

An Ethical Analysis of the Use of Intelligence and Investigations within Sports Integrity

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Submitted to Swansea University in the Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

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Swansea University
2024

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Abstract

Sport faces threats from integrity issues, such as doping, competition manipulation, corruption and abuse. The use of intelligence and investigations has been introduced to aid integrity organisations with the prevention, deterrence, detection and sanctioning of integrity offences. This research aims to assess the global use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity. This includes analysis of ethical questions, e.g., what the functions of sports integrity organisations are, what an ethical investigation is, issues surrounding reporting integrity issues, what the appropriate powers for sport integrity are, with an overarching question of whether sports integrity in its current form can justify these investigative methods. The data for this research was collected via semi-structured interviews with 20 participants. 15 participants were 'Integrity Officers' employed within different integrity organisations. 5 participants were Athlete Representatives. This study was conducted within a critical realist framework. This research found the use of investigative methods and intelligence varied. Differing powers are available to integrity organisations, including contentious regulations that allow organisations to demand objects and information. Participants displayed concerns with the use of these rules. Reporting integrity issues is an important source of intelligence, however, Athlete Representatives expressed concerns that athletes are not protected when reporting, whereas Integrity Officers considered protections to be in place. Overall, the methods currently used in sports integrity are not wholly justifiable. This is due to concerns from the participants with these methods, the fact that much wrongdoing in sport is not criminal in nature, and due to the coercive offer of some regulations. These findings indicate the need for further dialogue between athletes and integrity organisations, particularly around powers and protections, and the need for enhanced, unified investigative regulations. This could be supported by the creation of an independent, global integrity governing body.

Declarations

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.


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This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.


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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Doctoral Training Partnership (DTP). Many thanks to Dr Andrew Bloodworth and Professor Michael McNamee for their supervision in this research, and to Dr Luke Cox for his guidance.

Acronyms

ADP	Anti-Doping Policy
ADRV	Anti-Doping Rule Violation
AIU	Athletics Integrity Unit
CAS	Court of Arbitration for Sport
DFSNZ	Drug Free Sport New Zealand
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IF	International Federation
IS	International Standard
ITA	International Testing Agency
ITIA	International Tennis Integrity Agency
NADO	National Anti-Doping Organisation
NGB	National Governing Body
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USADA	United States Anti-Doping Agency
UKAD	United Kingdom Anti-Doping
WADA	World Anti-Doping Agency

Chapter One - Introduction

Integrity within the context of sport can be understood as ‘demonstrating conduct that is honest and ethical; providing safe, fair and inclusive environments; playing by the rules’ (UK Sport, 2021, para 1). Sport integrity is considered an important notion within global sport that various integrity and sporting bodies seek to preserve and protect. The integrity issues that plague sport include: doping, sport competition manipulation, corruption and abuse.

In this chapter, the key integrity offences and ethical issues that will be discussed throughout this thesis are introduced. A brief introduction, including definitions, to each integrity issue is first presented.

Doping is defined by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as the incidence of at least one Anti-Doping Rule Violation (ADRV) outlined in Article 2.1 to 2.11 of the 2021 WADA Code (WADC) (WADA, 2019a). WADA is an independent organisation for the development of anti-doping, scientific research, and education, with the key aim of ensuring sport is doping-free (WADA, 2022a). WADA describes itself as a Swiss private law foundation that does not work for profit (WADA, 2021a). While WADA exists as the global body for anti-doping, no such global organisation exists for wider integrity issues yet.

Competition manipulation is defined by the Council of Europe as ‘an intentional arrangement, act or omission, aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others’ (Council of Europe, 2014, p.3). Competition manipulation can be when an athlete, or other involved in sport, deliberately underperforms or makes the incorrect decision which affects the result of a competition. This is done to obtain a benefit, such as sporting or financial. It also includes match fixing, where the result of a competition is predetermined, either partially or completely. It can be done for financial gain, such as to win money from gambling firms, or to gain an advantage in a competition, such as to play a lower-ranked opponent or to get a better draft pick (IOC, 2017a).

Corruption in sport has been defined as ‘any illegal, immoral or unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the result of a sporting contest for the personal material gain of one or more parties involved in that activity’ (Gorse and Chadwick, 2011, p.8). Examples of corruption

in sport include officials taking bribes to conceal positive doping control test results (Council of Europe, 2018).

Harassment and abuse in sport can be broken down into five sections, that can occur alone or together, and are defined as (IOC, 2017b, para 5):

1. 'Psychological Abuse means any unwelcome act including confinement, isolation, verbal assault, humiliation, intimidation, infantilization, or any other treatment which may diminish the sense of identity, dignity, and self-worth.
2. Sexual Harassment means any unwanted and unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, whether verbal, non-verbal or physical. Sexual harassment can take the form of sexual abuse.
3. Sexual Abuse means any conduct of a sexual nature, whether non-contact, contact or penetrative, where consent is coerced/manipulated or is not or cannot be given.
4. Neglect means the failure of a coach or another person with a duty of care towards the Athlete to provide a minimum level of care to the Athlete, which is causing harm, allowing harm to be caused, or creating an imminent danger of harm.
5. Physical Abuse means any deliberate and unwelcome act that causes physical trauma or injury, this includes things such as inappropriate training loads, forced doping, training whilst in pain, punching' (IOC, 2017b, para 5).

When considering these integrity issues, it is evident that sport must work to eliminate them, and sanction those who commit integrity infractions. Within doping currently, positive doping tests for athletes are low, with 2022 WADA figures of 0.71% (WADA, 2024a). Yet there is a large gap between actual and estimated doping (Hopker et al., 2020), with some academic literature suggesting prevalence of those doping at elite levels could be as high as 39%, concluding that the numbers of athletes doping lay between 14 and 39% (de Hon et al., 2015). However, this study used an alternative questionnaire approach called randomised response technique (RRT) which the authors themselves admitted gave way to a level of uncertainty, with the results unable to give a single percentage, instead offering a confidence interval, meaning the method only yields population averages (de Hon et al., 2015). Further concerns with this method could be with the pace at which athletes had to provide answers, with quick responses meaning that athletes may not fully have understood the questions, with the chance for misinterpretation high. The results of these studies should be considered in the context of

these limitations, and not merely accepted as fact. Henning and Dimeo (2022, p.186) state that it is unclear whether anti-doping is effective as there are ‘no reliable prevalence studies.’

A response of some anti-doping agencies to low positive doping tests is to focus efforts on a restricted number of elite athletes, with targeted and intelligence lead testing, such as the Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU) who state a ‘shift to an emphasis on intelligence led testing’ (AIU, 2019, p.1). Hopker et al. (2020) suggests that if we are able to test a lot of athletes, then this should be done more intelligently. Intelligence and investigations can uncover evidence which can allow ADOs to prove an athlete is doping, without just a positive test. It is contended that an intelligence-led approach to aid with planning doping control testing programs could help anti-doping organisations to improve their testing processes and could lead to uncovering more positive doping tests (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023). WADA contend that an investigative approach is key in a modern doping landscape (WADA, 2020a). WADA state that they now recognise that insights, intelligence and information that inform investigations is the direction that the Agency is moving in to uncover ADRVs (WADA, 2020a). However, there are ethical concerns associated with these methods, such as lack of athlete privacy, consent and the potential for coercive offers.

Furthermore, other integrity issues do not have ‘tests’ such as doping control tests that can provide them with evidence to prove infractions, and lead to sanctions. Therefore, other evidence must be obtained to prove these integrity issues. Intelligence and investigations can assist with this. Integrity scandals have long rocked sport, such as historic corruption cases that have plagued major sports such as football and athletics (Council of Europe, 2018), and more recently events, such as the uncovering of widespread abuse globally in sports such as gymnastics (Macur, 2021). Furthermore, recent cases have brought sport competition manipulation to the forefront of discussion, such as the case of English Premier League footballer Ivan Toney, who admitted to 232 breaches of the Football Association’s rules that prohibit athletes from gambling on football and was sanctioned to an eight month ban in 2023 (MacInnes, 2023). Snooker also found itself at the centre of a competition manipulation and corruption scandal as 10 athletes were sanctioned, including two lifetime bans. The allegations included manipulating snooker games, approaches to other athletes to cheat, betting on the sport, and match fixing in 2022 (Broughton & Keogh, 2023). These integrity examples are in addition to high profile doping cases, such as the Russian Doping Scandal (McLaren, 2016) and historic doping in the Tour de France (Whittle, 2017). Effective ways to tackle integrity

issues and obtain the evidence needed to sanction those responsible are required. It is contended that intelligence and investigations can aid with this.

While undoubtedly an effective method, the use of intelligence and investigations raises a number of ethical questions, such as what the role of an integrity unit should be, what is an ethical integrity investigation, how can intelligence be used ethically within investigations, what are the ethical considerations for the use of reporting persons, what powers are ethically appropriate for sports integrity units and whether integrity policy in its current form can justify these methods. In this thesis, I investigate the ethics of intelligence and investigations for uncovering integrity issues. The following introductory chapter sets out a brief background to these integrity issues and investigations.

1.1. Background

This section provides more in-depth introductions to each integrity issue and their background. Intelligence and investigations are also introduced.

1.1.1 Anti-Doping

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) first held a World Conference on Doping in Sport in 1999 after widespread doping appeared in cycling in 1998 (WADA, 2022a). Police searches and interrogations uncovered organised doping within teams competing in the 1998 Tour de France, which resulted in several teams and athletes leaving the competition. Retrospective tests and athlete admissions of doping further added to the notion of widespread doping within cycling during this time (Whittle, 2017). The first World Conference on Doping in Sport was held in Lausanne, Switzerland and resulted in the Lausanne Declaration on Doping, which recommended an independent and global anti-doping agency to be formed before the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney. This was achieved when WADA was set up as a foundation on 10th November 1999 under the initiative of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), with support provided by intergovernmental organisations, governments, public authorities and other public and private bodies interested in anti-doping within sport (WADA, 2022a).

WADA is the custodian of the WADA Code (WADC) and monitors stakeholder activities covered by the Code to ensure its integrity (WADA, 2022a). WADA oversees and works with stakeholder groups such as athletes, International Federations, National Anti-Doping Organisations (NADO), Regional Anti-Doping Organisations (RADO), Major Event

Organisations, governments, laboratories, the pharmaceutical industry, and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (WADA, 2022a). International Federations are required under the WADC to conduct testing in and out of competition, to provide education programs, and to sanction all who commit anti-doping rule violations (WADA, 2022a). NADOs are designated by each country to run the anti-doping programmes including implementing anti-doping rules, planning and implementing anti-doping education, directing the collection of samples, conducting investigations, managing test results, and directing national results management (WADA, 2022a). Literature suggests that anti-doping education is vital for clean sport, with a need for culturally specific support across different countries (Barkoukis et al., 2022a). However, while important, some organisations can struggle to implement effective education programs, due to factors such as resources and funding.

WADA lists the purposes of the WADC and of the World Anti-Doping Program in the WADC (WADA, 2019a). These are: protecting athletes' right to compete within sport that is free from doping, and therefore support the qualities of health, equality and fairness for athletes globally; ensuring harmonised, coordinated and effective programs in anti-doping, both internationally and nationally, working to prevent doping. This is done through education, deterrence, detection, enforcement, and rule of law. Education involves ensuring that key values and skills are instilled in order to prevent ADRVs, both deliberate and non-deliberate. Deterrence works to put off those thinking of doping by ensuring that there are strict and clear rules and sanctions for all stakeholders. Doping is detected by successful testing systems and investigations teams. The rules are enforced in order to sanction anyone who commits an ADRV (WADA, 2019a). However, it is widely acknowledged that not all doping is being detected presently, due to dopers' ability to be one step ahead of testers (Vlad et al., 2015). The rule of law is to make sure that stakeholders agree to abide by the WADC and the International Standards, as well as the key principles of human rights and proportionality (WADA, 2019a).

The World Anti-Doping Program is based upon the WADC, which is a universal and comprehensive document, with the purpose of progressing anti-doping efforts by harmonising key anti-doping components. WADA states that the Code was drafted with considerations to proportionality and human rights principles (WADA, 2019a). However, critics of WADA, such as Møller (2016), suggest that the low number of athletes caught doping indicates that harmonisation and equality that WADA strives for are not achieved. Anti-doping policy has also been criticised for failing to preserve the privacy of athletes who make themselves

available for anti-doping control tests 365 days of the year. However, a European Court of Human Rights judgement (ECHR, 2017) has defended the use of the whereabouts system for out of competition testing as a way of protecting the health of athletes.

1.1.2 Competition Manipulation

Competition manipulation involves changing the course or result of a sporting competition in order to gain some kind of advantage, whether that is results focused, financial, or potentially both (Council of Europe, 2014, p.3).

Athletes, and those involved within the sport, are responsible for ensuring they have knowledge of the issues surrounding competition manipulation (AIU, 2022). There are several ways to report suspicions of competition manipulation including via the International Olympic Committee (IOC) integrity hotline (IOC, 2017a). Not reporting competition manipulation can lead to sanctions in some sports, such as athletics (AIU, 2022).

Motivations to commit competition manipulation include for sporting reasons and for financial incentives (AIU, 2022). Competition manipulation can involve athletes deliberately underperforming, and officials making poor decisions that change the course of the competition. The benefits can be extensive and an advantage, e.g. sporting or financial, is gained in exchange (IOC, 2021). The concern around competition manipulation is increasing, and it is a threat to sport integrity (IOC, 2018) and the spirit of sport (IOC, 2021). Competition manipulation can include an athlete deliberately not performing at their best at the start of a competition, in order to try and get an easier opponent at later stages of the competition (IOC, 2018). It could also include knowingly competing with faulty timing or measuring equipment, situations such as recording jumps as legal when they are in fact wind aided, or age manipulation of athletes in order to compete in lower age categories.

1.1.3. Corruption

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes corruption as ‘a crime against sport’ which is a threat to sports integrity, as well as to its benefits, such as social and economic (UNODC, 2021a, para 1).

The Council of Europe states that good governance within sport has been considered to be important politically since the 1990s (Council of Europe, 2018). This was furthered when the

Council of Europe designated it as its main topic of focus in 2004. This was followed by policy that set out principles for good governance within sport, which was adopted in 2005. However, it is contended that these guidelines have not been properly implemented since then (Council of Europe, 2018), indicating that more work needs to be done. The Council of Europe also states that since May 2015, the exposure of sports corruption is at historically high levels (Council of Europe, 2018). Examples include FIFA officials, who were arrested due to corruption, bribes accepted by officials in athletics to hide positive doping tests, and the arrest of the president of the European Olympic Committee, who was accused of illegally selling tickets for the 2016 Olympic Games (Council of Europe, 2018).

Examples of corruption in sport can include: fraud, money laundering, organisation and delivery of events wrongdoing, abuse of authority and illegal betting (UNODC, 2021a). Match fixing, which can also fall under the category of sports competition manipulation, is considered as corruption by some (UNODC, 2021a). Competition manipulation can include things such as money-laundering, fraud and organised crime (UNODC, 2023). The UNODC estimates that up to \$1.7 trillion is wagered on illicit betting markets each year (UNODC, 2021b).

1.1.4 Abuse and Harassment

As noted earlier, no such organisation exists to tackle global integrity issues beyond anti-doping. However, some sports and countries are moving to encompass wider integrity issues. Sports Integrity Australia (SIA) is one example of this. Founded in 2020, SIA was set up to tackle all integrity threats in sport including abuse and harassment, and the former Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority became part of SIA (SIA, 2023). Independent integrity organisations have also done this within sports, such as the Athletics Integrity Unit, who state that athletics was the first global sport to set up an independent body to manage integrity issues and was launched in 2017 (AIU, 2020a). The AIU lists ‘safeguarding’ as part of its remit, citing that there is no room for harassment within athletics (AIU, 2020a).

The US Center for Safe Sport was also set up in 2017, ‘to develop accountability through national SafeSport policies and abuse prevention education on emotional, physical, and sexual abuse and misconduct within the Olympic and Paralympic Movement’ (US Center for Safe Sport, 2023, para. 7). Their mission is to support the wellbeing of athletes and to end abuse within sport (US Center for Safe Sport, 2023).

Other organisations also exist which strive towards ending abuse in sport and supporting those affected, such as the Centre for Sport and Human Rights, who state that effective, accessible and available remedy for those who have experienced human rights abuses is vital (Centre for Sport and Human Rights, 2023).

While some countries and sports still prioritise anti-doping (e.g. the UK Anti-Doping Agency currently remains just as an anti-doping organisation), increasingly the need for countries and sports to cover more than just anti-doping is becoming apparent. This is evidenced by the fact that this year New Zealand Drug Free Sport announced that they are transitioning into a new integrity commission ‘tasked with safeguarding the integrity of sport and recreation in New Zealand’ (New Zealand Drug Free Sport, 2024, para 2). The commission will continue to address doping within sport, like it did when it was Drug Free Sport New Zealand, but will now also look at other threats to sport including: ‘bullying and harassment, sexual misconduct, racism and discrimination, corruption and fraud, match-fixing’ (New Zealand Drug Free Sport, 2024, para 11). This widening of remit seen by some integrity organisations shows that the sporting world is beginning to take the threats to sport seriously, and it is acknowledged there is more to be done to protect sport and athletes than just anti-doping.

