The philosophies of religion
Of Plato and Aristotle

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My thesis, 'The Philosophies of Religion of Plato and Aristotle', has not already been accepted in substance for any degree, and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

The work presented here depends to some extent on the sources mentioned in the bibliography, but is mainly the result of independent work. But it also depends on the help and criticism of my supervisor, Mr. Rush Rhees, to whom I am very thankful.

SUMMARY

An important change took place in Greek Philosophy with Socrates, and any understanding of the philosophies of religion of Plato and Aristotle is impossible without referring to his ideas. It was these ideas that influenced Plato, but had little influence on Aristotle, although he in his own way attempted to answer the questions which Socrates had raised.

Socrates's emphasis on the 'care of the soul' led Plato to develop his ideas about morality in close connexion with Socrates's ideas; and Socrates's disavowal of the ability to teach virtue led Plato to emphasise the great difficulties there are in learning what virtue is. But not only Socrates's views about morality influenced Plato. Socrates thought of his mission to the people of Athens as a 'service of the god', and this religious character of Socrates's thought is nowhere clearer in its influence on Plato than in what he has to say about creation in the Timaeus and about religion in the Laws. In the Laws especially there is a very close connexion between morality and religion. Plato thinks of morality as the service of the gods, just as Socrates had thought of his mission.

Plato recognises the limitations that there are in human thinking about morality and religion. There is no perfect understanding possible here. What is important is the kind of life that people live. It must be a life that is in accord with divine happiness and not with godless misery. But the nature of these is such that human beings cannot understand them. They only begin to understand, in so far as it is possible for them to do so, when they seek to live according to the standard of divine happiness. The limitations that there are here mean for Plato that there is no independent philosophical understanding of morality and religion, and this, in turn, means that for him it is not possible to distinguish here between philosophy on the one hand, and morality and religion on the other.

In Aristotle, however, we find an approach where philosophy is distinguished from moral and religious ideas. His view is much more that philosophy (what he calls first philosophy) is a method of enquiry that enables human beings to attain some kind of independent knowledge about, for instance, the nature of God. His ethical views too are of such a kind that he thinks it is possible to gain some kind of understanding about morality independently of the kind of life a person leads.

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SOCRATES'S ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS VIEWS.

Socrates is usually remembered for his ethical views and these are often discussed independently of any views he might have had about religion. The Socratic paradoxes, for instance, all seem to state issues which have to do only with ethics. Apart from this emphasis, however, there is the recurrent question of what we can know with any certainty about Socrates's views. From a purely historical point of view this question is important, but from a philosophical point of view it can hardly claim precedence. Here the problem is one of understanding rather than of historical knowledge - and even if a view we attempt to understand is not that of the "historical" Socrates (or the "unknown x" as Diels called him) then this is not as important as a correct understanding of the view itself.

In the Apology we find both ethical and religious issues discussed. The accusation which Socrates answers has to do with corrupting the youth and teaching false religious beliefs. His defence not only refers to those three views that are stated in the paradoxes (that virtue is one thing, that evil doing is involuntary, and that virtue is knowledge) but it contains frequent references to Socrates's religious beliefs. It begins with an appeal to the Delphic oracle and ends with the words: 'I go to die and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God". This statement has sometimes been interpreted as a statement of agnosticism, but as it stands it cannot be regarded as that. From the nature of the accusation it seems probable that Socrates was not only known for his teaching about morality, but also for things that he said about religion.

We can gain some idea of what these views were from the Apology itself, and an understanding of them is important not only in attempting to understand Plato's views about these matters but also those of Aristotle. For if Plato's work is to be regarded as an interpretation and perhaps even a development of these views of Socrates, then Aristotle's may be seen as stating a different kind of view. Socrates is undoubtedly a figure in the history of philosophy who is not just remembered for the views he stated, but also as we remember Heraclaitus and Spinoza, for the character of his life. His views on ethics and religion are to be looked at, in this way, as an expression of his own character

and the life he lived. Aristotle's Ethics compared with what we know about Socrates's views has an air of detachment, which points to important differences in their views that we shall attempt to show. Socrates died for the rightness of the views he held; Aristotle preferred to save the Athenians from committing a second sin against philosophy.

The "Apology" may be regarded as not only a personal defence, but also as a statement of Socrates's views on ethics and religion. His views on ethics may best be discussed in connection with the three Socratic paradoxes. It is not surprising that the views of Socrates, whose irony was an integral part of his character, should have come down to us in this form. (Even the statement of the Delphic Oracle is not only ambiguous, as it was usually taken to be, but also ironic. "No-one is wiser than Socrates" - but everyone may be just as wise and in fact no-one may possess wisdom. That Socrates interprets the oracle as he does to mean that his wisdom is his knowledge of his ignorance shows that he recognised its ambiguous and ironic character).

The three Socratic paradoxes are closely connected and all point in the same direction. What is it that makes them paradoxes? One main feature is that they all seem to state what is, as a matter of fact, false. They become paradoxes that is by being interpreted in this way - as if they were statements of matters of fact, based upon some kind of empirical notion in each case.

1. <u>Virtue is Knowledge.</u> - If this is interpreted empirically then it would presumably mean that there is a form of knowledge which can be learned, the application of which brings about virtue. But no such knowledge is known, hence the paradox. As the matter is put in the "Meno", "If virtue is knowledge then it can be taught".

2. <u>No one does evil voluntarily or intentionally.</u> - If this is interpreted empirically then one can give examples of wrong actions which are intentional.

3. <u>All virtues are one</u>. - If this is interpreted empirically then there is no difference between a courageous and a just act, but empirically there is. So from this point of view the paradoxes remain and shed no light on what Socrates may have meant.

Each may be regarded as a comment on the other. Then they can be thought of as instances of the kind of knowledge that

virtue is. They are general statements about virtue and depend on some kind of general understanding of what virtue is. A clarification of any of them is also a clarification of the other two.

Virtue is Knowledge. This is often regarded as a statement of Socrates's opposition to views about virtue put forward by the Sophists. The views stated in the Gorgias and the Protagoras make this clear. The Sophists claimed that virtue is not knowledge if what is meant is that our knowing what virtue is entails agreement on what it is; because there is no agreement. Here the kind of agreement meant is agreement that virtue is one and only one thing. The Sophists thought that there could be agreement of a conventional kind about virtue, but such agreement might make possible completely different views about it. Socrates's view, however, is that knowledge of what virtue is does not depend on agreement of this kind. It is not a matter of convention. There are two issues here:

(a) If virtue is one thing by agreement then it can be knowledge. The Sophists denied this. So did Socrates. He wished to argue that it was not a matter of agreement anyway.

(b) If virtue is more than one thing and it is each thing by separate agreements, then knowledge about it which presupposes a common agreement, is impossible. This is the Sophists' position.

Socrates denied both positions, and for him there was little to choose between the two. The kind of knowledge that he considers virtue to be is not dependent on any kind of human agreement. It is not because we agree that certain things are good and evil that they are so. Socrates wants to say that the difference between good and evil is independent of our agreement about the difference. The difficulty, then, is to say what the difference is, and the difficulty is made acute by the absence of a convention that decides the difference. For if the difference is just a matter of convention then the appeal can be made to the convention and that ends any dispute as to what the difference is. Socrates's problem is: How can you point to the difference if there is no convention which decides what the difference is? So if virtue is knowledge as the Socratic paradox states, then the knowledge that it gives of the difference that there is between good and evil does not rest on convention - that is on human agreement.

The question of convention is also important with regard to the question of the unity of virtue. The fact that the terms we use for different virtues are conventional ones may lead us astray and prevent us from seeing that part of the knowledge that virtue is,

is knowledge of its unity. When we give empirical examples of virtues, then the examples we give are determined by convention in this sense, that we have decided to call certain kinds of virtuous actions by certain names. This leads us to think of them as different and to forget what it is that they have in common. The problem, however, is just in attempting to say what they have in common. If we attempt this we run into difficulties simply because we are attempting to say something that is not amenable to the conventions of that kind of language which we use to state what is the case. The statement "All virtues are one" is not a description of virtue as the statement "Courage is a virtue" can be. We could imagine someone making a mistake with regard to "Courage is a virtue". He might, for instance, call a just act courageous if he did not know how we use the word just, and that would be a mistake in convention; but he would still regard the act as virtuous. So the question is: "What is recognising something as a virtue at all?" The recognition is independent of any convention. It is this recognition that is knowledge for Socrates, and for him this recognition depends on an absolute distinction between what is virtue and what is not. But this is no longer to make an empirical judgment, but a moral one.

Nor is οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει meant as an empirical judgment. So interpreted it is false. That is if it means for instance that no murder is ever committed intentionally. This statement is presumably meant to mean something else like: "Only if there is a definite distinction between good and evil and a recognition of this difference, will it make sense to say, that a person does wrong".

Neither can the point that Socrates is making here be explained in terms of conventions about language. If certain actions are called wrong and someone does one of these actions then what we say is "He does wrong!" Imagine the case of someone who knows that a certain action is, as we have said, called 'wrong', does this, and in doing it says: "I am doing something that is called 'wrong'; " he not only says this, but also: "I know I'm doing it - I'm doing it intentionally." It will always be possible to ask such a person: "Do you know that that is wrong, or just that it is called "wrong"? " If his answer is that he only knows that it is called "wrong", then it is difficult to see how Socrates's statement οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει applies to this case.

If we take the case of a person who says "I not only call the action "wrong", but I know it to be wrong and although I know that it is, I do it quite intentionally", then if the Socratic paradox is to have any meaning, it cannot just apply to this case as

it stands, for the person here admits that he does the action intentionally. But if intention here means "being aware of what one is doing", then we also have to admit the possibility of the actions being done unintentionally. If it were this kind of intention that Socrates is referring to, then we could conceive of someone not being horrified if he murdered someone while sleep walking. If we interpret Socrates empirically then we cannot make any sense of this case.

There is a great difference here between "Do I know what I am doing?" in the sense of "Am I aware of what I am doing?" and "Do I know that what I am doing is wrong?" Socrates's use of the word ἑκών cannot refer to the first sense of intention which is indicated when the first question is answered "Yes". Is the sense that he gives to the intention indicated then by an affirmative answer to the second question?

The answer to this question is in the negative, because Socrates did not wish to claim that a person can never know when he is doing wrong, for that would make any distinction between right and wrong very difficult. His statement, if it is to have any sense, does not refer to cases which can be described as follows:

(a) I can do wrong and not know I am doing wrong.

(b) I can do wrong and know I am doing wrong.

Socrates is not here referring to what is possible or impossible as a matter of fact, but he is referring to what is logically impossible. He means "I cannot do wrong and not know that I am doing wrong", that is "If it makes any sense for me to say 'I am doing <u>wrong</u>', then I must know that what I am doing is <u>wrong</u>". Both cases (a) and (b) refer to possible cases. "I cannot do wrong and not know that I am doing wrong "is quite different from "I can do wrong and not know I am doing wrong". "I cannot do wrong and not know that I am doing wrong" does not refer to some possible case, but to any case. It might seem then to contradict (a). But this is not so, for "I cannot do wrong without knowing that I am doing wrong" determines how it makes sense to say "I am doing wrong", but (a) only makes sense at any particular time if one is unable at that time to say "I am doing wrong".

Socrates's view on this matter, however, is more complicated than this, and what has been said so far does not state his view completely. It is easy to be misled by the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge, if one just attempts to understand what this identification can mean. There is another aspect which is fundamental. That is the view which Socrates states by saying that all men desire the good. This statement seems as much of a paradox as the statement that no one does evil voluntarily, because as a matter of fact it seems clear that people desire what is evil.

Socrates's statement οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει may be interpreted from this point of view to mean "No one does evil desiring the evil". The fact that the statement seems to mean this too shows that the interpretation which has already been given in terms of knowledge is not sufficient. That there is this additional sense to the phrase is clear from a passage in the Gorgias (509 E). ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀκόντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν. "We have agreed that no one wishes to do wrong, but that everyone who does wrong does so against his will". That is everyone who does wrong does so against his desire for the good. A passage in the Meno (77 B ff) also deals with this matter.

Those who desire evil may desire it in one of two ways:

(1) Either they desire it and know it to be evil, or

(2) They desire it not knowing it to be evil, but think it is good.

In the second case such desire cannot be properly regarded as desire of evil, but desire of good. They only desire what is evil out of ignorance and they are ignorant if they desire the evil thinking that it will benefit them. In the first case those who desire evil which they know to be evil also know that they will be harmed by it and so be miserable. But no one desires misery and if misery is the result of gaining evil if it is desired, then no one can desire such evil.

How is this view related to οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει? It seems to state the same view, and it is a view that is fundamental for Socrates. It is a statement of the view that knowledge of good and evil cannot be regarded as independent of what we may call personal desires. It is in this way that Socrates attempts to combat the view of the Sophists that morality is a matter of convention. The view that it is a matter of convention does not take into account what Socrates calls the general desire for what is good.

It might be argued, however, that the Sophistic view does take this into account. For presumably nothing is agreed to be good unless it is desired. And if in this way the emphasis is placed on desire, then the way is left open to say that there are as many different kinds of good which are agreed to be such, as there are different kinds of desires that may exist. The fact that Socrates denies this view shows that in what he means by desiring the good, the emphasis is not on the desire, for that may allow desire of different forms of the good, but on the good. His view is not that the good is good because it is desired, but that it is desired because it is good. At least that way of stating the matter seems to suggest a distinction that Socrates wishes to make. But this does not mean that there is a clear cut distinction between the desire and the good. According to the Sophists there would presumably be as many forms of desire as there are forms of good,

but for Socrates the unity of goodness entails that there is only one form of desire. In that sense it is one thing - the desire for good. It is because there is this desire for the good that any evil doing is contrary to it. (cf. Kierkegaard. "To will the good is to will one thing").

One of the questions that arises here, as in the previous discussion, is that between matters of fact and non-factual considerations. The statement "All men desire the good" seems to be interpreted by Socrates as a statement of fact, which can be rebutted by showing that as a matter of fact men sometimes desire what is evil. However Socrates does not deny that and this means that what he means by saying "All men desire the good" is not a denial of the fact that men sometimes desire evil. This statement then is not to be interpreted as some kind of inductive generalisation, but it is meant to state what is necessarily true about all men. It means of course too that the desire is of a certain kind, but the emphasis is not so much on the form of desire as on what is desired. It is a desire independently of particular desires. It may be the case that desires for different particular good things may be of different kinds, but this is desire for the good as such.

Socrates suggests in the Meno that all men are the same with regard to desire (ἐπιθυμία), what they differ in is their ability (δύναμις). This would seem to make his view closer to that stated by Saint Paul, than is sometimes allowed. For that statement might be interpreted as meaning that men desire the good and not the evil, but although they desire the good they are unable to do it, and do what is evil. However there does seem to be a difference between the two views, if the interpretation of Socrates's view that we are suggesting now is correct. For what Saint Paul seems to be referring to are particular good actions, for instance, which he is incapable of performing, whereas what Socrates seems to refer to is not a desire to perform particular good actions, but a form of desire which characterizes any action. That is the desire for the good is not desire for something in particular, but it is a form of desire which applies to anything which can be distinguished as being either good or evil. It could be identified with the possibility of seeing what <u>difference</u> there is between good and evil.

But what is meant by saying that the desire for the good is not a desire for anything in particular? Part of the difference can be put by saying that if it is asked what is the good which according to Socrates all men do desire, then this question cannot be answered, for instance, by mentioning any one particular thing - e.g. a virtue like justice. (This is connected with what Socrates meant by talking of the unity of virtue, and shows there is a

relationship between this view and the view that all men desire the good). It can be made clearer by referring to the view stated in the Republic that it is the good which renders all other things useful and beneficial. It is not a desire for any one thing. But even with desires for different kinds of particular things we can indicate differences in the form of desire. In some cases, although the objects of desire may be different, the form of desire may be of the same kind. If, for example, one has to choose between drinking coffee or tea on a particular occasion, although one might give reasons for one's choice in deciding what one wants, there is no real difference between the desires whatever is chosen. If the choice is what we call a moral choice, that is, between something that is considered to be good and something that is considered to be evil, then the desire is not indifferent, but there is a different form of desire for what is evil and for what is good. Here the form of desire changes with a change in the object of desire. But how is this connected with Socrates's view? What he means by desire for the good, when he says all men desire the good, is not that form of desire which is possible in particular cases when the object of desire is good, and which is opposed to the form of desire which is possible in particular cases when the object of desire is evil. With different good and evil objects of desire, the particular form of desire in each case can be different, but in any case it is a particular desire at a particular time, which we can conceive of as taking place at other times. With regard to these forms of desire it makes sense to ask what the object of desire is, and when the desire takes place, and to each of these questions a definite answer can be given. There is also a difference between particular desires which are evil and those that are good, and this difference also marks them off as particular desires at particular times. It was, we might say, these forms of desires to which Saint Paul referred. Socrates, however, is referring to something which is prior to this distinction. He is referring to what makes it possible to make any distinction at all between particular desires which are good and evil. It is this that he refers to when he says "All men desire the good". It is closely connected with his view that virtue is knowledge, as we shall show. Part of Socrates's point may be put by saying that the distinction between particular desires which are good and evil is not just purely descriptive of these desires, as we might describe different desires as strong or weak. Whether a desire is strong or weak can be decided by examining the desire itself; but whether a desire is good or evil does not just depend on the desire itself. If all we could say about desires depended just upon the desires, then there would be no sense in speaking of them as good or evil. Whether they are good or evil depends on something else than their nature as desires.

It is this that is decided by what Socrates calls the desire for the good. The Sophistic position as put forward by Protagoras for instance, may be stated by saying that what Socrates regarded as what we may call the general desire for the good is impossible. All that is possible are particular desires of which some are called better and others worse, but none can be regarded as good or evil. From what we have said it is clear that on Protagoras's view we cannot speak of the desire for the good as Socrates intended this. On Socrates's view it will still be possible to distinguish between desires which are better and worse, but his position is such that he does not make this distinction something independent, it will depend on what he calls the desire for the good. What is ultimate on Protagoras's view are certain forms of desire, but for Socrates this is the good.

This becomes clear in the Protagoras itself where the method of mensuration which, it is claimed, applies to pleasure is an ironic comment on Protagoras's view. If the good is to be identified with pleasure and if different pleasures can be quantitatively assessed, then there is a method for deciding between different degrees of goodness. It is sometimes suggested that Socrates was seeking some such general method of assessment of what is good and what Plato says in the Philebus about pleasure and good may be regarded as an argument for this. But the view in the Philebus about the art of measurement is quite different from that stated in the Protagoras, and the main difference is that it takes into account not only the difference between pleasure and the good, a difference which that art of measurement in the Protagoras does not consider, but also it takes into account the Socratic view that all men desire the good.

What has been said so far shows that there was a fundamental difference for Socrates between particular desires and the general desire for the good. This applies, for instance, to those desires that we can call desires for pleasure. Although it is true, and it is a fact of which Socrates was aware, that not all particular desires for pleasure are of the same kind, the desire for the good, as such, is different from any of these in not being a particular desire. However the view stated in the Protagoras about the art of mensuration is a direct result of the Protagorean view. It is only possible if all desires for pleasure are of the same kind - that is, if they can be quantitatively compared. But that such an art is possible also presupposes that nothing else is of importance here except individual particular desires. That is, all that happens is that the desires are measured against one another. There is nothing else which determines the method of assessment apart from the desires themselves. And for Socrates this is only an assessment of desire and not of what is good.

But what about the general desire for the good, if this is not a particular desire in the sense we have explained? It is rather a principle in accordance with which all desires are to be judged. Protagoras's position is different from this. Plato thought that his view was: 'Everyone should profess to be just, whether he is or not, and whoever does not make some pretension to justice is mad; since all without exception must share in justice in some way or other, or else not be of human kind' (Protagoras 323 B - C). Justice is then not something to be desired in itself and independently of human judgment. It is only a matter of human judgment. Then there is nothing external to moral judgments which is the standard in accordance with which they may be judged. Socrates thinks that there is one, and this is part of what he means when he says that all men desire the good.

The difference between different forms of particular desires is fundamental for Socrates. This becomes clear in the second half of the Gorgias, in the discussion between Socrates and Callicles. The question in dispute is whether morality is a matter of convention or not, but Socrates deals with the matter in such a way that it becomes clear that this question is closely connected with the question of the difference that there is between different forms of particular desires. For on Callicles's view, any form of desire is good as long as it does not prevent the person who so desires from preserving the power he possesses. So there is here a standard of a kind, but it is a standard which claims that any desire can be good under certain circumstances. The desire in itself is secondary, and this view does not allow for any distinction between desires in themselves. This is the view of Callicles that pleasure is the good. What is meant by pleasure, however, is what serves the end of preserving power. So desires are not good or evil in themselves, and this is what Callicles means by saying that morality is a matter of convention. Socrates's view, however, that all men desire the good, is meant to claim that there are differences in desires themselves, and that the difference is that some are good and some are evil, not in respect to something else, such as the preservation of power, but in themselves.

It might be misleading, however, to describe Socrates's position in just this way. It may suggest that what he describes as the general desire for good is not desire of any kind. We have distinguished it from particular desires in order to show that for him, it is what determines whether any particular desire is good or evil. But it is not just a standard which may be regarded as being separate from desire of any kind. Socrates would argue that if according to Callicles's view any desire is good which preserves power, this is because there is a general desire to preserve power.

The preservation of power, which is the standard, is also something desired. That would be, however, to identify desire for the good with a particular form of desire, and then there is no means of deciding about the different desires which, it is claimed, preserve this. For Socrates it is the desires themselves which have to be judged as either good or evil, and whether they can be judged as such depends upon whether there is a general desire for what is good. There has to be both the desire and the good and the desire has to be for the good. It is not sufficient to say that the standard is the good, unless this standard which is the good is also desired.

So the important distinction that it is necessary to make in order to understand Socrates's view is the distinction between particular individual desires, which according to him may be good or evil, and the general desire for the good which is not a particular desire (i.e., its object is not particular), but a desire which is a standard of judgment for all particular desires.

Now the relationship between οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει and πάντες τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, becomes clearer. Both these refer to the central point we have been discussing. Neither statement is to be interpreted as referring just to particular cases of wrong-doing and to particular individual desires, but they refer to the possibility of distinguishing between actions that are right or wrong and desires that are good or evil. Socrates is insisting that any action is either right or wrong in itself. To say this is to say that there is a general desire for the good, and that any wrong action is one which is contrary to this general desire. It is something that applies to all actions and desires.

If, however, Socrates's position against the Sophists is interpreted as stating an objective view of morality as against a subjective one, then this distinction is misleading. It is misleading because it fails to take into account Socrates's emphasis upon desire for the good. It is the unity of desire which is equally of importance for Socrates, and by the unity of desire is meant that it is desire for the good. Socrates's view is certainly that the good cannot be regarded as independent of the desire for it. But what form does this desire take? We have been suggesting that it can be looked at in two ways. Independently of the possession of it, it can be regarded as that which makes possible the distinction between good and evil desires; but its possession is not only this but also the desire for the good itself.

It is because of this double aspect of what Socrates means by desire for the good that the most well known of his paradoxes seems so paradoxical. That is, that virtue is knowledge. The possibility of virtue depends on a form of knowledge, and that is in the first place knowledge of the difference between particular desires which

are good or evil. But this only describes an aspect of the possibility of virtue. It is not virtue itself. It is true that virtue depends upon this knowledge, but this knowledge is not sufficient, and it cannot be just with this form of knowledge that Socrates wished to identify virtue. The knowledge that virtue is necessary must also be closely connected with desiring the good. We may say that the only way in which the knowledge that virtue is necessary can be put to any account is by desiring the good. It is not enough that someone recognisees the necessity of living virtuously, there must also be a genuine desire to live virtuously. The distinction can be put by distinguishing between "being good" and "doing good". Doing good may be regarded as the result of recognising the necessity of being virtuous; that is, one does good because one recognisees the necessity of the distinction between good and evil, but this doing of what is good might not be accompanied by a desire for what is good. And this desire is what Socrates wished to point to when he spoke of the general desire for the good. It is what he refers to in the Apology when he says: "I say the same to everyone whom I meet ..... For I know that this is the command of God; and I believe that to this day no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to my God. For I do nothing but go around persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons (σώμάτων) or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul " (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται.) (30 A - B) This desire for the good is what we distinguish as "being good". The same distinction is what is being discussed in the second book of the Republic and elsewhere; it is also the origin of the views that Plato develops in the Lysis, the Symposium and the Phaedrus about love.

It is also, however, connected with what Socrates says in the Apology about ignorance. This is not just irony: Socrates's intention is to point out that knowledge about the good is a form of ignorance. He says this in order to show that it cannot be knowledge as that is generally understood. It becomes ironic because Socrates knows that those to whom it is addressed will suppose that the knowledge he disclaims is of such a kind that one could give an account of it in similar terms to those in which other forms of knowledge could be described. So they will not understand his ignorance, and will imagine that it is feigned. This is the point of his comparison of knowledge of virtue with those forms of knowledge that we find in various τέχναι . For these, knowledge is something independent of the possessor of it. That means that it can be learned and taught. It is knowledge apart from its possession. Rather we may say it is knowledge to which the distinction made by Aristotle between potential and actual knowledge

applies. The knowledge becomes actual in its application - it is in this sense practical knowledge. But this distinction does not apply to knowledge of virtue, or the knowledge which virtue is. Knowing what virtue is in this sense is identical with being good - that is, virtue is the knowledge. It is being virtuous. And that is why Socrates claimed to be ignorant; for in the sense in which knowledge was thought of, as being knowledge of something in particular, knowing what virtue is could not be anything of the sort.

But to point this out is to point out a source of misunderstanding; it is not to state what is important about Socrates's view. Certainly the knowledge that virtue is, is ignorance if it is supposed that it is knowledge of the form of a τέχνη . This is not all that Socrates means. If it is not knowledge of this kind then it cannot be ignorance of this kind either, for if it were ignorance of this kind, then this would presuppose that the form of knowledge that it is would be the opposite of this form of ignorance. To show that virtue is not a τέχνη is to show what form of ignorance it is not, and not what form of ignorance it is. So we have to show what kind of ignorance Socrates genuinely claimed.

What this is can be illustrated by comparing Socrates's views about morality and religion with those of the Sophists. The Sophistic position about religion as represented by Protagoras is one of ignorance. Protagoras is ignorant about the gods, and his ignorance is the lack of knowledge of a certain kind (i.e. a τέχνη) to deal with the matter. The same is the case with his view about morality. We have no means of knowing whether virtue is one thing. It is the same form of scepticism with regard to both morality and religion. The questions are shelved because we have no knowledge. Protagoras seems to have dismissed the religious question altogether. He did not, however, dismiss the question about morality. At least here there was the moral behaviour of human beings to which to appeal. Protagoras's view, however, results from what he considers to be the correct description of this moral behaviour. For him the most important characteristic of this is that there is no agreement in moral opinions. If there were general agreement, then he would no doubt have been prepared to say that there is knowledge in the sphere of morality, and then also a distinction between true and false moral judgments. But the main difference between the view of Protagoras and Socrates is just this point about the kind of knowledge that is possible with regard to morality. The kind of knowledge which Protagoras would accept as knowledge here is quite different from the kind of knowledge the possibility of which Socrates is interested in. There is a specious resemblance between their views because the kind of knowledge which Protagoras denies is possible but would accept if it were possible, is a kind of knowledge which Socrates not only

denies to be possible, but which he considers it would be a mistake to accept as knowledge about morality at all. To think, as Protagoras seems to have done, that such a form of knowledge with regard to morality would be acceptable, is the fundamental mistake. So the moral scepticism of Protagoras arises from the fact that he thinks a certain form of knowledge about morality is not possible. His view is that we cannot speak of moral judgments as being true or false, but only of one judgment being better or worse than another. It is important, however, to recognise that he arrives at this view only because he has in mind a paradigm of knowledge which he tries to apply to morality. That is, if there is to be knowledge, it must be of this kind and no other. Because it is not of this kind, it is not knowledge. Socrates, too, denies that knowledge of morality is of this kind, but he is not led to the scepticism of Protagoras because he does not accept his view that there is this paradigm of knowledge. He denies that knowledge of morality is only conceivable if it is related to such a view of knowledge. Socrates's problem still exists even if, as he thinks there is truth and falsity with regard to moral judgments. He would claim that this would still leave the problem regarding the kind of knowledge knowledge of morality is. In other words, the problem would then be the problem of understanding what this knowledge is, and Socrates's view would be that an understanding could not be identified with that kind of knowledge in the sphere of morality that Protagoras denies is possible.

When Socrates identifies virtue with knowledge, part of his purpose is to emphasise that such knowledge escapes us. It may be put by saying that we cannot give a reason for the necessity of being virtuous which is something different from knowing that virtue is necessary. If we could give such a reason, then it would be possible to distinguish between virtue and knowledge about it. It is because we cannot do this that Socrates identifies the two. Our knowledge about virtue is only knowledge of the necessity of being virtuous itself, and not knowledge of a kind which gives a reason for its necessity. So ignorance here is not the result of a form of knowledge with which we are acquainted not applying, but it is ignorance of quite a different kind. It is not knowing what form of knowledge it is that could apply. This is the point of Socrates's remark that he knows that he does not know. The Sophists thought they knew, but they are ignorant in one sense, because they do not know that they do not know. They apply a form of knowledge that does not apply. Because they do not know that they do not know, they lack the form of ignorance which Socrates claims.

We can well understand why Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth, if he claimed ignorance of the kind which he mentions in the Apology. This would be interpreted as a denial that one can know what

virtue is, in the sense that one can know any difference between good and evil. This is to misunderstand Socrates's ignorance about virtue; for his ignorance is not not knowing what knowing such a difference is. But his knowledge of the difference is quite definite, as we have tried to show. His ignorance is, however, closely connected with his view that the difference is quite definite and absolute. He knows the difference, but not why there is this difference. This may lead to the view that the difference is an ultimate one, i.e., that no reason for it can be given. This may be thought to be Socrates's view, but it is not clear that it is. For his view may be that there is possibly a reason for this ultimate distinction, but he does not know the reason. The emphatic way in which he speaks of his ignorance suggests that his view is the latter one.

The Apology makes clear that Socrates thought that what he said about virtue was only said because he believed that in saying it he was fulfilling a divine mission. This may suggest that he believed that the distinction was not an ultimate one for which no reason could be given. Socrates's ignorance is closely connected with this. His ignorance is that he lacks understanding. He does not mean that understanding is impossible, but only that it is not possible for him. This is why he speaks of his own wisdom as that wisdom which is proper for human beings (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία) and compares it with a form of wisdom which is greater than human wisdom, which he does not claim (μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν) (Apology 20 D - E). By such a form of wisdom he means a form of wisdom which claims an understanding of virtue. This was the understanding he thought the Sophists falsely claimed, but this understanding they claim made virtue something that it is not. Socrates's own justification for his insistence on the difference between good and evil and on the necessity of living a virtuous life is a personal one. It is his belief in his divine mission.

From this point of view we see that for Socrates morality is connected with some form of religious belief. It seems that because it is connected with religious belief for him that his attitude towards virtue in regard to understanding it, may be characterised as a form of humility which is opposed to the pride of those who claim to understand when they do not. This characteristic comes out clearly in connexion with what Socrates thought about his divine mission. He did not think of himself as a teacher of virtue, as, for instance, Gorgias did. (ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην Apology 33A). Socrates knows what virtue is, but does not claim to understand it. If he understood, then he would to be a teacher. The knowledge that he possesses about virtue, as we have interpreted that, is of a personal kind. The knowledge is not independent of the possession of the desire for the good. This desire is not the result of teaching, in the sense of teaching

as a τέχνη . To regard knowledge of virtue as a τέχνη is to say that it can be understood, for the knowledge is then, as we put it, a matter of human invention. e can conceive of such knowledge as changing, but the kind of knowledge that Socrates refers to with regard to virtue does not change. Human beings cannot alter this. Apart from this, however, it is knowledge of a personal kind, in the sense that it has to be learnt for oneself. Even this however, may not show the difference that there is between this kind of knowledge and a τέχνη , for even of a τέχνη it might be said that it has to be learnt for oneself, if it is learnt at all. However, with regard to a τέχνη what is learnt by one person is the same as what is learnt by anyone else. The τέχνη is practical in this sense. It is based on rules that are learnt. What makes it possible to teach it is that there are these rules. If there weren't rules, then it could not be taught. Of course the rules have to be understood by the person taught, and this understanding is different from the rules as such. The teaching depends upon both the possibility of understanding the rules and the existence of the rules themselves. With regard to virtue, there are no practical rules of this kind which can be made the means of teaching. It might be thought that the position with regard to virtue would be analogous with the position with regard to a τέχνη if it could not be taught, but everyone had to discover the rules for himself. To suggest this, however, makes no sense. The very idea of a rule contains the possibility of its being able to be taught and learnt. With regard to the knowledge of which Socrates speaks in connexion with virtue, there are no rules. If there were rules, then an understanding of what being good is, would be the same as understanding how to be good, if this being good were the result of applying the rules. Because there are no rules, the understanding cannot be of this kind. With regard to any of the τέχναι , there is no fundamental difference between being a craftsman of a certain kind and knowing the rules and applying them - i.e. being a craftsman, and understanding what the τέχνη is. Socrates denies that he is a teacher, because there is nothing to teach. But even if there is nothing to teach in this sense of the word, that does not mean that there is nothing to know.

If we characterize the difference here as that between 'doing good' and 'being good', it is because it is possible to learn to do good, but not possible in this way to learn to be good. One can learn to do good if one learns what actions are good and does them. There is here in good actions something to be observed and imitated. But this would be, in Plato's terms only imitation of the good without knowing what the good is, and it is this distinction which Plato has in mind in the Republic in the simile of the cave. This distinction between

'doing good' and 'being good' may easily be misunderstood with regard to Socrates. For 'doing good' is not the same when it is accompanied by goodness and when it is not. This is the same distinction as we made earlier between recognising the necessity of living a good life, which may exist without a genuine desire to live virtuously. It is only this desire for virtue which according to Socrates can make the difference between a good and a bad life in contrast to good and bad actions. When Socrates speaks of human virtue (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀρετή) he is not speaking of something that primarily characterizes human actions, but human life. This form of virtue is an end in itself for him when compared with virtuous actions of different kinds. For virtuous actions are not certain marks of a virtuous life. They may be performed as Plato shows in the second book of the Republic only to preserve one's reputation, where the real desire is for something else which would not be considered as virtuous. But even in the case of a person who is genuinely concerned with doing what is good, he may find that his actions vary at different times and under different circumstances, so that it is not always what he knows to be good that he does. In that case what he lacks is what Socrates calls human virtue. The human virtue which Socrates is pointing to is a desire or love of the good itself; it is to love the good always. But to understand this form of good which does not change is what is difficult. For this is not like some particular action which can be observed and judged to be good, if it is recognised as good. For what must be understood now is what makes it possible for human beings to call not some particular thing, but anything good. And that is what Socrates says he cannot understand. But whatever it is a person does call good, his calling it so, is to be identified with what for him is human virtue. If this however makes it look as if there will be as many forms of human virtue as there as are human beings, that is not Socrates's view. One can state what the virtue of a particular man is, just as one can state what the virtue of a particular action is, but there is something over and above both these, which Socrates thought it was possible for all men to share - and that is human virtue proper. But it is just this that we do not understand. If a man possesses this virtue, it cannot be identified with any particular kind or kinds of action that he regularly performs, even if it is intimately connected with them; but it is the life he lives itself. If he lives this life, then goodness will be its pattern. He knows that, but does not understand how it can be the pattern, but only that it must be.

Socrates's ignorance then is ignorance of what virtue is, in the sense that he does not understand the difference between good and evil. He recognises the difference between the two, however, and he thinks that to know that there is this difference, and that the difference is independent of human opinion, is what is fundamental. It is because there is no

understanding that virtue cannot be taught, and the knowledge that there is of the difference between good and evil must be gained, without teaching, by every person for himself. If a person does see the difference and makes this recognition a guiding principle of his life, then he is, in Socrates's words, caring for his soul. There is not necessarily any suggestion of the soul's being a separate entity which is eternal in nature. To assume that, or to try to prove it, would lead in the direction of claiming the kind of understanding that is not possible. This is what Plato attempted to do, but as we shall see, Socrates's ignorance about this matter still influences Plato's view in certain respects. However, what was a matter of ignorance for Socrates becomes the beginning of a "metaphysical" view with Plato.

When Socrates says "an unexamined life is not worth living" this becomes with Plato the question "What is the nature of the soul?" and we find the same question raised by Aristotle when at the beginning of his "De Anima" he assumes, to begin with, that the soul is the principle (ἀρχή) of life. This form of enquiry may well seem to have been inevitable, seeing that both Plato and Aristotle, unlike Socrates, were not just interested in questions about morality. It is in contrast with both their views that we can see Socrates's position more clearly. Plato never definitely distinguished, as Aristotle did, between theoretical and practical knowledge, but it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle's distinction makes his view more Socratic. On the one hand, Plato tries to answer questions like "What is the nature of the good"? and "What is the nature of the soul"? and he tries to give a theoretical answer to these questions. Aristotle rejects a theoretical answer to the first, but his attempt to answer the second is still theoretical. In his "Ethics", however, Aristotle seeks a form of practical knowledge. His position is that "we do not wish to know what the good is, but how to become good". But this is not Socrates's position either. Socrates denies both forms of knowledge at this point. Both misinterpret Socrates in their own way and the views they put forward can be seen in this light. And this is true of the different kinds of view they held about morality and religion. Socrates's ignorance applies equally to what he thought about morality and religion. He can give no reason for his insistence on the difference between good and evil, nor can he give a reason for his belief in his divine mission. Plato's view as we shall see, still attempts to hold these two together, whereas that of Aristotle separates them almost completely. The "Meno" is a good example of these differences between Socrates and Plato. It begins in a Socratic way. There is first of all the question of whether virtue is acquired (by teaching) or whether it is innate. The preliminary discussion up to the introduction of the view of the eternal nature of the soul contains many Socratic allusions to such questions as to whether we can know the nature of virtue, to the involuntariness of evil-doing and to the general desire

for the good. Socrates's ignorance seems to be what is at stake, and the question is whether this can become knowledge.

The Socratic ignorance, however, is not scepticism, as we have attempted to show, in the sense of the denial of the possibility of a certain form of knowledge, because Socrates's point is that that form of knowledge does not apply. But it would remain scepticism of a different and more serious kind if Socrates's position was that because we do not understand, there is nothing to say. That is, his position is not pessimism either. (That it is not pessimistic may explain what often seems to be in Plato an over- optimistic view of things). It is not scepticism because he insists on the difference between good and evil - this is what he does know, and this knowledge also keeps him from pessimism of a form which states that because there is no understanding of the difference between good and evil, it is impossible to claim that the good must be desired. Socrates's ignorance is a form of humility which does not allow him to be pessimistic, but which leads him to state certain things as a matter of faith. This becomes clear at the end of the Apology, where he says: "But it is necessary for you, my judges, to face death with good hope and to be certain of this one thing at least - that no evil can befall an upright man either in life or in death, and that his life is in the hands of God. For now the hour has come for me to die. You will go on living. Which is the better fate is known to no one except God". This can hardly be interpreted as scepticism, certainly not as pessimism. It is a statement of hope based upon Socrates's conviction that a good life is one which can suffer no harm. Death is not the worst of evils, but wickedness is. (39A. "It is not hard to escape death; it is much more difficult to escape wickedness; for that runs faster than death. 39B. "I do not believe that it is God's will for a better man to be injured by a worse"). It is a statement of religious faith. What is important to notice, however, is that Socrates's knowledge of the difference between good and evil, and his insistence on the need to live a good life, are equally a matter of faith for him.

It might be argued that the Euthyphro states a view which does not allow this close relationship between Socrates's moral and religious views. This dialogue however, although it may indicate certain questions which concerned Socrates, does not state any view of his in a definite way. The ancient classification of it as Πειραστικός is right in this respect. There is nothing in it which could suggest that Socrates would not identify, as he seems to in the Apology, what is holy with what is God's will. The dialogue is meant to show how confused Euthyphro, who claims possession of a Τέχνη about what is holy, is about these matters. Socrates here is certainly criticising the religious art that Euthyphro claims to possess, and his criticism of this practical knowledge (Ἐπιστήμη) is comparable with his criticism of the possibility of practical knowledge

about morality. If, as we have suggested, morality and religion were very closely connected for Socrates, then this criticism would be more or less the same in each case. Then Euthyphro would, according to Socrates, be claiming a form of knowledge that is not possible here. It is certainly Socrates who poses one of the main questions, which Euthyphro does not understand, about the relation between what is right and what is holy, and he also raises difficulties about identifying τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ὅσιον . But there is no positive answer given to this question. Socrates (12E) agrees with Euthyphro's statement that that part of τὸ δίκαιον which has to do with the gods is τὸ ὅσιον , and that the remaining part of τὸ δίκαιον is that which has to do with men. That, however, is not the main point at issue, which is the question which Socrates states as follows: "Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?" The first part of this question suggests that what is holy is independent of the gods, but the second part suggests that it is not.

We find that the way in which Socrates, at the beginning of the Euthyphro, states the question about holiness is similar to the method he adopts in the Meno. He puts the matter in the way in which it has often been claimed leads to Plato's theory of forms. It is stated as a question (5D) ἦ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἓν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν πᾶν, ὅ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι. It was this kind of question which Plato answered in the affirmative and which led to his theory of forms, and which caused Plato himself, and writers about him, difficulties when they have attempted to discuss his religious views. Plato himself, a long time after the Euthyphro, in the Timaeus, thinks of the forms as patterns of creation which are independent of the δημιουργός . If what we have said about Socrates is correct, that he claimed no understanding of the nature of virtue, then his view about holiness might well have been the same. Certainly he says here that he is ignorant - and this may be interpreted not just as irony in the face of Euthyphro's confident claim to knowledge, but as a genuine statement of what Socrates thought. If holiness is one thing, just as virtue is, that does not mean that we can say what its unity is. From what we have already said, we can suggest that for Socrates it was not independent of God's will. In the Euthyphro, if it states Socrates's view at all, we find a criticism of current religious views which are similar to those in Republic Book 2. If holiness is what it is important to understand in connexion with religion, and this is Socrates's concern, as we see it in this dialogue, then the traditional religious views which make even differences of opinion about good and bad possible for the gods, cannot be of any help in an attempt to understand what holiness is. For Socrates assumes, just as he assumes with regard to virtue, that it is one thing, but the traditional religion makes it different for different gods. In the Republic God is described as one and unchangeable, and this must have

been Socrates's view too, if he thought, as he seems to have done, that holiness is one and unchangeable. The criticism that Socrates makes of Euthyphro's proposed definition of holiness, that what is dear to the gods is holy, seems to be that the proposed definition is not one, because it suggests that holiness is definable when it is not. The point of Socrates's question: "Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?" is to point out that "being loved by the gods" is a πάθος and so cannot define the οὐσία of holiness (11A). The position with regard to holiness seems to be the same as that of good and evil; one cannot understand its nature.

What is said in the Euthyphro about holiness being connected with θεραπεία can be understood in relation to what Socrates says in the Apology about his divine mission as a service to God. He thinks of that as showing his fellow citizens the necessity of living a life of virtue. It is this call to virtue that is his divine mission, and in calling people to this, Socrates also thought that he was calling them to a holy life. The question about what place holiness has amongst the other virtues is not a question of its relative merit. This may be suggested by this question of the relation between τὸ ὅσιον and τὸ δίκαιον. Socrates's view of morality is a religious one. By this is meant that he does not account for morality independently of religion, but he thinks of morality, that is, the knowledge of the difference between good and evil, as something for which no reason can be given. That is, it cannot be understood, and as has been pointed out, this knowledge is part of his belief in his divine mission. He does not understand, but his lack of understanding is not all there is for him. He cannot just leave the matter there, because this knowledge he does possess he thinks is of first importance; and his faith in this knowledge about virtue is a faith that is God-given. When in the Euthyphro he asks what this θεραπεία achieves, the answer is not given in a definite form, but from Socrates's conception of his divine mission, we can say that his answer would be, that its aim is a holy life.

At 14B Socrates says: "For now, when you were almost giving me the answer, you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness". This answer suggests that there is no instruction of the kind that Euthyphro claims, and Socrates is denying that he is right in thinking that there is detailed and accurate knowledge which is to be gained here. (πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν) Socrates interprets Euthyphro's statement that τὸ ὅσιον is τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν by suggesting that this θεραπεία is a τέχνη, and this is to interpret it in the way in which Euthyphro thinks of it. But when

Socrates inquires into the nature of this τέχνη by giving examples where this concept applies, Euthyphro does not agree. What Socrates does not understand is what Euthyphro means by this attention (τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὕτω ξυνίημι ἥντινα ὀνομάζεις 13A). Does it imply the same form of θεραπεία which is to be found in a τέχνη ? Socrates characterises τέχναι here as something which always aims to achieve an end, and his point is that the end achieved is different from the τέχνη itself. (οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα τοῦτον διαπράττεται). Its aim is to bring about some benefit to that to which it pays attention, but this cannot be what is meant by ἡ τῶν θεῶν θεραπεία for the gods are not benefited by the θεραπεία . The second suggestion that Euthyphro makes is a view which we find Socrates himself stating with regard to his own divine mission in the Apology (31A) where he says: τοῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. It is Socrates, who in the Euthyphro suggests that the θεραπεία is ὑπηρετική . Once he has made this suggestion, however, he goes on to interpret the θεραπεία as understood in this way again in analogy to a τέχνη . Euthyphro does not see, however, that Socrates is misrepresenting his suggestion in interpreting it in this way. The misrepresentation is deliberate however, and Euthyphro does not see it because that is just how he thinks of this θεραπεία - as a τέχνη . He says (14B) τοδὲ μέντοι σοὶ ἁπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων τοῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ὅσια. The θεραπεία which is holiness, is a means to the end of pleasing the gods. Socrates, however, does not think of the matter in this way. The gods need nothing and everything good which human beings possess comes from the gods (15A οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν, ὅτι μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν). So even the θεραπεία , rightly interpreted, if it is good, as Socrates would say it is, is not something human beings give to the gods, but a gift of the gods to human beings. Socrates's mission, which is the best thing that has happened in the city, is also a divine gift. (οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι Apology 31A) Socrates's view seems clear enough. The θεραπεία is a holy life itself and not ἐπιστήμη τις τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι (14C), and it is a holy life which is τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον of this θεραπεία .

Socrates agrees that there is a difference between ὅσιον and δίκαιον ; they can be distinguished as θεραπεία τῶν θεῶν and θεραπεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων . But it is not immediately obvious what is meant by θεραπεία and unless this is made clear, the force of the distinction is lost. The question of θεραπεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων is not discussed, but what we have said makes clear what Socrates understood by θεραπεία τῶν θεῶν. There are, however, some hints here about Socrates's view on this general question of the

relation between morality and religion. For τὸ ὅσιον is not separate from τὸ δίκαιον, but is that part of it which is concerned with θεραπεία τῶν θεῶν, what we may speak of as man's relationship with God. It is a holy life which recognises all good as coming from God. The θεραπεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων is not discussed here but from the Apology we see that Socrates thought of this too as something which was commanded by God. (ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός) So morality and religion are not separate for him. (These ideas influence Plato in the view he puts forward in the tenth book of the Laws).

The close relationship that existed for Socrates between morality and religion is clear from what we read in the Crito. Socrates states his view that 'we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us'. (49C) He holds this view not only because he considers it right, but it is also a result of his view that what is just and right is decided by a higher authority than he himself. The right of punishment belongs to the laws and the city and not to any individual men, and the laws tell Socrates that they are above him. ἆρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἴει, εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττα ἂν ἡμεῖς σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἴει δίκαιον εἶναι; (50B) The individual is not a law unto himself; and no man can regard himself as possessing greater wisdom than the laws. (51 A - B) Socrates thought that justice is to be recognised in the laws, and not in the opinions of men. And the laws are for him a divine institution. This is shown by what he says at the end of the dialogue: Ἕα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται. (55E) To obey the laws is to follow the command of God. Justice is not the opinion of individuals; from that only anarchy can result. Human wisdom is only found in obedience to God through obedience to the laws.

What can be gathered from Socrates's religious faith? It is something that is part of the life that Socrates lived. We are told of his action after the battle of Arginusae when he insisted that the generals should be tried individually because this was according to the law. We know too that when ordered with four others to go and arrest a man he went home. In doing this he was doing what he thought right, but this depended for him on his belief in God. His belief in the good and the right was for him a belief in the authority of God over human life. It was not just that he thought this. This is no doubt why he placed so much emphasis upon his δαιμόνιον. He believed that he was divinely guided not to do what was wrong. In deciding that something was wrong he thought that he was not just following his own opinion. The command was not his own but came from

God. That was the care that the gods took of human life. Socrates thought if something is wrong, it is not just that one thinks so. How does one think so? Doing wrong is not like making a mistake where one acts against what one thinks is correct. For what is wrong is not decided by oneself. What is wrong is independent of me. I can't make it right or wrong. But if it is independent of me, what is independent? It was for Socrates the command of God. That is why the care of the soul is so important. For the soul lives by either doing what is right or wrong. If that is independent of the soul, then one must be as careful as possible to learn what the difference between the two is.

Socrates claimed no knowledge about morality in the sense of understanding the moral view which he claimed, but this moral view was central to what he considered his divine mission. He did not think that there was ἐπιστήμη with regard to morality, if that means practical knowledge of the form of a τέχνη. His claim to ignorance about morality is a genuine one and comparable with his ignorance about other matters, such as whether death may not be a great blessing and not the great evil that many suppose it to be. Neither is there any purely theoretical knowledge about morality of such a kind that it is possible to say what the nature of good and evil are. Knowledge of good and evil is only such that human beings can know that there is a difference between the two. They cannot understand their nature. It was these views of Socrates that influenced Plato's views a great deal. Aristotle's view on the other hand is different from Socrates's in important ways: in ways which show that both Socrates's and Plato's views are religious, whereas Aristotle's is not.

Plato's view of the Soul.

The nature of the soul (ψυχή) occupies a central position in Plato's philosophy. It is not, however, a subject on which his views once stated remained the same. There is a development in what he writes about it from the Phaedo to the Laws. It is also connected with other views of his on politics and ethics, on the theory of knowledge, and on matters of religion.

The origin of this emphasis is to be found in the influence which Socrates had on Plato's thinking. This is the most important influence. But he was also influenced by ideas about the nature of the soul found in Orphism and in Pythagoreanism. Socrates may well have been influenced by such ideas too, but the way in which Plato works out his ideas about the soul suggests a difference between his view and that of Socrates. The exact historical truth about these matters escapes us, but at least we may see that what for Socrates was a moral and religious concern for what he called the 'soul', became with Plato more of a philosphical quest to determine the nature of the soul in order that he might be able to provide some form of philosophical proof for his moral and religious views. This he begins in the Phaedo where he discusses the relationship between the soul and the forms. Then in the Phaedrus we have his statement of the nature of the soul as self-motion. But although his view of the soul changes, he is always trying to say 'what it is'.

He states his view in the Laws: 'That nature whose definition is self-motion is identical with that which is called soul'. And this marks an important difference between his view and that of Socrates, whose view is that the soul is involved in a struggle between what is good and evil, and that that soul which is good is protected by God. Socrates's interest as we have pointed out is moral and religious, whereas Plato's is also theoretical. Just as Socrates disclaims knowledge about the nature of good and evil, so he disclaims knowledge about the nature of the soul; (Crito 47E.) but although he claims no understanding he is insistent on the importance for human life of knowing that there is an absolute difference between good and evil, and that the life of the soul, which is the most important part of human life, is concerned with this difference.

Plato begins in the Phaedo by emphasising this aspect of the matter. When in the first part of the dialogue, he talks about the life of the philosopher as the practice of death, this is related to the picture we have of Socrates in the Apology stating his belief that death may be the greatest of blessings. The emphasis here is on the life of the individual philosopher and this is why there is so much interest taken in trying to discover a proof for the immortality of the soul. What is meant by immortality here is individual immortality, and the proof that is being sought is a proof of the immortality of individual souls.

It becomes clear, however, towards the end of the dialogue that the question of the nature of the soul cannot be adequately treated in this way and these are suggestions that lead on to the view as it is stated later in the Phaedrus, the Timaeus, and the Laws that soul is the ἀρχή of all motion. This development in Plato's view is one in which an idea of the soul which arises from Socrates's interest in individual moral and religious matters becomes more of a principle of explanation not only for individual human life but also for everything that is - the whole κόσμος .This does not mean, however, that the emphasis on individual moral and religious matters disappears.

The view of the soul that Plato puts forward in the Phaedo is first stated in the Memo (81a ff.) It is introduced there as what is taught about the soul by certain people who are versed in religious matters. It is also connected with the name of Pindar.[1] The soul, according to this view, is eternal (ἀθάνατος), and death and life are only phases of its existence in some bodily state. These phases do nothing to alter its nature and it is indestrubtible. Part of what is meant here by saying that it is eternal is that it is has knowledge of all things (πάντα χρήματα). The life of the soul in a human body is such that it can by recollection retrieve this knowledge, which is knowlege 'about virtue and other things'. Here we find also a statement which is suggestive of the way in which Plato intends to develope his view. It is; ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τὴν ψυχὴν ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἕνα μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἂν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν. (81D) The kinship of the whole of nature which can be known by the soul, and which makes recollection possible leads on to Plato's view of the world-soul which in his later dialogues (e.g. the Philebus and the Timaeus) he connects with his view of the human soul. That is ψυχή is not just regarded as something that belongs to human life, but the human soul is to be thought of as part of the world soul itself.

What is to be noticed is that Plato takes over this religious view and uses it for his own purposes. He takes it as stating the nature of the soul, and what he has to say about the soul in subsequent dialogues is an attempt to give an account of the eternal nature of the soul. Plato, then, accepts a religious view of the soul current in his day, and uses this in his attempt to state something about the nature of the soul in a way which Socrates had not attempted. For Socrates as we have pointed out, the nature of the soul was something of which he was ignorant, and Plato's attempt to state that we may call a philosophical view of the soul which is influenced by certain religious ideas, raises problems about the relation between philosophy and religion.

1. Pindar. καὶ σῶμα μὲν πάντων ἔπεται θανάτῳ πρεισθενεῖ,
ζῶον δ' ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἴδωλον· τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν μόνον
ἐκ θεῶν
Fragment 136 'Pindari carmina cum fragmentis edidit A.Turyn'.

His argument about the nature of the soul as self-motion was criticized by Aristotle, who also puts forward an argument connected with the nature of motion to prove the existence of a first unmoved mover. There are, as we shall see, important differences in their views, but both attempt to state arguments for their views.

