco, has 21 herd of cattle and therefore very rich by rural standards. He however asked for assistance to purchase an engine arguing that his beasts were a form of social insurance (‘...in case my eldest son gets married’).
him the benefits of regular official visits, which are a source of information and a conferment of some social status. Quick expression of interest in the project appeared more of relationship-maintenance than interest in cassava growing. New projects appear to be accepted not for their appeal but for what they enable e.g. community visibility and proximity to officials both governmental and non-governmental.

At some of the community meetings attended during the research song and dance appeared to be important media used in development discourse. What was sung, when songs were sung, the names of people infused into songs and the general mood of a community or group seemed to be carefully selected. Song and dance appeared to be used to motivate development practitioners encouraging them to do more and to make promises to communities. There was also sweet-talking and generous praise-singing interspaced with serious messages in the speeches delivered at meetings by visitors and communities alike. Communities robustly mix elements of sympathy-seeking (we are a forgotten lot, very poor, hungry etc) and confidence-inspiring expressions in speeches delivered to visitors depending on the visitor. Where a community has sufficient knowledge of the organisation they would be ‘saying the right things’ and select the right spokespersons. Some of the phrases appeared to ridicule officials, for instance;

‘...money comes (from central government) but never arrives (to communities)…’
and ‘...we have become too good at talking and less on action’ (Land Dialogue, 2004, see Mbembe 2001).

From the first case, it would appear that offering gifts is a strategic way of influencing decision-making and may determine whether support is provided, the location of projects and the beneficiaries. Officials often solicit for gifts and inquire about certain produce or services, leading them to communities where they may eventually locate interventions. Community members also seek one-on-one interface with officials to secure support.

Based on the above I cannot say that people opt out of relationships with development organisations completely. However, they develop ways of dealing with development organisations for their benefit. Development organisations have methods of getting things done with communities that, among others, include pre-selection of beneficiaries or contacts. The next sub-sections explore some of the groups that
people form as a way of structuring their own participation in development. Some of the initiatives are facilitated by government and by NGOs. Except to the extent that Councilors are usually involved, the groups are rarely Council initiated. As such, they owe their existence to community initiatives and non-Council facilitation. Suffice it to say that they constitute an important strategy for addressing serious development issues while also drawing the attention of development organisations.

6.8.2. The type of groups communities establish

Notwithstanding the formal governance structures, communities form and participate in their own groups. These groups are formed from local initiatives as well as through the facilitation of different external development organisations. In terms of the first of the two most important groups that respondents belonged to, survey results showed a predominance of farming or productive groups as indicated by 41.5% of the respondents followed by religious groups at 32.1%, social groups at 15.1%, and micro-credit groups at 11.3%. These groups are established by people to pursue their interests. Groups present opportunities for individuals to approach authorities and NGOs for assistance with or without the blessing of Ward/Village Assemblies or Councilors. In Mutare’s new resettlement areas covered by the survey, these are not evident although in the Seke/Manyame sites these are already active. Four HIV and AIDS support groups (social groups), Taga Development and Taga Dairy Association (productive groups) and at least 10 project groups assisted by the Ward Coordinator are some of the examples in the community. In the Ward 15 Focus Group Discussion and the interview held with the Ward Coordinator of the same Ward these groups were considered the principal reference points, as there was no Councilor at the time of fieldwork.

Compared to resettlement Wards, communal Wards have more groups in both Mutare and Seke/Manyame. For instance, in Ward 2, Mutare District there are at least 21 groups affiliated to a 15-member umbrella club. They receive financial, technical and general training support from the new Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development. The groups range in terms of size from 3 to 18 members. Except for the bigger ones (above 6 in membership), the smaller ones are largely

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65 Support began before former Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation was split into two Ministries.
formed around family relations ('me, my wife, our children and our friends' type). Their institutional support comes from the umbrella club and through it from the Ministry. The activities they undertake vary but include smallholder irrigation (on plots of 0.02 to 3 hectares), sewing, soap-making, handicrafts, confectionery and trading in basic commodities.

The groups are different from AREX ones (discussed below) although for those undertaking agricultural activities they receive support from the department alongside other farmers. All groups engage in at least one activity to improve household welfare. They use a Committee-based governance system with Ministry-facilitated constitutions developed within the Cooperative legislative framework. In interviews, some of the members explained how they lacked access to financial resources, necessary equipment or tools and the skills they would need to run their activities successfully. Suffice to note that the concept of a project as a community (and thus public) intervention appears to be challenged from the manner in which some of these groups constitute themselves along family lines and activities that would ordinarily be regarded as household activities.

While community support mechanisms exist on an unorganised basis, it would appear that existing groups had some external affiliation and required catalysis (see Berner et al 2005). In the Kasempa areas where community diaries were kept, groups like Safe Motherhood Groups (SMOGs), Community Welfare Assistance Committees, Producer Groups and Village Resource Management Committees, among others, existed largely linked to externally-facilitated programmes. Between the household and the lower-level local government structures (Village and Ward Assemblies in Zimbabwe and ADCs in Zambia), there are therefore a number of socio-economic and political formations that enable people to participate in development. However, external facilitation for their survival and growth is very important.

6.8.3. Farmer organisations

In Zimbabwe AREX is supporting a number of specific or projectised activities as part of its mandate. Some of the activities are based on the promotion of specific crops and clusters of groups of farmers growing those crops. Some of the crops include cotton and small grains. In the Marange area of Mutare District, three wards
(Mutupo, Mukuni small-scale commercial farming area and Mafararikwa) are an example. Other crops emphasized include groundnuts and sorghum both considered suited to the agro-ecological conditions of the area. AREX is promoting small-grains more than maize and works in partnership with CARE International (an International NGO) to promote production of two sorghum varieties i.e. Chibuku and Marcia through an agro-dealer\textsuperscript{66} association. Farmer organisations therefore are formed around specific agricultural activities. In total AREX works with 52 registered Farmers’ Organisations in Mutare and there are many more not formally registered (Interview with Head of AREX Mutare 12\textsuperscript{th} January 2005).

Working with Farmers’ Organisations enables AREX to offer extension services on a cost-effective basis since its resources are limited at present. The AREX head for Mutare also acknowledged that Farmers’ Groups in the Chigodora area of Mutare provided the department with fuel twice to enable staff to offer services (Interviews, 7\textsuperscript{th} January 2005). During the army-worm invasion of 2004 he recalled how farmers in the affected areas directly provided transport and fuel support to AREX. Other development organisations find the AREX groups and Farmers’ Organisations useful launch-pads for their work. There have been challenges in this area with AREX feeling that development organisations especially NGOs are ‘reaping without sowing’ hence the sentiments discussed in Chapter 5 where AREX felt some NGOs burdened them without offering incentives. Moreover, the national Farmers’ Union (Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union- ZFU) perceives AREX-linked groups as rivaling it on the ground because some of them are affiliated to a splinter of the Union. At their 2004 congress, ZFU alleged that AREX was establishing farmer groups for organisations other than ZFU and thus undermining the viability of the Union (ZFU Congress 2\textsuperscript{nd} September 2004).

In Kasempa, there are a number of farmer organisations formed with support from the Department of Agriculture and Cooperatives (DACO). Table 19 shows some of the Cooperatives in Kasempa District and by sector.

\textsuperscript{66}These are mainly store-owners or rural retailers selling farming inputs to local farmers clustered into associations to promote a specific product. CARE has been in the forefront of promoting this approach to improve input accessibility for smallholder farmers.
Table 19: Types of cooperatives in Kasempa District (June 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperative Type/Sector</th>
<th>Main Activities</th>
<th>Number.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Seasonal and horticultural crop production.</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-purpose</td>
<td>Farming and non-farming activities.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer</td>
<td>Running retail (commercial) ventures.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-oriented</td>
<td>Catering.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Group (pre-cooperative)</td>
<td>Unregistered.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-credit</td>
<td>Savings and credit.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Cooperative Union.</td>
<td>Apex Body; supporting pre-cooperatives and registered coops.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bee-keeping</td>
<td>Honey production.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data.

There are therefore mixed views on the importance of Farmers’ Organisations. However, from a service provision perspective AREX finds them strategic. In interviews with sub-District AREX staff in the Marange area, they felt these groups were helping transfer lessons as the department’s resources no longer allowed regular and effective visits to farmers. An important finding of this study is the acknowledgement of farmer support by government-related development organisations as enabling service provision. It is usual to talk of participation of people in relation to locally available materials needed for a project and labor not material input into an organisation’s budget.

6.8.4. Volunteering as participatory development

People often give up their time to assist others or to participate in programmes without formal material rewards and working irregular times, which is important in any community. These volunteers are a critical mechanism for ensuring people’s participation in development activities. Zimbabwe’s fight against HIV and AIDS, especially Home-Based Care (HBC) activities, draw significantly from local volunteers. This enables communities to get benefits and access external organisations through their neighbors selected and trained as volunteers. Volunteers tend to have or develop strong community bonds. This is because communities usually select socially acceptable candidates for training as volunteers. They also develop or acquire skills, which often enable them to facilitate programme implementation. The Diocese of Mutare Community Care Programme (DOMCCP) and Seke/Manyame’s Seke Rural Home-based Care (a secular programme) are some of the organisations that depend on volunteers in the provision of their services in the two study Districts. The SMOGs and CWACs in Kasempa also use volunteers for delivery of services.

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Volunteers are not only found in the HIV and AIDS sector as they are there in other programme areas as well. In fact I can argue that most community leaders with the exception of a few (e.g. Zimbabwe’s traditional leaders) are volunteers. Their importance in making participation exist and work is therefore very important. When a volunteer is selected and trained, the newly acquired social status and zeal to help appear sufficient motivations for them to offer diligent service without expecting rewards. In all three Districts, some challenges with volunteers were identified. Some volunteers were beginning to demand more recognition and material rewards. Following a Strategic Planning session, which I also attended in January 2006, DOMCCP got feedback from volunteers and stakeholders making them commit to come up with a volunteer policy as their volunteers threatened to revolt over incentives (Interviews 22\textsuperscript{nd} June 2006). The perks given to volunteers differ with organisation in the AIDS sector. While AIDS programmes have built on traditions of inter-household and intra-community mutual self-help, high poverty levels are increasing volunteers’ opportunity costs. Box 11 provides a list of the factors that influence the quality and duration of volunteering based on data from the DOMCCP Planning session and interviews undertaken during the course of this study.

The above brings me to a broader reflection on how to make voluntarism a basis for participatory development. To what extent can development organisations work together to address some of the above challenges say at District level? Would standardization of incentives (e.g. Councilors and traditional leaders’ allowances in Zimbabwe or incentives for HIV and AIDS care-givers etc) help in addressing these challenges? How would this work where some development organisations are unable,
because of affordability, organizational values of other reasons, to comply with set standards? How about uniqueness and individual identity of organisations? The implications of the above questions for institutionalising participatory development are significant. For instance, once a volunteer withdraws their services the link between outsiders and the community may break dislocating local development processes. In some instances, disappointed volunteers have been known to constrain service delivery. In others, they introduce counter-attractons with the effect of disrupting community processes and internal-external linkages.