1.1.5 Intelligence and investigations

WADA contend that an investigative approach is key in a modern doping landscape to aid with catching more dopers than the current figures. Doping investigations involve multiple steps including: collecting information, analysing said information to address accuracy, investigate further with other partners including other WADA departments and external organisations such as ADOs, IFs and law enforcement (WADA, 2021b). Information is part of data that when merged and looked at together with appropriate background knowledge can be used in order to produce intelligence (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004). The approach allows integrity organisations to prioritise issues and allocate the appropriate resources to tackle them, as well as fostering effective collaboration between agencies.

Beyond anti-doping, integrity organisations with wider remits also investigate these threats. The AIU has a dedicated Intelligence and Investigation unit which compiles and analyses data and intelligence in order to undertake investigations into any integrity violations, in partnership with other organisations and law enforcement. They state that they implement a ‘world class and worldwide intelligence-based testing program using state of the art testing and analytical

methods' whereby they specifically focus on elite top-end athletes (AIU, 2020a, para. 22). It can be gleaned from open-source research of websites such as the AIU's that a main source of intelligence is gathered from tips and leads. They have a dedicated webpage encouraging people to report any concerns that they may have and detailing how they can do this (AIU, 2021a).

Miller and Gordon (2014) state that the aim of an investigation is not solely knowledge or truth, but the purpose is to gather the available evidence, and allow the justice system to preside over the truth of the matter.

Intelligence involves a range of activities, most of which fall under gathering information (Macnish, 2017). Miller and Gordon (2014) suggest that investigators are needed anytime someone could engage in illicit behaviour or gain an unfair advantage over another. There is a need to work out the rights of those being investigated, and in what circumstances, if any, their rights are overridden by the rights of victims/potential victims such as clean athletes, the public, stakeholders (Alexandra, Blacker & Miller, 2006).

This section has offered an introduction into the key topics that will be discussed in this thesis. Next, the limitations of this research are outlined.

1.2 Limitations

This research sought to gain a global snapshot of how intelligence and investigations are being used within sports integrity. While extensive attempts were made to access participants in areas that have historically been absent from integrity research, such as Africa, often attempts to reach these populations were unsuccessful. Potential participants either said they were unable to participate (some barred by their superiors within their organisations) or no response was received. Global representation was still achieved in this research with organisations who had conducted investigations in Africa, and organisations who had offices in this location. However, in order to further global research in integrity, speaking to people who themselves work in lesser researched locations and have direct experiences of the processes and challenges on the ground is vital.

Another limitation of this research is that all the interviews were conducted in English. Initial attempts at recruitment to some participants were made in their first language, but it was noted in the communication that all interviews would be conducted in English. This decision was

made based on English being the first language of all the research team. In order to expand on this research, future work could expand the languages used for interviews and ensure greater representation globally.

Research into integrity matters has typically focused heavily on anti-doping. This could be due to the fact that there is a global regulator for anti-doping, WADA, which was established 25 years ago, whereas the equivalent organisation for other integrity issues does not exist. While we are beginning to see a shift in integrity organisations recognizing other integrity issues and there are global conversations beginning to take place about how to tackle them, the academic literature and practical regulations still lack pace when compared with anti-doping. While this research attempts to in part address this gap by exploring other integrity issues beyond just anti-doping, literature and legislation is still lacking in some of these areas. Therefore, anti-doping may appear to dominate the conversations at times. As an example, this point is evidenced in the AIU's Complete List of Sanctions for Doping and Non-Doping Violations, which was updated in March 2024 and studied for this thesis in April 2024. Out of the 584 people who were listed as being sanctioned, just two of those were for non-doping integrity breaches, with the remaining 582 sanctions for doping offences (AIU, 2024a; AIU, 2024b). This is also seen in the organisations of participants, whereby I spoke to some Integrity Officers who work for NADOs, but no one who's organisation just focused on a different integrity issue that was not doping. In some interview conversations, doping would dominate, due to the participants' organisational remit, or to their personal experiences or interests, or the fact that their country or sport found that doping was the most pressing integrity issue. As doping has historically been the focus within sports integrity, it is noted that there is a potential for it to dominate both my research data, the literature, and this thesis. However, attempts were made when recruiting participants to speak to people who worked at integrity organisations with wider remits and experiences other than just anti-doping, and to Athlete Representatives with knowledge and experiences of all integrity issues.

Another limitation to note is that this research is a snapshot of the participant responses at that moment in time. This limitation is general to qualitative research which can be limited when generalisability is considered, and is not able to be viewed as widely representative. This research still manages to paint a picture about the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity by talking to those who work in integrity organisations and use these methods, and Athlete Representatives to gain the athlete insight and voice. These multiple experiences

and views are able to be presented and I gained further insight than what is publicly available e.g. on websites. As will be further noted in the data analysis section, I acknowledge my personal potential biases that I bring to the research. I attempted to both utilise these and look beyond them, fully attending to the participant voice and gaining their perspectives, which are presented in this research.

The limitations of my research have been outlined. Next, I present a summary overview of the project.

1.3 Summary Overview

In chapter one, I offer an introduction to the key integrity issues and topics that will be discussed in this thesis. This includes detailing what doping, competition manipulation, corruption and abuse are, including definitions, and providing context about these integrity issues needed for this thesis. Intelligence and investigations and why this method is used within sport integrity is also briefly introduced. The limitations of this research are outlined and a summary overview is provided.

In chapter two, I detail a history of doping within sport, noting significant moments throughout the years. Doping precedence and athlete views on doping are noted. The introduction of anti-doping measures and organisations are detailed. Details of other integrity issues, such as competition manipulation, corruption and abuse are further expanded upon. The chapter closes out with a look at intelligence and investigations within integrity issues, with the use of reporting as a form of intelligence outlined.

In chapter three, I offer the methodology supporting the thesis, complete with justification of the methods used. The participant demographics are detailed as well as data collection and analysis methods, critical realism framework, and the methodological rigour.

Chapters four to eight present the results of this research and provide ethical analysis.

In chapter four, I describe the current sports integrity landscape, as detailed by my participants. This means reviewing the challenges that those working in the industry face, as well as what the participants of this research think is going well, and what could be improved.

In chapter five, how integrity investigations are conducted and how intelligence is gathered and used is assessed. This includes detailing what intelligence is, and the types of intelligence used within sports integrity investigations. Participants also offer their perspectives on investigations. The chapter assesses whether intelligence and investigations are a good investment in sports integrity.

In chapter six, how reporting persons are used within integrity investigations is looked at and how such sources are used as intelligence. What reporting is, the processes used and how useful it is are detailed. Whether reporting persons are protected within the integrity system is assessed, alongside whether reporting should be anonymous, and whether people within sport have the obligation to report wrongdoing.

In chapter seven, the powers that integrity organisations have to investigate are ethically analysed, with note to whether these powers could be considered coercive, what the participants think of them, and whether they are proportionate for use in sport. Particular focus is placed on powers that some integrity organisations have to demand objects and information from those subject to investigations.

In chapter eight, whether the methods being used within sport integrity investigations are justifiable is considered. How important sport is is assessed, with participants offering their perspectives. A focus on athlete rights within the integrity system is detailed, before the chapter assesses whether the methods are justifiable.

In chapter nine, a summary of the thesis is presented, alongside concluding remarks and recommendations.

Chapter Two - Integrity Issues in Sport

This chapter further explores integrity issues within sport, including previous academic literature on each topic. A review of the previous literature is undertaken, which assesses integrity issues and reviews how they have evolved over time, as well as the measures taken to prevent and sanction them. Doping and anti-doping are first outlined, before moving on to competition manipulation, corruption and abuse. How intelligence and investigations are being used are further detailed, including the use of reporting wrongdoing. The aims of this thesis are then presented.

Alongside review of the previous literature, sports industry reports are also included. There is scant academic literature on the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity, therefore, sports industry reports are used to present practical examples of what is currently happening within the field. These are used to supplement academic literature and provide knowledge that is currently not represented in academic research. This aids with the purpose of this literature review – to understand what research and work has already been done, and to identify what is currently unknown about intelligence and investigations within sports integrity. Where there is wider academic literature available, such as on the prevalence of doping, this is provided in the literature review to give wider context to integrity issues that are explored within this thesis.

The research in this thesis focuses on a wide range of integrity issues: doping, competition manipulation, corruption and abuse. These particular integrity issues were selected as the focus of this research after a review of integrity organisations' websites, which showed these integrity issues as being the ones that are currently the top of integrity organisations' agendas. While there was thought to just focusing on one integrity issues, such as anti-doping, which has historically dominated integrity research and for which there is plenty of previous literature on the topic, it was this very reason that led this research to expand. Anti-doping literature and practice has evolved rapidly over the last 25 years, however, other integrity issues have lacked pace, and are often not shown the same attention. This research acknowledges that other integrity issues are just as important as anti-doping, and so wanted to contribute to the emerging literature in these fields. A drawback of this approach is that it can lack the depth of researching just one integrity issue, and additionally, the lack of previous literature on other integrity issues can limit the literature review. However, for this research, it is already

exploring a widely uncharted topic of the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity, a topic for which there is limited literature for anti-doping, as well as the other integrity issues. Therefore, as this thesis is already researching a novel topic, it was decided that the most relevant integrity issues, as stipulated by integrity organisations, were all worthy of exploration.

2.1 Doping in Sport

While doping and performance enhancement can be thought of as a modern-day phenomenon, it dates back to the first Olympic Games, and the Ancient Greeks (Baron et al., 2007). However, it is only in the last 30 years that anti-doping has been taken to the forefront of the efforts against doping, with WADA and the United Kingdom Anti-Doping Agency (UKAD) founded in 1999 and 2009 respectively (WADA, 2022a; UKAD, 2021a).

The start of recorded use of performance enhancing could be in Ancient Greece where athletes would change their diets and take stimulants in order to increase aspects of their performance such as speed and strength (UKAD, 2021a). The earliest records date to 668 BC and the use of figs by athletes to enhance their performance at the Olympic Games (Yesalis & Bahrke, 2002). It has been suggested that the first time that using substances to enhance performance was thought to be unethical was at the end of the first World War (Hoberman, 2001).

In 1928, the International Association of Athletics Federations chose to ban stimulating substances, with other organisations choosing to follow, although no doping tests were conducted at that time (UAKD, 2021a; Holt et al., 2009). In the 1950s, athletes in Eastern European nations were consistently winning in athletics and other large sports (Dimeo et al., 2011). It is within this time that some pinpoint as the beginning of doping in the modern day (Lucas, 1992).

Calls for doping tests to start were heard at the 1960 Olympic Games (UKAD, 2021a). This coincided with frequent doping within cycling coming to light (Wilson & Derse, 2001), which included a high number of positive doping tests such as one study of Belgian cyclists in 1965 which showed that 37% of professional cyclists were caught doping, and 23% of amateurs (Donohoe & Johnson, 1988). Anti-doping testing began at major events in 1968, notably at the Olympic Games that year, and both governing bodies for cycling (UCI) and football (FIFA) began testing (Holt et al., 2009). However, a key barrier at this time was the inability of

organisations to enforce anti-doping bans due to lack of appropriate protocols or equipment (Yesalis & Bahrke, 2002).

Over time, anti-doping tests have developed (Donike & Stratmann, 1974), with a reliable test for anabolic steroids made available in time for the 1976 Olympic Games (UKAD, 2021a). However, even once the technology allowed anabolic steroids to be tested for, not all samples were able to be tested at the 1976 edition of the Games due to how complex the technology was (Bertrand et al., 1978). During this time and into the 1980s, there were strong rumours about German Democratic Republic state-sponsored doping (UKAD, 2021a). It is believed by some that there are still questions that need to be asked of performances from athletes over this time period (Franke & Berendonk, 1997). Additionally, ethical concerns, such as athlete coercion and harm to their health, are associated with this time (Schofield, 2015).

In 1988, there was a rush to advance anti-doping tests after what some call the dirtiest race ever (Lucas, 1992). At the Olympic Games that year, six of the eight athletes who competed in the men's 100m race would go on to return a positive doping test or be implicated in doping at some point in their career. This was highlighted by the race winner and the world record holder at the time, Ben Johnson. A day after winning the race he returned a positive doping test for a banned steroid, citing the defence that he wasn't cheating as banned substances use was so common (Montague, 2012). Those Olympic Games continued to have a reputation for doping as a study conducted afterwards suggests that at least half of the athletes who had competed there may have been taking anabolic steroids (Dubin, 1990). However, Johnson's affiliation with doping meant that the list of substances that were prohibited in sport was examined more closely and facilitated debates about the spirit of sport (Beamish, 2015).

Later editions of the Olympic Games did not prove to be markedly cleaner. The 1996 Games were called 'the growth hormone games' in the media due to the prevalence of the drug (Holt et al., 2009). Two years later came events that in part led to the creation of WADA when the cycling team Festina were raided by the police at the 1998 Tour de France and multiple prohibited substances that could enhance performance were found and a staff member was arrested for transporting the drugs (Møller, 2004; UKAD, 2021a). As a result, a widespread abuse of performance enhancing substances within cycling was uncovered and a large investigation took place, led by authorities from France and Italy (Swift, 1999). These events led to the IOC calling a global conference with the aim of tackling doping. It took place in

February 1999 and WADA was founded in November of the same year to coordinate the efforts of tackling doping in sport (WADA, 2022a).

Despite the efforts to combat doping within sport, the 2000 Olympic Games were still dubbed The Dirty Games in the press as doping continued (Holt et al., 2009). It was frequently noted in the media at the time that levels of doping were high and that it was becoming a crisis for the Games with the IOC unable to cope with the issue (Harvey, 2000; Fish, 2000; Abrahamson & Wharton, 2000). Tour de Frances in the mid to late 2000s, where there were high numbers of positive doping tests, did not help sport's reputation for doping (McNamee & Møller, 2011).

In the build-up to the 2008 Olympic Games, WADA stated that anti-doping testing outside of competition would begin to take place. Several countries were announced to be involved, including the UK (Holt et al., 2009). It also marked an advancement as Human Growth Hormone was tested for one of the first times. This new era of testing meant that athletes received no advance warning of when they would be tested. Approximately 100 athletes from the UK were part of this and they were tested for HGH. None of these athletes tested positive (Holt et al., 2009).

A year later, in the United Kingdom, UKAD was created in 2009. This was in response to a suggestion that UK Sport had made to parliament that an independent organisation to oversee anti-doping was needed, especially with the prospect of a home Olympic Games in 2012 on the horizon. This meant that UKAD took over anti-doping testing and education from UK Sport (UKAD, 2021a).

In more recent times, systematic doping in Russia has been a cause for concern. In December 2014, a documentary was aired on MDR, a German television network, where investigative journalist Hajo Seppelt claimed that up to 99% of the Russian Olympic team were doping, and that there was extensive evidence of doping that could be considered systematic (Alexander et al., 2019).

The allegations in the documentary led to WADA investigation, with sports lawyer Richard McLaren publishing an independent report, the McLaren Report (McLaren, 2016). The report backed up the claims of systematic state-sponsored subversion of anti-doping practices by the Russian government (McLaren, 2016). The effects of the Russian doping scandal are still felt

years on, and it has been described as a legal, scientific and public relations fight that all involved in sport continue to battle (Duval, 2017). It has been suggested that such public doping scandals can lead to distrust of sport governance and dismay from the public (Alm, 2013; Solberg et al., 2010). There is uncertainty about the exact timeline of the Russian Doping Scandal, with some claims that it began before it was reported, however others have challenged the evidence of these alleged timings (Girginov & Parry, 2019). Additionally, anti-doping cases in the Russian Doping Scandal have been overturned by CAS, including in 2018 where CAS delivered a decision relating to 39 Russian Athletes which saw 28 appeals upheld and 11 partially upheld (CAS, 2018).

A prominent case to come out of the Russian Doping Scandal was Danil Lysenko's. In July 2021, Russian high jump athlete Lysenko was given a six-year ban from sport, which included a four-year ban for tampering (Article 2.5 of the WADC) (Pavitt, 2021). On three occasions within a 12-month period, Lysenko did not provide anti-doping authorities with his whereabouts information that was needed to be able to test him. For the second whereabouts failure, he claimed that he had not done so due to being in hospital on the week in question, suffering from an acute appendicitis (Pavitt, 2021; AIU, 2021b). The Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU) investigated this explanation and found that the clinic where he claimed to have been ill was in fact torn down before he said that he had been there, and photographs of the clinic's website had been from an insurance company. The people that were said to have treated Lysenko did not have licences. Due to this evidence that was uncovered, Lysenko confirmed to the AIU that he had provided false and fabricated evidence and claimed that people from the Russian Federation aided him in creating the story, with this being a common practice in order to mislead Anti-Doping Organisations (Pavitt, 2021; AIU, 2021b). The AIU provided further evidence that Russian officials had the objective of providing Lysenko with fake medical certificates. For his third whereabouts violation, Lysenko originally said that he was involved in a car crash on the date that caused him to be unavailable for anti-doping testing. He gave evidence in the form of photographs showing damage to his car and facial injuries, as well as his car documents and driving licence. However, the accident was actually a month after the date of the whereabouts violation, which Lysenko later admitted. These violations led to Lysenko being handed a four-year ban for tampering, and his case contributed to the Russian Athletics Federation's suspension by the governing body of athletics, World Athletics, as well as bans for high-ranking Russian officials (Pavitt, 2021; AIU, 2021b).

