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
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The Operationalisation of Political and Societal Securitization Theory, and its Application to Post-Colonial Indonesia

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Summary

This thesis is both a conceptual analysis of securitization and an analysis of the political and societal security threats that plagued the Sukarno and Suharto regimes in Indonesia. It charts securitization's place within the current security literature and examines the critiques of these sectors. It addresses the criticism that political security is too broad and lacking a distinct identity of its own. Using the work of Alagappa and Ayoob allows us to expand our understanding of political securitization, the nature of the threats to the sector, define a clear referent object, and apply securitization logic to the study of authoritarian regimes. Secondly, with respect to societal securitisation, this dissertation will develop the current literature to incorporate social psychology theory, which provides us with a clearer understanding of not only how and why social groups, and thus social identities, form but also why it is people need these groups in the first place, and also why inter group conflict can occur. This in turn provides a more robust conception of societal security. The thesis then uses these operationalised security concepts and uses them to analyse post-colonial Indonesia. It argues that the central principles of both the Sukarno and Suharto political regimes had within their guiding principles the antecedents that would lead to their ultimate failure. It also argues that the oppressive policies of the New Order towards ethnic minorities, rather than destroying the targeted groups actually defined and strengthened notions of what it was to be Indonesian.

Declaration

This work has not been previously accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed.. .... (candidate)

Date..... 28 March 07

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.

Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations

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Date........ 28 March 07

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Introduction

Strategic Vs. Security Studies

This thesis is based within the area of International Relations known as security studies. Since its conception in the aftermath of World War One International Relations has been preoccupied with the question of war, or more importantly why wars occur and how we can prevent them? Over the intervening 80 years or so the discipline has diversified to examine virtually every aspect of human interaction and behaviour, leaving the issue of conflict to be examined by Strategic and Security Studies. However, the difference between these two disciplines is something that should be examined.

Strategic and security studies first truly emerged from under the umbrella of IR as disciplines in their own right in the 1950s and 60s. Strategic Studies is concerned with how actors, predominantly government/state elites, think about and use force during peace or war. It looks at how force is used to promote the safety (or security) of the unit. By contrast Security Studies looks at how the unit defines "safety", it looks at what is constituted to be a threat, and what options the unit considers as being suitable to resolve it. So the primary difference between the two disciplines is that whilst strategic studies is concerned with how force is deployed and utilised, security studies is also concerned with why the force is being deployed, or more specifically what it is being deployed against. A further distinction is that security studies is also concerned with wider issues such as the environment or the economy, which are

considered to be equally significant but rarely involve the use of actual "force". In the aftermath of World War Two, with the deepening crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the increasingly complex nature of world politics it seemed that IR was being distracted from its roots, and in doing so diluting the academic possibilities for studying the issues surrounding conflict. Scholars like Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter and, in Britain, John Garnett were using the questions posed by strategic and security studies to refocus their minds back towards the key issues that were facing the Anglo-American governments of the day. This in turn led to the development of a substantial body of literature, and possibly even more importantly made a name for those researchers as being experts within the increasingly complex field of military affairs. As such it lead to their work becoming known by those in power, and therefore when the time came to re-evaluate nuclear strategy and your foreign policy agendas, these 'experts' were called upon.

As one might imagine, during this period these Anglo-American dominated fields, became severely entwined as the interests and concerns of both groups of scholars overlapped. In this climate, the question of what was making Western states insecure was over-shadowed by the dominant and somewhat obvious threat of nuclear war. Even when non-nuclear/irregular problems presented themselves they were typically related to the greater strategic questions of the day, or they were deemed to be irrelevant or of lesser importance. As David Baldwin states: "If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics."[1] However as we moved into the period known as the second Cold War in the late 1970s the

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[1] David A. Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security" *Review of International Studies* Vol.23, No.1 (2001), p.9

assumptions of Strategic Studies began to unravel. Lawrence Freedman pinpoints that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the eventual collapse of the USSR acted like a catalyst, leading to a disciplinary brain drain away from Strategic and towards Security studies. And as the Second Cold War finally came to its conclusion with the Velvet Revolutions and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, with it came the collapse of a single strategic threat. And with this collapse came the emergence of a wider debate between strategic and security scholars. Whilst some saw the end of the Cold War as having no significant impact upon an international system that had been unchanged since World War Two[2], others purported that the end of the Cold War radically altered all of the questions that scholars have been asking, and also meant that it was necessary to rethink the answers that they already felt they had.[3] Therefore the questions that the West had for so long found easy answers to now required re-analysis. Some felt that "[the] state system [was] alive and well... [and] military competition between sovereign states will remain the distinguishable feature of international politics"[4], and maintained that "strategic" questions should remain their primary concern. Others who had been considered strategic scholars now turned their hand to addressing these questions of security, and began new "risk assessments" of this "New World Order".[5] The end of the Cold War provided a platform for security scholars to table their questions, without the concern that they were superfluous to the "larger" geo-political concerns of superpower relations. Previous assumptions

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[2] John Mearsheimer "Disorder Restored" in Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.) *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992) p.214; also cited in David A. Baldwin "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War" *World Politics* Vol. 48, No. 1, (1995) p.117.
[3] Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Studies" *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 37 (June 1993) p.141
[4] Mearsheimer "Disorder Restored" p.214
[5] For example Lawrence Freedman, "International Security: Changing Targets" *Foreign Policy* No.110 (1998) pp.48-63

concerning force, power and insecurity were no longer sacrosanct. And this in turn meant that splits began to emerge within Security Studies.

The Traditional/Orthodox vision for Security Studies can be summed up by Stephen Walt who believes that it may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force, which should be examined in a positivist/empirical way.[6] He argued that Security Studies was "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force".[7] In this Walt is arguing for Strategic Studies with a few why questions thrown in. This is not to suggest that the whole orthodoxy was as dismissive of change as Walt, and in fact Walt's article provoked a considerable backlash from security scholars arguing for a less narrow approach to security analysis. Within the traditionalist camp there were those concerned with other problems that states face, however there was a debate as to whether these were dealt with within the realms of normal politics or not. They stipulate that Security should be confined within a narrow military definition in order to maintain its analytical validity. The traditionalist definition of security post-Cold War had not moved significantly away from the works of the Strategic/Security thinkers of the 50s and 60s. The claim by Walter Lippmann in 1943 that "a state is secure only to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to *sacrifice core values*, [and] if it wishes be able, if challenged, to maintain them [values] by victory in such a war"[8] still held validity to Walt and his contemporaries. They still saw that to be secure was concerned with the ability of the

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[6] Stephen M. Walt, "The renaissance of Security Studies" *International Studies Quarterly* Vol.35, No.2 (1991) pp.211-239
[7] *Ibid.* p.212 (emphasis removed)
[8] Walter Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943) p.51 (Emphasis added)

state to "protect internal values from external threats".[9] The orthodoxy sought to emphasise the dominance of an external orientated realist, or neo-realist, ontology of International Relations. Security was about stopping others from changing your personally chosen way of life. An outlook blatantly coloured by the American tradition and the experience/perceptions of the Cold War.

Even from within the critics to Walt's *Renaissance* article, there was still a considerable state-centric flavour. For example in his comprehensive critique of Walt's, Edward A. Kolodziej argued against the dominance of second and third level analysis, that is interstate conflict and the impact of the international system.[10] However, he stops short at arguing for a totally reductionist approach to the discipline and instead posits that intra-state conflict should be incorporated into security analysis. Therefore whilst he takes issue with Walt's neo-realist leanings he does not quite break ranks from the realist paradigm entirely and embrace a radical rethink of security. For orthodox security studies it is the state and the military that lie at the heart of the questions concerning security and insecurity, and whilst there were efforts made to review these questions, the orthodoxy maintained their focus. The primacy of the state dominated their thinking, and the "state can have no higher goal than survival"[11], as such ultimately the sanctity of a states borders and the protection of its population remains the focus of analysis. Therefore because this is the remit of the military, military affairs too are the focus of security studies. Even with the advancement of ideas like Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' and the alleged 'Islamic threat' posed to the western way of life, this traditional view of

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[9] Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, "National Security", in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968) p.40

[10] Edward A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" *International Studies Quarterly* Vol.36, No.4 (Dec., 1992) pp.423-4

[11] Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored" p.222

security still carries a lot of weight, and has a prominent position both within the discipline and public policy. However even with its historically strong position, this is not to say that this was the only way to judge security, and challenges were being made.

Critical Security Studies

The traditionalist view has not gone uncontested, and numerous contending approaches emerged or were reintroduced to the discipline. These approaches come under the general heading Non-Traditional Security Studies, though this not a homogenous group and is in fact a very broad church. The first meaning of Non-Tradtitional Security Studies is that it is a group encompassing all of those who, for whatever reasons, are critical of the orthodox approach. The small 'c' theorists' concerns vary from those who wish to broaden our conception of security, that is, beyond the narrow state and military focus of the orthodoxy, to those who wish to deepen our notions of what it is to be insecure. The second group of people who are typically labelled Critical Security Theorists, and they are so called because they seek to incorporate Critical Social Theory into the study of security. That is, they seek to propose an alternative to the epistemological, ontological and normative preconceptions of orthodox security studies.[12] An orthodoxy that stipulates that the neorealist model of 'systemic stability' is fundamental in ensuring security, a stability that is typically enforced with military means. Instead Capital 'C' Critical Security Studies, sometimes called the Welsh School[13], argues that critical explorations of

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[12] E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward Critical Social Theory of International Relations* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1997) p.4

[13] The reason for it being labelled the Welsh School is due to the fact that much of the early work was carried out by scholars based in Aberystwyth. Not all security scholars who see themselves at belonging to the "Capital C" camp would embrace the label of "Welsh School" however I have chosen

security "have to start in our heads before they can take place in the world."[14] Welsh School theorists believe that the focus should shift from state level politics towards that of the individual, and more specifically human emancipation. This is a view initially put forward by Ken Booth who states that:

Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop the carrying out what they would freely chose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on… Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security.[15]

Booth therefore argues that by looking at the constraints to individual freedoms instead of that which limits the power of the state, we will have a better, and wider, understanding of what is behind a given insecurity, and more importantly the strategies devised will be directed towards what he argues to be the real problem.

Another major problem that the Welsh School has with Orthodox Security Studies is in its positivist methodology. Instead they believe it is unrealistic to think that you can study the social world in an objective/empirical manner. Richard Wyn Jones interestingly cited that in fact the positivist attempts to emulate the natural sciences are outdated as they model their position on a Newtonian world rather than using modern Quantum Developments, ironically Jones uses science to attack the positivists scientific method.[16] Jones cites Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle as a case and point. Heisenberg states that the act of observation changes the behaviour of

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to use it as it is a useful term to distinguish between the two type of critical security scholars. For a more thorough explanation review Ken Booth (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005) pp-vii-ix.

[14] Ken Booth, "Critical Explorations" in *Ibid.* p.3

[15] Ken Booth "Security and Emancipation", *Review of International Studies* Vol.17, No.4 (1991) p.319

[16] Richard Wyn Jones, "Travel without Maps': Thinking about Security after the Cold War' in Jane Davis (ed.), *Security after the Cold War* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996) pp. 196-218.

an object, therefore for example you can either know the speed of an electron, or its exact location but you cannot know both. This is because the act of measuring a particle's speed effects its location, and finding its location affects its speed. In the social world we know that we act/behave differently when we are being watched, and also that we use our personal values as a filter when we interpret what we see. Therefore an observer will either affect the subject or alter the results from their purest form making objective/empirical study impossible. Jones concludes that in the current/Post Cold War environment the models and assumptions that had been established and used by traditional security and strategic studies to understand security issues were now obsolete, he believes that we are now travelling map free and stipulates that whilst most wander around aimlessly, Critical Security theories offer us a normatively given sense of direction. Jones believes that you can use the issue of Emancipation as a compass, which can be used to guide our learning, observations and interpretations. Also we will be able to use this direction will negate the sense of uncertainty and flux that we find ourselves in, both as academics and also within the physical reality of the world, and give us a sense of focus. It is here that I take issue with the Welsh School. Using Jones' terms, an observer may have an effect on an object, but it is an unintentional and unfortunate side effect of the observation process. To attempt to influence the object is not the role of the Security Studies Scholar, rather it is to digest and attempt to understand what we see and comment upon it. Whilst I believe the intentions expressed by the Welsh School are morally applaudable, they are also inherently Western, and it is questionable as to exactly how valid the belief that such a culturally biased solution would be a better solution to our intellectual problems than the orthodoxy currently offers.

In recent years the notion of expanding, or arguably it would be more accurate to say reducing, the referent object to the Individual or smaller, minority groups within the state has continued with the development of Human Security. This is based around two clear reconceptions of insecurity: "[Firstly] safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. [And secondly] it means protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in patterns of daily life."[17] This broad redefinition takes us away from the systemic approach of the traditionalists, instead looking at a much lower level of analysis. Human Security sees the individual as the focal point of study and therefore anything that is detrimental to an individual is a security threat, notably; economic, food/nutrition, health, environment, personal safety, community integrity and the freedom from political oppression.[18] This was summed up by Amitav Acharya as 'freedom from want and freedom from fear'[19]. This discussion of how best to understand the assault on personal freedoms has been a contentious issue for many years, especially within the literature concerning the Third World. This is because of the more evident threats to human security within these regions of the globe. The debate however has not just raged over attempting to better define what it is that impinges on Third World citizens' abilities to live a 'secure' life, but also in terms of an effective point of analysis. Is the individual the best way to examine this issue, or is this reductionism inadequate for examining the complex security dynamics of the Third World?

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[17] United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999 p.23 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/

[18] This is not to suggest that the security scholar only reviews these issues at the micro-level, rather that by using the individual as the referent object it opens up a wider notion of what it is to be insecure. Through the analysis of the issue it is likely that one would look at other levels of analysis, for example in the case of the environment whilst one could begin by reviewing the impact of climate change upon an individual and/or their local community, one would also need to address the wider regional and international implications of the issue. I also would like to highlight that it is not from work on human security that thinking on insecurity in these other sectors originated, rather human security offers a framework with which one can broaden and deepen security analysis.

[19] Amitav Acharya, "Human Security: East versus West?" *IDSS Working Paper 17* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, September 2001)

Third World Security Studies

Third World security studies had a broader definition to insecurity long before the current debate. This is because they acknowledged that the realities of first or second world states, the main focus of the western literature, were very different to those of the third world. In 1987 Caroline Thomas became one of the first Western authors to introduce this perspective to the mainstream Security Studies literature. She stated that the issues that affected the Third World were not thermo nuclear war, rather "[it was] relative weakness, the lack of autonomy, the vulnerability and the lack of room for manoeuvre which third world states have on economic, political and of course military levels."[20] In the same way that the level of analysis for the Welsh school is different to the Orthodoxy, opting to focus predominantly on individuals, third world security studies sees insecurity as not only originating from the international system, but rather on the internal dynamics of states and intra-state tensions. This alternative focus to security, lead to Third World Security scholars adopting and incorporating a wider range of theoretical concepts and methodologies. This broadening allowed the scholars to engage with non-traditional issues that, whilst they were not considered high politics in the developed world, had more resonance in the third world. For instance the environment, whilst it *was* being studied and engaged with by non-third world scholars, was still secondary to "hard" security issues. Third world security writers like Jessica Tuchman Mathews however saw the environment as having more significance. Tuchman Mathews states:

Environmental decline occasionally leads directly to conflict, especially when

scarce water resources must be shared. Generally, however, its impact on

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[20] Caroline Thomas, In *Search of Security: the Third World in International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1987) p.1

nations security is felt in the downward pull on economic performance and, therefore, on political stability.[21] This highlights two key trends in third world security, firstly that focusing on individual insecurities may be too narrow or reductionist to appreciate larger regional or global security problems. And secondly that many threats are not directly harmful in and of themselves, but rather in the effects they have elsewhere, for instance here in the economic and political realm. Therefore to focus on the international political system to provide security or emancipating individuals is at best irrelevant and at worst distracting from the real security threats to those in the third world, as these westernised attempts to secure do nothing to resolve the third world's real problems. In the 1990s in the midst of the development and growth of alternative approaches to the study of security, many scholars began to more explicitly examine the security concerns of the developing world. These studies varied from those who built upon the work of scholars like Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Caroline Thomas, to those who sort not to radically detract from the orthodox realist position. But rather more clearly understand how *both* internal and external factors directly effected the third world, an example of this approach is the work of Mohammed Ayoob.

In his 1995 text *The Third World Security Predicament*, Mohammed Ayoob lays down a constructive critique to both the traditional and critical security studies scholars. To the Traditionalists he argues that the majority of the characteristics of their literature are unsuited to discussing the dynamics of the third world. Especially their external orientation, focus on systemic security and, even in the post Cold War, a preoccupation with the issues regarding the two major alliance blocs of the previous

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[21] Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "The Environment and International Security" in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.) *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) p.366

50 years.[22] Ayoob's concerns are that these issues are of far less importance to third world states and so analysing them does little to shed light on, let alone resolve third world insecurities. Firstly Ayoob states that the problems that many developing states face are not external at all, but rather emerge from within their own borders, and those threats that do emerge in the external realm are actually instigated from problems within third world states. These threats tend to be in the form of civil wars in neighbouring states that "spill over", a particularly dangerous prospect as these spill overs can act like a catalyst to the recipient states equally insecure domestic situation.[23] It is because of the third world's need to focus internally that any changes made in the international/systemic arena have little or no positive consequences on their security. This is because changes made are done for the benefit of the first and second worlds, bypassing the third's concerns, which remain ineffectively remedied. Whilst Ayoob is more interested in a wider interpretation of Security Studies, he is also equally dissatisfied with the "de-definition" that he sees the Welsh School is advocating. Rather than lowering ones focus to the individual as a point of analysis, he still sees the state as the primary unit of security affairs, and in particular the state making process. Secondly, Ayoob sees that it is the Political realm that should be studied rather than the excessive broadening approach advanced by other members of the critical security studies camp. This is not to say that Ayoob is ignoring these other realms rather:

Although it retains its primacy in the definition of security, the political realm must be informed by these other areas of human activity. However, the influence of the other realms on matters that effect security must be filtered through the political realm and must be directly relevant to that realm. In other

[22] Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1995) p.6
[23] *Ibid.* p.7

words, when developments in other realms - ranging from the economic to the ecological – threaten to have immediate political consequences or are perceived as being able to threaten state boundaries, political institutions, or governing regimes, these other variables must be taken into account as a part of the state's security calculus.[24]

Ayoob sees that an efficient concept of security for the analysis of the Third World must meet two main criteria: "First, it must go beyond the traditional western definition of security and overcome the external orientation and military bias that are contained in the western definition. Second, it must remain firmly rooted in the political realm while being sensitive to variables in other realms".[25] Ayoob envisions a politically focused definition of security, which is still state focused, but examines the architecture, and influences of the state making process on the insecurities third world states face. He acknowledges that other realms sometimes affect state security, however they are irrelevant as a point of focus unless they "threaten to have political outcomes…or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics."[26]

With regards to State building, the problem is as follows. Ayoob sees that there has not been enough time for the states that exist in the third world to take root and develop effectively. The territories that were inherited from the colonial powers are filled with problems left over from their previous rulers. These include; ethnic tensions, as groups suddenly found themselves placed within states that they have little or no allegiance to, this leads to fissures in society and ultimately attempts to overthrow existing regimes; Demands for political participations, economic

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[24] *Ibid.* p.8
[25] *Ibid.* pp.11-12
[26] *Ibid.* p.9

redistribution, and social justice; and finally because of the unrepresentative and authoritarian nature of many regimes there is a "vicious circle of violence and counter violence as regimes are challenged and react with brutal force."[27] It is this "overloading" of weak polities with massive problems that are at the root of the insecurity that is apparent in most of the developing world.

Unfortunately these are not the only problems that Third World regimes face. The state making process does not occur in a vacuum, and external actors also impact on those involved in it. The problem that third world states have with respect to the international system as a whole is that they are forced to adhere to the rules and norms that the developed world has previously established. The first of which is concerning what it is to be a 'state'. It is expected that a state will have an effective infrastructure that will support the social and economic well being of itself and its people. There is an expectation placed upon the state elite that they should control their borders and maintain law and order within their state. This expectation originates both from their own people and, perhaps more importantly, from the international community as a whole. At the same time modern rules dictate that you should do all of these things in accordance with international laws and morals, they need to behave in the same way as the "civilised" western world.[28] This pulls states and regimes in two opposing directions. Third World states are:

[Expected] to approximate human rights standards as measured by the performance yardstick of the industrialized democracies...[and] enhance their stateness by extending their dominion over often reluctant populations in the

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[27] *Ibid.* p.41
[28] *Ibid.* pp.87-88

shortest possible time in order to approximate the standards of effective statehood set by the industrialized democracies of Europe and North America.[29] This aggravates the instability of the regimes in place, as they are unable to effectively achieve either task. If they focus their efforts on human rights and their status as a member of the international community their domestic situation will collapse and hence the regime loses its status anyway. If however they focus purely on maintaining control, then the international community condemns them especially if they use more *extreme* methods of pacification, which given the time scale and economics of most Third World politics is likely. The international community then places pressure on them to stop and revert to a more acceptable methods, which masy be less successful strategies and so their state/regime is less secure.[30] What becomes the normal pattern of behaviour in many of these weak states is that they move from one compromise to the next, never really achieving a secure position. This means that they move from crisis to crisis, with little knowledge of how to effectively alienate themselves from this predicament. One of the true injustices of this predicament that can be perceived but is not explicitly emphasised by Ayoob, is that the developed world has already been through this state making process, but was able to do so at a much slower pace and without excessive scrutiny. Rather than guide the third world through this time of transition however, and help them not to make the same mistakes, they instead pass judgement with out offering real alternatives to those regimes struggling with the infancy of statehood.

Ayoob also expresses concerns with the emancipatory approach to the study of third world insecurity. Whilst Ayoob acknowledges the claims that it is problems that

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[29] *Ibid.* p.87
[30] *Ibid.* p.88

are inherent in the state that create insecurity, he opts for a less reductionist approach to the study of the third world. Against Booth's Welsh School reasoning he states "Booth's definition refuses to acknowledge that a society or group can be emancipated without being secure and vice versa".[31] This comes down to the fact that whilst states/regimes may create insecurity for individuals, the collective/majority of people ultimately better within the state, irrespective of injustices, than without the large scale institutional support and representation. This said however Ayoob does see the need to address the individual/human level concerns within the state making process. Appreciating the concerns by those who put pressure on the third world he states:

> In the climate of their changed domestic and international attitudes, the move toward democratisation is no longer merely a laudable goal for states in the Third World; it has become a political precondition for establishing legitimate state structures and regimes that enjoy the acquiescence, if not enthusiastic support of their populations.[32]

What this statement represents is a further acknowledgement from Ayoob that we must rethink how we deal with third world security problems. He is saying that whilst the external pressures from the west, to conform to our values, have altered the security dynamic to the extent that it makes state making even more difficult. If the third world were better able to take into account the root concerns that the Welsh School and Human Security writers are discussing, then the current boom/bust cycle of the third world security predicament could be redressed and ultimately averted.

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[31] *Ibid.* p.10
[32] *Ibid.* p.179

The security predicament in the Third World in likened by Ayoob to a 'Multilayered cake', these layers being the domestic, regional and global. Whilst each is distinct and has its own 'flavour' it is the domestic layer that flavours and dominates the cake as a whole.[33] Ayoob sees however that the regional and global factors contaminate and influence what the nature of a state's domestic policy will be. So whilst the instability that is experienced by most Third World states appears to be a localised phenomenon, because of the contaminating effect each layer has on the others, an insecure Third World will have repercussions for the rest of us, and also because the majority of states are currently in the "developing" camp, the overall impact on the developed world could be significantly dangerous. Therefore, for Ayoob, a re-thinking of how we see Third World Security and therefore how we address and resolve problems here is vital for global security too.

Re-defining Vs De-defining

In his case for broadening the definition of security Ken Booth argues that it is better to have open intellectual boundaries and risk irrelevance, than narrow ones and risk ignorance.[34] This declaration was a move against the closed neorealist ontology that underpins the orthodoxies assumptions regarding security. That is, the dominant position of the state and military in their thinking.[35] Critics of the orthodoxy[36] stress

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[33] *Ibid.* p.189

[34] Ken Booth and Eric Herring, *Keyguide to Information in Strategic Studies* (London: Mansell, 1994) p.20

[35] Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999) (online edition) (http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones04.html 02/05/06)

[36] For example as shown by Rob Walker in "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics" *Alternatives* Vol. 15, No. 1 (1990) pp. 3–27; and "The Subject of Security" in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press Limited, 1997) pp.33-59 (amongst others)

that it is these deep-seated assumptions that colour and restrict the orthodoxies conception of security. They argue that by deepening our conception of security, our change in perspective will open the security scholar up to other questions that have been closed off by the ontology of the orthodoxy. As discussed above this is not a point of view that originated post-Cold War, however as Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller argue "[the end of the Cold War revealed] a different set of dangers" and in so doing "revealed [an] agenda...broader in its focus, giving much greater attention to previously neglected sources of conflict."[37] That is, "the end of the Cold War...added legitimacy and credibility to demands for a broader security agenda"[38], and in so doing established the possibility to re-define the concept of security and in so doing open up our "intellectual boundaries". This is what the Welsh School has sought to achieve, however, whilst as an individual I whole-heartedly agree with Booth's argument against intellectual parochialism, I also feel that intellectual irrelevance is not a risk worth taking. By this I mean, that given increasing time and financial constraints we do need a way of focusing our attentions. Therefore whilst the Welsh School, and other post-positivist, theories that attempt to broaden the concept of security are admirable, the orthodoxies concerns that this may de-emphasise the study is not purely the final roar of a dinosaur in the face of evolution, rather it is a legitimate scholarly criticism of the broadening agenda.

Securitization and the Copenhagen School

The Emancipation model of re-imagining Security Studies was not the only route scholars took. A notable and very interesting approach was devised by the

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[37]Sean M. Lynn–Jones and Steven E. Miller, *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995)
[38]Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (online edition) (http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones04.html 02/05/06)

Copenhagen School, so called because of its base at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI); it is an approach that was formally put forward within *Security: A new framework for analysis*,[39] though it is a continuation of the themes and ideas put forward by the main contributors in earlier works. Most significantly *People, States, and Fear* by Barry Buzan,[40] which laid the groundwork for the Schools redefinition/broadening agenda and influenced the work of other critical security scholars including those within the Welsh School.[41] The Copenhagen project is not as radical an assault on the orthodoxy as the Welsh School however. When *A New Framework* was published in 1998, a collaboration between Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde,[42] it was a comprehensive rethinking of the discipline in order to effectively address the on going problem of broadening the subject without *"reducing its analytical utility"*.[43] I choose to discuss it after the Welsh School because whilst its foundations lie earlier than emancipatory theory, the comprehensive framework was published after Critical Security Studies established its own theoretical base and so in part Buzan et al were responding to Critical Security Studies as well as the Orthodoxy.[44] Therefore this means that also, and perhaps more significantly, I believe that the Copenhagen approach not only addresses problems with the orthodoxy, but also communicates an alternative to the more extreme, especially from the point of view of traditional security scholars, elements of other critical approaches. The first thing that this framework did was redefine what was meant by

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[39] From now on referred to as The New Framework.

[40] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983) A second edition was published in 1991.

[41] This influence was expressed both in Ken Booth's "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist" lecture held at the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto in 1994 (Transcript available (http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP26-Booth.pdf (14/05/2006)) and also in his chapter of the same title in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* pp.83-120 (most explicitly, though critically, p.86, 106)

[42] From now on Buzan et al, unless the author of a particular section is evident/specified directly

[43] Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* p.9

[44] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1998) pp. 34-5

security. To the Copenhagen School "…security is about survival… [from] an *existential threat* to a designated referent object", and that "…the special nature of security threats justifies the use of *extraordinary measures* to handle them". This creates a more fluid environment for the Security scholar to examine, however it is still narrowly and specifically defined.

An 'existential threat' is something that effects a referent objects (what these objects are will be addressed below) ability to not only function but to actually exist. If a threat of this nature appears then the object is able to "use whatever means necessary to block a threatening development"[45] How though does one establish what an existential threat is? The Copenhagen School does not believe that there are objective threats 'out there' that we can empirically measure and quantify, rather they are subjective. Unlike Ayoob who sees that an issue becomes one of security once it enters the political realm, Buzan et al envisage a different process. For them there is a spectrum ranging from non-politicized at one end to securitized at the other. Any issue can be placed anywhere on this spectrum, depending on how it is perceived by those involved in the issue. If an issue is not being *seriously* discussed, debated, or commented upon by sector elites or authority figures, then it will be non-politicized, an example of this could be a dispute between neighbours where it is very serious to those concerned but has no wider repercussions. If, however, an issue were to become part of public policy, that requires action from a governing body, e.g. intervention or funding, then this issue has been politicised. An example of this would be the regulation of CFC emissions; the concept of global warming was elevated from being a minority issue to requiring direct intervention from

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[45] *Ibid.* p.21

government, and ultimately all governments, in order to resolve the problem. For an issue to leave the realm of politics and become a security issue, it must be argued that "this issue is more important and than other issues and should take *absolute priority*".[46] The way that this priority is shown is by presenting the issue as an existential threat, claiming that if we do not focus all of our effort *here*, we will not be around to worry about the other issues. Therefore, and this is a key principle within the New Framework, " 'Security' is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue-not necessarily because a *real* existential threat exists but because the issue is *presented* as such a threat."[47] The point here is that whilst any issue *can* be a security issue, most of the time they remain elsewhere on the spectrum. Therefore it is better to analyse the process that makes an issue a security threat, or perhaps *prevents* an issue being securitized, in order to have a clearer understanding of security.

The process of moving through the Securitization spectrum is not as simple as pointing a finger and mobilising your armed forces. Presenting something as an existential threat is only the first step in the process and termed a 'securitizing move', the issue is only secuitized if the 'audience', who can be defined as those who need to be convinced, accept that it is a risk. For example, The Government claimed that Iraq is a security risk to Britain, however they then needed to mount a Public Relations campaign, including the now infamous intelligence reports in order to sway public opinion enough to justify their desire to use extraordinary methods to remove the threat. In this instance the measure desired being military force or war. "Securitization [is fulfilled] by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking

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[46] *Ibid.* p.24 (emphasis added)
[47] *Ibid.* (emphasis added)

of rules",[48] this is rather like the Clausewitzian concept of war being a continuation of politics by other means; security is an extension of politics by extraordinary means. This process, like any human activity, differs from time to time and place to place, the Copenhagen School have highlighted five different 'places', or sectors from which an issue can emerge and become securitized. These are: Military; Economic; Environmental; Political and Societal. Each sector has its own distinctive set of actors and referent objects that are involved in the process.

In the Military sector the focus of attention is on the State as a whole. The focus of this sector is to maintain the 'territorial integrity' of the state, be it internal or external. This means that the securitizing actor, or securitizer, is typically the state itself or a state representative for example a member of government. The audience that needs to be convinced can be more varied ranging from the general public as a whole, to the armed forces or a government select committee. However, once an event has escalated to the extent that it has become an existential threat to the State, securitization is easier than in other sectors. This is because the securitizer in this sector is seen to be a voice of authority and so his or her arguments are perceived to have validity.

For the Copenhagen school the Economic sector has a diverse range of referent objects. However not all of these objects have equal claim to be considered a security referent. Some of these units, for instance transnational corporations, NGOs, small businesses, and even individuals who have invested the Stock Market, though they all can be considered integral to the capitalist economic system, rarely make a

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[48] *Ibid.* p.25

securitizing move to a wider audience when they are existentially threatened. This is because at this level economics is a brutal Darwinian world, and it is not possible for every unit to be successful. In fact it is an important and necessary part of the system for companies to collapse, and some individuals will lose money, as new companies will rise to replace weaker ones and resources are redistributed; this competition is at the heart of Capitalism.[49] The result of this *competition* is that existential threats to these units are not *generally* securitized.[50] For these units to successful securitize their existential crisis the Copenhagen School argues that it is necessary for the unit to tie its demise with a wider economic issue. For example it may be possible to claim that the collapse of their business will have ramifications for the local community, or instead it could be connected to a national issue.[51] However, for the Copenhagen school these moves rarely succeed unless it can be claimed that either the state or wider "liberal international economic order (LIEO)—meaning the entire nexus of rules and norms about open trading and financial arrangements"[52] are also being existentially threatened. An existential threat here would be an issue that lead to the total collapse of the economic system and so an inability for those within the state, or wider LIEO, to function. Buzan et al argue that because of the variety of referent objects that consider themselves, or can be considered, to be units of the economic sector, what can be considered to be an economic existential threat is equally varied. *A New Framework* acknowledges that for individuals economic security is primarily concerned with the same "basic human needs" as outlined within the Human Security

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[49] *Ibid.* p.100

[50] There are examples of securitizing moves being made for instance the closure of the Rover plant at Longbridge in 2005 elicited a call for extraordinary measures from the government to ensure the plants survival.

[51] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* pp.100-1

[52] *Ibid.*p.102

theories.[53] However, where the Copenhagen approach differs is because despite the hardship and suffering an individual in an economic crisis may feel, and the fact that these issues may be "enormously important to individuals and indeed societies"[54] the issues cannot be considered to be an existential threat to the individual. And if the individuals circumstances become such that the individual's ability to *survive* the situation does come into question, it is more likely that the issue would either be securitized within another sector, for instance political or societal. Or as with securitizing moves made by other economic actors the issue would be tied together with wider state or LIEO issues. The Copenhagen School argues that:

> [there] is…a state equivalent of basic human needs. Unless a state is self-reliant
> in the resources required to feed its population and industry, it needs access to
> outside supplies. If that need is threatened, the national economy can be clearly
> and legitimately securitized.[55]

In the ordinary, day to day, running of the state, whilst there may resources in which it is not self sufficient, typically they will be able to access these resources through direct trade with other states. Therefore, if a domestic industry is seriously and adversely affected by an issue it may not have direct ramifications on the state itself; however, it may adversely affect its ability to trade or engage within the LIEO as a whole. Or in even more extreme cases the impact of an economic sector threat will have ramifications in other sectors as the state elite works to rectify the economic crisis. This overspill, the Copenhagen School argues, problematises the study of the economic sector; however it also signifies one of the central concerns of economic

[53] *Ibid.* p.103
[54] *Ibid.* p.104
[55] *Ibid.* p.105

insecurity, that is, that "economic activity fairly easily triggers survival issues in all the other sectors".[56]

With the Environmental sector the Copenhagen School built upon a wide body of literature that had been developing both within security studies and International Relations as a whole, but also in the natural sciences.[57] In its broadest sense, the *New Framework* argues that the environmental sector can encompass a vast range of issues including: climate change, the disruption of ecosystems, the depletion of natural resources, famine, war-related environmental damage, issues that emerge from over population and unsustainable consumption of resources.[58] But the complexities of these issues mean that again there is a degree of overlap with other sectors, and the degree that these issues would be securitized as environmental threats is debateable.[59] Also with such a wide range of potential security issues, it raises the question as to what in particular is the primary referent object within the environmental sector. Buzan et al argue that, on the surface at least, the primary referent object is the environment itself, that is, the space in which we live. But underlying this is a concern that ultimately the primary concern of the environmental sector is the "risk of losing achieved levels of civilization".[60] So rather than the physical planet upon which we live being the primary referent for environmental security, it instead

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[56] *Ibid.* p.116

[57] Examples of this literature would include Neville Brown "Climate, Ecology and International Secuirty" *Survival* Vol.31, No.6 (1989) pp.519-532; John E. Carrol (ed.) *InternationalEnvironmental Diplomacy: The Management and Resolution of Transfrontier Environmental Problems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" *International Security* Vol.20, No.1 (1995) pp.35-62; Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security" *Foreign Affairs* Vol.68, No.2 (1989) pp.162-177; Clive Ponting, *A Green History of the World* (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1991); Caroline Thomas, *The Environment in International Relations* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), and Arthur H. Westing (ed.) *Cultural Norms, War and the Environment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). These represent a cross section of some of the literature available and should not be considered exhaustive.

[58] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* pp.74-5

[59] *Ibid.* p.75

[60] *Ibid.* (Emphasis removed)

"concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the *essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend*".[61] Buzan et al go on to argue that if one takes this civilizational position *vis a vis* environmental security then the following paradox arises: "*The only way to secure societies from environmental threats is to change them.*"[62] Therefore, we wish to secure the environmental sector in order to maintain the way in which we carry out our lives, but in order to secure the environment it is likely that we will need to alter the way we live our lives. In essence, it is the civilizational developments we ultimately wish to secure that are at the heart of the threat to the environmental sector. This in turn creates an interesting dynamic for whilst there are those who acknowledge that humans must behave responsibly when engaging with their physical environments. There are other actors who actively seek to oppose securitizing moves as to radically change behaviour in the interests of the environment will in turn restrict other human endeavours, for instance industrial, and hence, economic activity.[63] The Copenhagen School goes on to argue that there are essentially three possible environmental threats that can emerge. Firstly, threats to human civilization from the natural environment that are *not* caused by human activity (for example earthquakes or meteor strikes). Secondly, threats from human activity to the planet, where the changes made *do* seem to pose existential threats to civilization (for example greenhouse gas emissions, or landfills). Finally, threats from human activity that *do not* seem to pose existential threats to civilization (for example the depletion of mineral resources, whilst inconvenient, it is arguable that humanity will adapt new technologies to make up for the loss).[64] Securitizing moves to remedy these issues can be initiated from any level in the

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[61] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Second Edition)(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) pp.19-20 (emphasise added)
[62] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.76 (Emphasis added)
[63] *Ibid.* p.77
[64] *Ibid.* pp.79-80

system, however in order to counteract the wider and more serious consequences of environmental threats it is still the state that is dominant not only in drawing attention an issue, but also in the implementation of the extraordinary measures necessary to promote the necessary changes, and even then rarely unilaterally.[65]

The Political sector is a more vague area, this is partially because it can be argued that "*all* security is political"[66] or at the very least all security issues have been political at some time in their duration. For the Copenhagen School Political security is concerned with threats directed towards the political regime, from both within the physical territory that the political elite administers (its legitimacy), and from other states (whether it is recognised). These two variables (legitimacy and recognition) enable a political regime, (the institutions, processes and principles that make up the political system, not the government that is in power) to function effectively.[67] The existing literature on Political Security distinguishes between legitimacy and recognition by stipulating that they are generated internally and externally respectively. That is legitimacy is obtained from within the unit that the regime governs, and recognition is generated from the international community at large. If they are existentially threatened then the regime is unable to carry out even the most basic of functions and thus it must act in order to prevent this from happening. To date the majority of the work conducted by the Copenhagen School with respect to political security has focused on recognition and the external pressures facing political regimes, which is not necessarily appropriate when examining developing states.

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[65] *Ibid.* p.92
[66] *Ibid.* p.141 (emphasis added) and Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament. Passim.*
[67] This is discussed in detail in Chapter 1. (See Also)Buzan et al. *A New Framework for Analysis* p.144, 150. Also, Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear* (2nd Edition) Chapter 2 (passim); and Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2003) p.63

As part of my thesis, in order to more effectively operationalise the concept for developing states and regime formation in particular, I have utilised the work of Muthia Alagappa[68] and Mohammed Ayoob. Alagappa provides a thorough definition and exploration about the nature of legitimacy that is currently lacking in the literature of political security and is particularly appropriate when examining the complex political realities faced in the developing world. Ayoob on the other hand addresses the difficulties faced by developing states during the nation building process. That is the way in which new regimes are forced to balance the need for external recognition against the legitimacy derived internally. The synthesis of these writers enables me to develop a clearer understanding of not only the nature of the threat within the political sector but also how the struggle to attain and maintain political legitimacy impacts upon the power elites within states, and in turn explains why they identify these problems as security issues. Another key debate that has emerged within this sector is the nature of the audience and what constitutes an audience. Whilst in western style liberal democracies the audience is relatively easy to pin point, however in more authoritarian regimes the securitization process is less straightforward, particularly within the political sector. Within authoritarian regimes who do the elite need to address in order to move an issue from the political realm into that of security? What is the nature of this type of regimes audience, and is it legitimate? A more fundamental question would be do they make a securitizing move at all, and if so, which I believe they do, why? Why is it necessary for a regime that could or should be able to act unopposed, to seek the tacit approval of an audience?

[68] Muthiah Alagappa, (ed.) *Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: the quest for moral authority* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995)

Societal security is of great interest, and an area that is unique to the Copenhagen approach. The sector is made up from are the numerous collective identities that are independent from the state, examples of which would be ethnic or religious identities. In the societal sector, the referent object is one the numerous sub-groups that make up society, the identities that we subscribe to, and make up who we are. In the words of Buzan and Waever:

> For international security analysis, the key to society is those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political organisations concerned with government[69]

If an identity is existentially threatened then the elite can securitize the issue of the threat and call for extraordinary measures in order to remove the threat and secure the identity.

Whilst the definition above seems simple enough the concept of societal security is not unproblematic and therefore it is necessary to clarify the terminology further. For the purposes of securitization analysis, societal security is about the large, self-sustaining identity groups that individuals align themselves to. This large, self-sustaining identity group could be the state's population, since as Benedict Anderson famously notes a nation is an "imagined *community*". A nation is itself though often comprised of large, self-sustaining identity groups and is often referred to as multi-ethnic. Thus societal security can be used to examine the perception of threat that can exist within a multi-ethnic nation, such as Indonesia.

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[69] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.119

Since this concept was introduced however it has faced criticism and requires refinement. Perhaps the most important critique levelled at the approach is in questioning whether identity should be used as a referent object at all. This is a point that has been addressed in recent literature (for example Tobias Theiler) and I will develop further in part two of my thesis utilizing ideas from the discipline of social psychology. Social psychology is the study of "those mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness since they presuppose the reciprocal action of many".[70] It is this change of emphasis from individual identity to a larger, less reduced group/collective perception of identity that is necessary to fully address the concerns of the Copenhagen schools critics, and thus eradicate the problems associated with identity as a referent object. Theiler draws particular attention to the relatively recent psychological development of Social Identity Theory (SIT).[71] SIT is a method of explaining not only how and why social groups, and thus social identities, form but also why people need to form these groups in the first place. I have developed the work of Theiler to incorporate a wider section of the theories and concepts of Social Psychology to provide a more robust conception of Societal Security. I believe that this provides a clear notion of, and definition of, the group formation process itself. This allows a clearer understanding of what it is that is threatened, why identity is targeted by certain political actors, and more importantly, answers the critics of societal security by showing why societal groups are valid referent objects. This interdisciplinary approach, combining International Relations and Security Studies

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[70] W. Wundt cited in Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, *Social Psychology* (Third Edition) (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2002) p.112

[71] Tobias Theiler, 'Societal security and social psychology' *Review of International Studies* Vol.29 (2003) pp.249-268

with theories of Social Psychology, offers a more robust and empirically sound notion of societal security.