6.9. Conclusion

This Chapter has explored people's understanding and use of development organisations. Such use is mediated through people's own (local) organisations and structures or spaces created by outsiders. Through the study I learnt of the factors that communities use to evaluate the helpfulness of development organisations. Critical factors include perceptions of organisational relations, track record and the type of needs communities have. Local innovations and volunteering were discussed to show the avenues through which ordinary people channel their developmental agency. External development organisations play a critical role in facilitating people's involvement in development. However, it was noted that external development organisations lack mechanisms for providing and receiving feedback and often lack time to facilitate development interventions as shown in the proposed cassava project. The perceptions of relationships and usefulness of development organisations combine to influence whether ordinary people take the challenge to participate through existing structures or resolve to use their own initiatives. Evidence from the study suggests considerable local participation in activities (including groups) that are directly linked to external development organisations. In some instances, the linkages are multiple and simultaneous leading some development organisations, as shown in the ZFU case, to complain that their work is negatively impacted upon. While it appears that to some degree institutional interaction plays a peripheral role in people's own initiatives it cannot be completely ruled out of the endeavours of ordinary people. The chapter has also shown ways in which people's agency critically and innovatively influences individual organisations as well as inter-organisational interaction.
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction
Participation was defined as the taking of meaningful and voluntary action in development spaces, structures and processes. Institutionalising participation involves taking formal and informal actions to ensure that ordinary people have access to and control of such spaces, structures and processes. The key research question was posed as: what are the key institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions to participatory development at District level? This question was answered by drawing on the theory and practice of decentralisation and participation. The study finds that the main factors facilitating participatory development relate to inter-organisational interactions. Organisational interaction occurs in joint and separate spaces. Governments influence and participate in these spaces through policy and programme implementation. Governmental involvement strengthens but also distorts local organisational relations.

The study also finds that people's participation acts as the bottom-up pressure essential for making organisational interaction responsive to local priorities. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, considerably rich and dynamic traditions of grassroots participation exist, which however lack extra-local influence. Using the analytical models of Arnstein (1969), Pretty et al (1995) and White (1996), such participation remains at the nominal levels. Zimbabwe's crisis has seriously strained organisational relations and capacities (see Mukamuri et al 2003), which has affected people's participation. Decentralisation theory does not hold much promise for Zimbabwe considering that there is little left to transfer to the decentralised governance structures.

The factors listed in Box 12 (below) summarise the study findings and the analyses in Chapter 2, which particularly engaged issues of mechanisms and structures used to institutionalise participation. I consider these factors critical for participatory development at the District level. I present the factors in a neutral way, i.e. not as either supportive or inhibitive of District level development. This is because, depending on context, each factor may have both supportive and inhibitive elements. With the exception of factor 2, the rest concern aspects outside the direct control of
any individual organisation. I use the evidence from the field to discuss how these factors manifest themselves in the case study countries and therefore the extent to which participation is enabled or constrained.

Having discussed the opportunities for and challenges to institutionalising participation in Zambia and Zimbabwe in Chapters 5 and 6, in this section I pull together key issues and draw some theoretically generalisable conclusions on the subject of participation in rural development. The research experiences deepened my understanding of the research question and raised additional questions. Exploring the question was a rich experience from a theoretical and practical perspective. In the first section of this Chapter, I elaborate on the factors in Box 12 to shed light on the meanings drawn from the findings and contribute to debate on enhancing participation in developing countries like Zimbabwe. Other sections focus on the new insights from the study regarding local governance practices from the perspective of institutional interaction.

7.1.1. Traditions of grassroots participation

In any given community there are preferred or generally deployed mechanisms for participation at the local level or regarding engagement with outsiders. These preferred and generally deployed mechanisms of participation are what I refer to here as traditions of grassroots participation. Available literature highlights ordinary people’s agency in different legal, social, economic and political contexts (see Mercer 2002; Green 2000; Tilakaratna 1987; Haidari and White 2001; Connell 1997; Marshall 2005; McCall 1988; Kar 2003; Mapedza and Mandondo 2002). What is also critical are the structures that shape the agency (see Giddens 1984; Bentzon et al.

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The effect of development organisations and programmes on people’s participation was explored extensively using literature (see Oomen 2002; Thompson 1995; Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999; King and Cutshall 1994; Mungate 1993; Blackburn and de Toma 1998; Krishna et al 1997; Gaventa 2005; Cornwall 2002). This study identified various ways in which communities organise and engage with development organisations. Both self-organised and outsider-organised mechanisms were observed. Some of the specific mechanisms deployed include writing letters of complaint, attending meetings, volunteering, directly approaching development organisations and membership of farming (or other) organisations. The use of these different methods varies by gender, age, social status, existing institutions, resources and, among others, available information. In Chapters 5 and 6, I presented examples from where these variables that collectively form what I call here ‘traditions of grassroots participation’.

7.1.2. Organisational participatoriness

An organisation’s perceived or proven use of participatory processes influences participation (see Thompson 1995, Staudt 1991). This constitutes an organisation’s own traditions of participation. For instance, the establishment of ADCs in rural Zambia is guided by the desire to limit the direct participation of traditional leaders who are perceived as non-participatory. It is felt their involvement might limit people’s freedom in ADCs. In Chapter 5, I also discussed the practices through which Mutare and Seke/Manyame deal with public complaints and generally communicate with people. Organisational expectations also arise from track records particularly in relation to internal resources to meet demands placed on an institution. Similarly, organisational mandates, at law as well as popular interpretations thereof, affect interaction and the extent to which other actors work with particular development organisations.

7.1.3. Inter-organisational relations

These occur in public spaces and in intervention design or during implementation. The relations are guided by existing policies (point 9 in box 12) but also depend on lived experiences. The strength of horizontal coordination of actors and availability of resources for development organisations to perform their functions thus dependability are key variables. One example, cited in section 5.4.2 of working to boost inter-
organisational relations, which also helped institutionalize participation, involved establishment of a Mutare District Assembly, which is an initiative of Council and Plan International, an NGO.

7.1.4. Institutional delivery

Development organisations leave foot prints in communities where they work. The foot prints are both about development processes and actual products delivered. Organisations and communities use such knowledge of organisational foot prints to decide on the breadth and depth participation. The same logic applies to institutions like that of chieftainship (see Oomen 2002), Councilors and central government. Another relevant example is Zimbabwe’s decentralised development planning system. In recent years, the system is failing to deliver. The result is that ordinary people have become skeptical of its dependability (GRZ 2004; Hammar 2003; Conyers 2003; see also Government of Zambia 2004). Development organisations now participate more as a ritual than a meaningful process. People’s perceptions of, and development organisations involved in, the development planning process have been negatively affected. However, when schools, clinics, other infrastructure and governmental services were provided in response to villagers’ submissions the system was very popular. The tensions between NGOs and the Government of Zimbabwe at present are in part explained by the higher visibility of the former in rural areas than the latter. Actual delivery creates the necessary conditions for good relations and participation.

7.1.5. Coordinating activities and development organisations

Development processes are coordinated by local and national government-related development organisations within sub-national spaces. The coordination function is often contested. Central and local government development organisations lay a claim to the coordination role. The contested claims affect the extent to which ordinary people and development organisations participate. District Development Committees are often the spaces within which these tensions are played out. Such tensions constrain the Committees and reduce their attractiveness (see Gasper 1997; Government of Zambia 2004). In some instances, constraints and tensions in joint planning and coordination spaces force non-governmental organisations and donors to create alternative structures. In Zimbabwe, attendance of Development Committee meetings by government departments and NGOs was noted to be erratic. However,
there are good practices emerging, as the case of Mutare Council-DDF and three NGOs shows. Sub-District structures are also affected by vague role assignment and weak development coordination. Traditional and elected leadership on the one hand and government technical staff on the other are often in conflict. Interventions by national politicians also stress the District planning and coordination system.

What often makes the coordination of development activities and functions more difficult is the limitations in resources both for coordination and actual activity implementation. Some national programmes do not provide adequate resources for coordination e.g. Zimbabwe’s Public Works programme discussed in Chapter 5. Some organisational conflict is more a product of resource stresses rather than role overlaps. The expectations that the public sector has of NGOs regarding material support often stresses organisational relations particularly where the NGOs are unable to facilitate access to resources and incentives. District level planning and information management processes are often under-funded. Outside support for joint spaces and processes is reduced for fear of sustaining what is called the workshop and per-diem culture67 while District level budgets are inadequate for such expenditures.

7.1.6. Institutional support from above

Sub-District structures receive inadequate strategic and operational support from above. The party politicization of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe and the support they receive has had the effect of distorting local relations (see Odotei 2005; GRZ 2002a; Mukamuri et al 2003). Critically, central government rules and decisions have a stronger bearing on sub-national organisational relations than local processes. Consequently, in both Zambia and Zimbabwe integrated management and sustenance of local development institutions is weak. I return to this issue in section 7.6.

7.1.7. Participation and institutional effectiveness: a role for associations

Associations like the National Association of NGOs (NANGO), the Association of Rural District Councils of Zimbabwe (ARDCZ) and the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) are avenues for people’s participation through their different structures and processes. They also represent distinct and sizeable constituencies whose activities are

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67 This is where professionals hop from one workshop to another more for the associated financial benefits (per-diems or allowances) than to act on knowledge acquired or resolutions made.
pertinent to the furtherance of participation. Associations have different roles including capacity development of their members, which could be a basis for building participatory cultures. In 2004 I followed NANGO processes on the NGO Bill in Zimbabwe, attended an ARDCZ biennial congress and the ZFU annual congress. The NANGO process illuminated state-NGO tensions at all levels particularly as the Bill followed the 2003 Operational Manual seen as part of confining NGO operational spaces. NGOs saw the Bill as a threat to NGO freedom generally and particularly targeted at advocacy and human rights organisations. Non-human rights NGOs saw themselves as safe, which strained NANGO regarding pulling together its membership. NANGO's proposals for self-regulation, which were explained to Parliamentarians and other stakeholders, did not succeed, which showed how entrenched state-NGO differences were.

The ARDCZ and ZFU congresses reflected constraints faced by associations in a polarized context where they struggle to balance ‘delivering their constituents to the ruling party’ as a way of securing space and recognition and raising serious concerns, for instance, in relation to centre-local relations (ARDCZ) and government activities perceived as undermining non-state bodies (ZFU). For ARDCZ technical and political actors appeared to respond to different governmental signals from different parts of government. The heterogeneity of all three associations affected their ability to articulate clear and non-partisan advocacy agendas. Interpretation of signals from existing environment and organisational relations informed both the debates and outcomes. The associations’ experiences pointed to the need for an underlying democratic culture in society regarding how non-governmental development organisations operates and co-exists with state organisations. As such, although the thesis has proceeded on the basis of articulating the power of the local, I have not ignored the place or critical influence of macro-conditions, which are dictated upon principally by the central state and global trends.