There was, also something in the view that Socrates stated about morality which probably led Plato to this view of the eternal nature of the soul. Socrates thought of the difference between good and evil as absolute. That is the difference did not change, and was not dependent on changing human opinions about the matter. There was something unalterable about it, and this may naturally lead to the view that human life which is involved in this unalterable difference is itself in some way unalterable. To live in such a way as to take this difference into account was what Socrates called caring for one's soul. So Plato was led to attempt to show that the life of the soul itself is unalterable. But whereas Socrates had emphasised mainly this unalterable difference between good and evil, when Plato sought to connect this with the nature of the soul itself as unalterable, he was led to difficulties - especially the difficulty of stating what this eternal nature of the soul is, and how it can be connected in any way with a form of life, that is human life, which is not unchangeable. It is this difficutly which arises in the Phaedo and which makes it necessary to discuss the nature of generation and decay. Once this issue comes to the fore the question about the eternal nature of the soul ceases to be just a question of individual immortality, and we see here the beginning of Plato's later view that the soul is the cause of all becoming. When we come to the Phaedrus we find that although in the myth about the soul there is a great deal that is connected with the kinds of life that individual souls lead as human beings, the general statement or definition of the nature of the soul which precedes the myth and which seems to be regarded as a more definite statement about the nature of the soul than what is said about it in the myth itself, is not a definition of the nature of the human soul but of all soul. All soul is eternal (ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος).

This development in Plato's view raises as we have said certain difficulties about the relation between philosophy and religion which arise also in connection with the views of Aristotle, but which are not so serious for him since his view is less religious than Plato's. The main difficulty can be stated by comparing Plato's view with that of Socrates. It can be put by saying that the interest of religion is not in determining the nature of the soul as such (αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν as Plato puts it). It is the consequence of the view that the soul is eternal as it is stated in the Meno that is important for religion. It is said that because the soul is eternal it is necessary to live as holy a life as is possible. And this is what Socrates emphasised. Whether the soul was eternal or not he did not know, but

this ignorance did not make the necessity for living a holy life any the less. Plato's question is different, but it is born of the same interest - an interest which his answer cannot satisfy.

It is primarily a moral and religious interest for Socrates, and the necessity of living a holy life is not shown by showing that the soul is eternal. This is what Wittgenstein refers to: ' The temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say, its eternal survival after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive forever? Is this eternal life not an enigmatic as our present one?' (Tractatus 6.4312) The possibility of the soul's survival of death is one of the main questions in the first part of the Phaedo, but with the introduction of the question of generation and decay this question is not so much in evidence and as Plato developed his later view about soul, the question of human immortality took on a different aspect. In the Theaetetus (176) and in the Timaeus (90) the purpose of human life is seen as achieving immortality in so far as that is possible for human beings, and that suggests that it is something different from a form of immortality which is eternal.

We may also contrast Plato's attempt to prove individual immortality in the Phaedo with the Christian belief in order to see that the main interest of the latter too is not to establish the eternal nature of the soul. In the Christian belief eternal life is a gift of God. 'The wages of sin is death, (Romans 6.23) but the gift of God is eternal life". But on the view that Plato is trying to establish the soul is eternal anyway. At least that would be the outcome if the soul were shown to be eternal and in the Phaedo the efforts to show this seem to be quite serious. That the arguments put forward are regarded as inconclusive suggest too, however, that Plato may have felt some of the difficulties that have been mentioned. There does at least in the later dialogues seem to be some conflict in Plato's mind between this view about the eternal nature of the soul and another view that we find stated in the Timaeus. There he says in his myth of creation that the order of the cosmos, to which he refers when he speaks of the world soul, is not completely indissoluble in its own nature, but its depends on the will of the creator (41 B).

Even in the Phaedo, however, there is much to suggest that for Plato what is of interest is not just proving that the soul is eternal, for there is a great deal in the dialogue that shows that he is interested in the character of the eternal life of the soul. He thinks that this eternal life has a character of its own, and it is the character of the life of the soul that allows it to achieve immortality whether it is strictly eternal or not. In this respect we see that Plato is much closer to the view of Socrates than he would be if his main interest were just in proving the soul eternal.

Here it is sufficiently clear that the kind of life the soul (that is the human soul) leads does not belong to it of necessity. This contrast is seen in Phaedrus too. There is the definition of the soul as eternal, but then a description in the myth of the kind of life that is possible for the human soul.

If we ask why the kind of life that belongs to the human soul does not belong to it of necessity then the answer seems to be that it is because the life of the human soul is tied to the life of the body. Here again we have a clash of different aspects in Plato's treatment. For the view he states suggests that the natural life of the soul is a pure one; it is its presence in the body that makes its life impure. This account of the matter presupposes that soul and body are distinct, and with regard to the soul it presupposes that it is something of an eternal nature which has been compelled to live in a physical body. But even if it presupposes this, it at least makes possible some account of the form of life that is considered to be natural to the soul which it is prevented from living by its presence in the body. Here Plato was no doubt influenced by the Pythagoreans. The body is the prison house of the soul, and the life of the philosopher is meant to be one in which he strives to overcome those influences of the body which prevent the soul from living that life that is proper to it.

It is easy to misunderstand some aspects of the account in the Phaedo, however, if all the emphasis is placed on the distinction that there is between the body and the soul. For although the body is a prison, it is a prison of our own making. It does not have to be a prison. If it is a prison then human beings have made it a prison for themselves. This is why Plato says in his discussion of the lusts and pleasures that can accompany bodily life that 'the prisoner is the chief assistant in his own imprisonment'. (τοῦ εἱεγμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα καταδοῦσα (ἡ φιλοσοφία) ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστιν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι (82 E).

Plato thinks that the philosopher needs to purify his life of the evil influences that result from life in the body. He describes this καθάρσις as τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν (67C) So the end to be achieved is a life separated from the body, and this view may well seem to be in strange contrast to what we find in the Phaedrus (246B): πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου . The main difference between these two views seems to be that the former thinks of the soul as simple and unchanging in nature, whereas the latter attributes to the soul a form of motion which does not allow it to be simple and unchanging. The view in the Phaedo also makes the life of the soul alien to that of the body whereas the later view does not make the difference between them so radical. There is a contrast also between what Plato says about God in the Phaedo and what he says in the Phaedrus. In the Phaedo God seems to be thought of in the same way as a form - that is free from everything bodily. In the Phaedrus, however, Plato says

'Although we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, we imagine an eternal living being which possesses both a soul and a body, which are united for all time'. (246D) But in the Phaedo the proper life of the soul is not one which is life in a body.

The main difficulty in understanding the Phaedo is that it does not just state one view about the nature of the soul; it shows us the difficulties which Plato saw in a certain view of the soul as eternal and unchanging. In the first part of the dialogue we have a view of the soul that is other-worldly. Because the soul is thought of in this way, asceticism is regarded as the ideal of human life. And this is a view of the soul which pays attention only to an individual human life. It is the immortality of the individual human soul that is important, and it is thought necessary to show this irrespective of any relationship there might be between the life of an individual soul and other souls. Its immortality also is something which is achieved in separation from the human body; for the body is alien to it. This view was probably suggested to Plato by the life of Socrates, and the importance he attached to the soul in the sense of the life of an individual human being. For Socrates this was not connected with any attempt to prove anything about the nature of the soul, but once Plato attempted to speak about this, then the questions of the relationship of one soul to another, and of whether the body is completely alien to the soul, were bound to arise. So the view of the soul that we find in the first part of the Phaedo before the objections of Cebes and Simmias is a consequence of Socrates's teaching, but it is also an account of the nature of the soul which gives rise for Plato to difficulties which Socrates was not concerned with. According to this view each human soul is considered as independant, and its immortality is something that belongs to itself alone. The first arguments are only concerned with how such an individual soul can possess an eternal nature. So one has to show that the soul will survive the death of the body and that it existed before its life in the body.

These arguments are concerned with attempting to show that the life of the philosopher is not a forlorn hope. For the philosopher lives in such a way that he has no fear of death. It does not harm his soul; it brings release from the evil influences of bodily life. He faces death confidently because he believes that he will go to live among men that are better than any who live on earth. The philosopher desires to escape from the life of the body, which is evil (κακός), for as long as the soul is shackled to the body it will never gain what it desires - the truth. (τὸ ἀληθές 66B). So Plato describes the life of the philosopher as a μελέτη θανάτου which takes the form of a κάθαρσις of the evil of bodily life. This is preparatory to that pure life of the soul which will be achieved in a future life. It will only, however,

be achieved by those who have earnestly sought to purify themselves, 'for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the pure' (66B), and 'the life after death will be far better for the good than the evil' (63C). The end that is achieved by the purified soul is described as the acquisition of wisdom and knowledge, and this is only properly possible in a life that is lived ἐκ τοῦ σώματος . The philosopher seeks to live in such a way that he is untroubled by the pleasures and desires of the body. These have no value for him. But in thinking of them in this way he is misunderstood by the majority of men who think that life is only worth living in so far as one takes delight in bodily pleasures. The philosopher, however, takes delight only in one thing (68Aἥκιστα δὲ φρονήσεως) - wisdom, and because he sees that the possession of wisdom is only impeded by the body, his desire is to escape from it as hateful to him.(67C, 68A). He knows that even in this life, where his search is impeded by the body, truth is only attained ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι (65C), that is by the soul in so far as it separates itself from the life of the body. The purification which seeks to bring about in this life the continued separation of the soul from the body involves a great struggle (ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία 67B), but its fruits in this life are the foundation of a hope that death will be the means of achieving a complete purification (63C, 67C) of the soul from those evils which result from a life lived in the body. The man who grieves at the approach of death is not a φιλόσοφος but a φιλοσώματος (68B); he is more concerned with cultivating the life of the body than that of the soul. To cultivate the life of the body is to be a lover of the body, to regard as of first importance the pleasures of food, drink and sexual love; but the objects of desire for the life of the soul when it is properly cared for are not these but the forms of justice, beauty and goodness in themselves. The soul will become like that which is the object of its love. If it loves wisdom then it will become like those things which alone make wisdom and pure knowledge possible; and these things are the forms. The form is the only true object of knowledge. The forms Plato refers to here are moral, aesthetic and mathematical which are conceived as ideal standards to whose perfection particular things strive to attain. The forms cannot be known by the senses; it belongs to the activity and life of the soul to know them, and also in knowing them to strive to attain to that purity which belongs completely to the forms. It achieves this by that activity that is characteristic of its own life - by thinking (ὁ λογισμός 79A). It can only do this if it is not influenced by the body; it is only the man who αὐτῇ καθ'αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος is able to attempt to make a search for αὐτὸ καθ'αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων(66A). The kind of life which is here suggested as the one proper for the soul is one of contemplation. If anyone is said to know anything in its purity, it is necessary for him to be separated from the body and contemplate things with the soul alone. It is because the soul cannot achieve true knowledge while living in the body that true knowledge will never be attained except after death. In this life one will approach nearest to knowledge only

when one strives to avoid communion with the body and seeks to purify oneself from it, until God sets one free.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between two aspects of this account, one which remained central to Plato's view as it developed, and another which changed. The aspect that changed is the idea that this life of purity is only the concern of the individual philosopher. When in the Republic Plato demands that the philosopher should return to the cave, that demand seems foreign to what is said in the Phaedo. What remained unchanged is the view that there are certain elements in human life which need to be driven out, if anything like a life of purity is to be possible for human beings.

Plato insists that the rule of the soul over the body is a natural rule; human life becomes unnatural when it is bodily pleasures that rule. What Plato means here when he speaks of the pleasures and lusts of the body, is not just purely physical pleasures and lusts, but anything that would prevent the soul from achieving its proper purity of life. There is a definite struggle between soul and body, and the life of each is affected by that of the other. That means that there is impurity of soul. It is not just the body that is the cause of impurity. Rather it is the soul itself. For it is the soul that rules, and if it rules by directing its life in accordance with low desires, it becomes impure. It has to overcome the turbulences of life in the body so that its own life may be pure.

But how is this possible? Only if the end of the soul's rule is its own purity. Otherwise the life of the soul is destroyed; its life becomes one which is determined by its bodily existence. It becomes chained to the body, and is forced to follow desires which are unnatural to it. 'Because the soul has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body'. (83D) If the soul does not make its own purity the end it seeks, then all that is possible is for it 'to exchange pleasure for pleasure, pain for pain and fear for fear'. (69A). That is what Plato means here by the life of the body from which the soul must escape. It is a life whose end is not purity of soul; its self-restraint is a form of self-indulgence. It is the life of those people who refuse some pleasures only in order that they may enjoy others which they cannot do without. Because they cannot do without these it is impossible for them to achieve purity of soul. It is that which is virtue and wisdom, and only this is able to judge the true nature of pleasure, pain and fear.

It is this idea that remains central to Plato's view throughout. Human life must not be just an exchange of pleasures, pains and fears. It must be a search for wisdom and virtue. When it is the former, then it becomes impossible to care for the life of the soul. It is these things that prevent the soul from gaining its own purity.

But they are not external to the life of the soul and just a part of bodily life. Otherwise the prisoner would not be the chief assistant in his own imprisonment. As it is he is, and he will remain a prisoner to his low desires, unless he realises that there is something else to care fo. Such pleasures and pains are not external to the life of the soul, but can influence its own life, and their influence is so immediate, that many people think that these are what make life worthwhile. They are so acceptable to most people, that Plato calls those who indulge in them with what he calls self-restraint, κόσμιον (68 E). They are the people in the cave who see only images. They think they follow virtue, but it is only a painted imitation of it.(69B).

Plato's view here is one that is stressed in many religions. It is found in Christianity in the saying of Jesus; 'Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth where moth and rust do corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasure in heaven where neither moth nor rust do corrupt and where thieves do not break through and steal'. (St.Math.C. VI.vv.19-20). 'Love not the world nor the things of the world' (1.John 2. 15) Plato himself connects the view in the Phaedo with the mystery religions of his own time. He says; 'I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, "the thyrsus bearers are many, but the mystics are few" (69C) "Straight is the gate and narrow is the way that leads to life, and few there be who find it'. (Luke 13.24.) Socrates for Plato was a person who had learned to care for his soul; who had learned the kind of virtue and wisdom that is possible for human beings. That wisdom and virtue does not lie in choosing what pleasures one wants and avoiding others so that these can be achieved. It is not a question of choosing those pleasures that are the least troublesome, so that one can live in comparative peace without too many pangs of conscience, and avoid the pains that may follow from over-indulgence. For that nails the soul to the body in the same way that a life of pure indulgence does. There is no escape in that direction. From one point of view the distinction between soul and body is not absolute, in so far as the life of each is affected by the other. But from another point of view they are, for to care for the soul is to live a life that is quite different from any of the multitude of lives that are an exchange of pleasure for pleasure. Unless one prevents oneself from living such a life, then it will be impossible to care for one's soul. Care of the soul only comes in so far as that kind of life is overcome. When Socrates remained in prison, he was not concerned with what for most people would be a matter of choosing between pleasure and pain, but of doing what he thought right.

He was able to do that, without compulsion, because he had lived a life which was not a continual choice between one pleasure and another, or one pain and another, but a life that only sought virtue and truth; virtue and truth that are that kind of life.

This life knows no fear of death. Socrates could have escaped, but he thought that that would be contrary to the laws. But even if he faced death for that reason, he might still have feared it; though for Socrates the two were closely connected. He had overcome that fear. We may well ask what he had overcome. He had overcome that kind of desire which places its hopes in this life; that cannot bear the thought of being separated from the pleasures that life in the body brings with it. He had learned to live in such a way that there was nothing upon which he depended to live except virtue. He was prepared to lose everything except that; and that no one could take from him. It would lead him, he thought, to a life with the gods. It is no doubt possible to have no fear of death, but not to possess the hope that Socrates shows in the face of death.
Epicurus thought of death in this way: 'When we are, death is not; when death is, we are not'. One's view of death, however, is closely connected with one's view of life. One could say that it is part of one's view of life, although then the difficulty arises of how one distinguishes between the two. Certainly Epicurus's view about death is a result of the way in which he thought about life; that view of human life included the idea that death is the end, and because it is the end there is no need to fear it. If death is the end, then that also determines the way in which one thinks of life. One important difference between the view of Epicurus and Socrates's is that Epicurus has decided what death is. When a person dies he knows and feels nothing. He does not even dream as he might when asleep. Although there is a dead body, the life that belonged to it has completely ceased to exist. Epicurus's view of life in this sense depends on his being right about what death is. Socrates does not <u>know</u> what death is. This makes his view very different. It is his view of life that gives him hope that after death he will go to live with the gods, who have provided for him during his lifetime. The difference might be put by saying that for Epicurus what life is determined by what death is, whereas for Socrates what death is determined by what life is. Those who have lived a good life will fare better after death than those who have not. Philosophy is the practice of death in the sense that the philosopher seeks to live in such a way that his life is a preparation for a future life in which none of the distractions and turbulences that accompany life in the body will be present. If that is what death makes possible death is not something to be feared, but something to hope for.

What assurance is there that this hope will be fulfilled? Plato thinks that it must depend on the soul being eternal in nature. This is the point of the first two arguments that are put forward. The views that everything must be generated from its opposite and that the soul's learning is recollection are meant to show that the soul exists after death and that it also existed before birth. This too is the purpose of the argument that the soul is uncompounded and simple in nature. But none of these arguments answer the main objection put forward by Cebes, that there is no means of showing that the soul is eternal in nature, because even if it does exist before the life of the body and survive it, death in the end may be the destruction of the soul itself. Cebes's question raises the problem of the nature of coming-to-be and passing-away. The question of the eternal nature of the soul cannot be discussed independently. For the life of the human soul is life in a human body, and its life cannot be thought of as completely different from that of the body, unless it is shown to be different. Simmias puts forward the view that the soul is a harmony of the life of the body, but Plato thinks that this idea does not explain what is most characteristic about human life. If the soul is a harmony of the body, then how can it admit opposite states such as virtue and wickedness.

The answer that is given to this question in the Phaedo is only the beginning of an answer for Plato, and the question continues to exercise him throughout the later dialogues. The answer here begins by attempting to show that an answer to the question of γένεσις and φθορά cannot be one just in physical terms. For that will leave something physical unexplained. The point here seems to be also that human life cannot be explained only in physical terms, for such an explanation does not account for what is most characteristic about it, that it is a life which has to do with virtue and wickedness. So Plato proceeds to discuss the nature of the soul in connexion with what are regarded as the true causes of physical existence - the forms.
But the view that is put forward in the Phaedo raises difficulties not only about the nature of the forms themselves, but also about the nature of the soul if it is compared to a form. The main difficulty with regard to forms is just how they are to be causes of physical things which come to be and pass away, and this problem becomes central to the discussion in the Parmenides. For if physical things participate in forms, what is the nature of this participation? It is difficult to understand how if the form is to be an efficient cause it can remain unchanged, and how it is the same form which is the cause of many particular things. For that would suggest that the form is not indivisible. This problem is not dealt with in the Phaedo, but it arises in connexion with the question of the nature of the soul, because the soul does participate in physical existence. So is the soul divisible or indivisible in nature?. That is the main difficulty here. If the eternal nature of the soul is in some way like the eternal nature of the forms, then it must be shown how

a form is related to physical existence in order to make clear how the soul is.

The account that we have here of the dissatisfaction felt by Socrates with physical speculations shows in some ways the kind of distinctions that it is necessary to make between the soul and the body. For the soul is concerned with understanding the goodness of things and this is something which cannot be understood in terms of physical causes. When Socrates claims that the reason why he remains in prison can only be explained in terms of what is the best, this may be regarded as explaining his action in doing so. But Plato wishes to make this kind of cause more general. It is not only meant to explain human actions but also the order of the universe. It is τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν . (98b). Those who are only concerned with physical speculations are not concerned with this kind of cause. They are unable to distinguish between what is a cause τῷ ὄντι , and that which is not such a cause but the necessary condition for the existence of such a cause. (τὸ γὰρ μὴ διειλέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον (99b). For recognising this distinction is to recognise that there is some divine power which causes things as they are to be in the best possible state. (99c) That is also the kind of cause that the soul can be in its life in the body. It can rule the body in such a way that human life bdcomes as holy as possible (107d).

The connexion between this view that mind is the cause of all things and orders them for the best (98 a-b), and that the true causes of things are the forms is not clear. It was not clear to Plato either and it remained a problem for him even in the Timaeus, where he thinks of the δημιουργός who is the mind who orders things for the best as separate from the forms which are the patterns in accordance with which he does order the world for the best. And the difficulty is present here in the Phaedo in attempting to show the nature of the soul. For first of all the cause is thought of as some divine power, which we might identify with the δημιουργός , but also the cause is the forms. This may be why Plato here seems almost to think of the soul itself as a form. And if it were just a question of the forms themselves which are unchanging and eternal being causes, then it would seem that there would be no alternative to regarding the soul as a form. But Plato does not give an account only in terms of the forms. That this is the view in the Phaedo might be suggested by the first statement about the form as a cause: 'If anything is beautiful except the form of beauty, it is is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in the form of beauty'.(100C). This suggests that there is just the form of beauty which is unchanging, and particular beautiful things which are not unchanging but which owe any beauty they possess to the unchanging form. On this view it would be difficult to say anything about the nature of the soul, for then there would be a form of soul from which any particular soul would derive the being it possesses as a soul. But how exactly it derives its being would be left unexplained.

Plato attempts to give an answer to this question by saying that it is necessary to take into account not just the form but something else. Each form is separate and unaffected by any other form. No form will admit its opposite. This is true of forms themselves, but Plato goes on to say that it is also true of things that participate in forms (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει 103b). The position now is that the true causes of things are the forms in things themselves, and if things possess opposite forms then it is impossible for one to become the other and still possess its form. But there are other things whose nature is such that although not opposite to some particular form cannot admit the presence of that form without its nature changing. Thus the number three although not opposite to the form of evenness cannot admit the presence of that form without changing its own nature. This view is now applied to the nature of the soul. This would mean that the soul although not the opposite of death cannot admit its presence without a change in its own nature. The argument as Plato states it is however invalid. Instead of using as a premiss in his argument what he claims to have proved, that is, that the soul cannot admit death without a change in its nature, he makes a premiss of the statement that the soul does not admit of death, and so assumes that he seeks to prove. He seems to realise this when he goes to ask whether what is immortal is also imperishable, and there is the suggestion that further argument may be needed to show this (106c).

So the argument is inconclusive. There are, however, suggestions here that Plato seeks to work out. He speaks of God and the form of life which are immortal and imperishable if any thing is. This is suggestive of the view stated in the Timaeus of the νοητὸν ζῷον which serves as a pattern according to which the δημιουργός creates the world. In the Timaeus the soul is created and this marks it off from the intelligible world of forms which are uncreated. In addition, the view (80b) that the soul is akin to the divine and the eternal leads on to Plato's view of the soul as intermediate between the indivisible and the divisible. It is this view that seems to be most important in the Phaedo. This is that the life of the soul is something distinct and cannot be identified with bodily life. For the soul has a life of such a kind that it is not independent of the difference that there is between good and evil. The achievement of a good life is what seems to be meant by the soul's immortality. But there is no certain proof that this form of life that can belong to the soul of the philosopher is imperishable. At 107 A Socrates says: 'The soul then, Cebes, more than anything else is immortal and imperishable' and this certainly is the conclusion that Plato wants to reach. The arguments are not conclusive, but they clearly show that Plato is attempting to bring forward arguments for the faith with which Socrates faced death. There may also be a suggestion in the Phaedo that Plato thought at this time that the immortal nature of the soul would be an argument for the necessity of living a good life.(107C). Because the soul is immortal there is a need to become as good and wise as possible in order

to escape evil in a future life. Plato in this way seeks to develop and establish the views that Socrates seems to have held, and when he wrote the Phaedo the natural way of doing this seemed to him to prove that the soul is immortal. But to prove this is not what is most important in Socrates's thought. For him it is necessary to live a good life whether the soul is immortal or not. Showing that the soul is immortal and eternal will not show what kind of life needs to be lived. In the Phaedo both these aspects, namely the question of the soul's eternal nature and the need to life a holy life are present and the relation between them is not clear. In the Republic (611B) Plato attempts to overcome the difficulty by putting forward the argument that the soul is not destroyed by evil. This means that both good and evil souls are immortal. It is clear, however, in the Phaedo that by the immortality of the soul is also meant that the soul seeks to live as good a life as possible. Plato seems to have realised this difficulty. The difficulty is to distinguish clearly between the soul's being eternal in nature and the kind of life it leads.

In subsequent dialogues when he discusses the nature of the soul it is the kind of life that is possible for the soul that is uppermost in his mind, and he seems to take the eternal nature of the soul for granted. His view of the soul now changes, and he no longer seeks to establish its eternal nature by thinking of it as similar to an eternal form, but he discusses the nature of the human soul in terms of and he connects this with a different view of the soul's eternal nature. The soul is eternal because it is self-motion. The soul is not thought of as necessarily good, and from this point of view if we take into account the connection that there is in the Phaedo between the notion of immortality and goodness of life, human immortality is limited. (κατὰ δύναμιν) Immortality becomes identical with the goodness of the life of the soul. Before this view becomes clear, however, Plato found it necessary to discuss the nature of the soul in connection with its nature as ἔρως , and this led him to think of human life from a less individual point of view. For that is what is stressed in the Phaedo when a proof is sought for the immortality of individual souls. Once doubt is cast upon this it becomes necessary to make a far more detailed enquiry into the nature of the life of the soul itself.

Plato discusses the nature of love in the Lysis, the Symposium and the Phaedrus. In the Phaedrus we first find his definition of soul as self-motion. The view of ἀνάμνησις stated in the Phaedo is connected with this, because this attributes to the soul an ability of its own - a kind of spontaneous ability of the soul to recollect the forms. Apart from the cosmological aspects of his view of the soul as self-motion, which we shall deal with later, the human soul also possesses self-motion which Plato thinks of as ἔρως and λογισμός . It was the ἀνάμνησις of the soul in its recollection of the form that was emphasised in the Phaedo where the soul is said to be akin to the forms which it recollects. The nature of the soul as ἔρως

however, is more closely connected for Plato with the life of the soul as good and evil, and in his discussion of this it is the Socratic view that all men desire the good that he has in mind.

The discussion of this question brings about a different approach to the question of the nature of the soul. The Socratic view about the care of the soul had suggested to Plato that the soul is something that exists independently, and then the most important part of human life is the care of this independently existing soul. But this independently existing soul is hardly human at all. It can inhabit other forms of bodies apart from human ones. Its life in a human body is accidental. So Plato does not find it difficult in the Phaedo to accept the possibility of the transmigration of souls. If the soul is of this nature then its living in a human body is only a form of imprisonment and it must seek an escape from this. Such a view of the soul will not allow of a serious consideration of human life itself as the life of a human soul in a human body. The view of ἔρως that Plato now states is an attempt to discuss the nature of the human soul, and whereas in the Phaedo his view of the soul which belongs to a philosopher is hardly distinguishable from that which belongs to a god, the view that he now develops is one which makes a clear distinction between human and divine life. On the view stated in the Phaedo there would be little need for any kind of religious devotion. Salvation depends only on the moral struggle of the soul itself to free itself from body. That is the soul saves itself. It is able to do this because its life in a human body is an imprisonment only, and its true nature is of such a kind that, if it succeeds in its escape, then its immortality is assured. Socrates would have had little sympathy with this. His insistence on the care of the soul was for the human soul, and it was simply because he did not know the nature of this that we find in the Apology that he cannot state with certainty what his fate after death will be. Plato in the Phaedo attempted to achieve just this certainty, but only at the price of making the nature of the soul something that could not be regarded as the human soul. From this point of view the way in which Plato later seeks to understand the nature of the human soul is more Socratic.

In the Lysis we find the beginning of the view that is stated in more detail in the Symposium that the nature of ἔρως is neither good nor evil in itself, and this leads to the view that, if this ἔρως is part of the life of the human soul, then it is neither good nor evil in itself. This is quite different from the Phaedo where the view stated seemed to be that the soul is immortal in nature and also good; its evil is a result of its life in a human body. It becomes clear in these three dialogues that Plato's main interest is to show what human love for the good is, and how it is possible. There are two points made in the Lysis which help to make clear the direction that Plato's thought will take.

One is a statement about the nature of love, and the other is a statement of the nature of the good. In the Phaedo the desire of the philosopher to achieve immortality was a desire to achieve that state of soul which is his true state of soul. His desire for this is a result of his life in the body which is alien to him. And that state of soul is good in itself. But now there is a separation of the desire from the good. The life of the human soul in the human body is a natural state for it, and the desire is not now something which belongs to the soul because it lives in a human body, but it is a natural part of the soul itself. This means too that the human soul if it desires the good cannot be regarded as good in itself, but only hindered from achieving this goodness by its life in the body. Because it desires the good and this is part of its life, the human soul is not perfectly good in itself.

The discussion of love in the Lysis shows that this is a subject on which it is possible to hold confused notions, and no notion at all of the fact that love defines the nature of the human soul, that is of human life. The first question is: Who is the true lover - the person who loves or the person loved? Asking this question, however presupposes that one knows what love is, and so the discussion leads into difficulties. The first part leads to no conclusion because it rests entirely on ambiguities of the word love - ambiguities which lead to views of the following kind: It is possible to love and not be loved - and so friendship is impossible; It is not the lover who is a friend, but the one who is loved; It is the hated who is an enemy, and not the one who hates; People must often be loved by their enemies and hated by their friends and be friends to their enemies and enemies to their friends. There are other ambiguities too. If, however, it is thought that only persons of like character can be friends, this too leads to difficulties. For then a good person is supposed to be a friend of someone good but it is claimed that a good person will be self-sufficient and will need nothing and so will neither cherish nor love anything. This is the argument that is put forward again in the Symposium to show that a god does not love because he lacks nothing. If because of this it is thought that love is between opposite characters then this will lead to such absurd results as the just loving the unjust.

These impossible positions now lead to what is put forward as a view that really meets the difficulty, that what is neither good nor bad loves the good and the beautiful on account of the presence of evil (τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μητ' ἀγαθὸν γίγνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν. 217 B.) (The use of the word ἀπορωτεινόμενος here is interesting. It is a word which Plato often uses when he states a view which he takes to be important and fundamental, but which takes the form of a view to be argued for, and is not just the result of an argument. It might be called an intuition or insight. That Diotima states the same view in the Symposium bears this out). What Plato is now trying to make clear is that if love is to be

understood at all one must make a distinction between love and its object. And what is being assumed here is that the proper object(οἰκεῖον 221E) of love can only be something that is superior to that love itself. That is the insight contained in saying that what is neither good nor bad loves the good and beautiful on account of the presence of evil. This dialogue is given the title μαιευτικός , and much of what is said has that character. There are only hints given as to the position that is to be adopted; but although the dialogue ends on an inconclusive note because it seems to have returned to a view that has been rejected that 'like loves like', the whole point of the use of the word οἰκεῖον here seems to be that love must be of its own proper object which is the good. It is suggested that what is neither bad nor good loves the good because of the presence of evil, in order to avoid saying that what is evil loves the good. This in any case would not be a correct statement of the case, because human life is not regarded as being evil of itself. If it were then it would not love the good. The main example is from medicine as so often. A human body which is neither bad nor good needs medicine on account of the presence of the evil of disease. (Compare the saying of Jesus: 'I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance. They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick'(Luke 5.32). Evil can be present in two ways, however, and it makes a great deal of difference which way it is present. The soul's nature as neither good nor bad is changed if evil is completely present. Then it loses its desire and love for the good. But if evil has not completely taken possession of a soul then the desire for the good is still possible. (καὶ τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν ἐνίοτε κακοῦ παρόντος οὔπω κακόν ἐστιν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἤδη τοιοῦτον γέγονεν. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μήπω κακὸν ᾖ κακοῦ παρόντος, αὕτη μὲν ἡ παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἐπιθυμεῖν. ἡ δὲ κακὸν ποιοῦσα ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς φιλίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γάρ ἔτι ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κακόν.(217E).

This view is one in terms of which one can state the Socratic view about ignorance. Socrates's ignorance was that he knew that he did not know, and so his state is intermediate between complete ignorance and and knowledge. The one is evil, the other good. The Socratic position is intermediate between the two, and it is on account of his ignorance which is evil, and because he knows that he is ignorant that he can love knowledge and wisdom, and be a philosopher. But what is said about good and evil here does not solve the problem that Socrates could not answer about the nature of evil and good. That it is difficult to state the nature of the soul as neither good nor evil is a result of not being able to understand this. For the nature of the soul as neither good nor evil is defined in terms of good and evil. But although it does not give an explanation of this, its purpose is to say something about the nature of the soul with regard to good and evil, and the fact that these are not understood makes it difficult. That is why the soul is spoken of in

terms of love. This question of good and evil continues to be discussed by Plato, and in the end of the tenth book of the Laws there is a suggestion that he can give no answer to the question when he says that there must be at least two kinds of soul responsible for the nature of things, one good and one evil. (Laws 896E) But if the soul is thought of as love, then it is possible to think of the human soul not as either good or evil in itself.

In the Lysis, the break with the position adopted in the Phaedo does not seem to be as complete as it seems to be in Symposium where there is clear cut distinction between the divine and the human. This distinction is not discussed in the Lysis. But there is an indication that the view of the soul as eternal in nature which was put forward in the Phaedo still engages Plato's attention. The examples that are given to illustrate the two different ways in which evil can be present in the soul are reminiscent of the view stated in the Phaedo of the relation of the forms to things. For it is suggested that evil can be present in such a way that the presence of good is impossible, and in the Phaedo the view was that life belongs to the soul in such a way that death is impossible for it. Now what is discussed in the Lysis is not the question of whether the life of the soul is eternal or not. That question is shelved here to be raised again in the Phaedrus. The question here is how one can speak of the life of the soul in relation to good and evil irrespective of whether it is eternal or not. All the emphasis is on this characteristic of human life. At 221E Plato says: τὸ δ' ἐνδεὲς ἄρα φίλου ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ; δοκεῖ μοι. ἐνδεὲς δὲ γίγνεται οὗ ἂν τι ἀφαιρεθῇ. πῶς δ' οὔ; τοῦ οἰκείου δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅ τε ἔρως καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οὖσα. This seems to refer to the view of the soul in the Phaedo. For there the soul on account of its life in the body has had something taken away from it - the possibility of its living that life which properly belongs to it. The true object of love for the soul is something οἰκεῖον .

This leads to the last suggestion of all (222D) that the good is friend of the good alone. (ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνον φίλος). The difference that is stated here between τὸ ὅμοιον and τὸ οἰκεῖον also seems to refer back to the Phaedo, for there it was the relation of what is like to like that was important in describing the life of the soul. The life of the soul is most like (ὁμοιώτατον) that which is eternal and unchanging, but now the emphasis seems to be on that good which is οἰκεῖον to the soul itself, and its likeness to something eternal is left out of account. These seem to be contradictory suggestions, but may not seem to be so when we realise that the suggestion that the soul 'becomes deficient in that which it is deprived of' (221E) also contradicts the suggested nature of the soul as neither good nor bad but as loving the good. The contradiction that

arises here is that if the good [illegible] something οἰκεῖον , then this raises [illegible] between the soul as love and the object as its love. Plato realized this difficulty, and in the Symposium he considers it necessary to enquire further into the nature of the love which the soul possesses, and says that t is love is not love of the beautiful (or the good) but love of generation and conception in the beautiful. (206 E) This makes it possible to distinguish between the nature of the soul as love as being neither good nor evil in itself and the object of its love. It is shown that the love is different from its object. This is not clear in the Lysis.

This is also connected with another matter which becomes increasingly important for Plato. In his discussion of what is good in the Lysis he refers to that good in which all other goods terminate. (φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλίαι τελευτῶσιν. οὐκοῦν τὸ γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα φίλον ἔστιν; 220 B) If the good is οἰκεῖον then the good in which all goods terminate would be goodness of soul, and so we would have a position which would not be strikingly different from that in the Phaedo. The subject of this final good is not discussed here as it is in the Republic for instance. There it is clearly something different from the goodness which an individual soul can achieve, although it is that in relation to which human life can become good. This raises a question that is central to Plato's view of morality. Is the good only human or does one have to seek its origin elsewhere? The inconclusive nature of the Lysis results from the fact that it only refers to human life. However what is said about the final good does not change in later dialogues in so far as a complete distinction is made between all relative ends and the final end (τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο, εἰς ὃ ἕτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα, ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα, οὐδὲν τούτοις ἔοικεν. 220E). With regard to the nature of the soul the problem that Lysis sets is how to understand its nature as love. It must be made clear that this love is not for something that the soul is (οἰκεῖον) but for something that the soul can become. But the importance of the use of the term here is that the soul by loving the good does achieve what is natural for it. (τὸ μὲν δὴ φύσει οἰκεῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν πέφανται φιλεῖν 222A cf. Rep. 586E). It becomes what it is. This is the view that is stated in the Phaedo too, and in the Symposium and the Phaedrus Plato attempts to show how this is possible.

The difficulties that are raised in the Lysis are well illustrated by the first two speeches in the Phaedrus, that is by the speech of Lysias in praise of the non-lover, and the speech of Socrates on the same subject. These two speeches illustrate these difficulties because they leave us in doubt as to what the nature of true love is.

What Plato wishes to argue is that true love can only be defined by its object, but what these two speeches do is to examine the non-lover and the lover unless proper attention be given to the object in each case. The kind of life that is proper and good for the soul can be understood only in so far as true love is understood. When Socrates criticises Lysias's speech his criticism of it is that it lacks a definition of love, and without this any discussion of love is impossible. Socrates's first speech is however an ironic imitation of Lysias's. Although he ostensibly begins in the way in which he thinks Lysias ought to have, by giving a definition of love this definition only serves the purpose of his irony, and in his withdrawal of his speech Socrates claims that it cannot have been a speech about love, because it describes love as evil, but 'if love is a god or something divine, he can be in no way evil'. Socrates's definition is not a definition of what he considers love to be. ἦ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἐρρωμένως ἐωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγή, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη.(238C).

This discussion of love in both cases does not deal with what Plato thinks is essential before an account of love is possible, and that is an account of the nature of the human soul. (245C) An examination of Lysias's speech, and the first speech of Socrates shows that what is being described is the non-lover and the lover from what we might call a 'phenomenal' point of view. It is just a description of a certain kind of love, or on the other hand, absence of that love, which is made entirely from the point of view of the lover and non-lover without considering the objects of their love. There is no attempt to explain the possiblity of such kinds of love, and to understand whether there is not some standard in accordance with which they can both be judged. What the two speeches give are accurate enough descriptions of what is possible and what in fact does occur, but these descriptions do not allow for any judgments to be made on the different kinds of emotions they describe.

The two speeches contain two different ways of praising the non-lover. Socrates's speech is ironic, because although it does praise the non-lover, it is meant to suggest that such praise is only possible if love is interpreted in the way in which he defines it. But that is not what love is. Lysias's speech properly assumes this definition of love, and that is why it praises the non-lover and not the lover. If that is what love is, then it is difficult to praise it. Socrates's speech, however, does contain statements which are central to Plato's view, as he states that in the myth, when he gives a picture of the nature of the human soul, and tries to show that love can only be understood in connexion with that. The two ruling principles which Socrates says belong to every man are later referred to in the myth as the two horses of the soul. They are ἡ ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν and ἐπακτὸς δόξα ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου ; the former leads to ὕβρις , the latter

το σωφροσύνη .(237D) Love is defined as the former of these, and the point of Socrates's speech is to show that the speech of Lysias understands love in the same way.

If love is the sort of thing in this way then some of things that Lysias says about the non-lover seem acceptable enough. The kindnesses of the non-lover are not the result of passion, and so he does not repent of the kindnesses he shows as the lover does when his passion ceases. Because his actions are not passionate, there is no compulsion in what he does. He acts of his own free will, and is able to take his own interests into account. A passionate person, on the other hand, that is the person whom Lysias describes as the lover, will have many regrets. He will repent of the injury done to his own affairs because he has followed his passion. He will think of the trouble his love has caused him and believe that the persons whom he loves are in his debt. Passion gives rise to jealousy, and to new objects of passion. A passionate person, if his passion becomes directed to another person, will hate the person to whom his passion was formerly directed. If love is passion of this kind, then it lacks completely the self-control of the non-lover. It is momentary and not lasting; depending on the urge of the moment; and unable on this account to form any sure judgement about human character. The non-lover, however, because he practises self-control, and is not led astray by momentary passion, is able to judge character. He attempts to understand people, forgives them their involuntary wrongs and tries to prevent their intentional ones. The passionate person is to be blamed for his evil way of life; but lack of such passion is not to be blamed. It is not on this account that a person can be blamed for mismanagement of his affairs.

Some of the ideas here strike one as Plato's own, though cast in another mould. The ability to forgive involuntary wrongs and prevent intentional ones is something which interested Plato a great deal, and the idea no doubt had its origin with Socrates. But Lysias has only succeeded in praising certain moral traits at the expense of love. His speech suggests that if you want to practise self-control, then this only possible in the absence of love. But the love which is then absent, is not true love. It is not sufficient Plato thinks to kill passion; something must take its place. Otherwise a man may find himself in the condition that Jesus described when he talked of casting out one devil only to let seven other devils take its place. If there is a form of passion which is evil, it must be replaced with another form that is good. Lysias's speech shows us what the nature of such evil passion is, and its critisism of it appears just. But it is not sufficient just to drive out love of what is evil; it must be replaced by love of what is good. Lysias's non-lover has only apparently got rid of that love of evil, but what has taken its place is not love of the good. It seems to be a condition of disinterestedness which is not capable of any love at all. Socrates suggests that such a state is impossible.

Ἔρως is an inevitable part of human life, and if one form of it is driven out, it must take another form. Socrates suggests this at the very beginning of his speech: ἦν δὴ οὕτω παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα καλός· τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί. εἷς δέ τις αὐτῶν αἰμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἐρῶν ἐπεπείκει ὡς οὐκ ἐρῴη. (237B) The disinterestedness is only a covering of real intentions. The soul of such a non-lover still lives in a state of self-deception. He may lack the overwhelming passion of the lover whom Socrates despises in his first speech; but he does not possess true love. He has given over his life to a calculating sensuality, and in doing so he thinks he is still master of himself. Such a state is not that of true love(ἐλεύθερος ἔρως 243C), but one of servility, although it is praised by the multitude as virtue (ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετήν 256E).

Lysias's praise of the non-lover does not take into account the conflict between good and evil that takes place in human life. That conflict arises, according to Plato, because a person loves both what is good and what is evil. Lysias wants to drive the love out; for him it is only something evil. Plato, however, recognises that it is not just that, and he thinks that it needs to be purified. It needs this, because it was once pure. But in order to understand this need it is necessary first of all to understand the nature of the soul; to understand that what it needs is purification; it needs that because it has become impure. The love which characterises the life of the human soul is not evil in nature; it is only evil as a result of its fall from its original purity.

It is impossible, however, to understand the nature of this fall unless one tries to understand the nature of the life which belongs to the soul. The speech of Phaedrus does not mention the soul at all. It does not attempt to understand how someone can be the kind of non-lover it describes. It is just a description of that condition. It is only possible to praise the non-lover in this way if one assumes that love is what Socrates defines it to be. But if love is not just that, but can be understood in another way, then other arguments would have to be presented in praise of the non-lover. But even so there would then be only different opinions as to the nature of love and no means of deciding whether one opinion is the correct one or not. It is necessary to explain how love is possible at all. Plato realises the difficulty of attempting to do this. He says that he can only state what the life of the soul is, and so how love is possible, in a myth. Human knowledge is unable to state its nature; that would demand an account of a divine nature.(246A). But although he speaks of love only in a myth, the myth gains its serious purpose from being a myth about the nature of the soul, and without some understanding of this, it is impossible to have any understanding of what love is.

In the Lysis we have a discussion of love which is independent of any discussion of the nature of the soul. This is the reason why the

discussion there leads to no definite conclusion about the nature of love. It raises certain problems about it only. And those problems still remain after the speech of Lysias and the first speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus. The Lysis, of course, does suggest that love is something that is οἰκεῖον to the life of the soul, but it does not show how that is possible. Love is only discussed there as a part of human life, and its divine origin is not mentioned.

If we compare this with the speech of Agathon in the Symposium, then there is an immediate contrast. Agathon's speech in praise of love praises it as a god. Then the difficulty is to see how it can be part of human life. Neither the speech of Lysias which considers love to be only human, nor the speech of Agathon which regards it as only a god, can answer the question as to the nature of human love. Plato wants to show that love is a form of 'madness which comes from God, and is superior to sanity, which is of human origin' (Phaedrus 244D) 'It is a madness that is given by the gods for our greatest happiness'. (245C).

If love is of this nature, then it is understandable that Plato speaks of it in a myth. But an examination of the myth shows that it is not unrelated to human life. He does try to show how the ideas he expresses in his myth are related to the different ways in which men live. One might think that Plato's view about love and the divine origin of the soul is just an illusion. How would Plato answer such a charge? His answer, I think, would be that a myth of the divine origin of the soul, and so the divine origin of love enables one to understand something about the soul and love which could not be understood in any other way. In seeing how Plato relates the myth to human life, we see its purpose and value as a myth. If it did not enable us to understand anything about human life, then it would be illusory. But this does not mean that the myth gives us some understanding that can be stated apart from the myth. Rather the understanding is latent in the myth itself. But it gives understanding in so far as it is related to human life. It is a picture of elements in human life of which one cannot give an accurate account. If we think of the immumerable different kinds of things with which human love in its different forms is connected, then we realise that its nature is a mystery to us. How could one accurately distinguish between the kind of love shown by the lover of Lysias's speech, and the lover of a Zeus-like nature in the myth? If one says that one is attracted by a certain kind of physical beauty (232E), while the other is moved by beauty of soul (252E) then making this distinction in no way explains how love is possible in each case. We cannot find out anything about its nature apart from the way in which it reveals itself, but to understand it even as it reveals itself Plato considers to be full of difficulty. The question of how one learns to recognise love is very difficult to answer. Plato thought that it cannot be answered at all unless we think of its origin as divine and not human. And Plato

thought too that such an understanding of what love is enables one to understand certain things about it which cannot be understood in any other way. In fact he thinks that this is the only way in which love can be understood. But this kind of understanding only comes when people live a life in which their relationships to one another are also relationships with the gods.

If we examine the speech of Agathon in the Symposium, then we see that what he says about love, does not help us to understand what human love is. Although in Agathon's speech there are statements about the nature of love with which we may feel Plato would not disagree, the speech does not say anything about human love, and how that becomes possible for human beings. Plato wants to see how it is possible to understand human love. For there are ideas in Agathon's speech which remind one of what Plato says in the Timaeus about creation. But what he says in the Timaeus about creation is concerned with divine activity in creating the world, and not with human life except in so far as it is part of that creation. Agathon asks: 'Who will deny that the creative power of all life is the work of Love's wisdom, by which all living creatures come to be and are borne?" (197A). Agathon opposes the works of reason to those of necessity, and creation is the victory that persuasion gains over force. Love must be distinguished from necessity. It is love that is σοφός (Ἔρωτος σοφία 197A). It is what brings order where there was disorder before. It not only rules in the realm of natural becoming, but it is also the regulating principle of divine life. Before the birth of love there were πολλὰ καὶ δεινά among the gods, due to the rule of ἀνάγκη ; but the birth of love brought πάντ' ἀγαθά, both to gods and men through the nature of its love, a love of beautiful things.

Socrates objects to Agathon's praise of love. He has said that love is love of the beautiful (τὸ ἐρᾶν τῶν καλῶν), but Socrates criticises this statement. Love itself is not a longing for the beautiful as such, but it is a longing and desire for conception and generation in the beautiful (206E); it is not a longing and desire to love the beautiful or even to know that there are beautiful things, but the ἔρως of each living creature is a desire to perpetuate its own existence in accordance with the beautiful, i.e. to become beautiful oneself.

In the Symposium Plato is seeking to show that all becoming strives to achieve a state of being which is always the same, a state which he calls ἀθανασία . He thinks of the process of becoming as a continual transition from one state to another, where nothing remains the same. This is also the account in the Phaedo (74d). The idea expressed there was that one particular thing strives (βούλεται) to become like something else which it is not, but falls short of this. The question of generation and decay is discussed in the Phaedo, in relation to the εἶδη . Each thing it is said, derives its being from the presence of the form in it; nothing is beautiful apart from the presence of the form of beaty. According to the view of the matter

as it is put forward in the Phaedo, it is for the best that becoming should be determined by the forms (97c ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ἅπῃ ἄνβέλτιστα ἕξῃ). That everything should be as it is, by the presence in it of its appropriate form is for the best. Aristophanes, in his speech, regards the fruition of love as ἄριστον (193C). His view of love is from Socrates's point of view, completely one-sided and it is criticised (205E). It had only to do with sexual love which found its consummation in the finding of one's other half. Socrates shows that love is not only something which has to do with love between a man and a woman, but also that it has a far wider meaning. He illustrates what he means by explaining the use of the word ποίησις . This word (and its cognate ποιητή) is usually only used to refer to one class of people, those who write poetry. But this is an unnecessary narrowing down of the real meaning of the word, for all creative activity should be regarded as ποίησις. ἡ γάρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἰόντι ὁτῳοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις, ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ πάσαις τοῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί In the same way the meaning of the word ἔρως has been narrowed down. Just as all ποίησις is a cause of bringing anything into being, so ἔρως is in every case a love of that which is good, for there cannot be any love unless it is a love of the good, and this love of the good which men possess is not only a desire to possess the good, but to possess it for ever (ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀεί). Love then, just as creative activity (ποίησις), is universal in its scope and activity; and just as all ποίησις is determined by love only, insofar as it is ἡ γιγνόμενον καὶ τόκος ἐν τῷ καλῷ, so all love itself is only love when it is love of the good, and the good is the same as the beautiful. This means that generation and conception being the object of love is good, for every object of love is good, and in this way the account given in the Symposium agrees with that given in the Phaedo, that everything that is, is for the best.

What is emphasised in the Symposium is that this love of generation and conception is ἐν τῷ καλῷ . Here we see in Plato's account the way in which he is seeking to answer the question of the relation between the temporal and eternal which is so fundamental to any view of immortality. The reason why Socrates says that love is not the love of the beautiful itself is because the beautiful itself (τὸ καλόν , the form that is) is unchanging and eternal. So any love of the beautiful itself would, in a sense, itself be unchanging. The four previous speakers had all agreed in their eulogy of love in praising love as a god. Now Socrates denies the divinity of love, for the nature of love is that it desires that which it lacks, but no god can in any way be said to lack anything. The beautiful itself is unchanging, it is that which is the end and aim of all training in τὰ ἐρωτικὰ , which is achieved when a man looks

upon: αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμικτον ..... αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν μονοειδές (211E). As such beauty is αὐτὸ καθ'αὑτὸ μεθ'αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν, and every other beautiful thing partakes of its nature in such a way that however much particular beautiful things may come to be and perish, beauty itself remains for ever the same. It is clear that in the Symposium the emphasis is placed on the unchanging nature of the form, the form of beauty as it is here. As for things that become, they are for ever changing. (207D.E.) Human life is never the same; and this change applies both to man's body and to his soul, and it is only because the soul possesses this love for generation (ἐν τῷ καλῷ) that it can achieve immortality in any way whatsoever. For love is described as a great daemon; a mediator between what is divine and human; between the immortal and mortal; between the unchanging and eternal, and the changing and temporal. The myth about the birth of love throws light on this. For love itself is borne of earth and of heaven; he is the offspring of Resource and Poverty. (Πόρος καὶ Πενία) As such love is that which is always changing itself. "In the space of a day he will be now, when all goes well with him, alive and blooming, and now dying, to be born again by virtue of his father's nature, while what he gains will always ebb away as fast" (203E). All generation is a manifestation of love, which is forever seeking to gain immortality for itself. "The whole creation is inspired by this love, this passion for immortality". (208B) This desire for immortality is a desire to be always the same and unchanging, a state which is achieved for human life insofar as it can be achieved in a kind of "beatific vision".

Diotima outlines the successive steps which must be taken in order to achieve this end. (211C) It is a gradual process; it is that which in the Phaedrus (239D) is called ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία. This education of the soul (παιδεία) is the main object of discussion in the Republic, and, for that matter, in the Phaedrus, which is closely connected with the discussion in the Symposium. Here we may note what seems to be the general drift of Plato's discussion. His main interest in the dialogues, up to and including the Republic, is in virtue (ἀρετή), that is human virtue. He is concerned to see how a man can possess such a knowledge of what is good, just and beautiful, that he may become such himself. This whole discussion is one which is carried on in relation to the doctrine of the forms which are the true objects of knowledge. We see, however, that Plato's interest in what we may call personal life, that is, in ethics, led him into difficulties when he attempted to explain how human goodness depends on divine goodness (the form). The form was a principle of explanation; everything that <u>is</u> derives its <u>being</u> from participating in a form. This view of things meant that to explain anything was to explain it by its form, and in regard to virtue, it led to the view that virtue in itself

is one thing. Men, when they are good, are not good in different ways or through different causes, but they are good in the same way; for not only is it the case that αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν (the form) is always one and the same, but also any one man who is good can only be good because he shares in the goodness of the form itself. (c.f. Meno 73 C. All persons therefore who are good a c good in the same way; for they are good by being possessed of the same qualities.) This principle of explanation as applied to human life presents difficulties; the difficulty, for instance, of how anything can be good-in-itself, which Aristotle raised. But the view raises far more serious difficulties when, from being a way of accounting for the nature of human life and conduct, it is elevated into a principle to explain all things, or everything that is. For this is the view put forward in its most elaborate form in the Republic, where we find that the form of the Good is regarded as the μέγιστον μάθημα - the most important thing to be learned. As such it is that which gives being to everything that is (the ideas themselves) and also it forms the pinnacle of the hierarchical system of knowledge as it is described in the Republic; no object of knowledge can be properly known for what it is, unless one has knowledge of the form of the Good. It is that which gives the intelligible world of the forms its order and being and is also the principle in accordance with which all things in the world of becoming, become as they do. It was because Plato chose to make the form, which was first of all only used in considerations about virtue, into a principle of teleology that his most serious difficulties arose. For now there were not only ethical ideals - justice, beauty, goodness; but also there is the question as to whether there are physical ideals - a form of fire or a form of dirt (Parmenides 133). But not only that; there is also the question of how such forms (of physical objects) need to depend for their being and nature on the form of the Good.

We mention this later development of Plato in brief in order to point out that the kind of discussion of immortality and the whole question of the purpose of human life which we find in the Symposium is one which it is difficult to connect with his later discussion of the matter. For here the most important role in this achievement of immortality is played by ἔρως . Love is the determining factor in the desire for immortality; without love it would be difficult to see, on the view put forward in the Symposium, how immortality, and what goes with it, were possible. For love is that ceaseless striving in all that is, to become like the divine. It is not divine in nature itself; but without its operation there can be no relationship with what is divine and eternal. It is described as a δαίμων μέγας and as such it makes intercourse between what is divine and human possible. This role of a mediator between what is human and divine is a necessary one, for Θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται (203A). The divine is entirely different from the human, being changeless and eternal, whereas human life is always changing. In both the Symposium and the

Phaedrus this power of love is directly connected with the arts of divination and prophecy which depend on an inspired madness (as it is put in the Phaedrus) for their working. In the Phaedrus, when Socrates wishes to enquire into this great power of love and the divine madness which it inspires in human life, he first of all gives an account of the immortality and nature (ἰδέα) of the soul. This shows us quite clearly that ἔρως is a possession of the soul, both human and divine. In the myth of the Phaedrus, the figure which is used to depict love is that of wings; it is the wings of the soul which enable the soul to wing its flight to that οὐράνιος τόπος where it may feast upon and contemplate the world of the eternal and unchanging ideas. Love enables the lover to become one with the beloved. Through love the soul becomes capable of what Plato, in the Phaedo, had described as the kinship of the soul with the forms.