Whilst this sector seems to be a natural bedfellow to the Welsh School, or the Human Security camp, there are key differences that make it not a totally smooth alliance. For whilst it is true that this sector is about "…threats primarily to individuals (threats *in* society)" the distinction is that "…only if they threaten the breakdown of society do they become societal security issues."[72] So rather than becoming embroiled in the day to day concerns facing individuals, one sees how these challenges affect the collectivities these individuals belong to. For the examination of the third world this should be an adequate distinction. This is because there are many different hardships that individuals face, however many of them will not be able to garner enough resonance to lead to successful securitizations. And the more reductionist concerns of Human Security will likely impact upon society as a whole and thus be securitized, or politicised within different sectors, either way the issues are addressed or acknowledged within the framework.

The central importance of "Identity" in international relations theory is not one that originated with the Copenhagen School, and their position is a continuation of that put forward by Alexander Wendt,[73] and the Social Constructivist school of thought. Constructivists argue that in a "world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained by intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and

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[72] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.121 (emphasis in original)
[73] For example in Wendt, "Constructing International Politics" *International Security* Vol.20, No.1 (1995) pp.71-81; "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics", in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.) *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996) pp.47-64; *Social theory of International Politics.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and the seminal 1992 publication "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics" *International Organization* Vol.46, No.2 (1992) pp.391-425.

do, is one in which 'anarchy is what states make of it'".[74] What this is suggesting is that if one does not accept the traditional "atomistic" conceptions of the state, and instead think of states as entities with leaned identities and interests, then traditional/realist assumptions of international relations are brought into question. Rather than 'national interest' being a simple notion of state survival, interests in a constructivist world are derived from the identities that individual states have developed in discourse with other states.[75] And this in turn determines the behaviour of states within the international system.[76] Therefore, "daily life of international politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in relation to Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result".[77] It can be argued that identity is a fluid concept and that it changes and evolves over time.[78] This is a concept that is integral to Constructivist thinking. For example in his introduction to *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* Peter J. Katzenstein argues that a central reason for rethinking traditional security is to understand "why do the interests of some powerful states in the 1990s, but not in the 1930s…make them intervene militarily to protect the lives and welfare of citizens other than their own?"[79] It is therefore the changing nature of identity that has elevated it as a valid subject within both IR and security analysis, but this in turn problematises the Copenhagen School's claims that it can become a referent object.

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[74] Alexander Wendt, "Levels of Analysis vs. agents and Structures: Part III", *Review of International Studies* Vol.18, No.2 (1992) p.183
[75] Maja Zehfuss, "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison" *European Journal of International Relations* Vol.7, No.3 (2001) p.318
[76] For further examples of this argument see Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It" p.398; and Wendt, *Social theory of International Politics* p.231
[77] *Ibid.* p.21
[78] This is one critism (of several) that has been levelled at the Copenhagen approach by Bill McSweeny initially in Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School' *Review of International Studies* Vol.22 No.1 (1996) pp 81-93, and continued in "A Response to Buzan and Waever", *Review of International Studies* Vol.24, No.1 (2000) pp 137-40, and also *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). A full exploration of the criticisms of the Societal Sector are addressed in Chapter one.
[79] Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) pp.7-8

Previous approaches maintained the state as the primary referent object for analysis, and use identity merely as a variable to better understand state behaviour, whilst the Copenhagen School de-coupled identity from the state and instead argues that identity itself should be the focus of analysis. The Copenhagen School argue that the criticism that this is impractical due to the fluidity of identity is misplaced; this is due to the fact that whilst identities do change, a core value, label or conception of the identity still remains, and it is this label that subsequent members identify themselves with. So whilst what it is to be a British individual may alter, the fact that they are British does not. Whilst each generation of teenagers identify with different things, they are still teenagers.[80] So an existential threat within this sector would be something that would destroy that social group and make it impossible to identify yourself with it. For example policies that would make it illegal to practice your religion or speak your language. The problem for the study of this sector is in identifying what are merely evolutions, and what are assaults upon the identity as a whole, and perhaps more importantly what would be an extraordinary measure to combat such an assault? One concern is that a securitizing move in the societal sector may in fact lead to state intervention and a politicisation within the political sector, thus negating the utility of the sector for analysis (a critique further developed below). However whilst this is sometimes the case, it is also possible for perceived identity threats to be dealt with outside the state. These minority groups, rather than using the states legitimate apparatus devise their own strategies in order to "survive as a distinct culture".[81] The New framework highlights three strategies that can be used: "to dominate the existing government (e.g., Tutsis, whites under apartheid), to form their own [separate]

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[80] This discourse is closely examined by Paul Roe in his thesis on the *Societal Security problematic in Krajina and Transylvania.*
[81] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.122

government (Slovenes, Zionists) or to be left alone (traditionally, Jews in Europe)".[82]

It is worth noting that any one of these strategies can have drastic knock over effects within other sectors, for instance the Political. One newly emerging threat that the New Framework draws attention to is that of Globalization, or the homogenisation of Global culture. This ties in with Ayoob's notion that the Western norms and values can undermine third world security. This cannot only be a securitized issue, in how it destabilises regimes (Political sector) but also in how the indigenous cultures/identities react to this intrusion.[83] It is issues like this that make the societal sector a pivotal focal point of analysis of state security problems.

There are numerous criticisms of this approach to the study of Security, firstly because the New Framework sees security as a 'speech act', in which individuals determine what or what is not an issue worthy of merit, then we lose any objective notions of security, which is something the traditional, positivist strategists and security scholars constantly strive for, and also it distracts our attention from 'real' dangers that are in the world.[84] The crux of this argument however seems to be one of the focus for security analysis. The critics are more interested in what a security threat is, where as the Copenhagen School are more interested in how an issue becomes a security concern. Believing that in understanding how an issue is securitized we can more fully understand security predicaments/dilemmas and thus deal with the threats. Another critique is that some of the sectors seem, for want of a better term, irrelevant. That is, the areas themselves rarely are securitized, or tend to only be directly embroiled in security issues through indirect actions in other sectors.

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[82] *Ibid.*

[83] *Ibid.* p.138

[84] For an expansion of this critique see Olav F. Knudsen, 'Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization' *Security Dialogue* Vol. 32, No.3 (September 2001) pp.355-368

This is particularly the case with the political sector where the concerns of regimes can be "squeezed" or obscured by security incidents within other sectors.[85]   And because of the problematic nature of the political sector (which will be addressed in full in chapter one), scholars have decided in the past to address it in conjunction with these other incidents.   For instance Barry Buzan has used the terms "military-political" and "political-societal". By condensing the terms he both is acknowledging this problem, and offering a temporary solution, but also problematizing his own sectors.[86] Another problem/phenomenon that can occur is "spill over"[87], where issues emerge in one sector, but the responses to the issue has ramifications in other sectors. For example economic crises can result in environmental or societal threats.[88] This apparent sidelining of some issues, seemingly placing emphasis on the more traditional areas of study, seems to create a hierarchy within the sectors, where Buzan et al claim there is not one. To the critics, if the majority of security events take place within the state, and thus are seemingly explained by addressing the military, or military-political, sector, why should they focus their attention on the other 'redundant' sectors? The reasons for examining all sectors come down to what the Copenhagen school call 'Cross Sectoral Dynamics'.[89] This is because securitization is a social process, all other social processes colour the security actors' perceptions. So they "let security concerns from one sector color their security definitions in other sectors",[90] thereby making it easier or harder to securitize certain issues. That is, the perceptions and views held by the audience with respect to an event in one sector, can

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[85]. Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.141

[86] Examples of where Buzan has done this are: "National Security in the Post Cold War Third World", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* Vol.16, No.1 (1994) pp.1-34, and "The Post Cold-War Asia-Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Coopertaion" in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) pp.130-151

[87]Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* p.117

[88] *Ibid.* p.211

[89] *Ibid.* pp.163-194

[90] *Ibid.* p.190

determine their reactions vis-à-vis a second sector. Therefore "problems that on the surface seem to be military might, on closer inspection, turn out to be motivated by fears in the other sectors",[91] and so by ignoring the so called 'lesser' sectors you may in fact be ignoring the real root of insecurity.

This cross-sector dynamic is of particular relevance when considering the processes involved in political security. One of my key aims in this thesis is to determine the boundaries of the political sector. As discussed above, there is a difficulty in defining the referent object in this sector due to the fact that in effect everything can be considered political. Therefore by developing this area of the securitization concept, one will be able to formally define the sector and determine its utility. For if it can be argued that political sector security threats *all* cross over into secondary sectors, is it useful to keep political as a sector in its own right or is it more advantageous to consider security threats as being political economic, political military etc.

From the above discussion of the research literature I believe that there is a need to expand our conception of security away from the orthodox neo-realist state centric/military dominated definitions. Whilst I acknowledge the significant intellectual and normative advances that have been made by Critical Security Studies, I also feel that this more reductionist conception of security is so far removed from the orthodoxy, that it is virtually unrecognisable. In short by using the concept of individual emancipation as the referent for study, whilst one effectively broadens the concept of security to encapsulate a wider variety of potential security issues, but one

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[91] *Ibid.* p.167

also devalues the systemic/inter-state concerns that have traditionally dominated the discipline. This is why I feel that the Copenhagen School's securitization framework offers a more appropriate model for the expansion of security, because the Copenhagen School openly accepts that the traditional security dynamics still hold validity and are of central importance within the military sector, whilst at the same time their securitization model offers an alternative perspective on how and why an issue becomes considered a security issue. By reconceptualising beyond traditional ideas of power and interest, to instead posit that it is the discourse between the elites and audiences of dominant referent objects, it opens up the possibility to broaden the study of security beyond traditional boundaries, whilst still maintaining a clear analytical position. That is, not everything can be considered a security issue if it impacts upon individual freedoms, rather accepting that whilst theoretically everything can become a security issue, the logic of securitization and the intersubjective discourse between the elite and audience mean that security issues still have a sufficiently refined and definitive quality. With regards to the broadening agenda of security studies I believe this controlled broadening that the Copenhagen School offers the most intellectually satisfying solution to the problem of widening the agenda beyond traditional conceptions, whilst maintaining the analytical validity of security as a concept.

That said, the model is not unproblematic. The criticism of the approach, in particular with regards to its Sectoral expansion and the definitions of the referent objects has not been effectively addressed by the School itself. In part one of my thesis I will seek to address these problems with regard to the political and societal sectors. Chapter one will focus on the political sector, clarifying the referent object

with this sector, and what constitutes a political threat. I will address the concerns that the framework as it currently exists fails to effectively address the challenges that face the developing world and in particular authoritarian regimes. In order to do this I will incorporate the work of Mohammed Ayoob and Muthiah Alagappa to examine the issues that face a developing regime, and in particular intra-state challenges. Chapter two will look at recent developments in social psychology, and use them to bolster the claims made by Buzan and Waever regarding identity as a valid and verifiable referent object within the societal sector. I hypothesise that these operationalised concepts will provide a more robust analytical framework. I will then use the two models to examine the political and societal challenges that faced the Sukarno and Suharto regimes in post-colonial Indonesia.

Post-colonial Indonesia

My motives for using Indonesia as a case study are that I wish to address another criticism of the Copenhagen approach, that it is Eurocentric and not useful for the study of other areas. The case study in question is post-colonial Indonesia and the concept of securitization can be applied to its nation building experience in particular the formation and maintenance of political regimes and the ethnic tension between *pribumi* and *non-pribumi*.

The formation of both the nation and the regimes that govern it is particularly interesting with regards to Indonesia. Such a large and diverse nation state caused problems and difficulties even prior to its inception. How were these problems exploited by the independence movement and by the first regime 1947-1956? What institutions and processes were created and why? In this section I will carefully address the *Pancasilia*, the five principles upon which Indonesian nationhood and

nationality is based. What are the principles and what do they mean with regards to the establishing of a legitimate Indonesian regime? Chronologically, the next key event that is of interest is the attempt by Sukarno to transform the regime away from a western model towards an Indonesian model of "Guided" democracy. What was he hoping to achieve? What effect did it have on the perceived legitimacy of his rule, who was his audience and how did they react? What were the other effects of this transition? Another important question is how the international community responded to this change, was this new regime recognised favourably, and how did their recognition or lack of it lead to, or contribute towards, the eventual downfall of this regime and the September 30th 1965 coup? And how in turn did Suharto and the New Order react to the coup whilst establishing their own claims to govern, how did they usurp Sukarno's legitimacy, and effectively convince their audience that they were the right people to govern Indonesia?

For the New Order the central question is how did they balance the need for external recognition against the need for internal legitimacy? How were they able to effectively enforce their regime? What methods did they use, how did they adapt and develop their ideas, and finally what events eventually emerged to bring about their downfall? Interconnected with this analysis is the exploration of how both Sukarno and Suharto created and manipulated Indonesian identity. Both what it was to be Indonesian and perhaps more importantly what it was to *not* be Indonesian. Within this aspect of nation building I postulate that the "othering" of the Chinese was central to both regimes, but more effectively by the New Order, in establishing the group that they claimed to represent and thus their audience. Why did they target the Chinese for this treatment? What is in both national cultures and characters of both the ethnic

Chinese and the Indonesian's that lead to this segregation? What did the New Order do to resolve their issues with the ethnic Chinese and what effect did it have, not only on the Chinese but also on Indonesian as a whole? This will help address the question as to why these political regimes in Indonesia put as much time and energy as they did in seemingly secondary endeavours, when they could have been focusing their attention elsewhere. I argue that the policies they pursued were in fact central to the regimes attempts at establishing a coherent notion of Indonesia and therefore were central to the nation building process itself.

I believe that by using the securitization framework to examine Indonesia I will test the robustness of the operationalised concept. Therefore because this thesis is primarily concerned with securitization theory, rather than radically altering our perspective of post-colonial Indonesia[92], I decided to utilize the wealth of secondary data that is available from within the United Kingdom rather than utilize the archives and libraries in Indonesia, or conduct interviews. This is because whilst this would have been undoubtedly fruitful and interesting, the cost of a prolonged field trip in the region was not justifiable as it would not sufficiently advance the primary concerns of my thesis.

The structure of the thesis reflects the primacy of the securitization theory. In part one I address the problems with political and societal securitization and then in part two I seek to apply this operationalised concept. Chapters three and four look at the political challenges faced by Sukarno, initially looking at his struggle to establish a clear notion of what an independent Indonesia should be, looking at both the

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[92] Although I do believe that the securitization approach does offer a fresh perspective on both Sukarno and Suharto era Indonesia, and this in turn gives a better understanding of both the ethnic tensions that plagued this period and also the rise and fall of both regimes.

struggles he faced from within "Indonesia" and from the colonial powers of Japan and the Netherlands. Chapter four looks at how after establishing his vision of Indonesia he sort to further maintain his hold on power and it examines the two democratic models that he implemented and ultimately their failure. The failure of Sukarno's model of rule is addressed in chapter five, which examines how Suharto and the New Order successfully formulated and implemented their own agenda for Indonesia, and they effectively laid claim to the legitimate right to rule. Chapter six explores the New Order regime and how it manufactured Indonesia's political system in order to de-legitimise and weaken political opposition and thus was able to solidify their own grip on power until the economic crisis of 1997 sufficiently weakened the regimes claim to legitimacy and brought about the end of the New Order. Finally chapter seven explores the role of *pribumi* and non-*pribumi* relations in Indonesia and in particular the relationship between the Indonesian elites and the ethnic Chinese. It argues that the societal conflict and othering of the Chinese was integral to the establishment and survival of a coherent sense of Indonesian-ness.

In the two sections of my thesis I will answer the following questions. Firstly, it will show if there is a clearly definable referent object in the political sector, and if so what are the mechanisms that occur during the securitization process in this sector. Secondly, I show if it is possible to develop the concept of political security with particular reference to the problems that occur within the developing world. Next I will address the criticisms of societal securitization and see if it is possible to use the tools available within social psychology to create a more robust and clearly defined notion of identity. In part two, I will examine regime formation within Indonesia, and see whether the securitization process is applicable to the political security of an

authoritarian regime, both in its inception and in maintaining power. Finally I will utilise the opertaionalised societal concept to see if it enables us to better understand the ethnic troubles within Indonesia, and particularly Sino-Indonesian relations.

Part One: Operationalising the Political and Societal Sector

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Chapter One: Political Security: External Vs. Internal

Of the five sectors that were highlighted by the Copenhagen School, it is political sector that is the most problematic. This is because there is an apparent difficulty in separating political threats from threats directed at or emerging from other sectors. This however is a difficulty that has emerged from a lack of understanding in what political security actually entails. This problem with respect to political security was initially highlighted by Buzan et al within *Security: A New Framework*, where they state:

> The problem with the political security sector is that, paradoxically, it is the widest sector and is therefore also a residual category: In some sense, all security is political. All threats and defences are constituted and defined politically. Politicization is political by definition, and, by extension, to securitize is also a political act.[1]

This observation that "all security is political" is inadequate for defining political security as an area for study in its own right. Buzan elaborates that political security is the "sub group of political threats that do not use *massive* military, identificational, economic or environmental means"[2] thus giving the sector the appearance of a theoretical overflow, which is reserved for all issues that do not comfortably fit within other sectors. This conception of political security does not tell us very much about what a political security issue is, rather it informs us as to what it is not. Therefore if the political sector is to establish an identity of its own, several

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[1] Barry Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1998) p.141
[2] *Ibid.* p.142 (emphasis added)

points need to be clarified in order to remove its theoretical ambiguity. Firstly, it is necessary to define the political sector and establish what it is that is threatened. Secondly, how is the political sector threatened? What constitutes a threat, and from where do these threats originate? By addressing these questions this will enable analysis of the discourse in which security issues within the political sector are resolved. Within this chapter I will address these points, and also make the claim that the current bias towards external political threats is misplaced and in actuality internal challenges are equally prevalent, especially in relation to the developing world.

What is the referent in the Political sector?

The political sector is the realm where authority has been institutionalised. That is the governments, institutions and bodies that either already wield authority and power, or those actors that seek to gain that power and authority themselves.[3] Therefore the referent objects for the political sector are these political units themselves, but how does one effectively define a political unit? Charles Tilly lays an appropriate foundation in his definition of the state. He stipulates that they are "coercion-wielding organizations that are 'distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations… The term therefore includes city states, empires theocracies, and many other forms of government, but excludes tribes, lineages, firms, and churches as such'[4]".[5] Buzan et al expand this notion further claiming "[a] political unit is a collectivity that has gained a separate existence from its subjects. It *can be* a firm or a church, not in their

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[3] *Ibid.* pp.145-50(*passim.*)
[4] The "as such" is an acknowledgement of the fact that historically some typically non-political units, for instance churches, can in fact develop a political aspect.
[5] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990) pp.1-2

basic capacities as economic or religious units but only to the extent that they act according to the political logic of governing large groups of people."[6] The most obvious 'political unit' therefore would be the state, which is still the primary and dominant referent in international relations.

Buzan and Waever observe that there are three classes of state, which can be classified based upon their level of development: Modern, Premodern, and Postmodern.[7] Modern is the archetypal "Westphalian" state model, it is this that represents what it is to be *developed*. It is defined as having "strong government control over society and restrictive attitudes towards openness. They see themselves as independent and self-reliant entities, having distinctive national cultures and development policies"[8]. Premodern states are those that have low levels of socio-political and economic cohesion and also have "poorly developed structures of government".[9] States at this level of development may have yet to attain modern status, this may be the case for a new state, or it may be that the state in question has "failed",[10] that is it did fulfil all the criteria to be classified as being modern at one time but no longer does. Buzan and Waever establish a case that could lead to this lapse in status. In the case of some developing states, particularly those with authoritarian regimes, the regimes may establish themselves as being at a higher state of development than is strictly true. These states are said to "impose modernity",[11] that is, they successfully emulate the role of a developed state. However, because this is an artificial situation, that is, they are *not* in the same developmental position as

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[6] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.143
[7] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp.22-26
[8] *Ibid.* pp.22-3
[9] *Ibid.* p.24
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.* p.23

other modern states, it is possible for there to be a backlash in which the veneer of modernity collapses. Those in power will find that in actuality it has some serious developmental issues that have not been addressed and thus it loses its status. Examples of imposed modern regimes would be Iraq (pre-2003), Iran and North Korea.[12] Postmodern or post-Westphalian states appear much like modern states, but "they have a much more open and tolerant attitude towards cultural, economic, and political interaction".[13] Postmodern states do not see borders, sovereignty and national identity as being as important as their modern counterparts, instead developing institutions and are less concerned with the "inside/outside" politics that preoccupies modern and premodern states.[14] Examples of postmodern states are the member states of the European Union. Buzan and Waever observe that in reality states rarely perfectly fit into one of these three models and it is better to think of a spectrum of development that these states are moving through, with premodern at one extreme and postmodern at the other.[15]

Whilst the state *is* currently dominant in international relations, this is not necessarily a permanent arrangement but rather the political *reality* that security analysts, political institutions, and those attempting to create political institutions, find themselves in today.[16] For the Copenhagen school the primary referent object within the political realm is *not* the state itself, but rather the principles, ideas and institutions that allow a state to function. That is, they give the states elite (the government) the authority, both internally and externally, to effectively 'govern'. These principles,

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[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.* pp.23-4
[15] *Ibid.* p.22
[16] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* pp.143-4

ideas and institutions are called the political regime.[17] The political regime is "the formal and informal organization of the centre of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not."[18] The regime can also be defined as referring to "the principles, institutions, and procedures that constitute the political system."[19] A threat to the political regime would target the two pillars upon which all regimes are built: the first is the internal legitimacy of the regime, and the second is its external recognition. Political security is about the survival of the unit that currently represents the state and/or the population that make up the state. This is not to be confused with military security, threats to the physical integrity of the state, or societal security, threats to the ethnic identity/identities of the people or peoples that inhabit the state.   Political security is concerned with the threats to the instruments of power, the institutions, principles and apparatus that enable effective governance, or conversely it is concerned with attacks made against those who seek to eliminate the incumbent regime. Those alternative/opposition political units that are attempting to change the current political order. An appropriate example of the complexity of this sector of security studies is that of the struggle for independence. The ruling regime will attempt to target the political organisations that threaten their position, for example opposition political parties, newspapers, and individuals. This is an attack to weaken the capability of those that wish to usurp them. It is a move made in order to defend their ability to govern effectively. When such a move is made it can blur the line between societal, military and political security, depending

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[17] *Ibid.* p.144, 150. Also; Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear* (2nd Edition) (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) Chapter 2 (passim); and Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003) p.63

[18] Robert Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy" *World Politics* Vol.42, No.3 (1990) p.428

[19] Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: the quest for moral authority* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) p.27

upon the methods implemented by the regime, this blurring can make establishing the root cause of a securitizing move problematic. The overlap of security sectors however is inevitable as many of the principles, ideas and institutions that are at the heart of the regime have antecedents outside the political sector, for instance the societal sector or military. Are a regime's actions ethnically motivated or is it trying to assert its authority upon a situation? Is the regime in power targeting institutions because they belong to a particular ethnic group, or is the ethnicity of the group secondary to the fact that the regime feels that the group it is targeting is trying to weaken their ability to govern? Conversely the actions of the independence movements also need to be scrutinised. Are they attacking the incumbent regime because they feel that the regime has no right to hold power over them, or is it because they do not like the regime's ethnic make up? This analysis is made doubly difficult because ethnic slurs can colour the language of the parties involved in a political struggle. Therefore either making the conflict shift into the societal arena, or simply give the impression of this occurring. A similar blur can occur between the political and military sectors by virtue of the fact that the governing regime may make a securitizing move in the name of the state, which, if accepted, will provide the regime with the means to remove the threat posed by their political opponents, this action will move the nature of the conflict out of the political and into the military sector.[20]

The problem of identifying which sector the issue that is being securitized is within is even more acute within premodern states. This is due to the need that they have to establish themselves within the international system as a whole, and also the

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[20] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.146

fact that they are more prone to threats that target the regime's internal legitimacy. This is because the regimes in developing states have not been long established and therefore there is the likelihood of those within the state who will question the legitimacy of the new regime. However, within modern and postmodern states, the regime is more established and accepted as being the norm, and as a result challenges to its legitimacy are less likely.[21] What are also established within modern regimes are the boundaries of the ordinary and the principles, rules and ideas that lie at the heart of the political order. These will have permeated into the wider population of the state and have been accepted. This means that the population itself have become an institution within the regime (for example within democracies) and therefore it widens the number of authorities within the sector and therefore the places where a move in defence of the political regime can originate.

It is important to note the difference here between *principles* and *values* as referents that can be securitized. A *principle* can be securitized as a referent object because it can be existentially threatened. *Values* by contrast cannot, at least not by the political unit itself. This is because a value is essentially an individual interpretation of the central principal and therefore more difficult to securitize.[22] For example even a relatively straightforward principle like the belief in the sanctity of human life can in actuality lie at the heart of numerous, sometimes opposing values. So for instance with regards to the death penalty being the appropriate punishment for a convicted murderer, people who are in favour of capital punishment can argue that it is acceptable as a form of deterrent and also a method of emphasising the seriousness of the crime, whilst those opposing would argue that all life is sacred. Both cases can

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[21] *Ibid.* p.146
[22] *Ibid.* p.148, pp.161-2

be made using the same central principle. If a principle is deemed to be important enough then the threat can be perceived as being existentially damaging to the current political order and therefore there is the possibility of securitization.

What is a threat in the Political sector?

Having established that it is the political regime that is threatened it is necessary to address what it is that constitutes an existential threat to the regime. For Buzan:

> Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state… The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organising ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state.[23]

Therefore within the political sector, whilst the state is an important entity it is not the state itself that is threatened but rather the principles, ideas and institutions that make up the state. If one imagines that the human body is the state, a political threat does not target the body itself directly but rather the immune system, central nervous system and those processes that allow the body to function effectively. For Buzan and Waever politics is about the discourse between these institutions, the principles and ideas that each has, and the discourse between those currently controlling the institutions and those who wish to change the current order.[24]

[23] Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (2nd Edition) p.118
[24] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* pp.142-3

For the Copenhagen approach political security is an evolution of the classical tradition that includes the likes of Machiavelli who see politics as "a continuous struggle to establish the quasi-permanence of an ordered public realm"[25], political security is about "threats to the legitimacy or recognition either of political units or of the essential patterns (structures, processes or institutions) among them."[26] It is about the struggle that political units have in order to establish themselves, and then maintain their position as a member of the international community. This is not something that can be achieved via force of will, but rather it is a matter of "international subjectivity, of statehood and other forms of international being, to which the individual unit has to relate."[27] For Buzan the political regime has three main components that can be attacked. These are: Physical Base, Institutions, and Ideas.[28] The physical base is the geographical area that is administered by the regime, and this can be threatened by several means, and potentially other sectors, namely economically, environmentally or militarily. If the regime no longer has somewhere to administer or govern then this will be existentially damaging. The physical base is essentially the State itself, and as such it is unlikely that an existential threat to the physical base, although it is fundamental to the regime, would be securitized as a "political" issue. Rather the move is more likely to be made within the military or environmental sectors, depending upon the nature of the threat. Institutions are similar in nature to the physical base in that any actual attack upon an institution can be explained more effectively through the sector that the physical issue emerged, for instance military or economic. The aspect that links both institutions and the physical base into the political sector however is in the ideas upon which the political

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[25] *Ibid.* p.144
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] Buzan, *People, States and Fear.* Chapter 2

institutions (including in many instances the nation state itself) are based.[29] Within the remit of ideas, any principle can potentially gain significance and be existentially threatened; however three that are seen as being particularly important within international security policy are nationalism, political ideology and sovereignty. These lie at the heart of any regime's claim to legitimacy and recognition, as they help to define that they are the appropriate body to administer their region. This can cause problems for premodern states where the claims to statehood are or can be relatively recent developments and as such challenges to the legitimacy of the regime can become security issues; this is not as likely in the developed world where challenges of this nature are more likely to have an institutional or politicised outlet. Thus if the ideas that lie at the heart of the regime can be weakened, the nature of the current political and social order can also be changed. If the ideas that lie at the heart of a regime's claim to govern are threatened and this threat constitutes an existential threat to the regime, the elite will need to use whatever means necessary – including extraordinary measures- to defend the regime. An example of an elite utilising such methods to remove a threat to their regime would be the Stalinist purges in the Soviet Union. The incarceration and execution of key political opponents by Stalin was a way of ensuring his political survival and therefore the survival of his regime.

Securitization in the Political sector and the "Securitization Paradox"

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Copenhagen model of security analysis is the primacy of discourse and debate to the establishment of security threats. The dialogue that emerges between the audience and elite that initiates the passage of an issue from the politicised to the securitized realms of the security spectrum is

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[29] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.150

particularly interesting when one examines the political sector. Because of the lack of a "physical" referent within this sector, the securitization process is forever rooted within the theatre of political discourse in a way that is less apparent within other sectors. For instance even within the societal sector there *is* an actual, real ethnic group whose ethnic identity has been threatened, whereas in a political security situation it is an idea that is being challenged. As explored above, the three aspects of the political unit can all be threatened but attacks upon the institutions or the physical base would be conducted from within other sectors, and as such a securitizing move from the elite would be couched as being an existential threat to the referents of these sectors rather than the regime. However, for ideas, the existential threat can only be made in the name of the regime,[30] and because the biggest threat to an idea is another competing idea, the discourse and debate that occurs as a response to a threat is even more crucial within the political sector.

The process of securitization within the political sector differs slightly from what occurs within other security sectors. In the other sectors the process that occurs is that a securitizing move is made, which may or may not lead to the authorisation for the use of extraordinary means to rectify the situation. Within the political sector however this is only the start of a larger phenomenon, for there is the secondary problem, which I call a "securitization paradox". The securitization paradox occurs because of the dual nature of the discourse. Within the political sector the securitizing move is not merely followed by the authorising or denying response from the audience, but also a counter-securitizing move from the body that initiated the threat. Buzan et al discuss this problem with particular reference to international

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[30] Although it may be worded in terms such, as "this is a threat to our way of life".

intervention. In this instance the intervening power will call upon a principle in order to justify the extraordinary step of intervention, for example referring to an act of genocide or aggression. Buzan et al observe that in such an instance "dual securitization" takes place as the government that is the 'victim' of the intervention will protest against this act, most likely claiming that its sovereignty is being violated and it will do whatever is necessary to defend itself from the violation. What is occurring is that there are two competing securitizing acts, which are both in the defence of two different but equally fundamental principles.[31] As such there will be a debate between the opposing sides resulting in compromise, conflict or one side backing down.

This dynamic is also of particular relevance to the study of developing states and the problems of regime formation itself, more particularly with regards to internal security threats. This is because at the early stages of regime formation there are typically numerous competing groups all laying claim to the legitimate right to rule. Therefore, if one can understand the dynamic of securitization and counter-securitization that occurs within the political sector, then one can have a better understanding of what is occurring in at the early stages of regime formation.

It can be argued that this counter-securitization that is observed within the political sector is not unique to political security and a discourse of this kind occurs in all securitization situations. However because of the fact that the escalation of "hostilities" that occurs within the political sector never leaves the discourse stage, this means that the securitization paradox, whilst not unique to the political sector, the

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[31] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* pp.148-50

conditions surrounding political securitization mean that it is more likely to arise here than in other sectors. The debate escalates and it can fuel security incidents within other sectors but the political security incident itself will remain rooted in discourse, the issue only being resolved via compromise on the part of the competing "elites", or the removal of the physical base and/ or institutions through another sector.[32] The paradox is that the political security threat may not actually result in victory for either party within the political sector itself.

Within *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* Buzan et al establish two main types of dual securitization processes, that can lie at the heart of securitization paradoxes: Intentional and Unintentional.[33] Intentional threats can originate from within the state or from a neighbour and will be a single-minded assault on the regime in place with the intention of removing one or all pillars of the regime. An example of this would be an independence movement such as the Vietminh in Vietnam. Their *raison d'etre* was to liberate Vietnam from initially the Japanese and then the colonial French. Their defining principle was that of self-determination and it was diametrically opposed to the imperialist principles that defined the actions of their colonial opponents. Their every act was designed in order to undermine the regimes that were in place. Unintentional threats by way of contrast, may have systemic or structural antecedents that erode the pillars of the regime and thus necessitate a securitizing move. An example of an unintentional security threat would be the European Union.[34] As this institution grows it encroaches upon areas that would traditionally belong to the nation state, for example the right to establish their own

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[32] The third possible outcome, one side backing down, is typically a merely a delaying tactic and just leaves more time for the 'disagreement' to fester.
[33] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* pp.154-60
[34] *Ibid.* p.151, 152

laws and rule without external intervention. As such for some Europe is seen as being a threat and some groups, for example the United Kingdom Independence Party, politicise issues and others, for example the British National Party, go further and attempt to securitize issues with reference to sovereignty and national independence, claiming that the EU threatens Britain's political system. If the defining principles of one regime put them at odds with another then an unintentional securitization cycle can occur, for instance if a regime establishes itself on a principle of being anti-communist, any communist unit, whether it is internal or external in origin will see the regime as a threat and react accordingly, and vice versa. Equally if a regime is defined by a principle that loses potency over time, then the very principle that offered protection and stability initially can now either become a threat to the current political order, which could occur if there was a drastic shift in the balance of power between two dominant powers. For example in Indonesia, Sukarno's decision to position his regime to the left and thus allay himself with the Communist powers of the region, in particular the People's Republic of China, meant that the United States and the West saw his regime as being a political threat. Another reason that the principles the regime is based on can weaken the regime's position is if other political units no longer recognise the principle as being significant, the idea no longer is sufficient to act as a pillar for the regime. A good example of this would be the New Order regime. In 1966 their anti-Communist stance was an adequate foundation and was enough to ensure effective relations with the dominant powers in the region. By the mid-1990s however this principle was both irrelevant and insufficient and so the regime found itself being criticised by the same powers that had supported it at its inception. However for the regime that finds itself being existentially threatened,

whether the attack is intentional or not is essentially irrelevant, as extraordinary measures still must be taken in order to re-stabilise the regime.[35]

External Political Security in Premodern Regimes

Within the current literature there is a bias towards the study of externally based security threats.[36] There are several reasons for this, firstly due to the dominance of Realism in international relations there is a bias towards a systemic ontological perspective within the literature. This is not purely symptomatic of the perspectives of the writers, but also it reflects the attitudes of the audience, in this case the Euro-American academic communities who still make up the mainstream of the discipline. Whilst there is a move away from state centric perspectives (as was shown in the Introduction) the dominance of Realism and Neo-realism still permeates these alternative approaches. Secondly, because the research was being carried out by Europeans, and the primary case studies for the initial research was the western world, in particular Western Europe, then it is not surprising their research was more concerned on external issues. This is due to the fact that in the security calculations of these regimes the simple truth is that political security threats are concerned with interstate relations, due to the fact that their domestic situation is relatively fixed and stable, and therefore unlikely to be threatened from an internal actor.[37] This means that the threats directed towards these regimes were predominantly issues that questioned the regimes position in the international system itself, namely issues of external recognition. This is highlighted further within *A New Framework* where in exploring and defining potential political security challenges the text focuses almost

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[35] *Ibid.* pp.154-59
[36] An Example of this perspective would be Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Order in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993)
[37] Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* p.152

exclusively on the two principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the discourse between the state elite and external actors.[38] Where the possibility of local security challenges does arise, the text argues that whilst political challenges are rarely regional/bilateral engagements, but also they are "almost never local [intrastate]" affairs.[39] However, for many developing states external security, that is ensuring recognition from the international system, whilst it is important, is secondary to the immediate problem of establishing a legitimate claim to power. Whilst it is true that external recognition is vital for the fledgling regime, the immediacy of internal threats can have a far more debilitating effect upon their chances of survival. It is this problem that Mohammed Ayoob addresses in *The Third World Security Predicament*.

Ayoob observes "[given] the historical juncture at which Third World states find themselves, this means their security calculus must take into account domestic as well as external threats."[40] The juncture that Ayoob is highlighting is the immediate aftermath of colonial rule, where for most third world states the single most important action that must be undertaken is the nation building process. This is where the new political order is established, the ideas are formulised, and the factors that make the political unit what it is, both physical and ideological, are laid down. Ayoob stipulates that there are three main activities that make up this are; War, Policing, and Taxation. Whilst these three processes do not effectively show all of the processes that are at work during the regime formation process what Ayoob does highlight is the mechanism by which the state elite establish both the physical base and also the

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[38] *Ibid.* pp.150-60
[39] *Ibid.* p.159
[40] Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) p.11

formation of the primary institutions that allow a regime to function. War is concerned with the expansion and consolidation of the "territorial and demographic domain" that the regime will administer.[41] This is the establishment of the physical base upon which the regime is based. For Ayoob war also incorporates the activity of imposing order upon those within the "domain". Once order has been imposed then policing becomes the primary activity. For Ayoob, policing is "[the] maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has already been imposed".[42] This is a long-term project and in order to be successful requires full implementation of the third activity, taxation. Taxation is "[the] extraction of resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state essential to support not only the war-making and policing activities undertaken by the state but also maintenance of apparatuses of state necessary to carry on routine administration, deepen the state's penetration of society, and serve symbolic purposes."[43] In short these three activities are necessary to enable a new regime to establish itself (war), but then also ensure that it is able to sustain any and all threats that come its way (policing and taxation). What Ayoob is describing here is the creation of the physical base and institutions that are the foundations of the regime. It is the role of a new regime's elite to move its physical base/state through the developmental spectrum in order to attain an advantageous position, namely modern and ultimately postmodern status.

However for new regimes, this first task is a far from straightforward operation. This is because aside from the "universal" challenges of war, policing and taxation, regimes that are entering the current international political system face a second significant problem. The problem is that the current system is a far less favourable

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[41] *Ibid.* p.22
[42] *Ibid.* pp.22-3
[43] *Ibid.* pp.22-3

environment than the one in which their predecessors developed. There have been changes in the international system, both in terms of technology and ideology, that mean the developing state is constantly being assessed, monitored and judged by others. The technological changes are quite fundamental to the world that we now find ourselves in. When the European and American regimes were established the world was a very different in terms of communication and transportation, and it is developments within these two technological areas that have a fundamental impact upon new regimes today. The world today is a far more accessible place, to the extent that to a large degree if something has a significant impact upon one part of the globe, then it has repercussions everywhere else. This is due to developments within transportation and communication. The developments in transportation mean that people travel much more widely and cheaply, meaning that these once unknown or far away places are now known and more readily visited. This means that people now have affinities with these places and therefore feel affected by events that happen there. Developments in communication have had a far more serious impact, for not only can people travel to these places, but they can now relay information about what is going on there to people back home, instantaneously. This has lead to the creation of a mass media, which quickly and effectively draws attention to anything that is considered inappropriate by western populations. This ties in with the changes that have occurred in terms of ideology, particularly in postmodern regimes. A significant change that has emerged from the west, but it has spread, is that there is an acceptance of universal rights, which all human beings should enjoy. This means that if or when, the media report on events that occur in the developing world, it can provoke a reaction from western populations. Therefore, not only does the regime need to effectively resolve the issues of war, policing and taxation, but it has to do this in a

way that is deemed to be acceptable by the rest of the international system, or at the very least it must not behave in a way that alienates itself from the more powerful regimes within the system. This is not because there is any real risk of external intervention, but rather there is a need on the part of the new regime to "fit in" with the dominant regimes in the system. If it is perceived as being a rogue regime then it can have repercussions in matters such as economic policy or tourism.

The second problem that new regimes face is that they need to establish themselves *quickly*. The European and western regimes were able to develop at their own pace, able to slowly resolve problems in the most effective way. This ensured that the regimes that developed were stable, legitimate in the eyes of their populations, and recognised by other regimes. This process created a template of what a regime and nation-state should be. It is this template that all new regimes need to emulate, and it also the standard by which new regimes are measured. However, in the current order, new regimes do not have the luxury of time that their predecessors were afforded and this means that they find it difficult to attain the results that they desire and thus the nation building process is more difficult.

In the same way as the rest of the world is now able to observe and therefore influence the nation building process, those regimes in development are also able to see those that have already developed, and this interaction has an effect upon their own actions. One possible outcome is that they will not find an effective, "unique" solution to their developmental issues. Instead they follow the example that was left to them by the states that have already attained modern or postmodern status. However, in so doing they may not actually find an appropriate solution to the

problems that they face. After all the realities that a seventeenth century European regime faced are not the same as those of a twentieth century regime in Southeast Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa.[44] The second side effect of the interaction that premodern regimes face is that because there are states already 'flaunting' the fruits of development, the new regimes work to an accelerated timetable to reap the benefits themselves. They are constantly in a state of playing 'catch-up' with the rest of the world, and because of this corners may be cut in the building of the pillars of the political unit itself. This means that important developmental issues may be overlooked in their policy formulation as they focus their attention on the "goal" of becoming "developed". This leaves them vulnerable to criticism; both from within and without, and therefore inevitably weakens their position developmentally speaking.

Whilst Ayoob does not explicitly discuss the third pillar of the regime (founding principles and ideas), he does observe that within third world security the options available to a developing regime are limited by the principles of the international system that these regimes find themselves in. Historically the principle of sovereignty was so engrained and dominant that what occurred within a nation's boarders was its business and no one else's. This means that whilst nation building was a violent and bloody process, there was no public out cry or external intervention to limit the actions of the developing regimes. For regimes in the twentieth and twenty first centuries however the principle of sovereignty is less dominant as it once was to those members of the international system who are positioned in the postmodern area on the development spectrum, which is compounded by the presence of the global mass

[44] *Ibid.* p.27

media, and it means that the options available to a regime are again limited, as they do not wish to garner negative publicity. At the same time the international system dictates that in order to be accepted as an equal member of the system, then the new states must behave and act in the same way as the current members. This creates an extra level of pressure as the state attempts to resolve its problems using methods that are not necessarily best suited for the task.[45] This as a notion parallels the Copenhagen schools principle of recognition. An example of this would be Sukarno's attempts to establish a western style democracy in Indonesia post independence. This was an attempt at emulating existing models of state administration, but Sukarno abandoned this system in 1957, claiming that "[Indonesia] had used the wrong system, a wrong style of government…an import democracy…not in harmony with our [Indonesia's] spirit…not in harmony with our personality".[46] Sukarno went on to describe his model of Guided Democracy, or *Gotong Rojong*, as being "an authentic Indonesian term which gives the purest reflection of the Indonesian soul".[47] By behaving in the same way as an established regime behaves, therefore the regime will garner the same recognition and respect. In much the same way as in human psychological development, we feel the need to fit in and be part of a group, political regimes want to be part of the international group of states. They want to be viewed by other regimes as being an equal, or at the very least valid. This need for recognition therefore hinders their own actions and policies, and so they must conduct themselves not only with their goals in mind, but also the opinions and values of the rest of the international community and their neighbours.