7.1.8. Planning products and plan promoters

These create serious opportunities for participation. However, development organisations face coordination constraints regarding activities and actors (section 5.3). Local steering and resourcing of planning systems and products (the procedural and substantive issues) remain weak, which constrains local ownership particularly as
local elected and traditional leaders seem pressured to ‘bring projects’ and fear engaging with their constituents if they have ‘nothing to bring/take’. This ‘externalisation of the development process’ slows down local participation (see Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2005). Such externalisation was borne out of high development expectations at independence and the early positive state responses in the two countries. In Zimbabwe more than in Zambia, these immediate post-independence responses had a lot to do with donor assistance made possible under the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development initiatives (GRZ 1981) and a relatively stable economy. For Zambia, good world copper prices, among others, enabled meeting of post-independence development demands. The current economic decline and donor flight in Zimbabwe contrasts sharply with economic recovery and donor support in Zambia. However, despite these different macro-conditions the underlying local institutional challenges reflect close similarities.

7.1.9. Maneuvering in existing spaces

The existing national policy environment communicates good intentions but betrays centralistic tendencies in both countries. Mutizwa-Mangiza (1991) observed that a state without complete control of local government secures such control through recentralizing the national economy and other responsibilities. This is an assessment that remains true for Zimbabwe today. However, local actors do not seem to be innovative enough to extend their capacities and generate value within existing statutes. For instance, not all challenges faced by Councils in relation to local revenue collection require policy or legislative changes. This is because the challenges reflect lack of citizen-Council trust, limited Council visibility at sub-District levels and weak Councilor capacities. More can (or could) be done by and through Councils under existing legislation in the two countries than is often acknowledged. Similarly, more can (and could) be done by other local development institutions without radical changes to existing policies and laws while at the same time that same maneuvering may act to initiate medium to long term policy shifts.

7.2. Projects as learning and conflict spaces

Physical, economic and social projects are (and have been) important in addressing poverty and mobilizing society around critical issues. Project funds mostly come from outside benefiting communities, although local resources (time, labor, materials etc)
are used during implementation. Regarding benefit delivery, projects in the two countries have mixed results but are not always complete failures (see Ferguson 1994). However, it is important to look at projects as spaces within which relations are (re)-shaped. The (re)-shaping of relationships provides useful lessons in terms of how development is done, particularly the institutional arrangements beyond benefit delivery to communities. The Public Works Programme in Zimbabwe shows how local and central government relations were organised and how implementation generated debate. ZAMSIF sheds similar light on relations e.g. the handling of the District Health sub-project in Kasempa District. Zimbabwean programmes analysed in Chapter 2 also provide insights into how projects are used to influence the doing of development. Perhaps it is in influencing how development is done that projects generally fail, considering that challenges regarding inter-organisational relations and their effect on development remain resilient.

Projects do not appear to address core social mobilisation issues. Often, communities, project promoters, and hosts-cum-implementers focus more on material project outcomes than participation. A combination of preconceptions about solutions (see O’Laughlin 2007; Ferguson 1994; Nyoni 1987; Chambers 1983; 1997), the role of outsiders and short-term interests (Mansuri and Rao 2004; see Booth 2003; McGee and Norton 2000; Calderisi 2006; Browne 2007; Moss et al 2006) detracts from project effectiveness. In addition, most project conflicts concern organisational relations especially accountability than project design or implementation. Learning and sustaining project-based participatory practice from projects are curtailed by organisational relations. As Illich (1997) argues, existing models of development (projects included) are not meant to work. Mitlin and Bebbington (2006) also note that the importance of social movements is less about influencing specific policies and programmes but the terms in which society debates poverty and social change (see Cornwall and Brock 2005). The point becomes about the extent and quality of interface in different spheres and at the different levels not actual project outcomes.

Hiding institutional conflict is positive and negative, deliberate and inadvertent. It is done by organisations and their representatives as well as by individuals. The example of the conversation between the farmer and a government official (section 6.8.1) shows situations where potential conflict is at once avoided and deferred. Hiding
conflict could be positive if eventual implementation of a project helps develop mutual understanding amongst development organisations. It is negative where it weakens project design rendering implementation impossible. Another challenge with projects is the high number of externally supported ones. This is not to undervalue the existence of local initiatives but to highlight that joint spaces and Committees resultantly become more externally than locally stimulated. It is therefore not surprising that after external support initiatives dependent on external stimuli falter (see Moyo et al 2000; Mansuri and Rao 2004).

I acknowledge that development is not the same as projects and projects are not synonymous with donors/NGOs. However, the perception on the ground suggests that people tend to equate the two. As such when a community says there is no ‘development’ in their area or a politician promises to respond to community needs, bringing a project and/or an NGO is generally what is meant. ‘Nothing happening’ is thus the same as limited interaction with authorities and the outside world. Communities do not seem to regard the regular extension support and Village meetings to discuss and address social problems as development. Similarly, contributing to infrastructure development at the local school is hardly regarded as development unless a donor/NGO is involved at some stage of the project. The study found that these ‘small things and regular activities’ continue to take place but are not seen as the ‘real thing’. The search for the ‘real thing’ shapes interaction and allows ennoblement of some actors ahead of others. This is what promotes the culture of ‘looking up and out’. In many ways, this constitutes a distortion of what development is, or should be about (see Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006; Mararike 1995) for which outsiders (NGOs, government etc) are largely responsible.

Taking development to communities is seen as similar to projects. Let me refer to this as externalisation of local development. Externalisation starts with amplification of local needs to a level where external assistance is seen as the only basis for leveraging change. Such amplification simultaneously underplays local competences, resources and experiences. Externalisation breeds a level of helplessness from local through national level. If there is any lesson emerging from projects it would appear that it is about ‘projectisation of development’. Externalising and projectising development has some resonance with the practice especially amongst cattle keepers. Cattle farmers are
known to resist disposing of their animals to meet household needs. Some tend to articulate their needs as community needs and thus projectisable to enable them to access outside assistance. Development organisations, Councils included, also tend to adopt a related approach. Instead of addressing emergent community needs in the normal course of their work, they regard requests for assistance more often as special and requiring unique responses. The requests then get blown beyond their existing (or developable) competences. Such a disposition blurs the difference between development needs that can be met locally and those that require external or special responses. This culture affects both communities and development organisations (see Kar 2003; Kar and Pasteur 2005). Making development about things (materialisation), projectisation and externalisation of development appear unsuited to institutionalising participation. Alternatively put, where materialised and projectised development becomes about outsiders intervening in locals’ life worlds making the taking of a meaningful and voluntary part (participation) merely nominal. In their joint and separate spaces, development organisations need to work to undo such a disposition and to localize the doing of development.

7.3 New forms of local governance

Tandon and Mohanty (2003) question the distinctiveness and difference of civil society from the state. I am persuaded to concur with this if the referring of community assistance requests by Councils to NGOs, official requests for assistance and growing recognition of NGO activities are considered. My reasoning is that development organisations in any given District ideally work in keeping with the development vision of that locality. The activities they execute further an agreed agenda. As such, a community request for assistance to Council or any other organisation can be shifted to the organisation best placed to respond to that need. Such a referral system for development activities suggests that NGOs have become a recognized part of local governance (see Krishna 2003; Johnson and Wilson 2000). Councils are also supported by NGOs and international donors to cover expenses ordinarily covered from treasury e.g. salary payments under CAP for PAAP Officers in Zimbabwe, covering expenses for travel and meetings, payment of allowances and other forms of support that NGOs/donors provide to public organisations. It is in this context that local governance seems to have acquired new dimensions and actors. These dynamics have implications for the public sector and communities.
The situation in Zimbabwe presents some policy and practice contradictions. At policy level and in terms of political rhetoric NGOs are Western and therefore undesirable. Nugent (2004) captures this view when he notes that ‘...in general NGOs contributed to the weakening of the post-colonial state’ (2004:237; see Nyangoro 1999). Since 2003, the policy and legislative maneuvers to monitor NGOs reflect this position (GRZ 2003a; CPIA 2005). This has been occurring alongside growing NGO visibility in development and humanitarian work. The guidelines that the Government of Zimbabwe has developed in recent years betray unhappiness with NGOs and often a perception that they are a nuisance particularly those involved in human rights and advocacy work is evident. In terms of their growing programme visibility government responded by collapsing four of its programmes into one (the RCDF) to ensure that grants become more meaningful and thus activity at the sub-national level becomes more visible. The RCDF is an example of what I have called projectisation of development and in this case a projectisation of government presence. The work done by Women for Change in Zambia and other advocacy organisations has also ruffled government feathers and presents a challenge in terms of conceptualising and operationalising NGO-state relations something requiring further research.

Trends in Tanzania where international development assistance is coming through the state have been observed to influence state-NGO-donor relations (REPOA 2007) by bringing the three closer together. The Tanzanian dynamics read in relation to Figure 1 highlight the role the international sphere plays working more in alignment with the state. The situation is different in Zimbabwe where the international sphere seeks ways of relating directly with the people of Zimbabwe (EU 2007) making new local governance shaky. What may be of interest in post-crisis Zimbabwe is to explore how the donor/NGO-facilitated inter-organisational relations survive a possible ‘donor/NGO-state romance’. What role will NGOs and other non-state organisations play, how will their stores and flows of influence be affected between individual non-state organisations, with the state and with the international sphere? As Marshal (2005) observes regarding the perceived separateness of religion and socio-economic development, there are ‘many holes in knowledge and awareness of work across different silos of action’.
Tensions notwithstanding, there are opportunities for the transfer of good and participatory practice through this ‘new public administration’. The sharing is more practical at the District level. Meetings, projects and other spaces provide the venues for such exchanges. Constraints to exchange of lessons are more operational and attitudinal than structural and policy related. In Zimbabwe, perceptions and often unsubstantiated political rhetoric fans acrimony between the state and non-state organisations. The study exposed the predominance of national level control of the interface between non-state and sub-national governmental structures in Zimbabwe. The operational guidelines that are made at local level e.g. the case of Nyanga RDC are drawn more in response to central dictates than local realities. This explains the weakening of NGO participation in sub-national joint spaces or Committees in Zimbabwe, further reducing scope for productive interaction. The lack of funding and logistical resources in government organisations including Councils strains relations and exposes capacity weaknesses. Strained relations arise from expectations brought on NGOs to cover expenditures that should ordinarily be covered from public sector resources. NGOs often find it difficult to fundraise for or justify such spending.