The main difficulty which he had faced in the Phaedo, and failed to solve, was how the soul can be regarded as immortal unless it is unchanging in character, since the immortal and divine are unchanging. At least the forms are unchanging and eternal, and always the same, but human life and the life of the human soul cannot be regarded so. The soul can change, and the nature of its life can change, and this fact is brought out, in part at least, in Plato's account of metempsychosis which appears in other accounts of the life which the human soul lives (in the myths of the Gorgias, Republic, Phaedrus, and in the account of the creation of the human soul in the Timaeus.) The doctrine of metempsychosis however, is a part of Plato's attempt to see the life of the human soul as something which meets judgment for its life in the body, and the kind of life which a human soul will live in another incarnation is determined by the kind of moral striving it is able to attain in any human life it might live. One of the important points, stressed in the Phaedo, is that the life of the true philosopher is one which enables him so to take care of his soul, that he may have a sure hope that after death he may go to live with the gods and escape from the "wheel of rebirth." It is the philosopher who is regarded as able, if anyone is, to live the kind of life which makes this escape possible, for his life is characterised by a moral striving which will enable him to avoid the judgment that naturally comes the way of the human soul. However it is clear that the human soul does strive; its achievement of immortality depends upon this, and this, in its turn, means that the life of the human soul must change.

With regard to this, the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις is important. For the soul does not remember what it has learnt in a previous life about the forms as a matter of course; it can either recollect more clearly or more dimly, and whether its remembrance is clear and pure depends on the purity of the life which it has itself achieved. Plato's argument about the kinship of the soul with the divine and eternal must be connected with his whole view of ἀνάμνησις . It is not merely that ἀνάμνησις is meant to prove the pre-existence of the human soul

before birth; it also, in a way, shows that the soul is of such a nature that it can recollect what it once knew. This means not only that the activity of the soul in remembering is characterised by λογισμός , but also that this λογισμός is dependent on the soul's being akin to the divine and the immortal. We might say - the soul is not immortal because it thinks and reasons, but rather that this activity itself, which is regarded as that which makes ἀνάμνησις possible, is only conceivable because the soul itself is immortal in nature, or, as the matter is put in the Phaedo, akin to the divine and the unchanging. So the soul conceived as pre-existing before its life in the body must have had a life of a specific nature; if it did not have this kind of life it could not have known the forms. The argument which is connected with this statement about the soul being akin to the divine is that of the soul being uncompounded and simple. That which does not change (the divine and immortal: the form) is uncompounded and indissoluble, and the soul is akin to this, and so it is argued that it is "altogether indissoluble or nearly so". The view is that the soul is of this nature, because in human life itself, the soul, as long as it continues constantly the same and unchanging (αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν) is able to contemplate and know the forms. This condition of the soul (πάθημα τῆς ψυχῆς) is wisdom (φρόνησις). What the soul must achieve is "reduplication" (ἀνάμνησις) of its condition when, before its life in the body, it knew the forms as they are in themselves. It is the soul in this condition that can be thought of as uncompounded and simple, and the life of the philosopher is the striving to achieve this kind of condition for his soul. It is striving after wisdom. But this can only be achieved by the soul αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν . This is the main point of the ἀνάμνησις doctrine. The life of the soul in the body, however, that is human life, must be an attempt more and more to achieve this state; that is, a state unchanged and simple, and as like the divine as is possible, for in such a state, and only in such a state, the soul will be able to contemplate that which is eternal and always the same.

From this it becomes clear that the fundamental difficulty is how the soul of the philosopher can be immortal at all, for this can only be the case if it is αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν, but it is equally evident that it is never this but also changing. It is this difficulty that the doctrine of ἔρως is meant to meet. It is interesting to note that in the Phaedrus Plato divides his account of the soul into two parts. There is first of all a general kind of proof for the immortality of the soul (245C - 246A), or rather for the soul qua soul, that is for the state of the soul described in the Phaedo as αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν. The soul as such, it is argued, is immortal because it moves itself and its self - motion is ungenerated. For Plato the presence of soul always implies the existence of a living being(ζῷον); and his position in this respect is important.

It might be argued that it is not at all clear whether in fact this is the case, for in the Phaedo, his description of the soul had come very near to saying that it is a form, and it would be very difficult to understand how a form (according to the Phaedo view) as unchanging and αὐτὴ καθ'αὑτήν could in any sense be said to be alive (ζῷον) and Plato nowhere says there that the εἶδος is a ζῷον , but his difficulty is seen in the fact that he speaks of the form of life (αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος) and for our purpose, it is important to note that that form is there coupled with the words ὁ θεός ; and it is said that if anything is immortal and indestructible, it is these two.

But neither of these is the soul. When we come to the Phaedrus, we have the statement (difficult enough to interpret in detail) πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ; not only is the soul immortal, it is indestructible and ungenerated - this is what its immortality implies. Presumably, however, this indestructibility and immortality of the soul is different from that which is attributed to αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος and ὁ θεός for a form, at least is unchanging, and it is difficult to see how Plato ever thought of it as otherwise. So it does not partake of motion; it does not move as a form. This mention of a form of life is perplexing, for how can it be a form of life unless it is living itself. If that is the case it must in some way be regarded as its own form, if we are to evade the difficulties of the third man argument. This brings up the whole problem of the relation between the changing and unchanging, which is the fundamental problem of Plato's philosophy. As for the account given of the soul in the Phaedrus, it is clear that it forms part of Plato's later attempt to answer this problem. For his answer begins with the admission (in the Sophist for instance) that τὸ παντελῶς ὄν itself contains motion, life, soul and intelligent activity, and here we find that ψυχή is made the means of distinguishing between what is mortal and what is immortal, between what is temporal and what is eternal. Soul in its perfect condition and fully winged cares for everything which is without soul, and governs the whole cosmos. The soul of a human being is different from this because it has lost its wings and so its perfection and goodness. It has, by this loss of its wings, suffered a kind of fall which is apparent in the fact that it inhabits an earthly body. The mortal is distinguished from the immortal in this way. A living creature (ζῷον) which is mortal is one which is compounded of soul and body; its mortality consists in its having lost its wings and inhabiting a body. In this state it has lost the power to maintain its proper relationship with what is immortal and divine.

In the Phaedrus, the nature of the human soul is discussed from two points of view, both of which attempt to show in what way the soul can be regarded as having any relationship with the divine. First of all there is the discussion of ἔρως in the myth as the power whereby the soul gains access to the divine and secondly there is the discussion of rhetoric in which Plato attempts to show how the life of a soul is its λόγος (discourse) and how souls of different kinds are determined in their

differences by different λόγοι which make up their life, and how the best kind of soul has a λόγος about things that are divine and eternal.

Plato's whole philosophy up to the Republic is orientated towards the Form of the Good which he regarded as the ἀρχή of all knowledge. The dialectician is described as συνοπτικος - he who is able to see all things in their proper relation to everything else, and is thus able to give an account which is true and correct. There is, however, in the Republic, a strict cleavage between the realms of opinion (δόξα) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The description of the dialectician as συνοπτικός is similar to his account of the flight of the soul to the οὐράνιος τόπος in the Phaedrus, and also the description of the Form of Beauty in the Symposium. Although in the Symposium it is the Form of Beauty that is the main object of discussion, (c.f. Phaedrus 250D), and the other forms are not so much as mentioned, we find that in the Phaedrus the same status is given to the other forms (247D) justice, temperance and knowledge. It is important that the form of knowledge itself is mentioned here, for it shows what Plato's thought in this respect was. In this part of the myth he is describing the nature of θεοῦ διάνοια . It is nourished νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ which has no relation to generation and change (γένεσις), but is τὴν ἐν τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ὄν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν . This is the nature of divine life which is unchanging and eternal. There is only this one kind of divine life, which is unchanging; but human life takes different forms and the clarity of this is made to depend on the clarity of vision of the eternal world which the soul possessed prior to its fall. What is important is the description of that kind of human life which the philosopher lives. The fall of the soul from this οὐράνιος τόπος is described as a loss of its wings which symbolise the power of love which enables it to follow the procession of the Gods to the heavenly plain, and feast upon the forms. Now of all the human forms of life, only one does not seem to be regarded as a complete fall and a complete loss of wings. This is the life of the philosopher (249 C διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια) For the philosopher seeks to remember those eternal forms the contemplation of which make divine life what it is. This is done in a particular way by thinking (λογισμός); by seeing the unity of the form in many particulars, that unity of the form which the philosopher saw when he travelled in the procession of the Gods.

What kind of account can Plato give of the soul then? He thinks that the immortality of the soul follows from its being self-motion; but as for the nature of the soul as it really is, this could only be known by a long and superhuman account. From a human point of view it is only possible to give something resembling an account of its real nature. This is attempted in the myth. Here we meet one of the most

characteristic features of Plato's philosophy with regard to the distinction between what is human and divine. It not only appears here in the Phaedrus. In the Republic, for instance, the form of the good can only be described by means of a simile, and likewise in the Timaeus, the account which is given of creation cannot be regarded as based upon reason and knowledge. For the account of the created world shares in the nature of that world itself. The nature of the account that can be given of anything is determined by the nature of that thing itself. The created world, compared with the world which is eternal, is an image of that eternal world; so the account which can be given of it is only an image compared with an account of that which is eternal and unchanging.

There are suggestions in the Phaedrus myth of this distinction between what is human and what is divine. In the terms of his myth, Plato distinguishes between a mortal and immortal living creature, between a human being and a god. The previous argument for the immortality of the soul had been concerned with soul apart from any of its particular manifestations in the world of becoming. It had been concerned to show that soul is ungenerated and the cause of all generation. Now in the myth Plato seeks to talk about the different ways in which the soul which is ungenerated participates in the life of the as a whole. Soul ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη , and the two forms with which he is concerned here are the divine and human forms of soul. Soul considered generally apart from its various manifestations 'has the care of all that which is soulless and traverses the whole heaven', but in doing this it appears in different forms of living creature, of which there are two kinds which he mentions here - the mortal and the immortal. The distinction which is drawn between the human or mortal and the divine and immortal living creature is one which depends on whether soul is perfect or not.(τελέα) The distinction is not one which is based upon a difference between a created and an uncreated living creature, but upon a difference in the kind of life that soul lives in each case. For soul that is perfect governs the whole world, and this perfect state of soul is described here as a full possession of wings, which enables it to approach the world of eternal forms and find its nourishment there. The mortal living creature's life is such as it is because its soul has lost its wings, and has become joined to a body. As for the immortal living creature, no reasoned account can be given of its nature, but it is imagined as "an immortal being which has a soul and a body which are united for all time". The divine soul is perfectly good, whereas the human soul is partly evil.

The life of the gods is one which is perfect and unalterable. There is no difficulty for them to ascend to the οὐράνιος τόπος and contemplate the eternal forms. The loss of wings comes about when those souls who are divine, but follow in the procession of the gods, are unable

to follow an account of the recalcitrance of the horse which represents evil in the soul. Such a soul "loses its wings and falls to the earth". In the myth the kind of life lived by a human being on earth corresponds to what he saw when he followed in the divine procession. There is a gradation of different kinds of lives beginning with that of the philosopher and ending with that of the tyrant. The philosopher gained the clearest vision of the eternal world; the tyrant saw the least of all. Of all these it is only the philosopher who in any way still possesses wings, and this because he is able, by the exercise of λογισμός to recollect what once he beheld. Such a man does not concern himself with human interests, but turns his attention to what is divine. In doing this he is misunderstood by the majority who consider him to be mad, whereas he is really inspired.

There is one recollection in human life which above all else enables a man to regain the use of his wings and so live the life of a philosopher. This is the recollection of beauty, and it is by the love of beauty as seen in human life that a man is able not only to regain his own wings but also to be the means of bringing the person who is the object of his love to regain his. This regrowth only happens, however, insofar as that unruly horse of the soul is tamed and brought under control; at least as far as he is concerned with achieving the wisdom of the philosopher. For the souls of men seek for their loved one, who is of like nature to their own, and who resembles the god whom they follow. This relationship becomes the basis of education; for as the lover recollects, by means of his beloved, the nature of his god, and seeks to imitate the life of his god so also he leads the beloved to live a life in accordance with the life of the god. This kind of life is only possible insofar as the lover eschews evil. This is especially the case with the followers of Zeus, who seek out one of a philosophic nature for their beloved. Their action towards their beloved is free from envy and slavish ill-will. Love (ἔρως) is that power in the life of the soul which brings a man to his destined state; it means a recovery of his pristine nature and life before he lost his wings. Here, as in the Symposium, the achievement of this is not an individual effort, as it is in the Phaedo, on the part of a man by himself, but it is made to depend on a relationship of love with one who is like minded with oneself; and this love can only be good, for evil cannot be the friend of evil. Only the good can be the friend of the good.

The second part of the Phaedrus throws some light on the myth itself. The myth describes different kinds of souls, and had depicted the different kinds of life as to some extent determined by the following of different gods. The followers of Ares, when they are seized by love and consider themselves to be wronged in any way, become murderous in intent and wish to sacrifice both themselves and their loved ones. The myth also accounts for the different kinds of lives

lived by different people (i.e., the philosopher, the physician, the sophist and the demagogue etc.) by relating them to the clarity of the vision of the eternal world which the soul gained before its life on earth. The differences that exist in human souls is Plato's way of referring to different kinds of life that people live. Plato was undoubtedly very interested in distinguishing between these different kinds of lives and in seeking to show that it was the life of the philosopher, ruled by the cultivation of νοῦς , that was the best. It is no accident that two of his most important later dialogues are called "The Sophist" and "The Statesman". A great deal of what Plato wrote was concerned in showing the importance of being able to distinguish between different kinds of life and which life was good and which was evil.

The importance to be attached to the art of persuasion or rhetoric in this connection is paramount. Plato had inherited from Socrates the idea that philosophy was concerned with discussion and with persuasion by means of discussion. Rhetoric, as practised by the Sophist, is described by Plato as τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων (261A), and Plato himself was concerned to show what he considered the true nature of this art of persuasion to be. He thought that everything worthwhile in the end depended upon the right kind of persuasion, and to bring this about he considered to be the true end of education. The influence that this idea had with him is seen when we remember that his whole view of creation in the Timaeus is considered as a victory of persuasion over force. But the persuasive art must use truth as its guide, and not be led astray by deception, it must be a persuasion of the good over the evil and not vice versa. There was, however, so far as rhetoric itself was concerned, a spurious kind of art which was the art of the Sophist. It was merely concerned with words and not with truth - it was a λόγος λόγων and not a λόγος ὄντων . Plato mentions here his theory of dialectic, which is more fully treated in the Sophist and Philebus. The rhetorician, at least, must, if he is to be successful, know the nature of the soul and be able to distinguish between the different kinds of soul, because there are just as many different kinds of men to be persuaded as there are different kinds of soul. The first necessity in a speaker is that he should know the truth about those things with which his speech is concerned. He must be able to give a clear definition of all the particular things with which he deals and he must be able to divide them into their appropriate classes until further division is impossible. If he is not able to do this, his discourse will rest upon opinion and error and not on knowledge and truth. The true discourse as a means of persuasion must be a persuasion of souls which will lead them to know the truth. Such discourse will only be possible if one uses dialectic, the art which shows one the true nature of any particular thing.

Plato wishes to emphasize that the person who uses the true art of persuasion seeks to create souls like minded to himself. Every discourse itself must be constructed like a living creature, and as such it creates its own likeness in the soul of the one who hears; and this process can be continued from one person to another for ever, and the possession of this discourse is the highest form of human happiness. It is not the written word, nor the word spoken as a means to some end, such as deception or personal gain, as is the case with so much of rhetoric, that are true λόγοι capable of persuading the soul to goodness and justice (277A, 278A); but rather "those words about justice and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in the soul, which alone possess clarity, perfection and true value. For these are to be considered the speaker's own legitimate offspring. First the word within himself, if it be found there, and secondly its descendants or brothers, which may have sprung up in a worthy manner in the souls of others." The man who pursues the task of creating λόγοι of this kind is the philosopher, the lover of wisdom; he is not wise, for wisdom belongs to God alone; but his love of wisdom is no doubt for Plato a kind of love of God and the divine. Socrates's prayer at the end of the dialogue is one which shows Plato's intention. For what Socrates prays for is what Plato has been suggesting is the aim of the philosopher. He prays to Pan and the gods of the place δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γένεσθαι τἄνδοθεν and his prayer echoes what is said of love in the Symposium, that love is not a longing for the beautiful, but a longing for generation and conception in the beautiful.

This account of what Plato says in the Lysis, the Symposium, and the Phaedrus, brings to light certain matters that are central to his discussion, and which, as we have suggested, show a change in view from what we find in the Phaedo. There the different virtues are spoken of as forms, which are eternal existences, whose reality is assured enough, but which seem to be far removed from the world of sense. If in the Phaedo a life of goodness for human beings does depend on knowledge of the forms, then it seems to depend on something completely remote from the world in which this goodness is to manifest itself. So the problem becomes this: how is it possible to think of human life itself as one in which unchanging standards of goodness can apply? That is, how can the form of justice appear ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ? And that is the question about the possibility of the attainment of virtue in human life itself. For in the first part of the Phaedo the moral forms are grasped by regarding them as objects of knowledge. They are known by λογισμός . But that kind of knowledge of them does not show how they can be related to the practical difficulties of human life itself. Plato seems to be giving an easy answer to the question which had concerned Socrates about how it is possible to know what virtue is and what this knowledge is. What the identification of virtue and knowledge was for Socrates we have tried to explain.

Plato in his first attempt to answer this question seems to be separating the two. The form of justice becomes an <u>object</u> of knowledge, but in becoming just that, it seems to lose its character as justice. All the emphasis seems to be placed on the kind of object of knowledge it is, and its specific character as justice seems to be lost. It is difficult to see for instance, how justice <u>as a form</u> differs from equality <u>as a form</u>. For what it is that makes both of them forms is something that they each possess, the character of being an unchanging object of knowledge.

Perhaps it is possible to suggest how this happened. Socrates's interest was certainly in knowing what virtue is, but he did not think it possible to gain a complete understanding of what he called the unity of virtue. He insisted, however, on its unchanging nature. What happened, it seems, in Plato's first attempt to deal with the question is that he denied the unity of virtue by make a virtue like justice a unity as a form in itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό) and by claiming for each of these forms that they are unchanging. But then each of them seems to become a separate object of knowledge, and a question that is most important for their understanding is left out of account. What is it that they have in common? But it is not only the status of these forms as objects of knowledge that is in question. By making them forms of this kind it is also claimed that they are known in a certain way. Their nature as forms determines the way in which they are known, and then there arises the question as to whether this is the kind of knowledge that is possible where virtue is concerned.

In fact this view of knowledge with regard to the forms led in the Sophist to a complete revision of Plato's view about knowledge. In the Phaedo the life of the senses, that is the life of the body is a source largely of error. This view of knowledge is there closely connected with his idea that virtue is attainable for the soul only in so far as it is able to escape from the body and order its life according to the forms which are the only true objects of knowledge. But in the Theaetetus and the Sophist the question about knowledge has become one which not only refers to eternal forms, but also applies to the world of becoming. Here now the question which Plato tries to answer is what knowledge there can be of the world of becoming itself. It is no longer regarded just as a source of error, and what he says at the end of the Phaedo that things that become participate in forms, and possess whatever reality they do possess from these is the beginning of an attempt to answer this question. It is now not enough to say that the true objects of knowledge are eternal forms and that these alone are real. It is also necessary to try to understand how things that become have a reality that is dependent on the forms.

The life of the soul is seen in later dialogues to share in the world of becoming, and the moral life of the soul is also something that becomes. The question now is to show just how it is possible for

the soul to become good. This is what is made clear in the Symposium (212A); 'He brings to birth not shadows of virtue, but true examples of it. For he he is not in contact with shadows, but with what is true. The man who brings to birth in his soul true virtue, and nurtures that there becomes dear to God, and he, if any man does, becomes immortal'. True love, unlike the false love of which Socrates speaks in his first speech in the Phaedrus, is a love of immortality, and that is the cultivation of a virtuous life.

For this means too that the kind of knowledge that is possible about virtue is not something that can be learned apart from a long process of education. And here the distinction which we have seen between the kind of knowledge that is possible with regard to and the knowledge that comes in virtuous living which was so important for Socrates is developed by Plato. He does this in the Phaedrus by spreaking of rhetoric, and one of the main points that he makes there is to show that properly speaking this is concerned with distinguishing between a good and evil life. (260C) But if one asks how this distinction is to be made clearly, then the answer is that no statement of the difference is adequate, and the distinction is only possible in the life of a person who knows the difference and lives in accordance with it. That is what Plato means here by saying that a λόγος must be ἔμψυχος . (276A)).

For Socrates, as we pointed out, there was no agreement about the meaning of such moral terms as justice, and this leads to difficulties if one wants to insist as he did that virtue is one thing, because the lack of agreement about meaning, makes it impossible to state what the unity of virtue is. This too is the view that Plato states in the Phaedrus (263 B). He says: 'The person who intends to establish the art of rhetoric must first make an orderly division of these things, and understand the nature of each separate class of things whether it is one about which people must be in doubt or not'. The first examples he gives of what people are not certain of are justice and goodness. Love, too, falls into the class of things about which there are different opinions, none of which are definite. It is this that Plato illustrates in the dialogue. Socrates makes two speeches about love and the characters of these speeches are related to the difference that Plato sees between good and evil. Ne the first deals with that kind of love which has evil for its object, the second with that love which is love of the good. Love is described as a form of madness. 'There are two forms of madness, one which arises from human weaknesses, and the other which is a divine release from generally accepted customs' (265A). It is the latter form of love which is the cause of the greatestblessings to men.(266B).

The point of calling love madness ( ) in both cases is that it does fall into the class of things which cannot be defined accurately. It is τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας and τὸ τῆς παρανοίας. (266A) But even if love cannot be accounted for in the desired way, it is important to distinguish between these forms of love. Otherwise anything that is said about it is bound to be inaccurate. Although it is possible by a correct division to show the difference that there is between the two forms of love, this does not mean that either of them is understood except in comparison with the other. Love still remains something that is not understood. That is why Plato says of the right kind of love that it is madness which comes from God and is superior to sanity which is of human origin (244D) Love falls into that class of things that is described as τὰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα τε καὶ χαλεπὰ εὑρεῖν (236A).

If that is the case with regard to love, what can be said about it? Any λόγος about it must be ἔμψυχος . Plato is here criticising rhetoric as it was thought of at his time, as an art of speaking and writing. Rhetoric was thought of as an art to be practised in connexion with law and politics. Plato points out, however, that its scope is much wider than this. It applies equally to private life as well as public. If it is thought of as only an art of persuasion that applies to public life, then what he speaks of as the divine release from generally accepted customs is impossible. It is these that then determine the actions of the person who practises this art, and the result is that what he says is determined by the general opinion as to what is virtuous or not. What one considers virtue to be ceases then to be an ἔμψυχος λόγος . If virtue or love is thought of in this way, then there is no difficulty in stating what it is, for then all that needs to be said in describing it is what the general opinion of it is. But Plato's view is that it is not like that. It must be nurtured in each individual soul and it is only to be found there. If virtue is a matter of what is commonly accepted then a λόγος of it will be subject to change just as commonly accepted notions of virtue are. A true λόγος is one 'which is written with knowledge in the soul of the learner, which is able to defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom it should silent'. But it is just because it is a possession of the soul that it cannot be adequately stated. (277C αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐπίσταται). How then can there be any knowledge about it? It is only in instruction that a person can come to know what virtue is, or what the true form of love is. Anything that is written about it can only be an image of the ἔμψυχος λόγος (276A). It is because this is so that Plato now claims that education is so important. It is important because knowledge about the true forms of love that leads to virtue cannot be gained ἄνευ πολλῆς παιδιᾶς (273E). and that means a long process of education. It is only in so far as one is able to distinguish different forms of λόγοι and see how these are the offspring of different forms of ψυχαί , that one will be able

to bring to birth in one's own soul an ἔμψυχος λογος of virtue. The understanding then becomes part of the life of the soul which it has gained through its relationship with kindred and like-minded souls. But it would not be possible for a person in whose soul such a λόγος has come to birth to explain to another person what it is unless that person himself goes through a similar kind of education. The Phaedo had suggested that knowledge about virtue is something that an individual person gains for himself when his soul αὐτὴ καθ'αὑτὴν contemplates by λογισμός the eternal forms, and that way of speaking about the matter does make it look as if knowledge about virtue were some kind of theoretical knowledge which a person can gain for himself. It gives the impression that it is something external to the person himself, and from that point of view might be compared to the conclusion of an argument the soundness of which depends on the forms of reasoning which are independent of any one particular person. It is as if the knowledge that is gained in this way is such that it forms some kind of conclusion to an argument, so that as long as someone is able to follow the argument, then it will be possible for him to understand the conclusion. But the most important thing is that the conclusion can be stated, and its statement stands alone. Plato now sees that the knowledge that is possible for the human soul about goodness cannot be like that. It cannot be the kind of knowledge that is capable of a precise statement. That he thinks this is clear from what he says in the Symposium about the kind of education it is that is possible with regard to τὰ ἐρωτικά . This is a long process and there is no easy substitute for it. What is οἰκεῖον to the soul can only be attained by such an education in the 'long and difficult syllables of life' (Politicus 278D).

PLATO'S VIEW OF CREATION.

The idea of creation is one which in different forms is to be found in many religions and the part that it plays in Plato's Timaeus may from certain points of view be regarded as religious. This has been denied, however, by Cornford, who says that the δημιουργός is not a religious figure. One question that has often been discussed is whether Plato's idea of creation is comparable with that which we find in Christianity. (Was Plato a monotheist or a polytheist?) One of the main distinctions that is pointed to in this respect is that the Christian doctrine of creation is 'creatio ex nihilo' whereas the view of Plato is different from this because he thinks of his creator as bringing order into some form of chaos. Another point that is thought important here is the question of whether creation is meant to be temporal or not. Cornford sees a difference between the two views. He says: 'Myriads of Jews and Christians from Moses to the present day, have believed that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, and have understood 'beginning' in a temporal sense'. (Plato's Cosmology p.27). He thinks that Plato's view is in no way temporal. But even if it is not, this would not be an argument against saying that it is religious. Plato himself, however, seems to suggest that this question cannot be answered. At the very beginning of the account Timaeus says: 'We who are now to discourse about the universe - how it came into being, or perhaps had no beginning of existence - must if our senses are not altogether gone astray, invoke gods and goddesses with a prayer that our discourse throughout may be above all pleasing to them and in consequence satisfactory to us'. That at least connects Plato's views of creation with religious belief. The difficulty here seems to be the sense in which the two possibilities are to be taken - how it came into being, or perhaps had no beginning of existence. There is another passage in which Plato expresses doubt about whether the universe is eternal or not. At 38B he says: 'Time came into being together with the universe, in order that, as they were brought into being together, so they may be dissolved together, <u>if ever their dissolution should come to pass</u>; and it is made after the pattern of the ever-enduring nature, in order that it may be as like that pattern as possible; for the pattern is a thing that has been for all eternity, whereas the universe has been and is and shall be perpetually throughout all time'. Both these passages seem to suggest that with regard to the question of whether or not it makes any sense to speak of a temporal beginning of the universe Plato is unable to decide. Whatever he means by creation it is not an answer to this question. Both these passages suggest to us that Plato did not think that that question had any meaning.

Sometimes, however, it has been suggested that there is to be found in the Timaeus a particular form of theology which can be contrasted with that of Christianity. (M. Foster)[1] It is claimed that in the Timaeus there are two contrary views about the relation between the creator and the world. There is first of all the artificer-artefact image which suggests that there is a disctinction in nature between the creator and his creation. There is also, however, the father-son image and this is contrary to the former because, it is claimed, a father must be of the same nature as his son. Christian theology, it is thought, does not make this mistake, because it uses the term father with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, where God and Son are of the same nature - both divine. The term maker, however, is used in Christian theology only in the doctrine of creation and it refers to something that is made that is distinct in nature from God - that the created world is not divine.

Foster adopts this view because he thinks that any scientific view of the world must presuppose a theology, and this vitiates the account he gives. He says, for instance, that the assumption of the uniformity of nature which has sometimes been put forward as a basis for the truth of science is a theological assumption. But if theological statements are about God, does this mean that the statement that nature is uniform is about God? If there is some such thing as the unifromity of nature, it must be shown if this is regarded as a theological statement just how it is a statement about God. Unless this is shown it cannot be thought of in this way.

Foster's account in any case presupposes that it is possible to compare Plato's theology with that of Christianity, and this seems to depend on a particular view of what theology is. Theology is thought of as a science whose object of investigation is God. It says certain things about the nature of God. It is certainly true, historically, that Christian theology, as stated in the Athansaian creed for instance, makes statements about the nature of God, and Foster is right in thinking that these were mainly concerned with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and the Christian doctrine of creation - especially with the former. A great deal of this theology was stated as an aplogia against heresy; and the creeds were thought of as giving precise statements of the Christian faith. Precise statements, that is, which could be distinguished from heretical ones. The beginning of the Athansaian creed is typical: Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεόν, πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν. Καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρός, θεὸν ἐκ θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, δι' οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο.
(Hahn-Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche 137-8).

1. Christian theology and modern science of nature. Mind vv. XLIV & XLV.

If this theology is interpreted as it sometimes is as a means of arriving at truths about the nature of God, then it certainly does not make clear just how one arrives at them. For the creeds are not that, but statements of faith; but the view that they are the result of theological enquiry will lead one to suppose that theology is a means which human beings possess of stating truths about the nature of God.

The distinction that is sometimes made between natural and revealed theology does not in any way help here so far as the nature of theology is concerned. For in so far as both of them are supposed to make statements about the nature of God, which are meant to be understood, they are both alike.

It seems to be the case that theology has been thought of in this way within the Christian church, but it is a mistake to think that Plato thought of it like this. For him there was no λόγος about God, understanding by λόγος what he speaks of in the Timaeus as νόησις μετὰ λόγου With regard to the distinction between natural and revealed theology, it is sometimes supposed that what Plato writes is natural or rational theology, and what he has to say in the tenth book of the Laws, when he seeks to prove the existence of gods against atheists, seems to be this. But what he has to say there can hardly be regarded as a proof or argument, and when it is taken together with what he says in the Timaeus it looks less like natural theology. If we examine what natural theology was for someone like Thomas Aquinas we may begin to see the difference. Aquinas thinks of it as part of what he calls divina scientia, and he thinks of this form of knowledge as one in which we arrive at definite conclusions from certain premisses. There is a great difference between the Timaeus and the Summa Theologica even if they both state natural theology, because for Aquinas the notion of natural theology depends on the distinction he sees between this and revealed theology, and no such distinction exists for Plato. But the main point is whether Plato thought that there was theology at all in the sense in which Aquinas accepted natural theology.

There is one characteristic that all the proofs that Aquinas puts forward share. That is that he thinks all of them prove the existence of a first cause of the universe - and then he adds, and seems to see no difficulty in this addition, that 'this we call God'. From this point of view what Plato says in the Timaeus is not an argument to prove the existence of God. His whole account of creation presupposes that. Because it presupposes it, it cannot be regarded as a natural theology in the accepted sense which regards the existence of God as something to be proved. Thatis why Plato's account can be regarded as an account of creation, whereas natural theology is not. And it is the difference that there is between speaking about creation and the kind of statement that is made in natural theology that is important.

Natural theology as often interpreted, depends upon the cosmological argument which is thought of as going back to Aristotle. This argument seems to arise from asking the question: 'Why is there a world at all?' and proceeds to treat the question as if it were of the same kind as 'Why is there a solar system?' Not that it completely treats the question in this way, but the way in which an answer is given cannot help giving this impression. For the answer takes the form of saying that there cannot be an infinite regress of movements in the universe, although it has no means of showing this. The problem is - 'How could one show that an infinite regress of movements is impossible? For this is regarded as in some way self-evident. Aquinas himself realised the difficulty, because he thinks that it is only possible to say that the world is not eternal because it has been revealed by God to us that it is not.

This objection has led to the arguments of natural theology being stated in a different way which does not, it is thought, raise the question about an infinite regress of causes. It is claimed that the nature of the world is contingent, and this demands the existence of a cause of this contingent nature. And this argument is not meant to be in any way scientific, as the one about an infinite regress of causes might be supposed to be. It is called a metaphysical argument. The form of contingency referred to is metaphysical contingency. If it is asked what exactly this is meant to be then the answer is not clear. It seems to suggest that this is a characteristic that is shared by everything that exists, and because this is the case, it becomes impossible to point to anything in contrast with it. That is to something which does not possess this characteristic. It seems however to be important to recognise this if one is to answer the question 'Why is there anything at all?' It seems that that question can be asked only if one has recognised this contingency. Recognising this contingency is then regarded as a necessary step in arguing that there is a God.

If one wonders why there is anything at all, then it is not clear what the form of wonder this is. But it is, no doubt, a common feeling. If one could be clear about what kind of wonder it is, then one might be nearer to an answer, in so far as one could decide whether it is the kind of wonder to which an answer can be given. It seems to be a kind of wonder for which we cannot imagine what form an answer would have. For the only kinds of wonder to which it seems possible to give an answer are wonder about particular things and our wonder is answered by reference to other particular things. But we are speaking of wonder about everything. It is what Wittgenstein referred to when he said 'The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling'. (Tractatus 6.45). That is meant to suggest that it is a feeling that cannot be understood.

But if this feeling is made the basis for an argument to the existence of God, it can only be so if the feeling is not mystical, but is something that is understood. The arguments of natural theology do seem to be attempts to understand this, but impossible ones. For if there were some necessity which leads from this wonder to the existence of God, why is that some people who possess this wonder do not see the necessity if the necessity is, as it is claimed, part of the wonder itself? It might be argued that those who do not see the necessity, do not really have the wonder, but this only pushes the point one step further back. Then it becomes necessary to ask how one distinguishes between genuine forms of this wonder and spurious ones. And then the only answer seems to be: the genuine ones are those which see the necessity. And that is no answer. The trouble seems to be not that this form of wonder about everything is impossible, but what is to be gathered from it. Is the metaphysical contingency of the world something that everyone is supposed to blink at, and then really open his eyes in order to be able to say that God exists? It then becomes almost as if aslong as one is able to possess this feeling, the question about God is solved. It is claimed that because we see that the world is contingent, then there must be something upon which this contingency depends, which is necessary and not contingent. But even if there were, although there is no way of showing this, then if this were called God, as Aquinas claims it is, there is nothing to identify this with the God whom Aquinas wishes to identify it. For the God Aquinas refers to is the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ.

This objection may not be fatal if people may claim that there is a God without accepting Christian revelation. And Plato did. But if such a statement of God's existence were accepted, then it would probably, as in the case of Plato, involve an idea of God as creator. And of course the argument to which we have referred about the contingency of the world seems to be an argument to the effect that God is the creator of it. But then problems arise about how the idea of creation is to be understood. It may be argued for instance that there is no conception of creation in Aristotle's God. This would raise the question of the possibility of there being a God who is not a creator. And then it looks as if there is a question of the following kind to decide: How can we decide whether God is the creator or not? From the point of view of the argument that we are discussing this question is easily answered. God is the creator because he is a necessary being on which the contingent existence of the world depends. So any conception of God which would deny that he is the creator is mistaken because it does not take this argument into account. It would have to deny the whole point of the argument that the contingent existence of the world does depend on God's necessary being.

It should be clear that an argument of this kind is possible only if theology of this kind makes sense. If it does not, then the difference between the conceptions of creation in Christianity and in Plato is not as fundamental as it might seem. For Plato's idea of creation need not be interpreted in the same way as the one that is common in natural theology, which we have tried to outline. For the important point about both of them is that the idea of creation is not reached by argument. In fact what natural theology does is to make something material for an argument that cannot be this. It could only become material for an argument if it were understood, but it cannot be understood. What has been described as a feeling about the contingency of the world, could not be identified as the feeling it is if we could understand it. If we did understand it, then we would be able to supply a reason for it, but we are unable to do this. We can also say that we would not possess this feeling as we do now, if we understand what we do not now understand. For the feeling as we possess it now is something that we do not understand.

If we take as an example of natural theology its attempt to show that God is the creator of the world, then it might be possible to show something further about the kind of confusion that can exist here. For the argument claims that it can show that God is the creator. The argument shows that he is. If these arguments are meant to be philosophical, then they are comparable to other philosophical arguments - like the one for the existence of an external world. So if the argument is sound then it would be contradictory to say that God is not the creator. But this is to put all the weight upon the soundness of an argument, without considering the question which is prior to the soundness of arguments. That is the question about whether the terms of the arguments make sense. For unless they do make sense, then even if the form of the argument is valid, we do not know what the argument is about. It is because we cannot give a sense to this feeling about the contingency of the world that it cannot be a term of an argument and so we do not know what arguments about it are concerned with. To put forward arguments of this kind is to suppose that this feeling has quite a definite sense which leads on to an idea of creation that has equal sense. It is because the feeling of contingency has a sense that the idea of creation has one too. But if we cannot say what the sense of this is, then it becomes clear that it is not on the basis of this that the idea of creation can have sense. But that is what is claimed. We understand what is meant by creation because we understand what is meant by the contingency of the world.

If, however, the idea of creation cannot derive sense from this, then this is not an argument to show that it only makes sense to speak of God as the creator, and that it does not make sense to speak of him not being this. That it makes sense to say of God that he is the creator is not the result of an argument. Whatever it means, its sense is independent of any argument that we can put forward. Its sense is not the result of argument. But if the idea of creation has no sense which allows it to be a term in an argument, does this mean that it has no sense? Its sense is not the result of an argument or proof, as for instance the sense of a theorem in mathematics depends upon its proof. What sense then does it have?

Its sense is prior to any argument about it. It is not a question of showing that it has sense, but rather of seeing its sense, apart from argument. To speak of God as the creator is the way in which it makes sense to speak of God. There is no question of showing whether he is the creator or not. That is already decided. That is what is determined about what it makes sense to say about God. If one goes on to say certain things about this idea of creation, as Plato does for instance, then this is not to be regarded as an argument for the truth of this idea, but as a consequence of the idea itself. To say that God is the creator is not to say something about God which is either the result of some form of empirical investigation or some form of argument, but to make a statement about what it makes sense to say about God.

But if this is accepted, can we say what the sense is? And here there arises the difficulty of which Plato seems to be quite aware, when he suggests that no account of this matter that is accurate and precise can be given. He means that it is not possible to understand perfectly the sense of saying that God is the creator. And it is in this respect that his view of the matter may be compared with the view of creation that we find in Christianity for instance. The idea of creation is central in the Christian faith. Both St. John and St. Paul speak of Jesus not only as the Redeemer but also as him through whom all things are created. (John I, Colossians I). Apart from this, however, the creation is a matter of faith, and there is no distinction here between what is believed and what is understood. Not that there is no difference between the two views. But they do have this much in common that the idea of creation is not thought of as something which is understood. The kind of understanding that Hamann had of the creation is quite different from that of Plato when he says: 'How often does Moses, and the Spirit of God through him, find it necessary to repeat this assurance that God has created man in his own image, in the image of God, after the divine likeness.

Here reason sinks down, and it is on this basis that the decision of God rests to save fallen man, to restore this image. How much it has cost that I am saved! Unfathomable God, thou hast nevertheless considered this race worthy of the costly ransom. And that we are so worthy in our salvation is due to the worth which thou hast ascribed and communicated to us in creation. To restore this likeness God had to assume the likeness of men. Both are equally great mysteries of faith.' (J. G. Hamann Biblical Reflections Genesis I trans. R.G.Smith p.124). There is also an idea of human salvation in Plato, which he thinks of in terms of a human imitation of divine life, but this is different from the Christian view. The Christian view does not think of the possibility of salvation as an imitation of divine life, so much as a gift of divine grace. This affects the different views of creation too. In Christianity the idea of creation is closely connected with that of redemption. Creation is totally the work of God, and this includes human life. For Plato there are limits set to the creative activity of God. He cannot make his God in any way responsible for human wickedness, and that is why the creation of men is pictured by Plato as the work of subsidiary gods "so that he might be guiltless of the future wickedness of any of them". (42D) So Plato's God differs from the Christian idea of God in this important respect, that there is nothing like the Christian idea of redemption in Plato's view.

To return to the idea of creation. It may be thought that Plato puts forward an argument which is very similar to that of natural theology about the contingency of the world. At the beginning of the Timaeus (27C - 29D) he gives a statement of three principles which determine his account of the creation. One of these is: 'All that becomes must needs become by the agency of some cause; for without a cause nothing can come to be.' (πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι) But immediately after this comes the well-known statement: 'The maker of this universe is a hard task to find, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind.' The proximity of these two statements suggests that for Plato, there was no easy inference from the contingency of the world to the existence of a necessary cause. In another passage where he is discussing the relation between form, copy and space he says: 'This (i.e. space) indeed, is that which we look upon as in a dream and say that anything that is must needs be in some place and occupy some room, and that what is not somewhere in earth or heaven is nothing. Because of this dreaming state, we prove unable to rouse ourselves and to draw all these distinctions an others akin to them, even in the case of the waking and truly existing nature, and so to state the truth: namely, that whereas for an image, , since not even the very principle on which

it has come into being belongs to the image itself, but it is the ever moving semblance of something else, it is proper that it should come to be in something else, clinging in some sort to existence on pain of being nothing at all, on the other hand that which has real being has the support of the exactly true account, which declares that, so long as the two things are different, neither can ever come to be in the other in such a way that the two should become at once one and the same thing and two'. What becomes 'clings in some sort to existence on pain of being nothing at all'. This may be compared to what has been called contingent existence, but for Plato this form of existence is not of such a kind that we can infer from it the existence of a necessary cause for it. And the reason for this according to him is that there cannot be a true and exact account of its nature. Only if this were possible would its dependence on a necessary cause be clear. If Plato's view was similar to the kind that we find in natural theology that the contingency of the world implies the existence of a necessary cause of its existence, then there would be no point in his saying, as he does, that the maker of this universe is a hard task to find. The idea of creation is presupposed in all that he says about the world. The Timaeus is not an attempt to prove the existence of the creator, but an attempt to show what meaning such idea can have. But the meaning also cannot be made clear, because any account shares the nature of that of which it is an account. And so what Plato says about creation is set in the form of a myth, or rather as we shall see later, in a series of myths. The idea that there is only one myth might mislead us into thinking that the treatment is systematic, even if mythical, as if the different parts of the myth had some internal connexion which makes it an integrated whole. But that is not so. There are gaps which prevent this. Rather the Timaeus is to be seen as different myths, each of which attempts to represent something about different aspects of what is meant by the view of creation put forward. And this too shows a difference between Plato's treatment and that of natural theology. For the latter does attempt some kind of systematic treatment in which the parts are connected in a whole, but Plato's account is not like this. That it is not like this shows that he thinks the subject matter with which he is dealing is quite different from anything of which it is possible to give a systematic account.

In the Republic Plato speaks of the sun as the offspring of the form of the good, and this is an idea which he develops in the Timaeus where he gives an account of how the world is the creation of the δημιουργός. The reason why there is this connexion between what Plato says in these two dialogues is because whereas in the Republic it is the form of the good that is the cause of the things that become, in the Timaeus the δημιουργός who is the cause is described as good. Not that the two are to be identified, however, for they have different roles. We cannot attempt to interpret what Plato says in a completely systematic way.

Both in the Republic and in the Timaeus Plato says that about the questions under discussion there can be no complete account; he makes the same point in the Politicus where he says: "It is difficult to deal with any of the more important subjects of discussion adequately except by means of illustrations; for it looks as if each of us knows everything as if he were in a dream, but is completely ignorant of everything when he comes to his senses'. Plato is pointing to the difficulty that there is if one set out to account for everything that there is - for the whole universe; and his view is that no account of this kind could make complete sense. But although that is so, he nevertheless thinks that something must be said about it.

The main distinction that we find Plato making in the Timaeus is one between what we can call cosmology and theology. This distinction is comparable to the one that he makes in the Republic between the form of the good, which he calls the first principle of everything (τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν 511B) and those principles which are only hypotheses. As an example of the kind of thing that Plato meant by an hypothesis we many consider the cosmological account that he gives in the Timaeus. It is to this kind of account that he refers also in the Republic (510Cff): 'Those who study geometry and calculation and similar subjects, take as hypotheses the odd and the even, and figures, and three kinds of angles, and other similar things in each different enquiry. They make them into hypotheses as though they knew them, and will give no further account of them either to themselves or to others on the ground that they are plain to every one'. It is characteristic of cosmology that it begins from first principles which are hypothetical, and because this is the case it is a form of inquiry that can ot arrive at a first principle of everything, for that could not be a hypothesis. Part of what Plato seems to mean here is that once certain hypotheses have been accepted as first principles, like the axioms of geometry, then what can be deduced from these is not a first principle of everything, but only the consequences of hypotheses which are limited in nature. So the consequences too will be limited. But the first principle of everything is in no way a deduction from anything else, for then there would be something prior to it; and as the first principle of everything it is not limited in its scope. If what Plato means in this passage (511B) by the first principle of everything is the form of the good, then what he says about it is by no means clear. This lack of clarity goes with the difficulty that Plato saw in speaking about a first principle of everything (cf. Sophist 233Eff.) For the form of the good is the final object of that form of inquiry that he calls dialectic which he describes here. (511B) This 'treats its hypotheses not as first principles, but as litorally hypotheses, that is, as stepping-stones and starting points, until it comes as far as that which is not a hypothesis, to the first principle of everything. This it grasps,

and then reversing its procedure takes hold of that which takes hold of this first principle, until it so completes its descent'. This form of inquiry is different from that of the so called arts (αἱ τέχναι καλούμεναι 511C), by which he means such studies as astronomy and geometry. This form of the good which is the final object of knowledge for dialectic is we are told only reached with difficulty. (517C) But what Plato says about it suggests what he says in his seventh letter. It is not the result of what we would now call scientific investigations, for it is not only connected with what can be said about the physical universe, but it is also connected with the kind of understanding that is possible about human life. This seems to be the point of what Plato says in the Politicus (278 C-D): 'Can we wonder, then, that our soul, whose nature involves it in the same uncertainty about the letters or elements of all things, is sometimes in some cases firmly grounded in the truth about every detail, and again in other cases is all at sea about everything, and somehow or other has correct opinions about some combinations, and then again is ignorant of the same things when they are transferred to the long and difficult syllables of life'.

The passage in the Sophist to which we have referred (233Eff) makes the same point as the passage from the Politicus. 'When people have lived longer and grown older, they will of necessity come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experiences openly to lay hold of realities; they will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life'. (234D) This must be part of what Plato means too in the Republic (511B) when he speaks of stepping-stones to the form of the good. The question then is not about what can be known as a result of scientific enquiry only, but it has to do also with the kind of understanding that is possible for human beings. And this is not a matter of a scientific theory, which as the Timaeus states might be superseded as an explanation. Human life can only be understood in terms of goodness, and to understand how this is possible demands a long process of education. The first stages of such a process are ones in which false and perhaps contradictory principles of interpretation are used. These have to be given up until this final form of interpretation is reached, in the light of which what was previously misinterpreted can now be understood. But this is not to be compared with abortive attempts to establish some scientific theory which finally result in an adequate one. If it were similar to that there would be no point, as we have said, in speaking of a conversion of the soul. With regard to a scientific theory, its statement must be as precise as it is possible to make it. But this kind of precision is not possible with regard to the form of the good.

It is not that kind of explanation. A scientific theory must state clearly its own meaning; but there is no such statement about the form of the good. What it is can only be illustrated.

From this point of view there is much in common between what Plato says in the Republic and in the Timaeus. The general point which he has in mind in both dialogues is that between the kind of knowledge that is gained in science, and the kind of general understanding which human beings often demand about their own lives, and the world in which they live. Such an understanding, as we have seen, both for Plato and Socrates depended on the first place on a recognition of the difference that there is between good and evil and their view is that there is no theory about this. Socrates, however, thought that his mission of bringing the difference to the attention of his fellow citizens, was a divine mission. Plato adopts the same point of view when in the Timaeus he speaks of the world as created by a god who is supremely good. He speaks of this god much as he does of the form of the good. Just as it is impossible to give an adequate account of the form of the good, so it is impossible to speak of the maker and father of this universe, in such a way that people could understand. Part of the difficulty here has to do with giving an account of everything, of the whole universe of becoming. Such an account, on Plato's view, is impossible in merely scientific terms, for that account must start somewhere, and the point at which it starts must refer to a part of the universe of becoming itself, and so the point from which it starts is left unexplained. It is only a hypothesis. The kind of account which Plato is speaking of is not one which starts from some part of the universe of becoming and then proceeds to give an account of the rest of it beginning at this starting point, but one which deals with the whole of it. But to give an account of this kind Plato sees is to give an account of an entirely different order. In so far as an account in the terms of cosmology is an account, this other is not an account at all. For a cosmological account is only possible if there are certain ideas in terms of which the account is given - geometrical ideas for instance; and Plato himself attempts to give an account of the material elements of things in terms of geometrical solids. But what he says about the δημιουργός is not like this. There is nothing comparable in terms of which he accounts for the creative activity of the δημιουργός . It might be thought that the account is in terms of goodness, but that is something which belongs to the δημιουργός himself, and so cannot be thought of as something in terms of which an explanation can be given.

What Plato is trying to account for, it seems, is the beauty of the world. The world is "supreme in greatness and excellence, in beauty and perfection" (μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστος τε καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν). But such a description of the world is quite different from saying that an account of its material elements can be given in geometrical terms. Even if the geometrical account were final, and Plato does not think that this is this, it would be a geometrical account which could be understood by someone who might not describe the world in terms of beauty and perfection as Plato does. So it is not the understanding of an account in terms of geometry, for instance, that will enable one to say that the world is supreme in beauty and perfection. But to say that the universe is supreme in beauty and perfection is to say something about the universe as a whole which is not said in a mathematical account of the material elements in it. But this is something which he says depends on the goodness of the δημιουργός. The world is the most baautiful of things that have come to be and the δημιουργός is the best of causes. (ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων 29A). But this is not a statement in cosmology. When Plato says (29E) that the goodnes of the creator is 'the supremely valid principle of becoming and of the order of the world' (γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου ἀρχὴ κυριωτάτη) he is speaking of something that is not part of the world itself, as the geometrical configuration of the material elements is. The mathematical account can be understood only with respect to the world, but this principle of theology accounts for the world itself. But if we say this it must be remembered that the sense of 'account' is not the same in each case.

The difference that there is between the two can partly at least be referred to by saying that the principle of theology appeals to the life of the human soul in a way that the cosmological account cannot. At the end of the Timaeus (90A-D) Plato speaks about the life of the human soul,, and he is concerned with that life which is best for it. He thinks that it is by a study 'of the revolutions and harmonies of the world' that the intelligent part of the human soul achieves that life that is best for it, by becoming like these. This may seem to suggest that it is cosmology that is important. But a study 'of the revolutions and harmonies of the world' includes for Plato what he speaks about as the goodness of the δημιουργός in creating the world. That belongs to the life of the human soul too, and it is in recognising this that it is converted, as he puts it in the Republic, from darkness to light. Nor this is a life of the soul that eschews a life that is 'engrossed in appetites and ambitions and spends all its pains on these'. This is to cling to mortality, and to be unconcerned about the guide which God has given to every man. It is, however, this form of life for the soul that Plato thinks it impossible to speak about in precise terms.

What he has to say about the δημιουργός in the Timaeus and the form of the good in the Republic, especially in the simile of the cave, is an attempt to give expression to this. For seeing the goodness of the world is more of the nature of a revelation which comes to the soul when it does realise that there is order and beauty in the world, where previously it could not see these. But this revelation for Plato is not just something to be seen, as something might be seen in geometry for instance. Seeing this is to see one's life as different, and to see what the best kind of life possible for one's soul is. But this does not mean that one can say what the best life is, and give an account of it that is easily understood. But it is to see that there is a life that is best, just as one sees that the world is the best of things that have come to be. If one wishes to attempt to speak of this best life then one can describe it as Plato does in the Theaetetus as a life which is patterned according to divine righteousness. But this pattern is not just all there is. If there is a demand to say something about it, then there is something to which it can be compared, and that is a life of godless misery. To see the difference between these two is to see what kind of life can be best for the human soul. Just as this difference between a life of divine righteousness and godless misery is the final distinction that can be made about human life, so the distinction between saying that the world is the creation of a good god and saying that it is not is the final distinction that can be made about the world. Both distinctions affect the life of one's soul. They are in fact part of the life of one's soul itself, and to make the distinction in the right way is part of that life which is the best possible for one's soul. This distinction between cosmology and theology is present in a great deal of what Plato says in the Timaeus.

The account that Plato gives of creation in the Timaeus begins with a distinction that is probably the most frequent in his writing, but the sense of which, as he speaks about it, in the Timaeus is by no means clear. It is the distinction between 'that which is always real and has no becoming and that which is always becoming and is never real'. (27D) What distinguishes these is that the former is that which is apprehended by 'thought together with an account' (νόησις μετὰ λόγου), while the latter is that which is 'the object of belief together with sensation' (δόξα μετ'αἰσθήσεως). He thinks too, that the latter, that is, all that becomes, must become through the agency of a cause, and that there is a relationship between this cause and that which is always real and unchanging. This is the model in accordance with which that which becomes, becomes as it does through the agency of the cause. But this is not all.

It is because the pattern or model of becoming is eternal and unchanging, that what becomes through the agency of the cause of becoming is good. If the pattern were not eternal, then the κόσμος would have come to be according to a pattern that was itself changing, and then Plato thinks it could not possess that goodness that belongs to it because it is fashioned according to what is eternal and unchanging. It is because the δημιουργός looks to that which is eternal that he is the best of causes, and so fasions things in the best of possible ways. The whole κόσμος is the best of things that have become. To deny that it is like this is blasphemy.

There is also another general point that is made. This is not part of the statement of Plato's account of creation, but something that makes that account the kind it is. 'Any account is of the same order as the things it sets forth' (29B). The account that is given of the world shares the characteristics of the world itself. The world is not unchangeable, and it is only of this that one can give an account that can be regarded as perfectly true. The world itself is only a likeness of what is unchanging, and the account that can be given of it is only an image of what an exactly true account is. This distinction is made in the same terms as those that are used in the simile of the line in the Republic: 'As reality is to becoming, so is truth to belief'. Here one can only have an εἰκὼς λόγος

Thirdly, Plato speaks here of the δημιουργός, whom he calls 'the maker and father of this universe'. 'It is a hard task to find him, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all mankind' (28C).