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[45] Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* p.27
[46] Sukarno cited in Geoff Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p.154
[47] *Ibid.*

The consequences of failing to balance these two problems can be incredibly detrimental to the security of the regime that is in place. For Ayoob security is defined in relation to vulnerabilities "that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and [the] governing regimes."[48] At the heart of third world security policy is the need to limit these vulnerabilities, but as explored above, the ruling elites must try to achieve this under difficult circumstances. If a regime were able to totally ignore the opinions and values of the international community, then this could potentially enable the elite to more effectively remedy the regime's internal vulnerabilities and conduct its nation building, in a way more appropriate for their particular problems. However, even though their internal situation may be perfectly, uniquely, and appropriately resolved, because the regimes actions may violate the founding principles of other regimes in the international system, this means that the regime may indirectly weaken itself with respect to its external vulnerabilities. And whilst it is unlikely that the regime will come under direct threat from an external power, the elite may however find that it is not viewed favourably in other areas of international politics and diplomacy, for example the economic sanctions towards Cuba since 1957, South Africa in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, and Iraq in the 1990s. Even more damaging is the possibility of an external regime offering support to an internally based rival and thus strengthening their cause against the incumbent regime. The seriousness of the violation and the importance that the violated principle holds to the offended regime would determine the magnitude of their response, however ultimately it could result in the regime being existentially threatened by an external power, or at the very least the regime would be weakened. By contrast if the regime remains focused upon the wishes of the

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[48] Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* p.7 (emphasis in original)

international community and neglects their domestic agenda, then either the nation building process could fail, or other groups within the state will make the claim that they are better suited to administer power. This could result in an existential threat from within. The regime's legitimacy can then be questioned and if it is to survive then extraordinary measures would be required to remedy the situation. So even though the primary concern of a premodern regime is internal in focus, the regime's elite's task is even more difficult due to the state of the international system that they are in. The nature of the current political system means that external political threats can negatively impact upon their primary task of nation/state formation and development. And so whilst unlike in postmodern regimes where security challenges are "almost never local", the external challenges are likely to have internal repercussions. And many of the internal challenges will actually have external antecedents.

Internal Political Security in Premodern Regimes

Internal security is based upon ability of the regime to be legitimate in the eyes of those that it has power over. Legitimacy is the cement that holds a regime in place; it "achieves what power alone cannot, for it establishes the belief in the rightness of rule which, as long as it endures, precludes massive challenges".[49] Regime legitimacy is concerned with the acknowledgement of the regimes claim to govern, and it is obtained through dialogue with those who are to be governed. It is a dual process in which the right to command is coupled with the obligation to obey by the populous.[50] If the population do not feel obliged to obey, for instance if they do not feel the ruling

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[49] Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) p.17
[50] Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* p.11

elite represent their interests, then political legitimacy is insecure and therefore the regime may be existentially threatened. Examples of where the population do not acknowledge the right to rule of the regime would be the case of the Republican movement in Northern Ireland or the Basque separatists in Spain. In both of these cases sections of the ruled population feel no obligation to obey the ruling elite and thus the legitimacy of the regimes are weakened in those regions. The dual process model is adequate when defining political legitimacy and therefore security in most developed/democratic regimes. Here the population at large has a significant and frequently constitutionally defined role to play. This means that any incumbent government *inherits* a secure and legitimate position, with out the regime itself being called into question. However the dual process model is less apt for addressing the issues of legitimacy that emerge within premodern/developing states.[51] Here the role of the population is less favourable than those of developed/democratic regimes, and in particular with reference to authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian regimes the population as a whole appear to have a very little role to play at all in the process of legitimisation. This particular criticism has been levelled toward the Copenhagen model by Ralf Emmers. The critique lies in the fact that during the process of securitization, the securitizing authority or elite must engage with an audience. But in an authoritarian regime who or what is this audience, and why would a dictatorship be required to take part in the discourse that securitization logic suggests?[52] It would appear that by its very nature an authoritarian regime would not make this move. An authoritarian elite would have no need for audience participation, and thus it would

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[51] Definitions of modern, premodern and postmodern states discussed on pp.42-3 of this thesis
[52] Emmers and others participating in the Non-traditional security project at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Nanyang, Singapore have voiced this concern with the Copenhagen framework in correspondence, though as yet have not expressed it in print.

appear that the Copenhagen framework does not, or cannot explain what occurs in these regime types.

Therefore, whilst securitization theory can be used to examine why some challenges become security issues in the modern and postmodern world, it appears to be less useful when examining challenges that face developing states. Where authoritarian regimes and dictatorships seemingly pay no heed to the wills of the people, or the people are too terrorised to feel able to speak up against the wishes of the regime that is in power. That said the fact that the securitizing authority is undemocratic does not change the need to gain legitimacy. This is because in the current international political system, the dominant states all place emphasis on the need for other regimes to mirror the same political systems that they adopted, which includes being legitimate.[53] This is another example of internal and external political security issues overlapping, the *need* of the regime to be recognised means that it also *needs* to be legitimate. A regime's actions need to be seen as coming from a legitimate source, and because the regime that is in place wants to be recognised and be secure from external pressures, the regime will therefore do what it can in order to be seen to be legitimate. In the Words of Muthiah Alagappa:

Legitimation of power is an interactive and therefore dynamic process among the government, the elite groups, and *the politically significant public*: those in power seek to legitimate their control and exercise of that power; [and] the subjects seek to define their subordination in acceptable terms[54]

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[53] Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Power* p.24
[54] Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* p.13 (Emphasis added)

Therefore for Alagappa the existence of a less than democratic system does not ultimately change the process by which legitimation is achieved, rather he believes that it is occurring in a more selective way. By this I mean that the regime still seeks the approval of an audience, but rather than looking for the acceptance of the entire population, they target an audience of the "politically significant". Now depending on the nature of the regime in place, who and what is significant will vary, but the process of legitimisation still needs to be undertaken, and an audience needs to be in place. Alagappa goes on to explain the process of legitimisation as being "characterized by projections and counter projections of legitimacy, by contestation of meanings, and by deployment of resources including coercion, negotiation, and possibly suppression and elimination."[55] Thus Alagappa has highlighted the dual process of the securitization paradox, and interestingly this paradox is perhaps more evident within developing/non-democratic regimes than within the developed world that the securitization approach is argued to favour. For Alagappa the nature of the struggle is an attempt by the contesting parties, that is the regime and those opposed to the regime, to gain legal validity for their principles and also gain consent from their audience.[56] The legal validity is of importance as it gives the regime/or counter regime, the power to define the realm of the ordinary, and in doing so setting the boundaries of the *extra*-ordinary, thereby creating the parameters of any securitizing moves that they may wish to make. This discourse lies at the heart of the securitization paradox. An important part of this process is to ensure that "adequate procedures exist for the population to express their dissatisfaction... [thereby ensuring that] they can be satisfied within the existing political framework".[57] What this suggests is that even within an authoritarian system there is a need to establish within

[55] *Ibid.* pp.13-4
[56] *Ibid.* p.14
[57] Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia* p.64

their political regime an appropriate safety valve of this nature. This does not mean the formation of democracy, or a free press, but rather the "politically significant" must feel that they have an avenue or mechanism whereby they can channel their frustrations. For instance within Indonesia both Sukarno and Suharto established a parliamentary system of politics where potential politically significant dissidents could participate within their respective regimes. If a regime does not effectively find a place to channel potential opposition then their ability to govern will be hampered, this is because their energies will be spent using non-political means, for example martial law, to secure themselves. This is necessary to ensure the longevity of the regime, because any potential opposition can be satisfied without needing to resort to methods that may existentially threaten those in power. If the regime is particularly careful in how they define their political institutions, principles and frameworks, in essence defining the *ordinary,* then they will be able to keep many of the more undesirable actions of regime formation[58] outside of the securitized area of the political spectrum. This is beneficial not only in securing the regime internally, but also in being able to avoid drawing undue attention to the less favourable processes of nation building, this allows them to secure their legitimacy without negatively effecting their international standing *vis a vis* their external recognition.

Elite-Audience discourse in Premodern Regimes

The elite of the regime will emerge from out of the same group that make up their politically significant audience.[59] Therefore when the ordinary is defined, it is carried out with reference to a pre-existing framework of the social and ideological

[58] From the perspective of the international system.
[59] Tobias Theiler, 'Societal security and social psychology' *Review of International Studies* Vol.29 (2003) p.261

principles, which are shared by both the elite *and* the audience. This means that authoritarian regimes can achieve a degree of legitimacy that would appear alien from a western/liberal perspective.

A command-obedience relationship may be defined as legitimate if the political order in which it is rooted is based on shared norms and values, if the government in concern acquired power in conformity with established rules, if that power is exercised within prescribed limits for the promotion of the community's collective interest, and if the governed have given their consent to the incumbent government.[60]

This acceptance of an authoritarian regime can also be explained by the circumstances in which it came to gain power. For example, "it may have brought about the removal of a despotic regime or of an authority installed by an external agency such as a colonial power".[61] If a regime is perceived as being more favourable than their predecessor, then there is every possibility that the politically significant audience will accept what the new regime offers. Once the new regime's rules and norms have been accepted, then the regime will be judged in accordance with them. If they are found wanting then there is the possibility that the audience will rebel and thus become a threat to the regime. The audience will judge the regime based on two criteria, firstly on whether they follow and obey their own rules, in other words, is the regime corrupt, and secondly based upon their performance in using the power.[62] Both of these criteria are viewed subjectively by the internal audience, and whilst in theory they hold equal importance for judging the effectiveness of the regime, in reality so long as the regime performs well, then the regime can still maintain an

[60] Alagappa. *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* p.15
[61] Collins. *Security and Southeast Asia* p.67
[62] Alagappa. *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* p.21

effective grasp on power irrespective of corruption.[63] So long as those within the audience feel that the regime is working effectively for their best interest, then other misdemeanours can be overlooked.[64] This is however a dangerous position for a regime, because if it is corrupt and relying on its performance alone for legitimisation, then there is the possibility that their performance will at some point fail to meet the standards of their audience. If this occurs then the regime will be in a weakened position and therefore vulnerable to political threats.

External vs. Internal: Political sector securitization in premodern regimes

The current output of work that is concerned with Political sector securitization has a major failing. It is overly biased towards examining the issues that effect western modern and postmodern regimes. In its raw state the theory is inadequate for examining the complexities of the nation formation process that much of the world is undergoing. The bias towards external security threats suggests that the framework is unable to address the internal security crises of premodern regimes. However, Buzan et al acknowledge that the Political sector is incredibly complex and the framework is still being developed. Not only by Buzan and Waever themselves,[65] but also in the ongoing research of both security and area specialists.[66] I believe that by incorporating the ideas of Ayoob and Alagappa within the framework of political securitization as outlined by the Copenhagen school, a more robust and satisfactory

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[63] David Beetham, *Legitimation of Power* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1991) pp.136-42
[64] This is also true of the external audience who can and will ignore much so long as they feel the regime that is in power is performing effectively for their (the audience's) best interests.
[65] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Power*
[66] See Ralf Emmers, *Non-traditional Security in the Asia Pacific* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004); Amitav Acharya, Mely Caballero Anthony and Ralf Emmers (eds.) *Non-traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006); and Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia.*

analytical framework becomes available. The work of Ayoob highlights with greater clarity the problems that face premodern states and in particular the external challenges that face developing regimes. The inclusion of Alagappa defines the legitimation process that all regimes undergo and this gives a greater understanding of the utility or even applicability, of the securitization approach when examining authoritarian regimes. This operationalisation of political security was necessary to address the criticisms of the political sector, especially with regard to third world security challenges. In part two of this thesis I will examine the case study of post-colonial Indonesia. Between 1945 and 1997 Indonesia experienced several political security challenges that this framework will enable a better and clearer understanding of. These challenges are: How did an effective Indonesian independence movement emerge and how did they gain sufficient legitimacy and recognition to effectively usurp the Dutch colonial powers? How did this new regime fare once it had established itself as the new regime? What methods did Sukarno use, and what mistakes were made, in attempting to establish the pillars of the new Indonesian nation state? How did Sukarno manage the external political security situation? And finally in relation to the Sukarno era, what was the nature of the political assault in 1965 that ultimately lead to his removal from power and the emergence of the New Order regime under Suharto? With respect to the Suharto era, what methods did the New Order regime employ, how did they differ from Sukarno and perhaps equally importantly, what lessons were learnt? How did the New Order ensure that it was able to maintain a secure grip on power, how were they able to effectively control the creation of boundaries of the ordinary and *extra*-ordinary? What role did external security issues have in the life of the New Order regime, both in terms of its creation, it longevity, and perhaps ultimately its demise? What had changed in terms of the

effectiveness of the regime and the nature of the audience, why did the New Order collapse?

Chapter Two: Operationalising Societal Security: Social Psychology and Social Identity Theory.

The concept of societal security is a recent phenomenon, developed from the works of both Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, of the Copenhagen school. In the societal sector, the referent object is not society itself but rather the numerous sub-groups that make up society, the identities that we subscribe to, that make up who we are.

> "For international security analysis, the key to society is those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political organisations concerned with government"[1] p.119

Whilst the definition above seems simple enough the concept of societal security is actually problematic and therefore it is necessary to clarify the terminology further. For the purposes of securitization analysis societal security is about the large, self-sustaining identity groups that individuals align themselves to. So one may say that societal security is about addressing the security of society, however even this is problematic, this is because society is often used to refer to the greater/wider term of state population. Whilst initially an acceptable assumption, when one spends any time examining state dynamics, particularly within developing states, it becomes clear that the state is rarely a group that has a collective identity. In actuality a states

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[1] Barry Buzan et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998) p.119

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'society' may be made up of several societal units, or multiple identities, that share no common connections aside from that they share geographical proximity. What the Copenhagen approach argues is that it is these societal groups that are the referent object of the Societal Sector. Societal groups are self-defining, self referential and self-sustaining. The membership of these groups chose to be part of the entity and identify with it and other members of the group. This term as defined by the Copenhagen school is not without its critics, one critic of note for instance was Bill McSweeney who argues that the Copenhagen school was attempting to objectify identity in a way that is inconsistent with the fluid nature of identity itself. That is, all social identities are self referential and "imagined"[2], by their very nature they change and alter both as a natural process of them being, in other words identities simply change from time to time and place to place evolving to suit the needs of the individuals that make up a societal group. Because of this McSweeney argues it is problematic to make identity the referent object in a security context because it is difficult if not impossible to establish what is a genuine threat to a given group and what is in actuality an evolution of the identity.[3] McSweeney sees identity not as being an abstract fact, something that is "out there" to be studied, but rather that "it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups"[4], and as such to objectify it in anyway creates problems. This is because it will mislead the scholar into believing society can be empirically examined, in other words our theories of what is occurring within society can be modelled and compared to "the real world", something that McSweeney feels is impossible. He also feels that the Copenhagen argument is mistaken in believing that there is one identity within society that could

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[2] An idea supported in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Verso: London, 1991)
[3] Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School' *Review of International Studies* Vol.22, No.1 (1996) pp 81-93
[4] *Ibid.* p.85

be identified and thus objectified as a point of reference in the study of security, in his defence McSweeney was criticising early concepts of societal security[5], however I believe he was misinterpreting what it was Waever et al were trying to emphasise as being "societal". Rather than the sub-groups that constitute what we commonly understand as being society, McSweeney was instead viewing societal security as being about assaults upon society as a whole, and by society meaning the cultural equivalent of the state, he did not see that it is actually possible to have numerous identities within the same society.

Buzan et al took the questions raised by McSweeney seriously however they argue they were misplaced. Their response is this, that whilst identity is changing and does change there is still a core notion of what it is to be whatever you claim to be, so for instance whilst what constitutes and Englishman in 2005 is different than what made an Englishman in 1955, certain key themes would allow them to recognise each other, and also the fact that they both claim to identify themselves with the label "Englishman" means that the concept has utility. One could argue that the analysis of security is essentially a snap shot of a given place at a given time, when viewed in this light the fluid nature of identity has no bearing on the analysis. Also as securitization is about the survival of the referent object, even a fluid object will have a notion of what it means to not survive. For instance:

"The state is not a constant either, yet there is a lot of security policy to defend it. France has changed over the centuries, but there is a French security policy. There are actors who mobilize security policy in the defence of something which is 'thingish' enough to be invoked in this way. Identities too can be

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[5] That is pre 1998 and the more formal establishment of the concept of securitization within *Security: a New Framework for Analysis.*

defended. This does not imply that identities do not change, only that we should not expect everything to change all the time: certain things stay the same throughout the period relevant for an analysis. A very big part of social science is about what we take a relatively more fixed than what."[6]

If we were to ignore any socially constructed notion from being a referent object, then social scientists would very quickly run out of things to study. The Copenhagen School argue that whilst it is true that we could study the process of identity formation, in much the same way as we examine the processes that lead to the formation of states, however just as it can be superfluous to over analyse the historical context that lead one to understand "why" a particular security problem has occurred to a state, so to it is necessary to accept that a particular identity does exist and that it is struggling to survive. Also McSweeney's claim that identity is "never more that a provisional and fluid image of ourselves as we want to be"[7] is seen by Buzan and the Copenhagen school as being misleading as identity itself can, in fact often, becomes "solidly sedimented" within our social reality and is seemingly if not actually an immovable object within the "real world".[8] The heart of this difference of opinions is in ascertaining what identity actually is, is it a fluid, abstract value that individuals give value and meaning to, or is it "an intersubjectively constituted social factor"?[9] For the Copenhagen School it is the latter. That is, identity is given validity and meaning, not merely by individuals laying claim to it, but rather it is sedimented by interactions with either others who also lay claim to the identity, or by those who view themselves as being different. McSweeney criticises the Copenhagen approach

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[6] Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, 'Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically untenable? The Copenhagen school replies' *Review of International Studies* Vol.23, No.2 (2000) p.243

[7] Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School' p.90

[8] Buzan and Waever, 'Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically untenable?' p.244, also explored more fully below.

[9] *Ibid.* p.245

regarding this position, as this would mean that all self determined notions of identity would be relegated into the "black hole of individualism".[10] In other words, for McSweeney identity is self determined and therefore impossible to objectively study because of its individualistic nature. This is not to argue that identity is irrelevant but rather the Copenhagen project is flawed in thinking that it is able to objectify identity as a referent. By contract because the Copenhagen School see identity as being determined intersubjectively, this means that once a group has established for itself what "it" is, then a social object has been created, and it is this that they claim can be studied as a referent for the societal sector.

Social Psychology

Despite the engagement on the concepts of identity and societal sub-groups that has taken place within the literature,[11] there still exists however an analytical uncertainty regarding the validity of identity as a referent. For whilst it is apparent that some security instances do appear to have societal elements, the responses to the criticisms of McSweeney and others as to how identity can be attacked threatened, and existentially destroyed, have not been fully addressed by the Copenhagen school or their supporters. And if one is unable to fully address these questions then the

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[10] Bill McSweeney, "Durkheim and the Copenhagen school: a response to Buzan and Waever" *Review of International Studies* Vol.24 (1998) pp.138-9

[11] Aside from the initial discussions between McSweeney, and Buzan and Waever in McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', Buzan and Waever, 'Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically untenable? ', McSweeney, "Durkheim and the Copenhagen school: a response to Buzan and Waever", McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) (*Passim*) but in particular pp.68-78. A wider body of literature concerning this sector has also emerged. Including Michael C. Williams "Modernity, identity and security: a comment on the 'Copenhagen controversy'" *Review of International Studies* Vol.24 (1998) pp435-39, Michael C. Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security" *European Journal of InternationalRelations* Vol.4, No.2 (1998) 204-225, Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?" *Journal of peace research* Vol.36 No.2 (1999) pp183-202, Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security" *International Studies Review* Vol.5, No.2 (2003) pp.203-22.

validity of the societal sector within the Copenhagen framework is thus called into question. This is a point taken up by Tobias Theiler within his article 'Societal Security and Social Psychology', in which he argues that the holes in logic within the Copenhagen school's framework not only can be, but also already have been filled within the findings of social psychology.[12] It is important to note that the vast majority of social psychology is dominated by the study of individuals and in fact this is perhaps why the vast bulk of the research in this discipline has either been ignored or simply gone unnoticed by scholars of international relations, however that being said there is a growing movement within social psychology that acknowledges that there is a "psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals".[13] It is these processes that social psychology purports to explain, it is the study of "those mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness since they presuppose the reciprocal action of many". [14] It is this group/collective perception of identity that is necessary to fully address the concerns of the Copenhagen schools critics, and thus eradicate the problems associated with identity as a referent object. Theiler draws particular attention to the relatively recent psychological development of Social Identity Theory (SIT). SIT is a method of explaining not only how and why social groups, and thus social identities, form but also why people need to form these groups in the first place. The following section explores the development of the Social Psychology, starting with the work that was carried out in order to explain how individual group identities form and develop. This degree of analysis into the process of identity formation does contradict assertions within the Copenhagen approach that

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[12] Tobias Theiler, 'Societal security and social psychology' *Review of International Studies* Vol.29 (2003) pp.249-268
[13] Floyd Allport, *Social Psychology*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924) p.4
[14] W. Wundt cited in Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, *Social Psychology*. (Third Edition) (Harlow, Essex; Pearson Education Limited, 2002) p.112

to study these processes would be "superfluous",[15] however I believe that it is by understanding these processes in more detail that we understand the empirical validity of identity as a referent object. Theiler's study drew particular attention to the recent developments of Social Psychology, but I contend that by understanding how the discipline developed its understanding of group formation and dynamics, then we too as scholars of international relations and security studies will also have a clearer understanding of what identity is and why it is significant.

Realistic Conflict Theory

This question as to why we as individuals form groups is one that has been at the heart of philosophy and political science since its inception, whether it is to escape our state of nature or maximise our interests social psychology offers us an empirically rigorous explanation of our behaviour and actions as a collective, be that in states or in smaller societal groups. SIT was not the first concept that attempted to explain this group phenomenon. In 1966 Muzafer Sherif introduced the Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT), which was a way to explain the peculiarities not just of group behaviour but also intergroup behaviour.

"*Intergroup relations* refer to relations between two or more groups and their respective members. Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its *members in terms of their group identifications* we have an instance of intergroup behaviour" [16]

Sherif saw all behaviour as being based upon seeking goals and competition between different social groups. Groups formed based upon the competition amongst

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[15] As is discussed earlier in this thesis p.73
[16] Muzafer Sherif cited in Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology* p.390 (emphasis in original)

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individuals. If individuals can function/survive on their own they will, however if there emerges a goal that can only be achieved via interdependence and cooperation then a group will form. This observation is not one that is new to IR scholars, and it has parallels to the stag hunt that Rousseau describes in *Inequality,* where the need to eat drives the five hunters to group together to capture a stag.[17] The hunger overrides the individual desire to be independent, by acting as a group they will profit and thus a group is formed. However, Sherif proposes that when there are mutually exclusive goals, that is when there are not enough resources to share, and then it will lead to inter individual competition. To continue the stag hunt analogy this is when the opportunity for the individual to capture a hare, at the expense of the group as a whole, then he or she will take this and thus ensure their survival.[18] The key thing that Sherif notes is that this behaviour is reflected in intergroup relations as well.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif 1966)[19]	Shared Goal Requiring Interdependence	Mutually Exclusive Goal
Interpersonal Relations	Interpersonal Cooperation	Interpersonal Competition
	↓	↓
	Group Formation Group Solidarity	Interpersonal Conflict Reduced Group Solidarity Group Collapse

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[17] Rousseau cited in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) pp.167-8
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology.* p.392

Intergroup Relations	Intergroup Cooperation	Intergroup Competition
	↓	↓
	Intergroup Harmony	Intergroup Conflict

So for RCT the natural state of things is independence whether as an individual or, once one has been formed, as a group. This creates an ethnocentric view of the world in which there is an us and a them, or those who are cooperating and those who are not. The only way to overcome this bias is with the introduction of a "Superordinate goal", in fact in experiments to try and replicate the intergroup conflict observed by Sherif in his initial experiments British researchers Tyerman and Spencer discovered that whilst testing a group of boy scouts the pre-existing superordinate relationship that the boys had meant that any attempts to promote or even provoke conflict were to no avail, by contrast it was easy to increase intergroup cooperation. Tyerman and Spencer concluded that this was due to the overarching, pre-existing identity as scouts counteracted the sub-group/patrol mentality that RCT predicted would dominate proceedings.[20]

Minimal Group Paradigm

In the early 1970s researchers began to get interested in what it took to form a social group and so Henri Tajfel initiated experiments to establish what the minimum requirements were. They wanted to see what conditions are "both necessary and

[20] *Ibid.* pp.392-3

sufficient for a collection of individuals to be ethnocentric and to engage in intergroup competition".[21] The first experiment in 1971 took a group of British schoolboys and divided them into two separate groups randomly, although the participants were told that they were divided based on their preference between the works of two anonymous artists. The children were then told which group they belonged to and that another group existed, although they had no idea as to who was in their group (in-group) or the other group (out-group), as their identities were concealed by code numbers. The participants were then told to distribute an amount of money between pairs of recipients based only on code number and which group they belonged to. In repeated experiments the results showed that the children developed a distribution strategy that favoured their own group.[22] This was a surprising finding as these groups had no history or chance of a future, there was no basis for the members of the groups to favour those who were in their group other than the fact that they were members of the group, there was not even any possibility of financial gain as the participants could not assign money to themselves. The only explanation was that the fact that they were members of a group meant that they wanted their group to be more prosperous than the out-group.

Later experiments were developed with the intention to create even more minimal groups. In 1973 Billig and Tajfel divided the participants into X and Y groups and explicitly told those involved that they were being divided randomly so as to avoid any possibility that group members may feel a kinship or connection with their fellow members for some other reason, for instance that they liked the same

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[21] *Ibid.* p.399
[22] Henri Tajfel et al, 'Social categorization and intergroup behaviour' *European Journal of Social Psychology* Vol.1 (1971) pp.149-77

artist.[23] This and numerous later experiments backed up the proposition that "the mere fact of being categorised as a group seems to be necessary and sufficient to produce ethnocentrism and competitive intergroup behaviour".[24] However, this view has not gone unchallenged and whilst being placed in a group does have an effect it is not always sufficient to either over power pre-existing prejudices or conceptions,[25] and a particularly interesting observation was made by Mummendey et al, who identified a "positive-negative asymmetry". That is they saw that in Minimum Group Experiments participants did show the typical ethnocentric bias when their task was distributing resources to their group, however when it came to removing resources (or potentially issuing punishments) the group effect was much weaker and in some cases disappeared.[26]

Identity Theories

It became clear from the Minimal Group Experiments that how one categorises oneself is of vital importance to how one behaves in the social world. Within sociology and social psychology there are two main schools of thought about how one does this: Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory (IT and SIT respectively). IT sees that individuals may have numerous distinct selves, based upon their different roles in society, for example a person can be a mother, a daughter, a wife and a teacher, and these identities or roles are "self-conceptions, self-referent cognitions, or

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[23] M. Billgin and Henri Tajfel, 'Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour' *European Journal of Social Psychology* Vol.3 (1973) pp.27-52
[24] Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology.* p.400
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] A. Mummendey et al, 'Categorization is not enough: intergroup discrimination in negative outcome allocation' *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* Vol.28 (1992) pp.125-44

self-definitions".[27] This mirrors the arguments put forward by Bill McSweeney. In IT the importance a given role has is based upon its *salience* to the individual. That is these roles exist in a hierarchy within the individual, the higher a given role is within an individual the more likely that aspect of their self is to have on their behaviour.[28] This hierarchy is self constructed and so even though two people may have the same roles they will not necessarily behave the same way in a given situation because of differences in their salience hierarchy. An example being: "one person may work on the weekend while another may spend time with the children, although both may have a "parent" role identity. The difference in behavior is due to differences in identity salience".[29] But how does one account for differences in salience? IT argues that the salience of a given identity will be determined by a person's commitment to that role, and this is determined by how important a person feels it is to behave in a given way around certain people. For instance, one will behave one way when one is with friends or colleagues and in a different way when one is with a superior or someone in a position of authority. If one does not adopt the appropriate role when the situation dictates then it can result in a weakened position for the individual, be it literally or psychologically by effecting self-conceptions and or self-esteem.[30]

Sheldon Stryker has identified two distinct forms of commitment: Interactional and Affective. Interactional commitment reflects the number of roles that are associated to a given identity, or into how many facets of your life does the identity permeate (extensivity of commitment). Affective commitment refers to how

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[27] Michael Hogg et al, 'A tale of two theories: a critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory' *Social Psychology Quarterly* Vol.58, No.4 (1995) p.256
[28] *Ibid.* p.257
[29] *Ibid.* p.258
[30] John Hoelter, 'The effects of role evaluation and commitment on identity salience' *Social Psychology Quarterly* Vol.46 (1983) pp.140-7

important one finds the relationships associated with a given identity (intensivity of commitment).[31] The more committed a person is to an identity the higher the identity salience and the bigger the impact upon the behaviour of the individual. Stryker also suggests that the more people who are included and affected by the social relationships involved with an identity the more salient it will be.[32]

Social Identity Theory

A parallel theory of identity that has emerged in the social psychology literature is Social Identity Theory. Unlike IT SIT focuses not on the individual but rather on the social groups themselves, what do these groups offer the individual and thus explain why certain identities gain salience. SIT is based on the notion that society is structured into a hierarchy of different social categories, which engage in competition for both power and status with one another.[33] We, as individuals divide the world into categories in order to make sense of and reduce our uncertainty of the world around us. In the same way as we have categorised the natural world (animal, vegetable or mineral) we structure our social world in the same way. However socially this process not only gives us a structured picture of the world around us, it also enables a person to define him or herself as well. This is because the social categories into which one falls provide a definition of who one is, by virtue of the defining characteristics of the category, "a self-definition that is a part of the self-concept".[34] In much the same way as IT sees that the social roles we adopt govern how we behave

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[31] Sheldon Stryker, cited in Hogg et al, 'A tale of two theories: a critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory' p.258

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology* p.401

[34] Hogg et al, 'A tale of two theories: a critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory' p.259

in different social contexts, the categories that we are members of describes and prescribes our social identity.

"Thus, when a specific social identity becomes the salient basis for self-regulation in a particular context, self-perception and conduct become in-group stereotypical and normative, perceptions of relevant out-group members become out-group stereotypical, and intergroup behavior acquires competitive and discriminatory properties to varying degrees depending on the nature of relations between the groups."[35]

The social group one belongs to does not only describe or prescribe ones personal attributes; it also affects how one evaluates.

"[Social] identities have the important self-evaluative consequences, groups and their members are strongly motivated to adopt behavioral strategies for achieving or maintaining in-group/out-group comparisons that favor the in-group, and thus of course the self."[36]

So societal groups perform two important psychological roles. Firstly by categorizing the social world it makes sense of the chaos and thus allows an individual to better understand the world and also define self. Secondly, it allows them to enhance themselves via association with their in-group. This is achieved either by evaluating the in-group in positive terms, by seeing the out-group in a negative light, or a combination of the two. This is because people have a need to obtain a "relatively positive evaluation of themselves", which in turn boosts their self-esteem.[37]

But what happens if the in-group itself is negative when compared to the out-group? What are the possibilities available to the members to boost their self-esteem?

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[35] *Ibid.* p.260
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology* p.402

How does one move either physically or psychologically from this negative situation? SIT postulates three main strategies: Individual Mobility, Social Creativity and Social Competition. Individual mobility is possible when the boundaries between the groups are permeable and so individuals can simply move into the dominant group and thus improve their situation. An example of this would be changing the football team you support or physically moving from a bad area of town into a good area, there is nothing to prevent these actions, and though there may be resistance from existing members of the dominant group assimilation is possible. If this is not possible then group action is needed to alter the *status quo* in favour of the lower status group. The actions that are undertaken depend upon the stability and legitimacy of the current order. If the *status quo* is considered to be both stable and legitimate then actual social change is very difficult and so social creativity strategies are adopted. Three different outcomes have been experimentally observed here, the first is that the lower status group will rethink those factors that they use to compare themselves with the out-group. For example, if one finds oneself in a group that is considered to be poor academically, and one has little chance of competing in this category one may emphasise the athletic prowess of the group you belong to instead. In short side stepping the previous point of comparison and attempting to gain status through another previously untried method, without directly challenging the dominant out-group.[38] The second outcome is that the in-group will attempt to redefine and change the existing values attached to their characteristics. An example of this is the slogan "Black is beautiful"; it is asking us to reassess our previous conceptions of the characteristic of skin colour.[39] The third and final strategy observed here is to try and compare the in-group to other low or lower status out-groups, in essence accepting

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[38] Thomas E. Ford and George R. Tonander, 'The role of differentiation between groups and social identity in stereotype formation' *Social Psychology Quarterly* Vol.61, No.4 (1998) p.374

[39] Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology* p.404

that you cannot win against the dominant group and so instead compete with a more equal player or dominate an even weaker group.[40] The third and final strategy emerges if the *status quo* is considered to be illegitimate, unstable and therefore insecure, and so the possibility arises to change the position of the in-group through intergroup competition.   In these circumstances political action, mass protests, revolution and even war can occur.[41] So in affect one could see these three strategies as having different places upon the Copenhagen schools spectrum of affairs. At one end there is individual mobility (non-politicised), in the middle there is social creativity (which bridges non-politicised and politicised), and finally at the other end there is direct social competition (which spans from politicised to securitized).

Self-Categorisation Theory

So the minimal group experiments show us that the very act of belonging to, and being categorised to a group is enough to create a rudimentary social identity, identity theory explains how these identities/roles affect individual behaviour and finally SIT explains why we feel the need to form these groups. However more recent developments in social psychology have made more concerted efforts to try and explain the phenomena of the minimal group experiments and understand more fully why and how the act of belonging to a group impacts upon one identity. Self-categorisation theory stresses the importance that the role of self-categorisation plays upon identity and behaviour.[42] It proposes that the process of self-categorisation accentuates both the similarities and differences between and within groups. So, for instance, all men are more aggressive than all women. This accentuation is done in

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[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] An example of this psychological approach is in J. C. Turner et al, *Rediscovering the social group: a self-categorization theory* (London: Blackwell, 1987)

conjunction with a group prototype. These prototypes are "fuzzy sets that capture the context dependent features of group membership"[43]; they are the list we consciously or subconsciously go through in our heads when we assign an individual to a category. They act to depersonalise individuals and make them a part of a "thing" rather than separate allowing us to homogenise the out-group, which helps us to better understand the outside world.[44] The prototype is also the template that we use to determine our own behaviour as part of the in-group, and also it is used to define what and who we admire and aspire to be and can have a bearing on who emerges to form the elite of a given social group. This is because we desire the conformity of the group norm and so it is in the interest of any aspiring leader to be, or at least appear to be, the embodiment of the group prototype.[45] However, group prototype formation is a process influenced by what out-group happens to be salient at a given time. This means that it is possible to radically alter the 'ideal' of the group and thus yourself over time. For example, when at war the behaviour and attributes that are desirable are not the same as they would be when one is in a peaceful situation because the nature of the in-group/out-group relationship has altered. Also if one changes the comparison group altogether a similar change can occur, for instance if Catholics were to define themselves with reference to Muslims rather than Protestants, the concept of what it is to *not* be Catholic would alter and thus so would the concept of what it is to be Catholic.[46] Therefore because prototypes are tied to whatever out-group happens to be salient at a given time, social identity can be highly dynamic and responsive to the whims of social elites. This pull on the salience of ones social

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[43] Hogg et al, 'A tale of two theories: a critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory' p.261

[44] Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology* pp.407-8

[45] Tobias Theiler, 'Societal security and social psychology' p.261

[46] Hogg et al, 'A tale of two theories: a critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory' p.261

identity is of particular interest with relation to the role and position of ethnic minorities. Does the fact that the minorities are not (necessarily) the dominant group in society affect them, and if so is it a positive or a negative affect. A positive effect would be if "minorities categorise themselves more strongly as a group and are more strongly depersonalised in their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour"[47], whereas a negative effect would be a break down of group integrity, and either an increase in deviant behaviour into the group prototype or assimilation into another group.[48] Salience of identity is key within the concept of societal security, for if an identity is salient then the likelihood of a securitizing move taking place in order to safe guard a group is increased, where as if an identity is not salient then changes to an ethnic group or even the elimination or assimilation of it may never enter the security realm at all.

This relationship has been explored and two ideas have emerged the first is that the increasing predominance of the in-group in a social setting leads to progressively less consciousness of the groups ethnic identity. Secondly, ethnicity becomes more salient as a group becomes increasingly heterogeneous.[49] So the more ethnicities you have to compare yours to, the more important your own identity is to you. This may explain the salience of national identity in the British Isles as compared to other states. McGuire and McGuire found when they researched these phenomena that ethnic minorities also behave differently depending on the size of their group as compared to the out-group. If they were vastly out numbered, then they were reticent to raise the issue or possibly the identity was not salient (perhaps as an effect of Social

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[47] Hogg and Vaughan, *Social Psychology* p.409
[48] *Ibid.* p.402
[49] Barbara Kinket and Maykel Verkuyten, 'Levels of ethnic self-identification and social context' *Social Psychology Quarterly* Vol.60, No.4 (1997) p.342

Creativity). By comparison when they were a more sizable minority, ethnicity was more salient.[50] This is a particularly interesting dynamic to scholars of societal security.

Societal Security and Social Psychology

A key issue therefore to determine when examining societal security is the salience of a given identity to the group being threatened. This can be interpreted in several ways, is the actual identity itself salient for in-group? It is likely that this question will be answered by the response to a securitization move that is being made. A more interesting proposition is the possibility that the group elite may manipulate the in-group prototype for their own ends, either to legitimise their own political and social standing, but also to the detriment of an out-group. It has been suggested that if an in-group wishes to boost its position it can creatively alter the defining characteristics of its self or even change the out-group that it compares its self to. This does not contradict earlier assertions that identity can become a "solidly sedimented" object. This is because, whilst what has been intersubjectively determined to represent the in-group has altered, the in-group itself still exists. That is, I interpret that to be "sedimented" means that it has become an immovable object within the societal sector, like the state is to the military sector. This however does not mean that the nature of the object does not alter. In the same way as the agendas, interests and perspective of a state will alter depending upon circumstance; an identity will also alter given the circumstances that the in-group finds itself facing. In a security context it may be possible to find evidence of this manipulation, for example in the relationship of the New Order regime and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Of interest

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[50] McGuire and McGuire cited in *Ibid.*

in the Indonesian case is the New Order policy of assimilation, what was the motivation for this? Was it a legitimate attempt to homogenise an Indonesian identity, or was it a legitimate attempt by the in-group to establish an out-group in order to create or recreate an Indonesian identity and thus legitimise the new political regime? What strategies were employed to achieve the assimilation of the ethnic Chinese and what affect did they have on both the in-group (Indonesian identity) and the out-group (Sino Indonesian identity)? Did the targeted minority respond positively or negatively and what strategies were employed by the out-group to counteract their less than favourable position. The key advantage that social identity theory, and other psychological concepts, is that it more clearly defines what identity really is and thus offers to the scholar of societal security a referent object that is a robust and verifiable as the nation state has been for traditional approaches to the discipline. At the same time as offering a more solid referent object, psychological approaches clearly show the importance of identity to us as individuals and human beings and thus it validates identity as an area worthy of academic study.

Part Two: Political and Societal Security Challenges in Post-Colonial Indonesia.

Chapter Three: Sukarno and the Establishment of Indonesia's first Post-Colonial Regime

This chapter addresses the origins of the political security challenges that faced post-colonial Indonesia, covering the period 1940 until 1950. This is a period where Indonesia moved from being a colonial territory of the Netherlands, to being an independent state in its own right and a recognised member of the international community. This period is characterised by the leadership of Kusno Sosro Sukarno, whose political vision was to become the foundation of the Indonesian state, and its political regime. This chapter will establish the main themes that were to colour Sukarno's period of rule. I will show how Sukarno worked to develop and implement his own notions of the physical base, institutions and principles upon which he felt Indonesia would be governed. It was a period of compromise and attempts to appease the competing visions of Indonesia as the political elite of the independence movement, and eventually the sate, sought to find a model that could effectively replace imperial rule. I will show how the political security challenges of regime formation, as established in chapter one, were at the forefront of the strategies that he adopted at this time in his efforts to effectively establish a new regime for an independent Indonesia. I will also show how he effectively secured external recognition for his regime, which in turn allowed for the possibility of Sukarno to then develop a regime that would appear legitimate to the Indonesian people.

Pre 1945: The Foundations of Sukarno's nationalism

In order to fully comprehend the significance that Sukarno had to the establishment of the post-colonial regime of Indonesia it is necessary to understand

his role in the pre-independence nationalist movement. Sukarno emerged as a prominent figure in the East Indies nationalist movement in the 1920s and 30s. During this period he assumed the leadership of the *Partindo*,[1] and set about developing his ideas, concepts of rule and notions of what an independent Indonesia should be.[2] However, Sukarno was limited in his actions due to the intervention of the Dutch administration, and he was arrested on several occasions. This was a move by the Dutch to silence any potential opposition to their rule, and so the colonial administration wasted no time in arresting and ultimately exiling numerous members of Indonesia's fledgling independence movement.[3] However the measures implemented by the imperial regime were not able to silence the growing nationalist tendencies within Indonesia, and Sukarno continued to establish his political mandate from his position of isolation on the island of Flores. During this period of exile, Sukarno's writing began to adopt a more radical tone, as it became apparent that the Dutch were not going to be open to negotiation on the issue of Indonesian independence. However in May 1940 an opportunity presented itself to the nationalists of the East Indies, for with the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, colonial control over the archipelago was significantly weakened. But it was the intervention of the Japanese in January 1942 that was to provide Sukarno and the nationalist with their best opportunity to develop their vision of an independent Indonesia.