In Zimbabwe, more than in Zambia, the state feels more secure working with non-state organisations in spaces that it manages than in autonomous forums (see Raftopoulos and Sachikonye 2001; Hammar 2003; Pankhurst 2002; Bond and Manyanya 2003). An emerging question is how Councils can ensure that the state feels more secure even when it indirectly controls spaces where NGOs are active. This is because Councils approach NGOs for assistance but are generally unable to protect them from state persecution. State security is not used in regard to civil unrest but to policy and programmatic comfort. As Nhema (2002) observes, the Zimbabwean state has used a corporatist approach to managing relations with non-governmental development organisations and often takes over their agendas or co-opts certain of their members (see Essof 2005; Raftopoulos and Savage 2004). Issues that arise relate to government’s preparedness to be seen as a partner of and be held accountable by non-governmental development organisations and general capacity to manage such interaction (see Mukamuri et al 2003; Nugent 2004).

Granted that some analysts (see Chambers 1989, Fritz and Menocal 2007) argue that the state has to grow in order to respond to poverty issues the question is whether
NGOs constitute an acceptable extension of state capacity. As presently constituted the Zimbabwean state appears ill-adapted to such a dispensation. A future state may find value in nurturing collaboration and partnerships (see Nyangoro 1999; Abrahamsen 2000) making the experiences from Mutare and Seke/Manyame instructive. Additional research work is however needed to analyze how state-NGO relations have evolved in the last seven years where the Zimbabwean crisis has deepened. The framework presented in this thesis is useful in exploring this question.

7.4. Planning, planners and plans: rethinking decentralisation

In sections 5.2 and 5.3, I engaged with the subject of planning and observed that the units of planning, the planners and development facilitation are many, which broadens spaces for participation but also overlapping. I gave examples of interventions based on chieftainships while others follow administrative boundaries like the Ward. In some instances, this creates inequities in resource deployment and confusion in terms of planning cycles in part a direct consequence of the complex taxonomy of planners. I also noted that the myriad planning processes and products are often not appropriately collated at District level. This is a point discussed above in regard to the challenges of coordinating multi-stakeholder processes where streams of resources are at once varied and non-local in the main. In the relevant sections of Chapter 5 I acknowledged the benefits and provided the rationale for how and why so many planners exist. I also shared my thoughts on why communities participate in such seemingly confusing processes.

Using evidence from the study I was able to construct the bases upon which development plans are arrived at (Figure 3) and presented the main challenge as one of the process not the content or priorities for development. The process relates to the quality and availability of planning information, collation of and comparison of available plans and synchronization of different planning approaches. Process weaknesses arise in part from the absence of a distinct anchor institution. While for the purpose of clarity in the thesis Council was chosen as the anchor institution this is not always the case in reality. As noted, District development coordination functions in Zambia and Zimbabwe are contested for practical and policy reasons. Outside organisations coming to work in Districts either ignore divisions or side with one or the other between central and local government. To receive whatever is available
District actors accept interventions and progressively influence interactions along the way. Capacity building programmes in both Zambia and Zimbabwe have not resolved this (coordination) challenge. This explains why central government and Councils plan for/with and service the same communities at times in parallel. While central government screams duplication in relation to NGO activity, the inter-governmental overlaps are the most apparent and perhaps this is where any institutional re-arrangements for enhancing participation may need to start.

One of the findings of the study relates to the doubling up of implementation and policy-making roles on the part of Councilors and Members of Parliament in Zimbabwe. Policy-making and implementation are not here viewed as solid and unrelated boxes. The role of Councilors in policy-making and monitoring often takes a back seat once they get involved in direct implementation of activities. For Councils, the situation is compounded by lack of sub-District staff to perform functions that end up being performed by Councilors. For MPs, it relates to the pressure to deliver electoral promises directly. In a way, this reflects a faltering governmental delivery system. As MPs deliver services through projects, they simultaneously subvert the national and local planning and implementation process. An example of subverting implementation processes is where an MP ends up supervising Ministry staff often creating an uncomfortable situation for the staff member concerned and distorting the concerned Ministry's personnel management hierarchy. Relatedly, direct delivery to the electorate sustains political patronage and diminishes citizens' right to expect particular governmental services irrespective of the type of MP they have. To sustain such a situation results in governmental decay. Two things also tend to occur. One is conflation of the party and government if the MP belongs to the ruling party and the other is field conflict between MPs and government where the MP is in opposition.

Councils are generally not evaluated on the basis of actual plans (outputs, outcomes and impact). In any District or Council area there is always a myriad of development organisations often operating in the absence of comprehensive or District-wide plans. The nature and level of plans is a key issue. Should the plans be anything above the local level in terms of both the ideas and the resources for implementing them? The community and planners helping them rarely separate those local needs that are for
local implementation using local resources from those that require external inputs and need external imperatives. There is a general conflation of these two borne out of an era when considerable resources were available (Zimbabwe) and perpetuated by existing externally-funded programmes (Zambia). Community responsibilities for their own plans in terms of institutions, resources and actions are inadequately articulated and developed. That it is inoperable and undesirable to leave the poor to their own devices (Berner and Phillips 2005; Chambers 1989) is not the same as proceeding to the other extreme of doing everything for the community. It becomes a question of balance between subsidies (level and form) and community self-respect (Kar 2003) bearing in mind limitations of the project (see Illich 1997).

There are limitations in terms of decentralised monitoring of plans in the two countries, which results from challenges with human resources, communication infrastructure and local institutional capabilities. Councilors are unable to service their Wards in both countries because they lack resources. Except for Ward 7 Seke/Manyame they do not have supportive structures to aid Ward administration. Public transport and communication infrastructure facilities are unreliable and generally inaccessible in most parts of the study Districts. As such, the prospects for improving planning and coordination of development in the study Districts remain weak. The debate on decentralisation and experiences in the two countries do not present immediate solutions to these challenges. Inter-governmental role assignment remains entangled making relations with other stakeholders difficult to smoothen. The pursuit of decentralisation policy frameworks has achieved basic institutional set ups in the two countries. However, resolution of the challenges discussed in this thesis requires other frameworks.

I acknowledge the importance of the need to untangle inter-governmental overlaps to reduce resource inefficiencies. This is one of the central outcomes of decentralisation. However, PRSPs and MDGs, among others, have provided a fresh impetus to the decentralisation debate (UNCDF 2006) as have ideas around the constitutionalisation of local government (see Aslop and Kurey 2005). The growing importance of partnerships within and across national spaces, international protocols and other core globalizing forces and processes (ICT particularly) shape decentralisation processes differently. This is because the nation state is no longer the exclusive source of
impetus, resources and ideas about social and political organisation and the sustenance of local organisations. One lesson for decentralisers that this present study has drawn is that local embeddedness of local governments rather than exclusive dependence on resource and role transfer from central government is attaining greater importance. Locally-resourced growth and horizontal partnerships are more critical than the legislative bases upon which most decentralisation programmes have proceeded. The law’s inadequacies (see McGee et al. 2003) and experiences from Zimbabwe where the law can be whimsically altered and applied by the state further reflects the importance of non-legal or social mobilisation bases for decentralisation.

UN Habitat (2005) highlights that governmental budget deficits are a critical aspect affecting the nature and process of decentralisation. Let us call this ‘resource stress’. Recourse to non-traditional funding sources and alternative approaches (in this case in housing finance) provide alternative impetus for decentralisation and a way around the resource stress. Zimbabwe’s multi-faceted crisis has thrust a lot of its citizens (corporate and individual) into informality and at times illegality. Some roles being undertaken by non-state development organisations are hitherto public sector responsibilities. As such, this study shows that decentralisation and by extension participation are not simply about policies and practices enunciated and followed through by conscious and capable governments but can be regularisations of lived realities. In Zimbabwe, the realities are as much a product of state stress and incapacity as they are of citizens’ adaptations to the ongoing crisis. Planning, Planners and Plans are therefore evolving from multi-stakeholder platforms that are not ordinarily defined in a traditional decentralisation script or legislation. It is therefore important to revisit the debate on decentralisation in the light of some of the findings of this study particularly in relation to people’s agency and new forms of organisational interaction (see Narayan 2005). The entrance of War Veterans onto the political and traditional institutional scene particularly structured through ‘Jambanja’, (a form of violent informality regarding access and control of development processes and spaces) raises more questions. This phenomenon requires further elaboration and research.
7.5 Party infrastructure and traditional governance systems

Available institutional structures are largely dominated by the political party. Ruling parties have had an enduring effect on local governance in the two countries since independence retaining far-reaching influence over rural and urban governance. Policy-making, interpretation and implementation generally oscillate between the party and government to the exclusion of ordinary citizens including those within the ruling parties. At independence, Zimbabwe used Local Government Promotion Officers to regularize party into local government structures. During the one-party-state era, the Kaunda Government in Zambia made similar partisan changes. The political polarization in Zimbabwe is largely evidenced by the ruling party’s equating of the state and ZANU PF, which explains the capture of most local governance institutions as party infrastructure. Making local governance institutions partisan is destroying professionalism amongst policy makers and community leaders. Box 13 captures some of these aspects at a national level. The capture of traditional leaders (see CPIA 2005), which has a pre-independence history, is causing institutional disharmony. This increases use of local governance structures more as mechanisms for controlling local dissent (see Gasper 1997) than facilitating democratic development.

However, traditional leaders are implementing relevant social programmes e.g. in HIV and AIDS in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. The institution of traditional leader is not integrated in modern local governance and thus the fortifying role that Ray et al (1997) refer to does not occur in that many places across Africa (see Vaughan 2005). The involvement of the Asante (Ghana) where they are implementing education programmes is perhaps one of limited examples (UNECA 2005). The study raised questions about the institutional sustainability of how Zimbabwe has integrated the

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Box 13: Seeing ZANU PF and Government?

'...ZANU PF and Government have the habit of creating chaos and then turning around to present themselves as gallant knights in shining amour, coming to the help of the defenseless, poor and victimized. It is abhorrent that anyone, claiming to represent or act in the interests of the public could consider rendering as many as a million people homeless in the middle of biting winter weather...The government should not delight in the suffering of people when it does not have a ready made alternative for them...The Government and the City Council [of Harare] are demonstrating that they do not care about visiting more hardships on the people for which they have failed to create jobs and housing'.


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institution in local governance. In addition, questions about de-partying local governance, defining the extent of central government’s reach and obviating distortions to horizontal relations without precluding Governmental regulation become important. The study provides no answers but recommends additional exploration. Zambia’s experience sheds different light as government has retained some distance from traditional leaders. The proposed ADCs are attempting to ‘keep Chiefs in their palaces’. A broader study to explore what a headman in Mutare District referred to as their role in reining in Councilors may be needed. The revelation suggests that traditional leaders can contribute to making local governance institutions responsive and accountable. How other actors are able to do the same for the traditional institutions becomes critical. Whether local governments are safe and accessible in the exclusive hands of political parties remains a key question. I am mindful of the implications of such a question on establishing and managing national governments but emphasize that the national level was not my research concern.