During the final phase of investigation into Lysenko between April and November 2019, the AIU conducted 22 key witness interviews; acquired 14 electronic storage devices including mobile phones and computer hard drives, conducted digital forensic analysis of over six terabytes of electronic data and translated approximately 7000 documents or records from Russian to English (AIU, 2021b). The AIU Chair at the time, David Howman, stated ‘traditional approaches to uncovering cheating have often proven to be inadequate and that’s why the AIU made the strategic choice of investing heavily in our investigations and intelligence capability. The benefit of this approach is evident from decisions like these’ (AIU, 2021b, p.2).

In May 2021, the request for arbitration filed by World Athletics against Lysenko on 01 February 2021 was partially upheld. In this judgement he was found to have committed ADRVs in Whereabouts and Tampering (Articles 2.4 and 2.5 of the WADC), for which he received two years period of ineligibility and four years ineligibility respectively, totalling six years ineligibility (AIU, 2021c; AIU, 2021d). This was suspended for a period of 24 months in consideration of the Substantial Assistance provided by Lysenko to the AIU by aiding them bring charges against former Russian Athletics Federation officials. The ban began on 03 Aug 2018, the date of his provision suspension, with his ineligibility ending on 03 Aug 2022, due to the two-year suspension (AIU, 2021c; AIU, 2021d).

2.1.1 Doping Prevalence

The prevalence of doping can be down to several cultural, environmental, and social reasons, as well as how efficient the anti-doping strategy in place is (Sjoqvist et al., 2008). Studies have suggested several reasons for athletes choosing to dope including injuries, reduction in performance, believing that their competitors are doping, their fears of exiting the sport, and pressures from others (Whitaker et al., 2014a; Whitaker et al., 2017). Knowing the prevalence of doping is necessary for WADA and the anti-doping community to assess how effective anti-doping programs are. This data can aid anti-doping by supporting risk assessments, informing doping test plans and allow for monitoring of anti-doping trends over time (Petroczi et al., 2022). However, it is noted that we will never know the true prevalence, due to the deceptive nature of doping.

The prevalence of doping within elite sport is not immediately clear. Some studies have attempted to quantify it, with varying results. Some academic literature suggests prevalence of

those doping at elite levels could be as high as 39% (de Hon et al., 2015), with the previously mentioned limitations acknowledged, while others argue that the range is between 39 and 62%, with prevalence of 43.6% and 57.1% reported at two 2011 major sporting events (Ulrich et al., 2018). A study analysed 3683 blood samples of athletes from 209 countries, based on biological measurements from international events and using haematological parameters to estimate blood doping prevalence. The results estimated the prevalence of blood doping to be at 18% overall, with estimations of 22% in female athletes, and 15% in males (Faiss, 2020).

While the literature generally disagrees on the exact number of athletes doping, all the studies estimate that the figures are higher than WADA data. WADA's testing figures from 2022 show that 0.71% of all tests were positive (WADA, 2024a), significantly lower than the prevalence predicted in the academic literature previously mentioned. This has led to suggestions that more intelligent testing is necessary to bridge the gap between estimated and actual doping (Hopker et al., 2020). While Presence and Use are only two of the 11 ADRVs, they remain the most common ADRVs. Furthermore, doping control tests offer a way to definitively prove that an ADRV has occurred, whereas such tests do not exist for other ADRVs, or indeed other integrity offences.

2.1.2 Athlete Views

There is a field of research that has attempted to ascertain what athletes think of the doping and anti-doping practices within sport. One study (Efverström et al., 2016) included 261 elite athletes from 51 countries, all of whom were in an International Registered Testing Pool within one of four international sporting federations. The athletes responded to a questionnaire and in general the athletes were in favour of anti-doping policies. More than 80% said that anti-doping efforts, such as doping control, whereabouts, how samples are stored, and the ABP, were a necessary part of clean sport. 80% of the respondents said that anti-doping should either continue at current levels or develop to include further anti-doping activities. The above results aid with the notion that the anti-doping system is seen as legitimate by athletes (Efverström et al., 2016). In another study, 98% of the German athletes that were asked thought that the anti-doping system was a necessity (Striegel et al, 2002). 93% of US athletes included in a study said that they supported USADA's purpose (USADA, 2017), with 68% of Australian athletes asked relayed that they thought a successful anti-doping program was important for the sport they competed in (Orr et al., 2010).

However, Efverström et al. (2016) also uncovered difficulties faced by athletes within the anti-doping system. These included 34% of athletes who had found it difficult to submit their whereabouts information. 73% of the respondents stated that they were worried about being unavailable for testing at the correct time and place in line with the information that they had provided on the whereabouts system. Furthermore, half of the female athletes and 30% of the male athletes were either somewhat or very uncomfortable in relation to their privacy when giving a urine sample during an anti-doping test (Anti-doping tests require athletes to undress from the waist to knees and provide a urine sample under the watch of a doping control officer). In addition, just under half of the athletes said it felt as if they were monitored due to the whereabouts system. 44% of respondents thought that whereabouts didn't work effectively across all countries (Efverström et al., 2016) with Danish athletes stating similar views that not enough testing took place in other countries and that it was not professional enough, allowing doping athletes to go unpunished (Overbye, 2016). 28% of the US athletes questioned thought that programs outside of the US were less effective (USADA, 2017), with British athletes involved in a study by Bloodworth and McNamee (2010) viewing testing as less stringent in other countries than their own. In another study, 58% of the athletes thought that athletes who doped were getting away with it, suggesting that athletes are doubting how efficient and equal the anti-doping system is in these regards (Efverström et al., 2016). Duivent et al's study (2015) stated that some Dutch elite athletes questioned the integrity of the anti-doping system outside of the Netherlands. Some key concerns from athletes have been highlighted from these studies. It is vital to listen to athletes and the alternatives must also be considered, such as how out of competition tests could be conducted without the whereabouts system, or how we would sanction doping if we did not conduct doping tests. While athlete rights are vital, it is acknowledged that some rights, such as privacy, may have to be potentially breached in pursuit of clean sport.

The anti-doping system needs athletes to view the regulations and those who set them as legitimate. How legitimate the athletes think that it is can affect how accepting and compliant they are with the regulations and the organisation as a whole (Tyler, 2006). Organisations who have perceived legitimate rules by the people who are impacted the most by them are the most effective (Jost & Major, 2001). Key to how legitimate an organisation is seen is that it has the right to set the rules, that it has correct values, and that the values are shared with those who have to follow the rules. They must also be believed to be appropriate (Tyler, 2006). These principles can be applied within anti-doping as athletes must believe that the rules are successful

at preventing the use of banned substances and methods (Overbye, 2016) and that the procedures are just and fair, applying equally to all athletes (Tyler, 2006).

Research suggests that athletes' reasons for doping can vary and are influenced by a range of categories such as personal, emotional, social, and situational circumstances (Whitaker et al., 2017). Whitaker et al. (2014a) found that injuries, a reduction in performance, and believing that competitors are doping and not getting caught are the reasons that athletes are most likely to turn to doping. This is supported by a study where national level athletes were interviewed and they thought that retiring from their sport, injuries, pressure from others, and thinking that everyone else is doping were the top factors that might make someone dope (Whitaker et al., 2017). This indicated that an explicit intention to cheat is not always the sole motivator for doping, but it can instead be a need to keep up with others (Whitaker et al., 2017). Here it is important to note that athletes may not be fully honest when discussing doping and other integrity issues, due to the fear of punishment or retaliation. The research mentioned can represent some populations also, such as the national level athletes, and while this is useful to understand the findings in relation to that study, it does not represent other groups, such as elite athletes.

2.2 Anti-Doping

The previous section has detailed what doping is, and some of the key issues surrounding it. This section outlines work being done to prevent doping.

After a series of aforementioned high profile doping scandals, in 1999 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) first held a World Conference on Doping in Sport (WADA, 2022a). This was held in part to ensure that sporting organisations kept control and fairness of the sports they oversaw, as well as to boost the acceptance of the IOC as leaders in anti-doping (Møller, 2016). The IOC's first draft of the anti-doping program was not welcomed by a number of representatives from leading governments prior to the conference as they called for an independent body with government contribution (Hanstad et al., 2008). The first World Conference on Doping in Sport was held in Lausanne, Switzerland and resulted in the Lausanne Declaration on Doping, which recommended an independent and global anti-doping agency to be formed before the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney. This was achieved when WADA was set up as a foundation on 10th November 1999 under the initiative of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), with support provided by intergovernmental organisations, governments,

public authorities, and other public and private bodies interested in anti-doping within sport (WADA, 2022a).

2.2.1 WADA Governance Structure

Currently, WADA's governance structure consists of (WADA, 2021a)-

- A Foundation Board with 38 members which has Sport Movement and Government representatives in equal numbers. 13 of the seats are current or former international athletes and four seats are for athletes who represent that Sports Movement.
- An Executive Committee with 14 members that manages and runs WADA, which includes overseeing how well the activities go and how assets are administered. Four of the Executive Committee are Independent Members - the President, Vice President, a member proposed by the Public Authorities and another by the Sports Movement. The other ten members are from the Sports Movement and Governments, and one of these seats is an athlete who represents the Sports Movement. In 2021, around $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Committee was formed of athletes who have previously represented their country.
- Five Standing Committees who report to the Executive Committee and advise policy and priority development. One such Committee is the Compliance Review Committee, an independent body formed of a Chair, two compliance experts, a representative for athletes, and two nominated stakeholder group members.
- Ten Expert Groups which advise WADA in their respective fields: ethics, gene and cell doping, laboratory, legal, NADOs, the prohibited list, signatory expert group, social science research, strategic testing, therapeutic use exemptions.
- A Nominations Committee that has a responsibility to match the correct personnel (in terms of skills and their independence) to senior governance roles at WADA

(WADA, 2021a).

2.2.2 WADA Funding

WADA is funded equally from the Olympic Movement and global governments, and has equal representatives from each, with the government representative from each region of WADA's Foundation Board tasked with forming an agreement with every region regarding how much each individual country will provide towards WADA's funding (WADA, 2022a).

The Olympic Movement matches the governmental contributions up to 50%. WADA stakeholders, alongside projects and partnerships also contribute to complement the other

funding. When WADA was formed in 1999, it had an operating income of 15.5 million US dollars, compared to 2022 where the budget is 46 million US dollars. The increase reflects WADA's expansion and their commitment to key areas of their operations (WADA, 2021c).

The Copenhagen Declaration details the regional share of monetary contribution -

Europe: 47.5%

Americas: 29%

Asia: 20.46%

Oceania: 2.54%

Africa: 0.5%

(WADA, 2021c).

Governments within the regions then decide how much they will contribute each year (WADA, 2021c).

2.2.3 Anti-Doping Programs

WADA contends that anti-doping programs are created around the 'intrinsic value of sport,' often called the spirit of sport (WADA, 2019a, p.13). The World Anti-Doping Program strives for harmonisation and best practices for anti-doping programs, both nationally and internationally.

There are three main aspects of the World Anti-Doping Program: 1) The WADC; 2) International Standards (IS) and Technical Documents; 3) Models of Best Practice and Guidelines (WADA, 2019a).

The World Anti-Doping Program is based upon the WADA Code, which is a universal and comprehensive document, with the purpose of progressing anti-doping efforts by harmonising key anti-doping components. It contains specific details to harmonise the key elements, and it is also designed to allow flexibility in how the Code is used while still adhering to the principles of anti-doping. The first Code was put into practise in 2004, with new Codes published in 2009, 2015, and most recently 2021. WADA states that the Code was drafted with considerations to proportionality and human rights principles (WADA, 2019a). Critics of WADA, such as Møller (2016) question the level to which these aims have been achieved.

The IS work alongside the WADC, and they include eight mandatory IS, and 12 Guidelines, which are not mandatory. Ergo, to be compliant with the WADC, the IS must be adhered to. IS are formed in consultation with Code Signatories and governments, before being approved by WADA. WADA's Executive Committee can revise them, after consulting relevant stakeholders. The eight IS are:

1. Code Compliance
2. Education
3. The Prohibited List
4. Therapeutic Use Exemptions
5. Testing and Investigations
6. Laboratories
7. Results Management
8. Protection of Privacy and Personal Information

(WADA, 2022b).

The guidelines provide technical guidance to ADOs for how to implement certain programs. In the same way as ISs, they are kept under continuous review. The guidelines aren't mandatory and are designed to support ADOs by providing recommended practices (WADA, 2022b).

In May 2019, WADA began to collect ideas from their stakeholders in order to form the strategic plan. Those consulted included athletes, governments, industry personnel, NADOs and WADA-accredited laboratories, as well as internal consultation. Success over the last 20 years, as well as areas for improvement, were identified during the process with these informing the strategic priorities (WADA, 2021a). The aim of the plan is to outline WADA's strategic activity for 2020-2024 and is designed for the purpose of 'leading anti-doping in a new era' (WADA, 2019c, para. 1).

WADA's strategic priorities are as follows -

1. Lead: to lead the way in anti-doping, and ensure that new issues are treated with innovation
2. Grow impact: focusing on the expansion of reach and impact of anti-doping programs, which includes expanding the capacity and the sharing of knowledge between ADOs and facilitating program delivery at a local level.

3. Be athlete centred: ensuring that athletes are engaged and empowered to get involved with how anti-doping policies develop, as well as facilitating an anti-doping journey that is easier for athletes and increasing programs for athletes and athlete support personnel.
4. Collaborate and Unite: to facilitate collaboration and engagement with all those involved in anti-doping, in order to expand support, coherence and unity.
5. Be visible: increased awareness and fine tune the message that shows the positive side of sport being doping free, and the role that WADA plays in that.
6. Perform: increase value to the stakeholders by minimising operations complexities and getting the most impact and cost-effectiveness.

(WADA, 2019c)

Critics of WADA, such as Møller (2016), suggest that the harmonisation and equality that they strive for has not been achieved due to the low rates at which that catch those who are doping, and that it works against protecting the health and fairness of athletes, making the playing field more uneven. However, the paper does itself acknowledge that it does not account for the challenges, obstacles and difficulties that staff at ADOs deal with on a day-to-day basis (Møller, 2016).

Hard (2009) argues that anti-doping rules need to be reconsidered. Primarily, this is due to the importance of clean sport, and the fact that it needs a lot of resources, as well as support from governments and IFs. These resources need to be used in the most efficient and effective ways possible, as there is no money to waste. This relies on clear goals and reasons such as why we want to eliminate doping. The anti-doping system needs to be fully informed by real life. This could include the reality of sports, how much abuse is going on, how far-reaching harm is, as well as the effect that sanctions can have on athletes (Hard, 2009).

Goldsworth (2019) suggests that WADA is unconcerned with athletes' human rights and that they instead favour the public interest of sport, something that they will not define, over these rights. Woolway et al. (2020) call for better perceived legitimacy of the anti-doping system for athletes, by means of making it more effective as well as equal, stating that the regulations and how they are implemented need to be harmonised internationally. It is also suggested that communication from ADOs needs to be improved to show the progress that is being made with uncovering doping, and better transparency with testing and who is selected for it. Furthermore,

more support is needed for athletes who are clean to understand and cooperate with doping control regulations in order to increase the legitimacy of the anti-doping system (Woolway et al., 2020). Henning and Dimeo (2022) contend that since the first WADC in 2003, WADA have struggled to banish doping, cheating and deception from sport. Their further criticisms centre on policies that were developed in haste, in a reaction to crisis, and the lack of consultation with athletes (Henning and Dimeo, 2022). Furthermore, they contend that despite developments in anti-doping education, testing and sanctions by WADA, doping, especially systematic doping, remains, and corruption persists within sport (Henning and Dimeo, 2022).

2.2.4 UKAD

The United Kingdom Anti-Doping Agency (UKAD) oversees anti-doping operations for all sports within the UK. UKAD is an example of a National Anti-Doping Organisation (NADO). For this thesis, UKAD has been selected as an example to outline some functions of NADOs. UKAD provides insight into their functions, including what they do with intelligence and investigations, on their website, which aided with this section. This information is not publicly available for every NADO. However, it must be noted that not all NADOs will have the same resources or functions as UKAD.

UKAD has a specialised Intelligence and Investigations team which follows the National Intelligence Model (NIM), also used by law enforcement agencies and other intelligence-led partners. This model is designed to make sure that the collection of data, and how it is analysed and retained, is effective and efficient. Information that comes into UKAD goes through the NIM process and is compared and analysed with data that UKAD already has (UKAD, 2018).