The Japanese occupation could have been negative juncture for the Indonesian nationalist cause; however because of the nature of Japanese regime the change of administration offered several opportunities for the Indonesian leadership, including

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[1] *Partindo* was one of two emerging factions in the Indonesian nationalist movement, the second being *Partai Nasional Indonesia,* the PNI or Indonesian National Party.
[2] J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972) pp.130-48
[3] Though Sukarno's exile was less extreme than that of many of his contemporaries who were transported off of the Archipelago. *Ibid.* p.138

Sukarno. For the Dutch, the primary method of control was repression. By silencing the voices of dissent and the problem would be removed. By contrast the Japanese had a different approach, for when the Japanese occupied the East Indies the exiled leadership was able to return to their place amongst the people and thereby re-establish themselves as the voice of the Indonesian people. Secondly the Japanese opted for a more politicised method of control. That is the Japanese encouraged the use of mass organisations, rituals and ideological indoctrination.[4] Therefore rather than silence the voices of opposition, the Japanese let the nationalists speak, but through prearranged avenues that they controlled. This is not to say that the Japanese agreed with the Indonesian independence movement as envisaged by Sukarno, but given the limited resources the Japanese had available to them to control the East Indies, this was a more efficient plan of action. And also it gave them the option of using the Indonesian leadership in their administration of the archipelago. This helped them to keep the revolutionary sentiment under control by establishing cordial relations with the potential revolutionary leadership, even to the extent of recruiting Sukarno to positions of responsibility within the administration, something that he justified as being in the "long-term interests of Indonesian nationalism".[5]

The Japanese were exploiting the anti-Dutch mood, but in a controlled manner enabling them to ensure that the issue of independence for Indonesia remained within the political area of the spectrum and did not escalate. Through the creation of organisations and committees that offered the possibility of *future* independence, the Japanese were able to even more firmly institutionalise, contain and control the nationalist movement, whilst at the same time using it to their own advantage. This

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[4] Harry J. Benda, "The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java" *The Far Eastern Quarterly* Vol.15, No.4 (1956) pp.542-3
[5] *Ibid.* p.541, see also Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* p.174

mechanism gave the nationalist movement a legitimate outlet within the Japanese regime. This was important for several reasons, firstly by using the nationalist leadership in this way the Japanese were able to maintain control over the population as a whole, making the administration of the region easier. Secondly, the provision of an institutional outlet ensured the nationalist cause remained a political issue, that is an issue that the nationalist saw as have a remedy within the realm of the 'ordinary'. If the nationalists had, had no political route through which to attempt to achieve their aims, it would meant that they would have seen no solution to their condition without a securitizing move being made. If the move had been successful and the independence issue *had* been securitized, then Japanese would have had to divert manpower from the war effort in order to maintain their control over the archipelago. This effort would not only have been targeted against the potential physical/military threat that such a move would undoubtedly have provoked, but also the Japanese administration would also have had to reengage with those members of the population who were being swayed to the nationalist cause. However, by effectively establishing an effective safety valve within their regime the Japanese were able to more efficiently control the nationalists than they would have been able using the more oppressive strategies of the Dutch colonial regime, and in so doing utilise the nationalists themselves to assist in the administration of the territory.[6] In order to maintain their control over the nationalists, Japan had to 'dangle the carrot of independence' and ensure that the Japanese appeared to be working in the interests of Indonesia rather than for their own self-interest. This was done to great effect on the 7th of September 1944, when Premiere Koiso of Japan announced, that independence

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[6] Josef Silverstein, "The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia" *Asian Survey* Vol.22, No.3 (1982) p.282

would be granted to the Indies in the near future.[7] In itself this message is extremely ambiguous and did not offer anything concrete, however compared to the repressive Dutch regime this was perceived as a step in the right direction, and made the Japanese administration appear to be in sync with the desires of the Indonesian people.

By 1945 the Japanese war effort was in decline and words alone were not enough to appease the nationalists, actions were now a necessity. In March 1945 the Japanese announced the creation of the *Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPKI), which was a committee to investigate and prepare for Indonesian independence. It is unlikely that the Japanese truly considered the BPKI as a true step towards Indonesian independence, and it took several months for the committee to have its first session. However the BPKI did provide the nationalist leadership with an appropriate outlet to channel their energies, and despite the Islamic elite of Indonesia being considerably under-represented,[8] this did ensure that "adequate procedures exist[ed] for the population to express their dissatisfaction… [thereby ensuring that] they [could] be satisfied within the existing political framework" and again keep the independence issue with the realm of the ordinary.[9] However, irrespective of the Japanese intentions, Sukarno was able to direct the BPKI to his own ends and on the 1st of June delivered to the committee the five principles upon which he saw Indonesia to be based. This address was to become known as

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[7] Raymond Kennedy, "Indonesian Politics and Parties" *Far Eastern Survey* Vol.14, No.10 (1948) p.131
[8] When on the 28th of April the membership of the BPKI was published of the sixty members only eleven per cent were from the Islamic elite, compared to thirty four per cent being from Sukarno's "secular nationalists". This weighting however was considered favourable by Sukarno himself as it gave him more freedom to dictate the proceedings. B. R. O'G. Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation 1944-45* (New York: Ithica, 1961) p.18
[9] Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003) p.64

Lahirnya Pancasila or the birth of the five principles, and it outlined the foundation of Sukarno's Indonesian political regime.

The principles Sukarno outlined were as follows: Nationalism, Internationalism, Democracy or Consent, Social Justice, and the Belief in one God. For Sukarno the *Pancasila* was intentionally designed to be in a form that would appeal to the cross section of Indonesian culture and society. It was intended to "embrace the separate currents of nationalism" and provide a basis for unity.[10] Sukarno elaborated and explained each of his principles with this end in mind. It was clearly important that he not alienate a section of his audience, the audience in this instance being his 60 fellow member of the BPKI, for if his vision for Indonesia was to pass he would *need* the support of as many of them as possible. For Sukarno nationalism was not merely freedom from external rule, but rather it was also concerned with the creation a *self-conscious* Indonesian people.[11] This was an important distinction for several reasons, firstly Sukarno did not want to unnecessarily alienate the Japanese, who were present during the BPKI meetings, and secondly, due to the vast ethnic diversity that existed in the East Indies to call upon one "national identity" in particular would have gone against his attempts to unify the people. Sukarno knew that Indonesian nationalism must cross the ethnic divides and encompass "all human beings who, according to geopolitics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the entire archipelago of Indonesia from the northern tip of Sumatra to Irian!"[12] He saw that nationalism meant "neither Javanese nationalism nor Sumatran nationalism nor the nationalism of Borneo, or Celebes, Bali or any other,

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[10] Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* p.184
[11] Silverstein, "The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia" p.282
[12] Sukarno cited in Herbert Feith and Alan Smith, "Indonesia" in Roger M Smith (ed.), *Southeast Asia: Documents of Political Development and Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974) p. 176

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but the Indonesian nationalism which at one and the same time *becomes the principle of one national state*."[13] The need to create a viable Indonesian national identity was of central importance to the developing regime, for if Sukarno were unable to overcome the differences in opinion and culture, then his vision of a unified archipelago would not be realised. But Sukarno needed to do more than merely unify his people; he also needed to effectively connect this *nationalism* with his second principle of *internationalism*. Sukarno understood that the Indonesian nation must exist as part of a wider principle, one that incorporated respect for other peoples, or else Indonesian nationalism would run the risk of becoming "petty patriotism".[14] For Sukarno the two principles fitted together to become what he called *Socio-nationalism*, a nationalism tempered by a strong humanitarian undercurrent.[15] The principles of Democracy and Social Justice were similarly connected in Sukarno's mind. This was to create a notion of democracy that was separate from the "democracy" that existed in the West, particularly Western Europe and the Netherlands. The democracy that was in place there was perceived as being corrupted, it was no longer acting for the best interests of the people, but rather for the few, in particular the Capitalists. Sukarno claimed that this democracy was merely political and he believed that economics would also need to be democratised, so that prosperity could be offered to all of Indonesia's people. This Sukarno called *Socio-democracy*.[16] This was a call across the nationalist spectrum; Sukarno was not only pushing for self-determination but calling for a type of determinism that was better than that practiced by their colonial rulers. At the same time this anti-capitalist rhetoric would have appealed to the Marxists and Communists who were represented

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[13] *Ibid.* (Emphasis added)
[14] Bruce Grant, *Indonesia* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1967) pp.29-30
[15] Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* pp.185-6
[16] Guy J. Pauker, "Political Doctrines and Practical Politics in Southeast Asia" *Pacific Affairs* Vol.35, No.1 (1962) p.5

in the BPKI, a significant and influential part of the nationalist community. What he was offering was more desirable, better and ultimately more legitimate political system than the Imperialists. The final principle, Belief in one God, was of particular importance and was a move by Sukarno to acknowledge the Muslim section of his audience. For Sukarno was aware that the Islamists, who held a tremendous popular mandate, could negatively affect the chances of his vision of an independent Indonesia becoming a reality. Sukarno believed that the theocratic Indonesia that the Muslim leaders sought would be divisive, as it would alienate non-Muslims as well as non-fundamentalist sections of the Islamic community. Therefore, whilst he conceded that religion must have a central role in Indonesia, he was careful to ensure that as a principle, it should have an inclusive quality. That is, the rule would have to be acceptable to all of the dominant beliefs within Indonesia, and *Belief in one God* allowed Muslims, Christians and Buddhists to practice their religions without violating the principle.

The *Lahirnya Pancasila* galvanised both Sukarno and the BPKI, and created a sound foundation for the process by which Indonesia would attain independence. The speech itself did not discuss or address any of the details concerning how and when independence would or could be achieved. What it did was lay the ideational heart of the regime that was to follow, and it gave the nationalist cause a sense of momentum that the Japanese could not have predicted.[17] However, what also became apparent after the speech was that the Islamic elite were not satisfied by Sukarno's principle of *Belief in one God* seeing it as a compromise. Sukarno dealt with this critique in three ways. The first was to inform the Islamic community that even though he was a

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[17] Silverstein, "The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and Indonesia" p.282

Muslim he felt that Islam was not an appropriate base for the state and that their influence would lie elsewhere. Namely within a representative assembly:

> The House of Representatives, this is the place for us to bring forward the demands of Islam…If we really are Islamic people, let us work hard, so that most of the seats in the People's Representative Body we will create are occupied by Islamic delegates…then the laws made by this representative body will naturally be Islamic laws.[18]

Much like the Japanese method of controlling political problems, this was an attempt to direct any potential threats to his principles towards and appropriate 'safety valve' that would keep the disagreement within the realm of the ordinary. His second concession was the Jakarta Charter. This was drafted at sub-committee level of the BKPI and was an attempt to put the ideas stated in the *Pancasila* speech into a document that would form the preamble of Indonesia's formal, written constitution. The Jakarta Charter restated the five principles that Sukarno had highlighted as lying at the heart of the new Indonesia, but elaborated on the final principle. It stated that Indonesia was to be based upon belief in God "*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya* (with the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow syari'ah, or Islamic law)."[19] This amendment was clearly an attempt to appear more pro-Islamic than the initial speech had suggested. However it raised more questions that it solved and it is argued that because of this that when the constitution was finally completed this addition was dropped.[20] Despite of this, the fact that the changes were even suggested has political significance. It shows a clear attempt by Sukarno and the nationalist leadership to create consensus within their movement. It

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[18] Sukarno cited in Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* p.187
[19] Nadirsyah Hosen, "Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* Vol. 36, No. 3 (2005) p.419
[20] *Ibid.*

acknowledged of the concerns of the Islamic elite, and thereby was an attempt to ensure that the Nationalist principles would be legitimate to as many Indonesians as was possible. What this shows is a commitment by the leadership to ensure that all Indonesians would be represented by the principles of the regime, and where possible consensus would and should be attained.

Sukarno's third and final response to the Islamic criticisms was in the final drafting of the *Pancasila*: Belief in One God; A Just and Civilised Humanity; National Unity; Consultation and Consensus; and Economic and Social Egalitarianism and Prosperity.[21] Here, aside from the rewording of his principles, it is important to note how the principle Belief in One God, has been elevated to being the first principle. This was a compromise made so as to ensure the stability of the regime, but was not just intended to appeal to the Indonesian people, but rather to a wider audience. When on the 17th of August 1945 the elite made a formal proclamation of independence, this was also intended for two audiences. Firstly the Indonesian people, but equally it was intended to send a clear message to the world at large, and especially the Dutch, that the nationalists had used the Japanese occupation productively. But did this declaration, and the *Pancasila* itself, have an impact in Sukarno's attempt to sculpt an independent Indonesia? Professor George Kahin states

> [in] no other exposition of principle can one find a better example of the synthesis of Western Democrat, Modernist Islamic, Marxist and indigenous-village democratic and communalistic ideas which form the several bases of the social thought of so large a part of the post-war Indonesian elite.[22]

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[21] See also Appendix 1
[22] George Kahin cited in Geoff Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p.136

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This was the signal that Sukarno wished to send out, that Indonesia had a representative and heterogeneous elite that represented the population of the archipelago, it was not an extreme or reactionary state but rather neutral and should be allowed to function on its own without external intervention. It was therefore within this final drafting of his five principles that Sukarno was able to finally establish a sense of national unity in Indonesia 'from the tip of Sumatra right to Irian!' Despite the fact that the Japanese were still technically in charge when independence was declared, and far from satisfied with the move, they were unable to do anything to counter Sukarno's move, and within four weeks the new administration was in control of much of the country.

1945-50: The Indonesian-Netherlands Dispute and International Recognition

Unfortunately for the New Indonesia despite the fact they had been under Japanese control for the previous 5 years, the Dutch had not relinquished their claim to these Islands, and when the war was finally over it was the Dutch claim that was supported, in particular by the other European powers. This was because there was a general desire to return the world to the pre-war *status quo,* and in some cases they were eager to rebuild the Empires that had been neglected during the War years and re-establish their dominance within the new post war world. This situation was compounded by the rising powers of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, who were beginning to exert their own influences and attempting to consolidate their spheres of influence. These external developments were to all to have a considerable impact on the new Indonesian elite's attempts to govern their territory, and even made the prospect of them remaining in control far from inevitable. From the outset the path to full independence was made difficult by the actions of colonial Western Europe, in part due to the personality of the person who

was placed in charge of restoring order to South East Asia in the aftermath of World War Two, Lord Louis Mountbatten, British Commander in Chief in the Region. Mountbatten's perception of order was radically different from that of Sukarno, he felt that the best way to stabilise the region would be to return the war-ravaged territories to their former colonial masters, including returning the East Indies to the Dutch.[23] This is a course of action that would help support, and create natural allies, for British claims to other territories not only in Asia but elsewhere in the emerging third world. However, Mountbatten was a pragmatist and suggested to Dr van Mook, his Dutch counterpart, that the best way to ensure a smooth reintegration of the East Indies back under Dutch Colonial rule would be through negotiations with Sukarno and the new Government. However, this was a move that was not supported by the Dutch Government, who felt that to acknowledge the new regime would give it credence, and so van Mook's efforts were not well received at home.[24] However even if van Mook had the full support of his home government, Mountbatten's plan was unlikely to have succeeded, because after having achieved so much, Sukarno and his new administration had no desire to relinquish any control back to the Dutch. The Nationalist movement had drastically changed its mode of operation. It was no longer the time for words and negotiation; it was now the time for action. The Sukarno administration was quickly establishing its own apparatus of government and control; this was sending a clear signal to Europe that as far as they were concerned, Imperial rule was over. Therefore it was impossible for the nationalists to have settled for anything less than prompt and early independence for the Indonesian nation.

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[23] Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian Revolution in Retrospect" *World Politics* Vol.3, No.3 (1951) p.372
[24] Simons. *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.137

Whilst the archipelago's position internationally was still far from certain, domestically the new elite set about creating the necessary apparatus to administer the state and on 15th November Soetan Sjahrir was appointed as the Prime Minister of the Republic, a move that was viewed with considerable hostility in the Netherlands and as such his position was not universally recognised internationally.[25] In an attempt to garner some international support for their cause the Indonesian elite created a memorandum, which was sent to the Dutch government. This was an attempt to emphasise the success that the new administration had had in normalising public services within the territory, that the vast majority of the population supported it, and that the Independence movement was actually "inspiring" the population as a whole.[26] It concluded that "the only solution for the Dutch government lies in the recognition of the Republic; for this was the only guarantee for the promotion of Dutch as well as Indonesian interests and it is the only way out of the present impasse and for the prevention of further bloodshed."[27] This was an act to resolve the political struggle without further escalation, however it fell on deaf ears and the Dutch attempts to retake their colony continued in earnest. It is particularly interesting to note that despite the fact that by this time the Indonesians had created its own armed forces, which it could have utilized to directly combat the Colonial threat, Indonesians made an appeal for membership of the United Nations. In short opting to utilize the realm of the ordinary rather than securitizing the situation into the realm of the extraordinary, choosing instead to put their faith in this organisation and other nations, especially the United States, to recognise their claim to sovereignty.[28] This is

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[25] *Ibid.*

[26] H. Arthur Steiner, "Post-War Government of the Netherlands East Indies" *The Journal of Politics* Vol.9,No.4 (1947) p.633

[27] Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.139

[28] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (Hemel Hemptstead: George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1983) p. xiii

evidence of the Indonesian elite attempting to keep the issue independence issue desecuritized. This was done not only to avoid bloodshed, but rather, it was possible at this time that if the independence issue could be resolved with out escalation this would allow the new elite to focus its attention on the consolidation of it position domestically. And also by attempting to resolve the situation without violence, they were reflecting the mood of the international community who were war weary in the aftermath of World War two. However the Dutch and the British, in the interest of "international capitalism and Western strategy in the Cold War", blocked this attempt.[29] This move demonised the Sukarno regime and in the long run made any attempts by the regime to secure itself externally increasingly difficult.

Superficially it would appear that the Nationalists should have been dejected at this time as there every move was blocked by the Dutch, however there were some areas in which they were successful. One example of this was the *Linggadjati* Agreement of November 1947. This agreement secured territory away from the Dutch and established boundaries for the Republic, which whilst being far from the full independence that the nationalists desired was at least a foundation to what could become an internationally recognised state. It was established that the Republic would have control of Java, Madura and Sumatra, and it also stated that by 1st January 1949 Dutch troops would be withdrawn from the territory and a United States of Indonesia would be created from these three parts, with a centralised Federal government, that maintained a union with the Netherlands. However despite the fact the Dutch signed this agreement, they began a series of operations that they hoped would confine the Republic and thus strengthen their own claims to the territory,

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[29] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.142. For the British in particular the Oil fields and other Indonesian natural resources had tremendous economic and strategic interest. An interest that would be more easily tapped if they belonged to a European ally rather than an Independent state.

cumulating on the 19th December 1948 when Dutch paratroops seized Jakarta and arrested Sukarno and other leaders of the Republic.

However the mood of the international community was altering and such actions were no longer deemed to be acceptable. This change in mood is highlighted by the non-military responses that were directed towards the Netherlands by other nations. For instance Dutch economic activity within the region was severely handicapped initially because the Dutch national Airline (KLM) was banned by states across Asia, and this was coupled by other actions against their Ocean based operations as well, for instance the boycott by Australian dock workers on all Dutch vessels. The combination of these activities restricted the Netherlands' capability to function effectively both economically and politically in the Far East. The Dutch were put under further pressure not only by boycotts but also by direct political pressure, in particular that of the Burmese government, which proposed a Conference of Asian Nations to consider further joint actions. This conference did eventually take place on 23rd January 1949 in Delhi. The consensus in Delhi was that the Dutch colonial stance had gone unchecked for too long and that it was a time for radical action. They demanded that:

All political prisoners be freed, that the legitimate Republican Government of Indonesia be allowed to function freely, that elections be held for a Constituent Assembly, that power be transferred to the Indonesians by 1st January 1950, that differences between the Indonesians and the Dutch should be settled by talks, and that the [UN] Security Council should be prepared to enforce its recommendations.[30]

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[30] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* pp.147-8

This regional stance was mirrored in the UN by other state actors in particular Canada who during their time as non-permanent member of the Security Council made considerable efforts to ensure the international recognition of the Indonesian Republic and the end of Dutch colonial rule. Due in a large part to the efforts of the Canadian representative on the Security Council, General Andrew McNaughton, between 1947 and 1949 nine resolutions were passed expressing increasing concern at the escalating situation in the East Indies and expressing its desire to remedy the dispute. This cumulated on 28th January 1949 when the Security Council passed resolution 67. It stated that the continued occupation of Indonesian territory by Dutch forces was preventing the successful resolution of the crisis and that it was "incompatible with the restoration of good relations between [Indonesia and the Netherlands] and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement".[31] The resolution went on to ask both parties to cease all hostilities but it placed particular pressure on the Dutch to not only discontinue its military operations, but also to release all of the political prisoners that had been arrested in December 1948. This release of the Indonesian leadership was necessary in the eyes of the UN so that the guerrilla campaign being conducted against the Dutch could be brought to an end.[32] This acknowledgment of the Republic's leadership's significance in the resolution of the dispute signalled the international community's recognition of the Sukarno administration, and the autonomy of the Republic of Indonesia as a sovereign nation state, or more particularly it recognised that Sukarno's desire to have Indonesian sovereignty recognised was a just and therefore attainable goal. This blueprint for peace did not explicitly side with either the Indonesians or the Dutch, but by placing both parties on an equal footing the Security Council was recognising Indonesia as a separate and

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[31] See Appendix 5
[32] *Ibid.*

independent entity away from the Dutch. In doing so the Dutch claim to the East Indies was effectively quashed and the period of colonial rule in Indonesia was to become a thing of the past.

Resolution 67 further echoed the demands of the Conference of Asian Nations in that it encouraged that both parties should make moves not only to cease hostilities but also to carry the *Linggadjati* agreement to its logical conclusion and transfer power away from the Dutch and into the hands of the Indonesian people. The UN set out a time table that power should be formally handed over no later than 1st July 1950, and outlined the steps and negotiations that both parties would need to agree to prior to the transfer of sovereignty. As a consequence of this between the 23rd August and 2nd November 1949 a round table conference took place in The Hague to finalise the settlement and for the Netherlands it was an opportunity to try and retrieve something from the situation. However, despite their best efforts the Dutch were forced to concede to the will of the international community and accept Indonesian Sovereignty, to take effect from 27th December, with the exception of Irian whose future would be decided in 1950. The plan was to create a Dutch style Commonwealth, the Republic of Indonesia would be joined by some 16 non-Republican states, with the Dutch Monarchy as their head of State. The Dutch armed forces, which by this time had grown to some 85,000, would be withdrawn as quickly as possible, leaving a naval presence in Surabaya. However even with world opinion against them, and a seemingly straightforward plan of action agreed the Dutch still proved problematic for the fledgling state. Aside from the issue of the Dutch armed forces continued presence in Indonesia until May 1951, continued tension between the incumbent Dutch officials and the newly independent Indonesians authorities meant

that there was not to be a smooth transition of power in Indonesia. Two issues of particular significance was the insistence by the Dutch that the new Republic assume responsibility for "Dutch East Indian" debts, debt that the new regime felt that they had no obligation to pay as the liability belonged to the Dutch and not the people of Indonesia. The second issue was to have significance later in Sukarno's rule, and that was the Dutch decision to maintain control of West Irian, a decision that went against Sukarno's vision of an independent Indonesia. However despite of these the transfer of power went ahead, and on 27th December 1949 the Indonesian National Flag was raised for the first time over the newly independent state, the non-Republican states were soon absorbed and on 20th July 1950 a Constitution was agreed and finalised. On the 15th August President Achmed Sukarno formally dissolved the Federation and announced a new state, inaugurating the Republic of Indonesia, and on the 26th September 1950 UN Security Council Resolution 86 was passed.

[The Security Council] Finds that the Republic of Indonesia is a peace-loving State which fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Indonesia be admitted to membership of the United Nations.[33]

The Indonesian-Netherlands dispute is a clear case of a struggle between two opposing political regimes. More specifically this is a case of a regime seeking the external recognition of the international community. For an imperial power like the Dutch legitimacy was irrelevant concept and so the focus of its battle was not on attempting to win the hearts and minds of the Indonesian people, rather they sought to ensure the support of the international community as a whole. Initially they were somewhat successful in that they did gain the support of several key European

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[33] See Appendix 6

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powers. When one examines the resolutions passed by the Security Council over the duration of the crisis you can see a shift in support for the Dutch claims. After the initial acknowledgement by the Security Council, in resolution 27 (1/8/47), of the dispute, the subsequent resolutions were not passed unanimously and there is a pattern of abstention by the Netherlands Imperialist neighbours in Europe. Of particular note are resolutions 63 (24/12/48) and 64 (28/12/48), which were both issued in response to the Dutch incursion into Jakarta and the arrest of Sukarno. Resolution 63 called for the Dutch to "cease hostilities forthwith [and to immediately] release the President of the Republic of Indonesia and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December 1948"[34], superficially this is recognition of the Sukarno regime, and at the very least it is an acknowledgment of his position as President. However 3 major states abstained from the vote, those being the USSR, Belgium and France.[35] Resolution 64, which stated that "the Netherlands Government has not so far released the President of the Republic of Indonesia and all other political prisoners, as required by Council resolution 63 of 24 December 1948, [and called for] the Netherlands Government to set free these political prisoners forthwith and report to the Security Council within twenty-four hours of the adoption of the present resolution."[36], but again there were abstentions, this time Belgium and France were joined by the United Kingdom. These two resolutions coming swiftly after the Dutch aggression were strongly worded and sent a clear signal that imperialist designs were no longer acceptable. Given that Belgium, Britain and France all had Colonial interests of their own meant that it was not in their interests to echo the anti-colonial sentiment of the two resolutions. However prior to his capture Sukarno and his colleagues had laid a

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[34] See Appendix 3
[35] The Ukraine was also counted as an abstention, however this was due to the representative being absent rather than being a political decision.
[36] See Appendix 4

sufficient foundation to their claims of legitimacy that even though they were prisoners of the Dutch regime, regional and global opinion had moved securely in their favour in initially recognising the injustice of the Dutch actions thereby leading to the Conference of Asian Nations and UNSC resolution 67 (28/1/49). Global opinion had shifted significantly enough by January 1949 the Security Council was able pass resolution 67 and more emphatically condemn the Dutch actions and when in September 1950 Indonesia was finally invited to join the United Nations no European member of the security council saw fit to abstain from recognising Sukarno's new Republic.

Chapter Four: Sukarno's Vision for the New Indonesia

This chapter will address the latter two phases of Sukarno's Indonesia the first being from 1950-56 and the second phase being from 1956-65. I will show that whilst superficially they have distinct political security challenges, were actually unified by the continuing theme of Sukarno's attempts to establish, and maintain, an effective political regime. This phase of Sukarno's rule was a period of consolidation, where he sought to secure Indonesia's place in the world and with it, the stability of his regime. I will show how prior to 1956 Sukarno's efforts to maintain the external recognition that had been integral to the process of independence became detrimental to other goals of the new regime and how they ultimately lead to a radical regime reform in 1956. I will then show how this new regime developed and sought to subvert the political challenges of the early 1950s. Finally I will address the rise to prominence of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (the PKI or Indonesian Communist Party) and the *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (the ABRI or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) within Indonesian politics.   These organisations emerged as alternative sources of power in Sukarno's Indonesia, and this in turn lead to a securitization paradox that preceded the failure of Sukarno's political regime, and the rise of the New Order under Major-General Suharto.

1950-57: Western Style Democracy in Indonesia

As was discussed in chapter one international recognition is only one of the necessary factors for an effective regime. The second and in the case of new states the most significant is the securing of ones internal legitimacy. With the effective removal of the Dutch from the majority of Indonesia, the Sukarno regime found itself in a difficult situation. There was no longer an external "other" to blame for the

nations difficulties. The Indonesian people now had to stand on their own two feet and govern themselves. However this was not an easy task and the regime had difficulty developing an effective governing strategy, as is evident from the fact that the Republic had five cabinets in the first six years of its existence. This did not promote political stability, and coupled with a National Assembly where the majority party only held 22% of the seats, and this did not encourage decisive action.[1] This political uncertainty was coupled by Economic problems too. Not only the aforementioned debt that the administration inherited from the Dutch, but also Sukarno's fierce nationalism, which was necessary for the forging of a new Indonesia and that was enshrined as a root principle of the independent Indonesia, lead to a fear of nationalisation and scared foreign investors. This in turn exacerbated the economic problems that Sukarno was faced with. This raised the question of how could the elite resolve these problems? Politically, Sukarno had adopted a Western Style parliamentary democracy. This approach had had several advantages for a fledgling state; firstly it was more likely to appeal to the significant political and economic power of the international community, particularly Western Europe and North America. This was a strategy adopted for two main reasons as by appearing to be 'one of them' Indonesia felt it would bolster their claim for recognition and secondly encourage cordial relations, including economic, once independence had been achieved. Secondly, it made sense for a new regime to adopt a proven method of governance, in particular a method that lay at the heart of all of the 'successful' and prosperous states in the system. However in such a diverse nation as Indonesia, with so many different groups and bodies to be represented all of which were contesting for power, it made strong government virtually impossible. The coalitions that were

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[1] Geoff Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000) p.151

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formed were neither strong nor stable enough, to drive through the changes required to remedy the nations problems or develop the institutions of power required to effectively govern.[2]   This weakness led to the increased participation of two significant actors into the Indonesian political system, they were to vie for power with each other and Sukarno's government. These two actors were the *Partai Kommunist Indonesia* (PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party), and the *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (ABRI, the Armed Forces).

The PKI had found itself marginalized from the liberal democratic regime that Sukarno had developed, whilst at the same, its membership was growing (100,000 members in 1952 to 165,000 in 1954) due in large part to a failing economy and a people who felt that they had been ignored and marginalized by the new Republic. The PKI were a voice that spoke for these sections of Indonesian society. Conversely the ABRI's role grew out of the perceived need to deal with not only the rising Communist threat, as the strikes the PKI organised and other acts of civil disobedience began to more significantly impact upon the day to day living of people in the republic, but they also they saw it as their role to more actively participate in the administration of the Republic. By the end of 1955 the membership of the PKI had risen to over one million, and they had secured 16% of the vote in the general election, taking a marginal party and giving it a significant voice within Parliament.[3] At the same time in response to this development the ABRI began to behave more proactively to secure what it perceived as being Indonesia's interests. An example of this would be when in December 1956 Colonel Simbolon, the regional commander of West Sumatra, actually took command of the Civil administration, the Army then

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[2] H. Freigth, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1962) *passim*
[3] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* pp.152-3

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made the same move in North Sumatra and *forced* the Governor of South Sumatra to make political reforms.[4] The army councils that were established soon gained public support by ordering improvements to schools, roads and other infrastructure that the official government had failed or been unable implement themselves. The Army then began to directly target the PKI who they saw as being a threat to Indonesian prosperity, to this end they initiated a policy of arresting PKI members, a manoeuvre that was supported by those foreign investors based in Sumatra. In fact some Western analysts were concluding that a military regime would be good for Indonesia, and would allow it "to achieve economic stability and … guarantee the profits of the domestic and foreign corporations."[5] Sukarno was caught in a difficult situation. On the one hand it was evident that the Democratic experiment they had undertaken had failed, on the other, both the PKI and the Army were establishing competing systems of power to the *legitimate* government.

1957-65: Gotong Rojong: An Indonesian Solution to Sukarno's Political Legitimacy

To deal with this problem Sukarno made a radical move. He initiated the policy of "Guided Democracy" on 21st February 1957, a form of government based upon mutual co-operation or *Gotong Rojong*, between the political parties and the other groups (that is Workers, Peasants, Religion, Youth etc that make up society). He believed that this scheme better suited Indonesia's "national character" than western style parliamentary democracy had and could.[6] Sukarno placed the blame for the crisis that the nation was experiencing at the feet of the Western Style Democracy that had been adopted in 1950. He stated that:

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[4] John R. W. Smail, "The Military Politics of North Sumatra: December 1956 - October 1957" *Indonesia* Vol.6 (October 1968) pp. 128-87
[5] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.153
[6] *Ibid.* p.154

we [the Indonesian people] had used a wrong system, a wrong style of government…an import democracy…not in harmony with our spirit…not in harmony with our [national] personality.[7]

Sukarno stated that *Gotong Rojong* was "an authentic Indonesian term which gives the purest reflection of the Indonesian soul"[8], rather than the cabinet being made up of the dominant party or a coalition it would be a "reflection of Parliament" and therefore a reflection of the electorate as a whole. In parallel there was the National Council, which was to be made up of all of the other groups of Society and importantly the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. This council, headed by Sukarno, was going to be "a reflection of [Indonesian] society" and would assist the Cabinet.[9] This was a cleverly orchestrated move my Sukarno as in one act he was able to deal with his peoples concern with his regimes performance, arguing that it was the fault of the Non-Indonesian model that was adopted, and insinuated that an Indonesian way, "Our Way", would be successful. This was a move that again directed the potential dissatisfaction with his rule towards an external other, even though in this case it had been his choice to adopt the western system. Therefore Sukarno was able to again look towards and use the Europeans as a counterpoint to help him to emphasise an Indonesian ideal. An ideal that so far had been corrupted and it was this corruption that had lead to the failure of Indonesia to prosper. This was calling upon feelings of national and cultural identity, using the defining principle of national identity to help justify a radical shift and change in the political regime. At the same time the National Council had a central role for the Chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces, which channelled their power and dissatisfaction *within* the regime

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[7] Sukarno quoted in Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia* (New York: Harper and Bros, 1959) pp.177-80
[8] *Ibid.* p.178
[9] *Ibid.*

itself, thereby removing a growing source of concern and a possible political rival. The third effect of the Guided Democracy principle was that it gave the PKI a legitimate route into power, however prevented them from assuming total control. Under the old style Cabinet the political conditions meant that the PKI could never attain a total majority and coalitions would form, in effect preventing the PKI from participating in government. This was frustrating and lead to the Communists resorting to other methods, strikes etc, to exert their influence on politics. With Guided Democracy they would be reflected in the Cabinet but not able to dominate and also as the cabinet was counter balanced by a strong President and the influence of the National Council the PKI should be more easily controlled.

Sukarno had seemingly found a solution to emerging or existing threats to the political, social and economic well being of Indonesia with *Gotong Rojong*. However, the west did not see it in the same light. The creation of an environment in which the Communists had any say in the governing of a nation was seen as destabilising and dangerous. Also all of the talk of deliberation and cooperation at the expense of Liberal Democracy was perceived as a dramatic shift to the left. Sukarno's case was not helped by the PKI's own satisfaction at this new principle, with Communist slogans appearing on walls in Jakarta and through out Indonesia claiming that Guided Democracy was the salvation of the Nation. So whilst Sukarno had seemingly removed two potential threats to his legitimacy, in doing so he had weakened his position international. However, in 1957 Sukarno's primary concern was the survival of the regime and if he had not acted in this way it is likely that the PKI and or the ABRI would have significantly impeded on his ability to govern. So despite initial concerns for *Gotong Rojong* Sukarno was able to manipulate and coerce

ministers of every level in order to garner enough support, momentum and power to push his vision through, and in 1960 Sukarno was able to replace the existing structures and replace them with institutions and structures based upon the 'Indonesian' principles of *Gotong Rojong*. [10] At the same time he established the People's Consultative Congress, a Supreme Advisory Council, a National Front and other institutions necessary for "Guided Democracy". The defining characteristic of this new approach was that instead of voting and the majority deciding an issue, each group would debate and deliberate (*musjawarah*) until "they reached consensual opinions in agreement with the President". [11] A principle that was represented by the acronym NASAKOM or cooperation between the Nationalists, Muslims and Communists, as *musjawarah* was dependent on getting these three factions to agree. [12]

This was not the end of Sukarno's struggle to secure his legitimacy. He still had the problem that whilst he may have in fact established a more effective way of administering the Indonesian Republic, not all of those in his diverse state agreed with his view of what was best for Indonesia. Ever mindful of the potential for future threats to his regime, Sukarno was able to again direct the people's attention away by reintroducing the Dutch as a viable "other"; in this instance he was concerned with the continued occupation of West Irian. Initially, Sukarno made statements to his own people, re-emphasising the continued Dutch occupation of West Irian, which many Indonesians felt was part of the Republic and should not be under Dutch control. They felt that true independence could not be achieved or claimed until West Irian was fully integrated into the Republic. At this time the UN was not willing to

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[10] J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972) p.5
[11] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.155
[12] Dennis Bloodworth, *An Eye for the Dragon: South-East Asia Observed* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1970) p.108

intervene directly to force the Dutch and Indonesian governments to negotiate a settlement, however Sukarno believed if he could rally enough support domestically, his vision of Indonesia could finally be realised.[13] To this end in November 1957 Sukarno stepped up his campaign to prepare his population, stating that if external support for Indonesia's claims to West Irian was not forth coming, then Indonesia would have to "startle the world" with a new direct course of action.[14] What Sukarno had in mind was that Indonesia should turn her back on the West, and so proposed that Indonesia break off trade with Holland in particular, and the West in general, and instead focus on Eastern Europe, China, Japan and India.[15] In the course of this campaign he also stated that Indonesia needed to build up power and force the Dutch out of West Irian. These actions were not with out there critics, and they believed such changes were dangerous to Indonesia's economic and political stability, and arguably their influence and power within the Indonesian political system.[16] The opposition to the changes that Sukarno instigated was most explicitly expressed by the resignation of his Vice-President Hatta, such a strong move by a high ranking figure resulted in a declaration of martial law by Sukarno[17], this manoeuvre effectively controlled the potential unrest and allow his new regime to take root. The regime change instigated by Sukarno at this time was only one strand in his strategy to improve upon Indonesia's fragile situation. Of equal importance was the move by Sukarno to securitize the issue of West Irian, and effectively re-establish the Dutch and the West as a viable threat to the Indonesian cause. This was a move that also re-securitized the principle of national identity, that is what constitutes Indonesia and

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[13] Legge *Sukarno: A Political Biography* p.291
[14] *Ibid.* pp.291-2
[15] *Merdeka,* 12 November 1957 cited in *Ibid.* p.292
[16] *Ibid.* p.292, also Jusrus M. van der Kroef, "'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia" *Far Eastern Survey* Vol.26, No.8 (1957) pp.115-6
[17] Kroef, "'Guided Democracy' in Indonesia" p.116

thereby the Indonesian people. This was societal politics being manipulated for political means, as the external threat would again be utilised to unify the disparate Indonesians into a unified whole that would enable this new regime to more effectively govern. The move against the Dutch was successful, as there was a response through out the archipelago, initiated by both Sukarno's actions and the apparent in-action on the part of the United Nations regarding issue of West Irian, that lead to a sustained campaign against Dutch property. This combination of strikes, mass demonstrations, and eventually the seizure of Dutch companies, banks and other interests lead to thousands of Dutch nationals returning to the Netherlands.[18] These actions were to have mixed results for the Sukarno regime, whilst initially the new system, the strong assertive actions of the President, and the vigour in which Sukarno stood up to the West all played well with the majority of people in Indonesia. However, as the campaign continued, and the situation escalated, elements within Indonesia began to show dissatisfaction with the President's actions. The most explicate being assassination attempts the first of which took place as early as November 30th 1957.[19] Another unforeseen consequence of the escalation and seizure of Dutch property was that the government was forced to announce that it would assume control, however in reality it was not Sukarno's administration that did this, but rather the ABRI. Whilst this was something that Sukarno did rectify in time, temporarily the Army found itself in a particularly strong position.[20] This did not effect Sukarno's efforts to liberate West Irian, for whilst economically speaking his regime's performance could not be considered a success he was still able to lay the blame at the feet of the Imperial Dutch and so therefore so long as he was strong *vis a vis* the Netherlands, he still was tremendously popular. To this end in August 1960,

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[18] M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (London: Macmillan, 1981) p.249
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Legge *Sukarno: A Political Biography* p.294

after a sustained period of economic and diplomatic harassment of the Dutch in Indonesia, Sukarno formally severed diplomatic relations with the Dutch. This extraordinary action left the regime with only one course of action, that being an escalation and the use of military means. This in turn signified the triggering of a securitization paradox, as there was no longer possible resolution of the West Irian situation within the discourse to the political sector. This cross over into the military sector lead to the creation of the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian in the December of 1961, which was under the command of Major-General Suharto, a promotion that would have significant, if in direct, ramifications for Sukarno in 1965.[21]

Relations with the West at this time were not at the forefront of Sukarno's mind at this time. It was however important for the regime to be successful in this endeavour, and neither the Dutch nor the United States wanted to see an extended conflict in the region. Sukarno's actions and rhetoric however sent a clear signal that he was prepared to fight for West Irian, and at this time he had rallied the support of the vast majority of his population. Importantly his stand against imperialism appealed to the PKI and the switch to a non-diplomatic approach gave the ABRI an important and central role in the resolution of the issue. Therefore as Sukarno continued his courtship of non-Western governments, particularly by accepting Military support and economic aid from the Soviet Union, the US, under the newly elected President Kennedy began to put pressure on the Dutch to resolve the situation, and also attempt to counter Sukarno's shift.[22] On 15th August 1962 the Dutch and Indonesians agreed that the UN would begin administrating West Irian with the

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[21] At this time there was no hint of the political ambitions that would lead to his rise to prominence in the aftermath of the 1965 coup.
[22] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* p.257

territory finally being ceded to Jakarta in the May of 1963.[23]   With this success

Sukarno was again faced with the reality of his domestic political situation, and the

internal rivalries of the republic were again begun to resurface. Despite the constant

striving on the part of Sukarno to find that external other to divert the internal

differences, his vision of a unified and prosperous Indonesia seemed to be falling

apart. This was problematic in several ways, as the Indonesian people were becoming

disenchanted with his leadership; they were not enjoying the fruits of independence

that he had promised them. Between 1960 and 1964 Indonesia was in a state of

economic hyperinflation, which remained around 100% per year. This exacerbated

Sukarno's political situation, as his poor performance economically created

dissatisfaction with the people, which in turn made the PKI and the Army seem like

attractive alternatives.[24] Sukarno needed to act, he needed a cause to have his people

rally behind, and so he targeted Malaysia.