7.6 Tame or thin? Reflecting on institutional jungles

While in Zambia new institutions in the form of ADCs are being installed in rural local governance (since 1993), in Zimbabwe no such major institutional insertions are under-way. There is also no evidence that existing local institutions await removal. Gasper (1997) also cautions that not everything can be tidied up into non-overlapping blocks. This is because institutions and the spaces they exist in are at once separate and overlapping or integrated i.e. what I referred to as ‘overlapping separateness’. This is not to discount what Ayittey, commenting on similar issues, considers ‘...utter institutional chaos and misgovernance’ (2005:21). The points above form the bases upon which this sub-section and the rest of the thesis has proceeded i.e. working with what is evolving (Zambia) and what already exists (Zimbabwe). Having problematised the local institutional terrain as dense and under-funded, it appears somewhat a climb-down to assert that it is unlikely that the ‘forest’ will be thinned.

No radical changes in structures are evident in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. This acknowledgement is based on the analysis of literature and primary data. However, questions were raised in relation to the definition of the anchor institution. What become essential are the criteria for selecting the anchor institution and defining how institutions can enhance responsiveness to popular aspirations. This is the process I
generally refer to as taming institutions including ensuring role clarity to reduce 
avoidable duplication. The *taming* of the institutional forest at sub-national level 
requires local input and capacity strengthening. However, in Zimbabwe the impetus to 
create thick institutional ‘forests’ at local and national levels comes more from 
national than local processes.

The study demonstrates that a sustained bottom-up articulation of the counter-
productiveness of untamed ‘institutional forests’ is critical in Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Councils can be the rallying point for such articulation but this has its limitations 
arising from the options available to central government particularly in establishing 
and inserting other institutions or re-assigning functions with minimum to no local 
oversight as grassroots capacities may not exist to perform such a role. However, 
anchoring all local institutional management in Councils may result in power monopolization. If Councils are politically controlled by the opposition, there will be 
a greater likelihood of heightened centre-local tensions. What is important is that 
taming institutions as much as is possible should be from local (public) resources 
considering the limitations of approaches funded from outside. In any event, it is 
important that governments in both countries and elsewhere should devote attention to 
sustaining local development organisations more meaningfully than what current 
evidence suggests. Councils’ articulation of decentralisation issues tends to be selfish 
as it excludes the interests of other local governance institutions. In Zimbabwe, the 
lobbying for recognition by traditional leaders has benefited from such exclusionary 
Council tactics. Traditional leaders approached government as marginalized entities. 
The divide and rule tactics used by central government, itself a pre-independence 
strategy, has sustained such a ‘silo mentality’ amongst local organisations. Again, 
Ayittey’s (2005) observation is useful as he notes that the ruling African elite 
generally is averse to implement real institutional reform and that such refusal 
produces un-ending crises.

Taming local institutions may allow for easier institutionalisation of participatory 
development. Users (communities) become more acquainted with organisations that 
exist for longer doing real activities rather than an environment where key players 
keep changing and mandates both overlap and are routinely cross-allocated from the 
centre. Frequent (and often unilateral) changes of the functions of supra-community
link institutions68 may get the community confused regarding where to go with different issues. Changes at this level also create new momentum through setting incessant impetus to change or introduce new (more/different) local organisational structures. The latter may occur because each outside development organisation feels its activities cannot be held prisoner to the existing confused and weak institutional arrangements and thus proceeds to create ‘special local committees’ to oversee its activities or special link/contact points. In Zimbabwe, a number of arguments were given to justify changing the early version of the VIDCO to the Village Assembly with its new context. However, there are good things that were lost in the process particularly popular accountability of elected members, which is something the Zambian ADCs seek to build upon.

As Ferguson (1994) puts it in reference to the World Bank’s description of Lesotho, some presentations constitute a rearranging of reality to fit a specific policy decision or to justify actions to be taken. This applies in a lot of ways to central government’s (in Zimbabwe and Zambia) definition of local government as lacking capacity. Between 1980 and 1996 in Zimbabwe, ‘local government weaknesses’ appear to have been articulated for two reasons. One was to justify continued central government direct service delivery (through line Ministries). This justification was evidence-based, as the colonial government had not only neglected communal areas from a service delivery perspective but also in terms of institutional capacity development. The second justification was aligned to raising resources principally from donors for capacity building of the local authorities (both urban and rural). The first reason also applies to the 2001 and later period. The post-2001 period has been associated with dwindling state resources (own and from donors) available for development activities. The limited resources are being allocated centrally. Since 2001, the need for government to be visible vis-à-vis NGOs has also come into play. In other words the weaknesses of local development institutions, while undeniable, need to be problematised in ways that explore the power dynamics inherent in such characterizations. Based on the study, Councils in Zimbabwe are not necessarily as hopeless as central pronouncements seem to suggest, which lends credence to the ARDCZ’s argument that government uses ‘proof by selected instances’ since only a

68 This is particularly the case with Government Sector Ministries in Zimbabwe.
few erring Councils seem to be used to justify what ARDCZ considers to be centralistic tendencies. Power relations thus constrain the taming and thinning of local institutional arrangements although rational (non-political) reasons are often offered.

7.7 Poor people’s agency

Poor people’s agency, discussed by Green (2000, 2002), Mapedza and Mandondo (2002), Kamete (2002) and Stiefel and Wolfe (1994), among others, is evident amongst the Zimbabwean and Zambian study communities. However the efforts of the communities exist in a stressed environment owing to harsh socio-economic circumstances (in both countries), physical isolation for some of the Kasempa communities, political polarization (Zimbabwe) and a generally unresponsive public sector. Feltoe (2006) highlights the myriad legal hurdles ordinary people and associations have to surmount to raise concerns with public institutions. To respond to Narayan et al.’s (2000) question, it appears no one can hear the poor. The low levels of responsiveness are particularly evidenced by weak accountability cultures amongst the study Councils. People’s agency is pursued through local groups, NGO-facilitated interventions and the social animation efforts of Councilors and traditional leaders.

People are also not passive in their interaction with the various groups of animators as shown in Ward 18 Seke/Manyame and in Mutare where either through writing letters of complaint or speaking at meetings they raise objections to the way their development is governed and seek redress. They also act with their traditional leaders to hold Councilors accountable and link up with national level actors to secure benefits as well as make representations on pertinent issues. Evidence from Mutare suggests that communities can manipulate development organisations to maximize benefits or accentuate inter-organisational conflicts if that increases benefits. This is another way in which their agency and socio-political power is deployed. Apart from wielding and using their power in their interactions with development organisations local people use song and dance at meetings to influence decision-making. Locals’ skills are however not effectively mobilised. Volunteering to offer services as in the case of HIV and AIDS interventions in both countries, SMOGs and CWACs in Zambia constitute other ways of showing agency in the study Districts. Outside interventions and assistance add value to people’s processes but in some cases disrupt local momenta through holding meetings too often, introducing interventions that do
not get finished on time, delay in meeting project obligations and using approaches and entry methods that are disruptive of community rhythms. The study therefore established that people's agency is alive and robust despite stressful contexts.

7.8 Empowering local policy-makers

The roles of Councilors tend to be restricted to information dissemination and mobilization rather than developing the overall frameworks within which organisational plans will evolve. In other words, for as long as policy-makers are ‘seeking and bringing projects’ and mobilizing people to take part in ‘available projects’ the policy-making role remains under-developed. The planning process and the resulting plans will be more external than internal. Because physical projects are not the only spaces for facilitating development, Councils cannot use lack of resources to deliver projects as an excuse for not ‘doing development’. Facilitating planning and implementation are contributions Councils can make to local development based on locally available resources. Where Councils demonstrate value to other development organisations they will become more able to guide development even without direct material input.

Zimbabwean Councils do not have joint sessions with Parliamentarians (Members of Parliament or MPs) in their areas. What tends to happen is that Parliamentarians assume a supervisory role and in cases where Councilors and MPs are from the same political party the structures and relationships in the party take precedence. Operational challenges also make it difficult for these two policy-making spheres to interface. However, this separateness often reduces opportunities for integrated policy-making while also limiting the influence of local policy-spheres on national policy-making. Whether policy-makers should bring projects to communities is not that important here. However, they should generally enhance popular understanding of policy-makers’ roles which may benefit from more effective interface between Councilors and MPs. This may act to deepen the control of the local policy-sphere, which is currently not locally entrenched while grounding and making the national policy-sphere both accountable and accessible to the local space.

The work done by Nugent (2004) and Mbembe (2001), among others, reflects how traditional leaders in Africa were used to manage the native question and to quell
political feuding by colonial administrators. These ‘uses’ of traditional authority have been continued by post-independence administrations in Africa with an essential slant towards extending central government control. The desirability of traditional leaders in local governance has received some treatment (Ray et al 1997) but practical realities throw up mixed reactions. In Zimbabwe the perceived partisan nature of government’s use of traditional leaders and the better remuneration they receive compared to Councilors for instance acts more to destabilize than empower local governance institutions (see CPIA 2005). For Zambia, the perception that the use of traditional leaders may obstruct the evolution of local democratic traditions has left the majority in their palaces while others like Chief Kasempa run visible programmes.

The law is important in terms of making provisions for people’s active and formal participation in the development processes. However, practical realities are often at variance with the letter and spirit of the law. Governments (in Zambia and Zimbabwe) issue policy directives, and develop and implement programmes, which define new roles for both government and Councils without necessarily changing the local governance laws. Underpinning societal values, democratic traditions and capacities play a more critical role in determining whether participation occurs or not. While on the one hand Councils contend that central government interferes in their operations they surprisingly do not create opportunities for citizens to participate in Council operations. This is the proverbial situation of the ‘pot calling the kettle black’.

7.9 Some proposals for improving the role of Council

‘…decentralisation and local government reform have focused on the supply side of formal systems and not on strengthening the demand side through actions that enable citizens to effectively use the space created by new rules and regulations…In general there has been insufficient attention to the relationship between citizens and local governments, and there are very few cases of investment in strengthening poor people’s organisations…so that they can effectively play the new roles assigned to them’ (Narayan 2005:13).

The above quote captures the main purpose of this section, which is to respond to the anxiety posed in section 4.5.1 about demonstrating value to institutions, which researchers study. I discuss ways in which the role of Councils may be improved in the two countries. The study suggests that governmental institutions at the sub-national level have considerable challenges in terms of facilitating participation.
Government is generally seen as the ‘black sheep’ in the family of development institutions. While acknowledging that the responses to the questionnaire were not differentiated by specific governmental organisation, the point remains that the perception that government is not doing enough permeates state-society relations in Zimbabwe and Zambia. A number of points can be raised to explain this situation. One is that because of government’s complex and multi-layered nature it is too easy to blame it for everything not going well. The other is that respondents and key informants were comparing governments against previous performance generally viewed positively. It is also important to acknowledge the role played by unrealistic independence expectations and election-time promises in creating high (and perhaps difficult to meet) expectations. The promises are also often made without proper assignment of responsibilities. This creates a ‘Father Christmas’ image.