The purpose of the NIM is to allow organisations and law enforcement to efficiently process their information and make this into intelligence that can be actioned. The model involves: setting a direction that the investigation will strategically take, making decisions as information is collected, allocating the resources, developing tactical plans, and coordinating actions. This allows information to be processed throughout different stages of the model which allow intelligence to be gained for organisations to act upon (National College for Policing Excellence, 2021).

The Intelligence and Investigation team collects information such as:

- Use and possession of banned methods and substances by athletes and support staff

- Sale and purchases of prohibited substances
- Banned substances importation routes
- How banned substances are distributed
- Information surrounding the commissioning of anti-doping rule violations

(UKAD, 2018).

UKAD highlights data-sharing as a key focus of their intelligence work to facilitate their investigations. UKAD using this to combat doping reflects a global shift towards intelligence-led doping detection. In order to do this, they have working relationships with the general public, the sports community, pharmaceutical companies and health regulators, law enforcement partners, anti-doping organisations, and WADA. The Intelligence and Investigations team are also part of strategic working groups that have an impact on the anti-doping landscape such as the Government National Investigators Group, the Controlled Drugs National and Cross Border Group, and the Anti-Doping Intelligence and Investigations Network Group (UKAD, 2018).

UKAD encourages tips to facilitate their investigations. This includes their 24-hour confidential phone line, following Crimestoppers' own tip line model, for people to report information and suspicions surrounding doping in sport (UKAD, 2018). In the UKAD 2019-20 annual report it was summarised that 1,313 incident reports were received. Furthermore, 30% of ADRVs since April 2019 (report published in January 2021) were said to be intelligence led (UKAD, 2021b).

The 2021 UK National Anti-Doping Policy states that if UKAD requests, a National Governing Body must share information with UKAD for them to access athlete data (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2021).

UKAD also employs disruption and intervention methodologies. In instances where athletes or support personnel are suspected of committing ADRVs but there is not enough evidence for a case or it is not in the interest of the public for a prosecution to be pursued, these tactics can be employed. This uses a range of options to prevent, deter, intervene, and disrupt ADRVs. UKAD cites this as an effective anti-doping method (UKAD, 2018).

In 2024, UKAD were granted the use of powers to demand athletes' objects and information if they are under investigation for integrity violations (Lawton, 2024). This is a contentious power which is ethically analysed in depth in chapter seven of this thesis.

While a long history is noted for doping and anti-doping, the same such record does not exist for all integrity issues. Due to the previous literature and the importance of doping as an integrity issue, a decision was made to outline this history of doping in full for this thesis. The next sections look at other integrity issues within sport, and how they affect the integrity landscape.

2.3 Competition Manipulation

Competition manipulation is defined by the Council of Europe as 'an intentional arrangement, act or omission, aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others' (Council of Europe, 2014, p.3).

While literature has historically focused on the history of doping (Huggins, 2018), limited work has been done to map out the history of competition manipulation and Huggins (2018) notes a dearth of literature detailing the issue. Examples of competition manipulation and match fixing can date back to the earliest Olympic Games, with examples seen in Ancient Greece and Egypt (Huggins, 2018). In the 1700s, there are documented cases within horse racing of deliberate losing of races, often with financial incentives to do so (Huggins, 2018). Claims for competition manipulation can go hand in hand with media coverage. When sports such as horse racing and cricket began to be reported in newspapers in Britain in the early eighteenth century, reports of allegations of competition manipulation also began to surface (Huggins, 2018).

There are several key issues related to competition manipulation, including fixing, inside information, tanking, and betting (AIU, 2022).

Any improper alteration of a competition is considered fixing. This can be done in conjunction with betting in order to win money. Examples of fixing include purposely invalidating an attempt or fixing heat results (AIU, 2022). Any private information that athletes, officials, and

support personnel have access to is inside information. This can include tactics and injuries. It cannot be shared as it could be used for betting (AIU, 2022).

Deliberately losing is alternatively called tanking. This is done to gain an unfair advantage within a competition. For example, this can be done by an athlete who deliberately loses their event, in order to compete in an easier event in later stages of the competition (AIU, 2022).

Athletes, their teams, and officials are prohibited from betting on their own sport. This kind of betting can lead to the manipulation of competitions. Within athletics, accredited persons cannot bet on their own competitions, any disciplines at the World Athletics Series Events, or any other competitions or disciplines at multi-sport events e.g. an Olympic Games (AIU, 2022).

In summary, what athletes, officials and Athlete Support Personnel should and shouldn't do:

- They must not bet on any event that they are participating in or any competition within their sport. This also extends to any multi-sport events that they are taking part in.
- They must not manipulate a competition or fix any results.
- Inside information cannot be shared with anyone
- Undue benefits e.g. money, presents, trips, cannot be accepted
- If approached to manipulate a competition, this must be reported. Not reporting such attempts can lead to sanctions including fines and bans from sport
- Anything suspicious or anything thought to be unethical must be reported
- Cooperation with investigations is critical.

(AIU, 2022).

To tackle the issue of competition manipulation within the sport of athletics, the AIU has programmes designed to raise awareness of the subject, as well as to ensure the monitoring, correct reporting, and thorough investigation of any incidences of competition manipulation in athletics, ensuring fair competition for everyone involved in the sport (AIU, 2022).

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) states that the manipulation of competition within sport is increasingly concerning and has the potential to damage the integrity of sport. To combat this, proactive prevention, and programmes to raise awareness of the issue are needed. Furthermore, when integrity is breached, thorough investigations and appropriate sanctions are vital. The IOC contends that sanctions imposed are currently not harmonious (IOC, 2018). This

suggests that more needs to be done in the area of competition manipulation, and up to date research will be vital to improve this. ‘Sports participants should be confident that any competition manipulation related offences are sanctioned according to the aforementioned principles and that all sanctions are based on an in-depth understanding of competition manipulation, consideration of all aggravating and mitigating factors while taking into account the specificity of each sport, the circumstances of each case and the implications of any given sanction upon the Participant’ (IOC, 2018, p.3).

Competition manipulation can be for sporting reasons or related to betting. If it is for sporting reasons, this means that the manipulation is done to gain a competitive advantage. This can include an athlete deliberately not performing at their best at the start of a competition, in order to try and get an easier opponent at later stages of the competition (IOC, 2018). Within the sport of athletics, it could also include knowingly competing with faulty timing or measuring equipment, situations such as recording jumps as legal when they are in fact wind aided, or age manipulation of athletes to compete in lower age categories.

It is vital that the disciplinary body involved with cases of competition manipulation is clear on exactly what is classed as competition manipulation, and how it is different to sporting strategy and tactics (IOC, 2018).

With competition manipulation that is betting related, this is when the reason for manipulation is to make certain bets successful. Where the manipulation directly affects the end result of the competition, this is called match fixing, while manipulation that affects a specific part of the competition, not related to the end result, is called spot fixing. An example of spot fixing would be timing the first throw-in in a football match. This may not affect the game as a whole but will have made a bet successful and gained those involved some kind of benefit. Both match and spot fixing are punishable equally. Sanctions for competition manipulation can be long periods where the person is banned from the sport, and monetary fines, especially when mitigating factors are not involved. The average sanction for competition manipulation is a ban from sport of more than five years and a fine up to 40,000 Euros (IOC, 2018).

When deciding which sanction is appropriate to impose, there are several aggravating and mitigating factors that are taken into account (IOC, 2018). These include -

Planning and Intention: The efforts that have gone into the manipulation should be looked at during the investigation, including if this is the first time that they have attempted the manipulation or if it is a repeated manipulation over a long period of time. The extent of the planning and if they were conducting the manipulation on their own or purposely engaging other people, both will factor into any mitigating or aggravating factor which is used to show the intention of the accused (IOC, 2018).

Number and size of bets: This can show the intention of the individual. Thought must also be given to whether the person is being bribed by others, as if so, in this situation they may not have knowledge of the number and size of bets by them (IOC, 2018).

Benefits: The size of benefits and the type should be considered as they can affect whether someone tries to gain an advantage unduly through corrupt conduct (IOC, 2018).

Persuasion and coercion: Whether the person has been persuaded or coerced must be considered, alongside the personal circumstances as well as the situational circumstances of those involved (IOC, 2018).

Consequences to the overall integrity of the competition: The part of the competition that the manipulation takes place in can affect the extent of the sporting consequences and whether it changes the overall integrity. The risk of manipulation taking place can sometimes be greater in low stakes games where it will have limited effect on the competition and so this must be taken into account when a sanction is decided (IOC, 2018).

As it became apparent that the threat of competition manipulation was increasing, the need for an international treaty was clear (Serby, 2015). The Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions is the sole international convention specifically for competition manipulation, also known as the Macolin Convention. It is open for signature for both European and non-European states. The Macolin Convention covers legal aspects, betting rules in sport, sporting regulation, and information sharing, as well as working to raise awareness, stop conflicts of interest, and create frameworks of national cooperation (IOC, 2017a; 2018). The Council considers all corrupt conduct as an offence, actions which include gaining a benefit through the competition manipulation or any form of corruption, whether that benefit is accepted, sought, received, requested, or the person involved provides it (IOC, 2018).

The IOC was part of the creation of the Convention and provides support to them. They are also involved with the network of present national platforms, called the Group of Copenhagen (IOC, 2017a). The Convention strives to preserve sports' ethics and integrity, while maintaining the autonomy of sport (IOC, 2018). The Convention has been praised for being a fundamental step in tackling competition manipulation (Olfers, 2014) and a notable legal tool to help fight the issues associated (Carpenter, 2014).

While the Convention has clear motives to eradicate manipulation in sport, Serby (2015) suggests that by wanting to increase regulation of the legal betting market, this could in turn force those who manipulate competition into the betting markets that are illegal. As betting on sport is already banned in many places, there will be a large part of the betting market - the illegal side - that will be unaffected by the Convention. One study estimates that 80% of bets on sport are made through illegal operators (Vidal, 2014).

Determining who is cheating, why they do so, and how they go about it is vital if competition manipulation is to be identified and prevented. This can be complicated and difficult to understand, especially when the growing economic impact of sport, the gains for stakeholders and the global aspects of competitions are considered. This can make it difficult to determine how to tackle the issue of competition manipulation. Working out how the manipulations are operating is vital when it comes to deciding how they are dealt with, whether this is through sporting channels, whether law enforcement needs to be involved, or a mixture of both. However, if it is not clear who is doing the manipulating, and how and why, then it can be difficult to investigate the issue, especially without information from stakeholders and the sporting movement. Furthermore, competition manipulation is a difficult problem to identify, and to work out where it starts, and how far reaching it is. It can also be difficult to find the right people and organisations to carry out the investigations and sanctions against those doing the manipulation, especially when it is considered that it is not easy to classify it sufficiently to ensure that the case goes to court and justice is served (Council of Europe, 2018).

The Council on the Manipulation of Sports Competition considers the gain of competition manipulation to always be financial, either directly or indirectly (Council of Europe, 2018). They also contend that the aim of the sport manipulation can be assessed via the type of undue advantage that is principally gained -

Sporting advantage: A competition could be manipulated in order to gain an advantage. The person manipulating the competition is doing so to illicitly gain a benefit for themselves, or for others such as athletes or a team. In this situation there is almost always a financial reward as a result of this such as money for the athlete or team, bonuses for winning, gaining a promotion or not being relegated, or for a change in where they rank. This is a by-product and could be a consequence of the sporting advantage in this situation and not the sole aim which is to gain a sporting advantage (Council of Europe, 2018).

Nonsporting advantage: In this type of manipulation, the aim is to directly gain a monetary benefit, no matter how it affects the competition results. Here, the manipulation is not committed for the athlete or a team, but sport is used as a tool. Corruption, money laundering, fraud and bribery are often used (Council of Europe, 2018).

Literature also suggests that competition manipulation can fit into two brackets - getting a sporting advantage such as winning, not getting relegated, facing a more favourable rival in the next round of a competition, or a financial gain, such as winning bets (Gorse & Chadwick, 2011; Spapens & Olfers, 2015), with other studies making similar distinctions between different types of competition manipulation (Frenger et al., 2019). When it comes to financial incentives to match fix, such as betting, these are often driven by those not involved in sport in order to make profit, whereabout gaining a sporting advantage is not, but can also lead to financial gains too (Frenger et al., 2019) e.g., if winning a race means getting a cash prize. The act of manipulation is the same. What changes is what is gained and what the motivations are (Frenger et al., 2019). It has been suggested that competition manipulation can be grouped into three main areas - criminal organisations (including illegal betting markets), vulnerable individuals, and governance failures (Frenger et al., 2019). A key group of people who are considered the most vulnerable to being involved in competition manipulation are athletes with financial difficulties (Frenger et al., 2019). This is likely due to the financial benefits that can come with manipulating competition. Aside from financial difficulties, other variables were analysed such as gender, where an athlete was in their career, sport type including season and team or individual, and no differences were found in the prevalence when these were taken into consideration (Frenger et al., 2019).

It is contended that doping can also be considered manipulation of competition (Ordway & Lucas, 2021). There are key similarities and differences between anti-doping and competition manipulation.

Similarities - Both are: An element of deception, both deceiving others of true abilities; attempting to alter the natural course of a sporting event; committed for sporting gain, which can also be for financial gain, prestige, adulation; trying to gain an unfair advantage and making it an unfair playing field; often requiring human sources to report suspicions/evidence; infringing on clean and honest athletes' rights.

Differences - Results manipulation is more likely to involve collusion e.g. between athletes, officials, management, external parties than anti-doping; methods used and how the athlete gets caught; for doping prohibited substances/methods are used often by the athlete themselves while for competition manipulation alteration is more likely to be done to something else e.g. to paperwork, technology, equipment; this can also mean that the markers we look for to prove doping or manipulation are different e.g. biological vs. technological; the way that they are investigated and who by is different as well as how they are reported e.g. doping figures are well reported as are ADRVs, whereas less is known about competition manipulation statistics and sanctions.

In the run up to the 2020(1) Olympic Games in Tokyo, the AIU received at least 17 investigation referrals that detailed suspicious performances which attempted to qualify for the Games. These referrals were wide ranging and were across 16 countries. They involved 31 athletes and five relay teams. Following AIU investigations, eight of these qualifying performances were considered invalid and were not recognised by World Athletics, meaning those involved could not participate at the Olympics. The AIU also flagged more cases for further investigation in order to see if they were involved in fraudulent behaviour and activity. Issues that were reported included photo-finish images that were not reliable, measuring courses as too short, using pacers illegally, field instruments that were used when not authorised, and timings that were not correct (Sports Integrity Initiative, 2021).

The likelihood of competition manipulation can depend on the environment, with it more likely to occur in corrupt environments. Important philosophical questions can also be drawn from

the subject of competition manipulation, such as what is the point of sport if the result is fixed before it already begins? (IOC, 2021).

While doping has been highlighted as a large-scale problem within sport for many years, competition manipulation and integrity issues have recently been shown as relatively new threats to sport (Hessert, 2020). Carpenter (2012) argues that when integrity of sport is breached, this is larger than just anti-doping rules being violated as it can impact the very credibility of sport.

An example of sports competition manipulation could be seen at the 2012 Olympic Games in London where eight badminton players were disqualified for throwing matches, in an effort to get a more favourable draw later in the tournament. The World Badminton Federation stated that the players were disqualified as they breached two sections of the player's code - one part for not exerting their best effort to win a match, and another for conduct that is abusive or detrimental to the sport (Walker and Siddique, 2012).

In order to combat competition manipulation, it has been suggested that an external assessment should take place that looks at the real-life norms, values and interests that facilitate sports governance in great depth. It is often the case that wrongdoing can occur when there are failures within sports governance and a lack of accountability taken (Moriconi & De Cima, 2021). This is because such an environment can lead to opportunities for people to take advantage of sport. A further suggestion to improving the issue is for sporting organisations, both national and international, to facilitate researchers' access to elite athletes in order to support evidence-based anti-competition manipulation policies (Frenger et al., 2019).

It is suggested that it is not always a lapse of individual ethics that causes an individual to manipulate a competition but often a corrupt network is involved (Moriconi & De Cima, 2021) and it is this network that influences and conditions individuals to partake in the manipulation (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Nielsen, 2003). Tak et al. (2018) characterises competition manipulation as a social issue that involves a number of people at work.

While studies on the prevalence of competition manipulation within sport are rare, a few can offer some insight. Frenger et al. (2019) found that approximately 8% of the elite German athletes in the study had been asked to be involved in competition manipulation, while 7.5%

had taken part at some point during their careers. A study that interviewed Eastern European professional footballers found that 11.9% of the players were asked to think about match fixing, and that 23.6% knew that it had taken place in their league (FIFPro, 2012). Similarly to the doping motivation studies, there are reasons why people might not be honest about match-fixing, such as fear of punishment or retaliation.