Konfrontasi was a policy of hostile engagement with Malaysia who Sukarno

argued was being an accomplice of "neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists pursuing a

policy hostile towards Indonesia."[25] Sukarno argued that the former British Colony

was a fabrication that was designed to protect Britain's control over Malay and

Brunei's national resources, therefore bolstering an "imperial" presence in the region,

which was detrimental to the indigenous states of the region particularly Indonesia.[26]

Sukarno claimed that the Malay government was assisting in policies design to

"suppress the democratic and patriotic movements of the peoples in these five

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[23] Bloodworth *An Eye for the Dragon* p.108
[24] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* p.259
[25] Sukarno cited in John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: "Crush Malaysia" and the Gestapu" *Asian Survey* Vol.6, No.10 (1966) p.256
[26] D.R. SarDesai, *Southeast Asia: Past and Present* (London: Macmillan, 1989) pp. 236-8

countries[27] which aim at attainment of genuine national independence and freedom from imperialism."[28] *Konfrontasi* was not supported by everyone within Indonesia, in particular those within the Islamic community who were "reluctant" going to war with a fellow Muslim country.[29]

However despite initially reticence Sukarno was able to argue the case for the policy with the two politically significant groups of the PKI and ABRI. Firstly, to the PKI he appealed to their own dissatisfaction with the failure of Malaysia's own communist rising, that had been quashed prior to their declaration of independence in 1960. Evidence of the attempt to appeal to this group is seen by Sukarno's use of terminology like "neo-imperialism and neo-colonial", which are slogans that appeal to the PKI's own sensibilities. The escalation of hostilities was also 'helpful' to the PKI as it meant that the ABRI was deployed on the border, rather than in central Java where they could hinder the PKI.[30] To the ABRI he appealed to a different set of criteria, significantly he appealed to their fear that if left unchecked the significant Chinese community within Malaysia would eventually control the state, and when that happened Malaysia would in turn be dominated by communist China.[31] The policy of *Konfrontasi* could be explained as a continuation of his nationalist/revolutionary ideology that he had established in the 1920s and 30s, and he would have reacted to any external presence in the region. However, it can also be read as a calculated method of controlling the potential threats that he faced from within Indonesia. At the same time this courtship of the Soviet Union made his

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[27] "Five countries" refers to the idea of *Indonesia Raya* (or Greater Indonesia) which incorporated Southern Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia.
[28] Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: "Crush Malaysia" and the Gestapu" p.526
[29] *Ibid.* p.527
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*

actions considerably anti-Western and thus further aggravated the United States. This was escalating his dealings with the Communist bloc outside of his Asian/regional context and instead onto the world/Cold War stage. When the Soviet Union began providing economic and military aid to the Sukarno regime this again had the West concerned about Indonesia, they began to rethink again how they factored the Sukarno regime into their equations. Importantly, because of the authoritarian nature of the Guided Democracy system, the responsibility for these policies could be placed firmly at the feet of Sukarno, giving the West, and anybody unhappy with developments in Indonesia as a whole, an obvious and easy place to focus their attention.[32]

Whilst antagonising the West, Soviet support and the liberation of West Irian had a positive impact on the standing of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Guided Democracy offered the Army the opportunity to exert itself in ways that had not been possible before. A prime example was the increase in the representation of the armed forces in the cabinet, in the first 1959 "Guided" Cabinet one third of its members were drawn from the military, as compared to 3 members in the previous cabinet and none prior to that.[33] This is aside from Military representation in the numerous other "Guided" bodies and institutions. It was the Army that benefited most from Sukarno's new relationship with Moscow securing numerous loans and programs with which to procure armaments, to both modernise and expand.[34] So in his attempts to elevate Indonesia's status on the World stage and secure his nation militarily and politically, Sukarno he was also creating a precarious situation with an increasingly strong and centralised armed forces. Whilst this had been pragmatic in 1957, and the

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[32] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p. 156
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] By 1962 the Army had grown to some 330,000 men. *Ibid.*

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disintegration of the Republic *had* been avoided, it was becoming evident that the balance he had created could not last indefinitely. The Army and the PKI were both growing terms of influence, power and ambition. And also the realities of Cold War politics were beginning to influence Indonesia more heavily as the policies of Washington and Moscow were to cast a greater shadow on how Sukarno could and would act.

Guided Democracy had also been a positive development for the PKI. By the early 1960s membership of the organisation had risen to some 3,000,000 and the organisation was now part of the government in Indonesia. This legitimate role that they had manufactured for themselves gave them the confidence to act 'proactively' in other areas of Indonesian politics. In 1964 the PKI was backing several Anti-western campaigns, especially against the British and the Americans, as part of the struggle against Malaysia and Imperial intervention in the region generally. These campaigns ranged from simple graffiti and protests against American films, to the occupation of foreign held property and plantations.[35] Such activities were not totally condoned by the Government, and certainly not the Military, and action was taken to restore order and "punish" those responsible, however the position the PKI held within the NASAKOM system, and also the growing Anti-American feeling felt by the population at large, meant that any reaction was little more than a gesture because the Army was not yet confident enough to act in any grand scale against Sukarno and the Communists. The few actions that the Army did undertake, for instance the banning of the PKI newspaper *Harian Rakyat* and the cancellation of the 1960 sixth

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[35] *Ibid.* p.157-61

congress, were quickly met with resistance from Sukarno himself leading to the further muddying of relations between the Armed Forces and the executive.

The increase in PKI campaigning and support for Sukarno's policies, for example crop sharing and land distribution in the early days of Guided Democracy, was creating more and more tensions both domestically and internationally. Sukarno was increasingly struggling to maintain a balance and not a return to the crisis of the late 1950s. PKI activity was increasingly aggravating others within Indonesia and groups like the Proletarian Party (*Partai Murba*)[36], and other members of the Cabinet were starting to voice their concerns both within the institutions of *Gotong Rojong* and without. Therefore when on 17th December 1964 Sukarno announced that *Partai Murba* was to be banned it sent shockwaves through out the establishment. Whilst this was not a popular group it was perceived that Sukarno was acting in the interests of the PKI, who benefited most with the disintegration of this group.

Sukarno's perceived shift to the left was seemingly gathering pace through out 1965 as in his Independence Day speech on the 17th August he declared, "We are now fostering an anti-imperialist axis...the Jakarta-Phnom-Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis".[37] Sending a clear message, both at home and abroad, that Sukarno had shifted away from a position of Non-alignment, to one that was evidently pro-communist. Although it is interesting to note that Moscow is conspicuous in its absence from Sukarno's axis. This was a clear attempt to establish an 'Asian value

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[36] An organisation founded by Tan Malaka, who had also founded the PKI in 1920 at the behest of Comintern (Communist International) and Moscow. This gave the organisation a prestige and legitimacy within Socialist circles, especially as Malaka had been executed in 1949. Whilst it was still a small player in comparison to the PKI, it was problematic to have a Socialist organisation in opposition to them.
[37] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.161

system', however it was one that was most certainly socialist and potentially anti-Western in character. And the absence of the Soviet Union whilst allying itself to the left, it can be perceived to be a move by Sukarno to segregating himself and thus Indonesia from being seen as a Soviet surrogate/colony. This was a move that echoed developments in the PKI's relationship with the Peoples Republic of China, as the leadership of the PKI openly supported the PRC against not only the capitalist West but also the USSR.[38] This was a relationship that was to a significant impact upon the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the aftermath of Sukarno's regime. However at this time the PKI could take a lot of heart from these developments, Ewa Pauker, an Indonesian specialist writing at the time, stated that the "patient, careful and extremely dexterous" leadership of the PKI "may well succeed in making Indonesia the fifteenth Communist State".[39] Not only this, but the method they were using was far more dangerous from the point of view of anti-communists. Sukarno had given the PKI a legitimate route to power, this was much more difficult for those who wanted to end Communist expansion to fight against. The Army was particularly disturbed by the relationship that Sukarno had nurtured with the Communists. They could see that as time progressed the increased strength of the PKI was becoming detrimental to Indonesian interests as they saw them. Not only was it evident that the PKI had a rather more radical long-term agenda, and as time went on this clashed with the Armies perceived role to protect both Indonesia's economic and political well being. The escalation in left wing policies was creating shock waves in the West that, in turn would impact on Indonesia. Army felt that it would have to react. In the August of 1965 Sukarno formally withdrew Indonesia from the International Monetary Fund, Interpol and the World Bank, and in doing so severed its connection

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[38] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* p.262
[39] Ewa T. Pauker, 'Has the Sukarno regime weakened the PKI?' *Asian Survey* Vol.4, No.9 (September 1964) p.1070

with the capitalist world.[40] When viewed in conjunction with the Independence Day "anti-imperialist axis" speech this move sent shock waves through the anti-PKI/pro-Western sections of Indonesia, particularly the ABRI. Within the Armed forces there was increasing dissatisfaction at the state wide corruption that had gone unchecked whilst Sukarno continued his campaign against the West.[41] Sukarno's performance was not meeting the expectations of his population, and with his withdrawal from the Western capitalist institutions and further allying himself with the PRC, he had effectively proven that his regime was not capable of resolving the economic crisis. His political legitimacy had been severely damaged and alternatives began to look appealing.

The policy of Guided Democracy had succeeded in placating the desires of the Army and Communists. Unfortunately it had done so by creating an environment where both were able to grow and develop more fully. This was fine in the short term, however by 1965 both organisations had reached a size where they were both to begin to see their only true way of securing their positions politically was by targeting each other. By this time Sukarno was unable to maintain the balance he had utilised to make his Guided Democracy succeed. Whilst he had attempted to manufacture an effective outlet for potential opposition, he had in effect merely provided an incubator for each organisations own political desires. More over, slowly but surely in order to allow for the stable and effective running of the Republic and counter act the growing power of the Army, Sukarno had sided with the PKI. This meant that when the clash between the Army and the PKI was to come, he was directly in the firing line, and in

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[40] Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* p.268
[41] *Ibid.* p.264

the aftermath of the September 30th coup attempt, Sukarno found himself in a precarious position.

<u>Chapter Five: The fall of Sukarno and the rise of the New Order</u>

The political environment that had been manufactured by Sukarno during his *Gotong Rojong* regime had become fundamentally unstable by the autumn of 1965. The chapter will address the events of September 30th 1965 and their impact upon Indonesian political security. It will chart the competing moves by Sukarno, the emergence of Suharto as a political actor, and how through a series of securitizing moves it was possible for the New Order to usurp Sukarno's political position. I will then explore how Suharto and the New Order was able to effectively establish the new political institutions and an alternative ideational position from which to govern the republic. It will show how in the aftermath of the 1965 coup the tension that had been building through the latter part of Sukarno's rule culminated in the ABRI effectively eradicated the communists from Indonesian politics, and how this in turn impacted upon Sukarno himself. This chapter will finally show how the New Order was able to successfully use the mechanisms and institutions of Sukarno's own *Gotong Rojong* regime to counter the President's power and lay the foundations of a regime that would stand until 1998. This chapter illustrates the manoeuvres that competing political regimes undergo in the regime formation process. Regime change is not as simple as flicking a switch and irrespective of the failings of an established regime, if it still, superficially at least, is able to claim the *legitimate* right to rule then the opposition regime needs to work to erode this right. The aftermath of the September 30th coup shows how by using Sukarno's own language, principles and institutions, the New Order was able to not only undermine Sukarno's claim to legitimacy, but also establish their own right to rule.

<u>The September 30th Coup</u>

The September 30th 1965 coup was a defining moment in Indonesian politics. For in its aftermath not only would the PKI, and with it Sukarno, be irreparably damaged, but also from obscurity would arise the little known Lieutenant General Suharto. The events of the coup have been written about extensively through out the literature however the securitization approach can shed light on the processes that were at play, which enabled the unassuming career officer Suharto to not only establish himself and his ideas as viable alternatives to Sukarno's Indonesia, but also usurp Sukarno's legitimacy and make it his own. And it was from here that the New Order regime would emerge and flourish.

On the evening of September 30th 1960 a move was made to arrest seven senior members of the ABRI. The plan was to arrest the generals and return them to Halim Air Force base, which was on the outskirts of Jakarta. However it quickly began to unravel as the generals did not come quietly, which in turn lead to confusion and the assailants shot and killed three of their targets (General Yani, Major General Haryono and Brigadier General Panjaitan) in their homes. And whilst the coup members did succeed in detaining three of the remaining generals (Major General Suprapto, Major General Parman and Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomiharjo), the seventh, the highly influential Nasution, was allowed to escape and his aide was taken to Halim in his stead. On the morning of October 1st Indonesia awoke to the news that a group under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Untung, whose battalion also acted as palace guards for Sukarno, had thwarted a CIA sponsored coup that was planned by the 'Council of Generals'. The captured Generals were alleged to be prominent members

of the council.[1] Untung issued a statement on *Radio Republik Indonesia* (RRI) to explain the violent events that had unfolded the night before, and to let it be known that the action was an internal ABRI matter, which was only directed towards the Council of Generals.[2] The broadcast went on to claim that these generals had "neglected the lot of their men [whist they] lived in luxury, led a gay life, insulted our women and wasted government funds".[3] Which was clearly move by the Untung group to rally the support of the ABRI behind their objectives. Little did they understand that removing the heads of the ABRI would enable Suharto to rise to prominence within the armed forces and ultimately Indonesia as a whole.

Upon hearing the news of the shootings and arrests of his senior colleagues, Suharto quickly moved to get a better idea of what had happened the previous night, and he established a group of senior military staff in order to take control of the situation.[4] Despite the fact that the Untung coup had taken control of RRI, Suharto did have at his disposal the army's own shortwave facilities and through this was able to establish communications and control with the increasingly confused military units that were based in and around the capital, and in so doing establish an effective chain of command with him at the top.[5] Thus, Suharto was effectively able to counter any securitizing or politicising moves made by the leaders of the coup. Suharto informed the forces he had contacted that there had been an attack on the State and the Pancasila, and that he intended to oppose it. And due to the fact that the Untung

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[1] Although Suharto later claimed that there was no such 'Council' and that it was in fact a fabrication on the part of the 30 September movement's leadership, and the PKI. See also R.E. Elson, *Suharto: a Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.101

[2] Taken from an English translation of the broadcast. Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, *A preliminary analysis of the October 1, 1965 coup in Indonesia* (Ithica: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971) pp.121-2

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Elson, *Suharto* p.101

[5] *Ibid.* p.102

group had arrested, and by this time killed, all of the senior, more charismatic members of the ABRI, there was no real opposition to Suharto's move. Suharto's need to regain control was further emphasised, when at mid day there was another broadcast on RRI, which explained that the group had formed a "Revolutionary Council" to "constitute the source of all authority" until elections could be held. Then Untung announced the make up of the council, and again made a move to appease the rest of ABRI by claiming that the Revolutionary Council was to abolish all military ranks higher than Lieutenant Colonel and also offered a promotion to military personnel who supported the coup.[6] This is a clear act of a political actor seeking legitimation of an audience, in this case the ABRI personnel. This mid day broadcast was followed shortly after by a brief statement being issued on Sukarno's behalf, which stated that he was safe, well and in control. When Sukarno had first received news of the coup he had initially opted to head to the Palace in the capital but eventually turned away from this course of action due to the general confusion and possibility that he could become a target of the coup himself. It was for this reason that he headed for Halim Air Base where there was an aircraft permanently based for him to use in case of emergencies.

It is important to iterate at this time that whilst his close proximity to the coup headquarters was to go some way to tarnish his reputation, there was not actually any evidence that Sukarno himself was in collusion with Untung and other members of the group. The fact that Sukarno's afternoon statement was read on his behalf rather than personally shows that there was distance between the President and the Untung group, and the fact that he did not explicitly offer his support also gave Suharto and

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[6] Andersen and McVey. *A preliminary analysis* pp.123-4, and see also Elson, *Suharto*. p.103

his ABRI forces the necessary resolve to move against Untung. By the early evening Suharto and his forces had been able to encourage several of the "neutral" sections of the army to join with him against the Untung group,[7] and Suharto was able to use this extra man power to retake the RRI studios and transmitters. Once this was done he broadcast a statement to counter Untung, in which he explained the days event, made moves to discredit Untung's earlier statements and explain his own intentions.[8]

By this time Suharto was effectively in control and in the early hours of October 2nd Halim Air Force Base was secured by Suharto's forces. And it is here that the real power struggle began to emerge. In the immediate aftermath of the coup Sukarno, upon seeing the realities of the situation had began looking for ways that he could reassert his control. His first move was to appoint a new commander of the armed forces, and whilst Suharto was an option, Sukarno decided to assume command of the armed forces himself, and appointed Pranoto Reksosamudro as a caretaker to deal with day to day matters. Elson postulates that Sukarno's reason for not picking Suharto to assume command, or even the caretaker position, was that given the fact that Suharto had control of Jakarta itself by the time Sukarno made the decision, to offer him a senior appointment at this time would have been seen as endorsing his actions. And at this time Sukarno, and the rest of Indonesia, was not yet sure which way the situation would develop.[9] This would seem to be a credible and intelligent move from such an experienced political mind like Sukarno. The continued struggle

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[7] One of the key reasons given for the movement of troops away from Untung and the coup was due to the group's inability to provide adequate food and drink for the forces that joined them. Elson, *Suharto*. p.105
[8] Suharto, *Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan: otobiografi seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K. H.* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989) and its English translation *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: an autobiography as told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K. H.* (English translation by Sumadi; edited by Muti'ah Lestiono) (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991) pp.127-8
[9] Elson, *Suharto* pp.104-7

for power between the PKI and ABRI that had dominated his regime was always finely balanced, and at this time it was not in his interest to act strongly one way or the other. A strong move in favour of Untung or Suharto may have radically backfired if he opted to support the wrong ABRI faction. Pranoto by comparison was a more passive, and quite possibly malleable, choice, which in turn would enable Sukarno to get a clearer understanding of the situation. The choice by Sukarno to not overtly support Suharto at this time is also due to the fact that Suharto was not seen as being a political operator; he was not charismatic or articulate in any way that would seriously give Sukarno any cause for concern, and therefore Sukarno could afford to snub Suharto and offer Pranoto the senior position.

It was with this in mind that after the capture of Halim Air Base, Sukarno attempted to meet with Suharto. However, initially Suharto sent word to the President explaining that he was too busy to see him at this time, and whilst Suharto did later meet with Sukarno, at this meeting Suharto was able to secure for himself the role of Provisional Leader of the Armed Forces, a post that he had assumed autonomously in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Suharto then made a request that the President make a public broadcast to spell out his formal responsibilities, and in doing so legitimise the position of authority that he had stepped into the previous day.[10] At this time Suharto was not trying to counter the authority of the President, or lay the foundations of an alternative political regime, rather Suharto's actions were the mark of a military man who saw a mission to be achieved and ruthlessly sought the tools with which he could achieve it. First and foremost this meant securing the support of the ABRI, especially those forces that had been swayed by Untung's own broadcasts.

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[10] *Ibid.* p.108

Upon the capture of Halim the moves made by Sukarno to reassert himself threatened Suharto's own abilities and thus Suharto did make a move to ensure his position and his capabilities. But in doing so he had manoeuvred himself into a strong position, for as head of the Armed Forces Sukarno would not be able to overlook him again, and in hindsight it would be seen that Suharto had won an important victory against Sukarno's charismatic old order.

Meanwhile on the 3rd of October, the bodies of the murdered generals were discovered in Halim Air Force Base. Suharto issued an order that the site should be secured but it was not until the following morning that Suharto arrived to personally supervise the recovery of the remains. It was now that Suharto began to put his newly won power to full effect. After waiting until representatives of the media had arrived to capture the slow and grisly task of exhuming the dead,[11] Suharto then issued another statement to the public, in which he blamed the PKI and the air force for their role in the coup, and even "cast aspersions" on Sukarno's attempts to absolve the Air Force in a broadcast that the President had made the previous day.[12] This would seem a bold move by such an inexperienced political operator; however the visual images of the dead generals galvanised Suharto, who later said that at this time he saw that "[his] primary duty was to crush the PKI, to smash their resistance everywhere, in the capital, in the regions, and in their mountain hideouts".[13] Given the growing tension in relations between the PKI and ABRI in the years of *Gotong Rojong* rule, it is not surprising that Suharto would suspect the communists involvement, nor that the General would seek to remove the PKI as an obstacle to ABRI dominance in

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[11] Harold Crouch, *The army and politics in Indonesia.* (revised edition) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) p.38
[12] Elson, *Suharto* p.109
[13] Suharto *Pikiran* p.134

Indonesia. What was surprising was the method that Suharto sought to employ, having so effectively gained control of the armed forces one would assume that he would use a military solution to remove the communist 'threat'. Instead however Suharto saw a different method to vanquish the PKI, mobilising the Indonesian people, and using the military in a more selective way. In his autobiography Suharto stated "I preferred to lend aid to the people... [in order] to cleanse the respective regions of these evil seeds".[14] The media circus at Halim was a way that Suharto could channel his ideas about the coup towards the Indonesian people and in doing so effectively, and with a popular mandate, finally extinguish the PKI as a force in Indonesian politics. By referring to the PKI and the communist ideology as an 'evil seed', Suharto was making a securitizing move. Requesting that his audience agree with his claim that the communists were a threat to Indonesia.

At the public funerals of the generals later that week it became apparent that Suharto's mood was reflected by the public, as they flocked in their thousands to line the streets. Sukarno however was conspicuous in his absence. For Sukarno, the only appropriate course of action was to make light of the coup and make it out to be a *normal* part of Indonesian politics.[15] It was therefore in keeping with this approach that he did not attend, as his presence would have given the impression that the funerals, and therefore the deaths, were significant. This is a move to counter Suharto. By attempting to normalise the situation Sukarno is in effect making a de-securitizing move against Suharto. By the day of the funerals Sukarno had already established this approach to the crises in numerous staff meetings[16], and so even though the mood of the public was shifting, for Sukarno to have attended would have

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[14] *Ibid.* p.136
[15] Elson, *Suharto* p.107, 122
[16] *Ibid.*

been perceived by his cabinet and the leadership of the ABRI as either a sign that he was being indecisive or as a second loss of face against the manoeuvrings of Suharto. What was being established at this time was an alternative assessment to Sukarno's vision of Indonesia, or more importantly, Sukarno's vision did not match that of his audience. An audience who at this particular time was not merely the political and military elites, but also made up of the Indonesian people who were following Suharto's lead in response to the Coup. Sukarno's continued attempts to minimise the implications of the coup began to particularly irk Suharto who was still doing everything in his power to bring the PKI to justice for their alleged involvement in the affair. That said he claimed that "[he] had no thought at all of bringing down Bung Karno [Sukarno]. To [his] mind [Sukarno] remained a dedicated leader, although he had a different view of what happened on 1st October 1965. But I did not think it necessary continually to make public my opinion of him, except at appropriate moments".[17] This at least superficially respectful attitude to the position of President, if not the man, enabled Suharto to further cement his position, and on October 16th Suharto formally became the Commander of the Armed Forces replacing the murdered Yani.

Suharto in the aftermath of the Coup

After his appointment as the Commander of the Armed Forces, Suharto was better able to continue his efforts to destroy the PKI and the *Gestapu*[18] conspirators. The use of the media was central to this as is illustrated by his speech on the 6th of October. In which Suharto had been able to lay the foundations of the rumour that the Generals, had been viciously and maliciously tortured and mutilated by the *Gestapu*

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[17] Suharto, *Pikiran* p.139

[18] *Gestapu* taken from *Gerakan September Tiga Puluh* or the 30 September Movement.

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before their eventual murder[19], and supposition that was to be at the heart of the ABRI's campaign against the PKI and would be used to justify their actions against the Communists. Whilst Suharto had desired to not directly use the armed forces against the PKI, on Oct 10th *Kopkamtib*[20] was established with the express purpose of hunting down and arresting potential threats to the Republic, which to Suharto meant the PKI. *Kopkamtib*'s efforts were so successful that by the time Suharto's position as Head of the Armed Forces was formally accepted by Sukarno on the 16th of October, 1,334 suspected PKI members had been arrested.[21] These actions started a ripple effect out of Jakarta and effectively out of Suharto's direct control. Whilst in the capital the Army was able to systematically continue its policy of arresting PKI members, in the out lying areas of Java and the rest of the archipelago the situation began to escalate. Where the army had little presence and thus control, the local population took matters into their own hands and began to forcibly remove and in many cases kill suspected PKI members and their families. And even when the ABRI was present in stronger numbers, the nature of the mood that Suharto had helped establish lead to levels of violence that even they could not limit or control. At the same time in the media Suharto was still pushing his view of the events of September 30th, that the PKI had recruited from within the Army and the Air Force, and that the only way to prevent such an action from happening again was by "crushing and eliminating the counter-revolutionary movement to its very roots."[22]

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[19] Although whether or not torture and mutilation actually took place is widely debated for instance see Ben Anderson, 'How did the generals die?' *Indonesia* Vol.43 (1987) pp109-34

[20] *Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keaman dan Ketertiban* or Operations Command for the Restoration of Order and Security.

[21] Elson, *Suharto* p.124

[22] *Kompas* November 1st 1965

This clash between the PKI and ABRI had been long in coming due to the centrality of the adversarial relationship between the two groups, and its role in maintaining stability for Sukarno's *Gotong Rojong* regime. And whilst Suharto did not directly blame Sukarno for the coup or the resulting violence, it is clear from his writings and speeches that Suharto was beginning to lay the blame for the coup on the regime itself. For example on the 1st November Suharto stated:

that movement was not a movement that erupted spontaneously on 30 September, but only came to its culmination as a result of a series of happenings which had been prepared long before. An atmosphere of slander, of fomenting the bad feelings of one group against the other, and a gloomy social-economic climate which had previously been created, gave rise to a prior atmosphere and climate which was very easily seized upon by them [the PKI] to ignite the counter-revolutionary movement.[23]

He elaborated further:

[in] any drama there are always the main performers, assistants and the mastermind [*dalangnja*]. It was the just the same with the counter-revolutionary movement which called itself the 30 September Movement. There were major actors, there were also bit-players, and there was also the mastermind, the brainstrust [sic]. The main actors, whose roles amongst others were played by the Untung group and some other members of the ABRI, the bit-players, whose roles were played by members of *Permuda Rakyat* and *Gerwani* [Youth and Women organisations with strong ties to the PKI] and the mastermind which, based on the facts, the results of interrogation and important

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[23] Suharto cited in Elson, *Suharto* p.126

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documents which fell into our hands, points to the involvement of the PKI as the brainstrust [sic] of the counter-revolutionary movement.[24] This is a key statement of Suharto's view of the coup. It is clear that Suharto squarely places the blame on the PKI as being the organisation mind behind the coup, however it is important to note the emphasis he places on the nature of the regime that Sukarno had established. The climate of economic and social "gloom", and mistrust between the PKI and ABRI were integral antecedents to the coup and therefore Suharto was arguing that Sukarno's *Gotong Rojong* regime's failure was equally culpable. In a political security context this statement erodes Sukarno's legitimacy on the grounds of performance. But by blaming the circumstances rather than the man, Suharto was still clearly showing that he was not yet ready or perhaps willing to directly confront Sukarno at this time. A direct move against Sukarno would not have aided Suharto in his conflict with the PKI as Sukarno was still tremendously popular, and Suharto had yet to formalise an alternative to Sukarno's rule.

The mood of the population was slowly but surely moving away from Sukarno, as was evident in the extreme violence that the public was directing towards the PKI. Rather than the calm and reflection that Sukarno was attempting to promote, it was Suharto's rhetoric that the population responded to. And equally importantly Suharto's dissatisfaction with Sukarno's response to the Coup began to be echoed by the Indonesian people at large and in particular on the University campuses. Suharto saw that the student body was an essential actor for the future of Indonesia. He states "[time] and again I made contact with the students. I listened to their ideas, their wishes and their longings. I felt I needed to be close to them because they were the

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[24] *Ibid.*

ones who would be able to help me prevent the outbreak of disorder and excesses. There must be no *chaos*."[25] Suharto found himself in a precarious situation, whilst he had won several decisive victories against Sukarno with respect to the military situation; Sukarno was still making great efforts to control the rapidly escalating political unrest on the archipelago. In one move in January 1966 Sukarno issued a statement calling on for the Indonesian people to "form your brigades [and] gather your forces"[26] and to rally against the increasing unrest. This call escalated into a call from Sukarno's supporters for the formation of a 'Sukarno Brigade', which would have potentially risen to become an alternative to Suharto and the ABRI. This left Suharto in a difficult situation, as although he was now in command of ABRI, the organisation was fractioned and President Sukarno, as the Father of the Republic, still held tremendous influence and sway over the troops on the ground. Suharto was in no position to counter this directly, and his lack of political experience meant that he was not decisive in dealing with this situation. Although Suharto himself later claimed "I saw the political danger and quickly intervened"[27] in actuality Suharto did nothing decisive to counter the President's move and it was the collective actions of several senior military figures, notably Nasution and Ibrahim Ajie, who effectively resolved the situation in the ABRI's favour. Ajie issued a statement which said that "all state bodies, citizens, political parties, and mass organisations ... are in fact followers and supporters of Panca Sila [sic] and the Teachings of the Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolutions ... and therefore automatically make up *barisans* [brigades] standing behind Bung Karno".[28] This manoeuvre effectively removed the threat of the formation of any *new* or alternative bodies being created as Ajie argued that

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[25] Suharto, *Pikiran* p.162 (emphasis in original)
[26] Sukarno cited in Crouch, *The army and politics in Indonesia* p.167
[27] Suharto, *Pikiran* p.163
[28] Ajie cited in Crouch, *The army and politics in Indonesia* p.169

Sukarno's Brigades already existed and any bodies that emerged to counter existing institutions could be argued as being anti-*Pancasila* and anti-Sukarno giving the ABRI free reign to ban any such organisation.[29]

Suharto's inability to deal with Sukarno's challenge left him on the back foot and Sukarno began to push again relentlessly. The struggle to regain control of the situation required Sukarno to reassert his idea of the political situation, and in so doing undermine Suharto's. In mid February Sukarno gave a speech in which he openly praised the PKI for their sacrifices in Indonesia's struggle for independence, and also called for arrangements to be made for the release of those PKI supporters who had been arrested in the months following the coup.[30] This was followed by a cabinet reshuffle in which he removed several key anti-PKI ministers, including Nasution, and replaced them with communist sympathisers.[31] The only real exception to this was that Sukarno offered Suharto Nasution's post as minister of coordinating defence and security, an offer which Suharto rejected.[32] This move by Sukarno was a sign to Suharto and Indonesia at large that although the ABRI had made tremendous gains in the aftermath of the coup, they had began to lose the initiative whilst Sukarno had regained much of the "strength and energy" that he had lost on 30th September.[33] The cabinet reshuffle was a signal that Suharto could not afford to ignore. For if Sukarno was able to re-establish himself as an effective ruler, something he had lost after the coup, then the ABRI's position would be lost and it could even, potentially, leave the door open for a resurgent PKI.

[29] Elson, *Suharto* p.131
[30] *Ibid.* p.132 and also Couch, *The army and politics in Indonesia* p.174
[31] Legge, *Sukarno* p.401
[32] Elson, *Suharto* p.132
[33] *Ibid.* p.133

What followed was a battle of wills between the politically savvy though tarnished Sukarno, and the patient, pragmatic Suharto. Much of Suharto's manoeuvring had to this point been conducted quietly and indirectly out of respect for Sukarno's position in Indonesian politics and history. By supporting student movements like *KAMI* Suharto was able to support the reform movement without directly having to counter Sukarno. However Sukarno's reshuffle, coupled with the banning of *KAMI* in early 1966, removed such avenues and left Suharto with few options. He could either accept Sukarno and his position *vis-à-vis* Indonesian politics and the coup, or he had to tackle Sukarno more directly. In March 1966 Suharto made a decisive move in the form of the *Supersemar*.

March 11th 1966: The *Supersemar*

On March 11th a cabinet meeting was disrupted, and abandoned after reports of armed forces surrounding the building. Sukarno was quickly escorted to his Bogor palace outside of Jakarta, where he was to wait until it was safe. After the months of bloodshed and turmoil in Indonesia this reaction is particularly understandable, and whilst there was no evidence that Suharto was responsible for the troops' presence that morning, he was conspicuous by his absence from the meeting.[34] Later that day Sukarno was visited by Brigadier General Amirmachmud, Major General Basuki Rachmat and Brigadier General Mohammed Yusuf, three senior members of ABRI who had close ties with Suharto, who claimed that they had gone to Bogor in order to ensure that he "would not feel that he had been abandoned by the Army".[35] When their meeting with Sukarno was over he had signed over to Suharto the powers to "take all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm and the stability of the

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[34] *Ibid.* p.135
[35] Brigadier General Amirmachmud cited in *Ibid.*

running of the Government".[36] This order was known as *Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* or the Letter of Instruction of 11 March, the *Supersemar*. The increased military presence that accompanied the cabinet meeting, followed by the 'visit' by senior members of the ABRI effectively countered Sukarno's political posturing. For whilst at this time Suharto had proved to be less adept than Sukarno at the political manoeuvrings that had allowed Sukarno to reassert himself in Jakarta, Suharto showed on March 11th that he was aware of his own strengths. Coupled with the anti-PKI program that Suharto had conducted since the Coup, this move by Suharto sent a message that he was in control and had the manpower to back up his claims.

Once Suharto received the *Supersemar*, he used his new authority to formally attack and ban the PKI from Indonesian politics. The letter was enough to convince those within the ABRI who were still loyal to Sukarno that Suharto now had the legitimacy to carry out whatever actions he saw fit for the stability of the Republic.[37] This was irrespective of the fact that Suharto's move against the PKI was not directly sanctioned by Sukarno, who still sort to establish a balance between the ABRI and the Communists. But why did Sukarno sign over this power? One cannot deny the 'coercive' nature of the Military presence at the March 11th cabinet meeting, or of the visit at Bogor, but Sukarno was a shrewd and experienced political operator who would not sign away his power easily. Brian May suggests that the answer lies in the fact that he saw the *Supersemar* differently to Suharto.[38] For Sukarno, the document was a limited order to tie Suharto up in resolving the increasingly ambiguous political climate of early 1966. The document was in many ways little more than a formal endorsement of the work that Suharto was already carrying out, and whilst Sukarno

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[36] Carmel Budiardjo, *Surviving Indonesia's Gulag* (London: Cassell, 1996) p.211
[37] Elson, *Suharto* p.138
[38] Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) p.139

did not desire the destruction of the PKI, by signing the letter of authority he in some way 'owned' the actions of Suharto, and could claim that he was again in control. However, for Suharto the letter was a "wedge" to attain power rather than a source of power in itself. It legitimised the action he had taken to date, and allowed him to secure his position within the Indonesian elite. This letter is what finally marked the beginning of the end for Sukarno's regime. For whilst the letter itself was limited in the powers it gave, Suharto's actions, and how his actions were perceived, gave the letter more significance. In a memorandum of the People's Representative Council-Mutual Assistance (DPR-GR) it stated that the letter of authority was "the key to a new page in the history of the Indonesian Revolution, and constitutes the point of return to the true and pure basic objectives of the revolution as sought by the proclamation of independence of 17th August and laid down in the preamble and the body of the 1945 Constitution."[39] And Suharto claimed that it was "[a] historical milestone of the utmost importance for the safety of the people, the country and the nation"[40], and later going on to say that the *Supersemar* marked "the beginning of the struggle of the New Order".[41] The *Supersemar* gave Suharto the ability to act far more proactively to tackle his political adversaries and on the 18th of March even went so far as to arrest 15 members of Sukarno's *Dwikora* cabinet[42] on suspicion of being involved in the September 30th Coup, forcing Sukarno to restructure his means of governing.

Suharto's confidence began to grow rapidly, and he began to take the opportunity to address a wider audience. The *Supersemar* had effectively cemented

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[39] Cited in Elson, *Suharto* p.139
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] Suharto, *Pikiran* p.174
[42] *Dwikora- Dwi Komando Rakyat – Peoples Double Command

his position within, and the support of, the ABRI, now he needed to appeal to Sukarno's other base of support, the Indonesian people. What is particularly interesting is how the language that Suharto uses at this time echoes the content of Sukarno's own writings and speeches. For instance in April 1966 Suharto is reported as saying that "Indonesia is not contented with western democracy and other foreign democracies, with a liberal or totalitarian economy".[43] This is reminiscent of Sukarno's speeches when he was introducing *Gotong Rojong* in 1957; however for Suharto it is an opportunity to use the authoritative and legitimate voice of Sukarno to lay the foundations of his own agenda, and the need to correct the economic failings of Sukarno's regime. In August 1966 he used the new platform he had made for himself to again forge a relationship with the people of the Republic, and in doing so establish the core of the New Order's political agenda. He stated that whilst "ABRI was not expert in politics or economics, 'it had sufficient knowledge and consciousness of the national and international problems which had to be faced, how to solve them and those people who are able to get them done.'"[44]

The emergence of the New Order and the political defeat of Sukarno

This public assault was coupled by a less public competition between Suharto and Sukarno for control of the political institutions of the Republic. The battleground for this was to be the MPRS – the Peoples Consultative Assembly- which was the ultimate source of authority in Indonesia, for whoever had the support of the Assembly could claim to be the legitimate power in the state. On 21st June 1966 the MPRS issued a decree to "adopt and confirm the policy of the President…that is laid

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[43] Cited in *Kompas* 5 April 1966
[44] *Kompas* 5 September 1966 cited in Elson, *Suharto* p.140

down in the order dated 11th March 1966 addressed to Lieutenant General Suharto."[45] This decree changed the nature of the *Supersemar* from being a simple order from the President to Suharto, to instead being a law. Once its status had changed, then this meant that Sukarno could not alter or countermand the activities that Suharto did under the auspices of the letter of authority without having to go through the MPRS first. In response to this move Sukarno issued a statement to the MPRS, reiterating his position as President and restating the guiding principles of his regime. This move was a further effort by Sukarno to normalise, and in effect de-securitize, the post-Coup political environment, and reaffirm his position within Indonesian political life. The fact that he failed to comment upon the Coup at this time was not well received by the MPRS who stated that Sukarno's statement had fell short of what it and the people expected from the President, and in particular wanted an account of the actions he had taken in response to the situation, especially with respect to the economic and moral consequences of the coup.[46] This action is evidence of the MPRS responding to Suharto's earlier speeches in which he was attempting to move the political debate away from Sukarno's political position, and instead posit and alternative set of ideas and principles. Suharto felt that the way to effectively govern was to remove the communist threat as this would allow the Republic to rectify the economic and developmental problems that he felt had been allowed to develop during Sukarno's time in power. Suharto's addresses can be considered to be securitizing moves in the political sector. The Mars's decrees and responses in June 1966, whilst not authorising Suharto directly, elevated his position politically, and in so doing accepted that Suharto's guiding principles were a realistic and potentially powerful alternative to Sukarno's own. By directly criticising the President after his response to Decree

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[45] Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 cited in Elson, *Suharto* p.143
[46] *Ibid.*

No. IX, and in particular drawing attention to the President's lack of action in respect to the coup and Indonesia's economic predicament, they give credence to Suharto's earlier actions and ensured that Sukarno needed to respond directly thus securitizing the political sector. This in turn put Sukarno on the back foot, as his attempts to ensure that the situation remained de-securitized had failed. But the situation was about to become considerably worse for on July 5th the MPRS issued several more decrees which reinstated the institutions of the Republic to the form laid out in the 1945 constitution, called for the DPR-GR to review all Presidential directives and regulations issued since 1959 and they accepted Suharto's decision to dissolve and ban the PKI. Three other important developments are the fact that the MPRS called for *Dwikora* to be replaced by a new cabinet under the leader ship of Suharto (to be called the *Amanat Pederitaan Rakyat – Ampera* or Message of the People's Suffering Cabinet). They repealed Sukarno's appointment as President for Life, they decided that should the President be unable to perform his duties then the holder of the *Supersemar* would become the acting President, and finally they called for a general election to be held by July 1967.[47] These decisions effectively ended Sukarno's ability to resist Suharto's rise. Not only did Suharto now enjoy the full support and backing of the MPRS, but the MPRS had also effectively weakened Sukarno's own position by giving Suharto control of the Cabinet. And by issuing orders to investigate Sukarno's own conduct during the *Gotong Rojong* period of government the MPRS was calling into question the legitimacy of Sukarno's regime, and in so doing effectively opened up the possibility for Suharto to instigate an alternative.

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[47] Elson, *Suharto* p.144

At the same time the MPRS also announced that Indonesia should alter its policies *vis* a *vis* its position internationally and called for the government to reinitiate an active and independent foreign policy. The nature of this policy, and how it differed from Sukarno's particular approach was emphasised by a memorandum sent to the DPR-GR on July 5th, which informed the council that they wanted a quick and peaceful settlement to the confrontation with Malaysia. This move assisted Suharto in his own attempts to fully secure his position of power. For once the decree was issued he set about removing any structures and institutions that gave the President any real power. One of the most important of which being *Kogam* (*Komando Ganyang Malaysia* – Crush Malaysia Command), for with the MPRS sanctioning an end to the confrontation with Malaysia, Suharto had no difficulties abolishing this source of power for the President.[48] This directive from the MPRS gave Suharto the opportunity to direct foreign policy in a manner that he saw fit, the confrontational and anti-Western policies of Sukarno had not been favourable to foreign investors who Suharto saw as being fundamental to the development process. The MPRS action allowed Indonesia to reengage with the outside world which was beneficial for the political security of the fledgling regime. Two clear signals of this reengagement were Indonesia rejoining the United Nations in September 1968, after Sukarno withdrew in the January of 1965, and the creation of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the August of 1967. These two steps achieved much in the way of securing the Republics integrity and territory in a way that Sukarno's strong handed tactics could not. The UN offered Suharto the opportunity to perform as a global statesman, which not only improved his image domestically but also Indonesia's reputation globally. Meanwhile the formation of the regional institution

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[48] Suharto, *Pikiran* p.180 and Elson, *Suharto* p.145

ASEAN promoted dialogue and engagement with Indonesia's neighbours, for instance Malaysia, and mutual benefits. Indonesia's centrality to ASEAN was to have benefits politically for the New Order in that it allowed Indonesia to regain power and influence within South East Asia that had been lost by Sukarno's confrontational style of rule. This change in style was evident in other moves that Suharto made in the aftermath of the MPRS decrees, for whilst he still overtly maintained a respect for the President and his position, when the *Ampera* cabinet was formally announced later in July it was clear that a new thinking lay behind its creation and Sukarno's vision of Indonesia had been effectively superseded by Suharto's. Instead of being based on party political grounds Suharto's cabinet was predominately made up of civilian technocrats. This make up reflected Suharto's earlier speeches saying that whilst the Army, and more specifically Suharto himself, could not claim to be experts in the fields of economics and development themselves, they did know how to solve the problems that Indonesia faced, or more importantly it knew the people who *were* able to get them done.