As Plato proceeds with his account there are other details of importance which amplify this first statement of his (27D - 29D). But it is important first of all to bear in mind what he states in this opening passage, because most of what is said afterwards is by way of commentary on it. This passage does, however, raise certain questions for the understanding of Plato's view. For instance, when he says 'that which becomes must necessarily become by the agency of some cause' (28C) the immediate reference to the δημιουργός, seems to suggest that the cause he is thinking of is the δημιουργός himself. It might be thought that he is referring to causation within the κόσμος itself, but the reference to the 'whole heaven or world' shows that it is not this that he has in mind. So it is not to any kind of physical causation that he is appealing. And so that raises the question: What kind of causation can he mean? It is this question that led Plato to give the kind of account of creation that he does give. He thought that one cannot give an account of 'the whole heaven' in terms of physical causes.

At least there is no way of accounting for the goodness of the world in this way. And the whole point of introducing the figure of the δημιουργός into his account of the world is to attempt to say something about the goodness of the world. It is because the δημιουργός is able to look to a pattern that is eternal that his work of creation is good. But the δημιουργός is also described as good (29E). His goodness is completely devoid of any form of jealously, and so in creating the world he sought to make it as like himself as possible. It is this goodness of the creator that is 'the supremely valid principle of becoming and order in the world' (γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου ἀρχὴ κυριωτάτη 29E). The best is that which possesses intelligence, and the δημιουργός brings this about by creating soul, for intelligence cannot be present in anything apart from soul. The creation of the universe is thus conceived as the creation of a living creature in which the δημιουργός fashions reason within soul and soul within body. In this way, as the result of the providential activity of the creator the universe becomes as it is a living creature. The δημιουργός in creating the universe as a living creature uses as his pattern that living creature which 'embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living creatures' (30D). The visible universe is made as like the intelligible world as possible and this means that the visible universe is made to be one just as the νοητὸν ζῷον is one (31B).

The question is why Plato gives this kind of account. There are, of course, difficulties of interpretation, especially with regard to what Plato meant by speaking of the νοητὸν ζῷον. But apart from these difficulties of what exactly Plato meant and how what he says in the Timaeus is related to what he says elsewhere, and what Aristotle and others said about his view, what Plato does say is instructive in this sense that it points to certain difficulties that he saw in attempting to speak about creation. We have already pointed out that Plato thought that the kind of account that can be given about the world is an εἰκὼς λόγος. The reason for this is that it is an account of something that becomes and changes. This is Plato's view anyway apart from the kind of account that he gives. That this kind of account is the only possible one is not part of his 'myth' of creation. What he does give of course is a likely account, but even with regard to such likely accounts it is possible for him that one may be more acceptable than another. But that only a likely account is possible is what is certain for him. And that likely account is the kind of account that is possible for human beings. Plato makes this clear at the very outset at 29C where he says: 'If we can furnish accounts no less likely than any

other, we must be content, remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human, and consequently it is fitting that we should, in these matters, accept the likely story and look for nothing further'. It is clear too, as has been pointed out, that what Plato means here by εἰκὼς λόγος is not an account that can be described as probably true as if some account could be more probable than others. Cornford is right in emphasising as against Taylor that the account that is given can only be an image of a true account. And the point of this seems to be that human understanding of the world is bound to be limited and it is with regard to the limited nature of human understanding that the figure of the δημιουργός is important.

This view of the difficulty of speaking about creation is not only stated in the Timaeus. In the Politicus Plato faces a similar difficulty in attempting to describe kingship and in this connexion he says:'It is difficult to set forth any of the most important subjects, except by use of examples' (χαλεπὸν μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδεικνῦσθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων 277D). The word παράδειγμα used here has the same force as the phrase εἰκὼς λόγος used in the Timaeus. The form of the good which the Republic describes as μέγιστον μάθημα is also something of which it is not possible to speak with complete clarity. One can only suggest what it is by means of similies. All these three are examples of important matters of which human beings have only a limited understanding. It is a similar point that Plato makes about education in the second book of the Laws. 'Shall we regard such a man as better trained in choristry and music when he is able both with gesture and voice to represent adequately that which he conceives to be good, though he feels neither delight in the good, nor hatred of the bad, - or when, though not wholly able to represent his conception rightly by voice and gesture, he yet keeps right in his feelings of pain and pleasure, welcoming everything good and abhorring everything not good?' (645D). We see here the distinction which,we have already noted, was central to the view of Socrates. It is the distinction between that kind of knowledge that is a τέχνη and that which is not. The knowledge of the difference between good and evil was for Socrates not to be thought of as knowledge which takes the form of a τέχνη . The difficulty then, of course, is to attempt to say what this knowledge is, and we suggested that for Socrates this form of knowledge could not be understood. But that did not in any way minimise the importance of the distinction. If its form as knowledge as applying to human life could not be stated, this did not prevent Socrates from giving innumerable examples of the way in which this distinction did apply to human life. We also noted the difference that there was for Socrates between recognising the difference that there is between good and evil and seeing the necessity of living a virtuous life, and possessing a genuine desire to live in accordance with this distinction.

It seems to be a similar point that Plato is making in the Laws. Even if there cannot be an adequate statement of what is conceived to be good, any kind of knowledge of what is good, however inadequate, is pointless unless a person delights in the conception he has of what is good and hates whatever he understands to be evil. So there seems here to be an appeal to the relationship that can exist between what is conceived to be good and the person who conceives it. It is not enough that something should be thought of as good. It is also necessary that a person should delight in what he thinks to be good. In the Laws' passage the emphasis seems to be on the inadequate nature of human conceptions of what is good. But although this is the case it is the delight in it that is really stressed. And this is in line with what we have seen Plato says about love. In the Laws, as we shall see, he thinks that this incapacity of human beings to completely understand what is good should determine their lives in a certain direction. Even if you cannot understand the good, you should delight in it. And for Plato delight in the good took the form of giving proper attention to the gods, and in paying respect to their care and providence for human life.

It is from a similar spirit that his view of creation arises. For here too, he thinks, there is something that is thought of as good, but there is no perfect understanding of its goodness. If there were this, then there would be no difficulty in giving an adequate account of the goodness of the creation. But then it would be possible to speak of the creation in quite a different way. The maker and father of this universe would no longer be hard and difficult to find. But it is just because human understanding of the goodness that is revealed in creation is so limited that what Plato says about the creator is limited too. From this point of view it is a misunderstanding of what Plato says to attempt to interpret it as giving the kind of account that he thinks is impossible. This misunderstanding can take the form of regarding what Plato says as some kind of systemmatic account of creation, and it was this kind of misunderstanding that arose later in neo-Platonism with its doctrine of emanances. It is impossible to interpret Plato in this way. But to attempt to do so is to fail to recognise that for him to speak about creation is to attempt to give some account of the goodness of the world, and also to recognise that this goodness can only be understood in a limited way. But even if the understanding is limited, this goodness for him was something to take delight in, and even knowledge that it was good without the delight was of little worth. This seems to be the point of Plato's saying (37C):

Ὡς δὲ κινηθὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνενόησε τῶν
ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ.

The creation is good and its goodness is something to delight in. The creator himself recognises its goodness and the understanding which human beings can have of the creation is the recognition of its goodness that is possible for them.

It is only if this central point of what Plato says in the Timaeus is missed that a number of questions arise which in the context of the dialogue itself seem to demand an explanation. It is then assumed that some sort of answer to them exist within the dialogue itself. For the idea of creation it is thought raises the question which Aristotle asked about Plato's account in the Timaeus. Does the world have a beginning in time or not? Aristotle (De Caelo 280 a 30) says that Plato holds 'that the heaven, though it was generated, will none the less exist to eternity'. As against this there is the interpretation that was held in the Academy that Plato did not intend to teach that the world had a temporal beginning, and his account of the creation is not to be taken literally in this respect. The Academic tradition has led to the view that Plato meant his account of the δημιουργός to be nothing more than a fiction, which was used by Plato διδασκαλίας χάριν, an interpretation which Aristotle criticises (De Caelo 280a). And so we have the kind of view that is suggested by Cornford that the δημιουργός is to be identified with the world soul. Cornford, who puts this forward as an interpretation of what Plato says, himself says that 'this solution of the problem is no more warranted by Plato himself than others that can be supported by a suitable selection of texts'. (P.C. p.39). In this case, as Cornford puts it: 'The demiurge will no longer stand for anything distinct from the world he is represented as making'. (ibid). Taylor, on the other hand, identifies the δημιουργός with the ἀρίστη ψυχή of the Laws. 'The Demiurge of the Timaeus is exactly the 'best ψυχή' which is said in the Laws to be the source of the great orderly cosmic movements; that is he is God, and if we are to use the word God in the sense it has in Plato's natural theology, the only God there is'. (Commentary p.82). Both interpretations are of the same kind. They attempt to answer the question: 'What does the δημιουργός stand for? What is there in Plato with which it can be identified? Cornford seems to think that there is really this problem'. But Plato nowhere states the problem to which this is supposed to be a solution. What he says about the δημιουργός is a statement of his belief in creation, and not a solution of a problem. The whole of the Timaeus is an attempt to understand how the goodness of the creator is present in the world, and that is why, as we shall see, the world is described as it is; it is the best possible world. If Plato points to what he regards as evidence of this goodness in the world, this is not to be identified with what he means by speaking of the creator of this goodness. The δημιουργός is not just a figure

in a myth which has no serious purpose. It is possible to claim that there is order and goodness in the world without referring to it as the work of the creator. That Plato does refer it to the δημιουργός must be taken seriously. It must, however, be remembered that he distinguished clearly between the creator and his creation. For with regard to the latter, he thought that he could point to definite signs of goodness in the creation itself, but as to the creator he does not seem to have thought that anything could properly be said about him except in terms of what he has created. 'The maker and father of this universe is a hard task to find'. The δημιουργός is not then just a figure in a myth. From this point of view it is better to compare Plato's view with that of the Psalmist when he says: 'The heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handiwork' (Psalm lv. 1), than to think that the δημιουργός is a figure in a myth which stands for something else which Plato mentions.

This difficulty about the δημιουργός may be compared to what Plato says in the Phaedrus about the soul. He first of all puts forward a general argument that all soul is immortal, and he thinks that the argument for the soul's immortality is sufficient. (Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς 246A) When, however, he comes to speak about the nature of the soul (Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας ὧδε λεκτέον) apart from its immortality, which, if it is true that the soul is self-motion, he considers to have been satisfactorily proved, he can only use a myth, because, as he puts it, it would be impossible, to describe the soul as it really is. We may compare with this treatment of the soul in the Phaedrus, his treatment of the 'the cause of becoming' in the Timaeus. Just as he thinks that the immortality of the soul is assured, so he thinks that the existence of a 'cause of becoming' is assured, but just as it is a more difficult matter to speak of the nature of the soul which is immortal, so it is difficult to speak of the nature of the 'cause of becoming'. We find that Plato uses mythical images such as 'mixing' and 'blending' to attempt to speak about the creative activity of the δημιουργός. Likewise, he uses the image of the chariot and horses to described the soul in the Phaedrus. What Plato says about 'the gods and the generation of the universe' in the Timaeus is similar. It is impossible 'to give an account about them that is entirely consistent with itself and exact' (29C). In the Laws, however, it is regarded as sufficient to prove the existence of the gods by using the argument which had been used in the Phaedrus to show the immortality of the soul, but when in the Timaeus what has to spoken about is the nature of the gods, the only way in which this can be done is by a myth. Likewise in the Phaedo after the attempted proof of the immortality of the soul, the personal destiny of the soul is described in a myth. The same thing applies at the end of the Republic when

after Plato uses an argument for the immortality of the soul as not being destroyed by its own vice, he proceeds to speak of the destiny of the soul after death in a myth. The view that the δημιουργός is the world-soul must then be rejected if we take into account what Plato says in the Timaeus. For there the soul is described as 'the best of generated things'. This may seem to contradict the account in the Phaedrus where soul is regarded as the source and beginning of motion, and is as such ungenerated. But the soul is ungenerated as the origin of the motion of the κόσμος . It still possesses its own motion, but the δημιουργός is nowhere described as possessing κίνησις . What is clear from the Timaeus is that Plato thought that the movements of the world soul, which bring about the orderly movements of the heavens, are part of the creation of the δημιουργός.

It is necessary to bear in mind here the distinctions we have made between theology and cosmology. Plato's view of the soul as the source of motion belongs to his cosmology. If we want to compare what he says about the δημιουργός in the Timaeus with anything else in his writings it is best to compare it with the description he gives of God in the second book of the Republic. 'God is a being of perfect simplicity and truth, both in deed and word, and neither changes in himself nor imposes upon others, either by apparitions, or by words or by sending signs, whether in dreams or in waking moments' (382E) Can we say that the attributes which Plato ascribes to God here can also be ascribed to the δημιουργός ? When in the Timaeus Plato speaks of attempting to talk about the 'gods and the generation of the universe' he is probably referring to 'the visible and generated gods' of which he speaks later on (40D). These are the heavenly bodies. Immediately after making reference to them he refers to 'other gods' about whom he says it is not possible for him to speak. These, the gods of Greek religion, must be accepted as they are reported in popular religion. All these gods, both those that are visible in the universe and those that are not are then described as being created by the δημιουργός . Even the gods of Greek religion owe their being to him. That Plato should say this suggests to us that he thought of the δημιουργός as being supreme and different from all other gods. For he speaks of the creation of these, but he nowhere speaks of the δημιουργός as being created or being dependent on any other cause for his existence. The created gods are 'not immortal nor indissoluble altogether' (41B) and this leads us to infer that Plato means to say that he considers that the δημιουργός is completely immortal and indissoluble. So from this point of view of the unchangeablesness of God the account of the Republic agrees with that of the Timaeus.

In the Republic also God is described as truly good (ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι 379A). This is the way in which the δημιουργός is described in the Timaeus (29E). As we have pointed out it is the goodness of God that is there emphasised in connexion with his creating the world. This reference to goodness is absent from the proof of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedrus. This is another indication that the descriptions of God in the Republic and of the δημιουργός in the Timaeus are the same. We notice that in both myths, that of the Phaedrus and that of the Timaeus it is when the goodness of something has to be talked about that Plato reverts to a myth. The main point of the Phaedrus myth is the struggle between the two horses which can lead either to an evil or a good life of the soul. So in the Timaeus. If you want to talk about the goodness of the world you can only do this in terms which are not precise and immediately understood, for what an account is being attempted of is not just the physical structure of the κόσμος , but its goodness, and it needs to be shown how the physical structure itself exists as it does because it is the work of a good creator.

The same kind of difficulty which arises with regard to the distinction between the δημιουργός and the world-soul in the Timaeus arises in connexion with the cause of the mixture and τὸ μεικτὸν in the Philebus. Plato suggests first of all that νοῦς is the cause of the mixture, and so of the life of the world, the world soul. Just as νοῦς is the cause of those beautiful things that come to be in the human soul, (26B) so it is the cause of all the beauty and order that exist in the world as possessed of soul. The order and beauty of the world as a whole is thought of here as being dependent on the activity of νοῦς . He says that wisdom and reason cannot come to be apart from the presence of soul. He gives the same account in the Timaeus. But even the presence of reason and wisdom is attributed to the agency of the cause. 'In the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul and kingly mind were implanted through the power of the cause'. (30D). We are reminded here of a reference to Zeus in the Phaedrus myth: 'Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things'. In the Timaeus we read of the discourse of the world soul. The rational understanding and knowledge of this discourse is only possible because of the presence of soul. In the Philebus Zeus is described as having reason and soul through the power of the cause; and in the Timaeus we are told that the δημιουργός 'fashioned reason within soul and soul within body' (29B of Sophist 249A). In both the Philebus and the Timaeus Plato seeks to give a cause for the intelligent life of the κόσμος . The account in the Timaeus of fashioning reason in soul, and soul in body, is called a likely account, of the way in which the world became a living creature with soul and reason through the providence of the creator. In the Philebus the cause of the mixture is described as νοῦς and the fact that Zeus has been described as possessing soul and reason, has led to the identification of these two, just as the δημιουργός has been identified with the world soul.

This is what Hackforth does. He says: 'Although we may admit that Plato has not expressed his meaning with perfect lucidity, yet the difficulty largely disappears if we realise that the distinction is one of aspect rather than being. Transcendent νοῦς and immanent νοῦς are not two different Reasons: the latter is the self-projection of the former'. (Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p.57 note). This type of interpretation seems to miss the reason why Plato should speak of an αἰτία or the cause of the mixture. In the Philebus the life of the κόσμος itself is the mixture of the πέρας and the ἄπειρον. So Plato says at 26B: 'Thence arise the seasons and all the beauties of our world, by the mixture of the unlimited and the limit'. If there is beauty and order in the universe it must be due to the agency of a cause. One must attempt to understand why it is that there can be seen in the universe this order which is described as rational and living. This order in the universe Plato seeks to describe in terms of mathematics in the Timaeus, in connexion with the movements of the planets, and the way in which the primary elements combine with one another to form the body of the world. All this order, however, is something that Plato emphasises in different places. He says this in the Philebus (28D-E) and in the Sophist (265C-D). He mentions the belief of the many that the world is due to some 'self-acting cause'. (τῷ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης.)

It is the same point that Plato makes when he argues against atheism in the Laws. It is because he thinks this that he says in the Timaeus: 'Now the body of the heaven has been created visible; but she is invisible, and as having part in reason and harmony, is the best of things brought into being by the most excellent of things intelligible and eternal'. (36E) The 'supremely valid principle of becoming and of the order of the world' is that the creator is good and he seeks to make the world as like himself in goodness as is possible. Plato's point is that it is one thing to know that there is order and beauty in the world, but it is another to recognise this order and beauty as the work of the creator. For otherwise one has to say that the order and beauty is just there. And that is no different from saying that its existence is due to chance. Plato thought that a senseless thing to say which in some way contradicts the order and beauty that can be seen. The point that he wishes to make, however, is that something has to be said about this beauty and order itself. It is not sufficient to give a mathematical account, for that relates the different elements in the whole to each other, and does not allow one to say anything about the beauty and order as a whole. No mathematical account for Plato could do this. For him to make a statement about the whole was to make a statement of value. It is to talk about the goodness of the world as a whole, and this is not possible unless the goodness of the whole is

seen as the work of the creator. This is why the reference to transcendent νοῦς and immanent νοῦς as one in being and differing only in aspect is not to the point. It fails to recognise that Plato thought it is necessary to say something about the order and beauty of the world as a whole. It seems that the motive behind making such a statement as this is to make Plato's meaning clear. That, I suppose, is why Hackforth says: 'Although we may admit that Plato has not expressed his meaning with perfect lucidity'. But that is what Plato thought was impossible here - to express himself with perfect lucidity. You cannot make clear what is meant by creation, because it involves talking about the goodness of the world and saying that this is due to the activity of the creator. And to say this is not the conclusion of an argument, but it is a principle in accordance with which one attempts to speak about the world. It is, however, for Plato a principle which gives sense to the world. And this is not sense if by that is meant the kind of understanding to be found in an adequate astronomical theory. But it is to see that the world is good. The way in which Plato compares it with human goodness is instructive. For human goodness is achieved for him only when the human soul recognises its own good and pursues it. It is not something, he thinks, that belongs to the human soul as a matter of course. The human soul can pursue an evil path as well as a good one. It is because there is this possibility that he does not think of the life of the human soul as being completely the work of the creator. But the soul of the κόσμος is that. Its order and beauty, and so its goodness, are completely dependent on the goodness of the creator, in a way in which the goodness possible for the human soul, in so far as it depends on the choice of the soul itself, is not. That is why Plato in the Philebus says that the world soul is superior to the human soul. And he means by 'superior' here that its goodness is superior. This superior goodness is the work of 'a by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may justly be called wisdom and mind' (30C). That is one point. But we must bear in mind also the difficulty that Plato says there is in speaking on this subject. It does have the clarity that one might expect; and Plato thought that this was inevitable in any attempt by human beings to speak about these things.

To attempt to say that Plato in some way identified the δημιουργός with the world soul is almost to ascribe to him some kind of pantheism. In any case to do this is to interpret Plato in such a way that the questions to which he was seeking an answer are left unanswered. It would leave undecided the question about the goodness of the world. And it is important to have some idea why Plato speaks of the world soul as he does. The kind of interpretation we have been considering does not take into account why Plato speaks of the soul

becoming in body. For on this view the living κοσμός would be its own cause. It could then only be described, as the Sophist puts it ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης . The world would then have to be accepted as it is as a living Κόσμος , and there would be no means of knowing that its soul is superior in every way to its body. For in the first account of creation Plato says that reason was formed in soul, and soul in body. As he points, out this is not the correct order (34B-C) 'The god made soul prior to body and more venerable in birth and excellence, to be the body's mistress and governor'. So when the δημιουργός is pictured as having made soul he then proceeds 'to fashion within soul all that is bodily'. (36D). If we identify the world soul and the δημιουργός then it is difficult to see why Plato should speak of the creation of the world soul as he does. And if the δημιουργός is relegated to being only a figure in the myth, then it must be pointed out that he is the most important figure in the myth. Plato, in terms of his myth, might have described the activity of the δημιουργός differently. But the myth would have been completely different if it were not what it claims to be, an εἰκὼς λόγος of the creation of the world. The δημιουργός is central to the whole account.

The world-soul for Plato is not part of the myth of creation, even if there are mythical elements in his description of its creation. The world-soul is the most real and perfect part of the κόσμος . That this is the case is probably a reason why some have wished to identify it with the δημιουργός. The δημιουργός then becomes something definite, and something which Plato speaks about at different places, not only in the Timaeus. We have already seen reference to creation in the Sophist and the Philebus. It is referred to also in the Politicus myth. As it is seen in the Phaedrus, soul takes different forms, the two most important of which are the world-soul and the human soul. All the forms of soul, go to make up the total life of the κόσμος . And Plato thinks of this life in its totality as an image of the νοητόν ζῷον , which contains within itself all the different forms of intelligible living creatures. The reference to the νοητόν ζῷον is not easy to understand, but by it Plato seems to refer to that which makes it possible to see the unity and intelligibility of the life of the created world. It is spoken of as the model in accordance with which the creator works. It is only here in the Timaeus, among the dialogues, that Plato speaks of the νοητόν ζῷον . He does in the Phaedo, as we have noted, refer to the form of life which he there mentions together with God as being immortal and eternal. Even here we find the two distinguished in name, even if there is no account of the difference between them. How the two are to be distinguished is not easy to see.

The way in which Plato described God as unchanging in the Republic is very similar to the way in which he describes the forms in the Phaedo as unchanging and eternal, - as αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό . The problem of the relation between forms and things that become and pass away was the problem of how these things participate in forms. The problem of participation was one which Plato found it impossible to solve in terms only of that which is unchanging (i.e. the form) and that which is changing. In the Timaeus Plato has given up the idea that what becomes and passes away only does so because it participates in a form. His description of the form makes this impossible. For the unchanging form 'neither receives anything else into itself from elsewhere nor enters into anything else anywhere' (52A). This does not mean, however, that the nature of those things which are generated are not in any way related to the forms, for they are likeness of the forms, (51A). But now the fact that things become according to an eternal pattern is due to the creative activity of the δημιουργός .

If the way in which Plato describes God in the Republic is very much like his description of a form, it is also true that he never describes God as a form, nor does he describe the δημιουργός in this way. But there is a close connexion between the ways in which he thinks of the δημιουργος and the νοητὸν ζῷον. This is perfectly real, and can only be known by 'thinking'apart' from sensation with which human beings apprehend as far as they do by 'belief' the κόσμος which becomes in time. The former kind of knowledge of that which is real and eternal depends on that kind of intelligence which 'is shared only by the gods and a small number of men' (51E). Because this is the case the δημιουργός is able to look to the eternal as a pattern in order to create the world, and he sought to make it look as like the eternal as possible. The world is but one world that it might be an imagine of that uniqueness that is possessed by the νοητὸν ζῷον ; it is in time, for that is a moving image of what is eternal. But the world is not only like the νοητὸν ζῷον ; it is also like the δημιουργός . The δημιουργός 'desired that all things should come as near as possible to being like himself'. So here we see that Plato thinks of the δημιουργός in close connexion with the eternal world of forms when he says that the word is like both the νοητὸν ζῷον and the δημιουργός ; That was already suggested in the Phaedo. (106D). By the time he came to write the Timaeus Plato had come to think that there were in the nature of things two things that could be regarded as eternal and completely imperishable. These were, on the one hand the νοητὸν ζῷον , and on the other, the δημιουργός . They cannot, however, be identified. The δημιουργός is the cause of what becomes, whereas the νοητὸν ζῷον is not the cause but the pattern.

If these two, then, cannot be identified, it is important to see how each figures in Plato's account. Plato does not give an exact account of either of them, and with regard to the νοητὸν ζῷον , although

there is evidence that it was important for Plato, it is only in the Timaeus that he makes any direct reference to it. Aristotle in the De Anima (404b 16 ff) refers to what he calls the αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον . He says: 'In the same way Plato in the Timaeus fashions the soul out of the elements; for like, he holds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the principles or elements, so that soul must be too. Similarly also in his lectures 'On Philosophy' it was set forth that the Animal itself is compounded of the Idea itself of the One together with the primary length, breadth, and depth and everything else, the objects of its perceptions, being similarly constituted. Again he puts the view in yet other terms: Mind is the monad, science or knowledge the dyad (because it goes undeviatingly from one point to another), opinion the number of the plane, sensation the number of the solid; the numbers are by him expressly identified with the Forms themselves or principles, and are formed of the elements; now things are apprehended either by mind or science or opinion or sensation, and these same numbers are the Forms of things'. It is perhaps impossible to interpret this passage of Aristotle in detail, but Plato seems to refer to part of the subject matter of it when he discusses different forms of κίνησις in the Laws. He speaks there of what he considers to be necessary for any kind of γένεσις . He says:

γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκ' ἄν τι πάθος ᾖ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μεταβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἰσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. μεταβάλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ μετακινούμενον γίγνεται πᾶν· ἔστι δὲ ὄντως ὄν, ὁπόταν μένῃ· μεταβαλὸν δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἕξιν διέφθαρται παντελῶς (894).

What is important in connexion with this passage from the Laws, and the rest of the discussion of γένεσις there, is the wide sense that Plato gives to the term κίνησις . It does not just refer to motion in space, which is only one of the ten kinds of motion mentioned. It refers to all forms of γένεσις . Aristotle used the term in a similar way, although his discussion of γένεσις in connexion with his doctrine of the categories and his view of form and matter makes his discussion different from that which Plato gives. Aristotle distinguished between μεταβολή which is γένεσις ἁπλῆ in the category of substance and κίνησις which is change in the other categories. And this distinction rested upon his view that γένεσις ἁπλῆ is the becoming of form in matter. The kind of motion that Plato speaks of in the Laws as due to soul seems to be the function of the immanent form according to Aristotle, and from this point of view Aristotle attempts to combine those two forms of κίνησις which Plato distinguishes as ninth and tenth in the Laws. These two forms of motion are (a) that motion which always moves another object and is moved by another, and (b) that motion which moves both itself and another, and which is harmoniously adapted to all forms of actions and passion, and is termed the real change and motion

of all that exists." ὄντως τῶν ὄντων πάντων μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις 894C) It is when anything possesses this latter form of motion, that it is described as being alive. (895C).

It seems that it was because Plato thought of the κίνησις which soul brings to things as the real motion of everything that exists that he speaks of the νοητὸν ζῷον. In the Laws this soul is spoken of self motion, but in the Timaeus it is described as being created by the δημιουργός from indivisible and divisible existence, sameness and difference. This is what Aristotle is referring to in the De Anima. Its life in the Timaeus is described as a discourse which becomes possible for it because it is a union of what is indivisible and divisible, of what is eternal and what becomes and changes. And it is this discourse that enables it, as the Phaedrus puts it, 'to take care of all that is soulless'. If this motion of the soul is compared to physical motion which Plato describes as moving other things, but not itself, then the question naturally arises: How is its presence possible in the world? This is a question which Plato cannot answer. In the Laws (898E - 9A) he gives three different suggestions as to the way in which this is possible. Either the soul is present in what is visible, or else it is present in a body of its own which is not visible, or else the soul is completely without any body of any kind and directs the body by some miraculous power. However that question is to be answered, the fact that Plato does say that the κίνησις of the world soul, by means of the circles of the Same and the Different, as he calls them, possesses, 'rational understanding and knowledge' (37C) seems to mean that this κίνησις of the world soul is that which maintains order in the world. That means as we have suggested that the order is not self-explanatory, as the order of certain kinds of physical motions. The question that Plato is attempting to answer is not just 'Is there order in the universe?, but 'How is continuous order possible in the universe?' For that to be possible there must be some kind of sustaining cause. The kind of cause without which, as he puts it in the Phaedrus, 'all the heavens and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source of motion or origin'. It is this, too, that he refers to in the Phaedo (99C) when he speaks of 'the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed' and which possesses a divine force. (ἰσχὺς δαιμονία cf. Politicus 272E).

What Plato says about the world soul in the Timaeus is an attempt to answer the question about the nature of becoming which he first raised in the Phaedo. That question was raised there in connexion with the discussion of the immortality of the soul. What he says is that it is impossible to answer the question about the immortality of the soul unless one examines the nature of becoming, and now in the Timaeus his view is that it is impossible to understand the nature of becoming unless one takes into

account the real cause of becoming which is soul. Aristotle (Metaph. 987a 32) states that Plato in his youth was greatly influenced by Cratylus and Heracleitean doctrines 'that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them'. Aristotle says too, that Plato held these views even in later years. Plato was not only influenced by Heracleitus, but also by Parmenides and Zeno. He attempted to show how these two opposed points of view were both unsatisfactory. It was as wrong to deny all becoming as Parmenides did, as to say, with Heracleitus, that nothing remains the same, as Plato states his view in the Theaetetus. The view that Plato states in the Sophist that mind, life and soul must belong to that which is perfectly real is his answer to this difficulty. For it is mind, life and soul which in the Timaeus give to the world its character of being real. The motion of the world soul which is the real change which takes place in the κόσμος , is a union of the divisible and indivisible. It is not something which remains forever the same, as the form was described in the Phaedo, nor is it something that is forever changing which possesses no character of sameness, as what is bodily had been described there. It is the soul which gives to the world the unity and sameness that it possesses. Or rather the world-soul is the life of the κόσμος which possesses this unity and sameness. But it is no longer the kind of sameness and unity of which Parmenides had written. For this unity and sameness of the life of the world soul also possesses plurality and difference which Parmenides denied belonged to 'what is'. The world is not just a concourse of warring opposites, nor is it just a place of illusory appearances. The world is real itself, and its reality is the reality of the life of its soul. It displays order and design which cannot be present in anything apart from soul.

The way in which Plato describes the constitution of the world soul in the Timaeus as being a union of indivisible and divisible existence, sameness and difference seems to connect this account with the way in which he speaks of dialetic in the Sophist. That account is in terms of what he calls there 'the most important kinds', which are existence, sameness, difference, motion and rest. It is the way in which these forms can combine with one another that determines what it makes sense to say about what is. It is these that make it possible to affirm or deny anything at all. Unless these most important kinds were able to combine as they do in discourse, (which is itself regarded as a kind) it would not be possible to say anything. But that discourse is possible, for Plato, means that its possibility cannot be divorced from what is. The fact that discourse is possible for him

means that there is something real to which the discourse refers. If discourse is possible, and it is not the illusion which the Sophist makes of it, then it must be discourse about something that is real. And this discourse is possible about the world of becoming, and it makes possible a distinction between statements about the world of becoming that may be either true or false. 'Since discourse, as we found is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say 'it seems' is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false' (Soph. 264 A - B) This view of discourse as making possible a distinction between true and false perception and judgement, is possible for Plato because his view now is that it must be possible to refer to what is real in the world of becoming. And that reality as we have pointed out is the reality of the life of the world soul, which he goes on to refer to in the Sophist (265Bff.) when he claims that 'it comes to be through the agency of reason (λόγος) and divine knowledge (θεία ἐπιστήμη) that comes from God'.

Plato's view of dialectic in the Sophist is an answer to the problem stated in the Phaedo of the relation of the form to particular things. The difficulties of the account in the Phaedo are brought out in the first part of the Parmenides. If the form is conceived as αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ then it is difficult to see exactly how it can be an object of knowledge at all and how it can be related to the world of becoming. That view of the form cannot stand, if there is to be any knowledge of forms. If there is to be knowledge of forms then it must be knowledge of them as they are seen in the reality of what becomes. It is there that existence, sameness and difference, motion and rest are to be observed. The forms are known, in the way in which they can be known by human beings, when the order that exists in the world of becoming is known. For what is known about the world cannot be explained as only sensations which follow upon one another with no connexion and ordered continuity. This order and continuity can only be explained if one refers to the forms which become apparent in them. This is the point of the distinction that Plato makes in the first two hypotheses of the Parmenides. When he refers to 'the one' he has in mind, as the introductory conversation shows, the view of the form put forward in the Phaedo. That view made the form something which was completely separate and isolated from everything else. So the first hypothesis is: 'If there is a one' with the emphasis on 'one'. Then the form is a unity about which nothing can be said, not even that 'it is'. The second hypothesis: 'If the one is' with the emphasis on the 'is' is quite different. For if the form is, then its being can only be shown as it reveals itself in the world of becoming. One cannot speak about the being of a form which is completely isolated and separated from the world of becoming. Nor can one speak of the being of the world of becoming if that is completely isolated from the

forms. The forms themselves are what make human discourse about the world possible. There could be no discourse about a world in which there is no continuity and order to speak about; but it would be impossible to speak of it apart from the forms. So Plato says in the Parmenides: 'If a man refuses to admit that forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite form in each case, he will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same; and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. (τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθείρεις. 135 B-C) If there is to be knowledge of the world it can only be through the form. The enquiry must not 'be confined to visible things, but must extend to those objects which are specially apprehended by discourse and can be regarded as forms'. So Plato in the Timaeus speaks of the life of the world soul which is the reality of becoming, as discourse in the world soul and he thinks of this discourse as possessing knowledge of forms which enables it to maintain the world as it does.

In the Timaeus Plato speaks of circles in the world soul and the kind of motion which he thinks it possesses is circular. This is connected with his astronomical view but it is also meant to suggest that the motion which belongs to the world soul is eternal and unchanging in time, and is that which maintains the world of becoming. So he describes it as that which has 'the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason'. (τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δύνατον οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν Laws 898A) It is a form of motion which is unceasing and upon which all forms of physical motion are dependent. 'That which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion.' (Phaedrus 245C) It is this ceaseless life of the κόσμος , that Plato thinks of as being made according to the pattern of the νοητὸν ζῷον . It is what he thinks of as the continuity and order of the world that he describes in this way as the life of the world-soul.

But Plato did not think of this life of the world soul as self-sufficient in itself, although he does say in the Timaeus that it has been created self-sufficient. (33D) 'It was designed to feed itself on its own waste and to act and be acted upon entirely by itself and within itself; because its framer thought that it would be better self-sufficient, rather than dependent upon anything else'. This passage shows how it may seem possible to put forward the view that Plato identified the world soul and the δημιουργός . But it also states that the two are different. The motion of the world soul is described as most like the motion of νοῦς , but it is not νοῦς itself. For the life

of the world soul shares not only in indivisible existence, but also in divisible. The δημιουργός, however, as the νοῦς which brings the world soul into being, and gives to it a life most perfect of its kind, does not share in divisible existence, but has for his object of thought the νοητὸν ζῷον itself. The δημιουργός is the cause because he possesses perfect understanding of the pattern of the world. It is only by reference to these two that one can speak of the goodness of the world. For the δημιουργός himself is good, and the world is good because it is made according to an eternal pattern. And that is something that cannot be understood only by reference to the world soul. Its goodness is apparent in its order, but it cannot be just said to be good unless there is a reason for its being like that. Its goodness is not something that it just happens to have. It is present in the world in soul, and as we have seen Plato cannot explain just how it is possible for soul to be present in the world. Speaking in the Laws of the sun, he says that one cannot say how its soul directs its body, but nevertheless this is its divine life. For the soul 'is not to be perceived by any of the bodily senses, but can only be discerned by the understanding'. This means for Plato, as we may say, that the source of the life of the world is divine. It is not something that can be understood apart from its divine origin. We might be able to say that the world was moving, for instance, and that it was in some sense endowed with life, but we should not be able to understand this in any way unless we were also able to say that its life had its origin in something that we cannot perceive by means of the senses, but in something that can be understood νῷ μόνῳ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι. The man who believes this will be able to say that, borrowing a saying of Thales, 'all things are full of gods'.

So when Plato describes the world as the work of divine craftsmanship he is attempting to see how the world as a whole is good. And this is what he attempts to give an account of in the rest of the Timaeus. It is a goodness which in the end he would say human beings do not understand completely, though the fact that he pictures the δημιουργός as looking to a pattern that is eternal in creating the world, means that the goodness is something that the creator himself understands and applies in his creative activity. This is the point of Plato's saying in the Laws that the world is governed by a soul or souls that are good with perfect goodness. (ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν 899B) To assert the contrary would be blasphemy (899C) This brings us back to the distinction between cosmology and theology. For Plato in the Republic, God is a being of perfect goodness and unchanging in his nature. When, however, we come to describe the creative activity of God we try to understand something that can only be known to God himself. We are only giving a human account, and so our account cannot be perfectly exact. But because even human beings are endowed at creation with 'something that should share the name of the immortals' (Tim. 41C) and which is pictured as the gift of the δημιουργός

to men, they too can share in an understanding of the world which allows them to see the world as dependent on the goodness of God.

In both the Timaeus and the Laws the world is thus made to be dependent on the providence of God, that is on his goodness. It is this that Plato refers to when he says in the Timaeus in his address to the gods: 'Although you, having come into being, are not indissoluble altogether, nevertheless you shall not be dissolved nor taste of death, finding my will a bond yet stronger and more sovereign than those where with you were bound together when you came to be' (41B) Here Plato is referring to those bonds which he has described as those which make the heavenly bodies living creatures (38E); that is to the union of their souls and bodies. The will of the creator is a stronger bond than all of these, and this is what Plato refers to when he says that it is the goodness of the creator that is the supremely valid principle of becoming. God's goodness, we can say, as understood by Plato is not something that one can talk about only in the same kind of mythical terms in which he talks of the generation of the universe. God's goodness is no part of the generation of the universe for him, though it certainly is that in accordance with which the generation of the universe proceeds. The difficulty of cosmology lies in the attempt to show how this goodness of God is seen to be present in the universe in the things that he has made. The goodness of God cannot, however, be regarded as being present in the world as it is with God. For the goodness that is present in the works of creation is a limited goodness and an image of the perfect goodness of God.

One of the main difficulties that Plato faced was to show how the world could be regarded as good, and how this goodness is dependent on the goodness of the δημιουργός . For he saw that the world could not be regarded as perfect, and so the question was to decide how its perfection could be thought of as being the result of creation. The world is not perfect in its goodness as God is. The reason for this is that not everything that comes to be in the world is the result of the work of reason (τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργμένα), since there are things in the world that are the result of necessity. It is this latter element which restricts the creative activity of the δημιουργός . Although it is alien in nature to the goodness of the δημιουργός , it is not completely alien. For the creative activity of the δημιουργός is thought of as reason's overruling of necessity and 'persuading her to guide the greatest part of the things that become towards what is best' (48A) Plato describes this necessity as an 'errant cause' (ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία), and in order to understand its nature it is necessary to make an enquiry into the nature of fire and air, and earth and water, the four elements out of which the creator had been pictured as creating the body of the universe. The reason, as we shall see, why Plato thinks this is necessary is not just

that their nature should be understood, as far as that is possible, but also that their nature may be understood to be subservient to the goodness of the world. For these elements, in one way or another, have often been considered to be the first principles and elements of the universe (ἀρχαί, στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων). That is not their nature. With regard to them too, Plato thinks his account will not be strictly true. The position in this respect is similar to what it was in giving an account of those things that have come about through the agency of reason and not of necessity. The only possibility is a 'likely' account.

In his description of those things that are the result of the work of reason Plato had distinguished between that which is completely real and unchanging and that which is not so. The point of this distinction was to show that the world which becomes is made after an eternal and unchanging pattern. The nature of the universe as generated, both as soul and body, is dependent on this pattern. When, however, it is a matter of attempting to describe this changing world itself from the point of view of the nature of the change that takes place in it, Plato thinks that the distinction between that is unchanging and what is changing is not sufficient to show how becoming takes place. For in the nature of that which is unchanging there is no becoming and change, and so if one wishes to show how it is that things become as they do, then it is necessary to give an account which is in other terms than of that which is unchanging. That this is necessary is seen from an examination of the nature of those things that become. We cannot say that they just become, as we might say that that which is perfectly real is real. The world of becoming is not known by means of rational understanding, but through belief which springs from perception. To say, however, that becoming is completely described when we say that it is that which is known by belief involving perception would be untrue, for it is also determined in its nature by what Plato calls the receptacle of becoming, space. There are three distinct factors in Plato's account of creation: being, space, and becoming. Space is that in which things that become, become according to the pattern of those things that have being. But space is not a part of becoming, for it is unchanging in its nature. Plato thought that becoming cannot in its own nature be explained apart from something which is unchanging. This, however, could not be the form, for that, although unchanging in its nature, cannot be regarded as part of the world of becoming. What becomes are likenesses of the forms, and the possibility of their becoming as likenesses of something that is eternal and unchanging, depends on their becoming in something which although it is not in any way a copy of any form is yet unchanging in its nature.

That which becomes is described as necessarily visible

tangible and bodily (31B), but, if it is to become at all, then that in which it becomes must possess none of these characteristics. It is invisible and characterless. (51A). There is no becoming as such apart from that in which becoming takes place. Space itself is not a part of becoming. This is why Plato says that it 'partakes in some puzzling way of the intelligible and is very hard to apprehend' (51A). He is led to say this because space is not perceptible by the senses and also because it is unchanging in nature. It is, however, a part of the κόσμος as Plato thinks of it, and a necessary factor in becoming, apart from which becoming would not be possible. It is that by which what becomes 'clings in some way to existence on pain of being nothing at all'. (52C).

Space is not regarded as a result of the creative activity of the δημιουργός . It is one of the three factors which it is said exist 'even before the heaven came into being' (52D). The other two are being and becoming. By becoming Plato can here only mean 'all that is visible, not at rest, but in discordant and unordered motion' (30A). It is that which he also describes as what takes place in space before the creative activity of the δημιουργός begins. Plato gives a description of this condition of space which he calls one from which God is absent (53B) Plato describes the 'chaos' which existed before the ordering activity of God as follows: 'The nurse of becoming, being watery and fiery and receiving the characters of earth and air, and qualified by all the other affections that go with these, had every sort of diverse appearance to the sight; but because it was filled with powers that were neither alike nor evenly balanced, there was no equipoise in any region of it; but it was everywhere swayed unevenly and shaken by these things, and by its motion shook them in turn' (52 D - E) This uncreated condition of space is itself regarded as being in motion. Not only do its constituents possess powers of motion, but also space itself possesses a motion of its own: 'The recipient was itself in motion like an instrument for shaking'. (53A).

It is difficult to give an exact interpretation of what Plato means by this. It is clear, however, that this description of space as existing before the creative activity of the δημιουργός is as much a part of the myth of creation as anything else in Plato's account. In fact we may say that it is if anything more mythical. What is now being accounted for is not among the works of reason but it is that which comes about of necessity; and Plato thought it was impossible to talk about this in completely rational terms. Space itself is only apprehended 'by a sort of bastard reasoning' (52B), and those elements of fire, air, earth and water which exist in an unordered state before creation, could, as becoming, not even be apprehended by 'belief involving sensation'. For even that depends on the apprehension of some sameness and continuity. They are described as 'having every sort of diverse appearance to the sight'. Apart from the ordering activity of God they would not be known as fire and water, earth and air, since they would possess mere vestiges (ἴχνη) of their natures.

The very physical order that is presented to the senses is thus regarded as not the result of the mechanical combination of physical elements, or the result of any other kind of physical process whatsoever, but as the result of the design of the creator. That this description of space as a nurse of becoming is mythical is a consequence of the remarks at 48C ff. There Plato tells us that 'we are not now to speak of the 'first principle' or 'principles' - or whatever name men choose to employ - of all things, if only on account of the difficulty of explaining what we think by our present method of explanation'. There is, however, one striking difference between what Plato has to say about the ordering of the four primary elements of space as being a part of what comes about of necessity and his previous description of the works of reason. And this has to do with the distinction which we previously drew between cosmology and theology in Plato's exposition of creation.

Plato's account of the way in which God has ordered the physical elements of space is in terms of the combination of two kinds of elementary triangles. Fire, air and water are each of them different kinds of combination of the half-equilateral; earth is a combination of the isoceles. This account of the transformation of three of the elements into one another (fire, air and water), and of the formation of earth from the isoceles is not regarded by Plato in any way as a final explanation of the generation of these elements. He says: 'If any one can tell us of a better kind that he has chosen for the construction of these bodies, his will be the victory, not of an enemy, but of a friend'. (54A). The account that has been given is as far as Plato can see the best that can be given, but this does not rule out the possibility of an account which is nearer the truth being given by someone else. Not that this could mean that an exactly true account could be ever given. The nature of the subject precludes this: but there is no reason why some more adequate account should not be given. This, however, would be an account in mathematical terms, and not in any other. It is the possibility of improving a mathematical account of the physical elements of the universe that Plato is talking about here, for this kind of account was for him the most accurate kind of account of this matter that could be given. And any improvement in the account would be an improvement in the mathematics of the account, and not in the statement of what he says he is not discussing here, namely the first principle or principles of all things.

An account of physical processes in terms of mathematics was for Plato a far more adequate account than the kind of account which we find him criticising in the Phaedo as given by Anaxagoras. For that had been an account of what is physical in terms of what is physical. The mathematical account does not share this defect. For this makes that kind of account no account at all. But even of a mathematical account Plato thought the question could be asked: 'Why is that we see in the world precisely that order which our mathematical account shows to be there?' No answer could possibly be given to this in terms of mathematics,

and no improvement of the mathematical account would make this possible. This is the reason why Plato, when he first of all says that God ordered the chaotic elements of space, and remarks that 'the god then began by giving them a distinct configuration by means of shapes and numbers', also says 'the god framed them with the greatest possible perfection, which they had not before.' It is this latter fact that he regards 'as a principle we constantly assert' (53B). This is in no way a mathematical principle. It is rather, we may say, a principle of theology for Plato; whereas the mathematical order, however it is to be most adequately accounted for, is a principle of cosmology. The person who is able to provide a more adequate mathematical account is to be regarded as a friend and not an enemy, but the person who suggests that the world is not ordered for the best is guilty of blasphemy. This principle of theology for Plato is one which it is inconceivable that men could improve upon. It is, as he puts it, a 'principle we constantly assert'; there is to be no change in our assertion of this which is the supremely valid principle of becoming.

The distinction which we have drawn between theology and cosmology in Plato is one which shows that in an attempt to give an account of creation Plato is forced to recognise that there are differences of degree in his mythical account. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these differences of degree amount to differences of degree of approximation to what can be regarded as the exactly true account. For these differences of degree are not differences of degree about the same thing; that is about the same kind of account. The different accounts, although they are all mythical accounts, really amount to different kinds of myth about different aspects of creation. The world as created can only be described in terms of a myth: but the created world itself is made up of elements which are 'toto genere' different from each other. The four kinds of physical elements are entirely different in their nature from the nature of the human soul, even if as the elements of the human body they go to make up a part of the mortal part of the human soul. There could be no account of the generation of the human soul in the same kind of terms as those that are used in giving an account of the generation of the primary bodies, even if what has been said about them must be taken into account in any attempt to describe the mortal part of the human soul which is formed of these elements. The difference in nature of what has to be accounted for entail a difference in the nature of the account that can be given: as Plato thought there must be. 'An account is of the same order as the thin s it sets forth' (29B). This is why Plato says that he is not going to speak about that which is the principle of all things, for this would mean having to give one account of all things, and this by the nature of all things not being the same, is impossible.

Cornford (P.C. p.31) draws a distinction between two senses of myth in the Timaeus. 'There are two senses in which the Timaeus is a 'myth' or 'story' (μῦθος). No account of the material world can ever amount to an exact and self-consistent statement of unchangeable truth.

In the second place, the cosmology is cast in the form of a cosmogony, a 'story' of events spread out in time'. From this point of view the description of the world soul, the human soul, and the configuration according to a mathematical pattern of the primary bodies, for instance, would form part of the cosmogony; whereas the fact that the universe as a living creature is always in a state of becoming means that there can be no exact account of its nature as a whole. It is not the case that these two sense of myth are entirely independent of one another. There is only a cosmogony because no true and exact account is possible.

In a sense the distinction which Cornford draws is not a distinction between two sense of the word 'myth' at all. The fact that there can only be a 'likely'account is not a myth; this is something that is true for Plato. That an account is of the same order as the things which it sets forth, is no myth. What is important to see is the difference that exists between different kinds of myths. There is not just one myth, but as many as there are subjects for there to be myths about. The fact that there can be no exact account itself, is only that which makes myths themselves necessary. To speak about the destiny of the human soul as Plato does, for instant, in the Republic and the Timaeus, is to set forth a myth which is of a very different kind to the one which describes the nature of space before the ordering activity of the δημιουργός . Plato's myths form a family; and the Timaeus is more correctly described as a number of such myths rather than one.

There must be different kinds of myth. One could not, for instance, speak about the world soul in the same terms as one does about the human soul. There is, however, one principle on which Plato thinks all his myths are founded. This is his view that all things are ordered by God for the best. This is the thought that gives to all his myths their unity as myths. This applies equally to what he says about the destiny of the human soul, and to what he says of the configuration of the primary bodies. The differences that appear in the different myths are closely connected to the different ways in which Plato conceives his principle of teleology working out. The goodness of all things is not the same; different parts of the creation do not share the same kind of perfection and goodness. So any attempt to show by means of myth the goodness which one distinct part of creation possesses as over against another, will mean a difference in the myth that is given of each. But whereas the myths themselves differ they all share this one characteristic of being an attempt to show how that part of the creation that they describe is the best it could possibly be.

This distinction between different kinds of myth is no where clearer in the Timaeus than in Plato's account of what, on the one hand is created through the work of reason, and what, on the other, comes about as the result of necessity. The creation of the soul of the world is regarded by Plato as the work of reason, so also is the formation of the body of the world out of the four elements the work of reason; the fitting of the body of the world to its soul is also the work of reason; but that out of which

the four elements are designed is not the work of reason. The nature of space before the ordering of the universe is what Plato describes as ἀνάγκη . The universe as a living creature is the 'mixed result of necessity and reason'. Ἀνάγκη is that state of things which Plato describes as 'not at rest', but in discordant and unordered motion' (30A). It is these things that are 'accessory causes which the god uses as subservient in achieving the best result that is possible (46C). 'They are incapable of any plan or intelligence for any purpose'. (46C-D). The physical nature of the universe can only be described if we bring into account something of which a rational account can be given. This is why the nature of space is described as containing those things that 'produce their sundry effects at random and without order'. (46E).

Plato thought that nothing could be described as good unless it is possible to see that it possess intelligent design and purpose. This is what ἀνάγκη lacks, and only comes to possess when the δημιουργός takes over its random and purposeless motions and endows them with a design according to mathematical order. The nature of this physical necessity cannot in any way be called good, apart from the goodness that the δημιουργός gives to it. Even then its perfection is not to be compared with the perfection of the soul, for it does not possess intelligence as part of its own nature. For the only existing thing that can possess intelligence is soul (46D). The nature of what is bodily and only bodily apart from soul has no goodness. So the point that Plato makes in distinguishing between reason and necessity is a distinction between two different kinds of goodness, possessed by two different parts of the created world. If as we have said Plato in his myths is seeking to show the different kinds of perfection that exist in different created orders and that these differences demand a different mythical treatment, then the goodness of that which is necessary is different from that which is the work of reason.

The distinction, in other words, between reason and necessity is itself a distinction between different kinds of goodness. The goodness of the soul of the world, and of the divine part of the human soul is a derived goodness. It is derived from the creative activity of the δημιουργός , and is an image of his goodness, but its goodness is more like the goodness of God than the goodness of what is physical. For the soul is intelligent and is endowed with reason so that it can direct its own life after a certain pattern which God himself has presented it with, that is the pattern of his own goodness which is revealed in the creation as a whole. This is partly what Plato means when he says that the nature of the soul is self-motion. It has been made by God with the capacity to think and order its life in the body (whether the human body or the body of the world.) The goodness of what is bodily is also derived but it possesses no goodness of its own by which its motion may be directed. Its goodness is completely derived from God, for its motions are random ones without purpose and design. It cannot properly be called good apart from the order which it receives from God. All its goodness is thus derived.

The soul, however, is good in a different way. It can be described as possessing a goodness of its own. The world soul can be so described in that it is the cause of order and beauty in the world. The human soul can possess a goodness of its own, for it is by its free choice that it follows either what is good or what is evil (Laws 904C). There is, however, a difference between the goodness of the world soul and that of the human soul, which is described in terms of reason and necessity. This means that the goodness of the human soul depends on its being able to rule by reason those mortal parts that come about by necessity and which prevent it from attaining its own goodness.

There are, then, three different kinds of goodness which we can see in the creation, according to Plato. He describes these three different kinds of goodness in terms of reason and necessity. First there is the goodness of the world soul which is unchanging as being the work of reason; a goodness which can be described as its own. This is what Plato means when he says 'The soul, being everywhere inwoven from the centre to the outermost heaven and enveloping the heaven all round on the outside, revolving within its own limits, made a divine beginning of ceaseless and intelligent life for all time'. (36E). The human soul is the result of both reason and necessity, and so its goodness is not of the same order as that of the world soul. It is lower in the scale of perfection, and this is because it may lose its goodness if it chooses evil. But even its goodness can be described as its own if the choice it makes is correct. The goodness of what is bodily is completely dirivative and so it is described as what comes about through necessity and is not the work of reason. It is in this way that the myth changes in accordance as the perfection of what is being described is different.

There are two questions which arise in connextion with Plato's account which are important for an assessment of what he says. In what sense is it that Plato describes the world as good? and how is this goodness connected with his view about God. These two questions can be combined if it is asked what is the relationship between Plato's view of God and his view about the goodness that can be ascribed to the world. One answer to this question is to give an account as Plato does of the way in which reason persuades necessity 'to guide the greatest part of the things that become towards what is best'. (48A). To do this is to show the relationship which exists between the goodness of the world and God. To give an account of this is also to show how teleology figures in Plato's account of the world.