Competition manipulation is a problem within sport that needs addressing due to its ability to harm the integrity of competition (Emrich & Pierdzioch, 2015; Emrich et al., 2014). Manipulation of competition could lead to the audience losing interest due to the uncertainty of the outcome of the competition no longer being guaranteed due to a lack of respect for the rules and playing fair. Those who have manipulated the competition benefits as long it goes unknown (Frenger et al., 2019). There is also a growing concern for the relationship that competition manipulation can share with organised crime (Serby, 2015).

Attention must also be given to sports governance and how they currently tackle the issue of competition manipulation and reporting mechanisms that do not adequately encourage or support people to report wrongdoing (Moriconi & De Cima, 2020). The federations must focus on the causes and consequences of issues within their sports and seek ways to combat these, rather than relying on placing blame on those outside of sport such as organised crime (Moriconi & De Cima, 2020). Moriconi (2020) suggests that if competition manipulation is going to be understood and prevented, then the role of social norms and how organisations decide their actions to combat it need to be understood further.

Some steps that federations have taken to tackle the issue of competition manipulation include:

- Forming specialist integrity units to investigate and sanction wrongdoing
- Programs for athletes that educate on the dangers of competition manipulation
- Making competition manipulation a disciplinary offence in their Codes.

(Serby, 2015).

The above measures are supported by the Council of Europe convention on Manipulation of Sports Competition as it seeks to pass on responsibility to governments to make sure that they are successful at combating competition manipulation across sports of all abilities (Serby, 2015). Kuwelker et al. (2022) found that 43 of the International Federations they studied had

brought in regulations relating to competition manipulation, either writing their own or adopting the IOC's 2016 Code.

There are variations seen across sports as to how competition manipulation regulations are enacted. These include how it is defined and sanctioned. Some sports have life ban punishments whereas others have smaller sanctions, which will affect athletes and their careers differently. The differences seen between federations highlights the disparity between how seriously each is taking the issue. This is noteworthy when compared to other integrity offences such as doping (Kuwelker et al., 2022). The paper highlights that consistency across sports is needed, which would be helped by federations having uniform regulations and sanctions, graded by severity of the offence (Kuwelker et al., 2022). This links to increased calls for athlete rights to be protected when federations launch proceedings against them, such as in the case of suspected competition manipulation (Kuwelker et al., 2022).

One of the key barriers against stopping issues such as competition manipulation is the unwillingness for those within sport to speak up, especially against members of their own team (Moriconi & De Cima, 2020). Loyalty is promoted in team environments, where sacrifices are expected. This can lead to a culture of silence and unethical behaviours whereby teammates will accept and not report wrongdoing for the greater good of the team as a whole (Albisu, 2018). This code of silence reduces the chance of wrongdoing getting caught, and this can lead to criminal organisations turning to sport (Moriconi & Almeida, 2019). However, Moriconi & De Cima (2020) interviewed athletes who explained that fear and the risks of reporting were more likely to ensure that they did not report wrongdoing, rather than loyalty to the team. Furthermore, the participants thought that reporting wrongdoing was dangerous and could come with negative consequences. They also suggested that the probability of competition manipulation being uncovered was small as it was hard to collect evidence surrounding the facts. The athletes stated that without reporting wrongdoing publicly, there were other ways to resolve issues internally without exposing team members publicly (Moriconi & De Cima, 2020).

2.4 Corruption

It is worth noting here again that some definitions of corruption encompass match-fixing. However, in this thesis match fixing has been included in the section on sports competition manipulation, as defined by Olympics (2017a) and the Council of Europe (2014). Match fixing

and competition manipulation can be classed as ‘on-field corruption’ and doping could also fall into this category. Instead, this section focuses on ‘off field corruption’, which can include fraud, bribery and other benefits (Ordway and Lucas, 2021, p. 48).

UK Sport list some indicators of corruption (inclusive of fraud and bribery) (UK Sport, 2022):

Payments: such as those for abnormal amounts, any that are made in unusual ways, large variations in budgets or contracts, or the need to make payments quickly or before schedule.

Process: avoiding the normal procedures (such as procurement, investment or commercial), need in contracts that can only be met by specific contactors, non-declarations of conflicts of interests and gifts/hospitality, private meetings with contractors or investment recipients.

Individuals: unusual behaviours, secretive nature around certain topics or relationships, external workers requesting individuals personally, frequent gifts or hospitality of relatively low value during critical business periods, late notice trips made with no explanation, unexplained change of lifestyle, no time off taken, high monetary gifts given or received.

Decisions: unclear rationale behind decisions, including unexpected or illogical investments that are not in the best interest to the organisation, lack of management oversight and involvement.

Records: missing or incomplete key documents, lack of original copies of documents and instead they are scanned or photocopied (UK Sport, 2022).

Law enforcement agencies contend that corruption cases are the most challenging to prosecute, accentuated by the fact that both parties (one offering the bribe, one taking it) are satisfied with their side of the deal (Ordway and Lucas, 2021). This highlights the need for reporting persons within the integrity system (Ordway and Lucas, 2021), which is later explored in this thesis.

Two notable corruption cases in sport will be outlined in this section for further context. The first details the corruption within athletics, and the other within football.

In 2020, the former head of IAAF (now World Athletics) Lamine Diack was found guilty of corruption, which included bribes for covering up positive doping tests. This involved 23 Russian athletes who had their doping sanctions waived for payments ranging from €100,000 to €600,000. He was sentenced to four years in prison, two years suspended, and fined £455,000. Five other senior figures within athletics were also sentenced to prison. In total, around €3.2 million was taken in bribes, in exchange for full protection from doping sanctions (Ingle, 2020).

Athletics is not alone in being engulfed in corruption scandals. Football was also embroiled in a corruption case when in 2015 the US Department of Justice indicted multiple high-ranking executives of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the global governing body of the sport. FIFA's president Sepp Blatter and the president of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Michel Platini were banned for eight years from football by the ethics committee of FIFA. A Swiss criminal investigation into Blatter and Platini was also launched. The US authorities also indicted 14 FIFA officials and associates, both current and former, on charges of corruption following a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) inquiry. 16 further officials were also later charged (BBC, 2015). In 2022, the US Department for Justice stated that FIFA officials had been bribed by representatives working for Russia and Qatar to secure the men's World Cup hosting rights. More than half of the individuals involved with the votes for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups have been accused of wrongdoing, including Blatter. Not all of those have been criminally charged (Panja & Draper, 2022).

Among the ethical issues associated with corruption in sport, the financial implications can also be wide reaching. In the Diack case in athletics, the Parisian criminal court also awarded World Athletics a sum of €16 million for the embezzled funds, as well as the damage to their reputation from the crimes outlined (Ingle, 2020). In 2016, FIFA financial records recorded a loss of \$369 million as legal costs from the corruption investigations mounted, and sponsors were hesitant after the scandal (Associated Press, 2017). In 2021, it was announced that more than \$200 million that were stolen in the 2015 corruption scandal would be returned to FIFA and two other governing bodies. The money was seized from former officials who were prosecuted for the corruption (Ruiz & Panja, 2021). As well as financial implications directly from the corruption, there can be further reaching consequences such as the loss of sponsor trust mentioned. Furthermore, such scandals can lead to fan distrust, which could result in loss of

viewing figures, merchandise etc. In 2016, a survey by Transparency International researched the views of over 25,000 football fans from 28 countries. The results showed that 69% of fans surveyed did not have confidence in FIFA. Furthermore, 43% said that the scandals that had engulfed FIFA affected how they enjoyed football (Transparency International, 2016). These results highlight the loss of fan trust after a corruption scandal, and how it can affect them.

2.5 Harassment and Abuse

The UNODC contends that abuse in sport is being more widely reported as societal attitudes are changing and the availability of ways to report is increasing. However, despite this, abuse in sport remains underreported (UNODC, 2021c). To further combat abuse in sport, it is contended that the environment around reporting needs to be enhanced, and the regulatory and legislative frameworks must be addressed (UNODC, 2021c).

There is a lack of aggregated data on abuse in sport, however there is anecdotal evidence that covers many cases globally that have come to attention in recent years and show that the levels of abuse in sport is high and needs to be addressed (UNODC, 2021c).

Several examples of abuse in sport will be outlined below.

A survey of Canadian athletes found that all 1,001 participants had experienced at least one form of harm (which could include psychological abuse, sexually or physically harmful behaviours, or neglect), either from someone in a position of power or a teammate (Kerr, et al., 2019).

Gymnastics has seen a substantial number of reports of abuse, throughout the world. In the US, a former team USA doctor, Larry Nasser, was found guilty of abusing gymnasts, including children, over decades. He was sentenced to up to 175 years and 125 years in prison respectively in two separate Michigan courts for the abuse of female gymnasts. Many notable gymnasts spoke out about the abuse they had faced from Nasser, including Olympic gold medallists Simone Biles, McKayla Maroney, and Aly Raisman. In 2021, USA Gymnastics and US Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC) reached a settlement with the gymnasts affected by Nasser's abuse worth \$380 million (Guardian, 2021).

Systemic physical and emotional abuse was also uncovered within British Gymnastics. At least 38 civil cases were brought against British Gymnastics and since 2020, over 1,326 concerns have been raised with the welfare team (Pirks & Falkingham, 2023).

Following the men's 2020 European Football Championship final, England players (who lost the match) were subject to online racist abuse. This led to the UK government setting out legislation to extend the use of football banning orders so that they include online abuse (UK Government, 2021).

Abuse in varying forms is seen within sport. How to tackle and investigate this issue and the other integrity issues mentioned will be further explored within this thesis.

2.6 Intelligence and Investigations

A response of some anti-doping agencies to the low number of positive tests is to focus efforts on a restricted number of elite athletes, with targeted and intelligence lead testing (Athletics Integrity Unit, 2019). This can allow ADOs to prove an athlete is doping, without a positive test (Article 2.1 of the WADC). It can also provide evidence to prove other integrity issues where equivalent tests to doping control tests to prove doping do not exist.

While there is previous literature on many areas of integrity, particularly anti-doping, there are few studies looking at intelligence and investigations. This in part is due to the only recent emergence of this area and its importance for sports integrity. Furthermore, there is limited publicly available information about its use, in part due to its sensitive nature. This section provides the available details of how intelligence and investigations are used and outlines the current literature available.

Investigations in sport are used to ensure a level playing field for all, and fair competitions (ECHR, 2018). Intelligence provides leads for investigation which feeds the judicial process (Marclay et al., 2013). Intelligence-led anti-doping testing rose 5.5% from 2018 to 2019 (WADA, 2019b) and WADA chose an increased focus on investigations during this time (Kambhampati & Star, 2021). This is supported by the addition of Article 10.6.1 in the WADA Code that allows for athletes to have their sanction reduced if they provide assistance to WADA that leads to an ADRV (WADA, 2019a).

ADOs and sporting federations have been increasingly interested in internal investigations within sport, and their importance in sanctioning athletes (Hessert, 2020). Investigations can be key when looking into issues such as competition manipulation, unethical behaviour e.g., sexual harassment, discrimination), as well as alleged ADRVs without positive doping tests (Hessert, 2020).

The World Anti-Doping Agency states that they now recognize that insights, intelligence and information that inform investigations is the direction that the Agency is moving in to uncover Anti-Doping Rule Violations (WADA, 2020b).

Doping investigations involve multiple steps including: collecting information, analysing said information to address accuracy, investigating further with other partners including other WADA departments and external organisations such as ADOs, IFs and law enforcement (WADA, 2021c). Information is parts of data that when merged and looked at together with appropriate background knowledge can be used to produce intelligence (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004). ‘It is now fully recognized that gathering insights, intelligence and information followed by a rigorous investigative approach is how we will catch more of those who attempt to undermine the values of fair play and sportsmanship’ (WADA, 2020a, p.2).

WADA investigated the institutionalised doping within Russia, titled Operation LIMS (Moscow Laboratory Information Management System). Operation LIMS was carried out by WADA’s I&I Department who investigated 298 Russian athletes as the Target Group. The I&I Department travelled to Russia in January 2019 and April 2019 to retrieve LIMS data and samples. They used this to select athletes to investigate, further supported by the 2016 McLaren Investigation, and to build case files of evidence. The target group pillar of the operation saw the I&I Department give case files to 28 Anti-Doping Organisations (ADOs) comprising 27 International Federations and one Major Event Organisation for them to consider taking forward. This gives the ADOs an opportunity to assess the evidence and the intelligence could lead to further measures such as target testing of the athletes identified. The operation also included a Compliance Review Committee Investigation into the alleged manipulation of Moscow Laboratory data. The review resulted in the non-compliance case against the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA), a status which, at the latest update provided by WADA in October 2023, remains (WADA, 2023a). A further part of the operation is the on-going Moscow Sample Re-Analysis Program which is looking at samples removed from the Moscow

Laboratory and has so far resulted in 57 Adverse Analytical Findings (AAFs). WADA also passed on the LIMS and raw data to the AIU to conduct their own investigations into the relevant athletes and the AIU has taken over building cases and highlighting ADRVs where appropriate (WADA, 2020c). This operation was helped, in part, by the work of journalists and their role in uncovering the Russian Doping Scandal. For example, journalist Hajo Seppelt first broke the story when his documentary *The Doping Secret: How Russia Makes its Winners* was broadcast which showed Russian athlete whistleblowers detailing the systematic doping (WADA, 2015).

The AIU have published some of the details of a case involving Russian high jump athlete Danil Lysenko and the intelligence and investigation that went into this process. During this investigation they conducted 22 interviews, obtained 14 electronics such as mobile phones and computer hard drives from key individuals in the case which were subsequently inspected and analysed, forensically analysed over six terabytes of data, and translated roughly 7,000 documents into English from Russian. This investigation led to the Russian Athletics Federation and senior officials being charged with serious violations of Anti-Doping Rules as well as sanctions handed to the athlete (AIU, 2020b).

The World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct states that all athletes must cooperate fully with integrity investigations. Refusing or failing to cooperate with investigations is classed as a violation of the Code, as is obstructing or delaying an investigation. This includes tampering, concealing, or destroying documentation or other information related to the investigation (World Athletics, 2019b). This includes without limitation: ‘refusing or failing to provide accurately, completely and without any undue delay any information and/or documentation and/or access or assistance requested by the Integrity Unit or other competent authority as part of such investigation’ (World Athletics, 2019b, p.7). This could raise several ethical issues, such as the extent to which athletes consent to these rules, whether they are coercive offers, and if athletes’ privacy is breached.

As well as athletics, other anti-doping organisations and international federations require athletes and others involved in sport, such as officials, to cooperate with investigations and report information that is necessary for these to function. This is due to the increasing number of competition manipulation investigations into athletes. These allow the organisations to use what some call coercive powers to facilitate investigations into wrongdoing (Hessert, 2020).

This can include information from digital devices, social media accounts or bank statements, and athletes can be obligated to hand these over to governing bodies within their sport to cooperate with their investigations (Hessert, 2020). This can be considered coercive as athletes have to cooperate or they could be sanctioned and potentially banned from their sport. Athletes must also follow integrity rules which often means they have to report any wrongdoing they come across, be that doping, competition manipulation, or any other integrity issues, which again can lead to severe sanctions if the athlete does not comply (Hessert, 2020). It is unusual to see reporting obligations such as these in any other investigations outside of the world of sport (Hessert, 2020). This is further explored in chapter seven of this thesis, looking at powers within investigations.

In tennis, the International Tennis Integrity Agency (ITIA) have a Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (TACP) that all Covered Persons (athletes, coaches, officials and others, such as agents, tournament staff), have to abide by (ITIA, 2023a). As part of this, the rules dictate that if a Covered Person is thought to have committed a corruption offence, such as manipulating a competition, then the ITIA can demand access to their personal devices such as mobile phones, laptops, tablets, hard drives, as well passwords to social media accounts and cloud services to aid investigations. Copies of documents such as phone bills, messages, bank statements can also be demanded (ITIA, 2023a). Under these rules, the ITIA will keep the information confidential, unless they deem it necessary to pass on the information to authorities for non-sporting legal investigations (ITIA, 2023a). However, a point of ethical tension is the fact that athletes cannot refuse the demands without risking sanctions and this information could then be passed onto law enforcement. Some legal frameworks allow the right not to self-incriminate, which is a right here not afforded to athletes.

Due to these rules, tennis players have been banned from the sport. In 2021 the ITIA announced that Nikita Gudozhnikov, an unranked Russian athlete, had been banned for 30 months and fined \$7,500 after he failed to cooperate with an investigation with the ITIA (ITIA, 2021). In 2019, Juan Carlos Saez, a Chilean athlete who was ranked 1082 in the ATP singles at the time, was banned for eight years and received a fine of \$12,500 after failing to cooperate with an investigation and due to not reporting a corruption approach. The athlete repeatedly did not hand over his mobile phone when asked, in order for it to be forensically analysed as part of an investigation, and in another incident, he did not report a corrupt approach, which is a breach of anti-corruption rules (ITIA, 2019).