These moves and Suharto's action in the aftermath of the coup, and the general run of events surrounding the end of *Gotong Rojong* and the rise of the New Order clearly illustrate the complex social discourse that underlies regime change within developing states. Whilst traditional approaches concentrate on the military or physical aspects of radical changes to the governments of fledgling states, the securitization model moves the focus towards the struggle between the ideas that ultimately lie at the heart of the competing regimes. With the implementation of the *Supersemar* Suharto had effectively eradicated the PKI as a force in Indonesian politics, eroded the power that Sukarno had over the Indonesian political elites, and

began to establish himself and his New Order as the only viable system for the governance of the Republic.

Chapter Six: The New Order Regime

This chapter will address the political security challenges that the New Order faced once it was effectively in control. It will initially address the manner in which the New Order manufactured and sold its underlying principles and used them to assert control over the Indonesian political sphere. Secondly, I will explore the implementation of the New Orders principles, and the institutionalisation of their ideas. With the creation of the *Golkar* the New Order was putting the ideas and principles agreed at Bandung into practice. I will argue how this move was carried out not only in an attempt to create a legitimate system of governance, by using the *Pancasila* to justify their changes, but also to appeal to the international community and therefore improve their security externally. I will also argue how with introduction of *Golonga Karya* the new order was essentially 'de-politicising' the regime. Manufacturing a system where political opposition could only be carried out within terms established by the New Order, but in their slow and careful implementation, the regime was able to ensure that such mechanisms were accepted. I will show how such a system, backed up by developmental advancement and economic success, shielded the regime from potential opposition. The chapter will examine the concept of *Dwifungsi* and the role it had in allowing the regime to permeate through Indonesian society and provide the New Order with a means to engage with the disparate peoples of Indonesia in a way that had been unworkable under Sukarno. Finally the chapter will explore how as time progressed the principles and ideas that had initially proved successful began to breed resentment both internally and externally. I will discuss how Suharto and the New Order's relationship with the ABRI began to erode, how in the light of changing global

politics previous allies began to view the regime less favourably, and ultimately how the failure of the regime to maintain it claim to represent the best interests of Indonesia lead to its eventual collapse in 1998.

The Principles of Suharto's New Order

The ideological foundations of Suharto's New Order were laid in Bandung in August 1966. It was at this Army seminar that Suharto called for those attending to draw up a set of principles and objectives for the new government to achieve political and economic stability for the Republic, based upon the ideas established in the 1945 constitution and the *Pancasila*.[1] Suharto was aware that in order to be able to instigate his development program he needed to have a secure ideological base from which to argue. All of the ideational threats to his vision had not been removed by the MPRS decrees, and Suharto still had to work in order to fully secure the regime he was forming, in particular with regards to the PKI. Speaking of the post-Coup PKI in mid 1966 stated:

> [the] PKI as a party has been crushed, but perhaps the PKI as an idea lives on. I well know that an idea can't be crushed except with a counter-idea. It is fortunate that the counter-idea which opposes the PKI idea is sufficiently strong in Indonesia, because indeed the PKI idea is foreign for Indonesia which is religious and attached to *Pancasila*.[2]

It was this '*Pancasilaisation*' of Indonesian politics that was to become central to the New Order regime. As is shown in the above case, Suharto's rhetoric essentially

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[1] Suharto, *Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan: otobiografi seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K. H.* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989) and its English translation *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: an autobiography as told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K. H.* (English translation by Sumadi; edited by Muti'ah Lestiono) (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991) p181
[2] R.E. Elson, *Suharto: a Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp.148-9

drew a line in the sand of the Republic's political climate. Either an idea was based upon/supportive of the *Pancasila* or it was against the *Pancasila*, in which case it either had to be eradicated, or it was insignificant and could be ignored. This was a mood that was picked up on by other political leaders in Indonesia, for example Sarbini Sumawin, former leader of the Indonesian Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or PSI) who stated at the time that "the Panca Sila forces must be victorious in the General Elections".[3] From here Suharto was able to push more forcibly, and consolidate his power removing any potential opposition. In February 1967 Suharto's battle for power over Sukarno was eventually won with the public announcement by Sukarno of his decision, after prolonged negotiation between the ABRI leadership, Sukarno and Suharto, to transfer his powers to Suharto as holder of the *Supersemar*. This was followed by a call from the DPR-GR for a special session of the MPRS to appoint Suharto as acting President, a session that met on 7th March. At this time Sukarno was left in a precarious position as whilst he whilst he had no power, he was still the President but with the change in regime now becoming more formally accepted his position was tenuous. The solution to this problem was outlined on March 13th, "for the time being we will treat him [Sukarno] as a president who no longer has power, as a president who has no authority of any kind in the fields of politics, the state, and government."[4] This treatment was necessary for Suharto to fully secure his position, for if it had been perceived that Suharto was in anyway mistreating Sukarno at this time, he would have alienated those members of the Indonesian political and military hierarchy who were sympathetic to Sukarno even if they acknowledged his inability to govern. With Sukarno formally removed from the seat of power it left Suharto with the time to establish a consensus for his leadership.

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[3] Cited in Harold Crouch, *The army and politics in Indonesia* (revised edition) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) p.248
[4] Suharto cited in *Kompas* 13 March 1967

He was careful to downplay any overt signs of ambition or desire to become full president, claiming later in his biography that "eventually they were able to convince me that they really couldn't find anyone else. They didn't *trust* anyone else as much as me."[5] And even when he accepted power it was for the limited period of one year so that "we [Suharto and the MPRS] would use that period for mutual evaluation: whether I was capable, whether halfway through there would be a change of mind, or another choice."[6] Once Suharto was in power and Sukarno placed in "political quarantine"[7] he continued his public assault and *Pancasilaisation* process. Continuing to talk of the need economic modernisation and development, he began to wear civilian clothing to public engagements and inform the country at large of the New Order's plans and proposals.[8] These gestures were a sign of Suharto overtly attempting to disengage with his military past, and mark himself as a civilian/political actor. However, the question still remained as to whether or not the New Order would deliver on it promises, or follow the example set by Sukarno and fail.

Despite the public mood being favourable to Suharto and the New Order, it did however take time for their policies to take effect and in the infancy of the New Order, rising prices and economic uncertainty began fuelling criticism against the new regime. The majority of the criticism was benign in nature; however there were several alleged plots to assassinate Suharto, the Cabinet and other ABRI leaders, and return Sukarno to power.[9] Many of these failed plots were tied to the PKI, and the Army was active in putting down revolutionary movements and uprisings in the

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[5] Suharto, *Pikiran* p.189 (emphasis added)
[6] *Ibid.* p.190
[7] Suharto cited in Elson, *Suharto* p.159
[8] *Kompas* 22 May 1967
[9] Justus M. Van der Kroef, 'Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup' *Pacific Affairs* Vol.43, No.1 (1970) p.44

republic, for example within the Sino-Indonesian communities of West Kalimantan.[10]

For Suharto though these uprisings were not in themselves a problem, and in fact the continued threat that the PKI posed was useful for him at this stage. For Suharto the PKI threat was a method of controlling the Republic in this time of flux, as they allowed the Army to spread and expand its influence into the regions and in doing so remove any potential political threats. Secondly the continued PKI activity allowed Suharto to reemphasise communism as a long term threat to Indonesia and its future development, and finally Suharto tied any opposition that was emerging to the communists, and therefore undermined any arguments and criticisms that were levelled at him and the New Order. This is because of the success of Suharto's earlier addresses to the public tying the PKI and communism to *Gestapu*, and the violent and destabilising aftermath of the coup itself. This gave the Suharto the room and time to develop and implement their vision of Indonesia. For the New Order, Indonesia "was one in which all people lived in harmony and tolerance with one another, ignoring those things that divided them", which was in keeping with the *Pancasila*, and "the New Order [was] an order of *Pancasila* Democracy which puts the people's interests first and not group or private interests".[11] The fact that the PKI was seen to be resorting to violence was contrary to the *Pancasilaised* Indonesia that the New Order claimed to represent. To force home this vision of Indonesia Suharto used the word *Pancasila* 64 times in his inaugural Independence Day speech, and reemphasised that Sukarno's regime had deviated from this path.[12] This process of enforcing the *Pancasila* as the New Order's and therefore Indonesia's ideational foundation was concluded quite efficiently on the 23rd October 1967. At this time Suharto proclaimed that there was no more need to discuss ideology because Indonesia "already [has] one

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[10] Elson, *Suharto* p.160
[11] Suharto cited in *Ibid.* p.161
[12] Nawaz B. Mody, *Indonesia Under Suharto* (New York: Apt Books, 1987) p.172

ideology, *Pancasila*" thereby ending any debate on the subject.[13] What Suharto now needed was to establish an institutional basis for the regime that would allow him to govern effectively. This was to be known as the *Golkar* system.

Pancasila Democracy

The New Order perceived that the party political system as established under Sukarno was not in keeping with the harmonious Indonesia that they wished to establish. The Bandung seminar had posited several solutions to this problem; firstly, that politics should be non-ideological and those that participated should be allowed to do so based on their role, utility and commitment to the development and modernisation of the Republic.[14] Secondly, that the New Order should replace the *Gotong Rojong* system and return to the Western Liberal model of the early 1950s. This was problematic however as whilst it would have been useful to the new regime in one respect, as this model was acceptable to external powers in the west, it still relied on party politics. The final solution was to maintain the party structures as they existed under Sukarno, but also create a role for those groups within society that the New Order felt were essential for the development process that they envisioned. This particular method was useful for not only would it allow the 'technocrats' to have a bigger say in the running of the country, but it would not totally undermine the existing political order. This was particularly important with respect to the politicians who had supported and assisted Suharto in the aftermath of *Gestapu,* as if Suharto had totally ignored these groups then they could become a potential threat to the sanctity

[13] Suharto cited in Elson, *Suharto* p.161
[14] *Ibid.* p.163

of his vision.[15] Another important reason for maintaining the political parties was that it was important that the elections should "be won by the New Order by means of an honest democratic procedure",[16] it was for this reason that Suharto not only began to talk of the importance of political parties to *Pancasila* democracy, but in early 1968 he sanctioned the formation of the *Parmusi* which was a new Islamic political party. In the build up to the proposed elections commentators in Indonesia were particularly concerned. Whilst Suharto had successfully convinced the MPRS and the ruling elite of the nation that Sukarno was unfit to govern, it still remained to be seen whether or not Suharto would be any better. Arief Budiman asked the question "was it possible for a military man to be more democratic than a man like Sukarno, who had thought about freedom and its problems for a long time while fighting to free the nation from colonialism?"[17] The activities of the New Order in preparation for the elections did not however allay any of these fears.

In the months before the election the New Order began to reorganise the MPRS and DPR. Replacing existing members with ones who were sympathetic to their cause and in doing so raised the number of seats in parliament from 347 to 414, the majority of which were filled by ABRI or civilians with no previous connections to Indonesian politics. When the New Order had completed this reshuffle of the existing institutions it had effectively removed any possibility of a strong, effective opposition emerging to challenge Suharto. With no such alternative it left the way open for the MPRS to elect him as President of the Republic for a full five year term. So secure was Suharto in this position that on the day after his being sworn in he left Indonesia

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[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Kompas* 12 May 1967
[17] Arief Budiman, 'Portrait of a young Indonesian looking at his surroundings', *Internationales Asien Forum* 4 (1973) p.77

on a state visit to Japan, where he attempted to secure economic support, and court potential investment partners so that he would be able to deliver on the New Order's promises to Indonesia. This proactive and pragmatic approach to governing was reflected in his first development cabinet which was made up of "a combination of experts from university circles and members of the Armed Forces" who Suharto felt were essential for his modernisation scheme.[18] It is however worth noting that whilst he did see that the Army had an important role to play in the New Order for the development of the economy it was civilians who would have a greater role to play and so this cabinet had fewer service personnel as members than civilians. Suharto balanced his cabinet so that the economic matters would be dealt with by his technical experts, whilst matters of security would be dealt with by military members. Suharto saw five goals which his new cabinet needed to face, and be judged against; "political stability, including the conduct of foreign policy; General Elections; the restoration of order and security; reform and cleansing of the state apparatus and the economic stability with the first five-year development plan".[19] General Elections were of central importance to the future well being of the regime for not only would they be useful domestically to ensure that there was a method to channel political unrest in the republic and for the people to feel fully part of his regime, but also "internationally, elections offered the attractive target of legitimacy and stability".[20] This would enable the regime to attract further economic investment and the development Suharto sought. However as discussed above the New Order found party politics divisive and potentially dangerous to their plans, so they needed to devise a way to effectively maintain their ability to govern how they saw fit from within a parliamentary system.

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[18] Suharto, *Pikiran.* p.238
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Elson, *Suharto.* p.186

The New Order saw *Golonga Karya* (*Golkar*) or functional groups as the solution to this problem. If they could ensure that the Parliament was populated by enough sympathetic and technically qualified people, not career politicians, then they felt that their pragmatic solutions to Indonesia's problems would be able to be implemented effectively. They claimed that *Golkar* could be the political party without politicians, that it would appeal to many urban Indonesians who had become dissatisfied with the partisan, self-interest based Sukarno era politics and they gave *Golkar* access to state funds so that it could establish itself as a viable alternative to the establish parties. *Golkar's* route to electoral success was virtually assured by senior New Order figures working to tarnish the reputations and electoral campaigns of non-*Golkar* candidates,[21] and this was coupled with a succession of rules and regulations for the 1971 elections that limited the topics and issues that could be addressed and debated within the campaign in particular any criticism of the *Pancasila*, religion or Suharto's government.[22] Through the media, the New Order started a campaign that was to make *Golkar* synonymous with *Pancasila*, ABRI, the government and the regime as a whole, and so made it virtually impossible to actively criticise the new party. The only real opposition that did stand in its way, *Golongan Putih* (*Golput*), was banned prior to the general election and so *Golkar* won by a landslide winning over 62% of the vote, crushing the PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*) and *Parmusi* and NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*) opposition and in doing so firmly cemented the New Order as its voice in the DPR.

This electoral victory showed Suharto that partisan politics could be effectively limited, and that the Indonesian people would accept the changes that he sought. For

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[21] *Ibid.* p.188
[22] Ken Ward, *The 1971 election in Indonesia: an East Java Case Study* (Clayton: Centre of South East Asian Studies, Monash University, 1974) pp.85-6

the New Order this victory gave them the signal that it would be possible to further engineer the electoral process to their benefit without unduly damaging their reputation. The success of *Golkar* in the elections proved that it was no longer necessary to limit their strategies and that it may be possible to fully implement the proposals outlined at the Bandung seminar. It was proposed that this new parliament would have no need for multiple parties; instead Suharto argued that it should consist of just four sections, which he called "material-spiritual, spiritual-material, Golkar and ABRI".[23] In June 1973 this vision was finally institutionalised with the formal creation of *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP or Development Unity Party) and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI or Indonesian Democratic Party). The PPP was made up of the NU and *Parmusi*, whilst the PDI was the PNI and an assortment of non-Islamic parties. Suharto explained his reasons for this consolidation as follows:

With the one and only road already there, why must we have so many cars, as many as nine? Why must we have wild speeding and collisions? [...] It is not necessary to have so many vehicles. But it is not necessary to have only one. Two or three is fine.[24]

This continued the New Order's *Pancasilaisation* of Indonesian politics. The "one road" in question was the road to development which the New Order had established as being only achievable through the *Pancasila* and its institutional representation in the ABRI and *Golkar*. Multiple parties meant numerous potential sources of opposition to his policies and modernisation programs. However, the above quotation also shows that the New Order had recognised the danger in banning opposition. As discussed earlier it is necessary for a successful regime to have built into its institutional make up an effective route for opposition so that problems can be dealt

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[23] G. Dwipayana and Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (eds.), *Jejak langkah Pak Harto*. (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991) pp.374-5
[24] Suharto, *Pikiran* p.266

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with efficiently and without them escalating and potentially becoming securitized. The PPP and PDI were the New Order's route for opposition sentiment, however within the *Golkar* system, the opposition could be effectively controlled and suppressed. Suharto argued that "in our democracy based upon *Pancasila*, there can be differences of opinion. What is not allowed is a sharpening of opinions which can result in dissension."[25] It was this *Pancasila* democracy that allowed the political elites of the Old Order to be channelled within the institutions of the new regime, express themselves, and maintain seats of power, but in such a way as to not intrude upon or interrupt the New Order's policies. When the MPRS reinstated Suharto for a second term in 1973, the New Order regime's power was complete. From the coup in 1965 until 1968 Suharto had successfully removed obstacles from his path and skilfully manoeuvred himself into a position of power. Once he had been made President for his first term however he faced a different challenge. He had effectively removed Sukarno from power, but now he needed to ensure that nobody else could emerge to replace him. It was during this first term in office that Suharto created the institutions of the New Order regime and through them he not only was able to govern the Republic in the way he envisioned, but also he effectively removed the possibility of real political challenges to his authority, without the need to resort to violence. The *Pancasila* became the central principles for the regime and through constant reinforcement in speeches and through the media Suharto was able to de-legitimise opposing groups and reinforce his own policies. Through his involvement in ASEAN and the UN he was able to secure Indonesia's physical boarders and concentrate on what he perceived to Indonesia's final weakness. For now the regime had a secure

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[25] *Kompas* 18 August 1969

physical base, established an ideational core and effective institutions, the regime needed to deliver on its promise of economic development and modernisation.

The rule and fall of the New Order

Having established themselves in power the New Order regime now faced an increasingly difficult challenge. As is evident from the above, the regime whilst being a meritocracy had effectively stifled the possibility of any mass protests from being heard. The few movements that did occur were dealt with extreme measures and brutality. At this period in global politics the Anti-Communist position of the regime was sufficient for most of the great powers in the world to look the other with respect to violations of human rights, and even sovereignty, as is evident from the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. What this is evidence of is that principle of anti-communism out weighed other principles, notably human rights and sovereignty. Domestically these principles had less sway, so what enabled the New Order to remain in power as long as it did. Aside from the limited opportunity for effective opposition within the regime, the fact is that the regime rewarded those who would potentially challenge its authority. Secondly the regime fulfilled its promises of economic modernisation and development. Despite a spell in the 1970s where global economic crises had serious repercussions towards Indonesia's economic integrity, which lead to widespread rioting and violence particularly directed towards the ethnic Chinese,[26] the regime did bring about a period of sustained growth for the Republic. The *Dwifungsi*·· or dual role of the ABRI also assisted the regimes stability. This worked in two ways. Firstly, and initially, the fact that the armed forces adopted a secondary, social role allowed the New Order to maintain a presence in all areas of the Republic and in so doing allowed it a degree of control that had been impossible

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[26] For example in the *Malari* riots of 1974

under Sukarno. This presence also had economic benefit as the Armed forces personnel were given a role to fulfil developmentally speaking as well. Derek Davies writes "the army has set the country on the right road. An admirable rescue operation has achieved economic stabilisation. This has since been matched by an even more astonishing political stabilisation, which promises to keep Indonesia along the pragmatic road towards sensible development for some time".[27] The second advantage of this was that it tied the senior military leadership into the regime. They would not move against the New Order as they had too much to lose.

This was because the New Order's economic model did not follow the free-market model that Suharto's technocrats originally envisaged. Even from the outset of the regime a degree of corruption was evident, particularly when the ABRI was concerned. The funds that the Government officially had at its disposal and what the regime actually spent did not add up. The New Order exploited a dual economy which was seemingly transparent and fair on the surface, whilst underneath funds and investments were being moved through black market and more importantly ABRI channels.[28] This benefited the regime in two ways. Firstly it was successful, and promoted economic growth in Indonesia that trickled down to the population as a whole. Secondly, it provided wealth for those senior ABRI and political figures who may have opposed the regime. In short even though it was corrupt, the regimes performance prevented any serious challenge from emerging, and, equally importantly the international and domestic audiences tolerated the brutality of the regime.[29]

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[27] Derek Davies, "The Army's Double Duty" *Far Eastern Economic Review* Vol.31, No.44 (October 1970) (Available online) http://www.feer.com/articles/archive/1970/7010_31/PO18.html (12/2/05)
[28] Crouch, *The Army and Politics* p.323
[29] Elson, *Suharto* pp.171-72

By the mid 1980s the regime was at the peak of its powers, as a regime based upon delivering economic prosperity the decade had been particularly good to Indonesia which had benefited from rising oil prices and a series of excellent rice harvests. The pinnacle of this internationally was perhaps his speech given at a meeting of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation in November 1985, a meeting where he announced to the world that Indonesia was deliver 100,000 tonnes of rice to Ethiopia. This event marked a clear turning point in Indonesia's fortunes internationally as now they were in the position to assist in the relief of states in distress it was like a promotion from the developing to the developed world.[30] This success however was marred by resistance at home to the regimes continued policy of *Pancasilaisation.* As a response to a new law on mass organisations – *Ormas*- which called for all organisations to have the *Pancasila* as its guiding principle and nothing else, Islamic groups resented this legislation which in turn lead to rioting in the Tanjung Priok area of Jakarta. In the aftermath of the riot it was claimed that the military had 'desecrated' a mosque. What followed was mass violence, including a terrorist bombing campaign and levels of violence in Java the likes of which had not been seen since the Coup in 1965. The New Order however were able to utilise these event, because of the uncoordinated nature of the attacks the regime was able to use the prospect of Islamic extremism in much the same way as they had used the PKI threat in the aftermath of the coup.[31] The regime was quick to link any potential criticisms of the regime with the rise of Islamic extremism and so those groups that were opposed to *Ormas* fell into line to avoid a response from the New Order.

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[30] *Ibid.* p.235
[31] *Ibid.* pp.239-40

By the late 1980s Suharto's relationship with the ABRI was beginning to wear thin. Those in command now were a new generation of soldier who did not share his particular vision for Indonesia. In order to continue the development process Suharto was aware that he would need to change the regimes economic operations, which would have repercussions on the military. Disagreements began to emerge of policy issues and the direction that Suharto wished to take the regime. By this period Dr. B.J Habibie had established himself within the New Order elite and was placed in charge of carrying out this next phase of economic development. So radical was the new look regime that it was said that "the demilitarisation of Suharto's New Order has gone so far it is barely recognisable as a military-led government".[32] When the regime held a new set of elections in 1993 relations between Suharto and the ABRI were particularly frayed. This was bought about due to the increased cronyism and grooming the President employed in his administering of state affairs. This tampering with ABRI and government agencies, promoting people though the ranks with little respect for the natural order of the organisation, bred resentment and dissatisfaction within the institutions of state.[33] Other changes had begun to impact upon the smooth running of the regime too. Bodies of protest began to emerge in the campuses of the Republic but unlike previous movements the regime was not as quick to respond, and not as aggressive.[34] Why was this? The notable change for Indonesia at this time was not domestic but rather external. With the end of the Cold War, the New Order no longer was protected by the anti-communist principle that had sheltered it in the past. Evidence of this change in mood towards the regime is in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, where 200 soldiers and police opened fire on a group of students, women and children who protesting the Indonesian occupation of

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[32] Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto* (London: Routledge, 1993) p.61
[33] Elson, *Suharto* p.273
[34] *Ibid.*

East Timor. The major change was the fact that the west responded at all.[35] However the mood in the west was shifting and Suharto became to be aware of a need to change his regime accordingly,[36] however the nature of his regime was such that openness and dialogue that the political forces in the Republic effectively weakened his grasp on power and so it was a short lived experiment.[37]

In this period greater scrutiny of the New Order's economic policies lead to increased resentment at those in power within the regime, and in particular Suharto's children who were seemingly prospering at the expense of others in the country. This lead to increased civil unrest for example in October 1996 in Taskmalaya, however the regimes control over the protests was weakening. Likely due to the breakdown in relations between the New Order and the ABRI, but also because of the increasing deviation of the goals and practices of the regime and the desires of the population. This came to a crisis point in 1997 when in the August the rupiah crashed. Suharto responded in his Independence Day speech on the 17th, claiming that the economy was stable and that it was under control.[38] Despite calls for more urgent measures to be taken, Suharto failed to act, and when in January 1998 he issued what was considered to be a particularly unrealistic budget for the coming year. In response to this political opponent Amien Rais publicly made an offer to stand as president, which though nothing came of the offer was the first open and serious opposition that Suharto had faced since being made president, and there was a growing mood calling for Suharto to step down and change to be initiated.[39] However, despite this growing

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[35] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* pp.78-80
[36] Elson, *Suharto* pp.270-75
[37] *Ibid.* p.275
[38] *Suara Merdeka* 18 August 1997 Indonesia-p@indopubs.com
[39] Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) pp.213-7

unrest Suharto was re-elected as president for a 7th term, the reasons for this were that the institutional mechanisms that were established at the inception of the New Order were effectively doing their job. They channelled the calls for change and gave them a voice within the political sphere, however they were unable to instigate any effective change. What was different in post economic crisis Indonesia to previous elections was that the failures of the New Order system became elevated not only in the minds of political opposition, but also in the eyes of the public at large. Whilst in the past the regime had been seemingly successful, within its own terms, and Indonesia was seemingly prospering under their rule. In 1998 the failures of the regime to effectively deal with the aftermath of the economic crisis meant that there was a real mood in the population at large for genuine change.[40] However, the regime itself was not designed to accommodate such changes, and so what followed was open riots and calls for Suharto's resignation. In the final days and weeks Suharto's grasp on power "unravelled with astonishing speed".[41] Despite attempts to raise a reform cabinet the President no longer had the confidence of the Indonesian people of the political elite. At 9am on 21st May 1998 Suharto read a short statement in which he told the nation of his failure to raise a reform cabinet, thanked the Nation, apologised for his "mistakes and shortcomings", and he informed those listening that he would resign from position as president, effective from the moment he had finished reading his statement.

[40] *Ibid.* p.220
[41] Adam Schwartz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (2nd edition) (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999) p.308

Chapter Seven: Societal Security: The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia

This chapter will address one of the societal security challenges that face post-independence Indonesia. I will examine the case of the tensions that arose between the newly constituted Indonesian people than the ethnic Chinese. Like many states Indonesia is not ethnically homogenous, and during the nation building process faced the difficult task of establishing an Indonesian identity that could help ferment the physical formation of the state. This section looks at the role the ethnic Chinese had in this process during both Sukarno's and Suharto's periods of rule. I will examine the principles behind the formation of the Indonesian identity under both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, and explore the strategies they deployed to ensure that this identity was robust and prosperous. I will then examine the place of Chinese within Indonesia and attempt to explain the apparent contradiction in the fact that neither regime incorporated the Chinese within their conceptions of "unity through diversity". Finally I will address two previous explanations for the "ethnic" tensions between the *Pribumi* and non-*Pribumi*, the first being economic and the second being political. Finally, using the operationalised societal securitization concept developed in chapter two, I will argue that the societal threats directed against the ethnic Chinese, rather than being genuine existential threats to their identity, were in fact an effort on the part of the Indonesian elite to establish, and secure their our identity

What is an Indonesian?

Indonesia is a sequence of some 3000 islands that are populated by around 300 distinct ethnic groups of varying size and dominance.[1] The Javanese are the most populous of these ethnic groups, although there is misconception that Javanese equals Indonesian, similar to the way that many interchange English and British with relation to the United Kingdom. However in Java, aside from the presence of other Indonesian ethnic groups, there is a divide between the Hindu inland and the Islamic coastal regions.[2] Despite this diversity, in the face of external oppression the native population of the Dutch East Indies did rally together. In the war of independence Sukarno was able to fashion a shared notion of what it is to be Indonesian, which was conceptualised within the *Pancasila*. This allowed the native Indonesians (*pribumi*) a framework within which they could put aside their cultural and religious differences. Whether they were from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi or Kalimantan, irrespective of their religious differences the people of the East Indies were able cooperate towards a common goal, which in the first instance was independence from colonial rule.[3] Whilst there was still a physical struggle independence it was relatively easy for the *pribumi* elites to focus the peoples attention on the Japanese and later Dutch in order to unify their people. However, as was discussed in chapter two, given that self conception is carried out with reference to an "other", when there is an obvious group that is causing problems it is easier to establish unity in such circumstances. The real challenge came to the Sukarno regime once "Indonesia" had finally secured itself as an autonomous, sovereign "nation state". For whilst the political elites had successfully established Indonesia as a valid participant in the international system,

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[1] Patrick Guinness, 'Local Society and Culture' in Hal Hill (ed.) *Indonesia's New Order* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994) p.267
[2] *Ibid.* p.268
[3] As is discussed in detail in chapter three

the question still remained as to whether or not this conception of Indonesian-ness would survive with the removal of the external other.

Sukarno's project was to encourage *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* or Unity in Diversity.[4] This was apparent from the *Pancasila* itself, which was "the synthesis of Western Democrat, Modernist Islamic, Marxist and indigenous-village democratic and communalistic ideas which form the several bases of the social thought of so large a part of the post-war Indonesian elite."[5] In the early years of the Republic Sukarno was not merely attempting to remedy the archipelagos complex ethnic situation, he was also attempting to show the international community that Indonesia was a viable and successful member of the world at large. One can see the early attempts at parliamentary democracy as a sign of this. By emulating the west Sukarno hoped that this would not only prove his credentials as leader, but also encourage investment and thus prosperity for the fledgling state. In effect the political regime that Sukarno was attempting to establish was also intended to reaffirm what it was to be Indonesian, using external models of governance as a point of comparison. Making the claim that to be Indonesian has a qualitative equivalence to being "developed". However, the diversity that was supposed to be Indonesia's strength became its undoing in this context, as the numerous identity groups negatively impacted upon his ability to govern. This was because it became increasingly difficult to establish and maintain the degree of consensus necessary to effectively create institutions or coalitions stable enough to effectively govern.[6] This is an example of a cross over between the political and societal sectors, as the decision to

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[4] *Ibid.* p.269
[5] George Kahin cited in Geoff Simons, *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000) p.136
[6] H. Freigth, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1962) *passim*

establish a diverse Indonesian identity where by the individual ethnic identities of the archipelago were all equally valid, meant that Sukarno's attempts establish political institutions necessary to effectively govern were unsuccessful. This is because the political institutions required to operate in the regime he had established required the disparate groups to compromise their own individual interests for the good of the Indonesian whole. Unfortunately the identity that he had successfully established in the face of colonial oppression, that of unity through diversity, was now problematising the regime in the face of independence. As was explored in chapter four the internal tensions, and the political dissatisfaction that was symptomatic of the tensions, lead to Sukarno instigating radical changes in order to re-establish a more effective conception of Indonesia. In order to combat this Sukarno delved into the cultural heritage of the archipelago and initiated his program of Guided Democracy, which is a development of the tribal tradition of *Gotong Rojong*. This was a process of mutual consensus and cooperation amongst the numerous groups that made up Indonesia, including religious, cultural and political bodies as well as ethnic representation.[7] Sukarno used cultural language however to justify this shift in policy, stating that "we [the Indonesian people] had used a wrong system, a wrong style of government…an import democracy…not in harmony with our spirit…not in harmony with our [national] personality".[8] This plea can be seen as an attempt by the elite to reengage with the people of Indonesia, but rather than appeal to their individual ethnic groups, he is instead appealing to a sense of "Indonesian-ness". He was trying to put an end to some of the tensions that were emerging by enforcing a system of governing that he claimed was "an authentic Indonesian term which gives the purest reflection of

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[7] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.154
[8] Sukarno quoted in Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia* (New York: Harper and Bros, 1959) pp.177-80

the Indonesian soul"[9]. But whilst it was couched in cultural terms, this was in effect a way for Sukarno to have greater personal influence on every level of government and give him more control over Indonesia as a whole.[10] His problem however was, that whilst this may in fact be a more effective way of administering to the Indonesian people, not all of those in his diverse region agreed with what he felt was best for Indonesia. Ever mindful of the potential divisions, Sukarno was able to again redirect the people's attention, by reintroducing the Dutch as a viable "other", in this instance the othering was carried out in the name of the continued occupation of West Irian.

However this was a short lived plan of action as international pressure was put upon the Dutch and by 1963 West Irian was ceded to Jakarta and the internal rivalries of the republic were again allowed to re-emerge. Despite the constant striving on the part of Sukarno to find that external other to divert the internal differences, his vision of a unified and prosperous Indonesia seemed to be falling apart. This was problematic in several ways, as the Indonesian people were becoming disenchanted with his leadership; they were not enjoying the fruits of independence that he had promised them. Also, and this was to have perhaps even wider implications, the targets that he chose to other, whilst seemingly politically advantageous from a domestic point of view (for example Malaysia and the policy of *Konfrontasi*, which argued that Malaysia was nothing but a construct of the British, and that its primary role was to represent western/colonial interests in the region.[11]) they were alienating important sections of the international community, namely the United States and the west. It was perceived in the west that Sukarno was making a dangerous shift to the left; this was so that he could maintain his position of power against the dissatisfied

[9] *Ibid.* p.178
[10] J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972) p.5
[11] D.R. SarDesai, *Southeast Asia: Past and Present* (London: Macmillan, 1989) pp. 236-8

factions that were gaining prominence within the state. This shift was emphasised in his 1965 Independence Day speech, where Sukarno announced to the population that, "We are now fostering an anti-imperialist axis…the Jakarta-Phnom-Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang axis".[12] Looking at this carefully one has to question what was behind this action, the notable absence of Moscow from the axis shows that this is obviously an attempt at fostering some "Asian" value structure. At the same time Sukarno is appealing to the growing mood of the nation that was increasing pro-PKI, anti-American and importantly anti-imperialist. The absence of the Soviet Union in the above extract clearly allies Indonesia with the left, which by association sets it against the United States, but at the same time by not allying itself to Moscow, Sukarno was segregating himself and thus Indonesia from being seen as a Soviet surrogate/colony. However this move was not supported by everyone within Indonesia, the Army for instance saw that the expanding power of the PKI was a danger to both Indonesia, and perhaps more importantly, their role as protector of Indonesia's economic and political well being. This strive for an "other" with which to unify the people failed doubly, for not only did it create problems for Sukarno with the west, but it also failed to address the concerns of his own political elite. Because of this not only did Sukarno lay the roots for his own political down fall by tying himself and Indonesian identity to the communists. But he also did not effectively resolve the fragmentation of Indonesian identity. This fragmentation was an antecedent to the outbreak of violence that plagued the nation in the aftermath of the September 30th Coup attempt that signalled the start of the rise of Suharto.[13] When the mood of the people shifted in the aftermath of this violence, Sukarno was unable to disassociate himself from the communists, and so his own legitimacy as

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[12] Simons *Indonesia: The Long Oppression* p.161
[13] See chapter five.

representative of the Indonesian people was weakened considerably. This was not a mistake that the New Order was about to repeat.

The New Order saw that there was no single Indonesian identity, but they perceived that without a unifying ideal to guide Indonesia it would disintegrate. This is essentially what Sukarno had tried to do with the *Pancasila*; however in later stages of his regime Sukarno had gotten into problems by attempting to balance the various contending views of his people and then finally attempted to pander to the masses. The New Order however saw that it was not merely an ideal that was needed but rather strong leadership that would ensure the prosperity of the nation and also prevent the disintegration of the republic. This leadership came in two main forms, firstly through the Army themselves, whose *dwifungsi* or dual military/civil role meant that they were visible and prominent through out the entire nation. This provided them with a better opportunity to influence the public, and also made them better able to garner the opinions of the various peoples than a Jakarta based regime.[14] The second, and most interesting, approach was by actually attempting to create an acceptable and stable notion of what it is to be Indonesian. That is the actual creation of a Modern Indonesian identity.[15]

The New Order set about a process of cherry picking the best that Indonesia had to offer and carefully drew them together in order to manufacture an identity for the nation. Unlike Sukarno who tried to extol the virtues of diversity, the New Order understood that left to its own devices this was not a positive move for the stability of the state. So they began to simplify and create mini prototypes of each province in

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[14] Guinness, 'Local Society and Culture' pp. 269-70
[15] *Ibid.*

the republic. No where was this more evident or literal than in the *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*, a themed garden that represented each province. But in day to day life these simplified identities were reinforced through the mainstream media showing "traditional" dances, plays or songs on television and even on postage stamps which had representations of the various indigenous costumes that could be classed as "Indonesian national dress". So whilst on the surface it appears that the new regime was encouraging diversity, in actuality it was limiting it, by carefully choosing and reinforcing the avenues through which diversity could be expressed. So whilst it appeared that cultural differences were accepted, and perhaps even encouraged, in actuality the diversity was limited to that which was necessary to give the impression of cosmopolitanism, whilst any significant differences were being kept firmly in check by the Army and the regime in Jakarta.[16] Suharto further limited the possibility of diversity by ensuring that the *Pancasila* was acknowledged by all groups as being central to their own ideologies. Therefore if the ideas lay out in the *Pancasila* were considered incompatible with your group ideology, then your group either had to rethink itself, and thus change to accommodate the Indonesian national mindset, or the group would cease to exist. Either outcome was positive to the New Order who positioned themselves to be the protectors and embodiment of the *Pancasila* and the 1945 constitution. At the same time the children of Indonesia were being taught at school about the virtues of the nation and had to attend uniformed parades and sing the national anthem at least once a week, a ritual that was also practiced by public servants, thus continually reinforcing the idea that everyone was part of the same group.[17] To oppose this in anyway was conceived as being un-Indonesian and backward, or worse, communist. This would have gone against the very mandate that

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[16] *Ibid.* p.271
[17] *Ibid.* p.272

the New Order had used to legitimise their position in power, that is that they were able to not only better represent what the people wanted, but that they could also deliver the people the prosperity and success that they felt they were entitled to as an independent nation state. This gave the regime a degree of flexibility in how they conducted themselves. This is because as they claimed that they best represented not only the ideology of the people, the will of the people and also the best interests of the people, then to oppose them was to therefore oppose all of these things.

This gave the New Order a framework within which they could effectively limit the diversity of the archipelago and also spread the new "modern" way. This was effective at drawing all of the ethnic groups more securely under the umbrella of *pribumi*. However as mentioned above diversity on some level was still encouraged, but why? There was still something to be gained from some of the traditions or *adat* that the Indonesian sub-groups maintained. For example the *Eka Dasa Rudra*, which is a ritual used to legitimise the authority of the ruler/leader in Bali. This ritual still had power in this area and as such it was still useful, even to the post colonial regimes of Sukarno and Suharto. This particular ritual was used by both Sukarno and the New Order, with very different results. Sukarno's 1963 ceremony coincided with the eruption of a local volcano, which the people saw as a rejection of the ceremony and its attempt to legitimise Sukarno's representative. By comparison the New Orders ceremony in 1979 passed untroubled and legitimacy was secured.[18] There was also a secondary motivation for encouraging these *adapt*; tourism. "The promotion of tourism by the New Order helped to unify the country as government agencies and offices were established to service the industry and increasing numbers of domestic

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[18] *Ibid.* p.281

tourists travelled round the country."[19] Obviously the individuals who could afford to travel would be those that fit the prototype of the affluent, cosmopolitan, successful and above all else, modern Indonesia. This prototype would thus be seen in the far reaches of the Republic and thus reinforce the idea of what it was to be Indonesian. In the face of this dilution of the ethnic identities of the Indonesian sub-groups, the use of *adat* was a useful safety valve that the New Order, could use to allow the sub-groups an outlet for their other identities whilst not affecting the salience of the greater identity or driving the people towards more militant or political expressions of self. This may seem that the New Order's Indonesia was accepting to all ethnicities within the Republic; however this was not the case. One group in particular was highlighted for not only exclusion, but also acts of violence and ultimately attempts to eradicate their ethnic identity from Indonesia entirely. That group were the ethnic Chinese.

The Ethnic Chinese

Chinese began to migrate to what is now Indonesia in the 17th Century. There is a tendency to perceive or present the Chinese that settled in Indonesia as a single homogenous group.[20] However this is not an accurate portrayal of the Chinese diaspora in Indonesia, as the Chinese migrants that settled in Indonesia during this period tended to come from four distinct regions of China and so can more accurately

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[19] *Ibid.* p.282

[20] As is apparent from the subtitle to this section of the thesis, but also in the work of other Sino-Indonesian specialists for example: Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesian Policies toward the Chinese Minority under the New Order" *Asian Survey* Vol.16, No.8 (1976) pp.770-787; G. William Skinner, "Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol.321 (1959) pp.136-147; or more recently Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds.) *Chinese Indonesians: Remembering, Distorting, Forgetting* (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005).

be categorised into four corresponding ethnic groups: the *Hokkien*, the *Teochiu*, the *Hakka*, and the *Cantonese*. The *Hokkien* were the first to settle in Indonesia and were predominantly traders and small businessmen. They quickly established themselves and began to dominate the economies of the areas in which they settled. They migrated to central and eastern Java, and the west coast of Sumatra. By contrast the *Teochiu* were an agricultural people and plied their trade along the east coast of Sumatra, the Riau Islands and Kalimantan, however they did branch into other commercial ventures, particularly where the *Hokkien* were not represented. The *Hakka* came from the mountainous regions of Guangdong, and were not leaving China purely on grounds of trying to better themselves, but rather for economic and physical survival, as their homeland was so unproductive.[21] They established themselves on the outer islands of Indonesia and the *Hakka* took advantage of the natural resources in these areas. The *Cantonese* came in smaller numbers than the other Chinese and the majority were wealthy and skilled tradesmen. One area in which they were particularly adept was mechanics and so they set up throughout Indonesia as artisans and machine workers.[22]

Despite the apparent diversity, there is one central thing that unifies the four ethnic groups that make up the Sino-Indonesians, they were successful and flourished. They established themselves as being an invaluable part of Dutch colonial Indonesia, especially in Java, which even at this early stage was the dominant island in the archipelago and the seat of power for the Dutch. "Where the economy was concerned, the Chinese were ubiquitous and essential. Sooner or later everyone doing business in Java had to do business with a Chinese – from the Dutch planter needing

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[21] D. Hill cited in Sarah Turner and Richard Seymour, 'Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Crisis' in Roy Starrs (ed.), *Nations Under Siege*. (New York: Palgrave, 2002) p.173
[22] *Ibid.* pp.172-3

wagons and tools to a Javanese villager with fruits and eggs to sell"[23], this middle man role that the Chinese adopted set them apart from the native/*pribumi*. This middle ground even went so far as to influence and change their legal standing, They occupied a position between the *pribumi*, with whom they shared civil and criminal legal status, and the Europeans, with whom they were considered equals in commercial affairs.[24] This set them apart from the *pribumi* from the outset and bred resentment, especially amongst the Javanese aristocracy, *priyayi*, who felt that their status was being eroded further by the Chinese. In order to protect themselves from this the Chinese adopted two main strategies. Firstly they looked to the Dutch to intervene on their behalf, or secondly, if this failed them, they formed defence groups within their own communities, thus further alienating the Chinese population from the *pribumi*.[25] The gulf between the Javanese and the Chinese continued to grow to the extent that the *priyayi* began to view business as an "unworthy vocation" that any self respecting Javanese would have nothing to do with.[26] This is a clear example of one ethnic group targeting a positive attribute of one group prototype, that is 'Chinese are successful business people', and turning it into a negative attribute for your own group. A process that potentially had long standing repercussions for Sino-Indonesian relations even in the twentieth century.