The nature of the good had been a central theme in the Republic. There the discussion had been in terms of forms and things that become as likenesses to their forms. The form of the Good is conceived as the highest principle in accordance with which the world of becoming and the world of being can be interpreted. Plato says of the form of Good: 'The objects of knowledge not only derive from the good the gift of being known, but are further endowed by it with a real and essential existence; though the good far from being identical with real existence, actually transcends

it in dignity and power'. This passage has caused a great deal of trouble in the interpretation of Plato. Amongst the more serious difficulties in connexion with it is that Plato seems to make a form the cause of the being of the forms themselves. Plato seems to have thought, at least here in the Republic, that the difficulty which Aristotle felt with regard to the doctrine of the forms is overcome by the doctrine of the form of the good. For Aristotle's main difficulty with regard to Plato's view of the forms had been how they could have any kind of separate existence apart from the actualisation of the form in particular existent things. Plato's answer to this question is that the good is what gives to the forms the reality which they have. In other words, the final principle of the being of anything, whether it be an unchanging form or its image which becomes, is its goodness. The main point which Plato wishes to stress, however, is that we must not say that this goodness is discrete and completely different for different things. But this does not mean that the goodness of one thing is the same as that of another, as if Plato thought that the goodness in all things was identical. Each thing is not as good as another. There is first of all the fundamental distinction of the difference between the perfection of the form and of its image to be taken into account. But what he did wish to say is that there is a unity about goodness itself, and it is this unity which belongs to the goodness that he calls the form of the good in the Republic. If anything is called good, then it can only be called this by virtue of its relationship with one form of goodness; and everything that is called good shares, even if not in the same way, in the same goodness. The fact that different things are not good in the same way does not mean that there is no unity of goodness in which they all share as if there were more than one form of the good.

The reality of things, in the Republic, is thus intimately connected with their goodness. In fact we may say that what Plato is saying here is that degrees of reality and goodness go together. The more real something is depends on how good it is, and this is why Plato says that 'the good itself transcends being in dignity and power'. What is most real is the good itself. Things are real in proportion to their goodness. The main distinction in goodness and reality which Plato points to in the Republic is that between being and becoming. What becomes is an image of what is, and its reality is only an image of the reality of what is unchanging. So also its goodness is only an image of the perfection of the form. This is made clear in the simile of the line. The four parts of the line are not depicted as referring to four different approximations to what is most real. The point that is of importance is the proportion that is seen to exist between γένεσις and οὐσία. This is a proportion between what is less real and what is perfectly real; and so between what is less good and what is perfectly good. What becomes is not something that approximates to what is perfectly real, as for instance Burnet suggests in connexion with the Timaeus when he says: 'The sensible world is the intelligible world in

the making'. (Greek Philosphy p. 340). There is no sense for Plato in which something that belongs to becoming could become unchanging and eternal. What he does mean is that the world of becoming is an image of the eternal world and what reality it has, and also the goodness that it has, is an image of the reality and goodness of the eternal. For if one could say that the world of becoming could approximate to the world of being, and in some sense could become that, there would be no reason why what is called eternal should not approximate to something else more perfect than itself. In fact the approximation would be an infinite one with no conceivable end. It is only if a clear distinction is made between becoming and being that we can begin to understand the nature of either of them and see also that the world of becoming depends for its reality and goodness on the reality and perfection of the eternal world of which it is an image.

In the Republic Plato says that he cannot speak of the form of the good itself except by analogy. He compares the position it holds in the realms of being to the place of the sun in the realm of becoming. What the form of good is in itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό) cannot be stated. To say, however, that the form of good is the most important thing to learn about (τὸ μέγιστον μάθημα) is to assert that we begin to understand the relationship that holds between all things when we understand, as far as that is possible for human beings, the goodness that resides in all things. The final meaning which human beings can find in things is a meaning to be seen only when they see, as far as they can see, the goodness that all things possess. To say, however, that all things are in some way good and that the reality which anything possesses depends on the form of the good, is to say the same thing. This is to give an explanation of the goodness that there is in terms of goodness. It is because of this difficulty that Plato says that he cannot speak of the good as it is. The fact, however, that the form of the good is said to be the cause of being to all other forms and also of the reality of the world of becoming does show how Plato was attempting to see how he could find some connexion between what is unchanging and what is becoming. Part of what Plato means when he talks about the form of the good in the Republic is that there is one principle whereby the reality of what is eternal and what is temporal can be seen together. This principle is the goodness in which both shares and which the world of becoming possesses by possessing an image of that goodness that belongs to the world of forms.

The difficulty of speaking of the good as it is, is the difficulty of showing how it is the cause of the goodness of everything, and Plato thought that when one tries to do this the account cannot be exact. For one can believe that the world is good and interpret what happens according to a principle of teleology as Plato does, but what account can one give of this goodness? That the reality of things is good might be clear enough, but what is the nature of this goodness? How can one say that the reality of things is good, unless there is some means of understanding the nature of this goodness itself. It seems that

in order to understand the reality of things one has also to understand the nature of the good; and to understand how things are good is a different matter from understanding that they are good. It was this question about the nature of goodness that Plato in the Republic thought could not be answered in any exact manner. All that can be said about this has to be said in a myth, and what Plato in the Timaeus is seeking to do is to speak of the nature of that goodness which he said in the Republic he could not speak about as it is. This means that what Plato has to say about creation in the Timaeus is only an image of what a true account of the nature of goodness would be. For goodness in itself cannot be spoken of, and the goodness that there is in the created world can only be spoken of in images. This goodness for Plato is the goodness which can be seen in the κόσμος as a living whole. There is for him a unity about the world which is an image of that unity which is possessed by the good in itself. This is the reason why he insists that the created universe is one and complete and that this completeness is apparent in the fact that it has the form of a sphere which is the most perfect of the geometrical solids. At least this is the way in which Plato chooses to express the unity of the world. As to whether this expression is exact we can only say that it expresses in an image the goodness and the unity the world possesses, for the true expression of that goodness and unity escape us. The sphere is able 'to comprehend all the figures that there are' (33B) and its ceaseless revolutions make it the best possible image of eternal existence. What is important is not to lose sight of the unity of the world, however we express this unity; for the unity is an essential part of its goodness. It is also to express the goodness that there is in the world that Plato speaks as he does of the world soul that governs the world's body. The question, then, that Plato is seeking to answer in the Timaeus is how we can say that the world is good, when the real nature of goodness is something that we cannot speak accurately about. This did not mean, for Plato, that we must give up any attempt to speak of this goodness which is to be seen in the world. What it did mean is that we must first of all recognise that this goodness which we somehow discern to be present is something that we cannot properly understand. We must seek to understand it in the best possible way we can.

Plato's view is that we cannot begin to understand the goodness of the world unless we are prepared to say that there must be a cause for it which is itself good. There is one view that he always strongly opposed. This is that the order and beauty which is seen in the world and which enables us to say that it is good is only the result of chance. If we see that there is order and beauty in the world, then we must assign it to a cause. No one Plato thought who sees anything of the order and beauty that does exist can say that it is the result of chance. For this would be to deny that order and beauty. This means that Plato puts forward a view that might be regarded as an argument from design. To say, however, that he puts forward an argument of the kind that is criticised by Hume would be a mistake. Plato is just not saying that the reason why we

say that there must be a cause for the design in the universe is that we know that every human design is the result of some designing agent, for he thinks that the design and order that there is in the universe cannot be properly compared with any kind of human design. Although he uses the figure of a craftsman to describe the creative work of God, he is fully aware of the fact that this is not to be understood in analogy with human craftsmanship. It is not that divine craftsmanship is an image of human craftsmanship, but that human craftsmanship at its best is an image of that creative activity which belongs to God. To put the matter the other way round is what Plato calls in the Sophist the deceiving art of the sophist. The Stranger asks Theaetetus to think of a man who claims not only to know how to speak about everything but 'to know how to produce all things in actual fact by a single form of skill' (233D). He says that must be an illusion. For it entials saying that a man could make human life and all other kinds of life. There is a connexion between claiming some kind of universal knowledge about all things and this ability to know how all things are made. Plato seems to suggest that to know how to speak about all things would imply a knowledge of how the whole universe, 'men, all other animals, and plants, and sea and sky and earth and gods and everything else there is are made'. If any man claimed a knowledge of this kind, his knowledge would be only of illusions. He would not have understood that the world is of such a nature that such knowledge is impossible. All such a man could produce would be 'illusions in discourse'. (τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα) and he would know nothing about the realities of life. (τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων πραγενομένων 234E). The same distinction is made by Plato in a later passage of Sophist when he draws a firm distinction between human craftsmanship and divine craftsmanship (265). In both these passages we see that Plato thinks that to recognise that the world is the work of divine craftsmanship is not something that can be taught someone as one piece of knowledge among others. The Sophist is a person who makes it just that. To know that the world is the work of divine craftsmanship is, however, something that one comes to know not through any account that human beings might provide and be prepared to describe as exact. For if someone did attempt to explain to the young how it is that 'everything is made', then Plato thinks that 'the majority of them as they advance in age and after some time, would of necessity be compelled to apprehend things clearly as they are, as they come into close contact with the reality of things' and would give up their former beliefs. This is a matter of persuasion Plato thinks. It is not something that one can expect to see immediately on the first hearing.

Theaetetus is prepared to accept the view that the world is the result of divine craftsmanship and so the Stranger says that there will be no need for him to use arguments to persuade him of its truth (τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίως ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν 265D)

and he will assume that 'what is called natural is made by divine art and that the things that are made by men by human art. So there are according to this account two arts of production, the one which is human, and the other which is divine'. (265E). Plato goes on to argue that it is human art that is an image of divine art; that human beings imitate the design they see in nature. So it is clear that Plato is not saying that we see design in nature because we work by design ourselves, for this human design itself is in fact part of the design we observe in the world and which we attribute to the creative activity of God as its cause. Plato here lays it down ' as an hypothesis' that the world is the work of divine craftsmanship. This is the account that he will attempt to give, though he recognises that others may give different accounts. For Plato all other accounts would certainly miss the mark. The goodness of the world is not independent; it just does not exist without any reason. What men cannot do is to assign to themselves the role of God and give an accurate account of that goodness. When Plato assigns the world to God as its creator, he is then stating that the world for him is good and that it contains a meaning and purpose which he cannot completely explain. The true meaning of the world, that is its goodness, depends on goodness that is beyond the world itself and cannot be regarded as a part of the world, but it nevertheless appears in the world as the work of divine creation.

However the world is not completely good. There is also evil in the world which is contrary to that goodness that is revealed in the work of divine creation. 'Evils can never be destroyed; for there must always be something that is necessarily opposed to the good. They have, however, no place amongst the gods, but of necessity hover around this mortal nature and this world'. (Theaetetus 176A). Plato describes evils in this passage in the same language as he uses in the Timaeus to describe that which the δημιουργός takes over and persuades by reason. Plato's view of ἀνάγκη , and so of evil is not easy to understand. His description of evil 'hovering about this mortal nature and this world' is comparable with his description of space as a disorderly state before the creation. It is out of this state of ἀνάγκη in which the four elements are that Plato pictures the δημιουργός forming the body of the world. The world is, however, not only an ordering of a primordial chaos but its life is the life of a soul, and the nature of this soul is such that it has no ἀνάγκη about it. It is completely the work of reason. Apart from this Plato could not speak of the world as'a perceptible god, supreme in greatness and excellence, in beauty and perfection'. (92C). The cosmos as a whole possesses a harmony and perfection even though there is evil present in it, for the world as created is one in which reason has persuaded necessity to order things for the best.

There has been some disagreement over the way in which Plato's view of necessity is to be interpreted. Cornford criticises the interpretation which was put forward by Taylor. Taylor makes two points about ἀνάγκη . "(1) Plato emphatically does not mean that some things are due to intelligence and others to mere mechanism. 'Mechanism' comes in only as the 'subordinate' of intelligent purpose, which is the 'principle' of all undertakings. Apparently ψυχαί are altogether the product of intelligence, but nothing is the unaided product of necessity. (2) Also as the name πλανωμένη αἰτία shows, this 'mechanism', if we are to call it so, is supposed to be the most prominent in the apparently anomalous, exceptional, and singular' (p.300). He says also: 'If we could ever have complete knowledge, we should find that ἀνάγκη had vanished from our account of the world'. (p.301). Cornford objects to this view on the ground that it is 'inspired by the wish to make Plato's divine Reason an omnipotent'God'.' Cornford is right in objecting to Taylor's suggestion that with a complete knowledge we should find that ἀνάγκη had vanished from our account of the world. For Plato ἀνάγκη is not just something that figures in the account that he gives of the world, but it is meant to be something real in the world itself. But as we shall see it is difficult to separate completely what Plato speaks of as νοῦς and ἀνάγκη . They figure in his account together, and any attempt to separate them completely from one another gives a false impression of Plato's view.

Certainly Plato's view of the δημιουργός is not that he is omnipotent. But it is difficult to see how any intelligible meaning can be given to that idea, and that means that there cannot be any sense in saying that that God is either omnipotent or not. What Plato is concerned with is the goodness of the δημιουργός and that goodness as it is revealed in the world is something that he speaks about in terms both of νοῦς and ἀνάγκη .

Plato describes the imperfection of the world in terms of ἀνάγκη . But not just in terms of that, but in terms of that in so far as it is the material upon which νοῦς works. There is a contrast between the two also. Νοῦς possesses every kind of perfection, whereas ἀνάγκη is a description of what is imperfect, but the perfection of the world is superior to its imperfection, in such a way that the world is the best possible. We have already seen that ἀνάγκη has no goodness which can be said to be its own, but that its goodness is completely derived from the creative activity of the δημιουργός . Plato regards those things that are constituted of necessity as 'subservient causes'. The δημιουργός 'uses these causes as subservient, while he himself contrived the good in all things that come to be'. Now this goodness that can be discerned in those things that come to be is not dependent on the nature of ἀνάγκη itself. The good is completely distinct in nature from that which is necessary. This is a distinction that Plato draws in other terms in the Philebus (54C) when he says: 'That for the sake of which anything is generated is in the class of the good, and that which is generated for the sake of something else must be placed in another class'. What is necessary and described by

Plato as being taken over by the δημιουργός , cannot be placed in the class of the good, but must be regarded from the point of view of its existing for the sake of something else. There are two kinds of causes 'the necessary and the divine'. (Timaeus 68E) Plato goes on to say that the reason why we should seek to discover the divine cause is the attainment of that happiness of which human nature is capable. But it is also necessary to discover the nature of necessary causes, for without this knowledge it will not be possible to understand the divine as that should be understood.

The distinction between the necessary and the good is of great importance for Plato. We have noted that Plato distinguishes between the different kinds of goodness that are possessed by different parts of the world by his use of the distinction between reason and necessity. We have also seen that Plato thought that there is a proportion between the reality of things and their goodness. This means that Plato thought that there is a difference in reality between what is necessary and what is good. There are other passages in Plato which elucidate his meaning. First of all there is the statement in the Phaedo which distinguishes between the real cause and that without which a cause could not be a cause. The example that is given is that of Socrates explaining the reason why he stays in prison rather than run off to Megara or Boeotia. The point is that there are certain things which are necessary for certain kinds of human activity. Socrates says: 'If anyone should say that without possessing such things as bones and sinews, and whatever else I have, I could not do as I pleased, he would speak the truth'. (99B) These are the kind of things without which what Socrates calls here the true cause could not be a cause. They are those causes which are called in the Timaeus subservient causes (συναίτια) They are necessary by nature, and they determine in some way the nature of human action. But they cannot be thought of as the final cause of that kind of action. They are necessary means to that action. Socrates claims that the final cause of this action is what he considers in the circumstances to be good, and his determination of what this is does not depend on the constitution of his bones and sinews, even if the way in which he achieves his end does. It is pointless as far as Socrates is concerned to attempt to account for human action in terms of physical causes only. For those physical causes would be equally involved if his decision was different and he did run away. The decision is independent of them. It is the same point that Plato makes in the Philebus when he says that 'becoming is always for the sake of being'. He says that it is only being (οὐσία) that one can place in the class of the good, and that which is called becoming cannot be so placed. The distinction that Plato makes here between becoming and being, is the same as the distinction he makes in the Timaeus between what is necessary and what is good, which is the work of νοῦς . The world itself is described as γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν . This phrase is one which Plato would not have used in the early part of the Phaedo where the distinction between γένεσις and οὐσία is clearcut. But now he attempts to

to show that the world itself is real, and that he thinks the reality of the world is properly understood in terms of goodness. Otherwise the world can only be thought of as continually changing and consisting in 'such things as are incapable of any plan or intelligence for any purpose'. (46D).

If Plato speaks here about γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν , this does not mean that the distinction which he draws at the beginning of the Timaeus between being and becoming as between 'that which is always real and has no becoming and that which is always becoming and is never real', no longer holds for him. He wants now to show that the κοσμος cannot be described by means of one of these only, but that both must be taken into account. In doing this he is showing also how it is possible to speak about the reality of that which becomes. This reality cannot be unchanging; but neither is it to be described in such a way that it cannot be described as real, because it is always in a state of change where nothing remains the same. In fact merely as γένεσις , becoming cannot be said to have any reality at all. It is only when we bring in the end for which it exists, and so see what its goodness is, that we can speak of its being and reality. If one does not attempt to speak about the reality of what becomes in terms of its goodness, then one is bound up in the realm of the necessary and one has no understanding of the nature of the world. For the world is a sensible κόσμος ; it becomes in time, and is not eternal and unchanging. But its becoming is not something which is without any kind of order or measure. It is not something about which one can say nothing definite. It is not in this sense an unlimited chaos which has no unity or purpose about it. This is why Plato seeks to understand the world as the creation of intelligent design which in the Philebus he describes as due to the work of a cause. What is caused as the world is a mixture of the unlimited and the limited. This becoming differs only in name from what is created, and the cause of this becoming differs only in name from the creative agent of the world. So the Philebus agrees with the Timaeus in that it is an attempt to see how there is order in the world, and it attempts to do this by referring to the goodness of the world.

This is a central point in Plato's account. The reality which this world of becomming possesses is the order it possesses, and this order and measure is put by Plato is the class of the good. It is this which gives to becoming the being it has. This is the nature of γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν . At the end of the Philebus when Plato gives a classification of what is good in order of prbority he places at the head of his list 'measure, moderation, fitness, and all which is to be considered similar to these'. This is the choice of what he chooses to call here ἡ ἀΐδιος φύσις . (66A). It is the order which exists in the world as a whole which gives it its goodness and which enables us to speak of its reality even if it becomes.

If we leave the good out of account, then in speaking of the world we can only speak of what is necessary. We are then talking about becoming as becoming without attempting to see its relationship with being. As to this kind of pursuit Plato says: 'When a man for sake of recreation, lays aside discourse about eternal things and gains an innocent pleasure from the consideration of such plausible accounts of becoming, he will add to his life a sober and sensible pastime'. (59C). Plato did not think, however, that this plausible account of what is necessary was unrelated to what he calls 'discourse about eternal things', by which he means especially the goodness of things. This he makes clear at 69A. 'The divine we should search out in all things for the sake of the life of such happiness as nature permits; the necessary for the sake of the divine, reflecting that apart from the necessary those other objects of our serious study cannot be perceived or communicated nor can we in any other way have part or lot in them.' The point of this remarks seems to be that the necessity which does exist in the world is something that must be accounted for as accurately as possible, in order that it might be seen that even the necessity in the world is not something which is completely unordered but which, as Plato puts it, has been persuaded by reason to guide the greatest part of things that become for the best. This means that Plato when he gives his account of what comes about by necessity seeks to show to the best of his ability the order which exists in the realm of what is necessary. In other words his description of necessity is an attempt to show how 'necessity has been persuaded by reason to guide the greatest part of things that become for the best'. The goodness and purpose that Plato believes can be discerned in the world could not be there unless what is necessary had been so persuaded by reason. He gives, for instance, an account of vision in terms of necessary causes (δυναιτία). This is for the most part a description of vision as a physical process and such a description can only be given in terms of necessary causes. There are, however, elements in the account which cannot be regarded as a description of necessary causes. This illustrates the point that Plato makes at 68E: 'The δημιουργός made use of causes of this order as subservient, while he himself contrived the good in all things that come to be.' The purpose of vision, which defines its goodness, is the work of the δημιουργός.

An account of necessary causes is for Plato only an account of what becomes, and that becoming is necessary for him does mean that the physical processes of becoming possess in their nature something which is independent of the creative activity of the δημιουργός. But becoming as it is in the created world is something which is not completely independent of his activity, for that necessity which belongs to becoming has been persuaded. As a result of this creative activity what is necessary has been given an order and purpose which depends on the goodness of the creator. The chaos which Plato describes as existing

before the creation in his myth is not part of the world as it is. This is how Plato attempts to show that the physical processes of the world are not completely dependent on the ordering activity of the δημιουργός, in so far as he does not create what is physical, but gives to it the order and design it possesses. That this is the case, that is, that the physical processes of the world are partly dependent upon, and partly independent of the δημιουργός, means that in giving an account of what comes about of necessity we are not giving an account that is entirely disconnected with what is called the 'discourse about eternal things'. Only, in attempting to describe the physical processes as physical processes and as nothing else, all that is being given is a description of the 'mechanism' for instance, by which vision works. This is how things happen of necessity. It means that they could not happen otherwise. But this is not all. The fact that they happen as they do is not only due to the nature of the physical constituents of these processes, but is also due to the persuasion of the processes by reason. That this is the case is clear from the fact that Plato finds it almost impossible to say anything about a state of becoming in which the primary elements of the universe have not been ordered in the best possible way by the δημιουργός. It is because even necessity is seen to have the order it does have that Plato says that the study of necessary causes is needed for an understanding of those things which are the objects of 'serious study'.

Aristotle distinguished between three senses of the word necessary, and these distinctions seem to be influenced by the way Plato thought about the matter. They are: (a) That which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, (b) That without which good is impossible, (c) That which cannot be otherwise but is absolutely necessary. (Metaphysics 1072b12 ff.) It is the last sense of the word that he regards as primary, and it is 'from this sense of 'necessary' that all the others are somehow derived.' (1015 a 35). In Plato's account of what comes about by necessity senses (a) and (b) are included, for in his description of necessity he speaks of that as necessary which comes about at random and without any order (46E): he also speaks of necessary causes, and seems to have thought of these as those without which the good could not be. That is, the goodness of the world is limited by necessity. The goodness that the world possesses could not be apart from the necessity that exists. This means that to attempt to say in what way the world is good is impossible apart from an account of the necessity that there is in the world.

The nature of necessity thus shows how the goodness of the world is a limited goodness, but it does not show us the nature of the goodness that does exist in the world itself. This is clear from the account that Plato gives of the creation of men. It is a necessary characteristic of the human body that 'dense bone and much flesh cannot go together with keenly responsive sensation. For if these two characters had consented to

coincide the structure of the head would have possessed them above all, and the human race, bearing a head fortified with flesh and sinew, would have enjoyed a life twice or many times as long as now, healthier and more free from pain. But as it was, the artificers who brought us into being reckoned whether they should have a long-lived but inferior race or one with a shorter life but nobler, and agreed that everyone must on all accounts prefer the shorter and better life to the longer and worse'. (75 A-C). The creation of the human race is itself a mixed result of reason and necessity, but a description of what is necessary about it only would not help to see how it is that the gods created the best possible life for human beings. This is something that can only be seen by reason and understanding, but this understanding would not be possible apart from as accurate as possible knowledge of what is necessary as being subservient causes of what is good.

In describing the physical process of vision, for example, we give an account of how vision works. But this does not allow us to understand why there should be any such thing as vision. When, however, we seek the reason for it we also understand that the necessity of it is something that fits in with its purpose. This is the way in which Plato sees the necessary as something without which the good could not be. A true understanding of what is necessary in the world of becoming is impossible unless the goodness or purpose of this becoming is seen. So in the case of vision Plato would agree with the judgment of Leibniz when he says: "I advise those who have any sentiment of piety and indeed of true philosophy to hold aloof from the expression of certain pretentious minds who instead of saying that eyes were made for seeing, say that we see because we find ourselves having eyes' (Discourse on Metaphysics ch. XIX). It might be thought that in describing what is necessary all that is needed is a description in physical terms of how what is necessary comes about. But although this is indispensable in giving an account of necessity, it would not be a complete account of what is necessary, for we would not then have shown how becoming always exists for being, that is for goodness.

When one sees how becoming always exists for being then what one understands is not the necessary causes but the divine ones, and Plato thought it was necessary to keep these apart. For to understand how becoming always exists for the sake of being is to understand that the world is good. So there is a goodness about vision. Its goodness consists in the fact that through it men are able to study the heavens and the universe and so the serious study of the world which is philosophy becomes possible. Plato's view about the relation between the neces ary and the good is that it is possible for two people to agree about the working of necessary causes, that is they could give the same description of them, but they could disagree about the purpose of what they describe. For one might see no purpose where the other might do so, and so the one would not be prepared to see any divine causes in things, whereas the other would. As for the nature of the necessary Plato thought that it could be so described that the description of it didnot in any way militate against saying that there are divine causes. In this case,

it is possible for two people to agree about the physical processes of what is necessary, but disagree about whether there was any purpose or design in the process. In that case, for Plato, their accounts of what is necessary could not really be regarded as the same. A true understanding of what is of necessity also includes seeing its goodness which is not necessary. Unless one seeks to understand its goodness, it is impossible to understand how it is that one should seek the cause of what is necessary for the sake of the divine causes. Then it will be possible to understand that even what is necessary is something which is as it is on account of the creative activity of the δημιουργός .

If we say that the goodness that is in the world is impossible apart from what is necessary, this does not mean that it is the sole cause of that goodness. For although what is necessary determines the goodness that is possible, the goodness is there as the work of the creator. But this means that the goodness is limited. The world is not perfect in its goodness. If there were no ἀνάγκη , and the world were completely the result of the creative activity of the δημιουργος , who had not been limited in his work by ἀναγκη , then the world would share in the perfection that belongs to νοῦς . But even if its goodness is limited, its goodness is the most important thing about it. Plato's point is that if you describe the world as a mixed result of the operation of reason and necessity, then you are giving an account which is entirely different from one which states that the world is the result of chance. Things do not just happen to be as they are. What they are depends on the operation of divine causes which are good. As far as one can see from the account that is given in the Timaeus there is nothing that exists in the world which is unaffected by the nature of what is necessary. Nothing is completely necessary, nor is anything completely the work of reason. When Plato describes the κόσμος as a 'visible living creature' then its goodness as he conceives it is the mixed result of both reason and necessity. The two cannot be separated. If emphasis is placed upon one over against the other, then one fails to see the real nature of the world.

Plato's description of the world as a 'visible living creature' is the way in which he ends his account in the Timaeus. It is this feature of his account that it is important to understand. He speaks of the κόσμος as living, because he thinks it possesses a goodness of its own. That is why what he says about the world soul is central in what he says. The world soul is particularly that which gives to the world its goodness. Plato's conception of goodness and the soul go together; and this applies not only to what he says about the human life but also to what he says about the world. As he puts the matter in his seventh letter: 'No evil nor good worthy of account belongs to things that lack soul'. (Κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν λόγου ἄξιον ἔστι τοῖς ἀψύχοις 334E).

But also he thinks that the existence of rational order is impossible without soul. 'Reason and mind could never come into being without soul' (σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν πότε γενοῖσθην Philebus 30C). It is a combination of both these ideas that leads Plato to describe the world at the end of the Timaeus in the following way: 'For having received in full its complement of living creatures, mortal and immortal, this world has thus become a visible living creature embracing all that is visible. It is an image of the intelligible, a perceptible god, supreme in greatness and excellence, in beauty and perfection. It is single and one in its kind'. (92C)

Plato's view of Morality and Religion.

Compared with the Republic, the Laws has sometimes been thought of as the work of an old man who has lost the enthusiasm and inspiration which can be found in the earlier work. The Laws is a compromise solution of the problems which Plato was trying to answer. The Republic, written when Plato was a comparatively young man bears many marks of idealism. But the Laws lacks this. However the differences between the two works seem to go deeper than this, and one of the main differences is that in the Laws we find much more emphasis placed upon the importance of religion in the life of the city-state, and this is part of the central importance that is given to law, and what Plato considers the laws to be. His view of law is that it must be an expression in the life of the city of the will of the gods. This, as we have seen, is something that was stressed by Socrates, and Plato's view is that 'the service of the laws is the service of the gods', (χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι.... πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς τοῦτο τὴν τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι δουλείαν)(762 E.) It is this because the aim of the laws is virtue. (631 A) Plato's concern here is with seeing that there must be a unity about the laws as there is a unity about virtue. He is criticising a view of law which was common at his time. According to this view the establishment of laws was determined by the needs which circumstances gave rise to, and not by the consideration in each case as to whether they would make possible the practice of virtue. 'For what we must say, if we are to speak truly and justly about virtue which is divine in nature, is that the legislater must take into account not just a part of virtue, and that the least important part, in making his laws, but he must consider the whole of virtue, and seek for laws that correspond to the different forms of virtue. Nor should he do as our contemporary legislaters do. For they only investigate and establish laws when a need is felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about assaults, others about ten thousand other such matters.' (630E) The aim of the laws being virtue, this gives them their unity as laws. If they did not have this unity, then there would be no means of deciding what makes them laws. They would have no common purpose, but would only suit particular circumstances as they arose. This, for Plato, gives the laws a divine character for they are dependent on virtue which Plato classes among those goods that he calls divine. 'There are two kinds of good things; some are human, others are divine. Those goods which we call human depend upon the divine. The state which receives the divine also receives the human. But if it does not receive the former, then it is deprived of both. (631 Bff.) Material prosperity is a human good, but this must be given its proper place as subservient to that good which is divine, which is virtue. This is the order in which the legislater must place them if he is to ensure that his laws are to achieve the end of virtuous living.

In order to understand Plato's view that the service of the laws is the service of the gods it is necessary to say something about his view on morality - a view which does not change in its essentials from the Republic to the Laws. It was here that Plato was greatly influenced by Socrates. The Republic is not just concerned with justice as a political virtue, but with justice as a whole, and there is no distinction between this and what he means by virtue. (Compare Aristotle Ethics 1129b 25. 'There is a sense of justice which covers the whole of virtue') In the second book of the Republic Plato discusses two views of what virtue or virtuous living is. Glaucon and Adeimantus attempt to defend a point of view which regards virtue not as a necessary good in human life, but only as a necessary means to achieve certain ends. There is no need to be virtuous because that is the right way to live. You only need to practise virtue if it is thereby a means to achieving certain other ends one wishes to achieve. Plato, however, argues that if virtue is thought of in this way, then it is a mistake to think that it is virtue that is being practised. For the person who lives this kind of life does not really love virtue for its own sake. The love of virtue is that which makes possible the power which it has when "it exists of itself in the soul". (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Rep. 358B). Otherwise the practice of virtue is a sham. People only make a show of virtue to gain their own ends, and it ceases to be that which falls into the most important class of good which in the Republic is described as those goods which are prized for themselves as well as their consequences, and which according to the Laws are divine. (Rep. 358A) For if justice were what Glaucon and Adeimantus describe it as then the man who thinks of justice in this way is suffering from what the Laws calls the worst form of ignorance. That kind of ignorance is mean 'in the man who hates, instead of loving, what he judges to be noble and good, while he loves and cherishes what he judges to be evil and unjust'. (Laws 689A) This form of ignorance is sui generis. Plato holds the same view about it as Socrates did. There is no τέχνη which will cure a man of this kind of ignorance. This is what Plato refers to in this passage of the Laws: 'You will understand that I am speaking of something that is very different from the ignorance of craftsmen'. (689C)

Both in the Republic and the Laws Plato wishes to show the falsity of the view that Glaucon puts forward as to the origin of justice. Glaucon states this view as follows: 'By nature, men say, to do injustice is good, to suffer it evil, but there is more evil in suffering injustice than there is good in inflicting it. Therefore when men act unjustly towards one another, and thus experience both the doing and the suffering, those amongst them who are unable to compass the one and escape the other, come to this opinion: that it is more profitable that they should mutually agree neither to inflict injustice nor to suffer it. Hence men began to establish laws and covenants with one another, and they called what the law prescribed lawful and just. This then is the origin and nature of justice. It is a mean between the best - doing justice with impunity - and the worst - suffering injustice without possibility of requital. Thus justice, being a mean between these extremes, is looked upon with favour, not because it is good, but because

the inability to inflict injustice makes it valuable. For no one who had the power to inflict the injustice and was anything of a man would ever make a contract of mutual abstention from injustice with any one else. He would be mad if he did. Such, Socrates, is the nature of justice, and such is its origin, according to the popular account'. (Rep. 358E - 359B)

Plato's problem is: How can such a view be shown to be false ? Both Glaucon and Adeimantus are represented as not accepting it, but as being unable to show that it is false. Most of the Republic and the Laws are devoted to showing its falsity, but also both works claim that there is no easy answer. For if someone possesses virtue, he possesses it ἔμψυχος, and there is no straight-forward means of communicating it from one soul to another. At the very end of the Laws this is what we are reminded of. After all the discussion that has preceded, the question about education comes to the surface again (969A) The education of the guardians, whose task is the preservation of virtue in the state, cannot be an organised affair, 'It will not be easy for them to discover for themselves what they ought to learn, or become the disciple of one who has already made the discovery. Furthermore, to write down the times at which, and during which, they ought to receive the several kinds of instruction, would be a vain thing; for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the knowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul of each. (cf Rep. 358B) And so these details, although they could not be truly said to be secret, might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand, because when stated they would have no meaning'. (968D-E).

'Although they could not be truly said to be secret'. Plato's difficulty is how one could show that a life of justice is in all ways preferable to one of injustice. That is what he speaks of in the Gorgias. It is not difficult to make people agree that a doctor knows more about health than a cook, who may only be concerned with catering for what people find pleasure in and not what is good for them, but it is not easy to persuade people that there is a similar difference in the way people live. For some things are good for the soul, others evil. Socrates at the end of the Gorgias summarizes what he has been saying: 'But among the many statements we have made, while all the rest are refuted this one alone is unshaken - that doing wrong is to be more carefully shunned than suffering it; that above all things a man should study not to seem good but to be good both in private and in public; that if one becomes bad in any respect one must be corrected; that this is good in the second place, - next to being just, to become so and to be corrected by paying the penalty; and that every kind of flattery, with regard either to oneself or to others, to few or to many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric is to be used for this purpose always, of pointing to what is just, and so is every other activity'. (527 B-C)

The view that doing wrong is worse than suffering it seems to be genuinely Socratic. But it is a view that can only be held by a person who honestly seeks to live a good life. For it is only the man who cares for justice who will be prepared to suffer wrong rather than do it. For if the only way to avoid suffering wrong is to do it, then to avoid it is to cease to care for justice. It is only personal pleasure that counts then, and in allowing that to determine what one does, one sins against justice.

It is useless just to seem to be good without being so. One might attempt to do this for reputation's sake, and other people may think one honest and upright, but the lie is in one's own soul. One follows the path of apparent goodness, while all the time one knows that kind of life is senseless. For that is all life is then. The exchange of one momentary pleasure for another. One lives for oneself alone. That is what Plato calls 'dwelling with a soul that is not healthy, but corrupt, unjust and unholy'. (Gorgias 479B). One has to see that the difference between a just and unjust life is not something of minor importance, but that seeing the difference between them and living according to what is just and honest is what gives sense to life.

The main purpose of the Republic is to show the difference between the just and unjust life, that is between a good and evil life. (τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου 484A). Good and evil stand opposed for Plato in a quite definite way. The distinction between the two is not an incidental matter which will make little difference to a person's life, but it is the one distinction above all others, which it is necessary to make and act upon in order to make life worth living at all. It is because this distinction is so definite that Plato speaks of the destiny of the soul as he does. In his myths the life which the souls of men lead in Hades depends on the choice which they have made between the good and evil life while they are on earth. (Phaedo 108A ff). He pictures the souls of men as choosing their future lives for themselves in Hades when they have lived through their stay of a thousand years there. (Rep. 617D ff.) Their future life is of their own choosing. It is a man's choice which is the deciding factor in each case. The words of Lachesis here suggest that a man's life is not determined rigidly by fate, but that he has a destiny of his own, which he is able to choose for himself. This destiny is the choice he makes, and this means that the choice is not an arbitrary one. The choice is not a matter of indifference; it matters supremely what choice is made. No man can escape the penalty of having made a choice that is wrong. Each man has to choose his own daemon, the way of life he would live. It is not chosen for him. Whether or not he will achieve a virtuous life will depend on how much he is prepared to honour virtue. 'Virtue is the possession of no one'. (618E)

None can possess virtue as a slave; its possession only comes through a person recognising it as master. The rejection of its claims a man alone is responsible for, and God is blameless. In this choice of a life for the future the one thing that is left undetermined is what a man will make of his life itself. This Plato describes here as τὰ ἕξις ψυχῆς (618B) Its nature depends upon its choice, for as the soul chooses a different kind of life so does it become different itself. The life of the soul, its nature (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν 618D) changes according to the choice it makes between a life which is good or evil. This choice depends upon the exercise of reason and a man must learn to see what combination of possibilities makes for a good life. How poverty and wealth, high or low birth, strength and weakness in body, quickness and dullness in learning and all other natural and acquired capacities of the soul combine to bring about a life which is just and good. For that life is good which renders his soul more just, while the worse life will make it more unjust.

It is the same distinction which Plato is concerned to show in his discussion of the difference between the philosophic and unphilosophic nature in the Republic. The true philospher as distinguished from the false one is also the man who is able to distinguish between the two kinds of life that matter above all others, that is between the good and evil life. The life of the philosopher is one which is described as being possessed by that man who has his mind fixed on what is real (πρὸς τοῖς ὄυσι 500B) and on that which is unchanging in its order (ἐς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα. 500C). It is this order of the eternal world which the philosopher makes the object of his contemplation. It is a world which knows no strife and injustice, but where everything is an ordered whole marked by proportion. It is in accordance with this that the philosopher orders his own life; his life is an imitation of this. It is this reality which is described here by Plato as divine; it is θεῖον and κόσμιον. And in so far as a philosopher lives his own life in close company with this kind of world, so does his own life become as far as it is possible for human life to become such, θεῖος and κόσμιος. (500 C-D) It is this life, and only this one that can lead to justice.

There are serious obstacles placed in the way of anyone who seeks to live this kind of life, but they are not obstacles that cannot be overcome. There is in life what Plato calls ἀνάγκη. It is this that must be overcome. There is a difference between what is good and what is necessary. (493C) This latter is a recalcitrant element in human life which prevents a person from being able to live a good life. It appears equally in public, and in private life. For the person who seeks to live a life which is ordered according to the good, the life of society itself proves an obstacle. Plato compares it to the life of a 'huge monster' whose low and insatiable desires must be satisfied by anyone who has identified himself with its interests. According to this view the way in which life should be lived is determined by the desires of the multitude, desires which make no distinction between what is just and unjust, and life becomes a matter of whim and fancy. Such a life is

incompatible with philosophy, and it is impossible that the multitude should have any love of wisdom. (493E). This means that the philosopher will refuse to take part in the public life of a city where the only arbiter is lawlessness itself. (496 D-E) There is no hope for mankind in a life which is determined only by evil desires in its choices and actions. It is necessary that there should be some other kind of measure by which human life is lived, and this is a measure which Plato did not regard as human but divine. It is the issue with which the Athenian begins the Laws by asking Clinias whether it is to a god or to a man belongs the merit of instituting the laws of his city.

The tragedy which Plato sees in life is that those people who are capable of becoming true philosophers are also the people who may be most led astray by ἀνάγκη. It is those qualities in a man which enable him to live the life of the philosopher which also when reared in and nurtured by evil lead him astray and destroy the possibility of his leading a good life. It is the corruption of the best nature that is the worst.

What is meant by saying that the corruption of the best nature is the worst is not immediately clear. It may seem to be just a tautology that tells us nothing. Plato does not mean it as a tautology even if it has the appearance of being one. For it is necessary to understand what form this kind of corruption takes, and to realize the danger of such corruption. It is the possibility of this corruption that interests him, and also how it may be avoided. He may well have in mind here the accusation that was made against Socrates that he corrupted the youth, and he wishes to show that the cause of the corruption is something connected with a philosophic nature itself, when the circumstances of its life are of such a kind that this nature is not allowed to develop naturally. What is important for Plato is that this corruption should be recognised for what it is. For it is the result of following evil and not the good. But unless the difference between the good and evil is recognised, then the corruption will go unnoticed, and that is the worst kind of blindness possible.

He says that 'evil is more contrary to the good than to what is not good' (491 D). He does not mean by this that evil is more contrary to the good than to what is evil. That is quite evident. His point is that human life takes different forms of which one form is better than another. This is clear from his question (491D): 'Do you think that great crimes and complete wickedness come from a feeble nature and not rather from a noble nature ruined by education, while a weak nature will never be the author of great good or great evil ?' The possession of the good is not a necessary part of that character which has those qualities which go to make up the philosophic nature. (503C) This is connected with the view stated in the Lysis that what is neither good nor bad loves the good on account of the presence of evil. The soul which is of a philosophic nature is neither good nor bad of necessity, but there are different possible ways of life open to it. Its native

qualities are such that its proper life is to be good, but it is not necessarily good. So the important question is to know the difference between a corrupted and uncorrupted nature. It is assumed that a philosophic nature possesses those qualities which make a good life possible, but not only a good life but the best form of human life. 501B). What is important is that it should be safeguarded against corruption, for although its native qualities are such that they can make the best possible form of human life possible, these native qualities can also make possible the most evil form of human life. But the difference between good and evil which is involved in this corruption is not easy to understand. This leads Plato to say (492E): 'For there is not, and never has been, nor ever will be, a character produced by education, whose virtue has prevailed and stood out against the instruction of the many - not humanly speaking, my friend, for with God, as they say, all things are possible. For you must cetainly know that while the constitution of states is what it is, if anything is preserved and made what it ought to be, you will not be wrong in ascribing that salvation to divine providence' (492E - 493A). The escape from moral corruption is not completely within the power of human beings.

There is a passage in the Theaetetus which illustrates this view of the Republic that the corruption of the best nature is the worst in very clear terms (172C- 177C). Here too the distinction that is drawn is between the philosophic and unphilosophic nature. Plato's discussion here is connected with his criticism of the doctrine of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things. (152A). Plato, either quoting Protagoras or interpreting his view, says that this statement means 'that any given thing is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you as it appears to you, you and I being man' (152A). In his statement of Protagoras's position Plato,claims that Protagoras thought that this view applied not only to sense perception but also to statements about right and wrong. Evil and good, too, are as they appear to different men at different times. There is for Protagoras no means of saying that what is good and what is evil is independent of what a man might think to be good and evil. What a man thinks to be good is good for him; and the same thing applies to what he thinks to be evil. So thoughts about what is good and evil are neither true nor false, but each man's thought about good and evil,is as it is to him. Education is then the bringing about of a change from the worse condition for a better, and this change is effected by discourse. 'It is not that a man makes someone who previously thought what is false think what is true (for it is not possible either to think the thing that is not or to think anything but what one experiences, and all experiences are true); rather, I should say, when someone by reason of a depraved condition of mind has thoughts of a like character, one makes him, by reason of a sound condition, think

other and sound thoughts, which some people ignorantly call true, whereas I should say that one set of thoughts is better than the other, but not in any way truer'. (167A-B).

This view of morality for Plato leads to a false view of education, and it is this false view of education that Plato criticises in the Republic. (518B - C). It is there called 'putting knowledge into a soul that does not possess it' and is compared to putting vision into blind eyes. As against this Plato states his own view that the soul possesses the means of learning in νοῦς , and for him, because the nature of the soul is such, there is a distinction between what is true and false with regard to morality. Whether the soul knows what is true and false with regard to this depends on whether νοῦς is turned in the right direction, for it possesses of itself the power to know the truth. It was this that Protagoras seems to have denied in saying that each man is his own measure. He thought that there could be no common measure by means of which something could be decided to be true or false. Plato's view of the soul, however, involves saying that there is a common measure which is made possible by the nature of νοῦς which enables the soul to know what is true and good. Protagoras's view makes moral improvement comparable to improvement in health. Even if some virtues can be regarded as the result of habit and the exercise of them, Plato thinks that there is at least one which cannot be understood in this way. This is wisdom, which he thinks is of a more divine nature and becomes useful or otherwise is accordance to whether it is turned to what is good or what is evil. (Rep. 518E - 519A) But wisdom is not a necessary possession of the soul. It can be used to both good and evil ends. It is, we may say, thought of by Plato as a neutral capacity of the soul. It is, however, the power of the soul which never loses its energy which Plato elsewhere described as the soul's self-motion (Laws 896D - 897B) Evil does not affect the soul as disease affects the body, for the body can be destroyed by disease, but the soul cannot be destroyed by evil. It can only become evil itself. (Rep. 609 - 612).

In addition Protagoras's view does not allow for that element in human life which Plato considered to be so important. It does not allow for the fact that a man's life is determined in its nature by the choices which he makes. For Protagoras, at least as Plato represents his view of the matter, thinks that the sophist is able to change a man's view of what is right and wrong without, it seems, taking into account the fact that what a man regards as right and wrong, or good and evil, depends on his own choice. The sophist cannot choose for the man whom he would persuade, nor can any man choose for another. His choice is his own. It is his own soul that does the choosing.

Protagoras's view tends to a relativism which regards the good as expedient; for it does not in any way show, as Plato wishes to do, that there are only two alternatives when we think about the life of man. For Protagoras there may be innumerable alternatives. His measure of what is good is a human one which allows for different points of view in that whatsoever a man thinks to be good is good for him. Plato, however, regards goodness as not dependent on any human standards which may be

different, but as something which is divine in nature and unalterable. Goodness is demanded of men, not because it is expedient to seem good, even if one is not, but because 'there is no unrighteousness with God who is perfectly righteous, and there is nothing more like God than one of us who becomes as righteous as possible'. (176C) Men who live a life that is characterised by a false show of virtue and consider that other men believe them to be virtuous do not know the penalty of injustice. For the penalty they have to suffer is a life of godless misery; that is the pattern according to which they direct their lives. There are, for Plato, only two ways in which a man may live, either in the way of divine happiness which is then the pattern of his life, or godless misery which he follows at his own peril (παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἓν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου. 176E). The true philosopher is the man who sees clearly this distinction and seeks to flee from the evil. He knows that in this world evil will always exist and he orders his life as a preparation for that world in which the goodness of God is the only standard of life, as it must be for him also in this. Otherwise he is doomed to live forever in the company of what is evil. To live a righteous life, however, is to become as like the divine as it is possible for a man to become. (φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι 176A).

Plato thinks that the philosopher is concerned with an enquiry into human nature. (Theat. 174B of Phaedrus 230A). In the Phaedrus Socrates asks: 'Am I really a more complicated and more furious monster than Typhon or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, the born heir of a divine and tranquil nature ?' The philosopher is concerned to discover what 'a human being is, and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other'. Socrates thought that he was carrying out the advice of the Delphic Oracle in putting this question to himself. Human nature becomes an object of enquiry, and what Plato has to say about morality and religion is an attempt to answer this question.

To say that 'man is the measure of all things' is not an adequate explanation of morality, for it certainly does not explain what human nature is. It might be possible to give an account of sense perception in terms of men being the measure of what they perceive, but when one comes to morality, then one is concerned with the nature of human life itself, and not with its relationship to something else (for instance the world of sense perception as far as that is concerned). The questions of morality are human concerns and there is one thing that men cannot be the measure of - that is their own lives. So if 'all things' is taken to include man himself then he cannot be the measure of all things, because he cannot be the measure of his own life. For Plato there can be no adequate explanation in these terms. That this is the case means for him that any attempt to give an account of morality in terms of what is human is impossible, and so he rejects the Protagorean

view. The same kind of difficulty arises here with regard to morality as we find in the Phaedo with regard to an attempt to describe the cause of generation and decay. The important point of that discussion was that there could be no account of what is becoming and passing away in terms of something that itself becomes and passes away. Likewise any discussion of morality does not achieve its point unless it is made clear that to account for human life in terms of what is human itself is not adequate.

An account of morality is impossible unless it is seen that morality itself has its basis not in anything human which is always changing in its nature, with no common measure, but in something which is unchangeable and real, and that is the pattern of divine happiness. What Plato is attempting to give is what we may call an 'overall' interpretation of what human life is. It is not an attempt to explain just one aspect of life in terms of another aspect (as, for instance, one might attempt to explain the political life of men in economic terms), but it is an attempt to explain human life as a whole or, as it was put before, to see meaning in life itself. There are serious difficulties, Plato thought, in the way of reaching such an explanation, but it can only be reached if morality is seen to derive its reality from a pattern and measure which is divine and not human.

Together with this view of morality as being dependent on a pattern of divine happiness goes a view of the human soul as godlike. The righteousness or justice which Plato speaks about in the Theaetetus and in the Republic is not something accidental to human life, the nature of which can change without radically affecting the life of the soul itself, or as we may say, the nature of the soul. The view of Protagoras implied that it could. Teaching morality was merely the changing of one opinion for another one which was considered to be better. But this view seems to suggest that the change can take place quite naturally without in any way affecting the life of the person who adopts these different opinions. It is just a matter of adopting different opinions, of exchanging better for worse. There is in this view no means of deciding that there is a view of morality that is the best; there is here no question of any standard or measure of human life which can be regarded as absolute. This means, too, that there is no point in discussing, as Plato seeks to do, the nature of the soul (that is, the nature of human life) with a view to deciding that its nature is such-and-such, and that certain possibilities are ruled out. For Plato it is clear that one of the possibilities that is ruled out is saying that there is no definite pattern in accordance with which the soul should live. The human soul is not only divine in origin, but this origin is seen in human life, in the life of a person who seeks to live according to the pattern of divine righteousness. He could not even try to live this kind of life unless the soul had its origin not in something changing but in something unchanging. There are only two possibilities - the good and the evil. It is not, however, that the soul can become both of these. It can only become either the one or the other. It cannot become both at

once. It is that which makes up the destiny of the soul. In fact, it is this destiny of leading, by one's choices, either a good or an evil life that determines the unalterable nature of the soul. This means that it is the soul itself and nothing else that becomes either good or evil. For Plato the soul is characterised by its destiny, and to have a soul is to have a destiny; a destiny of the kind outlined. It is the special nature of the destiny of the soul that makes the soul what it is. The unchanging nature of the soul is made possible because its destiny is of an unchanging nature.

This in turn means that the justice of the soul is internal. It is not something that the soul can lose while remaining in essence the same as it was before its loss. It is the soul itself which is either just or unjust. Just as the destiny of the soul is something which is unalterable, so is that justice which the soul seeks to make its own unalterable. The soul itself is not of necessity unchanging in its nature, though its destiny is. But because justice is unalterable, then in so far as the soul becomes just it also becomes unchanging, and becomes like its divine pattern. It is this unchangeableness to which Plato refers when he says that 'the unjust pay the penalty for their injustice, and the penalty is the life they lead, answering to the pattern they resemble'. (Theaet. 177A). The human soul can only seek to achieve the unchanging nature of the divine in so far as it follows the path of justice and what is good. For the soul that seeks the good is also seeking unity; and whereas there are infinite varieties of vice, there is only one form of virtue. (Rep. 445C). The view of morality that Protagoras puts forward denies that there is any unity about what is good. The good is not one, for him, but many, for what is good is what appears and is good to any man; so likewise it is with what is evil. There is a variety both about what is good and what is evil, and with this goes the denial that we can talk in any sense about the unalterable nature of the human soul.

Plato's view of the destiny of the soul is important in attempting to understand his view of morality. It is primarily a religious idea which he often introduces into his myths. The idea appears in the Timaeus in the account that is given there of the creation of men, and it is central to the discussion of providence in the Laws. It is also connected with what Plato means by saying that the corruption of the best nature is the worst. In the Timaeus the destiny of the soul is thought of as part of its created nature. Its destiny is what determines the state of its life at any particular time. It cannot escape it, for that would be to escape from its own nature. The human souls at their creation are shown the laws of their destiny. (Tim. 41E). Plato here states a view of the fall of the soul which he also speaks of in the Phaedrus. (246ff). For in speaking about human souls being shown the laws of destiny at their creation, he seems to suggest that this is part of the perfection that they possess at their creation- that they know the laws of their destiny. That the corruption of the soul comes about through forgetting these laws is what

Plato says in the Laws, and in the Timaeus what a person achieves through living a life of righteousness is a return 'to the form of his first and best condition' (εἰς τὸ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο εἶδος ἕξεως 42D). So what the soul achieves is not something of its own making in the sense that it did not possess this before, but what it achieves is a form of life that belonged to it at its creation. It returns to that state which it possessed at its creation as something bestowed upon it by the δημιουργός

How is this idea of destiny connected with Plato's view that the corruption of the best nature is the worst ? In the Republic it was stated in connection with the kind of corruption that is possible for the philosophic nature, and which would prevent that nature from fulfilling the kind of rule that Plato thinks is necessary in the state. But in so far as the pattern that the philosopher follows is one which is laid up in heaven, it is connected with this view about the destiny of the soul. For the best nature is the soul. As the Laws puts it: 'Of all things that a man possesses, next to the gods, his soul is most divine, because it is that which is most truly his own'. (πάντων γὰρ τῶν αὑτοῦ κτημάτων μετὰ θεοὺς ψυχὴ θειότατον, οἰκειότατον ὄν 726A). Corruption is due to negligence of the laws of one's destiny, a destiny which belongs to one as the creature of the gods. 'This is the justice of heaven, which neither you nor any other unfortunate person will ever boast of escaping, and which apart from other forms of justice has been specially laid down. You must pay particular attention to it, for you will not lack its attention. However small you are you will not be able to creep into the earth's depths, nor will you be able to take to heaven for your height, but you will pay the fitting penalty either here or in the world below, or in some more savage place to which you will be taken. This also explains the fate of those whom you saw becoming great from small beginnings through their evil and unholy deeds. You thought that they had achieved happiness instead of misery and that you saw in their deeds, as it were in a mirror, that the gods take care for nothing, not knowing how they make all things work together so that they contribute to the whole. Do you think, you boldest of men, that you need not know this justice ? The man who does not know it will never be able to have any true idea nor be able to given an account of the happiness and misery of life '. (Laws 905A-B). This view that the soul suffers the penalty for its unjust deeds is not merely one which Plato speaks about in his myths. In the Laws it forms the end of the discussion of the view that the gods do take care of human life. His view of morality cannot be understood without it.

The idea of judgment cannot be separated from belief in the Gods. It is a religious belief, and a specific view of morality must go with it. Plato's discussion of morality is concerned with the reality of the distinction between justice and injustice. That distinction cannot be a real one for him, if what is just and unjust is a matter of human decision. The difference between good and evil is then a matter of

human judgment, and even if human judgment sees a clear distinction between the two, that judgment is still only based on the understanding that human beings can have of the difference. The emphasis which Plato placed upon this divine judgment, however, is a much more serious affair than any human judgment about the difference could be. For what is characteristic of human judgments is that they can change, though in their change Plato would say that they change either to a better understanding of the laws of destiny or they do not. But there are different judgments. But the judgment of the gods on human life is one, final and complete. That is what makes the difference between the judgments of the gods and human judgments. Human beings cannot make the final judgment about their own lives. They do not have the understanding of the difference between good and evil that would make this possible. It belongs to the gods.