It is necessary to consider the balance of the rights of athletes going through sports investigations and the interests of sporting federations conducting those investigations, with proportionality proving a key concept. The federations have a goal of keeping sport clean and free from integrity threats, and ensuring athletes can compete on a level playing field. Despite this, it is argued that the difficulties and complex issues that arise in investigations that require intelligence, cannot be solved by forcing athletes to give information that the federations would not have been able to obtain any other way. This could be classed as excessive and may mean that vulnerable athletes have no rights to defend themselves with (Hessert, 2020). However, in order to prove integrity offences, integrity organisations need evidence to support this. For integrity issues and ADRVs beyond presence, there are no tests to assist with this, therefore these methods can provide evidence to sanction offenders who commit integrity violations.

In response to this, Hessert (2020) highlights the need for protection for athletes involved in investigations, whereby federations are using self-regulated justification. Instead, different ways to progress with investigations to prove wrongdoing could be employed to allow fairness between athletes' rights and the goal of clean sport. This is particularly vital if there is a chance that the information that the athlete is required to provide could then be passed onto law enforcement, which would further erode the athlete's rights. An answer to this issue could be for federations to assure athletes who provide self-incriminating information that they are required to give to the federation will not be given to law enforcement. It is necessary for federations to apply the principles of fairness and proportionality throughout their investigations to avoid breaching athletes' rights (Hessert, 2020). Møller (2016) further contributes to this argument by stating that WADA rely on the fact that athletes are not employees in the way we are used to and are therefore not afforded the same protections as other professionals in fields outside of sport. One issue is that multiple stakeholders of sport, such as athletes, teams, governments, the audience, and ADOs, can all have differing views of what is effective, just, or proper (Read et al., 2019).

One such way that has been suggested to determine an anti-doping testing strategy is using the performance of athletes as intelligence (Hopker et al., 2020; Hopker et al., 2018). This is due to a common use of doping being to enhance performance and so by monitoring an athlete's performance over time on a longitudinal scale, this could indicate doping if disproportionate improvements or unexpected changes in performances are seen (Hopker et al., 2020; Hopker et

al., 2018). As well as improvements in athletic performances, decreases, or up and down performance profiles, could also indicate doping as it could be a pointer to the athlete not being able to keep up a consistent doping regime. A small number of performances from elite athletes could also be a flag if athletes are trying to maintain a stable performance profile (Hopker et al., 2020).

The data could be used to identify athletes who are at risk of doping (Hopker et al., 2018) and performance profiling could also act as a deterrent to doping, in a similar way that the Athlete Biological Passport (ABP) has (Hopker et al., 2020; Hopker et al., 2018). The method alone would be unable to prove doping definitively, but it could highlight potential cases and be used alongside other tools and models such as the ABP (Hopker et al., 2020), as well as comparisons with athletes who have been sanctioned for an ADRV and those who are thought to be clean (Hopker et al., 2018). Comparisons could also be made with previous data from training and competitions and training, the athlete's doping control results, and technology such as smart watches or power metres (Hopker et al., 2018). This could then inform a testing strategy of that athlete.

However, the accuracy of these and getting access to the information could prove difficult (Hopker et al., 2018). How the data is analysed to prove meaningful information would also have to be discussed further (Hopker et al., 2018). Alongside aforementioned data, other information could be used to provide a clear picture of how likely an athlete is to dope, and whether they should be target tested. This includes whereabouts, social media posts, at which level they are competing, and money they may make (Hopker et al., 2018). Performance profiling using the above methods could be used as intelligence to target test athletes.

While Hopker et al. (2020) raises ways to use intelligence to target test, some limitations remain. The study classes athletes who have not had an ADRV as 'clean', however based on aforementioned figures, it is likely that some of these athletes would have doped but not been caught. It is also stated that a 'normal' career progression would need to be formulated (Hopker et al., 2020) but as athletes tend to peak in their careers at different times due to a number of factors such as age they started the sport, genetics, coaching and training methods, this would be difficult to apply a one size fits all model to all athletes. Furthermore, Hopker et al. (2018) acknowledge that data quality and access to data are barriers to the research. Overall, using

performance profiling as intelligence to target test appears to be a useful tool in the overall doping system but needs key issues to be addressed.

Anti-doping organisations have to provide anti-doping programs to detect, deter and prevent doping. Anti-doping control tests make up approximately half of global anti-doping budgets, but questions have been raised over the last ten years of whether this is efficient (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023). A study by Lauritzen and Holden (2023) looked at 17 years of doping test statistics and ADRVs from the perspective of Anti-Doping Norway (ADNO). From 2003 to 2019, 48,709 anti-doping samples were collected by ADNO, including urine, blood and ABP, of which 216 were ADRVs, a percentage of 0.44% of ADRVs of the samples collected. A key finding of this study is that ‘relatively few ADRVs were recorded despite a comprehensive testing programme for almost two decades’ (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023, p.7). However, it is recognised that a key purpose of anti-doping control tests is to deter doping, and as such it is argued that regular testing during this period has contributed to deterring Norwegian athletes from using prohibited substances and methods, leading to lower positive testing figures (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023). In this study, from 2016-2019, 33 out of 63 of all ADRVs (52%) were linked to intelligence. This intelligence came from external sources such as information to the anonymous tip line and reporting, as well as internal sources such as reports from doping control officers, staff members or analytical information from previous samples. Moreover, it is noted that ADNO only employed intelligence-based testing in a ‘fraction’ of total tests, highlighting the potential that this method could have when compared with physiological and sport specific risk assessments (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023, p.8). This study found that the systematic use of intelligence when planning the testing process led to increased ADRVs (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023).

WADA guidelines have brought intelligence-led testing to the forefront of new methods, with ADNO implementing it based on WADA and independent researchers’ recommendations to incorporate intelligence gathering and law enforcement involvement as key methods to combat doping. Revisions to the 2015 WADC also highlighted the importance of incorporating intelligence and investigations in testing processes (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023). The study argues that more testing (e.g., testing for numbers) will not detect further doping and instead how successful testing is depends on the ‘quality of the information used in the test planning process, in which confidential source information and intelligence seem superior to other risk factors’ (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023, p 10). However, it is noted that exceptions to this may

exist, such as high doping prevalence sports, where it could be argued that more tests could lead to more positive tests. It is further suggested that resources to strengthen ADOs capability and capacity to gather the necessary evidence and to set up systems that can effectively collect reporting information are needed (Lauritzen & Holden, 2023).

Many investigations into wrongdoing use confessions or informants, leading Marclay et al. (2013) to highlight the need for the anti-doping system to proactively use this data more systematically and thoroughly to prove doping, both in individuals and on a systematic basis. Historically, doping tests have been thought of as the first point of information, however, ADOs should expand beyond this to catch more athletes who are doping (Marclay et al., 2013). Due to Article 2.2 of the 2021 WADC, Use, an athlete does not have to test positive for a banned substance or method for them to be sanctioned as an athlete can be found to have committed 2.2 without 2.1 (Presence) (WADA, 2019a). Forensic intelligence is a solution to catch more persons who are doping than tests alone currently are, offered by Marclay et al. (2013). This is a multi-level concept, incorporating tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence. Tactical intelligence is considered a reactive aspect which gives leads to investigations on targeted cases, to support the judicial process. Operational intelligence aims to provide answers to issues that are repeated often. Strategic intelligence focuses on the bigger picture, aiming to find flaws in the system. This means that forensic intelligence uses a wide range of tools to combat an issue, rather than just using one previous event (Marclay et al., 2013). This strategy could enhance the anti-doping system, as an explorative focus and diversified scope would mean up to date information that can support cases and decisions. A unified way for ADOs to collect and share anti-doping knowledge would better the system and allow those with the power to act on the information to do so more effectively (Marclay et al., 2013). These findings could also be applied to wider integrity issues.

2.6.1 Reporting as a Form of Intelligence

WADA define a Confidential Source as ‘a natural or legal person that has made a disclosure to WADA’ (WADA, 2021d, p.4). WADA has two levels of Confidential Source. The first level is an informant who can be anyone from someone who anonymously makes disclosure once, to a known person who has interacted with WADA multiple times. The second level is a whistleblower. An informant transforms into a whistleblower when they have a whistleblower agreement with WADA in place. Here, they formally record their rights and responsibilities, and they can be afforded further protections (WADA, 2021d). Adding Article 2.11 (Acts by an

Athlete or Other Person to Discourage or Retaliate Against Reporting to Authorities) to the WADA Code is one way WADA have sought to protect Confidential Sources (WADA, 2019a). External law assistance and physical protection are also protections WADA can explore (WADA, 2021d). Beyond the limited scope of anti-doping, the British Horseracing Authority (BHA), responsible for a range of integrity issues (including but not limited to anti-doping) in their sport, define whistleblowing as ‘the act of reporting any actions or events within an organisations control involving danger, risk, malpractice, or wrongdoing’ (BHA, 2023, para 2).

A number of high-profile doping cases have been brought to attention due to reporting. These include the Russian doping scandal (Bodrero, 2018) and Lance Armstrong’s doping revelations (Hart, 2018). The Russian doping scandal aided with a move towards increased intelligence led anti-doping (Erikson et al., 2019) and coincided with policies to support Confidential Sources such as reduced sanctions for information that aids with investigations, titled in the WADA (2019a) Code ‘substantial assistance’. While athletes appear to think that such assistance does not aid anti-doping, (Westmattelmann et al., 2018). academics disagree and suggest that they make anti-doping more effective, allowing reporting to join control, communication, and punishment as the fourth pillar of anti-doping policy (Westmattelmann et al., 2018).

In 2018, WADA’s Confidential Information Unit (CIU) was formed which aided intelligence and investigations operations in two priority areas - collecting anti-doping intelligence and managing Confidential Sources. The CIU centres around building relationships with Confidential Sources. In order to ensure accuracy, the CIU vets the sources and their information including assessing the motivations of the source, undertaking risk assessments and analysing the intelligence in depth (WADA, 2020b). Confidential Sources provide information, including knowledge of wrongdoing, to relevant authorities. Witnesses are a vital part of the justice system and Confidential Sources can inform for a wide range of reasons, including for personal benefit such as receiving a reduced sanction for any of their own wrongdoing (Miller & Gordon, 2014). To ascertain the weight that should be given to Confidential Sources, several aspects need to be considered. This includes how reliable they are and the credibility of what they say (Miller & Gordon, 2014). When questioning the reliability of Confidential Sources, we must first ask what reasons a Source might have for not being fully honest. These can include fear of embarrassment, worry of retaliation from those they are implicating, personal losses they could face, legal issues against them, the possibility of harming another, and implicating themselves in the wrongdoing (Miller & Gordon, 2014).

There is also a need to protect these reporting persons in case of retribution for any information they provide. It is their moral right to be protected (Miller & Gordon, 2014). WADA have invested a lot of resources into furthering their Confidential Resources infrastructures, such as their Speak Up platform (Verschuuren, 2020), and progresses reporting facilitations with the introduction of Article 2.11 to the WADC. Furthermore, the European Commission has proposed a new law to increase protection for reporting persons across the EU (European Commission, 2018).

WADA says that due to confidentiality and Confidential Sources being at the heart of WADA's I&I team, usually they decide not to publish their work due to the risk to their sources or due to the potential impact on the success of the investigation. However, they also highlight the need for transparency to facilitate trust and to ensure efficient and effective investigations (WADA, 2020a).

In 2021, WADA began to detail some provisions they were making for Confidential Sources. These strategies include tackling the issue of how to keep individuals who report doping anonymous. However, little detail is being given on the specifics due to WADA's intent to keep the methods undisclosed due to the risk to the individuals if more information was made publicly available. The premise is that WADA wants to protect the sources while keeping their identities anonymous. One issue that WADA raises involves the incentive for Confidential Sources of being able to reduce their sanction for an ADRV by providing information to aid WADA investigations (Rowbottom, 2021). This is an incentive that athletes have endorsed (Barkoukis et al., 2021). However, these sanctions are published publicly, thus if an athlete is shown to have a reduced sentence, then it can be apparent that they have aided WADA. Here, 'tactical actions' are being developed with further work needed to protect valuable assets (Rowbottom, 2021, para. 34).

WADA view Confidential Sources and the act of reporting as a preventative measure to combat wrongdoing in sport (WADA, 2016). Reporting doping and the use of Confidential Sources can be used to stop doping, help to protect clean athletes and sport, and provide better anti-doping social norms (Erickson et al., 2019; Verschuuren, 2020). This has been reinforced by studies involving athletes who believe that reporting wrongdoing can be a deterrent for doping and that it can facilitate clean sport (Barkoukis et al, 2021). Additionally, the benefits can extend beyond just individual athletes but also to the community, as well as the image that the public have of

sport. Benefits mentioned the most include: i) support for clean sport and athletes, ii) fair play and iii) their sport's and country's reputations (Barkoukis et al, 2021). Other aspects that affect choices to report wrongdoing include thinking that doing so is vital to the responsibility of their role (Near & Miceli, 2002), placing fairness above loyalty (Dungan et al. 2015) and being extroverted (Bjorkelo et al, 2010). If there are mechanisms in place to support those who want to report wrongdoing and there is a culture to support this, then it is more likely to be done (Keenan, 2000; Rennie & Crosby, 2002).

Athletes have voiced their beliefs that those who do report doping should be protected against any attempt at retaliation, with the lack of protection for this being seen as a barrier to reporting (Barkoukis, 2021). This barrier is echoed in several studies (Moriconi & de Cima, 2020; Rehg et al., 2008; Teo & Caspersz, 2011). Athletes and stakeholders are keen that the benefits of reporting wrongdoing should be greater than the negatives such as the risk of retaliation and the negative effect it could have on their sporting careers if people found out. Anonymity and privacy also need to be protected (Barkoukis, 2021; Whitaker et al., 2014b). WADA introduced Article 2.1 as a way to facilitate confidence of those reporting and know that they are protected from retaliation within the WADC. However, in practice, it does not appear clear if this is enough to encourage further reporting and to show athletes and others that they are protected when they report.

As aforementioned, a culture of silence can be a barrier to reporting wrongdoing. Within the public sector, whistleblowing is seen as a highly useful method to expose wrongdoing (Brown et al., 2016). In the past, people who have spoken out have faced punishments from their bosses (Uys & Senekal, 2008) and have dealt with legal proceedings, losing their jobs, and defamation (Rennie & Crosby, 2002). The code of silence has meant that those who have doped in the past have benefited from going unpunished as others are unwilling to speak out against them (Shipley, 2013). Here, an athlete may fear losing the trust of someone on their team and this could be seen as worse than the wrongdoing (Taunton, 2011). Within cycling, it has been seen that those who have spoken out against the culture of silence and reported wrongdoing have been ostracised (Kimmage, 2007; Hardie et al., 2010), and have left the sport due to their unwillingness to support or partake in doping (Whitaker et al., 2014b). In recent years, sports has also taken steps to facilitate reporting of wrongdoing (Kambhampati & Star, 2021).

Reporting doping or other wrongdoing is usually a moral dilemma (Uys & Senekal, 2008) as it presents two options, both of which are equally demanding and valid (Uys & Senekal, 2008). The athlete can either report the wrong doping and protect clean sport and athletes' right to compete in it, or not report it to protect the person who has committed the wrongdoing (Georgiadis & Papazoglou, 2014). In both situations someone is harmed (Erikson et al., 2017). This is highlighted by Erikson et al. (2017) whose interviewed student-athletes were not keen to report wrongdoing, and instead said they would prefer to confront someone who was doping. Furthermore, Whitaker et al. (2014b) found that in cultures that are unsupportive of reporting wrongdoing, then athletes within are less likely to want to report due to the effect that it could have on them. Athletes who partake in individual sports are more likely than athletes who play team sport to report doping within their sports, with the team sports more likely to abide by the aforementioned code of silence (Whitaker et al., 2014b). There are also further barriers to athletes to reporting wrongdoing than just the loyalty to their team. Reporting could mean threats to their careers as athletes (Moriconi & De Cima, 2020). Harris et al. (2023) also reported that confronting those who are doping could be preferred by other athletes, instead of whistleblowing.

Confidential Sources can help to uncover integrity issues such as doping and competition manipulation, however, those who do choose to report often do so while facing threats of retaliation and rejection (Hardie et al., 2012).

Proper ways to protect confidential sources and reporting persons and to be able to act on the information is needed, otherwise potential reporting persons may be unwilling to report issues in the future (Whitaker et al., 2014b). Furthermore, it has been suggested that clean athletes who report doping but would not benefit from a reduced sanction should be offered meaningful incentives (Barkoukis, 2021). Recommendations have also been made by athletes including making sure that the way that reporting can be done is trustworthy and reliable e.g., available in the user's native language and that it is clear how to use it, and that the reporting process e.g. who has the reports and how they are processed is transparent (Barkoukis, 2021). Being told the progress of the investigation into their report could also mean the process is more credible (Barkoukis, 2021). It is also vital that the system is independently evaluated regularly in order to ensure the effectiveness of the process (Barkoukis, 2021). The findings of the studies mentioned can also be applied to wider integrity issues beyond just anti-doping.

2.6.1.1 Recent reporting case

In July and August 2024, two articles were published in The Guardian detailing how reporting persons have been used within anti-doping in recent years. Due to the recent nature of the case they outline and the information they detail, they are able to provide insights of note related to this thesis.