By the mid- nineteenth century the Chinese had fully established themselves into a dominant economic position in the East Indies, to the extent that even the Dutch authorities began to take measures to dilute some of the influence that they had

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[23] James Rush cited in Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1994) p.102
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] Turner and Seymour, 'Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Crisis' p.172
[26] Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting* p.102

amassed,[27] but within the Chinese community itself rifts began to develop. Not between the different ethnic groups but rather the generations. The community split into two camps the *totok* and the *peranakan*. The *peranakan* were the Chinese who had been Indonesia for several generations, they were established, not only in their professions but also into the community at large. Many had married *pribumi* and sought the same kind of lifestyle as the population at large. The *totok* however were more recent migrants, hungry to make their mark in their new home. They did not care for the niceties of Javanese society and instead knuckled down to establish themselves. They saw the more settled and "Javanised" *peranakan* as being both uppity and soft, whilst the *peranakan* saw the *totok* as being crass and unscrupulous.[28] This internal prejudice was carried over into the twentieth century, especially in the 1920s and 30s when there was a massive influx of new *totok* migrants – as many as 50% more ethnic Chinese in some urban areas.[29] It was in the face of this migration that "sinophobia infected the embryo of modern Indonesian national consciousness"[30], the *totok*, true to their industrious prototype, were incredibly successful. This again bred resentment, this time as the *pribumi* saw the Chinese success not only as serving colonial interests but also causing poverty and repressing the *pribumi* themselves. At this time however the *pribumi* incorporated not just the Javanese but the wider population of the East Indies, who were being drawn to the anti-colonial nationalism that would eventually bring Indonesia independence. The internal differences that were of such importance to the ethnic Chinese were irrelevant to the *pribumi* outside of the community.

[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Ibid.* pp.102-3
[29] *Ibid.* p.103
[30] James Rush cited in *Ibid.*

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The Chinese had set themselves up to be outside of the rest of society, and as such were looked at with scorn. A stereotype was beginning to develop as is shown in the following extract by Charles Coppel:

The Chinese are clannish, they keep aloof socially and prefer to live in separate areas. They cling persistently to the culture of their ancestral homeland. Their loyalty to Indonesia is dubious at best; worst they are down right hostile to Indonesia. Chinese who apparently identify with Indonesia are not genuine; they are only pretending to do so for opportunistic reasons, rather than from a true sense of identification with the country and its people. This opportunism is characteristic of a people concerned with money, trade and business. They are not, like Indonesians, dedicated to ideals. Having been given a favoured position by the Dutch, the Chinese dominate the Indonesian economy, oppressing the Indonesian masses and preventing the rise of a national (i.e. indigenous) entrepreneurial class. Not content with their dominant position, they also engage in economic subversion, since they are expert in bribery and smuggling.[31]

This extremely negative portrait that was painted is the overt expression of the resentment felt by the *pribumi* towards the prosperous Chinese. What is interesting, and I believe central when considering identity security, is that it is this projected prototype that dictates the minorities position within society as a whole rather that how the minority sees itself. That is, in the case of Sino-Indonesians, the fact that they do not perceive themselves as a homogenous whole does not stop them from being treated as such. Thus as the Chinese were still being alienated from Indonesian society as a whole at this time they did what they always did, which is to knuckle

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[31] Charles Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in crisis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) p.5

down and try to prosper as best they can. The above stereotype is unfortunate as not all Chinese were anti-nationalist, after all even though they did experience a different status in Colonial society than the *pribumi* it was still less that ideal. Also the *peranakan* saw themselves as being Indonesia and so felt the same towards Dutch oppression as many *pribumi* did. When independence was finally won from the Dutch however the Chinese were still considered outsiders to the rest of Indonesia and so sought to better their position within society. They were in need of a boost to their self esteem.

As discussed in the previous chapter SIT dictates that there are three main methods of altering a group's position within society. The Chinese again were divided over what they should try to do in order to change their social position, should they adopt a position of integration or assimilation. Integration was a concerted effort by the Chinese elite, or a section of the elite in this instance, to promote the Chinese and 'Chinese-ness' as being just another Indonesian identity that was no different from Balinese or Javanese. That was not an attempt to change who the Chinese were, but rather through political lobbying and the use of the media they would try and alter the negative perceptions that had developed during the colonial period.[32] This was carried out by bodies like *Baperki*, which was an organisation established in 1954, which used the *Pancasila* as its main argument to cultural equality with the *pribumi*. This was an interesting approach, they focused upon the religious tolerance that the *Pancasila* espoused as a way of justifying their cultural distinctiveness whilst also allying themselves to the central tenet of what represented an Indonesian. The Chinese used their religious convictions that formed part of their

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[32] Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting* p.104

identities; Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity, and in essence established that they had components within their ethnicity that were shared with other Indonesian ethnic groups. In doing so they were legitimising their rights to cultural independence within the Republic as a whole. In SIT terminology this was Social Creativity, an attempt to re-brand the Chinese for post-colonial Indonesia. Assimilation by contrast was an attempt at Individual Mobility, this section of the Chinese community made the decision that the label "Chinese" was so derogatory that rather than attempt to re-brand they would rather lose the label all together and become something else. They wanted to be assimilated into Indonesia society as a whole and ignore their ethnic roots and values, instead choosing to adopt those of the majority.[33]

These moves however were blocked by Indonesian society as a whole. This is for several reasons. Whilst the Sukarno regime was intended to be democratic and representative of Indonesia as whole it was limited by the extremely anti-Chinese sentiment of the population. Therefore the Chinese elite were unable to exert much influence on the new democratic institutions that were developing and integrate into the wider Indonesian society in any meaningful way. The *pribumi* elites were reluctant to be seen as supporting the Chinese who were still perceived as being self interested and disloyal, wherever the Chinese turned, be it Sukarno or the PKI, they were a political liability.[34] Luckily for individual Sino-Indonesians the close business networks that had been established within the ethnic Chinese communities meant that they were still able to function and prosper, allowing the republic to reap the same benefits that the Dutch had from the Chinese. However rather than ingratiate

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[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*

themselves to the regime and the people who also benefited ultimately from the states economic prosperity, this actually further alienated the ethnic group from the population at large, reinforcing the original stereotypes and also making integration even less likely. This vicious circle is central to the problems in Sino-Indonesian relations, the Chinese were unable to alter their social position and so internalised, this was perceived as being "arrogant and haughty"[35] by the *pribumi* and so they were reluctant to allow the Chinese to enter mainstream society, which caused the Chinese to become self reliant and internalise and so on. Assimilation was seemingly a way out of this predicament however the various *pribumi* ethnic groups would not allow the Chinese to enter their groups, and as the Chinese were not simply culturally distinct, they also exhibited physical differences that set them apart from the *pribumi*. With this avenue closed the Chinese could seek to assimilate themselves into the wider Indonesian identity, however at this time there was no real Indonesian identity that they could be assimilated into. When the New Order assumed power in 1966 this was to change as the new regime was receptive to cultural unification, however the Chinese were not able to reap the benefits of this development.

One other recent development to the ethnic Chinese prototype in 1960s Indonesia was that Chinese were considered to be, or have links to, communists. Given the anti-communist nature of the New Orders rise to power and the mass killings in the aftermath of the 1965 coup, the Chinese found themselves again alienated and also tarnished with the crimes and inadequacies of the previous regime. When Suharto and representatives of the "New Order" began makinging claims against the PKI, the Chinese were assumed to be guilty by association. The fear that

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[35] Geertz cited in *Ibid.*

had helped fuel Sukarno's *Konfrontasi* initiative,[36] that is, that the Chinese diaspora represented a way for the Peoples Republic to influence the peoples of South East Asia.[37] Therefore, when one sees the vilification of the communists within Indonesia in the winter of 1965-6, and sees the fact that to many in Indonesia the Chinese were synonymous with communism. It is not surprising that of the many thousands of people killed in the aftermath of the September 30th coup, the vast majority were Chinese. This is an example of the way in which we as individuals catalogue the social world into homogenous groups, in this instance it meant that the *pribumi* lumped the ethnic Chinese and the PKI together. So the negative prototype was again reinforced, this time resulting in the mass murder of thousands of ethnic Chinese. The Chinese found themselves in an environment that was hostile and they were no longer given the luxury of being able to lock themselves away from the outside world. In fact the outside world was actively targeting them. This is emphasised by the words of Major-General Soemitro, who was Military Commander in East Java at the time of the coup:

I didn't allow them to live in villages, I didn't want them to trade, I didn't even want them in business. No public use of the Chinese language, no Chinese books, no speaking of Chinese, no Chinese shrines; nothing. We needed a comprehensive solution[38]

This vitriolic distrust and fear of the Chinese did have deep rooted antecedents, but then so did the differences expressed between the other ethnic groups in Indonesia. Surely now was the ideal time to not only create an effective and stable modern Indonesian identity but also integrate the Chinese into this ideal and therefore

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[36] see chapter four

[37] This was not the only justification for the *Konfrontasi* however it did motivate many within the armed forces.

[38] Major-General Soemitro speaking in 1991 cited in Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting* p.106

eradicate the animosity for good. The New Order did seek to eradicate the problem but rather than integrate the New Order sort to assimilate.

In 1967 the New Order put forward the 'Basic Policy for the Solution to the Chinese Problem'. This policy was a systematic and nationwide development of the policies that were initiated in the aftermath of the coup by some local commanders. It gave the following guidelines for the assimilation of the non-*pribumi* "[all] forms of cultural affinity based on country of origin should be removed, in order to give all elements of culture in Indonesia the opportunity to develop according to the Pancasila."[39] This policy went on to specify therefore that there could only be one Chinese language newspaper nationally; Chinese religious expression was only allowed to take place in the home; Chinese language schools were to be phased out (a policy that was completed in 1974); Chinese script was outlawed in public, and legally it was considered to be no different than pornography; finally, it was encouraged that the Chinese should adopt Indonesian sounding names and cultural practices.[40] The seemingly contradictory decision to allow the ethnic Chinese to maintain a newspaper, *Harian Indonesia* which was based in Jakarta, was that it served as a "channel for information and fostering Indonesian residents who only understand the Chinese language, in the framework of overcoming subversive activities and foreign propaganda that is hostile to the Indonesian Government".[41] At the same time the ethnic Chinese were given no legitimate routes to power, they were politically impotent and had no direct representation within the New Order

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[39] Mely G. Tan, "The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian Society" *Indonesia, The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life* (Ithica: Cornell South East Asia Program, 1991) p.115

[40] *Ibid.* p.117

[41] Charles Coppel, "Chinese Indonesians in Crisis" in Charles Coppel, *Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia* (Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. 2002) p.47

administration.   After the coup the Chinese political elite divided into two dominant camps, the first was the *Baperki*, (*Bandan Permusjawaratan Kerwarganegaraan Indonesia* or the Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) which was the dominant Chinese political party under Sukarno and had established itself as a body that effectively represented Chinese interests in Indonesia. The second group was the *Lambaga Pembinaan Kestatuan Bangsa*, (LPKB or Institute for the Promotion of National Unity), this was a right wing organisation that was sponsored by the government and military and represented those Chinese who were pro-assimilation.[42] However, despite these outlets seemingly being in place for a political outlet for the non-*pribumi* in real terms all avenues were closed off. The *Baperki* was dissolved in late 1965, and by the nature of their aspirations the LPKB were absorbed into other government organisations whose task it was to carry out the assimilation program.[43] And the potential utility of *Harian Indonesia* as a potential outlet was superseded by the reality that the New Order saw it more a tool to carry out their own agenda.[44] The Chinese were seemingly powerless with no real means available to them to affectively compete against this policy, and so it seemed that they would have to accept that this was how they would have to exist within Indonesia.

However the Chinese were allowed one sector within which they were able to not only express themselves, but also exist more or less free from state persecution. That was in the economic sector. In the face of such an overtly hostile environment the ethnic Chinese were forced to exploit this route for all it was worth, but this had

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[42] Christian Chua, "Defining Indonesian Chineseness Under the New Order" *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol.34, No.4 (2004) p.470
[43] Tan, "The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian Society" pp.120-21
[44] Chua, "Defining Indonesian Chineseness Under the New Order" p.477

considerable economic benefits. This meant that the tight business networks that had always been a prominent part of their business style were reinforced. The fact that the Chinese could not do anything else within Indonesian society, even academia was extremely restrictive if you were of Chinese origin, this meant that the Chinese focused all of their energies and efforts within this one avenue. This adversity also placed emphasis on a positive prototype attribute that the Chinese held, that is that "[they are] a hardy, self-reliant and, above all, a risk-taking lot".[45] The same resilience that had stood the earlier generations of *totok* re-emerged in the face of the new policies and the Chinese were forced to find a way to survive this threat to their existence. This is not to argue that all Chinese became economically prosperous overnight, and the vast majority of the Chinese population suffered terribly under the restrictive policies of the New Order.[46] The Chinese people at this time were represented by eminent members of the Chinese population, those being "community leaders ... writers, journalists, businessmen, scholars, and athletes",[47] those figures that could be considered to represent the best of the Chinese Indonesian population. However, due to the restrictions that were being placed upon the non-*Pribumi* by the assimilation program it meant that the only representatives that would have been *seen* representing the Chinese would be those considered to be successful within the economic sector. In short there were other forces working within the Chinese

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[45] Wu Yuan-li, 'Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia' *American Economic Review* Vol.73, No.2 (1983) p.112

[46] The standard assessment is that "the Chinese constitute only 3% of the population but control more than 70% of the Indonesian economy", or as Christian Chua calls it the 70% myth, whilst it is true under the New Order Chinese conglomerates dominated the economic sector, the wealth and prosperity was by no means shared amongst all of the circa 6 million Chinese in Indonesia. This is discussed more fully in Chua, "Defining Indonesian Chineseness Under the New Order" pp.465-79.

[47] Karen Kane, "Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies" (Review Article) *The Journal of Asian Studies* Vol.40, No.1 (1980) pp.207 paraphrasing Leo Suryadinata, *Eminent Indonesian Chinese : biographical sketches* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978)

community, however they did not have any real outlet to successfully interact with those outside the Chinese community.

The New Order was, despite its numerous faults and injustices, essentially an economic meritocracy. So long as you could provide something towards the economic growth and development of the Indonesian state then the regime would happily take advantage, even if it seemingly ran counter to another policy, and this was the case with the ethnic Chinese. How else were the Chinese able to survive the societal onslaught? There are three possibilities: it was simply the natural resilience of the ethnic Chinese and their efforts to react to the attack on their identity; there were political motivations for the New Order to maintain the ethnic Chinese as a separate entity, outside of a modern Indonesian identity; and finally, the Chinese were necessary for the propagation of the Indonesian identity and their assimilation was therefore impossible or detrimental to *that* agenda.

Chinese resilience defeated the societal threat

As a response to the New Order's assimilation policy the Chinese were left with very few options. As with the previous change in regime after the declaration of independence, the Chinese ethnic character was tarnished by association with the proceeding political order. In order to combat this association, whether it was justified or not, the Chinese had to disassociate themselves from Sukarno's system and appeal to the New Order. The Chinese affinity to business, which was a central part of their ethnic prototype, was an obvious way to assure their necessity to the new regime. By making connections to the new military order they were able to not only

make the best use of the only available avenue of public life, but they could benefit themselves and the New Order at the same time. Those that were able established relationships with prominent members within the local military command structures, this was known as a *cukong* or boss/master relationship. The Chinese would be able to raise money and establish business ventures and the Indonesian officials would be the figure head for the venture, offering protection and influence on behalf of the Chinese businessman. This meant that the Chinese were able to conduct their business whilst it appeared that it was a *pribumi* scheme, whilst the Official was able to reap the benefits of the Chinese business networks, gain a share of the profits from the ventures without ceding any of the capital, ensure that the venture was able to avoid much of the taxation and harassment that a non-*pribumi* would normally receive, and also take responsibility for the project if it was a success or easily disassociate themselves from it if it were a failure. These *cukongs* were such a success for the Chinese and the New Order that they began to dominate the new economic order, *pribumi* resentment of the Chinese was still at boiling point as they sought to break into the market. However how could they compete? The Chinese had little choice but to accept a subservient position in ventures, this meant that for an Indonesian official a partnership with a non-*pribumi* was more profitable personally than a partnership with a *pribumi*. The Chinese had again managed to assert their superiority within the economic sector and the Indonesians began to further recent the fact that these outsiders were again dominating Indonesian business. These issues lie at the heart of the January 1974 *Malari* riots (which comes from the Indonesian for 15th January Disaster), which whilst they were couched in terms of being anti-foreign investment, it seems evident that non-*pribumi* Indonesian investment was also an issue. This is because of the apparent targeting of ethnic Chinese businesses when

the initial protests turned to violence.[48]   If the protests were purely about external investment why would the Chinese be targeted in this way? It is an example again of the homogenisation of the out-group by the in-group. The *Pribumi* have established for themselves an effective other in the form of the Chinese economic elite, and *all* Chinese are therefore deemed to representative of *this* group.

This was another bleak time for the Chinese; in the aftermath of the riots the initially liberal economic policies of the New Order began to become more in keeping with the rest of the regime. Why was this? As was shown above the New Order was not popularist like Sukarno in that they were rarely dictated to by public opinion and their every action was a reflection of what they considered to be best for the nation as a whole. So what had changed between 1967 and 1974 that would bring about a change to their economic policy? By the mid 1970s the *cukong* relationships were simply not as necessary for the continued success of the economy. This was because the New Order officials now had become independently wealthy enough, and in all likelihood sufficiently aware of how to best conduct business ventures independently that they had no real need for their Chinese partners. Fortunately for the Chinese however the regime was not the only one to benefit from the relationship and they had also established themselves sufficiently enough that they had become integral to the success of the economy as a whole. That is not to say that they were free to function with total independence, because *pribumi* attitudes towards the ethnic Chinese were constantly negative and, in fact their continued resilience only went to further foster resentment. The fact that as Indonesian economic policy developed throughout the 1970s and 80s, the Chinese were able to take advantage of every

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[48] Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*. p.108

opportunity that presented itself. This reinforced the stereotype that the Chinese were corrupt and unscrupulous, and that their prosperity was disproportionate from that of the *pribumi*. In psychological terms the ethnic Chinese combated the existential threat to them in the societal sector by maximising their prowess within the economic sector. This provided them security in two ways. Firstly because economic proficiency was an integral and salient part of their ethnic identity, their ability to prosper within the economic sector reinforced this aspect of the Chinese self and thus counter-acted the New Order's attempts to assimilate them into the whole. Secondly, because the Chinese became so successful, anything that was too strongly anti-Chinese would have had a detrimental effect on the Indonesian economy as a whole. This meant that the Indonesian elite could not allow extreme anti-Chinese policies to continue and therefore effectively secured the ethnic Chinese from the existential threat.[49]

The New Order had political reasons for sustaining the ethnic Chinese minority

The initial challenge that the New Order faced when they replaced Sukarno was the creation of an effective and stable notion of an Indonesian identity. It is discussed above what strategies were employed by the New Order to achieve this end; however the ethnic Chinese were not part of their equation as to what this identity was to be. But why? For the casual observer there is no real reason why if you can be Javanese and Indonesian, or Balinese and Indonesian, why can you not be Chinese and Indonesian? The negative stereotype of the Chinese that prevailed when the New

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[49] Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*. p.129

Order came to power is an obvious answer; however these stereotypes existed for each and every one of the *pribumi* ethnic minorities as well. In fact it was to counter-act these that the New Order was attempting to establish and promote its new modern Indonesian identity. Politically the ethnic Chinese were the perfect rallying point for the New Order to build their new identity around. They "othered" the Chinese in numerous ways and perhaps the most direct way was by virtue that they were physically different from the *pribumi*, in other words they look different from the "indigenous" Indonesians and used a different language. This was compounded using geographical arguments or the notion that they are from elsewhere. By emphasising the alien origins of the Chinese they were able to play upon the fears of all of the various *pribumi* groups that their society, culture and values were being diluted. This was being carried out in conjunction with the use of *adat* by the New Order and therefore making a comparison between two possible futures for the *pribumi*, they could exist as part of Indonesia *or* they could be corrupted by the Chinese. This "othering" could have been directed at all migrants and non-*pribumi*, but the Chinese were a pre-existing "other", they were self contained and therefore potentially more controllable than different ethnic groups.

A secondary form of "othering" was cultural, or the way that the ethnic Chinese segregated themselves from the majority of the population "through the overstatement of differences of religion and cultural tradition"[50] by emphasising the differences inherent between the *pribumi* and non-*pribumi*, the differences that the Indonesian people knew and were already very aware of, the New Order was able to maintain the Chinese as an out-group and thus exploit or make use of these

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[50] Ariel Heryanto, 'Ethnic Identities and Erasure' in Joel S. Kahn (ed.), *Southeast Asian Identities* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998) p.97

differences for political advantage. It seems contradictory to a certain extent but essentially by singling out the ethnic Chinese for cultural assimilation the New Order further isolated and reinforced the separateness of the Chinese, a separateness that was only exasperated by the increasing economic disparity between the *pribumi* and the Chinese. The resentment that ensued was further enforced by the fact the perceived special economic relationship, which not only lead to the success of the Chinese in the realm of big business but also on the streets of, for it was on the street that the Chinese owned small businesses thrived and flourished at the perceived expense and detriment of the *pribumi* entrepreneurs.

So why did the New Order pursue this contradictory policy? Was it merely for economic gain? Or was there a deeper motivation behind the New Orders use of the ethnic Chinese? The traditional approaches to the study of the Chinese/*pribumi* relations argue that the economic disparity lay at the heart of the relationship and that the resentment and occasional violence directed towards the Chinese was the result of this.[51] The above argument postulates that it was the response of the Chinese community to the existential threat of the New Order that lead to their unique position economically in society and hence the heightened economic disparity. This is essentially an explanation of the traditional approach to the Sino-Indonesian question using Societal Security language. It assumes that the attempts to assimilate the Chinese failed because the Chinese made themselves indispensable. However it is not the only possibility, Heryanto proposes that the "othering" of the Chinese was for more political reasons. Not just in order to help establish a new Indonesian identity but also for more nefarious means. By maintaining the ethnic Chinese as an "other"

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[51] For an example of this traditional argument look at Turner and Seymour, 'Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian Crisis' pp.169-94 and their account of the 1998 anti-Chinese riots

then the New Order had a scapegoat that it could use whenever they wanted to divert attention from other problems that they may have. Heryanto argues that this was a rational political move on the part of the regime, and it was the desire for a political "distraction" that lies at the root of the ultimate failure of the assimilation program. However, whilst it is likely that this political desire is a variable, I believe that the nature of ethnic identity itself is the real reason for the continued othering of the Chinese. The New Orders attempts to create a new Indonesian identity required an other to effectively unify the many diverse groups that make the *pribumi*.

SIT informs us that the way we define ourselves is with reference to an out-group and so in order to establish an effective definition of who they were as Indonesians the New Order required that out-group. The Chinese were convenient for the task. It is possible that another out-group could have been established however in the aftermath of the coup there was little or no reason to do so. The combined impact of the communist/Chinese threat that was delivered to the Indonesian community by the New Order was sufficient to seed the modern identity that the New Order desired. In conjunction with cultural cherry picking and the establishment of what it was to be Indonesian, the New Order were able to build a prototype of what they wanted Indonesia and Indonesians to be, the Chinese were not and could not be part of that prototype. As time progressed the need for an active out-group was lessened, or at the very least it became less overt, however at times of national or political crisis the people still looked for a "them" to blame for what was wrong with their world. This is different from what Heryanto argues as it is not a rational political choice on the part of the New Order to maintain the ethnic Chinese, the policy of assimilation still persisted and the ethnic Chinese were targets of

sustained institutional attack on their cultural existence. However, the very identity that the New Order had established for Indonesia could not permit the sustained destruction of the Chinese. Firstly because they were the out-group that helped define what Indonesian in-group was. Secondly, the Indonesian identity itself prevented any overtly anti-Chinese actions by the Government. The vision of Indonesia that Suharto had established in 1966 had built into it "the pride Indonesians have in their multicultural society", a society that the New Order created, "and a desire to present to the outside world an image of a tolerant, non-sectarian society."[52] So whilst the ethnic Chinese response to the existential threat that was initiated with the 1967 'Basic Policy for the solution to the Chinese problem' undoubtedly ensured their survival in the short term, the prolonged survival of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was in fact assured by the ethnic group that threatened them.

Transmigration in the New Order

This Indonesianisation of the Archipelago was not only carried about by the attack upon the Ethnic Chinese. An area of future study would be the Transmigration process. The traditional literature focuses heavily upon the economic benefits of the program, however what cannot be ignored is the impact of the program on the attempt to develop a coherent Indonesian self. Because the vast majority of the Indonesia's population are based in Java, which constitutes only 7 % of Indonesia's landmass, there are obvious economic advantages to moving the populations into the outer islands and so exploit the economic resources there. What is also evident is that the New Order regime also encouraged the movement of people to propagate the idea of

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[52] Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting* p.129

a greater Indonesian self and suppress the ethnic communities that lived away from Jakarta. Ethnic unrest in Kalimantan, for instance between the indigenous *Dayaks* and the settling *Madurese* is one particular case that is worth noting, as is the struggle for independence in *Aceh* and the New Order's invasion of East Timor. East Timor is an interesting for the program of migration, some 70,000 people were moved to the area in the late 80s and early 90s was coupled by oppressive military measures to suppress the Timorese. This dynamic would open up the possibility to understand the use of societal securitization during a military occupation.

Conclusion

This thesis is a project to operationalise the concepts of Political and Societal security, as laid out by the Copenhagen School in order to provide a framework for the re-conception of security. When I examined in my introductory chapter the varied competing approaches I highlighted that whilst there are several competing approaches to this question, it was this securitization model of the Copenhagen school that offered the most robust theoretical framework for the broadening of security. It was able to provide a wider notion of security, whilst at the same time still being able to engage with the concerns of the traditional/orthodox conception of security. Irrespective of this claim however, as a theoretical framework this model was not unproblematic and in order for this to be achieved I believe that it was necessary, yet possible, to operationalise the theory so that it could be more rigorous and applicable to empirical research. The aim of my thesis was to address therefore was to explore the concepts of the political and societal sectors as explained by Buzan *et al*. Then by examining the criticisms of each sector I was able to incorporate alternative theoretical approaches to the sectors and referents that Buzan *et al* introduced in the *New Framework* and in so doing unproblematise the existing conceptions of political and societal security. This in turn improves upon the securitization model of security analysis and so provides a more robust re-conception of security. At the start of this project I asked my self a series of research questions that I intend to address in turn.

What is the referent object in the political sector and how does securitization occur?

Unlike the other security sectors the political sector is problematised by the fact that it does not have 'physical' referent object. Instead it is the political regime that is the referent object in political security challenges. More specifically an attack would target the two pillars upon which all regimes are built upon: the first is the internal legitimacy of the regime, and the second is its external recognition. Political security is concerned with the threats to the instruments of power, the institutions, principles and apparatus that enable effective governance and those political units that are attempting to change the current political order. Whilst it is possible for the institutions and physical base upon which a regime is based to be attacked through other sectors, or more specifically an attack on these pillars of the regime are likely to be securitized via a none political sector, so therefore the only solely political referent within the sector are the principles upon which it is based. Therefore it is these ideas and principles that are the central referent within the political sector, and they in turn will be threatened by *competing* principles and ideas. The most interesting aspect of securitization within the political sector is the fact that because there is a non-'physical' referent the extraordinary means required may also be non-physical there by leading to the formation of a securitizing paradox, this dual process is particularly interesting when addressing the issues involved in regime change and formation.

<u>Is it possible to develop the concept of political security with particular reference to</u> <u>the problems that occur within the developing world and see whether it is applicable</u> <u>for the study of an authoritarian regime?</u>

By integrating the work of Alagappa and Ayoob one is better able to comprehend the internal and external challenges that a developing regime faces. Alagappa's definition of legitimacy, and in particular how it is attained and utilised within authoritarian regimes, allows one to more completely understand the process of securitization within dictatorial states, and it allows a clearer understanding of the audience-elite discourse under authoritarianism. Ayoob by addressing the difficulties faced by developing states during the nation building process in particular the way in which new regimes are forced to balance the need for external recognition against the legitimacy derived internally. The synthesis of these writers enabled me to develop a more clear understanding of not only the nature of the threat within the political sector for the developing world but also how the struggle to attain and maintain political legitimacy impacts upon the power elites within states, and in turn explains why they identify these problems as security issues.

<u>Is possible to use social psychology to create a more robust and clearly defined notion</u> <u>of identity for the operationalisation of societal security?</u>

The introduction of social psychology to our notions of identity is particularly useful for the operationalisation of the societal sector. For whilst Buzan and Waever have responded to criticisms levelled at their conception of identity, psychological literature enables us to empirically ascertain the notion of identity and its importance

to group dynamics. This in turn allows us to address the concerns of critics who argue that because identity is a fluid, social defined variable, it is therefore unable to become objectified and be used as a referent object. Whilst there does exist within IR conceptions of "us and them" and "othering" the research carried out in the areas of SIT and Self Categorisation Theory that allow one to truly comprehend the processes that are taking place. And also the ways in which it is possible to attack and defend identity as a referent object. Whilst it could be criticised that the application of these psychological principles to the securitization literature does not actually expand our understanding of the societal sector, rather merely reemphasising what we already assumed to know. I would argue that the fact that these assumptions now have a more rigorous and empirical underpinning is necessary for a more complete understanding of the sector.

What does the operationalised concept of political security tell us about regime formation in Post-Colonial Indonesia?

Within the Indonesian context this operationalised theory has shed light upon the dynamics involved in the regime formation processed of both Sukarno and the New Order. It allows one to comprehend why Sukarno took the route he did in order to attain independence from the Dutch. How the UN offered an acceptable route for the recognition of an independent Indonesia.   It also explains why the fiercely patriotic Sukarno adopted a Western style of government in the immediate aftermath of independence, and also why it was necessary for the President to instigate a change of regime in 1957 due to its failure to resolve the states domestic issues. Of particular interest here was the role PKI-ABRI was to play in Sukarno's eventual downfall, especially how the nature of the regime he created laid the foundations for the

eventual crisis that lead to the failure of the *Gotong Rojong* regime. The use of this model to examine the security challenges of the Sukarno regime does change the focus of analysis. For example, when one examines the policy of *Konfrontasi* from a traditional security approach one sees an interstate conflict playing out between Malaysia and Indonesia. In particular one will be drawn to the concepts of territory and ideology, in particular it can be read as an attempt by Sukarno to redress the injustices of the Colonial period and secure Indonesia's borders from the neo-colonial threat posed by the newly created Malaysia. The political security model instead posits that the confrontation was as much concerned with the internal political challenges that Sukarno faced from the PKI and ABRI. *Konfrontasi* represents an effort by Sukarno to control these two rival factions within his regime, to not only channel their animosity away from him, but to also utilise it for his own political ends.

This framework is also of use when examining the New Order regime. The securitization model highlights the processes and dynamics by which the regime not only sought power, but also maintained it. The creation of the *Golkar* democracy and the *Pancasilaisation* of Indonesian domestic politics are fascinating methods of controlling and channelling potential political dissent. It is also important to note how the success of the regimes defining principle, namely economic development, allowed it to function effectively even with a high degree of corruption and brutality. This is coupled by careful control of the routes to power and in doing so define its own political audience. This focus on the establishment of the realm of the ordinary and how this in turn establishes the rules and mechanisms not only by which the regime administers over the people, controls potential opposition, but also determining the criteria by which the regime is judged by the politically significant, allows us to

understand the power dynamics with developing regimes. It enables the security analyst to comprehend how a seemingly "unjust" regime can survive. If the politically significant determine that the regime is performing effectively, based upon the regimes own criteria of success, then the regime will survive. If the regime is seemingly not performing, then this in turn opens up the possibility for the politically significant to be swayed by an alternative approach to governance.

What does the operationalised concept of political security tell us about regime formation in Post-Colonial Indonesia?

Looking at Sino-Indonesian relations, and in particular the "othering" of the Chinese for political ends, the operationalised societal securitization model helps illuminate a more complex pattern of events than previous existed within the literature. The assimilation that was instigated by the New Order regime becomes more than the systematic destruction of an ethnic minority, and instead one can see evidence that in fact the role that the Chinese play is actually central in defining what it is to be Indonesian. This insight can help us understand the policy decisions made by the New Order with respect to the Chinese, and also it allows us to comprehend why such a brutal campaign failed to fully assimilate the non-*pribumi*. Equally interesting is that if one examines acts of atrocity from directed towards the Chinese, for example in the aftermath of the 1965 coup. In this instance, one can see how the homogenisation of the out-group (the non-*Pribumi*) on the part of the "Indonesians" in the face of a crisis of self, in this case the arguable treachery of the part of the PKI, meant that the Chinese were vilified and attacked not merely because of their ethnicity, but rather due to the interpretation of this ethnicity by the in-group. In other words it was the *Pribumi's* own constructed conceptions that altered and thus lead to

violence, rather than an action on the part of the Chinese. Therefore in order to understand the anti-Chinese sentiment within Indonesia, this framework suggests you not focus on the acts of violence, or even the actions of the Chinese. But rather it is necessary to understand the actions of the in-group committing the acts of violence.

Possibilities for future research?

There are several potential areas for future study that have been highlighted by this research. I feel that within the Political sector the research that I have carried out concerning the Suharto era should be further expanded and particularly attention given to his downfall in 1998. Within the Societal sector I would like to address the transmigration programs of the New Order, the Javanisation of the archipelago and its role in forming a coherent notion of Indonesian identity. Here I would pay particular attention to the separatist movements and ethnic conflicts that emerged in the outer islands post Independence.

More generally there are several other directions that my research could go. As I feel that the Copenhagen model is the best way to allow us to expand our notions of security without losing validity, but it is not only the political and societal sectors that are problematic. To this end I would like to look at operationalising the economic and environmental sectors. The environmental sector in particular is of particular relevance currently, not only within Indonesian in the aftermath if the earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, but also in the developed world, for example Hurricane Katrina in the USA. I would also be interested in moving the operationalised models that I have established here and apply them to another area. I would be particularly

interested in looking as regime formation in Myanmar and Vietnam, and ethnic

conflict in Africa.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: The Preamble to the Constitution

Whereas freedom is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice;

And the moment of rejoicing has arrived in the struggle of the Indonesian freedom movement to guide the people safely and well to the threshold of the independence of the state of Indonesia which shall be free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous;

By the grace of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to live a free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.

Subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all the people of Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to improve the public welfare, to advance the intellectual life of the people and to contribute to the establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in the One and Only God, just and humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives and the realization of social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.

Chapter I. Form of the State and Sovereignty

Article 1

1. The State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state which has the form of a republic.

2) Sovereignty shall be vested in the people and shall be exercised in full by the.

Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat

Article 2

1. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall consist of the members of the Dewan

Perwakilan Rakyat augmented by the delegates from the regional territories and

groups as provided for by statutory regulations.

2. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall meet at least once in every five years in

the capital of the state.

3. All decisions of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be taken by a majority

vote.

Article 3

The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall determine the constitution and the guide

lines of the policy of State.

Chapter III. The Executive Power

Article 4

1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power of government in accordance with the Constitution.

2. In exercising his duties, the President shall be assisted by a Vice-President.

Article 5

1. The President shall hold the power to make statutes in agreement with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

2. The President shall determine the government regulations to expedite the enforcement of laws.

Article 6

1. The President shall be a native Indonesian citizen.

2. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat by a majority vote.

Article 7

The President and the Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible for re-election.

Article 8

Should the President die, resign or be unable to perform his duties during his term of office, he shall be succeeded by the Vice-President until the expiry of his term of office.

Article 9

Before assuming office, the President and the Vice-President shall take the oath of office according to their religions, or solemnly promise before the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat as follows:

The President's/Vice-President's Oath

"In the name of God Almighty, I swear that I will perform the duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia to the best of my ability and as justly as possible, and that I will strictly observe the Constitution and consistently implement the law and regulations in the service of the country and the people."

The President's/Vice-President's Promise

"I solemnly promise that I will perform the duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia to the best of my ability and as justly as possible, and that I will strictly observe the constitution and consistently implement the law and regulations in the service of the country and the people."

Article 10

The President is the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Article 11

In agreement with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the President declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties with other states.

Article 12

The President declares the state of emergency. The conditions for such a declaration and the measures to deal with the emergency shall be governed by law.

Article 13

1. The President appoints ambassadors and consuls.

2. The President receives the credentials of foreign ambassadors.

Article 14

The President grants mercy, amnesty, pardon and restoration of rights.

Article 15

The President grants titles, decorations and other distinctions of honour.

Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council

Article 16

1. The composition of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be determined by law.

2. The Council has the duty to reply to questions raised by the President and has the right to submit recommendations to the government.

Chapter V. The Ministers of State

Article 17

1. The President shall be assisted by the Ministers of State.

2. These Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by the President.

3. These Ministers shall head the government departments.

Chapter VI. The Regional Governments

Article 18

The division of the territory of Indonesia into large and small regions shall be

prescribed by law in consideration of and with due regard to the principles of

deliberation in the government system and the hereditary rights of special territories.

Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

Article 19

1. The composition of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall be prescribed by law.

2. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall meet at least once a year.

Article 20

1. Every law shall require the approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

2. Should a bill not obtain the approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the bill shall

not be resubmitted during the same session of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Article 21

1. Members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat have the right to submit a bill.

2. Should such a bill not obtain the sanction of the President notwithstanding the

approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the bill shall not be resubmitted during the

same session of the Dewan.

Article 22

1. In the event of a compelling emergency, the President has the right to issue government regulations in lieu of laws.

2. Such regulations shall have the consent of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat during its subsequent session.

3. Where the approval of the Dewan is not obtained, the government regulations shall be revoked.

Chapter VIII. Finance

Article 23

1. The annual state budget shall be sanctioned by law. In the event that the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat does not approve a draft budget, the government shall adopt the budget of the preceding year.

2. All government taxes shall be determined by law.

3. The forms and denominations of the currency shall be determined by law.

4. Other financial matters shall be regulated by law.

5. In order to examine the accountability of the state finances, a State Audit Board shall be established by statutory regulation. The findings of the Board shall be reported to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Chapter IX. The Judiciary Power

Article 24

1. The judiciary power shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and such other courts of

law as are provided for by law.

2. The composition and powers of these legal bodies shall be regulated by law.

Article 25

The appointment and dismissal of judges shall be regulated by law.

Chapter X. The Citizens

Article 26

1. Citizens are native Indonesian persons or persons of other nations who have

acquired a legal status as citizens.

2. Conditions to acquire and other matters on citizenship shall be determined by law.

Article 27

1. All citizens have equal status before the law and in government and shall abide by

the law and the government without any exception.

2. Every citizen has the right to work and to live in human dignity.

Article 28

Freedom of association and assembly, of verbal and written expression and the like,

shall be prescribed by law.

Chapter XI. Religion

Article 29

1. The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God.

2. The State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief.

Chapter XII. National Defence

Article 30

1. Every citizen has the right and duty to participate in the defence of the country.

2. The rules governing defence shall be regulated by law.

Chapter XIII. Education

Article 31

1. Every citizen has the right to education.

2. The government shall establish and conduct a national educational system which

shall be regulated by law.

Article 32

The government shall advance the national culture.

Chapter XIV. Social Welfare

Article 33

1. The economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based upon the principles of the family system.

2. Sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be controlled by the state.

3. The land, the waters and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.

Article 34

The poor and destitute children shall be cared for by the State.

Chapter XV. The Flag and the Language

Article 35

The national flag of Indonesia shall be the red-and-white.

Article 36

The national language of Indonesia shall be the Bahasa Indonesia or the Indonesian language.

Chapter XVI. Amendments to the Constitution

Article 37

1. In order to amend the Constitution, not less than two thirds of the total number of members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be in attendance.

2. Decisions shall be taken with the approval of not less than two thirds of the number of members in attendance.

3. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Clause I

The Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence shall arrange and conduct the transfer of administration to the government of Indonesia.

Clause II

All existing state institutions continue to function and regulations remain valid as long as no new ones are established in conformity with this Constitution.

Clause III

For the first time, the President and the Vice-President shall be elected by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence.

Clause IV

Prior to the formation of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat and the Supreme Advisory Council in accordance with this Constitution, all their powers shall be exercised by the President assisted by a national committee.

4. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

1. Within six months after the end of the Great East Asia War, the President of Indonesia shall take preparatory steps and execute all the provisions of this Constitution.

2. Within six months after its formation, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall convene a session to decree the constitution.

5. ANNOTATIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION

General

I. The Constitution as a part of the Basic Law

The Constitution of the country is only a part of its basic law. It is the written part. In addition, there is the unwritten part of the basic law which comprises principal regulations that grow and are preserved in the conduct of state affairs.

Indeed, to study the basic law (droit constitutionnel) of a country we cannot only analyze the articles of the constitution (loi constitutionnelle). We need to know the circumstances and the spiritual background (geistlicher hintergrund) that led to the drafting of the document.

We cannot understand the constitution of any country whatsoever by reading the text alone. To gain a thorough understanding of such constitution we have to know how the text came into existence, the conditions that prevailed at the time. In this way we can grasp the fundamental ideas and the basic reasoning underlying the constitution.