Such a view of divine judgment does entail the belief that the difference between good and evil is understood by the gods, and as understood by them it is unchanging. That is what makes their judgment an unwavering and final one. It also affects the view that a person can have about his life. A person who thinks that morality is only a human concern might think that he should live his life according to the difference between good and evil as he sees it. He decides to live like that though there is no reason he can give for deciding to live so. His life may be a noble and admirable one, but it is only his life, to make of it the best he can. But on Plato's view a person must see his life as a divine creation which in the end will be judged according to the laws of his destiny, which are not of his own making, but are part of his creation. His life is an attempt to understand those laws as clearly as he can and so 'return to the form of his first and best condition'.

Unless it is clearly stated that this is Plato's view, then many of the things that he says in the Laws and in other works are not intelligible. This applies for instance to what he says about prayer in the Laws. For a person who holds a view of morality which makes it a matter of human judgment, prayer is unintelligible. It becomes intelligible, however, on a view about morality of the kind that Plato holds. For according to that view the final word with regard to any human life and its choices between good and evil belongs to the gods who have a perfect understanding of the difference between the two. Prayer is for direction of the gods about matters of good and evil (Laws 687E 801). You pray to the gods because they know what is good and evil, and that is what a human being has to know if he is to direct his life according to the laws of his destiny.

Plato's view of morality, then, makes the reality of the distinction between good and evil something which belongs to the judgment of the gods. The distinction could not possibly be of this kind if it were only a matter of human judgment. In the light of this it becomes easier to understand the place that Plato assigns to the practise

of religion in the Laws. For that is not something which he thinks of as separate from the function of laws in the state. His view of law as aimed at the practice of virtue springs from his religious view of morality. His discussion of what he considers to be the most important institutions of society, such as the family, shows that these too are to be understood as part of the service which human beings owe to the gods, which he thinks is the service of the laws.

One of the most general points that he makes about the laws, when he says that there must be preambles to the laws, also seems to be connected with the same point. It is not enough that the laws should be stated and obeyed. It is also necessary that people should be persuaded of the rightness of the laws. The reason he gives for this is an interesting one. He thinks that the laws must not be external edicts which everyone must obey, but people must be persuaded that the laws are for their good, and obedience to the laws, if it is to be obedience of the kind required, must be the result of being persuaded that the laws make for the practice of virtue. The action of obedience to the laws must be ἔμψυχος, as all human action is. (904A) One must be persuaded of the rightness of the laws, otherwise there would be no sense in speaking of the destiny of the soul, and its return to that condition in which it knows the laws of its own destiny. Because virtue is divine in origin, the discovery of its true nature is all-important. But its discovery must be the result of persuasion and not of force. Plato considers the preambles to the laws of equal importance with the laws themselves. He thinks this because the law cannot be properly a law without the persuasion which the preamble makes possible. And this is the result of what he considers morality to be. For the origin of virtue is divine, and human beings do not have a perfect understanding of the difference between good and evil. If laws were just the results of human invention, then human beings could understand them, but because they have as their aim something that human beings do not fully understand, men have to be persuaded of their rightness, and that means making them a part of their own life, and seeing that they enable men to have further insight into the difference between good and evil. It is because we have no perfect understanding here that establishment of the laws is thought of as needing so much care, and whether or not human beings succeed in establishing just laws is thought of as the result of the guidance of divine providence.

This is the point of what Plato says in his general preamble to the laws in the fourth book. (715E ff.) The reason for the existence of the laws at all is that 'every man should make up his mind that he be one of the followers of God' (716C). In that case the laws must establish what relationship there must be between God and those who follow him. So the most important of the laws are those which apply to the practice of religion. This is so first of all because of the general relation that he thinks exists between the laws and religious belief. The discussion of atheism in the tenth book gains part of its point from the fact that

for him the establishment of the laws is ὡς ὄντων θεῶν (887A). But also the practice of religion has its own importance. In the Republic (427 B-C), the most important part of legislation, which has to do with religion, is something that cannot be achieved by men but must be left to Apollo, the god of Delphi. The most important, fairest and first of legal enactments are the 'founding of sacrifices and other forms of worship of the gods, daemons and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers of the world below to keep them gracious. For of such matters we neither know anything nor in the founding of our city if we are wise shall we entrust them to any other or make use of any other interpreter than the god of our fathers. For this god surely is in such matters for all mankind the interpreter of the religion of their fathers, who from his seat in the middle and at the very navel of the earth delivers his intepretation'. So religious practices are not thought of by Plato as the result of human invention; they are the gifts of the gods to men. There are two reasons why he thinks this. The practice of religion relates to matters human beings do not understand (τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμεῖς Rep. 427B), and these practices are given to men on account of the inherent weakness that there is in human nature. 'Child-training, which consists in right discipline in pleasure and pains, grows slack and weakened to a great extent in the course of men's lives; and so the gods, in pity for the human race thus born to misery, have ordained the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles; and they have granted them as companions in their feasts the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right their modes of discipline by associating in their feasts with gods ! (Laws 653C). But they are not just some forms of respite from toil. Their observance is the noblest and truest rule. 'To engage in sacrifice and communion with the gods continually, by prayers and sacrifices and devotions of every kind, is a thing most noble, good and helpful towards a happy life, and superlatively fitting also, for the good man; but for the wicked the very opposite. For the wicked is unclean in soul, whereas the good man is clean; and from him that is defiled no good man, nor god, can ever rightly receive gifts. Therefore all the great labour that impious men spend upon the gods is vain, but that of the pious is most profitable to them all'. (Laws 716D - 717A)

The preambles also state Plato's views on matters of religion. The first preambles have to do with the gods and family life (723E) and then with education which concerns the human soul 'which of all things that a man possesses, next to the gods, is the most divine, because it is most truly his own'. The necessity for preambles to the laws is described as κατὰ θεόν (722C). The main reason there must be such preambles is that people should be persuaded of the rightness of the laws. That for Plato means recognising their divine origin. That is how the general preamble to his own laws begins. 'Friends' we say to them, 'God, as the old tradition declares, holding in his hand the beginning, middle and end of all that is, travels according to his nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of his end. Justice always accompanies him,

and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To justice, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elevated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be a guide of others, he I say, is deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and may think he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed and his family and his city with him.' It is because human life is liable to corruption of this kind that people have to be persuaded of the divine origin of the laws, and in being persuaded of this, be persuaded of their goodness.

The importance of preambles which persuade of the goodness of the laws is connected with Plato's general view of morality which we have already outlined. If human beings had a definite knowledge of the nature of the difference between good and evil, and also the ability to live in accordance with this difference, then there would be no need of them. Their necessity arises from the weakness of human nature. It is as Plato calls it 'an unfortunate necessity' about human life. 'Human affairs are hardly worth serious consideration, and yet we must be serious about them - a sad necessity constrains us'. (803B). There must be serious concern for what is serious, and the most serious concern of human beings is God. Their life is dependent on God (as Plato puts it, they are puppets of God), and because the nature of this dependence is not fully understood, the practice of religion is the human recognition of it.

What Plato says about preambles here is connected with the way in which he speaks of initiation in the Symposium and Phaedrus. In both these dialogues he uses religious language in speaking about love. But such language is not confined to those two dialogues, but it is also found in the Republic and in the Laws. Why does Plato use such language ? The very use of such language shows that Plato thought that with regard to love which is so central to his view of the soul and so to his view of morality, what the soul can learn about the good it does not learn of itself and on its own, nor is what it learns just the result of its own thinking. The soul is initiated into the rites of love because what it has to learn about the good can only be learnt in living a certain way of life which is not of its own making. It has to be introduced to this way of life. Whether the soul does learn what it is depends on its association with the life of the gods. It is initiated into divine mysteries, which it could not understand on its own. It is only in so far as it shares in the life of others and in the life of the gods that it can understand what is good. This is something it cannot learn of itself.

Likewise the purpose of the preambles is to initiate people

into that life which is lived in accordance with the laws. For it is not something anyone can understand apart from seeing that it is a common life. Otherwise the idea of what the laws are will be that they compel individuals to act as the laws command. They are only external commands. Those people who think of them in this way, have not seen that it is necessary to be persuaded of the rightness of the laws so that they may share in a common life under the law. But that is not anything one can understand the purposes of apart from accepting such a common life. It is not possible to understand it alone and in isolation, for the understanding only comes in living the life itself. That is what Plato means when he says that the practice of virtue is the aim of the laws. Unless the laws are seen in this light, then what Plato says at 729D, for instance, has no sense. 'He who thinks the services which his friends and acquaintances do for him, greater and more important than they themselves think them, and his own favours to them less than theirs to him, will have their good will in the intercourse of life.' The laws achieve their point in the intercourse of life. Because that is so their point cannot be understood and realised apart from that kind of life that they make possible. But that must be a common life, and not one in which the conception of law is only an individual one. For then the laws are thought of only as means for the achievement of individual ends. The can be no conception of a common life.

For Plato the practice of religion in the city-state is a recognition of the source that makes such a common life possible. That source is the gods themselves. That is why the possibility of there being preambles is described as being κατὰ θεόν . The preambles apply not only to religious practices but also to the practice of morality. Morality depends on preambles as much as religion. What is most important about both of them cannot be a matter of legislation. With regard to morality it is a matter of praise and blame. For that which is most important with regard to morality can only be learnt through praise and blame. That depends on seeing the difference between a life that is ἀληθής and πίστος and one that is ruled by either voluntary or involuntary falsehood. The latter kind of life is the result of what is the greatest evil in the souls of men - selfishness, which leads people to think that their own ignorance is wisdom. (732A). Legislation must take this difference into account, but the difference itself cannot be legislated for directly. That is why Plato thinks of education as he does, as the persuasion of the soul of the rightness of the laws.

What Plato says about the gods in the tenth book of the Laws is itself a prelude. If the origin of the laws and virtue is thought to be the gods, then there must be a prelude to the laws which concerns the gods. The purpose of this book has sometimes been thought of as an apologia for the existence of the gods, and in this connexion it is described as rational theology. But what Plato says here about the gods is

said in connexion with what he considers the practice of religion to be. What he says cannot be regarded as a proof for the existence of gods apart from the practice of religion itself. The book does not just deal with the existence of the gods but also with their providential care of human life, and also with the kind of relationship that must exist between human beings and the gods. For the gods cannot be propitiated by human beings so that they condone any human action. So the importance of what is said is not just that there are gods, or to show that there are gods. In Book XII Plato says that 'the knowledge of the gods is one of the noblest forms of knowledge'. But that knowledge is not just to 'know that they are, but also to know how great is their power, as far as in man lies'. (966B). His view is very different from that of Epicurus who thought that if there are gods they took no care of human life. That was to deny the power of the Gods in connexion with human life. What Plato says at the beginning of the tenth book shows his purpose clearly. He says: 'No one who in obedience to the laws believes that there are gods ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word; but he who did must have supposed one of three things, - either that they did not exist, - which is the first possibility, or secondly, that if they did, they took no care of men, or thirdly, that they were easily appeased and turned aside from their purpose by sacrifices and prayers'. (885C). This passage connects Plato's view with what we have said of the relation that Socrates saw between morality and religion. The Socratic paradox, 'No man does evil intentionally' can only be understood, as we have tried to show, in connexion with this belief that the distinction between good and evil depends on the gods. For any person who recognises this, an evil action is contrary to the will of God. He could not perform an evil action without knowing it is against God's will. For Plato, as for Socrates, knowledge about the gods is not just knowledge of their existence, but also knowledge that they determine the difference between good and evil, and so determine the way in which men must live. In fact the two things go together. Human beings cannot understand what is meant by saying that there are gods, unless they know this power of the gods.

What Plato says here about the relationships between human beings and the gods is comparable with his purpose in speaking of creation in the Timaeus. For the interest of that, as we saw, was not to give some proof of creation, and so serve the interests of what is called rational theology. He does not prove the existence of a creator, for the father and maker of this universe is hard and difficult to find. His purpose is to show what saying that God is the creator means. And that cannot be understood unless his creation is seen to be good. But that is impossible unless the human soul itself recognises the goodness that is revealed in the creation. It is the same with the way men live. It only makes sense for them to believe in the gods, if they believe that the choices they make between good and evil can only be understood in terms of the relation between themselves and the gods. There is no

knowledge about the gods apart from knowledge of their power over human life. And that is why for Plato religion is concerned with morality. In fact it is with regard to morality, to the way men live, in relationship to other men, that beliefs about the gods are so important. This seems to be partly what Plato was suggesting when he wrote that men are the puppets of the gods. He meant that the decisions and actions of human beings are not just their own, but are continually under the judgment of the gods. So it is not just that there are gods. Just to say that, would be a form of impiety for Plato. That, as Epicurus put it, would not concern human life if human life did not concern them. But it does in such a way that Plato thinks that the most serious concern of human life is God.

Plato than is not just interested in showing that there are gods. His view in this respect is of interest when we consider certain kinds of philosophical discussions of religion. Such discussion of religion has often been about the notion of God's existence, and Plato's discussion here has been viewed in the same light. The question of God's existence is then looked at as if it is something to be proved, by philosophers who have put forward proofs, and by those who have attempted to argue against such proofs. Such attempted proofs, however, make it look as if the notion of existence can be applied to God in some way that we understand. As if it might be like discovering the existence of a planet that is not known to exist. If what Plato says about the existence of the gods is interpreted in some such way as this then the main point of what he says is lost. His whole interest in showing that there are gods is quite different from this. His point is to show that there are gods, but also to show that they are good, and regard justice more than men do. (887B) To show this is the best and noblest prelude to the laws.

One of the main ideas that Plato puts forward in the tenth book of the Laws is that the soul is prior to the body. His purpose is to state what is the noblest prelude to the laws, that there are gods, that they are good and honour justice more than men. What does this prelude consist of ? Of a statement that the soul is prior to the body. It is not easy to understand what he means by this priority, but it is clear that for him an understanding of it is important in order to get clear about his purpose in this book. The purpose cannot be interpreted as follows: Plato thinks that it is necessary to show that physical motion is dependent on the motion of the soul. He does not show this to be the case. In fact he mentions difficulties that there are in attempting to show what relationship there is between these two kinds of motion. His view is not that the nature of physical motion leads necessarily to the idea of the soul's self-motion. If, however, his view is stated in that way, then it is easy to think that his purpose is to prove that there are gods, if proving that there are gods is proving that the nature of the soul is self-motion upon which physical motion depends. Such an interpretation raises difficulties similar to those we have mentioned in discussing the notions of contingency and necessity in Plato's view of creation.

Plato is not concerned to show that there is a form of motion that is the motion of the soul. This is given as one of the forms of motion that exist. His whole interest is in showing that the motion of soul is prior to that of the body or, as he puts it is older than that of body - not that it is presupposed or implied by motion of bodies. To believe, then that there are gods is closely connected with seeing that the motion of the soul is prior to that of the body, and that it is the motion of the soul that governs the motion of the body.

There are two views possible here. Either the soul is the result of what is physical or it is prior to it. The Athenian says: 'I must repeat the strange argument of those who make the soul according to their own impious notions: they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things to be not the first, but last and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the gods'. (891E) Ignorance, then, about the nature of the gods arises from ignorance about the true nature of the soul. It is ignorance about 'the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin; they do not know that she is the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions'.

There are certain difficulties about Plato's view as it is stated in the Laws which have already arisen in our earlier discussion as to whether the δημιουργος of the Timaeus is to be identified with the world soul or not. Some have thought that the δημιουργός is to be identified with the world soul of the Timaeus and the best soul of the Laws. (897C) Such an interpretation seems also to be in line with what Plato says about the soul in the Phaedrus as being the ἀρχή of all generation and decay. What Plato says in the Laws is that soul is 'among the first of things', which seems to suggest that there are other things which are also first. Amongst these he would certainly place the gods. But the question he is discussing is not whether the nature of the gods is that they have souls or are souls, even if he describes the best soul that rules the worlds as a god. He is not prepared to say definitely what the nature of divine activity is. (898E) Still he does think that any view which puts body prior to soul will be unable to make any sense of what the gods are. He seems to be suggesting that with regard to the gods, the priority of soul over body, is one of the most important points that has to be understood, if there is to be any understanding about the gods.

It is very easy to extract natural theology from the tenth book of the Laws, and overlook much else that it contains which can hardly be said to have anything to do with that. When Plato's views here are interpreted as natural theology then all the emphasis is placed on the difference between that kind of motion which is self-motion and that which is not. The former is the true principle of change and motion in all that is. This is the distinction between soul and body, and that

distinction is fundamental to Plato's account. The distinction is first introduced to counter the arguments of those whom he calls νέοι σοφοί whose view is that 'fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance' (889B). The impiety of such people arises from this view and not from a love of sensual pleasure.. (886A) But it is impiety nevertheless, and the distinction that Plato draws between physical motion and the motion of the soul, and the claim that the latter is prior to the former, is meant to meet this form of impiety. It is this that gives the impression that what we have here is natural theology. But Plato thinks that this view that the body is prior to the soul leads the people who hold it to deny the existence of the gods. But then the view that they hold is not just that the body is prior to the soul. It is bound to affect, Plato thinks, their view of morality too. For their denial of the existence of gods which is a result of their physical speculations, prevents them from recognising what Plato thinks is the important thing - that the gods are good and honour justice more than men.

So it might be thought that Plato's purpose is to show that the view that body is prior to soul is mistaken, and in showing this to show also that what they think about the gods is mistaken too. But Plato's position is not as simple as that. Certainly the priority of soul over body is important to his view, but that priority cannot be identified with what Plato means by saying that there are gods. If it were just that, then it could be perhaps called natural theology. Plato's point can be better put by saying that the priority of the soul over the body illustrates what is meant by saying that there are gods. And it illustrates it in the only way that Plato thought was possible with regard to the view held by the νέοι σοφοί. Their denial of the gods is the result of their view that physical motion is what is primary. If they can be shown that view is mistaken, then their reason for denying the gods will be taken away. But just recognising the priority of soul over body is not to be identified with what Plato means by saying that there are gods. It would be possible to recognise this without recognising that there are gods. What is important too is to 'know the gods rightly and live accordingly'. (888B)

What Plato says about the motion of the soul as being prior to that of the body is only the beginning of what he has to say about the gods. Once that has been decided, it is necessary to go on and state what the nature of the soul is, and how its nature can only be understood together with the belief that there are gods. But even with regard to his statement that the motion of soul is prior to that of body, it must be emphasised that he takes for granted that there are these two different kinds of motion. He says: 'Let it be assumed that there is always one kind of motion which is capable of moving other things, but not capable of moving itself, and that there is always another kind of motion which moves itself and other things'. (894B)

The distinction between these two forms of motion is the

distinction between that which possesses life and that which does not. (895C). This distinction is central to what Plato writes here and also in the Timaeus. In the Timaeus the view of creation is about different forms of living creatures that are made after the pattern of νοητὰ ζῷα . This view of Plato's is also stated in the Sophist when he asks: 'Are we really convinced that change, life, soul and understanding have no place in what is perfectly real, that is has neither life nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness devoid of intelligence ? ' (248E) The reason why he states the matter in this way is to show the priority of soul. The soul is not just the result of the combination of physical elements, but its life has an intelligible pattern, and as such it is prior to the body of which Plato thought there was no νοητόν . So the question arises what kind of priority is it that the soul has over the body. It is the priority of intelligent life. 'Can we say that it has intelligence without having life ? ' (Sophist 249A) But that does not mean that it is the priority of one kind of life over another - that of the soul over that of the body. It is the priority of that which possesses life over that which does not. That too was the view in the Phaedo with the question: 'Does not the soul bring life to the body ? ' (105D) The body might be conceived as possessing a form of life of its own. But the way in which that is described in the Timaeus suggests that it is a life that does not possess intelligence, and whatever order it can possess is the result of the governing and ordering activity of the soul. So from a general point of view what Plato speaks of as ψυχή is the ordered life of anything. That is why he speaks of the world soul. It is the intelligent life of the cosmos. And that cannot be thought of as the work of chance, it is the activity of soul which has an intelligible and divine origin. Plato's quarrel with the νέοι σοφοί is that they do not recognise this.

If we ask the question about the truth of what Plato is saying, then that would be to ask, from one point of view that the question might be raised: 'How does he prove it ?' But he does not prove it independently of a person's recognising the priority. That is why he speaks of the need of persuasion, for what might be thought of as an independent proof is not possible. He thinks however that his view does make it possible to understand certain aspects of human life that could not be understood otherwise. Apart from the priority of soul it will not be possible to speak of the difference between good and evil. That difference is so bound up with the life of the soul and that difference only begins to make sense, when it is recognised as a difference that belongs to the life of the soul. It is this that determines the nature of life. Human life is unintelligible without it, but what it is belongs to the soul.

The priority of the soul over the body is, then, central to Plato's account. But as we have suggested it cannot be regarded as a proof of the existence of the gods. Its main purpose is to show that

unless the difference between soul and body is clearly seen, and so the soul's priority, it will not be possible to know what is meant by talking about the gods at all. For the priority of the soul includes its ability to govern what is bodily; the gods too exercise a providential activity in relation to the world. Just as it is necessary to recognise the difference between soul and body in this respect, so it is necessary to recognise the difference between the gods and the world. Just as there is a difference for Plato between a human life which is ordered according to a pattern of divine happiness and one that is not, so there is a difference between a world which is recognised to be a sphere of providential activity on the part of the gods, and one that is not so recognised. But the gods take care of all things. And so this providential activity is of a different order from that which is possible in connexion with a human soul and human body. That is why the belief in the gods is not just to be identified with a recognition of the distinction between soul and body in general. But that distinction throws light on the providential activity of the gods.

Plato's point seems to be that if you wish to speak of the life of the gods, then this is only possible when there is a clear distinction made between soul and body. But that distinction does not give an exhaustive account of the life of the gods. It is, however, the only way in which human beings can make sense of the life of the gods. His view of the human soul is that it is that which orders and governs human life in accordance with virtue. The life of the gods is spoken of in the same terms, but it is clear that the order and government of the gods is very different from the ordinary notion of the order of which the human soul is capable. For the life of the human soul can not only be an ordered one, but also can show disorder. That is the difference between justice and injustice. What Plato thinks is that when the human soul lives an ordered life and just life, then this order and justice is to be thought of as part of the life of the gods themselves. 'As we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also evils, and more of evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice, insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice, temperance and wisdom are our salvation; and the place of these latter is in the life of the gods, although some vestige of them may occasionally be discerned among mankind.' (906A-B) The justice and goodness that is achieved in human life is not then to be thought of as just human achievment. Its very possibility can only be thought of as the result of the life that belongs to the gods. That life is perfect in its virtue, and it is the perfection of the life of the gods that makes it impossible to think that they can be appeased. But it is also what makes possible a life of virtue for human beings. 'The gods are the greatest of all guardians and take care of our highest interests'. (907A) The word φύλαξ was the word used to describe the philosopher-kings of the Republic, and now it refers to the gods. This seems to suggest a change of emphasis in Plato's thought. In the Republic the guardianship of the state is in the hands of those men

who have gained knowledge of the good, and that for Plato meant knowing the forms which were thought of as unchanging realities. The philosopher king is able to rule because he possesses this knowledge. He is thought of as divine and after death may be worshipped. In the Republic the forms which were his objects of knowledge had been thought of as unchanging and eternal, and that gave them something of the character of ideals after which he must strive. They seemed to possess an unknown reality, however. (Parmenides 134C-D). That view changes in the Sophist where we find the attribution of life to what is perfectly real (249), and in the Laws the view is that the perfection of justice belongs to the life of the gods. When in the earlier works morality is a matter of knowing the forms which are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ , that seems to suggest a view of morality which is independent of religion. But even if in earlier dialogues there are views which show a religious influence, the position of the Laws is clearly one in which perfect justice is not just an ideal for human beings to strive after, but it is the life of the gods, and any justice which human beings are able to attain is only possible because the gods in their perfect justice and great power take care of human life.

This view gives to the questions of morality a different light. For they are not just problems of the relationships between human beings, but they have primarily to do with the relationships that exist between men and the gods. That does not mean that the question of the relationships between men no longer have any importance, but that these relationships are primarily relationships with the gods. Men must be just because the gods are just. If you seek to appease the gods then your action is like that of men who gain their ends with their fellow men by flattery. But to flatter the gods is worse than to flatter men. It is worse because it is impossible. You may flatter men. Then you are dishonest in your dealings with them. But if you attempt to flatter the gods that is impious. It is attempting to act in an unjust way in the face of perfect justice.

It is impossible to do this. But why ? The answer for Plato is that this perfect justice which is the life of the gods is not completely cut off from men. It is not as if the gods have a life of their own which is completely unrelated to the lives men lead. For human life itself belongs to the gods. It is through the power of the gods which is apparent in their providence that human life is possible at all. The gods take care of the whole. (903B) It may be difficult for human beings to see this; and a man may be vexed, because he does not know how what is best for everything turns out best for himself also, in accordance with the power that gives being to everything. (κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως) (903D). What men must seek to do is to live in close relationship with the providential power of the gods. For this power is greater than any human power. It enables human beings to live in accordance with virtue and truth. But disobedience of virtue and truth has its own reward. And Plato thinks that that is part of the

power of the gods too. As he goes on to say in the passage just quoted: 'And inasmuch as soul, being joined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul, there is left for the draughts-player no further task - save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to each may be alloted its appropriate destiny'. (903D)

It is, however, not easy to see how Plato is able to combine human disobedience with the perfect justice and power of the gods. If the gods are perfectly just and possess power which cannot be compared with human power, how is that to be reconciled with human disobedience ? Plato says (906A) that the world is more full of evil than of good, and that the conflict that goes on among human beings is immortal. (ἀθάνατος). This is to raise a question which probably Plato would have said he could not answer. How is the evil in the world to be explained, if the gods are good ? Plato perhaps would have answered that we cannot understand the nature of the evil that there is, but we must believe that in our conflict with it the gods are our allies to overcome it. Not to accept the gods as the allies of men would be for Plato to distrust the power which he believed they have. But whether Plato thought that the conflict would finally be overcome is another matter. From what he says in the Gorgias it seems clear that he thought it possible for a man who had obeyed the just commands of the gods to live a life in the company of perfect justice after death. (523 A-B). The ἀνάγκη in human life which makes the conflict immortal sometimes seems to be out of the gods' control. When Plato says: 'There is left for the draughts-player no further task, - save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to each may be allotted its appropriate destiny,' it looks as if the gods have no choice and that their power is limited. There is in Plato nothing which approaches a doctrine of redemption as we find that in Christianity. For that teaches that divine forgiveness is undeserved. That is possible for Christianity with its belief that with God all things are possible, but for Plato 'even God Cannot strive against necessity'. (741A)

Nevertheless Plato's view of morality in the Laws is religious. There is much that may seem harsh in the punishment he lays down for the impious, but that is because he thinks that impiety is the worst of sins. His view of morality is that justice belongs to the gods, and the penalty of injustice is inescapable. That is what Plato wants to point to. That justice is not decided by human beings, but by the gods, and not to recognise this is impiety. If justice were established by human beings, then it would have no reality. The reality of perfect justice is the life of the gods itself. Because this is so, there is a final judgment on human life. Because justice is not decided by human beings, but by the gods, injustice is impiety. It is acting against what the gods have decided. The person who thinks that the practice of religion as a means of appeasing the gods is 'of all impious men the most wicked

and most impious'. (907B) What Plato says about this may be compared to what Eckhart says: 'Lo, they are merchants all who, while avoiding mortal sin and wishing to be virtuous, do good works to the glory of God, fasts, for example, vigils, prayers, etc., all of them excellent, but do them with a view to God's giving them somewhat, doing to them somewhat, they wish for in return. All such are merchants. This is plain to see for they reckon on giving one thing for another and so to barter with our Lord, though they are mistook as to the bargain. For all they have and have the power to do, they have from God and do effect by means of God alone. God has no call to do to them or give them anything unless he chooses to. For what they are they are from God and what they have they have from God and not from themselves. God is in no wise bounden to requite their acts or gifts except he care to do so of his own free will, apart from what they do or give; for they give not of their own nor do they act of their own selves, as God says, 'Without me ye can do nothing'. They be sorry fools who bargain with our Lord like this; they know little or nothing of the truth. God cast them out of the temple and drove them forth'. (Eckhart's sermon on the text: Intravit Jesus in templum dei et ejiciebat vendentes et ementes. Matt. c. 21 v. 1) Plato thinks that the practice of religion cannot be regarded as a means to an end. It is itself the recognition of the providential care and justice of the gods.

The difference between a religious view of morality and one that is not, is clear in Plato. It is not, for him, attempting to give an answer to the question: Does morality have its source in the gods or not ? as if that question could be answered in the affirmative and there the matter be left. It is not from that point of view a question of only deciding what is or is not the case. The question taken just like that has no sense. An answer presupposes that one knows what morality having its source in the gods is. People who attempt to appease the gods look at the matter in that way. They answer the question in the affirmative without any understanding, and then proceed to act in such a way that their actions show that they have no understanding. For Plato, if one knows that morality has its source with the gods, then one knows that there is no alternative. One has 'to know the gods rightly and live accordingly'. (888C)

ARISTOTLE'S THEOLOGY. I. First Philosophy and Becoming.

For Aristotle theology is closely connected with first philosophy as he calls it (πρώτη φιλοσοφία), which we call metaphysics. In fact there are passages in the Metaphysics which suggest that these two, together with σοφία , are names for the same enquiry. It is, however, possible to see some distinction in Aristotle's use of these terms, and to see that theology refers to a narrower field of enquiry than is meant by either πρώτη φιλοσοφία or σοφία . This was clear to Aquinas who mentions this in the preface to his commentary on the Metaphysics. Dicitur enim scientia divina sive theologica, inquantum praedictas (i.e. separatas) substantia considerat. Metaphysica inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Dicitur prima philosophia, inquantum primas rerum causas considerat. Aristotle seems to have thought that of these, what he called divine science as such was the highest pursuit, because its object of enquiry was that substance which was separate from matter. Metaphysics or σοφία , as such may well be possible and understandable without the existence of any kind of substance which is unchangeable, and would then still be an investigation of the nature of being qua being, although then of course it would only be a metaphysical enquiry of that substance of which Physics treats. This Aristotle makes clear at 1026a28: "If there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being - both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being". The same distinction is to be found in another passage at 1069a37: "The former two kinds of substance are the subject of physics (for they imply movement): but the third (i.e. substance which is immovable) belongs to another science if there is no principle common to it and to the other kinds".

So it is clear that one of the primary distinctions that Aristotle is concerned with is that between substance that is movable , which means for him the natural world, and that which is immovable , by which he means the unmoved mover - God. It is this distinction which is uppermost in his mind in that book of the Metaphysics which deals more than any other with the subject matter of his theology, that is Book Λ.

When, however, we look at what Aristotle meant by first philosophy in general we find that this is concerned with an enquiry into the nature of being qua being, and this is something that he discussed for most part in terms of his doctrines of the categories, and difficulties arise when we attempt to see the relationship between the kind of theology that we read in Book Λ and what is said about the categories in other Books. We have already noted that the doctrine of the categories as an exposition of what is first philosophy for Aristotle can be perfectly well understood as referring only to moveable substance, and its application to what Aristotle understands as

God is not at all clear. When Aristotle comes to discuss the nature of God it is not only in terms of the doctrine of the categories that he does this, and in fact it seems that this doctrine is not fundamental for him with regard to theology. He discusses the matter in terms of the distinction that he sees between substance that moves and that substance upon which all moving substances depend, which is unmoveable. So here there is a fundamental difficulty of how Aristotle's metaphysics as stated in his doctrine of the categories is related to his theology.

At the beginning of Book Θ Aristotle says: "We have treated of that which is is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred - i.e. of substance. For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others are said to be - quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance". Here at least we may be said to see some point of connexion between the doctrine of the categories and the theology of Book Λ . For what is central to the doctrine of the categories, and the theology we find there, is the primacy of substance. The subject matter of theology is that substance which is perfect in its actuality, and we can say that for Aristotle the actuality of anything is to be measured against its perfection, but a knowledge of its perfection is for him not anything that is arrived at by an application of his doctrine of the categories. In fact, God can only be described as falling into the first of the categories, that of substance, but there is little interest in seeing that this is the case, because he falls into none of the others, and so the doctrine of the categories, regarded as a method of distinguishing different senses of being is of little use in determining the nature of God, except, apart from the category of substance, by way of negation, for none of the other categories apply to God. But as a means of saying that these categories do not apply to God it is of some use and thus marks off God's nature from all other substances to which some other category apart from that of substance applies. God's nature is described in other terms, in terms of being an object of love, and of thinking, terms which do not fall within the doctrine of categories.

Another way in which the distinction between Aristotle's doctrine of the categories and his theology becomes clear is by noting that the principal argument that he uses for the necessary existence of a first mover is not based upon that doctrine, but is an argument about the nature of motion. This argument seeks to show that there must be something which is unmoved upon which all motion depends. The point is not that there must be some first moving thing. To assume that would not be to explain motion, because motion would have to be assumed in order to give an explanation of it. This is the point which is madein criticism of the view of the early Ionians who just assumed that in the first place there was a πρώτη δίνη which was the source of all subsequent motion.

From this it becomes clear that the doctrine of the categories as forming the basis of Aristotle's metaphysics does not apply to his views about theology. However it is possible to see that Aristotle has them in mind when he is concerned with theology. And here it is the ideas of substance, motion and that which does not move, and potentiality and actuality that are uppermost in his mind. It is interesting to note that whereas there is

something which can be opposed to that which moves, i.e. that which does not move, and something that can be opposed to that which is potential, i.e. that which is actual, and the distinction between these is used in defining the first mover as completely actual and unmoved, there is nothing that is opposed to substance as such which is regarded as defining the nature of the first mover. Here we find the source of an idea in Aristotle's theology which has greatly influenced later writers: the idea that God is a substance. It is this use of the term substance to refer to God that leads to talking about God's nature. The distinction that Aristotle does make of course is between material and immaterial substance, and for him God is certainly immaterial, and also possibly that part of the human soul which he calls the νοῦς χωριστός. But that the term substance is used by Aristotle to refer to what is material and immaterial makes it difficult to know what he means when he calls God substance.

Aristotle seems to have developed his idea of the difference between the potential and the actual in the world of nature, and also his idea of the difference between efficient and final causality, and applied it to the difference that exists between that which is temporal and that which is eternal. The distinction that Aristotle draws between the temporal and the eternal is the same for him as the distinction between that which moves and that which is unmoved. For him there is no motion without the existence of time; nor is there any time without the existence of motion. As he puts the matter in the Physics Book VIII: "How can there be any time without the existence of motion? If, then, time is the number of motion or itself a kind of motion, it follows that if there is always time, motion must also be eternal. Since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment is a kind of middle point, uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time: for the extremity of the last period of time that we take must be found in some moment, since time contains no point of contant for us except the moment. Therefore since the moment is both a beginning andan end, there must always be time on both sides of it. But if this is true of time, it is evident that it must be true of motion, time being a kind of affection of motion. The same reasoning will also show the imperishability of motion". (Physics 251b10ff.) Aristotle here criticises Plato's view stated in the Timaeus that time is created, as also for Plato motion is. For Aristotle both are uncreated and also both are eternal in the sense that neither has a beginning or an end. The difference between the two views does not concern us at the moment, but what is to be noticed is that for Aristotle the eternal life of God is something that is timeless and unmoved and it is this that is its eternal nature, and as such is quite different from the eternal nature of time and motion. It is completely actual and is the final cause of all things temporal and moving. The world of the temporal and of the moving is one in which both efficient and final causality, and also potential and actual existence are to be found, but God is the completely actual and the final cause of all that is.

Aristotle thinks that he can arrive at such a view of God by an examination of the nature of the world, and that means an investigation of the nature of becoming, and it is such an examination that precedes his account of God's nature in Book Λ of the Metaphysics. He begins this book by saying: "The subject of our enquiry is substance and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part".

The term 'substance' is amongst the most ambiguous of those used in philosophy, and part of the ambiguity to which it gives rise in a consideration of what Aristotle says is connected with the distinctions that we noted at the beginning regarding the different ways in which metaphysics is regarded by Aristotle. For if metaphysics in its widest sense is an enquiry into the nature of substance then it is that which Aquinas differentiates as 'metaphysica inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum'. In this widest sense of all, substance is being - what is. At the beginning of Book Γ Aristotle writes: "Therefore it is of being as being that we must also grasp the first causes". That is what Aristotle calls τὸ ὄν , and it is this word that he uses when he talks in Γ and elsewhere of the categories of being and it is important to note that he is talking about the different senses of the term. He says τὸ ὂν πολλαχῶς λέγεται - τὸ ὄν has many different meanings. Elsewhere, however, as in Λ , which we have just quoted the enquiry of metaphysics is regarded as an enquiry into the nature of the causes of substances (οὐσιῶν) or substance (οὐσία). It is this twofold nature of the subject that is the basis of Aquinas's distinction between what he calls metaphysics which is a study of this subject in so far as it considers being and its attributes and 'first philosophy' in so far as it considers the first causes of things (i.e. οὐσιῶν). (Dicitur autem prima philosophia inquantum primas rerum causas considerat). The distinction is an important one for Aristotle. For if following Aquinas we call metaphysics the study of being and its attributes as Aristotle outlines that in Books Γ and Ε , for instance, then first philosophy although concerned with all these distinctions is chiefly concerned with what are the first causes of things as substances (οὐσιῶν), and this will not include the whole of being - because what Aristotle calls accidents will not belong to the first causes, but will nevertheless form part of metaphysics as being part of the general study of 'what is' that is τὸ ὄν - or being.

In book Ζ he distinguishes four senses of the word οὐσία as follows: (1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings (i.e. the heavenly bodies) and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them. (2) That which being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal. (3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed. (4) The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. The first of these Aristotle then says is the 'ultimate substratum' (τὸ ἔσχατον ὑποκείμενον) 'which is no longer predicated of anything else'; the other three come under another sense which

Aristotle describes as 'that which being a 'this' is also separable - and of this nature is the shape and form of each thing. Aristotle then uses the term not only to refer to some particular existing thing but also to refer to the essence. Substance is both τόδε τι and τὸ τί ἐστι .

Apart from describing τόδε τι and τὸ τί ἐστι and the substratum as substance Aristotle also sometimes says that the universal is substance. 'As the substratum and the essence and the compound of these are called substance so also is the universal' (Z 1038b2ff). But the universal only becomes part of the substance of a thing by way of definition. No universal is a substance. As to the substratum; this too is substance, 'and this in one sense is the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a 'this' actually, is potentially a 'this'), and in another sense the formula of shape (that which being a 'this' can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of these two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is without qualification, capable of separate existence. (Z 1042a30). It is the same point that Aristotle makes earlier in the same book at 1028b35ff: "The word substance is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main subjects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another shape, and in a third the compound of these'. No universal we have said is for Aristotle a substance, although it forms an important part of the definition of anything that is a substance. That the universal is not a substance is one of the main points on which Aristotle disagreed with Plato. "It is plain" he says, "that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also from the fact that no common predicate indicates a 'this', but rather a 'such'. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the 'third man' (1038b34ff).

Plato's argument for the existence of the forms was mainly based on arguments connected with his theory of knowledge, and Aristotle did not deny that forms were necessary in order to put forward an adequate epistemology, and even went as far as to say "Those who say Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances". (1040b28). And this is quite natural for Aristotle to say, because a substance is for him anything that has particular existence. Aristotle says, however, that where Plato fails is in not being able to give a good reason for the existence of 'imperishable substance which exist apart from the individual and sensible substance' (1040b32). That is Plato fails to give a reason for the existence of substances which are not individual and sensible because they are material, matter being for Aristotle the principle of individuation with regard to what he calls individual and sensible substance. Aristotle thought that the existence of non-sensible

substance was not something which was a matter of epistemology. Their existence depended for him on arguments about the nature of motion, and not upon arguments about the nature of universals. The being of universals is something that he refuses to hypostasise in the way that Plato does. "Clearly", he said, "no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances." If the universal were a substance then this would mean that these substances would have to be composed of substances, and it is a fundamental principle of Aristotle with regard to the nature of substance that no substance can be composed of substances.

In some passages Aristotle seems to identify essence and substance. At the beginning of chapter 6 of Book Z he writes: "We must enquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance; for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing." (1031 a115ff). But for Aristotle essence and substance are not completely identifiable, although at the end of this chapter he says: "Each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence' (1032a5). Just as no universal is a substance, no essence is a substance, in the sense of being an individual and sensible sustance. The essence is that whose formula is a definition and although 'in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality, e.g. the circle is 'a Plane figure' (1045a34), these are parts of the definition of the essence and are not material parts. The essence is the definition of the form. (1013a27). Primary substance is described as both τόδε τι , and τὸ τι ἐστι and for Aristotle both these descriptions apply analogically throughout the categories. So he asks: "Or has definition like 'what a thing is' several meanings? 'What a thing is' in one sense means substance and the 'this', in another one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality and the like. For as 'is' belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but to one sort of thing primarily, and to others in a secondary way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple sense to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of quality we may ask what it is, so that quality also is a 'what a thing is', - not in the simple sense, however, but just as in the case of that which is not, some say, emphasising the linguistic form, that that which is not is - not is simply, but is non-existent; so too with quality". (1030a18ff). (cf Aquinas Commentaria in Metaphysica' 1275 "Unde patet quod fere eadem est divisio substantiae hic posita, cum illa quae ponitur in Praedicamentis. Nam per subiectum intelligitur hic substantia prima. Quod autem dixit genus et universale, quod videtur ad genus et species pertinere, continetur sub substantiis secundis. Hoc autem quod quid erat esse hic ponitur, sed ibi praetermittitur, quia non cadit in praedicamentorum ordine nisi sicut principium. Neque enim est genus neque species neque individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium).

Particular sensible substances come to be and pass away. That which is called the substance, however, which is the form (the definition of the essence) does not come to be. Since substance is of two kinds, the concrete thing and the formula (I mean that one kind of substance is the formula taken with the matter, while another is the formula in its generality), substances in the former sense are capable of destruction, (for they are also capable

of generation), but there is no destruction of the formula in the sense that it is ever in course of being destroyed (for there is no generation of it either: the being of house is not generated, but only the being of this house), but without generation and destruction formulae are or are not; for it has been shown that no one begets nor makes these". (1039b20ff.) Aristotle states the sense in which one thing is the same as its essence and the sense in which it is not thus: "The essence certainly attaches to the form and the actuality. For 'soul' and 'to be soul' are the same, but 'to be man' and 'man' are not same, unless even the bare soul is to be called man". (1041b1ff.)

Of sensible substance although the form and matter are called substance it is the complex of these two that Aristotle regards as capable of separate existence without qualification.

Although, Aristotle, in Book Λ of the Metaphysics, where he deals explicitly with the subject matter of theology, says that there are three kinds of substance (1069a30ff), his division is really into two kinds - the sensible and immaterial.

(1) Sensible substance - of which one subdivision is eternal and another perishable; the latter is recognised by all men, and includes e.g. plants and animals, of which we grasp the elements, whether one or many.

(2) Immovable substance - which certain thinkers assert to be capable of existing apart, some dividing it into two, others identifying the Forms and the objects of mathematics, and others positing of these two only the objects of mathematics.

The former kind of substance (1) is the subject matter of physics (for it implies movement); but the third kind belongs to another science, if there is no principle common to it and the other kinds.

So the main division that Aristotle has in mind is one between movable and immovable substance. That there is no common principle which both share he tries to show by proving that there must be an immovable substance which is the subject matter of theology and which is the first principle (the primary essence) upon which everything that moves depends for its movement, and this makes it something that cannot be investigated by physics.

Aristotle's doctrine of the categories applies to sensible substance but not to immovable substance. The subject matter with which this doctrine deals is usually described by Aristotle in other parts of the Metaphysics, as τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν . Here (in Book Λ), however, he speaks of the 'universe' (τὸ πᾶν) of which substance is the first part, and is succeeded by quality and then by quantity. (1069 a20). This passage follows closely others at the beginning of other books of the Metaphysics, and as we have pointed out it is the central position that an investigation of substance holds in Aristotle's enquiry that forms the link between what he has to say about these two different kinds of substance. The primacy of substance in the doctrine of the categories is matched for Aristotle by the primacy of substance in his view of the nature of becoming which is summed up for him in his view that 'the causes of substance are the causes of all things'. For without the

existence of substance the existence or being of the rest of the categories is impossible and of sensible substance that which is said to be primarily is substance. But of everything that there is there is one cause which is the final cause of all, that is imovable substance 'which being the first in respect of complete reality is the cause of all things'. (1071a35)

Aristotle in book Λ works out this view in greater detail than anywhere else, and from what he has to say it becomes clear that for him theology is accounting for becoming. The first question to be answered is: how is the change (μεταβολή) that we see in sensible substance possible or how does it take place? This investigation is his more strictly theological views, and to claim that this change is of such a kind that necessitates the existence of a first mover which he calls God. It is important to recognise that this is the way in which Aristotle's thought proceeds, because it shows that his doctrine of the being of God, his theology that is, is that the process of becoming cannot be understood apart from the existence of its first cause, which is God.

Aristotle's Account of γένεσις and φθορά.

The question that leads Aristotle to put forward his view of God's nature that he does put forward is how is it possible that there is change in the world at all, and that question is very similar to asking how there is a world at all. Aristotle puts the matter in his own way by asking how is γένεσις ἁπλῆ possible? What Aristotle, like the rest of the Greek philosophers was interested in was in attempting to give an account of γένεσις and this meant seeking some measure of it. This however, was not a scientific enquiry as we understand it. There could be a scientific account for Aristotle in terms of the four elements, fire, earth, air and water but such an enquiry would be merely an account of the relations of physical change. It would be an account of relations of the ways in which these elements interact and description of the relations which exist between these physical elements. It would not provide any kind of explanation why they should so change at all. This position is stated, we might say, in its classical form by Socrates in the Phaedo, when he criticises Anaxagoras.

Aristotle recognises this distinction and he carries on Plato's attempt to answer this question in terms of form and matter. Becoming for him is the union of form and matter. He discusses this in Book Λ

He says:

ἡ δ'αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή· εἰ δ'ἡ μεταβολὴ
ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ πάντων
(οὐ λευκὸν γὰρ ἡ φωνή) ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι
τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει.
(1069 b2)

(Sensible substance is changeable, but if the change is from opposite states or intermediate states, but not all states are opposite to each other for the voice is not-white, but from the contrary state, it is necessary that there must be something which underlies changes into the opposite state, for contraries do not change). He proceeds to say that that which is different from both contrary states but which underlies both of them is a third thing which he calls matter. It is this which changes. The change which is possible for matter, however, is change which is different from any particular kind of change such as the change from night to day, which is a change in quality. There are four kinds of change - εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ πόσον ἢ ποῦ . These are four of the categories which Aristotle considers to be the ways in which τὸ ὂν καθ'αὑτό are classified. To each of them corresponds a different form of change, forms of change which bear the same kind of relation to each other as the categories do amongst themselves. In the doctrine of the categories there is a fundamental difference between the first and the rest that is between τόδε τι (and τὸ τί ἐστι) and ποῖον, πόσον, ποτε, ποῦ κτλ. (This is well illustrated by Aquinas in his Commentary (885) Dicit ergo quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens. Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidens, prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, Est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est albus, est ens per accidens. Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantiam attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens. cf 889)

The distinction then between the first of the categories and the remainder is the distinction between substance and accident. Since three of the forms of change that Aristotle mentions come under those categories which fall under accident (viz. πόσον, ποῖον, ποῦ) they are quite different from that form of change that comes under the category of substance itself. Under the category of πόσον falls simple generation and destruction (γένεσις ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορά ἡ κατὰ τόδε) under that of πόσον falls increase and diminution (αὔξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ πόσον); and under that of ποῦ falls alteration (ἀλλοίωσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος); and under that of ποῦ falls locomotion (φορὰ ἡ κατὰ τόπον) The three last kinds of change are changes that happen to substances, but the first is that kind of change by which a particular substance either comes to be or passes away (cf. Physics V 225a12-20 and 227b7ff).

Aristotle discusses the question of coming-to-be and passing-away

in the 'De Generatione et Corruptione' and in the first Book of the Physics (chapters 6-9). He refers at the beginning of the first work to the views of the early Greek philosophers in the following way (314a7ff):- ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἕν τι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ πάντα ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννῶσι, τούτοις μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν ἀλλοίωσιν φάναι καὶ τὸ κυρίως γιγνόμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· ὅσοι δὲ πλείω τὴν ὕλην ἑνὸς τιθέασιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Λεύκιππος, τούτοις δὲ ἕτερον.

The point here is that if you say that the universe is a whole and that everything has come to be from an initial state which is an undifferentiated unity, then coming-to-be is only alteration of this pre-existing unity, and so coming-to-be and passing-away are in no way different from alteration, but the same. If, however, the initial state is that more than one kind of thing exists, then coming-to-be and passing-away will not be just alteration, but there will be γένεσις and φθορά proper - that is one thing will come-to-be out of another, and one thing will pass away into something else. (cf 318a25-27). Aristotle criticises the views of some of his predecessors in the De Generatione et Corruptione. The view, stated in different ways by them, which comes in for most criticism is their view that γένεσις and φθορά are 'association' and 'dissocation' respectively. (315b15-19 : ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχέδον πᾶσιν ἕτερον εἶναι γένεσις καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ γένεσθαι μὲν καὶ φθείρεσθαι συγκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δὲ μεταβαλλόντων τῶν παθημάτων, περὶ τούτων ἐπιστῆσαι θεωρητέον.)

Aristotle wishes to say that γένεσις and φθορά are real changes, and not just different associations of the same elements. His view is that when Air comes-to-be out of Water, or when Water passes-away into Air - there is a change in the kind of thing that has-come-to-be or passed-away out of something else. It is a substantial change. Aristotle would agree that alteration is a change of 'qualities' (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δὲ μεταβαλλόντων τῶν παθημάτων), for he thinks that in ἀλλοίωσις there is always a τόδε τι which remains. The alteration is in one of the παθητικαὶ ποιότητες (Cat. 9a28ff) not in the τόδε τι itself. But in γένεσις and φθορά it is a τόδε τι which comes-to-be or passes-away together with any παθητικαὶ ποιότητες that it possesses. The τόδε τι is divided λογικῶς into two parts - εἶδος and ὕλη and it is when these last two change that coming-to-be and passing-away take place. (317a23ff ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις ᾖ ἡ μεταβολὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν ἢ φθορά.
ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλοίωσις.
The view that coming-to-be and passing-away are just association and dissociation does not explain how 'this' changes to 'that'.

Is this, however, all coming-to-be and passing-away are? That is, a changing from one thing to another? Can any distinction be drawn between the kind of γένεσις which is a γένεσις of something and γένεσις ἁπλῆ, which is coming-to-be without qualification? Aristotle puts the question in the following way: πρῶτον θεωρητέον πότερον ἔστι τι γιγνόμενον ἁπλῶς καὶ φθειρόμενον, ἢ κυρίως μὲν οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δ' ἐκ τινος καί τί. (317a32-34). The examples he gives of the latter kind of coming-to-be are: 'becoming healthy when one is ill'; becoming small from being large' and vice versa.

That there may be ἁπλῆ γένεσις , however, suggest that there may be ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄν , and this in turn would mean that 'not-being' (τὸ μὴ ὄν) is a property of some things, and not 'not-being' in some qualified sense (as for instance, when something is said to come-to-be from the 'not-white' or the 'not-beautiful', but in an unqualified sense, answering to the unqualified 'coming-to-be' which derives from it, for qualified coming-to-be is coming-to-be in some category other than substance, that is change of πόθος .

The reference to 'unqualified' is for Aristotle a reference to the Categories and 'unqualified' can have two meanings: (1) that which is primary in each category; (2) that which is universal and embraces all members of a class. To these two senses correspond two possible interpretations of the term 'unqualified coming-to-be' and Aristotle argues that according to each of these interpretations of 'unqualified', 'unqualified coming-to-be' (and 'unqualified passing-away) is impossible. The first of the categories is for Aristotle the fundamental one and as unqualified being is for him οὐσία , unqualified not-being will be its very opposite μὴ οὐσία ; so unqualified coming-to-be from unqualified not-being' will be οὐσίας γένεσις ἐκ μὴ οὐσίας (317b8). Such a view of 'unqualified coming-to-be from unqualified not-being' contradicts certain necessary principles of the doctrine of the categories. It presupposes the existence of not-being of such a kind that, since it is a complete negation of οὐσία , it will not be ἀόριστον and so nothing can be predicated of it under any of the other categories (since it is only of οὐσία that the other categories can be predicated); and so in addition it will necessitate the separate existence of these other categories. Such γένεσις is therefore impossible. According to the second meaning of not-being it will be nothing and ex nihilo nihil fit.

To overcome these difficulties Aristotle makes use of his distinction between δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια. The position now becomes changed because the distinction which is necessary in order to give an account of γένεσις and φθορά , is no longer between 'unqualified being' and 'unqualified not-being'. The position now is: τρόπον μέν τινα ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς γίνεται, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ἐξ ὄντος ἀεί. (317b17ff cf Physics 225a20ff). ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς signifies that which is not actually (ἐντελεχείᾳ), whereas ἐξ ὄντος ἀεί signifies that which is potentially (δυνάμει). The same kind of difficulties, however, arise with regard to this second view as arose with the first. Does this distinction enable one to distinguish between 'qualified' and 'unqualified' coming-to-be? Or do the same difficulties arise with regard to τὸ ὂν δυνάμει as there did with τὸ μὴ ἁπλῶς ὄν? For that which is potentially, is that into which what is passing-away must change. What, however, is the status of τὸ ὂν δυνάμει? Can one predicate of it any of the categories outside that of substance? If this is possible, but only potentially then there is a being which is undetermined and which also in coming-to-be proceeds out of some pre-existent nothing. If, however, it is possible to predicate of it some other category apart from that of substance, then these qualities will be separable, because the substance though δυνάμει ὄν is not ἐντελεχείᾳ . τὸ ὂν δυνάμει can be described not only as 'being', but also as 'not-being', and the question that arises for Aristotle is whether or not the same difficulties arise when τὸ ὂν δυνάμει is regarded as the τὸ μὴ ὄν from which becoming proceeds, as arose when τὸ μὴ ὄν was interpreted as μὴ οὐσία .

An adequate treatment of this question involves for Aristotle an investigation of the material cause (ὕλη) as distinct from the causes of motion which he says have been fully discussed in the Physics (VIII chapters 3 & 6) and in Metaphysics Λ - that is both efficient and final causes of motion. It is only by investigating the nature of ὕλη that an adequate account of passing-away and coming-to-be can be given and it is in this way that an adequate account can be given of the τὸ μὴ ὄν which enters into γένεσις and φθορά can be given.