As noted in this Chapter, the materialisation of development has also accentuated viewing government as under-performing despite government playing other roles. At the same time, Councils have not played their existing and potential roles in development facilitation innovatively enough. I return to this latter point but first let me engage with how else government can be seen, which may underpin more people-led and grounded development in the two countries. Central government at the District and sub-District levels is an employer of professional staff, which can be better utilized. This is despite the fact that numbers, performance, commitment/motivation and skills utilization especially within local authority areas may be inadequate. Although there are always questions about the quality of planning, its responsiveness, and the quality, timing and extent of people’s participation government is undeniably an important service provider, provides policy-making platforms and tries to provide for policy clarity. In both countries, these roles are considered evident and their performance reasonably effective. Evidence includes the presence of civil servants within reach of the remotest village or villager.

However, the study noted areas where people’s participation in policy making and the skills/performance of policy-makers is far from desirable for the institutionalisation of participatory development. As a host and coordinator of multi-stakeholder processes, programmes/projects and structures and a node for connections to the outside world, central government plays a critical function. In these areas questions about quality and
reliability of communication, performance of support functions towards non-state and state structures at District level, and effectiveness of resource deployment mechanisms, need to be asked and answered. What can be asserted though is that government plays an important role despite these questions. Councils can do a lot to complement central government by facilitating the answering of these questions in ways that are relevant to local areas. This brings me to the roles that Councils may do well to play if participatory development in Zimbabwe is to take root considering the acknowledgement above (that thinning of institutional actors is not in the offing).

A number of local government roles can be identified based on the findings. One is in relation to monitoring the provision of services by other development organisations in Council areas including funding the joint spaces where planning takes place. For government the implication may be giving up District development coordination including the holding of the necessary resources. The development organisations, which Councils will monitor, include central government departments and NGOs. In all three study Districts, this is a Council role that is inadequately articulated and performed. As for government, the local government monitoring role appears to be assigned to the central government representatives (DC or DA). The challenges that the DCs and DAs have in holding central government organisations accountable and ensuring that their work is effective means they cannot perform this function. Head offices of line Ministries often appear far removed from the grassroots to be able to monitor their field organisations and on their part field staff resent being held accountable by ‘bare-foot politicians’ (Councilors mainly but also traditional institutions, DCs and DAs). For non-governmental organisations, self-regulation mechanisms are inadequately developed leaving a considerable gap that Councils may do well to plug. Implications for Councils include placing staff at the sub-District level strategically to perform the monitoring role (and enablement function below). That Zimbabwe’s RDC is the basic unit of devolved authority with Ward and Village structures lacking corporate status (Makumbe 1998) makes emplacement of Council staff below the District is critical.

The other role relates to actual service provision. This research established that Councils have limitations in this regard. Resource limitations constrain performance particularly where development is exclusively about things to be delivered. Mutare
RDC's linking of levy payment to actual service provision may raise popular appreciation of Council roles and increase revenue flows if complemented by other development organisations. Where other development organisations place importance to Council revenue generation and help communicate positive messages about Council, trust building between Councils and citizens is bound to grow compared to situations where other development organisations speak ill of Councils in the course of their work. For Councils this implies opening up to other development organisations to enable the organisations to offer informed trust-building support.

A third role is with regards to facilitating others' service provision: enablement. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, Government will always have national programmes implemented within District spaces and for the foreseeable future remain unable to increase grants to Councils. Councils need to acknowledge this reality and begin to realign themselves to regulate government service provision in their areas. The Herald of July 28th 2007 quotes the Zimbabwe President as urging Councils to be aggressive to ensure that Ministers (and Ministries) deliver services to the people. Because the delivery of national programmes is through de-concentrated central government (field administration), Councils have a key role to play. Councils can facilitate access to such services, influence the manner in which such services are delivered, set and ensure adherence to local standards, policies and delivery mechanisms and generally articulate demand for specific services (agenda-setting). Enablement covers providing and updating planning and other data, community mobilisation, building local organisational capacities (e.g. Assemblies in Zimbabwe, ADCs in Zambia) and providing services to development organisations (e.g. accommodating development organisations).

Some Council roles discussed above are defined in existing legislation and some are being performed. However, I emphasize the opportunities, which in my view are currently not being maximized. Councils need to go beyond these nominal stipulations to define ways of working that at once redefine relations, unlock collaborative potential and enable articulation of relevant development agendas. Enablement will also entail assisting with operational resources where needed. This is already happening owing to under-funding of government departments but on a limited basis dependent more on personal relations than as part of Council mandate.
The discourse on decentralisation has tended to focus on the legislated transfer of functions from central to local government. It has invariably ignored functions that local government bodies are able to develop and attract from other development organisations including non-governmental organisations. Articulating the spheres of governance based on a clear division of functions between the centre and the local should not be premised on a static interpretation of statutes. One function defined in a static way relates to central government’s monitoring of the local sphere. In Zambia and Zimbabwe the presence of de-concentrated government within local government areas, which are inadequately monitored and supported presents a role for Councils as service provider to and facilitator of the central government departments. If central government is unable or unwilling to effect meaningful fiscal decentralisation (Ndegwa et al 2003; Conyers 2002) then central government ought to be held accountable for the delivery of programmes by Councils.

The service provision to, and monitoring and facilitation of central government departments can be extended to Parastatals, NGOs and the private sector as already stated above under enablement. This places a premium on responsibilities and functions for local government bodies hitherto latent at least in Zambia and Zimbabwe. These are functions relating to ‘enabling others’: provision of information to their constituencies to help them access available organisational services, attracting development organisations to their areas, servicing the information and other needs and developing critical policies within which development organisations operate to the best advantage of local populations. This includes developing and sharing coherent visions for development, brokering organisational linkages, and setting and ensuring adherence to minimum service-delivery standards. The standards could be in terms of community entry and exit, minimum service thresholds, programme management or organisation-community interface and community contributions.

The points made above relate to critical functions for the institutionalisation of participatory development. In both Zambia and Zimbabwe the functions are inadequately performed. Performing these functions will be complementary to traditionally defined Council roles. As stated elsewhere in this chapter these are ideas
that challenge the way decentralisation has been perceived hitherto i.e. as a mere governmental structuring framework.

7.10. Conclusion

The study explored some of the basic shakiness of the post-colonial Zimbabwean state (see Raftopoulos and Savage 2004, CPIA 2005, Prankhurst 2002; Nyangoro 1999; Carmody and Taylor 2003; Dixon 2002; Bond and Manyanya 2003), its uneven decentralisation (Brand 1991; Conyers 2003) and thus shallowness of its democratic processes, which affect participation and development. Some of the challenges that the Zimbabwean state and its structures face are prevalent elsewhere in Africa (see Ayittey 2005; Vaughan 2005; Calderisi 2006). State and non-state development organisations seat uneasily together to think and do development. Narratives about institutional relevance and irrelevance, renewal and obsoleteness, legitimacy and illegitimacy are generally informed by the development paradigm from the ESAP to post-ESAP particularly as these paradigms have featured changes in the role as well as resource endowment of the central state. The shift from command economy through the early 1990s, to market-based reforms, which were unsuccessful for a number of reasons back to a command economy since the late 1990s has created serious policy and practice aches and pains. This is because the re-introduction of state-led development processes is occurring amidst resistance from civil society and business, who consider it undesirable to close policy spaces opened up during the early days of ESAP and anchored in democratisation processes that swept the country and continent thereafter (see Enemuo 2000; Olowu 2000; Pankhurst 2002; Carmody and Taylor 2003). In addition, the state does not have adequate resources to return to its ‘fiscal populism’ of the 1980s (Davies and Rattso 2000).

Overall, answering the research question was a rewarding while challenging process. There were tensions in terms of using the evidence that I got, limited as it was in the fast-changing Zimbabwean environment. To give an example, inflation was 624% in January of 2004, dropped to below 120% by year-end but by July 2007 the issuing of official inflation figures had been stopped as the rate had breached 7000%. Some of my findings are therefore only good at the level of principles. Council budgets for instance have become meaningless and local revenue collection is now purely for institutional maintenance not facilitating any form of participatory development.
Another tension related to balancing evidence with my own lived experiences and my 'Zimbabweanness' as it relates to interpretation of events and articulating aspirations on the subject area for the research. Early versions of my thesis reflected this tension more clearly. I have not removed the 'Zimbabweanness' and the self from the way I have written the thesis as I consider these as important strengths. But some of the frustrations with the deteriorating situation may be evident for instance in the methodology Chapter.

In Box 12 I presented the main factors that I found as critical to answering the research question. In a lot of ways my thesis has attempted to define and explain the local governance crisis in Zimbabwe without hiding the commendable traditions of grassroots participation and inter-organisational interaction. My concern is that the weakening of local institutional interaction is destroying these sound traditions which are for participation. In their local groups and as volunteers ordinary people seem to reasonably control the spaces and interactions they are in. However, this slows to a trickle as the levels shift upwards (Figure 1) whether this participation in direct, representative or stakeholder facilitated spaces. In questioning the usefulness of decentralisation to Zimbabwe's local governance crisis, I have sought to flag the importance of inter-organisational interactions and addressing constraints to collaboration rather than uncritically accept, let alone hope, that more decentralisation will be a panacea to the institutional stress.

I have identified areas that need further work. These include state-NGO relations, particularly how to improve the policy and programmatic comfort of Government where it indirectly controls development spaces, horizontal relations between traditional leaders and other local power centres, dealing with the political party in local governance and the 'silo mentality' amongst local governance institutions that promotes vertical alignment ahead of horizontal relevance. With respect to state-NGO relations, what is critical to assess will be the effect of state capacity on the relations, funding models for non-state development organisations and the effect of state relations with the outside world on NGOs. This has to be explored in a context where citizens' trust of public institutions is low and local development organisations or spaces are starved of strategic support from the national level. The assertion by Hall
(1995) and other commentators that NGOs are not always the best builders of civil society may also need interrogation in the Zimbabwean context where community-capacity building efforts sometimes resulting in full-fledged CBOs has taken place. Anheier (2004) and Ackerman (2004) raise pertinent issues regarding the participation of social actors in sectors or activities generally regarded the preserve of the state. Their work may be instructive in exploring the research issues posed above.

Characterisations of the notion of ‘elite capture’ invoke an individualised cooption of influential people (see Essof 2005) or those with resources continuing to access public goods and services ahead of the poor. In Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa, the cooption of a whole institution of traditional leaders raises different questions pertinent to local governance. Because the central state is the patron, national government changes expose the local institution and fundamentally destabilises local relations. Some further work may be needed to avoid the stop-start integration of traditional institutions in local governance that the ZANU PF government has implemented since 1980. The phenomenon of Zimbabweans in Diaspora, from the perspective of participation in the country’s development processes raises additional unanswered questions as the study looked at ‘residents in situ’. Given their growing importance in terms of sustaining livelihoods and supplying ‘development visions’ back home, it is imperative to explore how this reconfigures participation. In a post-crisis Zimbabwe, some may return while other Diasporans will remain abroad and continue to have ‘offsite’ influence on development and policy-making.