The first article was published in July 2024 and outlined how USADA used an athlete who tested positive from a doping test to provide intelligence on other athletes training in their network (Draper, 2024a). This led to multiple ADRVs and sanctions of other athletes and people involved within athletics. USADA worked alongside the AIU on their intelligence gathering program (Draper, 2024a).

In a separate article published in August 2024 (Draper, 2024b), it was reported that a WADA official assisted USADA in recruiting athletes to report information about doping. WADA has accused USADA of breaching the WADC by use of this practice, despite the involvement of a WADA investigator. WADA took issue with USADA providing no or reduced sanctions for athletes who assisted with investigations, something USADA were able to do due to the substantial assistance clause of the WADC. USADA contend that using athletes in these undercover investigations allowed doping networks to be identified. WADA stated they were not aware of these investigations at first and ordered them to be halted when they found out. They also claim that USADA did not notify them that an athlete involved had their provision sanction lifted and did not give them an option to appeal. USADA defended their decision, stating it intelligence from athletes led to criminal charges as well as ADRVs and that USADA worked closely with WADA and World Athletes to ensure this (Draper, 2024b).

This case provides insight into how reporting persons have been using for integrity offences. However, it should be noted that it appears that all of the facts of the case are not publicly available. For example, it is not clear the extent to which WADA knew about USADA's operation, or their investigator's involvement in it. There is also high profile, public tensions between WADA and USADA currently, which stem in part from the recent case involving swimmers from China, which is discussed later in the thesis. Furthermore, it is also not apparent if other sports and integrity organisation are running these kinds of operations, nor are they likely to detail this, due to the clandestine nature of the operations. However, this thesis has been able to uncover more information on the use of reporting persons within sports integrity

than is currently publicly available and these results are detailed further in chapter six of this thesis. Conducting this literature review showed that there was a distinct gap in previous research, highlighting that intelligence and investigations within sports integrity has been largely unexplored. This facilitated the shaping of the research questions for this research to explore a novel area.

2.7 Aims

As evidenced in this chapter, there is an array of existing literature in sports integrity, particularly in anti-doping. However, there is a need for further exploration of wider integrity issues beyond anti-doping, such as competition manipulation, corruption and abuse. Furthermore, there is a dearth of literature exploring the specific issue of the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity, and the ethical issues that surround this.

This research aims to assess the ethics of the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity globally. This is in light of a growing acknowledgement that such intelligence is essential to address a now sophisticated approach to cheating in sport. Investigations into these issues are conducted by integrity units and there are questions surrounding how well this approach works, the function of these integrity units, and the optimal practices, and notably whether sports integrity in its current form can justify the methods seen used within investigations.

There is a need to work out what the rights of those being investigated for integrity purposes are, and in which circumstances, if any, these rights such as privacy and consent can be overridden by the moral rights of potential and actual victims of their actions, such as clean athletes and sport. Furthermore, there is a need to question whether integrity issues warrant these methods.

The research aims to answer the following questions -

- I. What should be the proper function of an Integrity Organisation?
- II. What is an ethical integrity investigation and how can the use of intelligence be undertaken ethically within these investigations?
- III. What are the ethical considerations with reporting integrity issues?
- IV. What powers are available and appropriate for use within sport integrity investigations?

V. Does sport integrity in its current form justify these investigative methods?

There has long been debate regarding the independence of sport from legal and ethical constraints, often generally accepted in wider society. Ethical policies have, as they seek to protect sport integrity, been criticised along a range of themes. While the issue of athletes' rights and integrity has been considered, there is limited ethical literature that also draws in detail on the nuances and developments in integrity investigations. Additionally, while doping has been highlighted as a large-scale problem within sport for many years, other integrity issues have recently been shown as relatively new threats to sport (Hessert, 2020). The focus on understanding the current problems facing policymakers should also ensure that analysis informs actual policy questions, such as the reach of anti-doping and integrity policy. While this policy has no doubt evolved and attempted to better incorporate the views and protect the rights of athletes, ethical challenges remain, alongside key questions of whether the investigative approaches employed by integrity units in their current form are justifiable.

Chapter Three - Methodology

3.1 Chapter Introduction

The purpose of the research was to assess the ethics of intelligence and investigations within integrity issues, such as doping, sport competition manipulation, corruption, and abuse. To explore this, I undertook semi-structured interviews with those administering integrity policy and Athlete Representatives who have knowledge of, and views on, integrity investigations.

The semi-structured interviews were chosen to gain further insight into the ethical issues surrounding intelligence and integrity investigations. Areas explored in the interviews included how well the approach works, the function of integrity units and the optimal practices, challenges faced, powers within investigations, the use of reporting persons and notably whether sports integrity in its current form can justify the methods seen used within investigations.

Semi-structured interviews were selected to offer the privacy to allow for more forthright responses in the sensitive context of anti-doping and integrity, as well as enabling an in-depth exploration of participants' experiences (DeJonckheere & Vaughn, 2019). Gaining first-hand accounts from those who had experiences and knowledge of integrity investigations was vital to further explore the issues associated.

My varied background, academically, professionally, and beyond, meant I came into this research with particular subjectivities. My data analysis method, thematic analysis, recommends embracing these subjectivities and being aware of them throughout the process (Clarke & Braun, 2021). Thus, my background and training as a sport scientist, social scientist, ethicist, sports journalist, anti-doping lead, and educator were all acknowledged and reflected on throughout the research process. Beyond my academic and professional experiences, I was a high-level athlete in skeleton and athletics previously, with personal experiences within the anti-doping and integrity systems. These experiences as an athlete helped with developing a rapport and trust with the participants in my research, in particular the Athlete Representatives. It also meant I had insider knowledge and understanding of how the integrity system operates, to add to my academic and practical understanding.

This chapter outlines the methodology used for this research in further detail.

3.1 Participants

15 Integrity Officers were interviewed, each working at a different integrity organisation, including NADOs, integrity units, integrity departments within sports governing bodies, and external integrity organisations who offer integrity services to other organisations. In this thesis, 'Integrity Officer' is the term used to describe an individual who currently or formerly has worked at an integrity organisation. Wide geographical representation was achieved and this was strived for due to the fact that integrity issues affect sport globally. Between them, these organisations had conducted investigations in Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Oceania. The choice to interview those who worked in integrity organisations was made to better understand their approaches and the challenges they face.

Five Athlete Representatives were interviewed. Four of the five were current or former international athletes, competing to Olympic/Paralympic and/or World Championship level, across both winter and summer sports. Each participated in a different sport. Three represented athletes globally, one represented athletes nationally, and one represented athletes both globally and nationally. Athlete Representative views were sought to understand how they balance a commitment to sport integrity with their own rights and autonomy.

While there are less Athlete Representative participants than Integrity Officers in this research, the Athlete Representatives represent a large number of athletes, and their views and experiences. These participants represent thousands of athletes between them and they were selected so they could bring these experiences to this research. Furthermore, there are significantly less Athlete Representatives with the knowledge and experiences of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity than there are Integrity Officers, and this is reflected in the sample sizes. When the results are presented, discussed and analysed later in this thesis, attention is given to both participant groups, and the views of both the Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives are considered for each relevant aspect to prevent bias.

No further information or demographics are provided on the participants in order to protect their anonymity and to eliminate the possibility of identification.

3.2 Data Collection

This research follows Viret (2019) in responding to claims that anti-doping must expand beyond disciplinary boundaries. Here it is claimed that a proper ethical analysis must attend fully to the

athlete voice. Viret (2019) argues that an interdisciplinary approach must be taken when it comes to anti-doping research and policy making. It is suggested that anti-doping policy require a level of subjectivity from stakeholders, and therefore this subjectivity should be informed, which can be aided by collaborative work and interdisciplinary research (Viret, 2019). De Hon (2016) concurs and highlights the need for multi-disciplinary work within anti-doping policy. McNamee and Moriconi (2024, p.18) state an 'integrated interdisciplinary approach to integrity that spans the humanistic and social scientific disciplines' is needed.

A proper ethical analysis of integrity policy needs a social scientific exploration of such issues. In arguing this I draw on Chappell (2014a) who argues that philosophical and ethical insights need to be supported by real-life examples and analogies, and that moral theories can fail to 'fit the contours of real life' (Chappell, 2014a, p.2) due to their tendency to cling too rigidly to a single principle framework, which can fail to grasp the nuance of real work confrontation with ethical issues. This is because of their rigid adherence to duties or obligations, in spite of the consistency and clarity single principle frameworks can offer.

Chappell (2014a) argues that such insights need to be viewed alongside real-life examples, noting that ethics involves knowing what to do, and how to make a difference, utilising our choices. Chappell proposes that just one traditional systematic moral theory should not be followed as a satisfactory ethical outlook, and that there is no universal formula that can help us make decisions or tell us what makes a good decision. Instead, a wider ethical outlook should be adopted. In this respect, we do not have to be rooted to one specific theory, and instead can take a wider view. A reason for suggesting this is that on paper it can be easy to use a moral theory to decide what to do in a certain situation, however, in real-life, it can become more complicated. Chappell argues that the resources used by systematic moral theory are often not enough to go on when trying to decide on how to make good decisions and knowing what to do. It can either give too much detail when trying to reason what to do, or not provide enough detail to be of assistance. Resources that we do need come under the heading of moral imagination, and Chappell suggests that moral theorists presenting systematic theories do not exercise their imaginations enough on the details of the situations they are considering, and that our imaginations must be engaged when thinking on how to act. This is needed alongside attention to our deliberations and actions. Despite not following one theory, the approach taken must still be coherent and rationally defensible. She also highlights the need for caring to get decisions right, and believing that we can (Chappell, 2014a).

Chappell (2014a) highlights what it means to do ethics and shows areas that matter in ethical understanding. She argues that to understand what matters in a situation, then we first have to know what it is like. To do this, we have to obtain content that allows us to comprehend what it is like for those involved in the situation. She suggests that we must experience the situation to fully understand it, and if this is not possible, then we must find out about all the details of the situation as best as we can.

Chappell explains this by saying:

‘Ethics is centrally about understanding the distinctive phenomenal contents of life’s paradigm experiences and events. Ethics is all about knowing what it’s like to be a child or a parent, a friend or a lover, to hurt or be hurt, to succeed or to fail, to sympathise or be sympathised with, to betray or be betrayed, to protect or to kill. So no one who lacks a grip on phenomenal contents like these can hope to understand what ethics is all about; any more than someone who has never experienced the colours can hope to understand what scarlet or sky-blue or canary yellow is all about’ (Chappell, 2014b, p.8).

Using Chappell’s (2014a) rationale, this led the research towards semi-structured interviews, as in order to undertake an in-depth ethical analysis of integrity investigations as perceived by the participants, an understanding of how their policies are enacted, how their stakeholders are attended to, and the issues around this, was vital. The semi-structured nature of the interviews, as opposed to structured interviews, allowed for flexibility and for the interviewer to react to answers provided and ask relevant follow-up questions. As someone who has not experienced an integrity investigation first hand, I could not fully say that I knew what the situation was like. As there was no way for me to experience this, I needed to understand what was going on within the situation from those who have experienced it. Semi-structured interviews with those who had knowledge and subjective experience of how these investigations worked allowed real-life insight into them, and in turn allowed me to understand what is going on within these environments which could inform my ethical analysis.

Chappell (2014a) supported the framework for the questions asked and the participants chosen for the research. The research was able to explore the beliefs of the participants, as well as institutional expectations, narratives, and policies. A strong emphasis on participant voice was attended to during the interviews, as this research sought to understand participant experiences fully, in their own words. Weissensteiner (2015) argues that athlete perspectives are often unheard within research and can fail to acknowledge the reality of athletes' experiences. Athletes are the key part of sport and have lived experiences of the issues being discussed in research (Weissensteiner, 2015), therefore, this research aims to address this literature gap by interviewing Athlete Representatives and highlighting athlete voice and perspectives.

While attempts to hypothesise what integrity investigations consisted of could have been made, details would have been missed out and it would only be through talking to those who have the lived experiences of the investigations that clear and deep insights were able to be obtained, with further detail than I alone could have hypothesised. Chappell's method of not being constrained to one ethical theory, and instead drawing on real-life examples and insights, justifies the use of semi-structured interviews with individuals with direct experiences.

Ethical approval was gained from Swansea University's Research Ethics Committee. Purposeful sampling was used to select participants purposefully, based on relevant characteristics and aims of the research, rather than randomly. This method is appropriate when the research aims to construct explanatory concepts in relation to real-life circumstances and events (Smith et al. 2010). By using purposeful sampling, this ensured that appropriate people for the research were accessed.

Participants were contacted via email and sent invitations and a participant information sheet detailing the study. Participants were initially selected from the research teams' networks. The supervisory team are well connected within the field of sports ethics and integrity and had many contacts to access who were suitable for this research. I also had my own network of potential participants, particularly Athlete Representatives from my background as an athlete, as well as other contacts from my time as a sports journalist and networking at events such as conferences.

After an initial round of contact from participants in the research team's network, a 'snowball' sampling technique was used (Noy, 2008). This was utilised in order to recruit participants

beyond personal contacts, meaning a wider pool of participants were accessed. Throughout this process, all participants were reminded of anonymity procedures of the research.

Several attempts were made to recruit potential participants in areas that are widely unexplored in anti-doping research, such as Africa and South America. We had multiple participants from these areas agree to participate, before later stating that they were unable to due to their organisation not allowing it. Other attempts also went unanswered.

In order to extend the participant pool beyond just contacts the research team knew, efforts were made to contact individuals we did not know, such as reaching out via email where addresses were publicly available e.g., on integrity organisations' websites. Furthermore, in some interviews, participants offered, without prompting, to connect me to other individuals they knew who may be willing to participate. Others gave names of contacts they knew who may be interested, and I contacted them separately. When contacting individuals unknown to the research team, some attempts were unanswered.

10 of the participants were recruited directly from personal contacts of the research team, and two participants were referred from personal contacts when they were unavailable to participate in the interview themselves. Three participants were recruited via recommendations of previous participants and the remaining five via reaching out directly to unknown individuals.

Consent was obtained via a signed participant consent form and verbally during the interviews, which was always recorded. Participants were told their right to withdraw from the study at any time, without fear of prejudice, with the process fully explained in the participant information form to ensure informed consent.

Data was collected via semi-structured interviews. This method allows dialogue between researcher and the participant which is directed by questions decided upon in advance and supplemented with follow up questions and reflections (DeJonckheere & Vaughn, 2019). Open-ended questions can be asked, and participant thoughts, feelings and beliefs can be explored deeply, as well as personal and sensitive issues (DeJonckheere & Vaughn, 2019), such as those that may arise around integrity matters. Semi-structured interviews allowed deviation from the set questions if further queries arose from a participant's previous answers. This meant that certain areas could be explored in much more detail, depending on the participant's experiences,

and allowed for wider findings. Interviews were chosen over other methods such as focus groups or surveys to allow for deeper exploration of the issues, and to allow for more honest and open conversations. Examples of the questions asked include what the participants thought was currently working well in sports integrity, what were the challenges they faced, what were their views on the powers sports integrity organisations had, and did they think reporting persons were supported.

Prior to each interview, extensive open-source research was conducted on the participant and their organisation. This was to ensure that the questions were relevant and specific to them, in order to get the most out of the interview. For each interview, an hour was allotted. This was a short amount of time to discuss several topics in depth. Therefore, I wanted to be able to maximise this time. For example, rather than use up interview time by having the participant explain certain policies that I wanted to discuss, I ensured I was familiar with the policies before the interview. This meant that the participant was able to use the time to detail how they were used in practice in their organisation and their thoughts on them, rather than just to explain them. Building my own knowledge of their policies and rules, as well as an understanding of their background, I believe helped me build a rapport with the participants, which was essential to gain trust and to collect rich data. The effort I had gone into to prepare for the interviews was appreciated by the participants and my knowledge of the subjects helped the interviews flow well. My experiences of working within the industry also helped during these interviews as I was able to show an understanding of how the procedures worked and empathise with the challenges. Furthermore, my experience as an athlete within the integrity system, particularly as part of the anti-doping system, facilitated greater rapport, in particular with the Athlete Representatives, four of whom were current or former international athletes. My insight into what it is like to be an athlete within this system was valuable and aided with building trust with the participants.

Interviews were conducted via online video call software Zoom, which is Swansea University approved, licensed and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) compliant, as well as the primary source of meetings and online teaching. The desktop version of Zoom was used, and the data collected (recordings of the interviews) was stored on my password protected computer. Only the research team has access to the data. The data will not be disclosed to other parties without consent or otherwise permitted by the law, ensuring privacy and confidentiality. Swansea University's GDPR processes were followed at all times. The international reach of

the research (as the threats of doping and competition manipulation to sport are global issues) also justified the use of Zoom, which can be used to contact participants globally, rather than face to face meetings which would have been logistically and financially challenging.