It has already been suggested that τὸ μὴ ὄν must be interpreted to be τὸ ὂν δυνάμει and not τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐντελεχείᾳ , but it is necessary to show precisely the nature of τὸ ὂν δυνάμει. This is done by showing that τὸ μὴ ὄν as τὸ ὂν δυνάμει is ὕλη . The difficulty which arises is in thinking that φθορά is a process into 'what is not' (εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν) and that 'what is not' is nothing (μηδέν). This view of the matter may lead to thinking that, if something is always disappearing into nothing, and if the source of each thing that comes to be is limited, the whole of being would long ago have disappeared. That this, is not the case, is a reason for thinking that coming-to-be and passing-away are just the coming-to-be and passing-away of one particular thing from another. Here, of course, Aristotle is assuming what he seeks to prove elsewhere that there is no actual infinite, but only potential infinite divisibility. If even this latter were the case, then the process of γένεσις and φθορά might continue indefinitely provided that each successive γένεσις and φθορά were smaller than the previous one. But this does not fit in with what is perceived to happen.

If then this is not the case, the continuous process of γένεσις and φθορά must be explained in another way. Aristotle's answer is suggested in the question which he now asks: ἆρ' οὖν διὰ τὸ τὴν τοῦδε φθορὰν ἄλλου εἶναι γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦδε γένεσιν ἄλλου εἶναι φθορὰν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν; (318a23-25), and the answer must be one which applies to all γένεσις and φθορά. The main question which demands discussion is the one which has already been mentioned: 'What is the distinction between unqualified and qualified γένεσις and φθορά ?'

The distinction that is to be made between these two forms of γένεσις and φθορά depends in the first instance on making a distinction between different kinds of possible change. This distinction is based on the doctrines of the Categories and in seeing as Aristotle puts the matter that τὰ μὲν τόδε τι σημαίνει τὰ δ' οὔ . Change from one τόδε τι to another, such as the change from earth to fire , is unqualified γένεσις and φθορά whatever the underlying subject of change (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) may be. For what is important is the nature of this change from being one particular thing to being another which is change which cannot be otherwise described than as ἁπλῆ .

Apart from this way of looking at the matter, where change is a change of one particular substance (τόδε τι) to another, there is a more general description of change which involves a consideration of the material cause of change (ὕλη). Aristotle here in the "De Generatione et Corruptione" (318b14ff) states the view that he puts forward in Metaphysics (1069b).

This is based on a distinction between οὐσία and στέρησις which are now regarded as being equivalent to τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν respectively, and he applies this distinction to the example which he has given of Earth and Fire (τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κατηγορία τις καὶ εἶδος, ἡ δὲ ψυχρότης στέρησις. διαφέρουσι δὲ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ταύταις ταῖς διαφοραῖς. This change is substantial and the distinction that is to be drawn between qualified and unqualified γένεσις and φθορά must be one which sees unqualified γένεσις and φθορά as substantial changes. The distinction cannot be made to rest on the difference between what is perceptible and imperceptible, for this latter is only a difference κατὰ δόξαν and not κατ' ἀλήθειαν .

Apart from this kind of γένεσις and φθορά (κατ' ἀλήθειαν) which depends on the nature of the material (ὕλη) of change, and this material may differ in three respects in so far as it is (a) a substance or not, (b) on its having more or less of the nature of substance, and (c) its being more or less perceptible, there is another kind of change which is noted at 318 a33ff. which is not γένεσις ἁπλῆ . It is the kind of change which is seen when we say that a student 'comes-to-be-learned', but not that he comes to be without qualification. (φαμὲν γὰρ τὸν μανθάνοντα γίνεσθαι μὲν ἐπιστήμονα, γίνεσθαι δ' ἁπλῶς οὔ) An explanation of this change too depends on the doctrine of categories: τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόδε τι σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, τὸ δὲ πόσον It is only of the first category of substance that we can say that it comes to be or passes away ἁπλῶς . Other changes that are denoted by the remainder of the categories are γενέσεις τινες or φθοραί τινες . There is a sense, however, in which changes in all the categories are to be regarded as unqualified coming-to-be and passing away, in so far as οὐσία and στέρησις apply not only in the category of substance but in the others too. Thus there is unqualified coming-to-be in quality if a person comes-to-be-learned but not if he comes-to-be-ignorant which is regarded as a στέρησις of knowledge.

Aristotle's view then is that continuous γένεσις and φθορά are dependent on the existence of the material cause as substratum which is subject to changes into contrary states. The puzzle that arises with regard to saying that what comes-to-be comes-to-be from what is not and what passes-away passes-away into what is not only arises if 'what is not' is left unqualified. The sense of 'what is not' that applies to γένεσις and φθορά is τὸ ὂν δυνάμει, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ' οὔ . The matter which underlies in each case is regarded as the same, but the being in each case is different. (ὃ μὲν γὰρ ποτε ὂν ὑποκεῖται τὸ αὐτό, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό 319b3-4). This is what Aristotle calls πρώτη ὕλη which is the subject of change in γένεσις and φθορά .

As such γένεσις and φθορά must be distinguised from alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), which is change in the properties of the substratum which remains as it is. According to the differences in the properties, which are subject to change, so the change is given a different name. Change of place is called locomotion (φορά); change of quality is called either growth or diminution (αὔξη ἢ φθίσις). Alteration proper (ἀλλοίωσις) is change of quality or property (κατὰ πάθος καὶ τὸ ποιόν). Matter (ὕλη) for Aristotle mainly that which is subject to substantial changes, but it also includes the substrata of these other kinds of change as well.

The Originative Sources of all Coming-to-be

All coming-to-be and all passing-away for Aristotle takes place in what he calls the region about the centre (ἐν τῷ περὶ τὸ μέσον τόπῳ) that is in the Lower Cosmos. (De Gen. et Corr. 335a26) The sources of all this coming-to-be (πάση γένεσις ὁμοίως , γένεσις here is a universal term which covers all γένεσις and φθορά indiscriminately) are 'equal in number to and identical in kind with those which exist among eternal and primary things (εἰσὶν οὖν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἴσαι καὶ τῷ γένει αἱ αὐταὶ αἵπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τε καὶ πρώτοις).

The eternal and primary things are the celestial bodies - the bodies of the Upper Cosmos. It is not, Aristotle thinks, sufficient to explain these if we appeal only to material and formal causes. The same is the case with the γενητά and φθαρτά of the Lower Cosmos.

Aristotle in the discussion of the four causes of πάση γένεσις in chapters 9 and 10 of the De Generatione et Corruptione, after making the point which we have just noticed gives a general definition of ὕλη as τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι . This definition of ὕλη only applies to γενητά and not to the eternal bodies of the upper cosmos whose motion must be different. Their being is necessary (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and they fall into one of the two classes of things to which this definition of ὕλη does not apply. The other is the class of things which of necessity do not exist.

The second cause in the sense of the end of particular things that come to be (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) is the shape and form (ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος). The form is the definition of the essential nature of each thing.(ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας)

The third cause is the efficient cause of becoming and passing-away which for Aristotle is the sun's annual movement in the ecliptic circle.

The fourth cause is the final cause of everything that is, both what is eternal and temporal -the unmoved mover.

The first kind of change is not γένεσις but φορά (ἡ φορὰ πρότερα τῆς γενέσεως), and so φορά is to be regarded as the cause of γένεσις . That this is the case involves an examination of the nature of motion itself, because if motion is only of one kind, then coming-to-be and passing-away will be impossible because they are contrary processes. It is this that leads Aristotle to say that it is not the primary motion (ἡ πρώτη φορά - that is the daily revolution of the πρῶτος οὐρανός) which is the cause of coming-to-be, but the motion along the inclined circle (ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλος) - that is the annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle. This latter movement is not always of the same kind but has two kind of movements which account for γένεσις and φθορά respectively, while the continuity of the movement of the πρῶτος οὐρανός accounts for the continuity of both γένεσις and φθορά .

Aristotle's Theory of Becoming in relation to his Theology.

It is now necessary to show how Aristotle's account of γένεσις is connected with his theology. Aristotle attempts to show the relation between the two in book Λ of the Metaphysics where he gives a summary account of the nature of γένεσις and φθορά (1069b3-1070a 30). He goes on to generalize this account and to relate it to his metaphysical and theological views.

He refers here again to the three constituents of becoming which he had mentioned in the De Generatione et Corruptione - ὕλη, εἶδος and στέρησις. τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.

'There are then three cause and principles, two being the contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation and the third is the matter.' Aristotle's notion of στέρησις is important with regard to his account of γένεσις and φθορά. He does not consider privation to be some kind of unknown cause which brings about generation. If Aristotle does describe στέρησις as τὸ μὴ ὄν it is in a special sense and one which is quite different from the view that was put forward later by Christian writers who talked about creatio ex nihilo (e.g. Origen εἷς ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ καταρτίσας, καὶ ποίησας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα. Commentaria in evang. Ioann. Chapter 9) Aquinas makes this clear in his Commentary when he says 'Fit enim album ex non albo, non tamen ex quolibet non albo' (2428) Aristotle held that matter itself was not a privation but that privation constantly accompanied γένεσις, but it is not in any sense a cause of generation, but only becomes possible as generation and decay are possible. For generation to be possible one must conceive of something coming-to-be which did not previously exist, but this change is not just from contraries to contraries, for if this were so, it would be equivalent to saying that privation is the cause of becoming, but if then privation were the cause of becoming in this way, it would take the place of the form as a cause, but it was for Aristotle opposed to the form. He does here call privation a cause, but it cannot be regarded as a cause as the form is a cause. At 1069b18, Aristotle says ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. What Aristotle is distinguishing between in this sentence is στέρησις and ὕλη. Privation is the accidental cause (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) of generation This Aquinas makes clear (2433): Unde et in genere substantiae fiunt omnia ex non ente et ente. Ex non ente quidem secundum accidens, inquantum fit aliquid ex materia subiecta privatione, secundum quam dicitur non ens. Sed per se fit aliquid ex ente, non autem in actu, sed in potentia, scilicet ex materia, quae est ens in potentia. The distinction which Aquinas sees here is a distinction between two modes of the potentiality of generation: privatio is δύναμις κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, (cf Physics 190b27), whereas materia is δύναμις κατὰ τὸ εἶναι. Aristotle stresses the need to decide from what kind of not-being generation proceeds - it does so in two senses from στέρησις and ὕλη. (cf. Aquinas 2437 on the three senses of not-being;

(1) Uno modo quod nullo modo est; ex tali non ente non fit generatio, quia ex nihilo nihil fit secundum naturam.

(2) Alio modo dicitur non ens ipsa privatio, quae consideratur in aliquo

subiecto: et ex tali non ente fit quidem generatio sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet generatio fit ex subiecto cui accidit privatio.

(3) Tertio modo dicitur non ens ipsa materia, quae, quantum est de se, non ens est actu, sed ens potentia. Et ex tali non ente fit generatio per se. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod si aliquod non ens est ens in potentia, ex tali, scilicet non ente, fit generatio per se'.

This view of the matter that there are three principles of becoming (εἶδος, στέρησις, ὕλη) is for Aristotle a generalization of the nature of γένεσις and these three can only be said to be the principles of all οὐσίαι γενηταί if one speaks analogically or universally.(cf. Joachim Commentary on De Gen. et Corr. pp. 198-199). As Aristotle puts the matter (1070a31): Τὰ δ'αἴτια καὶ ἀρχαί ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ'ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων. He puts the same point in a slightly different way when he says that 'the causes of substances are the causes of all things'. But again the causes of all things are the same only universally and analogically.(καθόλου καὶ κατ'ἀναλογίαν) There are two reasons against saying that the causes of all things are the same without qualification. In the first place, if this were true, there would have to be something which is common to all the categories - that is both to the category of substance and to the rest of the categories - so that it would be possible that both relations and substances would come to be from the same elements. There is, however, no way in which the different categories can be made to depend upon some common principle, for such a common principle would have to be prior to all the categories themselves, but there is no principle which is prior to substance which is the first of the categories. In fact, this idea would destroy the distinction which the doctrine of the cabegories makes clear. If there is no principle apart from substance and the rest of the categories, then the common element will have to be either substance or one other of the categories. But each category is distinct, and substance is not an element (στοιχεῖον) in relative terms nor is any relative term an element of substance. Secondly, no element is the same as that which is composed of the elements, but if it is also true that the elements of substances and the other categories are the same, then it would follow that none of the elements would be of either the category of substance of any other of the categories, but the doctrine of the categories is true so it cannot be the case that the principles or elements of all things are the same

The ways in which the causes of all things can be analogically and universally the same are first of all as form, privation and matter. Any γενητόν contains these three as elements - though these elements differ in different γενηταί . It is only those elements that inhere in anything (τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα) that are causes, as form, privation and matter do, but also there is an external cause, which may as regards its proximate nature differ in different cases, though for Aristotle there is one final external cause of all things - the ἀκίνητον κινοῦν . So there are analogically three elements and four causes and principles, the three elements (form privation and matter) being counted amongst the causes and principles.

In the second place the causes of all things are the same in the sense that without substances there can be nothing else. 'For when substances are removed all things are removed' (1071a34), for substance alone can exist apart.

In the third place, ἐνέργεια and δύναμις are common principles κατ' ἀναλογίαν (τῷ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν αἱ αὐταί, οἷον ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις) because everything that comes to be comes to be actually what it was potentially. Aristotle also sees a relationship between ἐνέργεια and δύναμις on the one hand and εἶδος, στέρησις and ὕλη on the other hand. (See supra) Potentially and actuality apply ἁπλῶς where the matter of cause and effect are the same, but in a different way when the matter is different (1071a12ff).

In the fourth place that which is first in respect of complete reality is the cause of all things (i.e. the ἀκίνητον κινοῦν) Aristotle, however, does not mean that this cause is to be understood κατ' ἀναλογίαν, as if there were different first causes for different things. It is the same for all.

This description of the way in the causes of substance are causes of all things is not in any way an argument for the unmoved mover. The necessity of that is what Aristotle goes on to show.

Aristotle's view of Motion and its connection with his theology

The main subject discussed by Aristotle in the Physics is that of motion and change. Both these are closely connected with what φύσις is for Aristotle. He says: φύσις ἔστιν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς (200b12). Physics is for him an investigation into the principles of nature (184a14) δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φυσέως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορισάσθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. and such an investigation deals mainly with motion and change, for without an understanding of these last two it is not possible to understand what nature (φύσις) is. This also is connected with Aristotle's theology as it is put in Book Λ and it is what he considers the nature of motion and change to be (and which make φύσις what it is) that leads Aristotle to put forward his view that depends upon the necessary existence of the unmoved mover. (Metaphysics 1072b7ff: ἐπεὶ δέ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γάρ, ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἔστιν ὄν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς· ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.
The argument that Aristotle puts forward for the existence of an unmoved mover depends on the view of motion put forward in the Physics, especially in Book VIII.

For Aristotle change (μεταβολή) covers all natural change and is synonymous for him with φύσις which is the subject matter of physics. Motion is, strictly speaking a narrower concept and Aristotle

usually distinguishes between three kinds of motion. This view (as we have previously noticed is connected in Aristotle's mind with his doctrine of the categories. In Physics Book V Aristotle gives an account of motion (κίνησις) relating it to the doctrine of the categories and showing to which of the categories motion applies.

Aristotle's general definition of motion is that it is "the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially" ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἡ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν 201a10) In addition to this there is a general classification of change (μεταβολή) There are three kinds:

(a) ἡ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον.
(b) ἡ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον.
(c) ἡ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον.

The last two are unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away and it is these two that are μεταβολαί and not κινήσεις . Although all motion is change, all change is not motion. It is only the first kind of change (i.e. ἡ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον) that is motion and this kind of change is regarded as applying to only three of the categories, namely ποιόν , πόσον , and ποῦ . This means that with regard to the category of substance there is no motion (κίνησις) though there is, of course, change (μεταβολή). So μεταβολή . applies to four categories, οὐσία , ποιόν , πόσον and ποῦ . Of these the last three forms of change are ἡ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον for this implies no relation of contradiction. In Book Λ (1069b3ff) (at the beginning of the investigation in that book into the nature of sensible substance an account of which has already been given) Aristotle says that change is from contrary states to contrary states and that besides these contrary states of change there is a third factor which remains during the change, namely matter. In Physics V he says : ἡ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ τοῖς μεταξὺ καὶ ἐν ἀντιφάσει. (of Mataphysics 1067b14ff) Of these ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ τοῖς μεταξὺ falls under that class of change which Aristotle has described as ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον whereas change ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον (φθορά) and ἐξ μὴ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον (γένεσις) is what he describes as change ἐν ἀντιφάσει . It might seem puzzling that on the one hand Aristotle should here speak of change ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον, and on the other hand (Meta. 1069b3ff) say that the ὑποκείμενον which he calls ὕλη does not change. It is clear however, that in the passage in the Physics the term ὑποκείμενον refers to what changes - to the subject in that sense - which can be positively described (κατὰ φάσει δηλούμενον) as a subject undergoing change, whereas what is meant by the substratum (ὕλη) in Λ is that which cannot be positively described but is what Aristotle regards as the substratum of all change whatsoever, matter whose nature is potential.

Aristotle here seems to show that there is a definite difference between μεταβολή and κίνησις . He argues that this difference exists by showing that it is that which is not (i.e. that which is without qualification not so-and-so τὸ διʼἁπλῶς μὴ τόδε) which

becomes and this cannot be in motion. So becoming is not a form of motion, although it is a form of change.

This difference which there is between μεταβολή and κίνησις is one which depends on whether the subject (ὑποκείμενον) remains the same or not. When it remains the same we have what he calls κίνησις, μεταβολή refers to a change in the subject of change itself. Different forms of motion as well as of change are conceivable, and it is important to see which of these are possible. Motion is a change with regard to contrary states for it is only where contraries are concerned that the subject remains the same throughout the motion: with regard to contradictories we have μεταβολή for contradictories entail change of subjects. There are different conceivable forms of motion which are contrary to each other. They are : - (Physics 229a8ff)

(a) Motions from and to the same thing
(b) Motions respectively from contraries.
(c) Motions respectively to contraries
(d) Motions respectively from a contrary and to the opposite contrary
(e) Motions respectively from a contrary to the opposite contrary and from the latter to the former.

Of these possible forms of motion the motions named in (d) are not contrary, but the same, although they are not the same in essence. Aristotle's example is that of motion from health and motion to disease. The motions named in (a) are really examples of becoming and perishing. Those in (b) and (c) are not contrary motions either but are changes not motions. Thus we are left with (e) which is the only example proper of contrary motions e.g. a motion from health to disease and a motion from disease to health. 'Thus' Aristotle says, (229b21) we see that two motions are contrary to each other only when one is a motion from a contrary to the opposite contrary and the other is a motion from the latter to the former'. In addition to a contrary motion, motion has another opposite, viz rest which is the privation of motion.

Motion only applies to things that have contraries - where these are absent there are only opposite changes, and here there is no rest which is conceived as an opposite of motion, but only absence of change. Rest is only conceivable in the case of motion which is a change ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον. It is, in other words, the same thing that can be in motion and at rest. So there is no change in subject where rest and motion are concerned. But in the case of μεταβολη the contrary of absence of change (ἀμεταβλησία) is also a change in the subject - as Aristotle puts it it becomes : οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἀμεταβλησία ἢ ἡ φθορά.

Of the three kinds of motion, locomotion (φορά) is primary and unless this kind of motion is possible the two other kinds of motion alteration and increase or decrease are impossible. The latter kind of change is impossible without alteration, and alteration impossible without locomotion. (Physics 260a27 - b14). As the primary form of

motion it is primary in each of three ways: (a) in existence (b) in time (c) in perfection of existence.

It is the primary form of motion in respect of existence, because it is the only form of continuous motion, and what moves in place may not be subject to either increase or decrease, or alteration, whereas these two latter forms of motion are not possible apart from continuous motion which is locomotion. It is also primary in respect of time, because this is the only form of motion that is possible for eternal things (i.e. the heavenly bodies), whereas in the case of something temporal, that comes to be and perishes, locomotion is the last of its motion in respect of time for locomotion presupposes that what moves in place has reached a state of perfection which has been preceded in time by alteration and increase. In the case of things that come-to-be however, locomotion must exist previously to any process of becoming, for the other forms of motion alteration, decrease and increase are subsequent to becoming in time, whereas locomotion is that whose being makes becoming possible. It is also primary in respect of perfection. This means first of all that because, 'the degree to which living things possess φορά corresponds to the degree to which they have realized their natural development, then this motion must be prior to all others in respect of perfection of existence.' (ἡ κίνησις αὕτη πρώτη τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη κατ' οὐσίαν 261a18ff) Secondly, not only is it the case that locomotion is a sign that a thing has reached the perfection of its natural development, but also such a perfected thing loses its essential character less in the process of locomotion than in any other kind of motion' (261a20ff). Locomotion is the only form of motion which does not involve a change of being by way of alteration or increase and decrease. It is also that form of motion which is produced by that which moves itself which Aristotle here describes as follows : φαμὲν τοῦτο εἶναι κινουμένων καὶ κινούντων ἀρχὴν καὶ πρῶτον τοῖς κινουμένοις, τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν. (261a25)

Not only is locomotion the primary form of motion but a particular form of locomotion is primary, and the fact that there is this primary form of locomotion makes clear how it is that there is a motion which is continuous and eternal. All the other forms of motion and change apart from locomotion depend on the existence of an interval of time between for instance becoming and perishing, increase and decrease, and between the two different (contrary) states of something due to alteration. But with regard to locomotion, for it to exist as opposed to a state of rest there must be continuity of the motion itself.

In these three forms of change apart from φορά - that is those three which correspond to the categories of οὐσία , ποῖον , and πόσον - there is another difference which marks off φορά from them all and shows that they, unlike φορά , cannot possibly be instances of continuous change - their continuity is prevented

by the impossibility of opposite changes of this kind taking place at the same time. These species of change (γένεσις and φθορά , ἀλλοίωσις, φθίσις and αὔξησις) all take place between intermediates, contrary or contradictory states and so none of them are instances of continuous motion.

It is not however all locomotion that is continuous and so it becomes necessary to show that there can be a continuous motion which to be properly continuous, Aristotle argues, must be infinite. In order to establish this Aristotle argues that all locomotion is either rotatory or rectilinear or a compound of both these forms of motion, of these rectilinear motion which is finite cannot be continuous and motions up and down and to the left and to the right are the motions which Aristotle has in mind here. Neither is locomotion in a circle the same as rotatory motion for the former need not be continuous, but discontinuous if the circular motion is in different directions. Rotatory motion is circular motion which is continuous and always in the same direction and differs from rectilinear motion or motion in an arc or a semicircle in that the starting point and termination (ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή) are not the same, whereas with rotatory motion they are identical.

Rotatory motion is then the perfect form of motion (τέλειος). It is also simple (ἁπλῆ) Aristotle means that it is unchanging when he says that it is continuous. He thinks that the only form of infinite motion (that is eternal motion) is rotatory motion, because there is no such thing as an infinite straight line, and even if there were it would be impossible to traverse an infinite distance. This means that all other forms of motion imply in some way or other rest, that is motion that ceases. The only conceivable form of eternal motion is motion in a circle and this motion is primary being the measure of all other forms of motion.

Aristotle sums up the position which he wishes to maintain under five heads (266a6 - 10)

(a) There always was motion and always will be motion throughout all time.

(b) There is a first principle of this motion.

(c) There is a primary form of motion.

(d) There is only one form of motion that is eternal.

(e) That the first mover is unmoved.

There is also a sixth point that Aristotle wishes to show, that the first mover mentioned in (e) is without parts and without magnitude.

In order to show this he seeks to prove the three following premises:

(a) Nothing finite can cause motion during an infinite time (266a 12 - 24)

(b) No finite magnitude can have an infinite force. (266a24 - b6)

(c) No infinite magnitude can have a finite force (266b6 - 24)

From these premises Aristotle argues that since the first mover is an infinite force because it causes a motion that is eternal it cannot be a finite magnitude, and because there is no such thing as an infinite magnitude, the first mover cannot be a magnitude either finite or infinite.

If the first mover is not a magnitude of any kind then it cannot be anything physical and so the problem arises which is fundamental for Aristotle's view of the unmoved mover of how something that is not physical can be the cause of eternal circular motion which is. The nature of this first mover is described in chapters 7 - 10 of book Λ

Aristotle's view of the first unmoved mover is not only a result of his physical views. The most important things that he has to say about it are independent of those views. He thinks that an examination of physical motion can lead to the conclusion that there is a first mover which does not move (Physics 267B), but the nature of this first mover Aristotle thinks of as νοῦς, and this cannot be just a result of physical enquiry. Whether Aristotle himself made such a clearcut distinction between physics and theology may be questionable, but there does seem to be an abrupt transition in book Λ of the Metaphysics from his statement that the existence of motion necessitates the existence of a first unmoved mover to his statement that the nature of the first unmoved mover is νοῦς. He says: ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δ'ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο· ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια, τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον κτλ). καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργειαι δὲ αἱ καθ' αὑτὰς ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

Apart from understanding what this statement means, there is the question of how Aristotle arrived at such a view, for Aristotle says that God's thinking is νοήσεως νόησις (1074b34) It is important however, to contrast this definite statement about the nature of God with Plato's statement in the Timaeus: 'The father of this universe is a hard task to find'. Aristotle's statement seems to be so definite that he seems to think that there is no difficulty at all in saying what God is. His intention is, presumably, that if we read his statement with understanding, then we know what God is. As we shall try to show in more detail later, this contrast between the two views is very important for any understanding of what relation there can be between philosophy and religion. The difference that there is here between Plato and Aristotle is to be found in another form at different periods in the history of Christianity. This difference may be put as the difference between a view of theology which claims to be a systematic account of God's nature, and another view which says that this is impossible. As a matter of history it would be difficult to disprove that the influence of Aristotle on Christianity led to the former view, that of Plato to the latter. But the difference, as we hope to show, is not just one about theology, but also about religion itself.

Aristotle's view of God as νοῦ ἐνέργεια makes God a substance unlike any that falls under those other two kinds of substance which he mentions, i.e. temporal and eternal sensible substance, and it seems that for him what marks off God from everything else is his nature as perfect thought. It is God's nature as νοῦ ἐνέργεια that makes the life of God ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. It is also in terms of νοῦς that Aristotle attempts, on the one hand, to distinguish between divine and human life, and on the other to show

what is meant by saying that human beings can share in divine life.

Aristotle does little to explain in the Metaphysics why he thinks that this comparison between human and divine life is possible, but his view on this matter becomes clearer from what he says in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. There he says that 'the activity of God which is blessed above all others, must take the form of contemplation'.(1178b22) There belongs to the life of God pleasure which is perfect because his life is νοῦ ἐνέργεια. It is in terms of this also that he describes human happiness. 'If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it will be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this can only be the virtue of the best part of us.' (1177a 11) The best part is νοῦς and 'the man whose activity is one of the mind and who cultivates that and keeps it in the best condition is also the man whom the gods love above all others.' (1179a 22). This virtue of the intellectual life Aristotle thinks is superior to that of the moral life. 'The moral as distinct from the intellectual life, will, though only in a secondary degree, be happy too.' (1178a 8). But this is human virtue and does not belong to the gods, for their virtue is presumably what belongs to their nature as νοῦ ἐνέργεια . God cannot be described as just or temperate. All forms of virtuous activity must be paltry for the gods and unworthy of them.

In his Ethics Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtue. In fact, to distinguish between these seems to be one of the main purposes of the work. We shall be more concerned with this distinction when we come to a comparison of Aristotle's view with that of Plato's. The distinction was, however, important for Aristotle, and it seems to be a distinction he had in mind when he speaks about the life of God. The perfection of God is the perfection of νοῦς , and in Λ chapter 9 Aristotle attempts to explain what the perfect νοῦς of God is. It is this passage in particular which has led to the idea that Aristotle's view of God is that of a being which has no direct relationship with the world. For the nature of God is νοῦς and the object of God's νόησις is God himself - that is his own thinking. So God knows nothing imperfect. So how can he know anything about the evil of human life? God knows only himself and his own perfection. 'It must be of itself that it thinks, if it is the most excellent of beings, and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. (1074b33).

We have already mentioned what may seem to be an abrupt transition from Aristotle's view of God as the first unmoved mover and his view of God as νοῦ ἐνέργεια. It is, however, necessary here to attempt to keep apart two aspects of Aristotle's view of God, even if it is the case that they are closely related in Aristotle's mind. One is what Aristotle states when he says: ἐκ τοιαύτης δὴ ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. The other: ἡ νόησις θεοῦ νοήσεως νόησις . It is emphasis on the latter that has led to the idea that Aristotle's view of God is that God has no direct relationship with the world. But that cannot be Aristotle's view if we take the first statement seriously.

In order to understand how Aristotle came to put forward the view that God's nature as νοῦς is νοήσεως νόησις, it is necessary to take into account his distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. In fact, Aristotle seems almost forced into the view he states by using this distinction in his account of God's nature. He seems first to have applied this distinction to physical change. Apart from this distinction, as we have seen, he could not give an account of γένεσις ἁπλῆ. Its meaning as applied to γένεσις seems to be clear, but as applied to the nature of God's thinking it is not so clear. It is, however, a distinction which Aristotle also applies to human thought. It is this distinction that he has in mind when he says in the De Anima: Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἔστι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς (430a10) This passage in the De Anima has given rise to notorious difficulties which will not be discussed here, but in general Aristotle is trying to account for the fact that human thinking is as he puts it, in the Metaphysics 'of composite things and takes place in a certain period of time." (1075a8) Unlike God's thinking it is not completely actual and always the same. It contains both a potential and an active element.

The distinction between the passive and active intellects in the De Anima and in book Λ is a distinction between νοῦς as φθαρτός and θεῖος. As the De Anima puts the matter: Τοῦτο (sc ὁ νοῦς ποιητικός) μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός. This same idea is stated in Metaphysics Λ as: τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἕξων, ὥστ' ἐκεῖνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν. (1072b22) In the De Anima, Aristotle is discussing what he calls in the Metaphysics ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, and it is only this that he is concerned with there. It is τὸ μόριον τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ. In the Metaphysics, however, he is concerned not only with human thinking, but with the nature of divine thought. The main difference that Aristotle sees between the two is that God's νοῦς is perfect and eternal, but human νοῦς deals with what he calls τὰ σύνθετα (1075a8). Its actuality is intermittent (De Anima 430a5 τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον), because its nature is δύναμις as well as ἐνέργεια. It is παθητικός as well as ποιητικός. The actuality of God's thought is complete and everlasting. But this actuality which belongs to God's thought is also possessed by men in an intermittent way. (1072b24) εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε.

One of the things that Aristotle says when he is discussing both the nature of human thinking and divine thought may seem to be puzzling, and may lead one to the idea that there is a closer relation between the two than there really is. That is the identification of νοῦς and νοητόν. We find this both in the De Anima and the Metaphysics. He says: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. (De Anima 430a1) and in Λ: αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν (Meta.1072b20)

The main difficulty in understanding Aristotle's view of God in the Metaphysics is that his account is a summary one, and there are questions which can be asked about the view which cannot be answered accurately from what Aristotle himself says. One such question is whether we are to say, as Aquinas thought, that God has knowledge of the world. There does, however, seem to be a difference in the identification of νοῦς and νοητόν with regard to human thinking and to divine thought.

Aristotle thinks that in human thinking there are simple objects of thought, and in the case of these, falsity is impossible. He says: ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἐν ὄντων (De Anima 430a 26) ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τι κατα τινος. (430b26ff). The same distinction is to be found in the Metaphysics. (1051b13ff.) Aristotle is here distinguishing between two kinds of truth. One kind of truth has a form of falsity opposed to it, and this is truth and falsity in relation to what he calls σύνθετα . But there is another form of truth which has no falsity opposed to it, of the kind that we find with respect to σύνθετα. He puts it in this way in the Metaphysics: περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἡ αὐτὴ γίγνεται ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐνδέχεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὅτε δὲ ψεύδεσθαι· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ γίγνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθὴς ὅτε δὲ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ (1051b13ff)

Aristotle thinks that essences and actualities (Meta.1051b31) (De Anima 430b28) cannot be otherwise than as they are, and these are the proper objects of human thinking. But when he speaks of these as objects of thought (νοητά) he does not distinguish them from actual thought. ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα. (431b17). That does not mean, however, that for Aristotle they are only objects of thought. But in so far as an essence or a form can become an object of thought, when it is that, it is not different from the act of thinking itself. It is only possible to distinguish between νοῦς and νοητόν when one thinks of them as potential; when thought takes place they are one.

This view of Aristotle, which is only stated in brief here, is clearly in his mind when he thinks of human thinking and divine thought, and the difference between the two. Human thinking can be either potential or actual. But divine thought is completely actual. The idea that God's nature is νοῦς leads Aristotle into difficulties, and Theophrastus later, realising these difficulties, rejected the question of what the object of God's thought is. (Magna Moralia 1213a8) Aristotle discusses these difficulties in chapter 9 of book Λ . One question that arises is whether Aristotle here has only divine thought in mind. (Ross in his translation of the Metaphysics begins this chapter in this way: 'The nature of divine thought involves certain problems.' (τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας 1074b15). This translation may be misleading. It suggests that there is some other kind of νοῦς , not divine, which Aristotle is not speaking of here. He seems almost to be speaking of νοῦς

in general, and at the end of the chapter as we have already seen, there is a reference to ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς . Ross's translation would not even be correct if all νοῦς were thought to be divine, because his translation suggests a distinction between divine thought and thought not divine. His translation leads him into difficulties in commentating on the second sentence of the chapter: δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον The distinctions that Aristotle makes in this chapter are not in substance different from what he says in the De Anima. In both places there is an identification of νοῦς and νοούμενον and this is meant to apply to both human thought and divine thought. This does not mean, however, that this chapter has nothing to say about God's νοῦς . It is mainly about that, but what is important to notice is that it is about that in analogy with human thinking. That is what leads Aristotle into difficulties.

And here the distinction between δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια is uppermost in his mind. This is a distinction that runs through the whole of Aristotle's philosophy, and he uses these notions continually, and not always in the same senses. They are usually translated into English as 'potency' and 'actuality'. But whereas Aristotle uses one word for the first, i.e. δύναμις , there are two words which he uses for the second, i.e. ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια . (Ross, in his translation, sometimes distinguishes between these by translating the former as 'actuality', and the latter as 'complete reality'). Aristotle also makes a distinction between them sometimes, although, for the most part, he uses them in the same sense. He speaks of the relation between the two terms twice in Metaphysics Θ . He says (1047a30): ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τοὔνομα, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι. And again: τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν(1050a22). Aristotle seems to connect the term ἐνέργεια more closely with κίνησις , than he does the term ἐντελέχεια . He describes κίνησις as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής in the Physics.(201b31). In the last book of that work he uses the word ἐντελέχεια in his definition, and not ἐνέργεια . But here it should be noted that the word κινητός is also introduced into the definition. He says: ἔστιν δ' ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινητοῦ ἀτελής (257b8). When Aristotle quotes his definition in the De Anima, and refers there to the Physics, it is the definition there at 201b31 that he quotes: καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται. (De Anima 417a16) This seems to suggest, apart from Aristotle's saying so himself, that the term ἐνέργεια was more closely connected in his mind with κίνησις than was ἐντελέχεια . Ross comments on the passage in the Metaphysics: 'From 1050a22 .....it appears that strictly speaking ἐνέργεια means activity or actualisation while ἐντελέχεια means the resulting actuality or perfection. Yet ἐνέργεια is not a movement towards something other than itself; this is the difference between it and κίνησις . Yet in Λ 6, 7, where God is viewed as the prime mover of the universe, he is called ἐνέργεια , activity, but in 8. 1074a36, where the immateriality and perfection of his being is insisted on, he is described as ἐντελέχεια . (Metaphysics Vol.II p.245) But it is not only

the nature of God as prime mover that is described in this way, but also its nature as νοῦς . The life that belongs to God is ἡ νοῦ ἐνέργεια.

Although Aristotle speaks of the two terms in this way in book of the Metaphysics, this does not mean that he thought that there was a clear-cut distinction between the two. But neither do they seem to have exactly the same meaning. The main difference is that Aristotle connects ἐνέργεια more closely with motion than he does ἐντελέχεια. In book Θ where he is discussing the difference between the potential and the actual, the word that he most often uses for the latter is ἐνέργεια . And he says that ἐνέργεια for the most part seems to be κίνησις (1047a32). This seems to explain why Aristotle uses this term of God's thinking and not ἐντελέχεια . It is more suggestive of a continuous process than is the term ἐντελέχεια . But then of course, a distinction has to be made between ἐνέργεια when it refers to κίνησις , in the sense of some physical change, and when it refers to τὸ νοεῖν . Aristotle makes such a distinction in the De Anima; ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ' ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου (431a6). The faculty of sense is not changed in perception. In perception it comes to be actually what it was potentially. The same Aristotle thinks is true of thinking. The mind is already capable of thinking; its nature is not changed in thinking; it is ἡ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια. This is true of both human and divine thinking. There is a difference between them, however. With regard to human thinking potential can be prior in time to actual thinking, but this is not true of divine thought. (ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν πρότερα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ) (431a2)

When Aristotle discusses the difficulties he thinks there are about νοῦς in Λ , chapter 9, the general distinction that he thinks there is between the potential and the actual is uppermost in his mind. He has already described human thinking as both potential and actual, and unless he made some such distinction as this it would be difficult to see how thinking could be possible at all. If there were no such distinction it would be difficult to explain how human thinking could exist, for its thinking refers to things other than itself, and the process of thinking is temporal. These make it not only actual, but also potential.

When Aristotle asks himself what the nature of God's thinking can be, he wants to answer two questions: Is God's thought potential or actual? and, What is the object of this thinking? His answer to the first question determines his answer to the second; and the answers he gives show that he thinks divine thought is different in nature from human thinking. But although this is true, Aristotle speaks of divine thought in analogy with human thinking. He seems to use what he thinks of as the nature of human thinking as a means of comparison, to point out those characteristics of human thinking that do not belong to divine thought.

Human thinking is both potential and actual. But can divine thought be this? He thinks it cannot. What makes human thinking both potential and actual, is that it depends on something other than itself - upon sense perception and imagination, without which there would be no

objects of thought - that is especially what Aristotle says is τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. So he says: τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή (431a14) τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ. (431b2) ἡ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά, πῶς; τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δὲ ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ αἰσθητόν. ἀνάγκη δ' ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι. αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔ. (431b21 ff.) ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν (432a4). τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἄλλα φαντάσματα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων (432a12)

Aristotle denies that these characteristics belong to divine thought. Human thinking is dependent on what we might call the material of thinking which, for Aristotle, is derived from sense perception and imagination, and this is what makes human thinking δύναμις. That is why Aristotle asks the question: εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν; He continues: εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ' ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. (1074b17) So God's thought is completely independent of anything else; its value is value as thought. So his nature is ἐνέργεια (1074b20), and not δύναμις. But if this is so, does this activity of thinking have an object? Here Aristotle seems to think that one cannot talk of thinking without talking of an object of thought, though as a matter of faut, the view he puts forward can be interpreted as saying that divine thought has no object - it is just divine thought. If one speaks of the object of its thought, then it is its thought itself. Aristotle however, comes to this conclusion, by trying to imagine what God would think about. He cannot think anything which is less perfect than himself, and in fact, there are certain things (presumably Aristotle means what is evil) which we cannot imagine God thinking about. (Aristotle does not discuss the possibility of whether there might not be different ways of thinking about evil. He seems to think that it is impossible for God to think about evil in any way. And here his view is very different from that of Plato, who thought rather that the real difficulty is for human beings to understand evil as God understands it.) If God thinks of himself, then he thinks of what is most precious and divine, and there is no change in this thought; for any change would be a change for the worse. This would also make its thinking of a continuous kind, and this would be wearisome. Its thinking would then be δύναμις and not ἐνέργεια. There is another reason for saying that God's thinking is simple and unchanging. If it were not, and one could distinguish here between thinking and its object, then if one tries to imagine, Aristotle seems to say, what could be an object of thought for such perfect thinking,

it could only be something more valuable than that thinking itself. So any distinction between thinking and object of thought in the case of God is impossible. For can we say that it is just the thinking, with no reference to the object, that defines God's nature. For thinking belongs also to someone who thinks of what is most evil. It is not just that God can think that makes him what he is, for there are certain things that it is better for him not to think. So Aristotle reaches the abortive conclusion: αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις (1074b33).

Why call it abortive? First because it is a direct result of Aristotle's attempting to apply his distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια to God, and he has given us no reason for thinking that such this distinction makes sense in speaking about God. In fact, Aristotle ought to have seen that, if as he thinks, God's nature is nothing but ἐνέργεια, then it is impossible to arrive at such a conclusion by using the distinction that there is between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. He tries to make it a conclusion, but it can't be that.

Apart from this, however, there is further confusion in connexion with what Aristotle says about νοῦς and νοητόν. He seems to regard this distinction also as some kind of evidence for what he says about God's nature. Aristotle in the first instance makes this distinction with regard to human thinking, and just as he had first made the distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια with regard to that and then attempted to apply it to God, likewise he attempts to apply this distinction to God's nature; or rather not the distinction but the identification of νοῦς and νοητόν.

A philosophical discussion of the nature of thinking is difficult. Here we are only interested in those aspects of Aristotle's view that influenced his theology. In the De Anima he says: ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα (431b17). This is a general conclusion. It comes almost at the end of Aristotle's discussion of human thinking in the De Anima, before he goes on to summarise his results. That it is a general conclusion is important, because as we shall see what Aristotle is striving for is such a conclusion which can be applied to different things, and it is this desire for generality that prevents him from emphasising important differences.

Aristotle was led to the view he holds about thinking partly as a result of his criticism of Plato's view of the forms. As Aristotle interprets Plato's view, the forms are separate, eternal substances, and for Plato knowledge is of these, and not of things that come to be and pass away in the world. Aristotle, in denying the separate existence of the forms, nevertheless made them indestructible elements ἐν ὕλῃ. But then the question of how they can be objects of thought and knowledge was bound to take on a different form. If they exist ἐν ὕλῃ, as Aristotle thought, it is not as such that they can be objects of knowledge and thought. It is only as the result of ἀφαίρεσις and ἄνευ ὕλης that they can be this. This view of Aristotle's was also a result of his denial of Plato's view of the soul as pre-existing before its life in the body, and also of the view that learning is ἀνάμνησις. Having denied this the question arose for Aristotle of just how the forms are

objects of thought. Can they as objects of thought be distinguished from thinking? His answer to this question is that they cannot. His point is that the form as an object of thought is not something separate from thinking; it is, however, separate as a form ἐν ὕλῃ . (Whether Aristotle's view is correct or not we shall not discuss here. It might be thought to solve certain difficulties that have arisen in philosophy about the relation of mind and objects of thought.)

Apart from this identification of νοῦς and νοητόν, Aristotle asks another question in the De Anima. Can νοῦς itself be an object of thought? (ἔτι δ'ἆρα νοητὸς καὶ αὐτὸς (sc ὁ νοῦς) (429b26) He seems to answer this question in the affirmative when he says : καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητὸς ἔσται ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. (430a1). It is important, however, to understand the sense in which Aristotle thinks that νοῦς is νοητός . For what he has to say about this does not entail that νους can have the character that he thinks God's νοῦς has, i.e. that it is νόησις νοήσεως . The form as νοητόν is a result of ἀφαίρεσις from perception and imagination. But as an abstract object of thought it can either be thought of in connexion with intelligible matter, or as an essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) in which case, it is an object of thought apart from such matter. Aristotle says: (ὅλως δ'ἅμα ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν. (429b21) So just as forms are objects of thought, so the mind also can be an object of thought. It will as Aristotle puts it: ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει (430a8). But we might say that νοῦς is νοητός as a form, just as other objects of thought are. That is why Aristotle calls it the <u>form</u> of forms. (καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανον ἐστὶν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν (432a1) It is as a form that it is νοητός; that means that it is not its νόησις as such that is νοητός . For human νοῦς is μεμιγμένον τι ἕξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τἆλλα. (429b28) But it becomes νοητός when we abstract from its composite condition, and think of it as a form. It is only ἄνευ ὕλης that we can identify τὸ νοοῦν and τὸ νοούμενον. (430a2)

Aristotle makes the same distinction in the Metaphysics.(1075a3) But here Aristotle's comparison of human and divine thinking is an illicit one. For granted that with regard to human thinking the form as object of thought is free from matter and can be identified with the act of thinking, this is only possible because it is a form that can be abstracted from matter. Matter is presupposed. Without it no object of thought would be possible. But when it is a question of divine thought which is completely free from matter we cannot argue in the same way. What Aristotle has done is to use a distinction between νοῦς and νοητόν which makes sense when it refers to instances where abstraction from matter is possible, in a case where it makes no sense to speak of such abstraction. Or we might say he has failed to distinguish two senses of ἄνευ ὕλης . One sense in which we speak of things which possess matter as ἄνευ ὕλης , and another in which we speak of something which does not possess matter as ἄνευ ὕλης . Because Aristotle fails to make this distinction, he says that with regard to divine thought νόησις and τὸ νοούμενον are one, and to say that God's thought is νοήσεως νόησις is just another way of saying this. But with regard to human thinking, to say that

νόησις and τὸ νοούμενον are one, is completely different from saying that human thinking is νοήσεως νόησις. The latter makes no sense. Even if it is a correct description of divine thought, the reasons that Aristotle gives for such description in analogy with human thinking are untenable.

So Aristotle attempts to give an account of divine thought in analogy with human thinking. At the end of chapter 9 of book Λ he does this in a quite general way, when he says: ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἢ ὁ τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὃν ἄλλο τι)— οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. (1075a7) Aristotle's thought at this point suffers the inevitable fate of any attempted systematic theology, which attempts to give an account of God's nature in analogy with human life. It becomes an account of God's nature which is really an account of human nature, but with certain limitations of human life left out. But the result is something we cannot understand.

We may say also that it is certain tendencies in the language that Aristotle uses that leads him astray. He makes a distinction which makes sense with reference to human thinking, but which makes no sense with regard to God, if as he thinks God is immaterial. Aristotle is also forced into difficulties because he tries to give a general account of thinking. He seems to think that all kinds of thinking are such that it is possible to identify νοῦς and νοητόν. But once he has made the distinction he wants to interpret all kinds of thinking in terms of it. All thinking is of one kind, or at least he tries to make it all of one kind. What Aristotle is interested in is the general question of how thinking is possible, and he wants to give a unified account of that apart from what is thought about. In his Ethics he makes a distinction between practical and theoretical νοῦς, but in the De Anima he brings the two together when he says: καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ (431b10) Aristotle's view about truth and falsity in connexion with τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι as we have seen, is that the mind cannot be in error here. He attempts to put forward the same view with regard to actions when he says in the Metaphysics: ὥστε τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται οὗ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. (1048a13)(cf. pp. infra). This is but one example. But for our present purposes what we wish to emphasise is how Aristotle's desire for a general account leads him to put forward the kind of views he does about God's nature.

Even if there are these difficulties in understanding Aristotle's view of God as νοῦς, there still remains the question of what relationship Aristotle thinks there is between God and the world. His

answer to this question does not seem to be as definitely stated as his view about the nature of God, and perhaps he was not as clear about this matter. The main question that seems to be in his mind is <u>how</u> the unmoved mover causes motion. He seems to have thought of this question separately from the one of which we have already given some account - that is the question of the necessary existence of the unmoved mover. In Metaphysics Λ he first gives his reasons for thinking that there must be such a source of motion (ἀρχὴ κινήσεως), but then he goes on to deal with the nature of this source of motion. What he says about this in Λ is very brief and summary, but his account can be perhaps better understood from what he says in the De Motu Animalium and in the De Anima.

In Λ he says that the unmoved mover κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ . (1072b3). This view is difficult to understand; just as difficult as the idea of God's νόησις being νοήσεως νοησις . We have seen, however, that the latter idea seems to have its origin in the attempt that Aristotle makes to apply the distinction between δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια , and that between νοῦς and νοητόν , to the nature of God. It is possible also to see Aristotle's view of God as the source of all motion ὡς ἐρώμενον , as the result of his attempt to apply his notion of ὄρεξις as a source of motion in the soul to the question of how God is the source of motion that exists in the universe as a whole. That this is not just a guess may be seen from what Aristotle says in the De Motu Animalium (698b8): 'The point of rest in the animal is still quite ineffectual unless there is something without, which is absolutely at rest and immovable. Now it is worthwhile to pause and consider what has been said, for it involves a speculation which extends beyond animals even to the motion of the universe'.

What is it that moves without being moved? It is τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν (1072a26). Aristotle attempts to identify these two notions with regard to God, though in the case of human beings he sees a difference between them. If we look first of all at what he says about νοῦς and ὄρεξις as sources of motion in the human soul, it may be easier to see how he attempted to use these ideas to speak about God.

Aristotle discusses this question in chapters 9 - 11 of the third book of the De Anima. He seems mainly to be concerned with the question of whether it is νοῦς or ὄρεξις which is the cause of human action. He thinks, though it seems with some misgiving that the cause is ὄρεξις and not νοῦς . That this question bothered Aristotle is clear when we compare the passage already quoted from the Metaphysics (1048a 13), where he seems to be saying that νοῦς is more the cause. But a full discussion of this question would lead to a consideration of Aristotle's ethical views. Aristotle treats the question of the relative merits of νοῦς and ὄρεξις as if it were a theoretical question to decide how they can be balanced against one another. For Plato it is rather a question of how we can overcome ὄρεξις when it is for what is evil; and

he does not distinguish the two when the desire is for the good. The relation between the two is never just a theoretical question for Plato, as it often is for Aristotle.

Aristotle attempts in the De Anima to distinguish different motive forces in human action. He distinguishes between νοῦς, ὄρεξις βούλησις, ἐπιθυμία, θύμος and φαντασία. We are not concerned here with the distinctions he makes between these, but rather with the general conclusions he comes to about the origin of human action. For there is a close relationship between this and his view of the movement that God brings about in the universe. He says: 'From these considerations it is clear that in one regard that which is eternally moved by the eternal mover is moved in the same way as every living creature, in another regard differently, for while the former is moved eternally, the movement of living creatures has an end'. (De Motu 700b30) Aristotle wanted to explain the eternal movement of the heavens in a way similar to his explanation of the temporal movement of human beings.

When Aristotle in the Metaphysics is stating his view of the unmoved mover of all things, he says that that which both moves and is moved is intermediate. (1072a24) He is referring to the circular movement of the heavens. It is intermediate between that which moves, but is unmoved, (i.e. God), and that which is moved, but does move (i.e. the sublunary region). He uses the same distinction in the De Anima when he is discussing the sources of human action. Here there is something that is unmoved and moves. It is τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. That which both moves and is moved is τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. That which is moved is τὸ ζῷον. Apart from the difficulties this view raises, the similarity between it and the view of God and the world in the Metaphysics is striking. Whether Aristotle put forward one view before the other, and the later view was a development of the earlier may be impossible to decide. But whether this is the case or not, the similarity between the two views is evidence of the fact that he thought that it was necessary to see that there is a close relationship of the kind indicated between an understanding of what human beings are and of what God is. He emphasises this in the De Motu: 'Now we have already determined that the origin of all other motions is that which moves itself, and the origin of this is immovable. And we must grasp this not only generally in theory, but also by reference to individuals in the world of sense, for with these in view we seek general theories, and with these we believe general theories ought to harmonise'. (698a10) Whichever view is earlier, what Aristotle says shows that he thought that it is possible to think of the nature of God in analogy with 'the world of sense'. It is the same thing that we have found him doing when he uses the notion of νοῦς, and the notions of δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια to speak of God's nature.

The way in which Aristotle uses the notions of something that is unmoved and moves, something that moves and is moved, and something that

is moved, to refer to human action, is not impossible to understand, and with regard to some forms of human action it seems to be a possible account. The object of desire is an unmoved moving cause of action by being an object of imagination or thought. τὸ ὀρεκτὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον, κινεῖ τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φανταοθῆναι. (De Anima 433a 18, b11; of Metaphysics 1072 a 26; De Motu 700 b 24). He goes on, however, to speak of the relation that there is between God and the world in the same terms. How this is to be understood is by no means clear, and it raises difficult questions about Aristotle's teleology. The point, however, that needs to be emphasised is that Aristotle thinks that it is possible to speak about the relation between God and the world in analogy with human action. In human action there are ends which human beings seek to achieve. In fact the life of the soul is the achievement of these ends. He thinks of the soul as being a cause in three different senses: ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή. ταῦτα δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ὁμοίως δ' ἡ ψυχή, κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία· καὶ γὰρ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὡς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχή αἰτία. (De Anima 415b8 ff). We find here an expression of an idea that is not really different from the passage we have quoted from the De Motu. (698a10) It is the idea that Aristotle states in the Metaphysics (1070a 31): 'The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all'. The soul could not be a material cause, because it is the form of a body, but it is each of the other three causes that Aristotle distinguishes. Here again we find a similar tendency to a general account.

Is there the analogy that Aristotle claims there is between the life of the soul as the end of human action, and God as the final cause of the world? In the case of human beings τὸ ὀρεκτόν is something to be achieved. It is first of all an object of imagination and thought, but it becomes actual in action. God cannot be the end of the world in this sense, because Aristotle thinks that the world and God are different. But this is only an instance of the kind of difficulty that must arise if with Aristotle we attempt to speak about God in a way which makes sense when we speak of human beings.

Aristotle himself seems to have realised this difficulty, and it is a difficulty which is connected with other aspects of his thought. The difficulty arises in connexion with Aristotle's conception of a final cause τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. In some places he distinguishes between two senses of this. In the Physics (194a37) he tells us that it is a distinction which he made in an early work called 'On Philosophy'. It is also a distinction which he uses in book Λ of the Metaphysics when he is speaking of God as the final cause of all things (1072b2). He also uses it in the De Anima when he is

distinguishing between what is temporal and eternal. He states the distinction there as follows: διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ. 'The final cause has two senses: (a) the end which is aimed at, and (b) the being for whose sake the end is aimed at. In the Metaphysics Aristotle says that it is only the former of these senses that exists ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις . In the De Anima he gives his reason for thinking this. It is 'because no living thing is able to partake in what is eternal and divine by uninterrupted continuance, for nothing perishable can for ever remain one and the same'. (415b3) What comes to be and passes away only achieves its end in whatever way is possible, and here there are differences of degree for different perishable things. The only sense in which what comes to be and passes away properly shares in everlastingness is through the indestructability of form. 'So what is perishable remains not indeed as the self-same individual but continues its existence in something like itself - not numerically one, but one in form'. (415b6)

The idea that seems to be in Aristotle's mind here is that we cannot speak of what is eternal and unchanging as having anything done in its interest. It is an end - the most perfect end, and it is this that the world of becoming seeks to achieve. But if we ask how it achieves this, the answer is by particular things achieving their own forms. But even in achieving this they are perishable; it is only the form that is indestructible. In fact Aristotle's view is that with regard to things that come to be and pass away the form is the final cause. (Physics 199a 30) 'And since 'nature' means two things the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which'. (cf De Gen. et Corr. 335b8).