The work that Gaventa (2005) and Cornwall (2000, 2002), as well as others at IDS focusing on methods (see Brock and Pettit 2007), reflects an increasingly interesting area of study regarding spaces, levels and forms of power on the one hand and methods for participatory development on the other. The question of state and NGO interface as posed above may benefit from an analytical framework that combines these perspectives. I suggest that anchoring analyses on what actually happens in the spaces in terms of organisational interaction, observing and documenting the forms and effect of interaction and its role in advancing organisational and ordinary people’s participation (as defined in this study) is critical. This will extend our understanding of how it all works or in most cases why it fails to work.
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8.1. List of Grey Literature Reviewed

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2. Minutes of an AIDS Action Committee Meeting; Mutare District AIDS Action Committee (2004).
4. CADEC Annual Reports for 2004-5.
6. Reminder on the submission of monthly returns for ongoing Rural Development Fund (RDF) funded projects, and speedy and complete response on Audit observations; Government of Zimbabwe (Ministry of Rural Resources...2003), REF RD1/5.
16. RDDC Minutes of Meeting Number 3 of 2003; Mutare RDC (2003).
17. RDDC Minutes of Meeting Number 9 of 2003; Manyame RDC (2003).
19. Rural Development Fund (RDF) projects; Manyame RDC (not dated).
### ANNEX 1: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS/INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution name &amp; type</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cheelo (Mr.)</td>
<td>DPPH, Gvt, Zambia</td>
<td>Planner, North Western Province-NWP.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Chibwe (Mr.)</td>
<td>Kasempa Council, Zambia</td>
<td>Director of Works.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chigidi (Mrs.)</td>
<td>DA’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>DA, Seke/Manyame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chigovera (Mr.)</td>
<td>DDF, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>District Head, Mutare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chikukwa (Mr.)</td>
<td>AREF, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>District AREF Head, Mutare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Chinaka (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>CEO, Mutare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Chivavya (Mr.)</td>
<td>DA’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>CEO, Seke/Manyame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Guta (Mrs.)</td>
<td>Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Treasurer, Mutare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Humure (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Treasurist, Mutare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Jafirisi (Mr.)</td>
<td>Veterinary Services, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Veterinary Assistant, Mutare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kambizi (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council, Ward 7, Mutare</td>
<td>Councilor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Kizeza (Mr.)</td>
<td>DC’s Office, Zambia</td>
<td>DC, Kasempa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Kupakuwana (Mr.)</td>
<td>Min. of Local, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Assistant PA, Mash East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Kuora (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council, Ward 18, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Councilor Seke/Manyame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Kuwanda (Mr.)</td>
<td>Min. of Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Under-Secretary (Rural Councils) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>from mid 2005, Director in Min. of Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resources and Infrastructure Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Maambira (Mr.)</td>
<td>CADEC, NGO, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Programme Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Machaka (Mr.)</td>
<td>Plan International, NGO, Zim-bwe</td>
<td>Programme Manager.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Mafaririka (Mr.)</td>
<td>Ward 16, Mutare, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Headman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Majaka (Mr.)</td>
<td>PLGH, Zambia</td>
<td>Officer, North Western Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Makoni (Mr.)</td>
<td>DA’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>DA Buhera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Malichi (Mr.)</td>
<td>FODEP, NGO, Zambia</td>
<td>A/Provincial Secretary, NWP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Mapoche (Mr.)</td>
<td>AREF, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Officer, Taga (Seke/Manyame).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Maponde (Mr/Mrs.)</td>
<td>Ward 16, Mutare, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Farmers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Matema (Mr.)</td>
<td>Veterinary Services, Gvt, Zim-bwe</td>
<td>Veterinary Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Matsinde (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>CEO Buhera RDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Maumbe (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council Ward 7, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Councilor, Seke/Manyame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Mauye (Mrs.)</td>
<td>SNV, Zambia</td>
<td>Coordinator, North Western Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Mbolela (Mr.)</td>
<td>LGA-Zambia.</td>
<td>General Secretary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Mpingo (Mr.)</td>
<td>Min. of Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary (Rural Councils).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Mtewta (Mr.)</td>
<td>AREF, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Supervisor, Marange (Mutare).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Mubaira (Mrs.)</td>
<td>DA’s Office, Gvt</td>
<td>Assistant DA Seke/Manyame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Mukelabai (Mr.)</td>
<td>SNV, Zambia</td>
<td>Advisor, North Western Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Mukwaira (Mr.)</td>
<td>Min. of Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary (Traditional Leaders).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Mulafulafu (Mr.)</td>
<td>CCJP, NGO, Zambia</td>
<td>Executive Secretary/Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Mubaiwa (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Council Chairman, Seke/Manyame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Mutseka (Mr.)</td>
<td>DA’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>DA, Mutare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Mutsindikwa (Mr.)</td>
<td>Min. of Youth Development</td>
<td>Ward Coordinator (Zimbabwe).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Nabanda (Mr.)</td>
<td>CCJP, NGO, Zambia</td>
<td>Coordinator, North Western Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Ndlovu (Mr.)</td>
<td>Association of RDCs, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Programme Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Nyamande (Mrs.)</td>
<td>Ward 15, Seke/Manyame</td>
<td>Farmer and AIDS activist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Salimu (Mr.)</td>
<td>ZAMSIF</td>
<td>Manager, North Western Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Simoono (Mr.)</td>
<td>PLGH, Gvt, Zambia</td>
<td>Auditor, North Western Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Siyang (Ms.)</td>
<td>Women for Change, NGO, Zambia</td>
<td>Acting Executive Director.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Tshumasi (Mr.)</td>
<td>Kasempa Business Association</td>
<td>Chairman (Zambia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. van Arkel (Miss)</td>
<td>SNV, Zambia</td>
<td>Advisor, North Western Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. van der Drift (Dr.)</td>
<td>SNV, Zambia</td>
<td>Advisor, Lusaka/National.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Zvauya (Mr.)</td>
<td>Min. of Health, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Environmental Health Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Zvirevo (Mr.)</td>
<td>Council, Ward 16, Mutare</td>
<td>Village Head’s son.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Zvirevo (Mr.)</td>
<td>AREF, Gvt, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>AREF Officer, Marange.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

69 Met on February 8th 2005 together with the Council Secretary and the Deputy Council Planner. Subsequently Mr. Chibwe was contacted via phone to follow-up relevant aspects of the study.

70 Met separately on February 8th 2005 and later he facilitated/participated in a full DDCC meeting where I met at least 12 other District Officials and learnt about the institution (DDCC).
ANNEX 2: RESEARCH TOOLS/INSTRUMENTS

Annex 2.1: Household Questionnaire

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE.

NB 1. The questionnaire focused on groups and community level organisations, Village and Ward governance processes and institutions for people’s participation in development.

2. In all settings the questionnaire was administered to individual households (defined as groups of people who ordinarily live, prepare meals and eat together). Where more than one distinguishable household share a homestead only one household was interviewed and respondents were principally household heads or their spouses.

Household ID;____________________________________
Date of Interview;________________________________
Name of Interviewer/Enumerator;____________________
Province;________________________________________
District;_________________ Ward;_________________
Village;__________________________________________

Section A: General

1. Name of Respondent;_________________________________________

2. Gender of Respondent; 1. Male 2. Female.

3. Age of respondent; ________years.

4. Position in Household; 1. Head. 2. Spouse. 3. Other _______

5. Length of time staying in Community;
   1. 0 to 12 months. 2. 13-24 months. 3. 25-36 months. 4. 37-48 months.
   5. Less than 5 years. 6. More than 5 years.

6. Household structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to Head</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender 1 M, 2 F.</th>
<th>Main Occup 2.</th>
<th>Empl Stat 3.</th>
<th>Level of Education 4.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Are there any children of school-going age in your household?
   1. Yes 2. No.

8. Do they go to school? 1. Yes. 2. No. If yes how far is the school ______ kilometers?

Section B: Local Level Organisations.

9. List the local level organisations or groups that exist in your community and the reasons why people join them or participate in them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of group.</th>
<th>Type (religious etc see below).</th>
<th>Main activities or why people join them.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Which of the organisations are you or other members of your household a participant of?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Importance to</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
<th>Whether 1. State</th>
<th>Whether 2.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71 Use the following codes 1 for head, 2 for spouse, 3 for child of head of household, 4 parent, 5 other relative, 6 servants and 7 other non relatives.

72 For main occupation use 1 for farmer, 2 trader, 3 fisherman, 4 handicraft, 5 private sector employment, 6 public sector employment and 7 other specify.

73 Use 1 for wage earner e.g. landless labourer, 2 self-employed without employees, 3 self employed with employees, 4 unpaid family worker, 5 inactive (e.g. student/retired).

74 Use 1 for none, 2 incomplete primary, 3 for complete primary, 4 for incomplete secondary, 5 for secondary completed, 6 Vocational and 7 University.
11. Give details about the two most important organisations for your household?

Name of group. | Follow-up questions.
--- | ---
1. | Why did you choose the group?
   Do you/members of your household hold positions in group?
   1. Yes.
   2. No.
   How did you join? Did you make a contribution and if so how much money did you pay? How much money do you pay monthly and/or annually? How many days in a year do you give to the group’s activities to stay a member?
   What are the main challenges for this group/institution?
   How actively do members in the group participate in making decisions in the group?
2. | Why did you choose the group?
   Do you/members of your household hold positions in group?
   1. Yes.
   2. No.
   How did you join? Did you make a contribution and if so how much money did you pay? How much money do you pay monthly and/or annually? How many days in a year do you give to the group’s activities to stay a member?
   What are the main challenges for this group/institution?
   How actively do members in the group participate in making decisions in the group?

12. What services have you accessed through these groups/organisations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group.</th>
<th>Services accessed through them (tick as appropriate).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Electricity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Do you or any members of your household take part in the management or development of the school (e.g. being member of PTA/SDC)?
   1. Yes.
   2. No.

14. If yes in what way?
   1. Providing labour at the school (e.g. brick making).
   2. Member of the PTA/SDC.
   3. Donating to the school.
   4. Other specify ____________________.

Section C: Village Governance.

15. Does your village have a Village Head?
   1. Yes.
   2. No.

16. If yes when was the current head selected/appointed? _______________
17. How were they selected/appointed?

18. What other structures are involved in managing/governing the Village?

19. Are there other outside organisations involved in running the affairs of your Village?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Activities in last 12 months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Section D: Financial Services, Agricultural Inputs and Production Support.**

20. Over the last year did you or any member of your household borrow or obtain credit or help for your activities?

1. Yes  
2. No

21. If yes indicate sources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source and Name e.g. of NGO etc.</th>
<th>Amount borrowed or of support given</th>
<th>What guarantee was required</th>
<th>Reason for borrowing</th>
<th>Was source 1. In village or 2. Outside?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends or Neighbors.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Credit Society.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Bank.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Bank.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Scheme.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Specify.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. What procedure did you use and what constraints did you face in the process?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

23. What have you or other members of your community done about the constraints?

1. Nothing.  
2. Approached the concerned organisation.  
3. Approached local Councilor, village head or other local leadership.  
4. Raised issue with Council, DA or other higher leadership.