II. The basic thoughts in the Preamble

What are the basic thoughts which are embodied in the preamble to the constitution?

1. "The State", so it reads, "protects all the Indonesian people and the entire territory of Indonesia on the basis of unity. The State shall also establish social justice for all the people of Indonesia."

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The preamble, therefore, incorporates the idea of a unitary state which protects and accommodates all the people with no exception. Thus, the state stands above all groups of the population and above all individual convictions. The state, in the context of the preamble, calls for the unity of all the Indonesian people. This is one of the principles of the state that must never be forgotten.

2. The state shall strive for social justice for all the people (This is the second principle).

3. The third basic thought in the preamble is that the state shall be based on the sovereignty of the people, on democracy and the deliberations of representatives. Hence, the political system envisaged in the Constitution shall be based on democracy and the deliberations of representatives. This line of thoughts conforms to the characteristics of the Indonesian society.

4. The fourth basic idea in the preamble is that the state shall be based on the belief in the One and Only God and on just and civilized humanity. It follows that the constitution must make it the duty of the state and all its institutions to foster high human ethical norms and to live up to the noble moral aspirations of the people.

III. The basic ideas in the preamble are embodied in the articles of the Constitution

The basic ideas reflect the spiritual atmosphere in which the constitution was drafted. These ideas gave rise to legal aspirations (Rechtsidee) which encompassed the basic law of the state, both the written (the constitution) and the unwritten. Thus the articles of the Constitution incorporate those ideas.

IV. The Constitution is concise and flexible

The Constitution is made up of only 37 articles. The clauses merely refer to transitional and additional aspects. Thus, this draft constitution is very brief if compared, for example, with the constitution of the Philippines.

It is adequate if the constitution only contains the fundamental provisions and guidelines as directives for the government and other state institutions to conduct state affairs and create public welfare. In particular for a new and young country, such a basic law is best to contain the basic provisions only while the operational procedures can be accommodated in laws which are easier to make, amend and repeal. Hence the system in which the constitution is drafted.

We always have to remember the dynamics of social and state life in Indonesia. The Indonesian society and state grow and time changes, especially during the period of physical and spiritual revolution. Therefore, we have to live a dynamic life; we have to watch all developments in social and political life. Consequently, we had better avoid hasty crystallization and moulding (Gestaltung) of ideas that can easily change.

It is true that a written provision is binding. Hence the more flexible a provision, the better. We have to see to it that the system of the constitution does not lag behind the change of time. We must not make laws that quickly become absolete. The important thing in government and state life is the spirit of the authorities, of the government leaders. Even though a constitution is characteristic of the family system, if the spirit of the authorities and the leaders of government is individualistic, then the constitution is in reality meaningless. On the other hand, even if a constitution is imperfect, but the spirit of the government leaders is right, such a constitution will in

no way hinder the process of government. Thus, what is most important is the spirit. It must be a living and dynamic spirit. On the basis of these considerations, only the basic principles should be embodied in the constitution while the instruments of execution should be left to the law.

6. THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

The government system emphasized by the constitution is as follows:

I. Indonesia shall be a state based on law (rechtsstaat, a legal state).

1. As the Indonesian state is based on law, it is not founded on power alone (machtsstaat).

II. The constitutional system

2. The government is based on the constitution (basic law), not on absolutism (unlimited power).

III. The highest power of the state is vested in the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Die gezamte staatgewalt lieght allein bei der Majelis).

3. The sovereignty of the people is held by a body named the Majelis Permusyaratan Rakyat which is the manifestation of all the people of Indonesia (Vertretungsorgan des Willens des Staatsvolkes). This Majelis determines the Constitution and the Guidelines of State Policy. This Majelis appoints the Head of State (President) and the Deputy Head of State (Vice-President).

It is this Majelis that holds the highest power of the state, whereas the President shall pursue the state policy as outlined by the Majelis. The President who is appointed by

the Majelis shall be subordinate and accountable to the Majelis. He is the mandatory

of the Majelis; it is his duty to carry out its decisions. The President is not in a equal

position (neben) as, but subordinate to (untergeordnet) the Majelis.

IV. The President is the Chief Executive of the State under the Majelis

Under the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the President is the Chief Executive in

the state.

In the conduct of the state administration, the power and responsibility rest with the

President (The original annotation reads: "(There is) concentration of power and

responsibility upon the President" which may be misleading. The new annotation

serves to clarify the point).

V. The President is not accountable to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (the House of

Representatives)

The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is beside the President.

The President must obtain the approval of the Dewan to make laws (Gezetsgebug)

and to determine the budget (Staatsbergroting).

Hence, the President has to cooperate with the Dewan, but he is not accountable to it,

in the sense that his status does not depend upon it.

VI. The Ministers of state are the assistants of the President. They are not accountable

to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

The President appoints and dismisses the ministers of state. They are not accountable to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Their status does not depend upon the Dewan but upon the President since they are his assistants.

VII. The Powers of the Head of State is not unlimited

Although the Head of State is not accountable to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, he is not a dictator since his power is not unlimited.

As pointed out earlier, he is accountable to the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. Furthermore, he has to pay full attention to the voice (or the opinions) of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is strong.

The Dewan Perwakilan is in a strong position. The Dewan cannot be dissolved by the President unlike its position in a parliamentary system. Moreover, members of the Desan Perwakilan Rakyat are concurrently members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. Hence the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat can always control the actions of the President and if the DPR is of the opinion that the President has acted in contravention of the state policy as laid down in the Constitution or as determined by the MPR, the Majelis may convene a special session and request the President account for.

The Ministers of State are no ordinary senior officials.

Although the status of the ministers of state depends upon the President, they are no ordinary senior officials since they mainly exercise the executive power.

As head of a department, a minister ought to know all the matters related to his duties. Hence a minister has great influence upon the President to decide a policy on his department. In fact this asserts that ministers are leaders of the state.

To determine the government's policy and for the purpose of coordination in the administration, ministers have to work in close cooperation with one another under the leadership of the President.

Chapter I. Form of the State and Sovereignty

Article 1

The decision to form a unitary state and a republic is a manifestation of the basic idea of the people's sovereignty.

The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat is the highest authority in the conduct of state affairs. The Majelis is the manifestation of the people who hold the sovereignty of the state.

Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat

Article 2

Section 1

This article implies that all the people, all groups and all regions are represented in the Majelis such that this assembly can really be considered as the manifestation of the people.

The term "groups" refers to such bodies as cooperatives, labour unions and other collective organizations. This provision fits with the conditions of the time. In conjunction with the idea of creating a cooperative system in the economy, the first section of this article is a reminder of the existence of such groups in economic organizations.

Section 2

The Majelis with such a large membership should meet not less than once in every five years. The term "not less than" implies that, should it be necessary, the Majelis may meet more than once within its five-year term, that is, by calling a special session.

Article 3

Since the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat is vested with the sovereignty of the state, its power is unlimited. To keep pace with social dynamics and by paying due attention to all developments and trends of the time, once in every 5 years the Majelis decides the policy of the state to be pursued in the future.

Chapter III. The Executive Power

Article 4 and Article 5, section 2

'The President is the Chief Executive of the state. To enforce laws he has the power to issue government regulations (pouvoir reglementair).

Article 5, section 1

Beside the executive power, the President together with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat exercises the legislative power of the state.

Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9

These are self-explanatory.

Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15

The powers of the President referred to in these articles are the consequences of his position as the Head of State.

Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council

Article 16

This body is a Council of State whose duty is to give recommendations to the government. It is only an advisory body.

Chapter V. The Ministers of State

Article 17

See above points VI and VII.

Chapter VI. The Regional Governments

Article 18

I. Since Indonesia is a unitary state (eenheidstaat), there will be no region under its jurisdiction that constitutes another state (staat).

The Indonesian territory will be divided into provinces which, in turn will be divided into smaller (administrative) regions.

All regions with an autonomous status "streek" and "locale rechtsgemeenschappen" or which merely form an administrative unit, must respect statutory regulations.

In regions with an autonomous status, a regional legislative body will be established since in the regions too the administration must be based on the principles of deliberations.

II. In the territory of Indonesia there are approximately 250 self-governing regions (zelfbesturende landschappen) and village communities (volksgemeeschappen), such as the "desa" (village) in Java and Bali, the "nagari" in Minangkabau, the "dusun" and "marga" in Palembang and other social-adminstrative units. These regional units have their own indigenous social systems and thus may be considered as special regions.

The Republic of Indonesia respects the status of the special regions and any government regulation on these regions shall have due regard to their hereditary rights.

Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

Articles 19, 20, 21 and 23

The Dewan has to approve all bills submitted by the government. It also has the right to initiate bills.

III. Following article 23, the Dewan has the right to control the budget (begrooting). In this way the Dewan controls the government. It has to be borne in mind that all the members of the Dewan are also members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.

Article 22

This article concerns the emergency rights (noodverordeningsrect) of the President. It is necessary to include this provision in order that in times of emergency the government can guarantee the safety of the country by taking prompt and appropriate actions. Nevertheless, the government cannot escape the control of the Dewan. Therefore, government measures referred to in this Article must obtain the approval of the Dewan must obtain the approval of the Dewan as they have the same validity as laws.

Chapter VIII. Finance

Article 23, sections 1, 2, 3, and 4

Section 1 refers to the right of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat to control the budget (begrooting). The method to decide a budget is a yardstick to assess the characteristics of the government. In a fascist country the budget is exclusively determined by the government. In a democracy or a country based on the people's sovereignty, like the Republic of Indonesia, the budget is sanctioned by law, meaning with the approval of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

How the people will live as a nation and where to get the funds from, must be decided by the people themselves through their representatives in the Dewan. The people decide their own destiny and hence also their way of living.

Article 23 stresses that to decide a budget the Dewan is in a stronger position than the government. This reflects the sovereignty of the people.

Since the right of the people to decide their own destiny is involved in the process of adopting a budget, any measures which impose a burden on the people, such as taxes and the like, must be determined by law, which means that these must be approved by the Dewan.

In this connection, the authority of the Bank of Indonesia, which will issue and regulate the circulation of money, should be set out by law.

Section 5

How the government spends the money that has been approved by the Dewan must conform to the decision on the budget.

To examine the accounts of the government there must a body that is free from government influence and authority. A body that is subordinate to the government will not be able to discharge such a difficult task. Nor does such a body stands above the government. Hence, its authority and duty should be determined by law.

Chapter IX. The Judicial Power

Articles 24 and 25

The judicial power is independent to such an extent that it is free from government interference. Thus, the status of judges should be guaranteed by law.

Chapter X. The Citizens

Article 26, Section 1

People of other nations, such as those of Dutch, Chinese and Arabic descents, whose domicile is Indonesia, recognize Indonesia as their home country and are loyal to the Republic of Indonesia, may become citizens.

Article 26, Section 2

Self-explanatory

Article 27, 30, 31 and, section 1

These articles concern the rights of citizens. Otherwise they are self-explanatory.

Articles 28, 29 section 2, and 34

These articles concern the status of residents. Articles which only concern citizens as well as those regarding the entire population, accommodate the aspirations of the Indonesian people to build a democratic state which will promote social justice and humanity.

Chapter XI. Religion

Article 29, section 1

This section emphasizes the belief of the Indonesian people in the One and Only God.

Chapter XII. National Defence

Article 30

Self-explanatory.

Chapter XIII. Education

Article 31, section 2

Self-explanatory.

Article 32

The national culture is the product of the mental and spiritual activities of the entire Indonesian people.

The old and indigenous cultures which were the peak of cultural life in all the regions of Indonesia, together form the national culture. Cultural activities should lead to the advancement of civilization and culture, and the strengthening of unity without rejecting new elements of foreign cultures which can develop or enrich the own national culture and raise the human dignity of the Indonesian people.

Chapter IX. Social Welfare

Article 33

Article 33 embodies the principle of economic democracy which states that production is done by all for all, under the leadership of supervision of members of the community. Social prosperity is the primary goal, not individual prosperity. Hence, the economy is organized as a common endeavour based on the principles of the family system. The form of enterprise which meets those conditions is the cooperative.

The economy is based on economic democracy which envisages prosperity for everybody. Therefore, economic sectors which are essential for the country and which

affect the life of the people, must be controlled by the state. Otherwise the control of production might fall in the hands of powerful individuals who could exploit the people. Hence, only enterprises which do not affect the life of the general population may be left to private individuals.

The land, the waters and the natural resources therein are basic assets for the people's prosperity and should, therefore, be controlled by the state and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.

Article 34

Self-explanatory.

Chapter XV. The Flag and the Language

Article 35

Self-explanatory.

Article 36

Self-explanatory.

Regional languages which are well preserved by the people, such as the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese and other languages, will be respected and preserved by the state. Since these languages are also part of the Indonesian culture.

Chapter XVI. Amendments to the Constitution

Article 37

Self-explanatory.

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THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Department of Information

Republic of Indonesia

First Edition

1. THE OPENING TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION

Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be

abolished in this world because it is not in conformity with Humanity and Justice.

And the Struggle of the movement for the independence of Indonesia has now

reached the hour of rejoicing by leading the People of Indonesia safe and sound to the

gateway of the Independence of an Indonesian State which is free, united, sovereign,

just and prosperous.

Thanks to the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to lead their

own free national life, the People of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.

Following this, in order to set up a government of the State of Indonesia which shall

protect the whole of the Indonesian People and their entire native land of Indonesia,

and in order to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the

nation and to contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon

independence, abiding peace and social justice, the structure of Indonesia's National

Independence shall be formulated in a Constitution of the Indonesian State which shall have the structural state form of a Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty of the people, and which shall be based upon: Belief in the One, Supreme God, just and civilized Humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, meanwhile creating a condition of social justice for the whole of the People of Indonesia.

2. THE 1945 CONSTITUTION

Chapter I. Form and Sovereignty.

Article 1

1. The State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state which has the form of a Republic.

2. Sovereignty shall be in the hands of the People and shall be exercised in full by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.

Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.

Article 2

1. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat *) shall consist of members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat**) augmented by delegates from the regional territories and the groups in accordance with regulation prescribed by statute.

2. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall sit at least once in every five years in the capital of the State.

3. All decisions of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be determined by majority vote.

Article 3

The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall determine the Constitution and the guidelines of the policy of the State.

Chapter III. The Powers of Government of the State

Article 4

1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power of government in accordance with the Constitution.

2. In exercising his duties, the President shall be assisted by a Vice-President.

Article 5

1. The President shall hold the power to make statutes in agreement with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

2. The President shall determine the Government Regulations necessary to implement statutes.

Article 6

1. The President shall be a native-born Indonesian.

2. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat by majority vote.

Article 7

The President and Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible for re-election.

Article 8

Should the President die, ceased from executing or be unable to execute his duties during his term of office, his office shall be taken by the Vice-President until the expiry of that term.

Article 9

Before assuming the duties of office, the President and Vice-President shall take an oath according to the requirements of religion, or shall make a solemn promise, before the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat as follows:

Oath of the President (Vice-President).

"I swear before God that, to the best of my ability, I will fulfill as justly as possible the duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that I will hold faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and regulations, and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation".

Promise of the President (Vice-President).

"I solemnly promise that, to the best of my ability, I will fulfill as justly as possible the duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that I will hold faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and regulations, and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation".

Article 10

The President shall hold the highest authority over the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

Article 11

The President, with the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties with other states.

Article 12

The President declares the state of emergency. The conditions governing, and the consequences of, the state of emergency shall be prescribed by statute.

Article 13

1. The President appoints diplomatic representatives and consuls.

2. The President receives the diplomatic representatives of other states.

Article 14

The President grants grace, amnesty, abolition and restoration of rights.

Article 15

The President grants titles, decorations and other marks of honour.

Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council

Article 16

1. The structure of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be prescribed by statute.

2. This Council shall submit replies to issues raised by the President and shall have the right to submit proposals to the Government.

Chapter V. The Ministers of State

Article 17

1. The President shall be assisted by the Ministers of State.

2. These Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by the President.

3. These Minister shall lead the Government Departments.

Chapter VI. Local Government

Article 18

The division of the area of Indonesia into large and small regional territories together with the structure of their administration, shall be prescribed by statute, with regard for and in observance of the principle of deliberation in the governmental system of the State, and the traditional rights in the regional territories which have a special character.

Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (The Legislative Body)

Article 19

1. The structure of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall be prescribed by statute.

2. Dean Perwakilan Rakyat shall sit at least once a year.

Article 20

1. Every statute shall require the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

2. Should a draft law not obtain the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the draft may not be submitted again during the same session of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Article 21

1. Members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall have the right to submit draft laws.

2. Should those drafts, although agreed to by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, not be ratified by the President, those drafts may not be submitted again during the same session of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Article 22

1. Should exigency compel, the President shall have the right to determine Government Regulations in lieu of statutes.

2. Those Government Regulations must obtain the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat in its next session.

3. Should that agreement not be obtained, the Government Regulation shall be revoked.

Chapter VIII. Finance

Article 23

1. The estimates of revenue and expenditure shall be fixed each year by statute.

Should the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat not agree to the estimates proposed by the Government, the Government shall work to the estimates of the previous year.

2. All kinds of taxes for the needs of the State shall be based upon statutes.

3. All kinds and values of the currency shall be prescribed by statute.

4. Further matters of the finances of the State shall be regulated by statute.

5. In order to investigate the accountability for state Finances, a Body for the investigation of finances shall be set up, the regulation for which shall be prescribed by statute.

The results of that investigation shall be made known to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Chapter IX. The Judicial Powers

Article 24

1. The judicial powers shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and other courts of law in accordance with statute.

2. The structure and powers of those courts of law shall be regulated by statute.

Article 25

The conditions for becoming a judge and for being dismissed shall be prescribed by statute.

Chapter X. Citizens

Article 26

1. Citizens shall be persons who are native-born Indonesians and persons of other nationality who are legalized by statute as being citizens.

2. Conditions with regard to citizenship shall be prescribed by statute.

Article 27

1. Without any exception, all citizens shall have equal positions in Law and Government and shall be obliged to uphold that Law and Government.

2. Every citizen shall have the right to work and to a living, befitting for human beings.

Article 28

Freedom of association and assembly, of expressing thoughts and of issuing writing and the like, shall be prescribed by statute.

Chapter XI. Religion

Article 29

1. The State shall be based upon Belief in the One, Supreme God.

2. The State shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his respective religion and to perform his religious duties in conformity with that religion and that faith.

Chapter XII. Defence

Article 30

1. Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence of the State.

2. Conditions concerning defence shall be regulated by statute.

Chapter XIII. Education

Article 31

1. Every citizen shall have the right to obtain an education.

2. The Government shall establish and conduct a national educational system which shall be regulated by statute.

Article 32.

The Government shall advance the national culture of Indonesia.

Chapter XIV. Social Well-Being

Article 33

1. The economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based upon the principle of the family system.

2. Branches of production which are important for the State and which affect the life of most people shall be controlled by the State.

3. Land and water and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the State and shall be made use of for the people.

Article 34

The poor and destitute children shall be cared for by the State

Chapter XV. Flag and Language

Article 35

The Flag of the Indonesian State shall be the Honoured Red-and-White.

Article 36

The Language of the State shall be the Indonesian Language.

Chapter XVI. Alterations to the Constitution

Article 37

1. In order to alter the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the total members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat must be in attendance.

2. A decision shall be taken with the agreement of at least two-thirds of the total number of members who are in attendance.

3. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Clause I

The Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence shall regulate and execute the transfer of government to the Indonesian Government.

Clause II

All existing institutions and regulations of the State shall continue to function so long as new ones have not been set up in conformity with this Constitution.

Clause III

The President and Vice-President shall be elected for the first by the Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence.

Clause IV

Before the Majelis Permusyarwaratan Rakyat, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat and the Supreme Advisory Council have been set up in conformity with this Constitution, all their powers shall be exercised by the President with the assistance of a National Committee.

4. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

1. Within six months after the end of the Greater East Asia War, the President of Indonesia shall regulate and implement all things which are stipulated in this Constitution.

1. Within six months after the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat has been set up, the Majelis shall sit in order to determine the Constitution.

5. ELUCIDATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

GENERAL

I. The written Constitution, a part of Fundamental Law.

The written Constitution of a state is only a part of the Law which is the basis of the state. The Constitution is that part of the Fundamental Law which is written down, while besides that Constitution there also prevails a Fundamental Law which is not written down, namely, the basic rules which arise and are maintained in the practice of running a state, although they are not written down.

Certainly, in order to study the Fundamental Law (**Droit Constitutionnel**) of a state, it is not enough only to study the articles of its written Constitution (**Loi Constitutionnel**) alone, but one must also study how it is applied and what is the spiritual background (Geistlichen Hintergrund) of that written Constitution.

The Constitution of any state whatsoever can not be understood if merely its text is read alone. Truly, to understand the meaning of the Constitution of a state, we must also study how that text came into being, we must know the explanations made of it and we must also know under what conditions that text was made.

In this way we shall be able to understand what is the meaning and purpose of the Constitution we are studying, and what current of thought it was which became the foundation of that Constitution.

II. Fundamental ideals in the "Opening" (Preamble).

What are the fundamentals contained in the Preamble to the Constitution?

1. The State--so the text runs-- is what "shall protect the **whole** of the Indonesian

People and their **entire** native land of Indonesia...based upon...unity...meanwhile

creating a condition of **social justice for the whole** of the People of Indonesia".

2. In this Preamble, the current of thought is accepted of the **unitary state**, the state

which protects and covers the whole of the people. Thus the state encompasses every

kind of group opinion, encompasses all opinions of individuals. The state, in

accordance with the concept of this Preamble, seeks unity, and extends over the whole

of the Indonesian People. This is one foundation of the state which may not be

forgotten.

3. The third fundamental idea contained in the Preamble is that of **sovereignty of the

people**, based upon democracy and deliberation amongst representatives. Therefore,

the system of state which is given form in the Constitution must be based upon

sovereignty of the people and must be based upon **deliberation amongst

representatives**. Indeed, this current of thought accords with the character of the

Indonesian society.

4. The fourth fundamental idea contained in the Preamble is that the state is based

upon that **Belief in the One, Supreme God** which conforms with the principles of

just and civilised humanity.

Therefore, the Constitution must oblige the Government and other authorities of state

to nurture the nobility of human character and to hold fast to the fine moral ideals of

the people.

**III. The Constitution gives form in its articles to the fundamental ideas contained

in the Preamble.**

The above fundamental ideas pervade the spiritual background of the Constitution of the State of Indonesia. These fundamental ideas give rise to those ideals of law (Rechtsidee) which dominate the Fundamental Law of the State, both written law (the constitution) and unwritten law.

The Constitution gives form to these fundamental ideas in its articles.

VI. The Constitution is short and flexible in character.

The Constitution has only 37 articles. The other paragraphs contain only additional and transitional provisions. This draft is thus very brief when compared, for instance, with the constitution of the Philippines.

It is enough if the Constitution contains only fundamental rules, contains only guidelines of instruction to the Central Government and to other authorities of the State for conducting the life of the State and providing social well-being. Especially for a new state and a young state, it is better if that written Fundamental Law contains only basic rules, whilst the provisions implementing those basic rules are left to statutes which are more easily drawn up, altered and revoked.

This is the system of the Constitution.

We must always remember the dynamic of the life of the Indonesian society and state. The Indonesian society and state are growing, the era is changing, especially during this present period of physical and spiritual revolution.

Therefore, we must live dynamically, we must watch every kind of movement in the life of the Indonesian society and state. In that connection, let us not precipitately crystallize, provide form to (Gestaltung), ideas which can still easily alter.

Certainly, it is the nature of those written rules to be binding. For that reason, the more flexible ("elastic") those rules are, the better. Thus we must guard against the constitutional system being left behind the times. Let us not go so far as to make a constitution which is quickly out-moded (**verouderd**). What is extremely important in the administration and in the life of the state is the spirit, the spirit of the authorities of the state, the spirit of the leaders of the administration. Although a constitution is drawn up which, according to the letter, is charactersized by the family principle, if the spirit of the authorities of the state, the leaders of the administration, individualistic, that constitution is certain to have no meaning in practice. On the other hand, although that constitution is not perfect, if the spirit of the authorities of the administration is good, that constitution will certainly not obstruct the course of the state. Thus what is most important is the spirit. That spirit is a living thing, or, in other words, it is dynamic. In this connection, only the fundamental rules alone must be laid down in the constitution whilst what is necessary for executing those fundamental rules must be left to statutes.

6. THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE

The system of the government of the State which is stipulated in the Constitution is:

I. Indonesia is a State based on Law ("Rechtstaat").

1. The State of Indonesia is based upon law (**Rechtstaat**), it is not based upon more power (**Machtstaat**).

I. The System is Constitutional

2. The government is based upon constitutionalism (Fundamental Law) not absolutism (authority without limits).

III. The Highest Authority of the State is in the hands of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat ("die gesamte Staatsgewalt liegt allein bei der Majelis").

3. The sovereignty of the people is held by a body named the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat as the embodiment of the whole of the People of Indonesia **(Vertretungsorgan des Willens des Staatvolkes)**. This Majelis determines the Constitution and the guidelines of the policy of the State. The Majelis appoints the Head of State (President) and the Vice-Head of State (Vice-President).

It is this Majelis which holds the highest authority of the State, whilst the President must execute the policy of the State according to the guidelines which have been determined by the Majelis.

The President who is appointed by the Majelis, is subordinate to and responsible to the Majelis. He is the "mandatory" of the Majelis, he is obliged to execute the decisions of the Majelis.

The President is not "neben" but is "untergeordnet" to the Majelis.

IV. The President is the Highest Executive of the Government of the State below the Majelis

Below the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the President is the Highest Executive of the government of the State.

In conducting the administration of the State, authority and responsibility are in the hands of the President (concentration of power and responsibility upon the President).

V. The President is not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Besides the President there is the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. The President must obtain the **agreement** of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat in order to make laws **(Gesetz gebung)** and in order to fix the estimates of the revenues and expenditures of the State **(Staatsbegroting)**.

Because of this, the President must work together with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, but the President is not responsible to the Dewan, which means that the President's position is not dependent upon the Dewan.

VI. The Ministers of State are Assistants to the President: the Ministers of State are not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

The President appoints and dismisses the Ministers of State. Those Ministers are not responsible to the Dean Rakyat. Their positions are not dependent upon the Dewan but are dependent upon the President. They are the assistants of the President.

VII. The Authority of the Head of State is not unlimited.

Although the Head of State is not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, he is not a "dictator", which means that his authority is not unlimited.

It has been stressed above that he is responsible to the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. Apart from this, he must carefully and thoroughly pay attention to the voice of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is strong. The Dewan can not be dissolved by the President. (This is at variance with the parliamentary system). Apart from this, members of the Dewan are **all of them concurrently members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat**. For that reason the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat can at all times control the acts of the President, and if the Dewan considers that the President has in fact transgressed against the policy of the State determined by the Constitution or by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. The Majelis can be called for a special sitting so that can ask the President to account for his responsibility.

The Ministers of the State are not ordinary high-ranking Civil Servants.

Although the position of the Ministers of State is dependent upon the President, nevertheless they are not ordinary high-ranking civil servants, because it are those Ministers who, in the first place, in practice execute the authority of the Government **(pouvoir executif)**.

As the leaders of Departments, the Ministers know the ins and outs of matters connected with their jurisdictions. In this connection, Ministers have a great influence upon the President in determining that part of the state's policy with which their Departments are concerned. Indeed, what is intended is that the Ministers are Leaders of the State.

In determining Government policy and in co-ordinating the administration of the State, the Ministers work together as closely as possible, one with the other, under the leadership of the President.

CONCERNING THE ARTICLES

Chapter 1. The Form and Sovereignty of the State.

Article 1

This prescribes that the form of the state shall be unitary and a Republic, and contains

the fundamental idea of sovereignty of the State.

Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.

Article 2

Clause 1.

The intention is that the whole of the people, all the groups and all the regional

territories throughout the country, shall have representatives in the Majelis, so that the

Majelis can truly be considered to be the embodiment of the People.

What are referred to as "groups" are bodies such as co-operatives, workers'

associations and other collective bodies. Such rule is indeed in harmony with the trend

of the times. In connection with the recommendation to establish the co-operative

system in the economy, this clause recalls the existence of groups in economic

organizations.

Clause 2

This organ which will have a large total membership, sits at least once in five years.

At least once, therefore if necessary of course it may sit more than once in five years

by holding special sessions.

Article 3

Because the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat holds the sovereignty of the State, its powers are not limited. In view of the dynamic of society, once in five years the Majelis reviews everything which has happened and considers all the trends at that time, and determines what policies it desires to be used for the future.

Chapter III. The Powers of Government of the State.

Article 4 and Article 5, clause 2.

The President is the head of the executive power in the State. In order to execute laws, he possesses the power to prescribe government regulations (pouvoir reglementaire).

Article 5, clause 1

Apart from the executive power, the President together with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat exercises the legislative power in the State.

Articles 6, 7, 8, 9.

Already clear

Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15

The powers of the President provided by these articles are consequences of the President's position as Head of State.

Chapter IV. The Advisory Council

Article 16

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This Council is a Council of State which is obliged to provide considered views to the Government. It is purely an advisory body.

Chapter V. The Minister of the State

Article 17

See above.

Chapter VI. Local Government

Article 18

I. Because the State of Indonesia is a unitary state, Indonesia, therefore, will not have within its jurisdiction areas which have the character of "states".

The area of Indonesia will be divided into provinces, and these provinces will likewise be divided into smaller regional territories. These regional territories will have an autonomous character (**streek- and locale rechtsgemeen-schappen**), titles of so-called autonomous areas during the colonial period, or have the character of purely administrative regions, all to be in accord with rules to be laid down by statute.

In those regional territories with an autonomous character, local representative bodies will be set up, because local government also will be founded upon the principle of deliberation.

II. Within the territory of the State of Indonesia there are to be found about 250 **zelfbesturende landschappen**, and **volksgemeenschappen**, titles of so-called selfgoverning localities during the colonial period, such as the **desa** of Java and Bali,

the **nagari** of Minangkabau, the **dusun** and **marga**: names of various social-administrative units.

Those localities have their own traditional structures, and for this reason can be considered to have a special character.

The State of the Republic of Indonesia respects the position of the said special regional territories, and all its regulations affecting those areas will bear in mind their traditional rights.

Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

Articles 19, 20, 21 and 23

See above.

The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat must give its agreement to each and every draft law originating with the Government. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat also possesses the right to initiate legislation.

III. The Dewan also possesses the **hak begroting** (right to fix the budget, Article 23). Through this right, the Dewan controls the Government.

It must also be recalled that all members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat are concurrently members of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat.

Article 22

This article concerns the **noodverordeningsrecht** (right to make emergency regulations) of the President. Such a provision is indeed necessary, so that the safety

of the State can be ensured by the Government in critical conditions which compel the Government to quick and appropriate action. Although this is so, the Government is not, however, to be, released from the control of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Therefore, the Government Regulations referred to in this article, which have the same force as laws, have also to be ratified by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Chapter VIII. Finance.

Article 23, clauses 1, 2, 3, 4

Clause 1 lays down the budget-making right of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

The method of fixing the estimates of revenues and expenditures is a criterion of the character of the government of a state. In countries based upon fascism, those estimates are fixed solely by the administration. But in democratic states or states based upon sovereignty of the people, such as the Republic of Indonesia, the estimates of revenues and expenditures are fixed by statute, which means: with the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

How the people -- as a nation -- shall live, and from where the expenses for living shall be obtained, must be determined by the People themselves through the intermediary of their representative body. The People determine their own fate and therefore their way of life also.

Article 23 states that in fixing revenues and expenditures, the position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is stronger than the position of the Government. This is a sign of the sovereignty of the People.

Because the fixing of expenditures concerns the right of the People to determine their own fate, all measures placing burdens upon the people, such as taxes etc., must be prescribed by statute, that is, with the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat.

Also the kinds and values of currency are prescribed by statute. This is important because the position of the currency has great influence upon the community. Money in the first place is an **instrument of exchange and of measurement of value**. As an instrument of exchange its purpose is to facilitate exchange -- buying and selling -- in society. It follows that it is necessary for there to be those kinds and forms of money needed by the people as measures of value as a basis for fixing the worth of the respective goods which are exchanged. The thing which becomes the measure of value must have it fixed worth, it must not be allowed to rise and fall because of the irregular condition of the money. Therefore, the state of the currency must be prescribed by statute.

Related to this, the position of Bank Indonesia, which is to issue and to regulate the circulation of paper money, is prescribed by statute.

Clause 5

The way in which the Government makes use of the allocations already agreed by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat must be in keeping with that decision. In order to investigate the Government's responsibilities in this respect, a body is needed which is free from the Government's influence and authority. A body which is subordinate to the Government could not perform so heavy a duty. On the other hand, neither is that body one which stands above the Government.

Because of this, the power and duties of that body are prescribed by statute.

Chapter IX. The Judicial Powers

The Judicial powers are powers which are independent, which means that they are free from the influence of the Government's authority. Therefore, guarantees must be established by statute concerning the position of judges.

Chapter X. Citizens

Article 26, clause 1

People of other nations, for instance, people of Dutch descent, of Chinese descent and of Arab descent, who are domiciled in Indonesia, who recognize Indonesia as their country and who are loyal to the State of the Republic of Indonesia, can become citizens.

Article 26, clause 2

Already clear.

Articles 27, 30 and 31 clause 1

These articles concern the rights of citizens.

Articles 28, 29 clause 1, and 34

These articles concern the position of the residents.

These articles refereed to here, both those which concern citizens alone as well as those which concern all residents, contain the desire of the Indonesian people to build a state with a democratic character which seeks to put into practice social justice and the principle of humanity.

Chapter XI. Religion

Article 29, clause 1

This clause states the belief of the Indonesian people in the One, Supreme God.

Chapter XII. Defence of the State

Article 30

Already clear.

Chapter XII. Education

Article 31, clause 2

The nation's culture is the culture which grows as the outcome of the endeavours expressing the identity and vitality of the entire People of Indonesia.

The ancient and indigenous cultures which are to be found as cultural heights in all the regions throughout Indonesia are part of the nation's culture. Cultural efforts should lead toward advances in civilisation, culture and unity without rejecting from foreign cultures new materials which can bring about the development of or enrich the nation's own culture, as well as to raise the height of humanity of the Indonesian nation.

Chapter XIV. Social Well-being

Article 33

In Article 33 is laid down the basis of economic democracy, production by all for all, under the leadership or control of the members of the community. It is prosperity of the community which is stressed, not prosperity of the individual.

For that reason, the economy is organised as a common effort, based upon ways of working that accord with the family principle. The co-operative is the form of enterprise in harmony with this.

The economy is based upon economic democracy, prosperity is for everybody.

Therefore, branches of production which are important for the state and which affect the life of most people should be under the control of the State. If they are not, the top management of production will fall into the hands of individuals who are in power and numbers of people will be oppressed by them.

Only those enterprises which do not affect the life of most people may be in the hands of individuals.

The earth and waters and the natural riches contained therein are the fundamentals of the people's prosperity. Therefore they should be controlled by the State and be made use of for the greatest possible prosperity of the people.

Article 34

Already clear enough; see above

Chapter XV. Flag and Language

Article 35

Already clear.

Article 36

Already clear.

In the areas possessing languages of their own which are actively used by the people

concerned (for instance, Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, and so forth), those

languages will be respected and also cared for by the State.

Those languages are a part of the living culture of Indonesia.

Chapter XVI. Alteration to the Constitution

Article 37

Already clear.

Adopted by the Security Council at its 392nd meeting, by 7 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Belgium, France, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, [1] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), on 24 December 1948

The Security Council,

Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia,

Having taken note of the reports of the Committee of Good Offices,

1. *Calls upon* the parties:

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith;

(b) Immediately to release the President of the Republic of Indonesia and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December 1948;

2. *Instructs* the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which hev transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948, and to observe and report to the Security Council on the compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

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[1] The representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was absent, and the President ruled that he should be counted as having abstained.

Appendix 4: UN Security Council Resolution 64

Adopted by the Security Council at its 395th meeting, by 8 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), on 28 December 1948

The Security Council,

Noting that the Netherlands Government has not so far released the President of the Republic of Indonesia and all other political prisoners, as required by Council resolution 63 (1948) of 24 December 1948,

Calls upon the Netherlands Government to set free these political prisoners forthwith and report to the Security Council within twenty-four hours of the adoption of the present resolution.

Adopted by the Security Council at its 406th meeting, on 28 January 1949 [1]

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 27 (1947) of 1 August, 30 (1947) and 31 (1947) of 25 August, and 36 (1947) of 1 November 1947, with respect to the Indonesian question,

Taking note with approval of the reports submitted to the Security Council by its Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia,

Considering that its resolutions 63 (1948) and 64 (1948) of 24 and 28 December 1948 have not been fully carried out,

Considering that continued occupation of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia by the armed forces of the Netherlands is incompatible with the restoration of good relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute,

Considering that the establishment and maintenance of law and order throughout Indonesia is a necessary condition to the achievement of the expressed objectives and desires of both parties,

Noting with satisfaction that the parties continue to adhere to the principles of the *Renville* Agreement [2] and agree that free and democratic elections should be held throughout Indonesia for the purpose of establishing a constituent assembly at the earliest practicable date and further agree that the Security Council should arrange for the observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the United Nations; and that the representative of the Netherlands has expressed his Government's desire to have such elections held not later than 1 October 1949,

Noting also with satisfaction that the Government of the Netherlands plans to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by 1 January 1950 if possible, and in any case during the year 1950,

Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in order that the rights, claims and positions of the parties may not be prejudiced by the use of force,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of the Netherlands to ensure the immediate discontinuance of all military operations, calls upon the Government of the Republic simultaneously to order its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare, and calls upon both parties to co-operate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order throughout the area affected;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by it since 17 December 1948 in the Republic of Indonesia, and to facilitate the immediate return of officials of the

Government of the Republic of Indonesia to Jogjakarta in order that they may discharge their responsibilities under paragraph 1 above and exercise their appropriate functions in full freedom, including administration of the Jogjakarta area, which shall include the city of Jogjakarta and its immediate environs. The Netherlands authorities shall afford to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may reasonably be required by that Government for its effective functioning in the Jogjakarta area and for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia;

3. *Recommends* that, in the interest of carrying out the expressed objectives and desires of both parties to establish a federal, independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as possible by representatives of the Government of the Netherlands and representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, with the assistance of the Commission referred to in paragraph 4 below, on the basis of the principles set forth in the Linggadjati [3] and *Renville* Agreements, and taking advantage of the extent of agreement reached between the parties regarding the proposals submitted to them by the representative of the United States of America on the Committee of Good Offices on September 1948; [4] and in particular, on the basis that:

(a) The establishment of the interim federal government which is to be granted the powers of internal government in Indonesia during the interim period before the transfer of sovereignty be the result of the above negotiations and shall take place not later than 15 March 1949;
(b) The elections which are to be held for the purpose of choosing representatives to an Indonesian constituent assembly should be completed by 1 October 1949;
(c) The transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia should tale place at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 1 July 1950;

provided that, if no agreement is reached by one month prior to the respective dates referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above, the Commission referred to in paragraph 4 (a) below, or such other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance with paragraph 4 (c) below, shall immediately report to the Security Council with its recommendations for a solution of the difficulties;

4. *Resolves* that:

(a) The Committee of good Offices shall henceforth be known as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The Commission shall act as the representative of the Security Council in Indonesia and shall have all of the functions assigned to the Committee of Good Offices by the Security Council since 18 December 1948 and the functions conferred on it by the terms of this resolution. The Commission shall act by majority vote, but its reports and recommendations to the Security Council shall present both majority and minority views if there is a difference of opinion among the members of the commission;
(b) The Consular Commission is requested to facilitate the work of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia by providing military observers and other staff and facilities to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under the Council's resolutions 63 (1948) and 65 (1948) of 24 and 28 December 1948 as well as under the present resolution, and shall temporarily suspend other activities;

(c) The Commission shall assist the parties in the implementation of this resolution and in the negotiations to be undertaken under paragraph 3 above and is authorized to make recommendations to them or to the Security Council on matters within its competence. Upon agreement being reached in such negotiations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Security Council as to the nature, powers, and functions of the United Nations agency which should remain in Indonesia to assist in the implementation of the provisions of such agreement until sovereignty is transferred by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia;

(d) The Commission shall have authority to consult with representatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic, and to invite representatives of such areas to participate in the negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 above;

(e) The Commission, or such other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance with its recommendation under paragraph 4 (c) above, is authorized to observe on behalf of the United Nations the elections to e held throughout Indonesia and is further authorized in respect of the territories oj Java, Madura and Sumatra, to make recommendations regarding the conditions necessary (a) to ensure that the elections are free and democratic, and (b) to guarantee freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is not constructed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals;

(f) The Commission should assist assist in achieving the earliest possible restoration of the civil administration of the Republic. To this end it shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend the extent to which, consistent with reasonable requirements of public security and the protection of life and property, areas controlled by the Republic under the *Renville* Agreement (outside of the Jogjakarta area) should be progressively returned to the administration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, and shall supervise such transfers. The recommendations of the Commission may include provision for such economic measures as are required for the proper functioning of the administration and for the economic well-being of the population of the areas involved in such transfers. The Commission shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend which, if any, Netherlands forces shall be retained temporarily in any area (outside of the Jogjakarta area) in order to assist in the maintenance of law and order. If either of the parties fails to accept the recommendations of the Commission mentioned in this paragraph, the Commission shall report immediately to the Security Council with its further recommendations for a solution of the difficulties;

(g) The Commission shall render periodic reports to the Council, and special reports whenever the Commission deems necessary;

(h) The Commission shall employ such observers, officers and other persons as it deems necessary;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such staff, funds and other facilities as are required by the Commission for the discharge of its functions;

6. *Calls upon* the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to co-operate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution.

[1] The draft resolution was voted on in parts. No vote was taken on the text as a whole.

[2] *Ibid., Third Year, Special Supplement No. 1*, appendices XI, XIII and VIII.

[3] Linggadjati Agreement, between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, signed on 25 March 1947.

[4] The proposals were submitted to the Committee of Good Offices on 10 November 1948 (see *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for December 1948*, document S/1117/Add. 1, appendix IV.

Adopted by the Security Council at its 503rd meeting, by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (China), on 26 September 1950

The Security Council,

Finds that the Republic of Indonesia is a peace-loving State which fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Indonesia be admitted to membership of the United Nations.