That Aristotle thought in this way raises a difficulty about his theology. One question that interested him was how one was to account for the continuity and unity of the kosmos. Why does Aristotle say that God is the cause of this in the Metaphysics? Why did he not just stop at the form as final cause? But if he does not stop there, as is evident, what relationship is there between forms which are indestructible and God, who is eternal? This is a question which Aristotle himself does not seem to raise in just this form. Although this does not solve the difficulty, his view may be stated as follows. He thinks that the continuity of forms is not something that explains why the world is as it is. In fact it is the continuity of forms itself that has to be explained. That we might say is descriptive of the world and not explanatory. For there is something else besides the continuity of the forms which needs to be explained. This is the unity of the cosmos. That could not be explained by just referring to the continuity of the forms, for the continuity of forms is a plurality, without any unifying principle in itself. Aristotle mentions this question of the unity of the cosmos both at the beginning and the end of book Λ of the Metaphysics. So it seems to have been important to him.

The continuity of form in the cosmos is what Aristotle terms γένεσις, and that is what needs to be explained. Aristotle, in his own way, holds the same view here as Plato: he thinks that γένεσις exists οὐσίας ἕνεκα. 'When we are dealing with definite and ordered products of nature, we must not say that each is of a certain quality because it becomes so, but rather that they become so and so because they are so and so, for the process of becoming and development attends upon being and is for the sake of being, not vice versa' (De Gen. Anim. 778b3) This passage, however, might be interpreted as referring to the form. That is what a thing is; that is the reason for its becoming. But where does God as final cause fit into this scheme. Isn't the form as final cause sufficient?

Aristotle's answer to this question is that it is not. But here it is difficult to see why he thought so. In many passages he seems to identify God with nature. He defines nature in the Physics in different ways. He thinks of both matter and form as 'nature'; but it is more the latter. 'The form indeed is 'nature' rather than the matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially'. (193b7) But when Aristotle speaks of God and nature doing nothing in vain (De Caelo 271a33 De Partibus 658a9), he seems to have something else in mind besides matter and form. It seems to be the same thing that he refers to in the De Partibus Animalium (645a5): 'Having already treated of the celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best of our ability, any member of the kingdom, however ignoble. For if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet even these, by disclosing to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that designed them, give immense pleasure to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to philosophy'. It is the same point that he makes in the De Generatione et Corruptione: 'The originative sources then, of the things which come to be are equal in number to, and identical in kind with those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of matter, and a second in the sense of form: and, in addition, the third originative source must be present as well. For the two first are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things'. (335a 28ff).

Aristotle's view of nature is thoroughly teleological. This is clear especially in his biological works, where his account of the generation of animals, for instance, is that nature predisposes them in a way which is conducive for the life they lead. Where there is purpose to be found, Aristotle seeks to find it. He states his view in a general way at the beginning of the De Partibus Animalium: 'There is the final cause and there is the moter cause. Now we must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second. Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call the final one. For this is the Reason, and the Reason forms the starting point, alike in the works of

art and in the works of nature'. (639b13) 'In the works of nature the good end and the final cause is still more dominant than in the works of art'. (639b20) It is the end or purpose of the existence of any particular thing that is its real cause. All other causes are subsidiary to this. Aristotle's view of a causal series is determined by this idea. He is arguing against the view that things come about by chance, and he wants to show that the kind of necessity that is to be found in the universe is the necessity of definite ends. He gives as an example, health, and says: 'It is that which is yet to be - health, let us say, or a man - that owing to its being of such and such characters, necessitates the pre-existence or previous production of this or that antecedent; and not this or that antecedent which, because it exists or has been generated, makes it necessary that health or a man is in, or shall come into, existence. It is not possible to trace back the series of necessary antecedents to a starting point, of which you can say that, existing itself from eternity, it has determined their existence as its consequent'. (640a5 ff) It is the kind of view that had been put forward by Democritus that Aristotle is criticising here. Aristotle says that Democritus 'reduces the causes that explain nature to the fact that things happened in the past in the same way as they happen now' (Physics 252a 33) But that is no explanation, it does not explain the continuity and unity that is observed. Aristotle says: 'He does not think fit to seek for a first principle to explain this 'always': so, while his theory is right in so far as it is applied to certain individual cases, he is wrong in making it of universal application'. Aristotle was interested in finding a cause of universal application, and he thought it possible to find this in the notion of purpose as applied to what happens in the universe. This is why he so often seems to personify nature. 'That which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything disorderly: for nature is everywhere the cause of order'. (252a12)

Although Aristotle speaks in this way of nature and of God (De Caelo 271a 33 cf 291b14; De Partibus Animalium 658a9, 661b24; De Generatione Animalium 741b5, 744a 36), and we must note that he says usually that it is nature that does nothing in vain, he does not think that it is possible to speak of nature as a cause in an unequivocal way. In fact Aristotle distinguishes here between what is subject to γένεσις, and what is not. 'It is well said that we must not take upon ourselves to seek a beginning (or first principle) of all things, yet this is not well said of all things whatever that always are or always happen, but only of these which really are first principles of the eternal things; for it is by another method, not by proof, that we acquire knowledge of the first principle. Now in that which is immovable and unchanging the first principle is simply the essence of the thing, but when we come to those things which come into being the principles are more than one, varying in kind and not all of the same kind'. (De Generatione Animalium 742b30).

When Aristotle speaks of nature doing nothing in vain it is not just personification. It seems to have that character if we do not take into account the view that he states in the Metaphysics that the causes of all things are the same universally and analogically. An understanding of nature is for Aristotle an understanding of how there can be such universal and analogical causes. And the kind of cause which is primarily a cause in this universal and analogical way is the final cause. It is for Aristotle the presence of rational design in the universe as a whole. With regard to the production of natural kinds the final cause is the form; it is this that for Aristotle is the evidence of design and purpose. Nature is a realm in which there are certain means at work to achieve definite ends (Physics 199a10) But one has to see how there are different kinds of causes which all contribute to the end. One must distinguish, for instance, between matter and form, and this is a distinction that many previous philosophers have not made clearly. Democritus's view does not make this distinction clearly, and so he is unable to distinguish between chance and necessity. On that view it does not seem to make any difference whether one says that things come about by chance or necessity - they seem to mean the same thing. It is only if one distinguishes between matter and form that one can distinguish between these, and between necessity and design. 'What is necessary is necessary on a hypothesis; it is not a result necessarily determined by antecedents. (As Democritus thought). Necessity is in the matter, while 'that for the sake of which' is in the definition'. (Physics 200a 13). 'Since "nature" means two things, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of "that for the sake of which".' (ibid 199a30)

Aristotle, then, thinks of nature as an organised whole, which can be described in accordance with his view of the causes, but even so they are only universal and analogical principles; that is general principles which are descriptive of the design that exists in the universe. It is only when nature is being described that it is necessary to refer to these kinds of causes. It would be a mistake to imagine that an account of nature must end there. That is the main task of the physicist - to explain the nature of the different causes and how they are related to one another. "Now, the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist to know about them all, and if he refers his problems back to all of them, he will assign the 'why' in the way proper to his science - the matter, the form, the mover, 'that for the sake of which'." (Physics 198a 22). The last three causes often coincide, Aristotle claims. He is thinking in particular of different forms of living beings. And so the causes for a great deal of nature can be said to be two - form and matter. But these are the causes that are present within nature itself, and they do not explain nature as a whole.

An explanation of that demands a kind of cause which does not share in the processes of coming to be and passing away. We have already suggested a possible way in which Aristotle might have been led to put forward the view he did of the νοῦς that is the unmoved mover of the

universe. But apart from those suggestions and the particular things that Aristotle says about the nature of God, it is clear that he does not wish to identify God and nature. There is a clear distinction between physics and theology. For the physicist 'motion is ultimately referable to nature' (Physics 253b5). Nature is 'a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally' (ibid 192b21). But nature depends on another cause. 'On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and nature' (Metaphysics 1072 b 13). For Aristotle the world of nature is multiform, and any account of it even in the most general terms, must refer to different kinds of principles. But God is unchanging and simple in nature.

There are a number of passages in Aristotle's works which may suggest that the distinction between God and nature is not definite. But the sentence we have just quoted from Λ makes it quite clear. Why does Aristotle say: ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανός καὶ ἡ φύσις?

Why does he not just say that it is ἡ φύσις that depends on this? The reason is simple. He thinks of the heaven as different from nature. The latter is what is subject to change. It is the sphere of coming-to-be and passing-away, but the heaven is eternal and unchanging for him. So those passages in Aristotle where he seems to identify God and nature are not to be taken as meaning this. When he seems to speak of nature in that way, it is because he is referring to the intelligent and purposive activity that he thinks is to be observed in nature.

The difficulty which has been felt about Aristotle's view of God, is how anything like the intelligent activity which he sees in the world of nature can be attributed to the kind of God which he talks about in Book Λ of the Metaphysics. It is this difficulty that might lead to an attempt to interpret Aristotle as identifying God and nature. But whatever difficulties there are in understanding Aristotle's views about God, it is not possible to make this identification. For φύσις, according to Aristotle, is not completely actual as God is. It cannot be understood without reference to what is potential. So Aristotle says: (Metaphysics 1049b4 ff):

λέγω δὲ δύναμεως οὐ μόνον τῆς ὡρισμένης ἣ λέγεται ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει τῇ δυνάμει· ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητική, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτό.

The difficulty that Aristotle is faced with in his theology is: How is it possible to conceive of divine activity in relation to the world? For his view of God is that God is simple and unchanging, and how can such a being be related to a world in which change is observed to take place? This is a difficulty arising not only in Aristotle's theology, but in any theology which attempts to state what relation

there is between God and the world. Aristotle in speaking of God as a final cause seems to be forced to say the only thing that he can say. He seems to think that because the form is the final cause of particular things that come to be and pass away and as such it is the most important cause in the realm of nature, the nature of God can only be understood in analogy with this. But even if we can make some sense of the form as final cause ἐν ὕλῃ , when this notion is applied to God its meaning is lost. For in the world of γένεσις , the form as final cause is the form of something, but God cannot be the final cause of something in this sense. So Aristotle's attempt to explain God's causality as final causality in analogy with final causality in nature cannot be said to work. His intention is no doubt to say that in speaking of God's causality in this way we understand God's causality, but all that he has really done is to interpret God's causality in the same way as the causality of the form as the final cause.

But Aristotle's view of the form is not just that it is the final cause. It is also in some way the efficient cause. It is not only what some particular thing becomes, but it is also the cause of its becoming that. He identifies the formal, efficient and final causes in the case of living beings. In the De Generatione Animalium he says:

βελτίονος δὲ καὶ θειοτέρας τὴν φύσιν οὔσης τῆς
αἰτίας τῆς κινούσης πρώτης, ἢ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχει
καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τῆς ὕλης.

(732a4) So the form belongs with the proximate efficient cause. It is for Aristotle an immanent moving cause, which is to be distinguished from external moving causes such as the sun. (Metaphysics 1070b22). When he is discussing the difference between male and female in the De Generatione Animalium he identifies the formal cause with the male, and the material cause with the female. He says of the former that it is better and more divine in nature than the latter. Similarly he thinks of the soul as the form and the body as the matter of a living animal.

The soul as the form of the living animal is both its efficient and final cause. Aristotle's general definition of the soul is:

ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει
ζωὴν ἔχοντος.

(De Anima 412a 27) It is the presence of life that distinguishes that which possesses soul from that which does not. (413a 21) It is the soul that makes life possible, and so it is the efficient cause. The soul, 'is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being ensouled'. (414a 27) But it is not to any form of matter that the soul can bring life to form a living animal. It must be matter of a particular kind. Aristotle criticises the views of previous philosophers who seemed just to fit the soul to a body 'without

adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body' (414a 23); There must be 'matter which is appropriate to the soul' (ibid 26) In the De Generatione Animalium Aristotle gives a fuller account, and there he claims that there must be a special form of matter for the soul to unite with in the generation of an animal.

πάσης μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων. ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις.

(736b 30) He compares this πνεῦμα to the aether of which the heavenly bodies are made. It is what makes possible the coming to be of soul in some particular body. It differs, Aristotle claims, as soul differs, and is more divine in nature than the so-called elements, earth, air, fire and water. It is what accompanies the male semen in the generation of animals. Aristotle calls it τὸ τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀρχῆς. (737a 9) It is the soul as efficient cause.

But the soul is also the final cause. πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καὶ καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ζώων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα. (415b 18) Aristotle wants to say that the soul is not only that which makes something that is alive, alive; but also it is the life which belongs to anything that is alive. It is not only the πρώτη ἐντελέχεια of a physical body in a temporal sense, but it also is the πρώτη ἐντελέχεια in definition. It is the soul which defines the nature of a living being. So he says: ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν. (Metaphysics 1043b 2 cf. 1036 a1) It defines its nature both as efficient and final cause.

The difficulty, however, in understanding Aristotle's view is how this view of the soul is related to his view of God as final unmoved mover. In Aristotle we find nothing comparable to the view that Plato states in the Timaeus. There Plato thinks of the δημιουργός as creating soul; but for Aristotle soul seems to have an independent existence. At least if he did think that its existence depends upon God, he does not show how we are to think of this dependence. Or rather we should say that he does not make it clear that soul is any any way dependent upon God. For we cannot say that Plato thinks that it is possible to show how the existence of soul is dependent upon God. But even if that is impossible, nevertheless Plato thinks that it is dependent.

Perhaps one of the few suggestions that we have in Aristotle on this question is to be found in the last chapter of book Λ. There he makes statements that can be interpreted as suggesting that there is some kind of providential activity to be found in the world. From what he says there, however, we cannot gather anything like the view of creation that we find in Plato's "Timaeus". And when we take this in connexion with what he says in the last book of the Ethics,

the impression we gain is that although Aristotle has a strong sense of the order that exists in the world, his conception of this is such that we could hardly call it religious, as we can call Plato's.

Aristotle is clearly concerned with how it is possible to understand the continued order of the universe. For instance, in the last chapter of book Λ, he is concerned with pointing out that any view which attempts to explain becoming in terms of contraries only, without any reference to a principle which is distinct from contraries is mistaken. There must be principle over and above what ever contraries there are. The first cause is not a contrary; 'for there is nothing contrary to that which is primary' (1075b 23). Of any contrary, Aristotle thinks, it must be 'possible for it not to be'. (1075b 31). So no contrary can be 'a productive and moving principle'. (ibid) And even if it were 'its action would be posterior to its potency'. If such were the principle of things, the world would not be eternal, as Aristotle thinks it is. The unity of things in the world, such as the unity of the soul and body, of the unity of form and matter generally, cannot be explained apart from a cause which is external to any union of soul and body, or any union of matter and form.

The question that Aristotle asks here is: 'How does the nature of the universe possess the good and the highest good? As something separate and by itself, or as the order of its parts? His answer is that it contains it in both ways. This does not, however, mean that Aristotle was a pantheist. What he has said about God previously rules that out. But neither is his view of God one which places God completely and irrevocably outside of the κόσμος. It is interesting that here Aristotle uses two terms - τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. (1075a 12). He has already described God as ἄριστος (1072b 28). It may be misleading to translate ἔχει here as 'contains' (as Ross does). That suggests that both τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ ἄριστον are ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου φύσει. Aristotle says: 'God and nature do nothing in vain' and not 'God or nature does nothing in vain'. So it seems that by τὸ ἄριστον here, Aristotle refers to what God brings about in the universe, and by τὸ ἀγαθὸν the order of the parts of ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις. If it is thought that τὸ ἄριστον and τὸ ἀγαθὸν must both refer just to ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις, then the example that Aristotle gives tells against this. He says: 'In both ways, like an army; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter' So it seems just to connect τὸ ἀγαθὸν with the τάξις of the world, and τὸ ἄριστον with God himself. The quotation from Homer at the end of the chapter is also evidence that Aristotle is not identifying the two: 'The rule of the many is not good; one ruler let there be'. It is good to recognise the order that there is in the world, but the best is to recognise that there must be a cause of the order.

The idea that the world is governed is central to the last chapter of book Λ, and this idea of providence is for Aristotle an answer

to the question he puts at 1075b 17: 'Why should there always be becoming and what is the cause of becoming?' Aristotle cannot get away from the idea that it is not sufficient to point to the τάξις that is to be found in the world. There must be a cause for it. The former is the kind of view he attributes to Speusippus at the end of the chapter (1075b 38): 'And those who say mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes, and they give us many governing principles; but the world refuses to be governed badly'. It is also an idea that we find implicitly rejected at the very beginning of the book, so it must have been uppermost in Aristotle's mind. 'If', he says, 'the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this view also substance is first'. (1069a 19).

Aristotle thinks, then, that it is impossible to understand the order that we see in the world unless we say that there is a cause for the order. In this he seems to agree with Plato. Though there are important differences. The way in which he states his view is far more theoretical than Plato's statement of it, and there does not seem to be the close connexion that Plato sees between the necessity of the order of the Κόσμος, and the necessity for order in the life of the human soul.

A Comparison.

The term 'philosophy of religion' in more recent times has come to be used in connexion with ideas that may be considered to be foreign to the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Jaeger claims that this is not so: 'The history of the philosophy of religion, in the modern sense of the phrase, begins with the sophists and their first great attempts to give a psychological explanation of its nature and origin. Rationalism, however, can never advance more than a little way along this road, because it lacks the organ by which the phenomena of the religious life are properly perceived; and hence the philosophy of religion did not enter on its classical period until the time of the early Aristotle and the Academy in the later days of Plato. It is a fact, though the accepted history of philosophy may ignore it, that almost the entire stock of later and modern ideas about the philosophy of religion can be traced to this society'. (Aristotle pp 156 - 7). The influence of both Plato and Aristotle on later writers is not to be denied. It is also necessary, however, to show that there are serious differences between the view of Plato and Aristotle in connexion with their 'philosophies of religion'.

If we compare some of the modern aspects of the philosophy of religion with the views of Plato and Aristotle, one of the main differences is that modern philosophy has to take into account the claim that religious truth has been revealed to men. In Christianity, for instance, this has resulted in the statement of beliefs that have been revealed. The truths of revelation are then contrasted with truths of reason, as they are by Thomas Aquinas who distinguishes between truths of reason and truths of faith or revelation. This led him to distinguish between philosophy and theology. A similar kind of distinction is to be found in Islam.

On the other hand it has often been pointed out that Greek religion was not dogmatic as the Christian religion is, and so the question of the justification of revealed dogma never arose for Plato and Aristotle, as it did for many Christian philosophers, though something very much like it did exist for them in so far as they faced the question of the relation between their own views and those of the religion of the time. Plato made use of the religious beliefs of his day to a far greater extent than Aristotle, and he quotes Orphic doctrine, for instance, about the nature of the soul. In fact what he has to say in his myths about the immortality of the soul tends to be almost an apologia for the kind of belief that was common in Orphic circles, and certainly his myths about the life of the soul after death are influenced by this source. In the Laws, religion for Plato takes on a far more dogmatic character than it has in his earlier works, and there is a very close relationship between morality and religion. We find nothing comparable in Aristotle and this goes with what we may regard as his more purely intellectual approach to the questions that religion raises for philosophy. In fact we may say in general that whereas Plato found it necessary to try to give some kind of account of the issues which the religion of his day raised for him, Aristotle is not

seriously concerned with religion as such, and is only interested in it so far as it seems to corroborate his philosophical views. (Metaphysics 1074b 1ff).

So in Plato we find philosophy and religion very closely connected; in Aristotle there is hardly any relation at all. And this difference becomes clear in the different kinds of views that they put forward. The point however, may be questioned. If Plato in opposition to the view of Protagoras and others claimed that God was the measure of all things, Aristotle too thought of the world as dependent upon a first cause which he calls God. In this he was probably influenced by what he had learnt from Plato, and it has been argued that this view of his is an earlier one in which the influence of Plato is still dominant. (Jaeger). Whatever be the truth about this matter, there is a general difference of approach and this difference is important in an attempt to assess the nature of religion from the point of view of philosophy. It is common to regard what Aristotle wrote as a development and criticism of Plato's thought, and this is often a fruitful way of looking at the matter. It is also necessary, however, to look at the two views for what they are in themselves. When we do this important differences appear, and we find that what in one way must be regarded as a development of Plato's thought is really very different and is a drastic revision of it.

The difference is clearly seen in their different views about morality. For Plato morality is closely connected with religion. For Aristotle it is not. There is a clear relationship between what Plato says about God in the Timaeus and what he says about morality in the Laws. If God is the creator of the world, he is also the creator of the laws in accordance with which men should live. There is also a clear relation between what Aristotle says about God in the Metaphysics, and what he says about intellectual virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics, but the relation is quite different from the one that Plato sees between God and morality. For Plato God is the law-giver; but he is hardly this for Aristotle. The standard for Aristotle is the good man (Ethics 1176 b26); for Plato the standard is God.

There is then not only a difference in their views about morality but also a difference between their views of God. It is the difference between their views about God that determine the difference between their views about morality. A.E. Taylor in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus claims that Plato is the originator of rational theology, but it is possible to see Aristotle as this more clearly than Plato. If we understand by rational theology what Aquinas understood by theologia naturalis then it is much easier to connect this with Aristotle than with Plato and this would also explain the attraction that Aristotle had for Aquinas. It is not just that Aristotle had become available for Aquinas in the translations of William of Moerbeke and in the commentaries of Ibn Ruschd, but that Aristotle's theology appealed to Aquinas in his attempt to give proofs for his religion. Rational theology as such may be considered as consisting of metaphysical arguments for the existence of God, about the nature of the human soul, and of the relation that

exists between the two. Aquinas thought that the cosmological argument was the most important of the arguments for God's existence and Aristotle's argument for the unmoved mover is most closely connected with this. There is one fundamental difference, however, between Greek religion and Christianity which makes such an argument play quite a different part in the thinking of a Christian like Aquinas from what it plays in the thought of Aristotle. This is the distinction in the Christian religion which is central to Aquinas's theology between what is created and the creator. In Aristotle this distinction does not exist, although Aquinas attempts to interpret Aristotle as if it did. For Aquinas too the argument is meant to be a philosophical proof of what is otherwise revealed, and so he thinks of the argument as some kind of defence religion. That this is so is illustrated by his view (Summa Contra Gentiles) that revelation is necessary because the argument will not be understood by all. It is nothing like this for Aristotle. It is rather the result of that part of first philosophy which he calls theology. It is no kind of apologia fedei. But as we have attempted to show it is in Aristotle that we find that idea of metaphysics which Aquinas considers to be a means of establishing proofs for God's existence. It arises from an interpretation of what Aristotle calls the study of being qua being in so far as that studies substances that are free from matter. The origin of the way in which Aquinas understands this is to be found in Aristotle. For Aquinas it is a matter of the distinction between what is contingent and what is necessary and this is connected with the notion of existence as that is applied to God.

In Aristotle's theology the notion of 'substance includes the notion of 'existence' as this has been applied to God in later theology. In any attempt to assess Aristotle's theology or Christian theology as it has been influenced by him attention should be paid to this notion of substance. It is not the so-called arguments for God's existence that are important, but this concept of 'substance' or 'existence' as applied to God. This is far more fundamental.

The concept of existence as applied to God is fundamental because any argument about God's existence must presuppose an understanding of this concept as applied to him; and if any argument for the existence of God is to work, it can do so only if the so called concept of existence which is contained in the premises of the argument applies to the conclusion also. But no one can want to apply the concept of existence which applies to what is mentioned in the premises to what is referred to in the conclusion - that is to God, and that is the main reason for saying that any argument for God's existence fails in what it attempts to show.

But what about God's existence itself ? We have no concept of God's <u>existence</u> as that notion is usually applied. From this point of view it makes no sense to say 'I know that God exists'. One of the most celebrated attacks on arguments for God's existence is Immanuel Kant's. His main objection was that existence is not a logical predicate and so cannot function as such in any argument. Kant would say that we cannot prove the existence of anything. In the sense in which 'exists' is being used here it would be possible to discover the existence of something, but

not to prove it.

Some people have thought that Kant's position may be regarded as and aid to religious belief, because it means that the existence of God cannot be disproved. This must be small comfort. But in any case Kant's view is irrelevant. This is so because the concept of existence which he denies to be a logical predicate makes sense for instance when it occurs in such a statement as 'There is a palm tree in my garden', and in Kant's sense it would not be possible to prove the existence of the palm tree, But what is important in this example is that the concept of existence has an application here - that it makes sense. But does this concept apply to God ? We do not know how to apply it to him, and this is the reason why Kant's view is irrelevant. He says that we cannot prove or disprove God's existence because it is not a logical predicate, but this pre - supposes that the concept of existence can be applied to God. Kant's position is: 'It is impossible either to prove or disprove God's existence, because existence is not a logical predicate'. Rather we cannot understand how the concept of existence applies to God and so we should not just say that it is impossible to prove or disprove God's existence, for that presupposes the application of the concept of existence to God, but that it makes no sense to prove or disprove God's existence, because we do not understand how that concept applies to him.

The same thing applies to Aristotle's conception of substance when applied to God. We cannot understand how it is to be applied. It is however because Aristotle speaks of God in this way that his way of thought gives rise to theology which speaks of God's nature. Plato's view however, is much nearer what is called in religion belief or faith. This is fundamental to religion. It is not necessary for belief in God that there should be an understanding of a concept of existence as applied to God. If such an understanding were possible then religion would not be a matter of belief. The true account is impossible for us. Aristotle on the other hand in speaking about God as immaterial substance is attempting to establish with regard to God a form of knowledge that runs counter to what is important in religion. Because the understanding that Aristotle thought was possible is not possible religious belief is something different from what it might be supposed to be. For belief in God is not anything like a hypothesis or supposition. It is not supposing that God exists. If someone says: 'I believe that there is life on Mars' then part of the point of this kind of supposition is that it makes sense to say: 'I believe there is life there, but I am not certain'. But belief in God is different. If it is thought to be some kind of hypothesis which could be confirmed, as the hypothesis that there is life on Mars might be, then that makes God as contingent as life on Mars is. There may happen to be life on Mars. On the other hand there may not be life there. But belief in God is not believing that something may happen to be the case or not. With regard to the supposition about Mars it makes sense to say: 'I believe there is life there, but I am not certain. Soon we shall find out'. But it makes no sense to say in the same way: 'I believe in God, but I am not certain. I shall find out whether my belief is true'.

There is such a thing as lack of faith - but that is not anything which one can get rid of by appealing to the kind of evidence which would decide that there is life on Mars. Lack of faith is not lack of evidence in that sense; it is sin not to believe. When Plato says in the Timaeus that is blasphemy to deny that God created the world, he seems to mean something like this.

One main difference then between Plato and Aristotle may be stated by saying that for Aristotle the nature of God can be a matter for human investigation. For Plato it is not this, but far more a matter of what one believes about God. Aristotle's view leads to theology in the sense that it makes sense to ask whether there is an immaterial substance and also tries to show that there is one which possesses the nature which Aristotle assigns to God in book Λ of the Metaphysics. When Aristotle says that there is an ἐπιστήμη which deals with being-qua-being he thinks that theology is part of this because it deals with immaterial substance. But for Plato there is no such ἐπιστήμη where God is concerned. For Aristotle the problem: 'Is there an immaterial substance ? ' is a question that can be answered in the affirmative, and reasons can be given for its existence. Aristotle makes it look as if one can give reasons for the existence of an immaterial substance - and this is God. But this makes the difference between believing in God and not believing in him, a difference between what is more reasonable and what is less so. But belief in God is not a reason nor an explanation of any kind.

We have already discussed the idea of creation as it is found in Plato (see pp 64 - 72) and we have tried to show that for him creation is a religious idea. It is not an idea which can be regarded as a result arrived at by philosophical argument and proof. If blasphemy is possible, and Plato thought it was, there is no independent proof that there is blasphemy. For religious belief to deny that God created the world is blasphemy; you are denying what you believe, and not what you have proved. If you deny what you have proved this is not blasphemy, but a contradiction. If a religious believer says: 'I cannot deny that God created the world; I don't believe that it is the result of chance' (cf. Sophist 265C ff) then he <u>is</u> saying that he cannot deny what he believes. Blasphemy is denying what one believes about God. It might be asked 'Why is that so serious ? Surely denying what one belives is not as serious as denying what one knows ! ' In the case of religious belief, denying what one believes is, because here one does not possess knowledge, but only belief. There is nothing but the belief to deny. And so not to believe is to blaspheme. That is why not to believe is such a serious matter. So Plato says: 'On the contrary supposition, which cannot be <u>spoken</u> without blasphemy'. The contrary supposition, which is lack of belief, is blasphemy. If one denies the creation, then one is not denying something that has been mistakenly asserted. If one denies it as a mistaken assertion, then this is to misunderstand what one supposed one denies. If it were just a matter of something that could be either mistakenly asserted or not, then it could not be a matter of blasphemy.

The difference between Plato and Aristotle is also seen in their different views of morality. Aristotle's view about morality raises questions that will not be discussed here, but we shall give some indication of the difference between his view and Plato's by discussing two points of his ethics. These are:

1. Aristotle's discussion of the Socratic paradox οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει and
2. Aristotle's distinction between intellectual virtue and moral virtue.

It may be suggested that Aristotle's discussion of Socrates's view in book V11 of his Ethics shows that Aristotle recognised the importance of ἀκρασία in a discussion of this subject, whereas Socrates did not; that Aristotle did so is to his credit, and we may reject Socrates's view because he fails to see this problem. From what we have already said about Socrates it should be clear that he did not deny that incontinence is possible as a matter of fact. If it were impossible then Socrates would have had nothing to teach.

The real point at issue, as Aristotle sees the matter, is the suggestion that the ἀκρατής acts through ignorance and Aristotle wants to understand what this ignorance is. His discussion of the 'practical syllogism' has this end in view, but it is difficult to see how his discussion of this answers Socrates's problem. Aristotle's account of the ignorance that is involved in ἀκρασία is that the ἀκρατής does not realise that one or other of the premises of a practical syllogism applies to his action. He seems to think that this solves the difficulty that arises and allows us to see that Socrates's statement of the problem is mistaken. Aristotle, however, at the end of his discussion says that Socrates was right. This might well be a case of Aristotle's thinking, as he often does, that a previous philosopher has correctly recognised a problem but has failed to give an accurate solution. Aristotle, nevertheless, interprets Socrates's problem in his own way, and attempts to solve that, but the way in which he interprets it makes his problem not the one which concerned Socrates. What we intend to show is that the interpretation Aristotle gives is not what Socrates meant when he said that a man who does evil does so in ignorance. For the ignorance that Socrates is speaking of here is not ignorance of a general premise that applies to a particular case, but ignorance of the evil involved in an action.

The ignorance of the evil that can be involved in an action seems to have been of a particular kind for Socrates. As we have attempted to show Socratic ignorance is primarily ignorance in the sense of not being able to understand the difference between good and evil, although knowledge that there is a difference is possible. For examples of such differences can be given. The distinction here between form and thing for Socrates, that is the distinction between just acts and justice, is the distinction between a particular act where there is a known distinction between good and evil (or justice and injustice), and the form, a knowledge of which would be an understanding of the difference between justice and injustice. The fact that Plato sometimes speaks of forms such as injustice becomes clearer if we look at the matter in this way. For knowing the form of

injustice would be understanding what injustice is, just as knowing the form of justice would be understanding what justice is καθ' αὑτό . It was this knowledge or understanding that Socrates denies we possessed. We can know that there is a difference between good and evil in particular instances, but we cannot know what that difference is in itself. It is this character of Socrates's view that is lacking in Aristotle. We can see this, for instance, in his saying that the standard is the good man and in his criticism of the form of the Good. Aristotle rejects the unity of goodness which Plato's view asserts. What Plato refers to as the form of the Good, about which he says that we cannot gain perfect knowledge, is what Socrates said he was ignorant about. Aristotle, however, rejects the notion. It is neither an object of knowledge or ignorance for him. He denies its existence. Socrates's position, however, is that he is ignorant of its existence. But that does not mean for him that it does not exist and there can be no knowledge of it. Only that he does not possess it. Socrates's position is that God knows, and this is the view that we see influencing Plato's thought especially in the Laws.

The kind of ignorance that Aristotle discusses is different. He is concerned with a person not realizing that a particular action is the one that should be done in a particular instance. It is not that what Aristotle says is completely mistaken, but that what he says does not answer Socrates's problem. Aristotle argues that there are two kinds of premise involved in the practical syllogism. He says:

ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κώλυει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, οἷον δὲ πᾶντι ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ· κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμηχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν

(1147a1 ff)

One main distinction that Aristotle is making here is between premises that are universal and ones that are particular. He thinks that it is possible to know the universal premises 'Dry food is beneficial to all men' without knowing in a particular instance that some particular food is dry. With regard to knowledge of the particular premise he thinks that it is possible either to possess the knowledge and not exercise it, or to possess it and exercise it. A man may know that some particular food

before him is dry and so good for him, but he may not exercise his knowledge by eating it. This distinction between potential and actual knowledge is important here and Aristotle has already made the distinction (1146b31). When he says at the end of the passage quoted: κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους . . . . . θαυμαστόν , he is repeating the point he has made earlier (1146b33): διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ τὸ γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. At 1147 a8 when he says κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους κτλ. he is referring to this frequent distinction between potential and actual knowledge and not to the distinction he makes at 1147a1 when he is referring to the two different kinds of premises. The distinction between potential and actual knowledge itself applies to both kinds of premise. It is this distinction that Aristotle uses in describing ordinary action. Knowledge must be actual if action is to take place. The difficulty with Aristotle's view is that he thinks the distinction between potential and actual knowledge can be applied equally to the universal premise and to the particular. But in the way in which he applies it to the universal premise it cannot be applied to the particular, and as a matter of fact Aristotle does not so apply it, even if he claims he does. For with regard to the universal premise the kind of thing Aristotle has in mind in speaking of the difference between potential and actual knowledge is the difference between knowing something and not calling it to mind at some particular time, and calling it to mind. But that kind of distinction is impossible with regard to what Aristotle calls the particular premise. If an example of such a premise is: 'This food before me is dry', then either I know this or I do not. The fact that it is impossible to distinguish between potential and actual knowledge in this case as one can with the universal premise, led Aristotle to say that actual knowledge in this case is acting in accordance with what one knows. But that is not knowledge but action.

But even if there is this difficulty in Aristotle's account of ordinary action, he realized that it would not account for incontinence, even though he seems to suggest this when he says: 'Since there are two kinds of premises, there is nothing to prevent a man's having both premises and acting against his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premise and not the particular.' He goes on to say: ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν δρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες. (1147a10) This is a different form of ignorance in which 'the fact that men use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothing', and the knowledge that is the opposite of this kind of ignorance must become part of oneself and this takes time.' If this kind of ignorance cannot be explained in terms of the distinction between potential and actual knowledge that applies to ordinary action, how is it to be explained? Aristotle compares it to madness and drunkenness, and suggests that in order to understand how such

ignorance can be dissolved we must go to the φυσιολόγοι . Incontinence is a matter of particular passions, and disregard for the universal which states what ought to be done.

Whatever we say about the details of Aristotle's account of incontinence (and the above is not a complete account) what he attempts to do is to give a description of it. He is most concerned with how incontinence is possible. But that did not concern Socrates. He was not interested so much in a physiological description of incontinence, but in trying to understand how it can be overcome. It could only be overcome he thought by following the good and not the evil. What Aristotle says about incontinence certainly does not help us to overcome it. His position is that the difference between an incontinent and imprudent man and one who is continent and prudent is that the latter not only knows what is right but also does it, whereas the former only knows what is right and does not do it. But that does not help us to understand how one can be continent instead of incontinent. Socrates's problem, on the other hand, is not whether we can give a description of incontinence which describes how it occurs but whether we can understand something about it which will enable us to do something about it. Aristotle tells us: 'We become good by doing good deeds', but this is small comfort if we are ignorant of why we do evil and are unable to do what is good. It is our ignorance here that Socrates stresses.

The distinction that Aristotle makes between intellectual and moral virtue is central to the account that he gives in the Nicomachean Ethics. This distinction is partly connected with what he says in the last book about the relationship that human beings can have with God. For it is the possession of intellectual virtue that makes possible the relationship that Aristotle thinks there is between men and God. He placed moral virtue below the intellectual kind. It is this distinction of Aristotle's that makes his view of morality strikingly different from Plato's. This distinction is not to be found in Plato and its absence there makes Plato's view of the relation between morality and religion of a particular kind. Aristotle's view does not raise the kind of problems about the relation between morality and religion that Plato's does. He places little emphasis upon the moral conflict which is connected with a religious view of morality. Our discussion of Aristotle's view of incontinence has shown that he treats this very much as a conflict between the intellectual and moral parts of the soul, between λόγος and ἐπιθυμία and his account of the matter is almost purely descriptive. His idea that in order to find out how the incontinent man loses his ignorance, we should consult the φυσιολόγοι , is in sharp contrast to Plato's idea of the matter. That for Plato was part of the ἀνάγκη in human life which he thought could only be overcome by 'knowing the gods rightly and living accordingly.'

Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtue at the end of Book 1 and at the beginningof book 11 of his Ethics. He says:

διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικάς, τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου· ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε παρεκκλινοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

The question that this passage raises is: 'Doesn't the attainment of moral virtue take time and experience ?' Aristotle suggests that it is just a matter of habit, meaning by this, that it is doing the same thing over and over again. But, of course, there can be bad habits as well as good ones, and the problem is how to distinguish between those. Later, however, in book VI he does something to alter this first impression when he distinguishes between two kinds of moral virtue. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρονήσις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσική τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.

Aristotle's discussion in book VI, chapter 13 does show that he is unhappy about the broad distinction that he has made earlier (1103a4 ff). In fact what he says later seems to do away with the distinction.

This is only an indication of the difficulty of the questions about morality that Aristotle is trying to answer. When he says, for instance, in this same passage: διόπερ τινές φασι πάντας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει, τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις οὐκ ἦν εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. (1144b 17), he overlooks the point of Socrates's paradox that virtue is one thing. For the problem here is about the unity of virtue as knowledge, not how different virtues are φρονήσεις. (Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λογοὺς τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας) (1144b28) When Aristotle says: δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φρονήσεως ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. (1144b30) he is still making a distinction between ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and φρόνησις as ἀρετὴ διανοητική which is foreign to Socrates's thought on the matter. The same thing can be said about his remark a little later: ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι (δοκεῖ αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ) ὑπάρξουσιν. (1145a2); The main point about Socrates's view here is (to use Aristotle's language) that you cannot distinguish between ἀρετή and φρόνησις. But Aristotle thinks there is a difference and he seems to betray the divergence between his view and Socrates's when he says: δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι. (1145a2) He refers to the intellectual part of human nature when he says

διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι

as if one could know what being prudent is without being so.

Aristotle thinks that it is necessary to make this distinction between φρόνησις and ἀρετή (i.e. ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή) because the first deals with τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος and the latter with τὸ τέλος . This distinction between things that relate to the end and the end itself would for Socrates not make sense in considering what virtue is. For as we have tried to show, what Socrates was concerned about was 'being good as distinct from 'doing good', and if the end is 'being good' then there is no distinction between τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος and τὸ τέλος . There is then no means of being good apart from being good and that is the end itself. That is what Socrates meant when he said that knowing what virtue is is being virtuous. Aristotle fails to see this. When he says: 'We become good by doing good things' he fails to see the distinction between 'being good' and doing good'. It is his failure to see this distinction that leads him to the view that he puts forward in the last book of the Ethics.

Someone might object to this distinction, and say that one cannot completely distinguish between the two. In that case it is necessary to point to the difference that there is between the possibility of doing good and possibility of being good. For it is possible to be good without doing good, and it is possible to do good without being good. If a person is good, then it is he who is good. If a person does good, his actions may be ones that he considers to be so, although he knows that they are not done with a good heart. The actions do not flow from his goodness. They are not a direct result of goodness. It is impossible to do away with a distinction of this kind. To distinguish between prudence as an intellectual virtue and moral virtue, as Aristotle does, does not help to understand this distinction.

Aristotle failed then to understand what Socrates was saying. Socrates's view, like Plato's, was a religious one. It sees a close relationship between human virtue and God. Aristotle, however, thinks of virtue in a two-fold way as intellectual and moral, and from what he says in Book X it is clear that it is the former of these that for him connects human life with God and not the latter; he seems rather to ridicule the idea that God could have anything to do with moral virtue. It is the life that is in accordance with reason that is most loved by God.

It is not clear what exactly Aristotle means by
He thinks that this is a life in accordance with the highest form of virtue. One characteristic that makes σοφία the highest virtue for Aristotle is its self sufficiency. (ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν. 1177a33) Θεωρία is its own end, but all practical activites have something else in view. The best life is one of philosophical contemplation which gains its own end through the exercise of νοῦς . It is only through the exercise of νοῦς that the best kind of life is achieved.

What makes this highest form of human life possible is what Aristotle calls θεῖόν τι . He contrasts this with what is human; ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο (i.e. ὁ νοῦς) τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν (i.e. τὴν ἠθικήν) εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον . (1177b28) It is something divine and not human that makes this best kind of life possible. Aristotle only succeeds in showing us what he considers to be the highest kind of human virtue by making it something divine and

not human. The real difficulties of human life seem to be overcome here only because they are not treated as human. What both Socrates and Plato were concerned with, however, was ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀρετή and how that is possible is not understood by shelving the problem as Aristotle does. For Aristotle's answer to the question of how human virtue is to be gained is to say that it is gained not as human virtue but as something θεῖος. The difficulty in trying to understand what Aristotle means by intellectual virtue as the highest form of human virtue is that it is not really human virtue.

This view is a sharp contrast with Plato's. His problem is how the human soul achieves the virtue that is proper to it. He thought the achievement is attended by serious difficulties and obstacles. But he does think that it is human virtue that is achieved, if it is achieved. The life of the human soul is determined by the choices it makes. Its life is its choices - how it chooses to live; and that is not just an intellectual life. It includes the life of what Aristotle calls τὸ ἄλογον the life of ἐπιθυμία as well as of νοῦς.

It is this difference which leads us to see how Plato's view of morality is religious in a way that Aristotle's is not. For Aristotle the life of σοφία is αὐτάρκης. A life in accordance with reason fulfils the highest needs of men. And Aristotle does not doubt for one moment that it is self-sufficient. That gives to human life a perfection of its own even if Aristotle does call it θεῖος. But Plato did not think that human life is self-sufficient. It is its imperfection that raises his problems, and his view of that was that it could not be overcome apart from the help of the gods. For Aristotle human life can possess its own divine nature in the exercise of νοῦς. It is self-sufficient and in no need of divine help. Aristotle's view of the relation between what is human and divine is that what is human possesses for itself what is divine. Although Plato thinks that the human soul is divine in origin, his view of the soul's destiny and divine judgment makes its nature different from that of God. θεὸς δὲ οὐ μίγνυται ἀνθρώπῳ. The gods are above us and will always remain our judges.

The difference between Plato and Aristotle here is great. The difference may be stated by saying that Aristotle thinks that it is possible for a person to be θεοφιλέστατος only as a result of the cultivation of a natural ability - that is the cultivation of νοῦς. For Aristotle νοῦς is, no doubt, something which διὰ τινας θείας αἰτίας ταῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχίαν ὑπάρχει (1179b22). The achievement of the highest form of virtue is dependent on good fortune, and even then it is not something human but divine. λείπεται τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον (De Generatione Animalium 736b28). This seems to suggest that νοῦς is properly something external to human life, - a divine element in human life which is not part of human nature itself. Νοῦς is θεῖόν τι ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ (1177b28), and it may well have been this idea that influenced the Stoics. If the highest kind of human virtue is possible it will be achieved as a result of the possession of something that is θεῖος.

The goodness that is achieved is not of a human kind but divine.

Aristotle's view raises the difficulty of how we can understand human virtue to be dependent upon something not human but divine. Plato's view raises the same question; but for him the dependence upon what is divine is not dependence on a divine element that is thought of as a part of human life itself. Human life and the life of the gods are different for Plato, but Aristotle thinks that human beings can possess of themselves a divine nature which enables them to achieve the highest form of virtue in θεωρία . But this can hardly be called a human relationship with the gods that is religious. If that is what human nature is, then it seems to make human life more independent of the gods than dependent upon them. Plato's view, on the other hand, is (as we have stated it) that ' what the soul can learn about the good it does not learn of itself and on its own, nor is what it learns just the result of its own thinking. The soul is initiated into the rites of love because what it has to learn about the good can only be learnt in living a way of life which is not of its own making'. (p.132). If, for Aristotle, human beings already possess what enables them to become θεοφιλέστατοι then what need have they of gods ?

The difference here between Plato and Aristotle does show something important about religion. For religion springs from a human need. Aristotle's view of αὐτάρκεια does not recognise that need. What is difficult is to put that need into words. It may be argued that not all feel the need; but if it is felt it is a feeling of insufficiency. We find it in Socrates. He stressed his ignorance, and that lack of understanding and the recognition of human weakness was what led him to speak of his mission as a service to God and to call upon men to care for their souls. That kind of ἐπιμέλεια which was so important to Socrates is impossible apart from a recognition of weakness. It is also to be found in Plato. In the Republic where he is putting forward his ideas about how justice can be achieved, his proposals are meant to serve the needs of human weakness. The leaders are guardians; they are meant to provide for human needs and maintain the life of society in such a way that the difficulties and conflicts which arise from human weakness are overcome as far as possible. In the Republic it is for the most part the guardians who are meant to fulfil this task, but in the Laws, as we have seen, these human needs are met by the practice of religion. For that binds people together in a common recognition of their dependence upon the gods.

Aristotle says in the Ethics: εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς). (1179a24) The words ὥσπερ δοκεῖ show Aristotle's attitude to the care of the gods for men. It does not have the deep conviction it had for Socrates and Plato. It is a hypothetical matter, which it seems Aristotle was not prepared to make a definite statement about. It is a matter of opinion, and it looks as if Aristotle's view about the practice of religion was that it might be something that is real. But, on the other hand, it might not. So he does not give to it the importance that Plato does, and many of his references to the gods seem

tentative and often only illustrative. For Aristotle the problems of ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία (1181b23) can be answered apart from religion. For Plato they cannot.

The difference between the two views does, however, raise the question: 'What does religion provide for men which is not provided in any other way ?' Plato thought that it enables a person to know the gods and live in accordance with that knowledge, but he does not seem to have thought it possible to possess that kind of knowledge apart from a religious life. The knowledge is in the life itself. What he denies is that an understanding of religion is possible apart from living a religious life. So there is no answer to the question of what religion provides for men which is not provided in any other way, apart from a religious life.

But can't people think about God and not live a religious life ? Many questions may arise in one's mind about God. Is he perfectly just ? The question can be of the form: Does he really have that nature ? How can it be shown that he does ? That seems to be the way in which questions about God arose for Aristotle. But they are only questions <u>about</u> God, and they exercise the attention of philosophers. But religion is not thinking about God; it is knowing God in that kind of life that only he can make possible for men. This was more like Plato's view. If one thinks about God in the way that Aristotle did then what seems to be at stake are questions about God's nature. But for religion those questions cannot arise; they are already decided. Aristotle was concerned with what God is, rather than with what relationship is possible between men and God. This is true of what he says about God in the Metaphysics. When he deals with human nature, it is just that that interests him. He is not concerned with the kind of relationship there can be between men and God.

Does this exaggerate the difference between the two views ? Did not Plato too see in the exercise of νοῦς the highest achievement of human beings and this is θειότατος. (Timaeus 90). But there is the difference we have mentioned. For Aristotle it is νοῦς that is central. This is θεῖος It is divine in nature - divine καθ' αὑτόν. Aristotle says it comes θύραθεν because for him its nature is divine not human. That makes human life a temporal union of something divine and something human. But because the divine element is present of itself in human life, that makes unnecessary any need for any kind of dependence of what is human on what is divine. For the human already possesses it. (Aristotle's view might be compared to certain Gnostic views about the nature of Jesus). The idea that human life is a struggle between good and evil in which divine assistance is needed to overcome is absent from Aristotle.

Aristotle's view might be compared to Plato's in the Phaedo. There Plato thinks of human life as made up of two elements different in nature - the soul and the body, and the life of the soul, so far as it is related to what is divine, is thought of λογισμός. Some of the things he says make it look as if only τὸ λογιστικόν is immortal. But even then Plato does not say that it is divine, but only akin to the divine. What he says later in the myth makes it clear that Plato is concerned in general with the immortality of ψυχή and not just of νοῦς, and that

means that he is concerned with the relation of human life qua human life with what is divine. Plato's distinction is between the human body and the human soul, while Aristotle's is between the human body and human soul and that part of the human soul which is not really human at all, but θεῖος .

Plato's view is bound to raise more serious difficulties than Aristotle's, and they are difficulties that are concerned with a religious view whereas Aristotle's is not. In fact Aristotle only answers Plato's problem about immortality by rejecting it. Why are they questions of a religious kind ? The answer to this question is not easy to give. The reason seems to be that for Plato the human soul is not θεῖος . God's nature is different from human nature, and so if human beings are to share in the life of the gods it cannot be as their equals. Aristotle, however, seems to think that only if human beings share the same nature with God can there be any kind of relation between them. But if human beings possess of their own nature something. θεῖος , then religion is not possible. For that depends on God's being, as Plato describes him in the Laws, φιλάνθρωπος . It is difficult to imagine Aristotle's God being that.

When Plato describes the life of the human soul in the Phaedrus myth and says that it is ἔρως that characterises its life, this is meant to show that the life of a human soul must be dependent on that of other human souls and on the gods. This is very different from Aristotle's view of the ἐπιμέλεια of the intellectual part of the human soul. Its nature as θεῖος makes it independent of others. The kind of love too that Aristotle seems to have in mind when he says that God moves everything ὡς ἐρώμενον seems to be different from Plato's notion of the matter. For Aristotle this ἔρως is the achievement of form and as applied to the intellectual part of the human soul, he seems to think that this achievement on the part of one person is independent of others. Aristotle thinks that that part of the human soul which is θεῖος is always θεῖος . It is that part which alone is immortal (De Anima 430a24). It almost looks as if it is an alien element in human life - not part of human life itself. In so far as it is θεῖος it does not change, though human life becomes immortal, as he puts it, in so far as it is ruled by that part. But it is because that part is divine that Aristotle thinks of the development of the human soul as more an individual concern. He does not think as Plato does that it is very much dependent upon the kind of relationship that exists between human beings.

For Plato the relationships that can exist between human beings can be an image of a human being's relation with what is divine. This seems to be the point of his saying in the Phaedrus mythhthat a lover seeks out a beloved in whom he can recognise the god he follows. The relationship between the two then becomes an image of the relation between the lover and his god. This is an important idea in Plato. It is the same thing he has in mind in the Laws when he says that it is in a common life under the laws that human beings can follow the life of the gods. This makes Plato's view very different from Aristotle's because it means for him that the

achievement of immortality, that is the establishment of a relationship between human beings and the gods, depends upon the kind of relationship that exists between human beings themselves. There has to be some kind of common life. A human being must recognise his own limitations and see that ἔρως makes it necessary for him to enter into relationships of love with people. For Aristotle, however, a human being becomes θεοφιλέστατος in so far as he cultivates τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, and that is an individual matter. A human being can become this alone.

But the kind of view that Plato holds does raise serious questions about the general relationship between philosophy and religion. For in Plato we find philosophy and religion so closely connected that it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The question may be asked whether such a position is the correct one or not. But that question is based on a misunderstanding of what philosophy is. If we say that Plato's philosophy is religious, then we do not mean that Plato has shown that philosophy shows the truth of religion, and so his philosophy is correct, whereas Aristotle's is not because he does not show its truth. For the philosophy is different too. Plato's is religious; Aristotle's is not. Can we say that philosophy as philosophy is able to make judgments about religion which have significance independantly of religion ? That is, they have philosophical significance, but not a religious one. If there are to be judgments about religion, then they cannot be devoid of religious significance unless they are judgments to the effect that religion is impossible. But then they are not judgments about religion, because there is no such thing. If they are to have religious significance, then religion is presupposed. Otherwise, as far as religion is concerned, they are meaningless; but they are also meaningless as far as philosophy is concerned. Plato's view is an example of a view which does accept that he may call the reality of religion; Aristotle's does not.

The same point can be put in another way if we say that in religion there is no understanding of religion apart from the religious belief itself. The understanding is the religion; or you might say the understanding is then religious.

Aristotle's philosophy contains a view about the nature of God. Doesn't that make it religious ? But this is only true if we make no distinction between the meanings of religious, non-religious and irreligious. According to this classification Plato's view will still be called religious, but will that mean that Aristotle's view is irreligious ? It might rather be called non-religious, and perhaps Aristotle would have described it in this way, with certain reservations. But he could hardly have wanted to say that his view of God and the soul were religious. Aristotle is only concerned with the nature of the soul and of God as independent entities, and not with the kind of relationship between the soul and God that makes religion what it is. Aristotle's view about religion is clearly stated in the Metaphysics: 'Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude

and to its legal and utilitarian expediency.' Aristotle is only prepared to accept as much of religion as agrees with his own views about the nature of the universe. There is little idea of the kind of human needs that religion serves. But for Plato 'the service of the laws is the service of the gods'. Plato could hardly have agreed with Aristotle's view of religion. But if Aristotle would have regarded his view as non-religious, for Plato it would have been irreligious. It is often said that Aristotle's view of God is impersonal and the sense in which Plato says in the Laws (716C) that human beings must become followers of God probably made little sense for Aristotle. The way in which Plato meant this led him to stress the importance of the practice of religion, and so for him religious worship is central. If there is a view of providence in chapter X of book Λ of the Metaphysics then it is impersonal compared with Plato's view as that is stated in the Laws. Aristotle would have understood a non-religious view of life. His view is largely that. Plato's view, however, is that a non-religious view is impossible. One's view is either religious or irreligious. We find in Plato, for instance, abhorrence of temple robbery and this is the first crime that he deals with in establishing laws. The worst form of crime is crime against the dwelling places of the gods. And that can only be the worst form of crime for someone for whom religion is first. The gods demand the first allegiance of human beings, then their own souls, and lastly their material welfare. Such a view of religion makes it impossible to think of philosophical thinking about it as something independent of it. If religion is that, then it cannot just be an object of enquiry. For that is then the way to live, and any thinking about it is regarded as part of that way of life itself. But more than that. For Plato it is a mistake to think that thinking about it will lead one to a perfect understanding apart from the life itself. Perfect understanding is in any case impossible for human beings. Whatever understanding is possible comes in living a religious life.

Plato's view accepts the reality of religion. His thoughts about the soul and God are what he thinks them to be. But here 'thinks' does not mean 'suppose'. But for Aristotle religion is mainly a matter of supposition. If we ask what accepting the reality of religion is, then it is not something which depends on proof, but it is something which decides one's way of life.

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