24. Did you get agricultural input support last season?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input type</th>
<th>Source of support</th>
<th>Neighbors</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Private Company</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize seed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton seed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. What procedure did you use and what constraints did you face in the process?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

26. What have you or other members of your community done about the constraints?

2. Nothing.  
3. Approached local Councilor, village head or other local leadership.  
4. Raised issue with Council, DA or other higher leadership.

27. Did you receive agricultural production support during last season?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of support</th>
<th>Source of support</th>
<th>Neighbors</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Private Company</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft power.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work parties.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28. What are the major production constraints that you face?

29. What have you or other members of your community done about the constraints?
   3. Approached local Councilor, village head or other local leadership.
   4. Raised issue with Council, DA or other higher leadership.

**Section E: Community Projects.**

30. Are there any new projects brought into your community in the past two years?
   1. Yes.  2. No.

31. If yes describe the two most important ones;
   a. _______________________.  b. _______________________.

32. Who brought these projects into the community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Sponsor/organisation that brought project.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GoZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33. Were you/members of your household involved in the project?  1. Yes.  2. No.

34. In what way(s) were you or the local community involved?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Community involvement.</th>
<th>Community contributions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Project choice.</td>
<td>2. Location. 3. Implementation Strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. Is the community (beneficiaries) satisfied with the project?
   Explain your response; __________________________________________________________.

37. Are there any projects initiated by villagers in your community?  1. Yes.  2. No.

38. If yes describe the two most important ones;
   a. _______________________.  b. _______________________.

39. Were you/members of your household involved in the project?  1. Yes.  2. No.

40. Have these (two projects) received external support?  1. Yes.  2. No.

41. If yes indicate sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Sponsor/organisation that brought project.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GoZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Section F: Council-Community Interface and Development Planning Experiences/Processes.**

42. Do you know your Councilor’s name?  1. Yes.  2. No.  3. No Councilor now.
   If yes, what is their name? __________________________
   If do not know them why is that so? ____________________________________________.
43. How do you rate the performance of your Councilor?
Explain your response; _________________________________________________________.

44. How do you rate the performance of your RDC/Council?
Explain your response; _________________________________________________________.

45. How often were Village Development Meetings held in the past year?
1. Not at all. 2. Once. 3. Twice. 4. Don’t know.

46. How often did you or members of your household take part in Village Development Meetings in
the last 12 months? 1. Never. 2. Rarely. 3. All the time.
Explain your response; _________________________________________________________.

47. Have you ever attended a Ward Development Meeting? 1. Yes. 2. No.

48. If yes did you contribute any views at the meeting? 1. Yes. 2. No.
Did you find your views being taken seriously? 1. Yes. 2. No.
Explain your response; _________________________________________________________.

49. How often were Ward Development Meetings held in your Ward in the past year?
1. Not at all. 2. Once or twice. 3. 3 to 4 times.

50. What are your village’s top two development priorities? (NB; agreed by Village)

51. Have these been included into the Ward priorities? 1. Yes. 2. No.

52. Do you feel the priorities will be respected? 1. Yes. 2. No.
Explain your response; _________________________________________________________.

53. If the needs/priorities are not included what will the village do?

54. Have you ever personally approached your Councilor, Council, DA, an NGO or other Government
Department with a village need? 1. Yes. 2. No.

55. If yes proceed with table below;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation approached</th>
<th>Development Need/Priority</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Govt. Department.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Leader.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56. How well do you understand the roles of these organisations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation.</th>
<th>Role.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village head.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Departments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57. In your view how well do these organisations work together?
**Section G: Household Assets, Land Resources and Livelihood.**

58. Do you own any of the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset type</th>
<th>Number owned</th>
<th>How acquired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plough</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheel-barrow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cart</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others specify</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59. Do you/does your household own any land?  
1. Yes.  2. No.  
If yes how much (in hectares/ acres)? ____________

60. How did you acquire the land (tick appropriate box)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Village head allocation.</th>
<th>2. GoZ i.e. resettlement.</th>
<th>3. Private Purchase.</th>
<th>4. RDC allocation.</th>
<th>5. Leasing/renting.</th>
<th>6. Sharing with parents.</th>
<th>7. Inherited from parents.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. Did you pay any amount to be allocated land?  
1. Yes.  2. No.  
If yes how much did you pay in ZWD ______________.

62. Do you have documented proof of your land claim?  
1. Yes.  2. No.  
If yes are the documents registered at a Government Office?  
1. Yes.  2. No.

63. Does your village hold meetings to plan about village/common land?  
1. Never.  2. Rarely.  3. All the time.

64. Do you or your household members attend the meetings?  
1. Yes.  2. No.  
If yes what role do you play in such meetings? ____________________________.

**Section H: Extra Questions for Resettled Households (new and old).**

65. When were you resettled? _____________________

66. Where were you before being resettled?  
1. In communal areas in the District.  
2. In a communal area outside the District.  
3. In a communal area outside the province.  
4. In an older resettlement scheme.  
5. On a large scale commercial farm.  
6. From city (name town/city) _____________________________  
7. Outside Zimbabwe (indicate name of area) _______________________

67. What socio-economic facilities did you find in place in your new community?

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Facility. Tick if present on arrival. If not present on arrival how long did it take to be established.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dip tank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing Depot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68. Do you sometimes work together with your neighbors? 1. Yes. 2. No.
If yes, in which areas or on which activities?

69. What was your socio-economic status at the time of being resettled and what is it now?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>At resettlement</th>
<th>Now.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cattle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ploughs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master-farmer training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70. How many other families from your original community were resettled here?

71. How do you compare your original with your new area in terms of the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility, service or resource</th>
<th>Rank on arrival</th>
<th>Rank now.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land (amount, quality etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other natural resources (trees, water etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing for your livestock.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health facilities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainfall (pattern, reliability etc.).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension services.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation facilities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market infrastructure.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village governance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward governance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General relationship with;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Council.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* DA.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Other organisations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB use 1 where your old area was better than the new area and 2 where the new area is better than the old area.

72. What are the most frequent conflicts that occur in your community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict type</th>
<th>Main causes</th>
<th>Resolution mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land boundaries.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource extraction.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

END.
Annex 2.2: Community Diary Guidelines

To compensate for language and time constraints this method was used to ensure that study accesses community (sub-District) development dynamics pertinent to the research question. The Diaries were kept in relation to the following questions or guidelines.

1. History of the community, current inventory of infrastructure and basic services (roads, schools, clinics, water and sanitation, bridges etc) in the community and comments on quality, access etc).

2. Village Governance;
   a. How is the Village organised generally and for purposes of development activities?
   b. What structures exist (legislated/formal and informal)?
   c. How well are the Village structures perceived and how well do they work with outsiders?

3. Main local level organisations or groups that exist in the community;
   a. What activities do the local organisations undertake? What services do people access through these groups/organisations?
   b. Who participates in them and how? Do people make contributions and if so how much (ranges) do they pay monthly and/or annually? How many days in a year do they give to the group’s activities to stay a member?
   c. How people join and why?
   d. Most popular organisations in profiled communities and why?
   e. What are the main challenges faced by these groups/institutions? How are the challenges dealt with? How are external organisations involved and if so which ones, how and why?

4. How the community relates to Council and how do they assess its performance?
   a. Services provided by Council in the community (quality, delivery mechanisms etc).
   b. How often and using what methods does the community interact with the Councilor, council, government departments from the District level and any other organisations.

5. Seasonal calendars (principal socio-economic activities from January to December) and main livelihood activities;
   a. What are the main farming types (livestock or crop based, mixed etc)?
   b. Average landholdings per family (ascertain with local extension staff)?
   c. What other livelihood activities exist, which times of the year are they pursued, which groups are involved (or types of households) etc.
   d. What are the existing sources of financial, agricultural inputs and production systems support in the community?
   e. Household assets and wealth differentiating variables (livestock, homesteads, land etc).

6. Livelihood-related constraints faced and how they are managed/addressed;
   a. Principal livelihood threats experienced (link to seasonal calendar if possible).
   b. Who is mostly affected? How the threats are addressed?
   c. Most successful ways of dealing with constraints (cite cases where shared).

7. Other organisations e.g. NGOs working in the community.
   a. Which ones are these? What are they doing and with who?
   b. Targeting and institutional arrangements for activity/programme implementation.

8. Any other stuff deemed useful in coming up with a ‘participation profile’ of the community.
Annex 2.3: Question Guide for Key Informants

Semi-structured questions were used in two main phases of the study as shown below. The specific guiding questions were overlapping but generally deeper and case-specific explorations were undertaken in phase two.

Phase 1 [April to August 2004]: Exploratory.
For Zimbabwe the exploratory phase looked at the four overlapping periods in which local governance evolved or changed distinctively. They include the pre-independence era, early post-independence to amalgamation (1980-93), the Amalgamation period to the Traditional Leaders Act 2000 and then the period since enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act. The sub-questions or issues that the study pursued using semi-structured questions were within the framework of decentralised local governance and included the following:
1. The structures for participation; arrangements and functionality, challenges and strong points for Councils, sub-District structures, Councilors, traditional leaders etc.
2. Resourcing arrangements for rural local government during the four periods. Both internal and external sources critical to assessing the viability of local government structures.
3. Monitoring (accountability) mechanisms for local governance structures/institutions with respect to the systems used, their effectiveness, constraints and improvements over the years. The role and effectiveness of ordinary citizens in the monitoring process.
4. Key institutional stakeholders in local governance and their roles (general and specific i.e. some best and worst cases). The stakeholders of primary concern include religious groupings, business organisations, clubs and associations notwithstanding individual residents of local authority areas.
5. Specific development interventions managed in terms of experiences (good and bad practice) and improvements or changes made as a result of bad and best practices.
6. Local institutional capacity building; who does it, how and the key issues.

Phase 2 [from September 2004 through May-June 2006]: Detailed follow-up.
In this phase detailed organisational profiling and interaction analysis was done on the back of deeper exploration of organisational structures and networks. The guiding questions included:
1. The structure, functions and powers of the 'respondent organisation' (explored in the light of broad issues distilled from exploratory phase, question 1 above).
2. The relationship between the ‘respondent organisation’ structures and other local organisations’ (governmental and non-governmental) structures i.e. policy processes and operations.
3. Administrative structure and budget of the organisation (staffing, budget for operations and administration, sources of support and levels).
5. Processes of developing and implementing development plans, projects and programmes i.e. role of the ‘respondent organisation’ and other organisations. This focused on specific planning years, projects and programmes and followed-up examples of inter-organisational relations in specific programmes, localities and processes. A sector follow-up was often used to learn about and assess prevailing conditions for cooperation/collaboration and constraints faced.
6. Constraints faced by development organisations (including the ‘responding organisation’), available responses both individual and collective.
7. Alternative ways of arranging existing development relationships and processes. Efforts done by the ‘responding organisation’ as well as others to promote such alternatives. Assessment of potential for success or identification of pre-conditions.