The interviews took place with one participant at a time. One on one interviews were decided upon to allow for more honest and open conversations and to put the participant at ease if discussing sensitive topics. It also allowed the interviews to be tailored to the participants and for the most relevant questions for the person to be asked, and in more detail where necessary. The interviews were between 27 minutes and 65 minutes in length, with the average interview lasting 46 minutes. No notable differences in length between the two participant groups (Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives) was found (the average interview length for Athlete Representatives was 45 minutes and 53 seconds; average interview length for Integrity Officers was 46 minutes and 21 seconds).

The participation for this research was completely voluntary with participant information sheets clearly stating that potential participants did not have to take part and could withdraw at any time. It was also detailed that the data that was collected would be kept confidential in order to respect participant privacy, with raw data and participant identities only known by the research team. Participants are anonymised in this thesis and papers for publication, with the people who work within sports integrity called 'Integrity Officer x', and the Athlete Representatives titled as such. No names, organisations, locations or other identifying details are disclosed to anyone beyond the research team. Information sheets were emailed to participants before their participation began to ensure they are aware of the research details. Identifiable characteristics (such as name, location, organisation, details of cases) were removed from writings and publications at the stage of data transcription, with pseudonyms used to describe participants, to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. Anonymity will only be broken if there are legal requirements or participants are deemed a significant risk to themselves or others. No such concerns were noted at any point in the process.

The decision to anonymise the data was made to facilitate more open and honest conversations and to allow the participants to speak freely, without fear of consequences such as from their organisation for speaking out against their policies or rules. Despite this, it is acknowledged that participants may still speak in their official capacity during the interview, sticking to their official organisation's line (Duke, 2002). Therefore it is important to view the data collected

with this in mind and provide critical analysis. Furthermore, it must be noted that anonymisation means that some of the richness of data could be lost, and this was found during the write up of this thesis and papers for publication. By not being able to attribute certain quotes to their organisation, depth and richness is lost. However, on balance, the quality of data that was achieved and able to be reported anonymously was still high and therefore deemed worth the anonymisation.

The interviews took place in the primary supervisor's locked office, where no one else was present. This was to ensure participant anonymity and confidentiality as the interviews and the participants could not be overheard, interrupted, or seen by anyone else.

Following each interview, time was taken to reflect and initial thoughts were noted. This was an important part of the process and it ensured that the initial observations were captured immediately. This also aligns with the data analysis method of reflexive thematic analysis, where it is encouraged to keep a reflective journal for documenting thoughts (Clarke & Braun, 2021).

The potential physical and psychological risks that participants may experience were limited, however, some areas of discussion may be personal and sensitive subjects. Before participation, informed verbal and written consent was obtained and it was also confirmed that the participant feels comfortable partaking in the research. It was made clear to the participants their right to terminate the interview at any time without prejudice and that they can choose not to answer any questions if they wish. If sensitive and ethical information was discussed, this was reported to and discussed with the research supervisor(s). Participants were guided to avenues of support throughout the study to ensure that all participants are supported and protected if distress or discomfort was caused. A point of contact was always available, and this was clearly detailed to the participant, as well as their rights and how to make a complaint. Before the interview, participants were reminded that they did not have to answer any questions they didn't want to and that they could stop the interview at any time.

3.3 Data analysis

Each interview was recorded with the participants' consent to allow transcription to occur after it had concluded. The data was manually transcribed after each interview. At this point, the data was anonymised. While tools and AI exist to aid with this process, the choice was made to

manually transcribe in order to be immersed in the data fully, to aid with the understanding of the data, and to ensure maximum accuracy. This aided with the recall of the interview data later in the process. It was also useful to have a high level of familiarisation going into and during data analysis, as well as when writing up this thesis.

The interviews were then analysed for emergent themes. Thematic analysis based on Clarke and Braun (2021) was used to extract meaning from the data. The raw, anonymised data was imported into the qualitative data package NVivo R1 (2020).

Thematic analysis (TA) is a method of analysis used to develop, analyse and interpret patterns in a qualitative data set. It involves the systematic process of coding data in order to develop the ultimate analytical purpose of themes. TA can be useful for research that seeks to understand subjective experiences and perspectives, as well as critical qualitative research (Clarke & Braun, 2021). TA is an appropriate method for spoken interviews, with the transcripts being amenable for analysis with TA (Clarke & Braun, 2021). The analysis that TA produces is dependent on the version used and how it is used. Reflexive TA is one version of TA and is the approach selected for this research. Reflexive TA is a systematic and flexible approach of TA that utilises the subjectivity of the researcher and requires reflection on this role, as well as the research practice and process (Clarke & Braun, 2021). Clarke and Braun (2021, p. 247) state ‘reflexive TA is the most ‘fully qualitative’ member of the TA family and thus the most suitable for those who want to explore deep, complex, nuances meaning and understanding.’ An advantage of reflexive TA is the flexibility it offers (Clarke & Braun, 2021).

Clarke and Braun (2021) recommend assessing the quality of your data early in the collection process to ensure it is diverse and rich. For the research in this thesis, the interviews were reviewed with the primary supervisor after the first few had taken place, to ensure sufficient depth and quality of data. As a team, we were happy with this and therefore continued with the interviews.

A primary tool for reflexive TA is researcher subjectivity, which is at the heart of the analysis. This is because knowledge generation is inherently situational and subjective. Subjectivity is not something that needs to be eliminated. Instead, it should be understood and allowed to be a resource for conducting analysis. The assumptions we hold will influence our research, and it is up to the researcher to acknowledge the influence that they have (Clarke & Braun, 2021).

Reflexivity means reflecting on assumptions, expectations, choices and actions throughout the analysis and research. Reflecting on these means that consideration to the researcher's standpoint and choices and what these may enable or exclude can be taken. It also means that consideration to the theory that informs the research is needed, and work is done to enable the theory and how the research is done to align (Clarke & Braun, 2021). When undertaking reflexive TA, it is recommended by Clarke and Braun (2021) that ethical thinking should centre about the responsibilities to participants that the research has. I considered my disciplinary training and experiences, such as as an ethicist, a social science researcher, as a sport scientist, as well as previous experiences and training, such as as a journalist and an athlete.

The six phases of the analytical process were:

1. Dataset familiarisation
2. Data coding
3. Initial theme generation
4. Theme development and reviews
5. Theme refining, defining and naming
6. Writing up

(Clarke & Braun, 2021).

3.3.1 Familiarisation

Firstly, familiarisation of the data takes place, which involved immersion in the data. Here, it is important to be active, critical, and analytic to ensure depth. Thinking about how you as the researcher are making sense of the data facilitates a higher quality analysis (Clarke & Braun, 2021). I reviewed the interview transcripts multiple times, in varying orders.

3.3.2 Data Coding

Within reflexive TA, the smallest unit of analysis is a code, and codes are the building blocks of the analysis, from which themes are developed. Codes encapsulate specific meanings within the dataset which are relevant to the research question. Coding is the process of patterning meaning within the dataset, developing the codes. Code labels are applied to segments of the data which are analytically interesting. Codes need to be specific and precise (Clarke & Braun, 2021).

Coding is subjective as it is shaped by what the researcher brings to it and their interpretation. This means that different people will code differently and so it is not recommended to use more than one coder as a way to achieve ‘true or accurate’ analysis (Clarke & Braun, 2021). Using a singular coder, most often the researcher, is normal and good practice for reflexive TA (Clarke & Braun, 2021) and this is the method I employed, being the singular coder for the analysis.

For the coding process, I used NVivo R1 (2020) to organise my interview data files and to have my coding all in one place. I undertook two rounds of coding and changed the coding order to gain a different perspective (as suggested by Clarke & Braun (2021)). Codes were refined continuously and I ended the coding process with over 100 codes. As coding is never completed, due to meaning never being final (Clarke & Braun, 2021), a subjective judgement was made when to stop.

3.3.3 Themes

In reflexive TA, a theme is ‘a pattern of shared meaning organised around a central concept’ (Clarke & Braun, 2021, p.77). Themes reflect multiple facets of ideas or concepts, while codes do this for just a single facet or idea. In my research, themes were generated, reviewed, and developed to each have distinctive properties and central organising concepts. It is important to remember that themes do not emerge, and instead they are produced actively (Clarke & Braun, 2021). Below is a summary of the themes and subthemes that were produced and the definition of each theme.

Theme	Sub-themes	‘Definition’ of the theme
Varied functions of integrity units	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness Challenges Limiting structures and rules 	The theme <i>varied functions of integrity units</i> explores the expansive and differing opinions of what the function of an integrity unit is, and should be, expressed by interviewees. Notably discussed was <i>how effective</i> these units currently are, alongside what they are doing well, and could improve on. The <i>challenges</i> that the units face were highlighted in the dataset, and how these are affecting the functions of the organisation. It was noted during interviews that the <i>structures and rules</i>

		that integrity units are bound by were affecting their functions.
Best practices in integrity investigations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Challenges • Standards of proof • Varied practices 	The theme <i>best practices in integrity investigations</i> explores core ideas expressed in various ways throughout the data set - that there are processes in integrity investigations that produce effective investigations, and these differ across organisations - a sub theme which is broadly characterised as <i>varied practices</i> . Another main expression of best practices in investigations is being aware of the <i>standards of proof</i> that must be met when wrongdoing in sport is prosecuted, and the fact that investigations must produce sufficient evidence to adhere to this. This is noted as a <i>challenge</i> , alongside many others, which can hinder investigators and their mission of best practice within investigations.
Investing in intelligence for investigations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Justification • Integrity organisation practices • Sources of intelligence 	The theme <i>investing in intelligence for investigations</i> explores how intelligence is used within sports integrity investigations. The processes and <i>practices used by integrity organisations</i> are laid out to allow for understanding into what happens with this intelligence and how it is gained, alongside the <i>sources of intelligence</i> used, to facilitate further analysis. The reasons for using and investing in this intelligence, how it is used, and why, supports the <i>justification</i> by policy makers that this is an appropriate and useful tool for investigations.
Differing views on the usefulness of reporting persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection • Integrity organisation practices • Ethical issues 	The theme <i>differing views on the usefulness of reporting persons</i> explores how reporting persons are used within investigations, and how useful and effective this method is. Some interviewees stated that they are a vital investigative tool, with others noting that they were often unhelpful. The levels of reporting person, from a person who anonymously reports one piece of information about wrongdoing, to a

		<p>confidential source, affects how they are viewed. How reporting persons are <i>protected</i> is a central idea, with athlete experiences as reporting persons, and policy makers' views, put forward. <i>How</i> reporting persons are used is explored, with <i>ethical questions</i> arising such as the levels of protections that should be afforded, whether reporting persons should be anonymous, and whether those in sport have an obligation to report wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Ethical and practical concerns of powers in investigations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence • Demands for information and objects • Ethical concerns • Varied levels of powers 	<p>The theme <i>ethical and practical concerns of powers in investigations</i> explores the core idea voiced in various ways throughout the dataset that the powers of integrity units to conduct investigations can raise concerns with stakeholders of sport. These powers <i>differ between organisations</i>, with some policy makers stating that they do not have enough powers, and others happier with theirs, citing difficulties with gaining <i>evidence</i> as necessitating these powers. Athlete Representatives meanwhile express concerns with the powers in integrity, in particular with those that allow organisations to <i>demand information and objects</i> from athletes and other stakeholders. There are a number of <i>ethical concerns</i> raised by the powers that integrity units have, including whether these powers are proportional to the threats facing integrity.</p>
<p>Recognising athlete voice in integrity</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rights • Difficulties • Support 	<p>The theme <i>recognising athlete voice in integrity</i> explores the importance of listening to athletes within the integrity system, as they are the stakeholders who are most affected by the rules and policies implemented. Athletes in the dataset share the <i>difficulties</i> that they face within the integrity system and they, along with some policy makers, call for athlete <i>rights</i> to be protected. The need for <i>support</i> for clean athletes, athletes who are suspected of wrongdoing and those who report</p>

		wrongdoing is widely called for within the dataset from Athlete Representatives.
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Table One: Themes Identified in Data Analysis.

3.4 Critical Realism

As noted earlier, Chappell (2014a) offers an approach as to how we best do ethics, that informs research to collect social scientific data to better address these ethical problems. Critical realism is an approach that distinguishes between the ‘real’ and the ‘observable’ world. There is not one singular framework, methodology or set of beliefs that defines critical realism (Archer et al., 2022). It is based on work from Bhaskar (1975), which has since been developed by many more academics, such as Archer (2022), Stutchbury (2022) and Tikly (2015). Broadly speaking, critical realism contends that there is a reality that exists beyond and independently of the researcher’s ideas about it. It is recognised that human practices shape how we experience and know reality and these give rise to truths that are contextual and influenced by our perspectives.

Archer et al. (2022, para. 2) describes critical realism as a ‘reflexive philosophical stance concerned with providing a philosophically informed account of science and social science which can in turn inform our empirical investigations. We might think of this in terms of three layers: our empirical data, the theories that we draw upon to explain our empirical data, and our metatheories—the theory and the philosophy behind our theories.’

Critical realism is a combination of realist ontology, which contends that there is something real to find out about, and relativistic epistemology, which suggests that people come to know things in differing ways (Stutchbury, 2022). Ontological realism forms a key part of critical realism and it suggests that there is a transcendental reality that we do not know about and cannot be found by empirical surveying or justifiable examination alone (Archer, 2016). It states that a lot of reality exists and operates beyond our awareness or knowledge of it (Archer, 2016). The social world is only able to be understood if we can understand the structures that cause events and ontological study looks at hidden generative structures (Zhang, 2023).

The ‘critical’ part represents the need for researchers to be critical of theories that are used and explanations that are proposed (Stutchbury, 2022). To find explanations, critical realism goes

further than detailed descriptions, while accepting that these explanations could draw on different social theories due to the complexity of everyday life (Tikly, 2015).

Critical realism looks for explanations, otherwise known as causal mechanisms (Stutchbury, 2022). Causal mechanisms are things that produce events (Fryer, 2022). It regards much of reality as unavailable to the observer, with the causal mechanisms existing below the surface, giving rise to experiences and events (Stutchbury, 2022). The causal mechanisms are found through deduction and analysis of data from the research (Stutchbury, 2022). Judgemental rationality is assumed which means researchers can use evaluation and comparison to assess different theories and select those that explain reality most accurately, with the knowledge present (Hu, 2018).

Fryer (2022) explains the importance of causal mechanisms by stating that the world as we know it isn't a scientifically controlled lab. Instead, there are always different things happening and causal mechanisms in place that interact in complicated ways. This means that they only tend to bring about events, they are not guaranteed to. As we can't quantify tendencies, there's no universal laws to what will impact what, but instead a variety of causal mechanisms that will have more or less effect, depending on the different people and different situations.

Critical realism suggests that observable events come from activities that happen within social structures that are changing all the time due to said activities. They are happening beneath the surface and cannot be seen at first, however, they can be accessed through research (Stutchbury, 2022).

There are three levels to critical realism:

1. The empirical level, which comprises of the experiences and sensed perceptions and can be seen and / or measured
2. The actual level, events and objects that occur in the real world and can be researched through qualitative methods
3. The 'real' level, which consists of causal mechanisms and deeper lying structures, and have to be worked out through theoretical re-description and a focus on the causal mechanisms.

(Scott, 2005; Fletcher, 2017).

A reason for selecting to use critical realism in research is that it can allow the researcher to delve beyond big descriptions and to look for explanations (Tikly, 2015). However, a downside is that this method can be potentially intrusive (Stutchbury, 2022). In practice, using critical realism could mean selecting interviews as a methodology in order to understand individuals as they interpret and navigate their social structures and reality, and crucial decision points that they come across (Archer, 2003).

3.4.1 Critical Realism and Thematic Analysis

When taking a critical realist position for reflexive TA, this means that the data does not show a clear and direct reflection of reality, rather a mediated reflection of reality is accessed. It is participants' perception of their reality that is seen, which is shaped by their experiences and perceptions, as well as their cultural contexts and language (Clarke & Braun, 2021). Their realities are brought to the research by the participants, which is interpreted by the TA, which happens alongside my own cultural perceptions. Critical realism TA aims to give an interpretation of the data that is coherent and compelling and is grounded in participants' stories which speak to situated realities, as well as the limits of their worlds (Clarke & Braun, 2021).

When developing the codes for TA, it can be useful to think about this in terms of critical realism concepts of experiences and events (Fryer, 2022). Descriptive codes attend to the experiences of agents, which helps to describe the coded data. As the codes are developed, general events can be considered alongside these experiences. For example, within this research, provision of support during investigations could begin to be considered, rather than just one participant's experience of accessing providing support during investigations. This can also help with refining the codes, as it can aid the researcher by asking whether some of the codes refer to the same events, and therefore can be consolidated (Fryer, 2022).

Furthermore, when considering how TA and critical realism interact, the three critical realist concepts of experiences, events and causes can loosely correspond to data, codes and themes (Fryer, 2022). The data reflects the experiences of participants, these experiences are consolidated by codes to talk of events, and the causal mechanisms which produce the events and experiences are considered by themes (Fryer, 2022).

In critical realism, knowledge production is seen as subjective and fallible (Bhaskar, 2008), and therefore the researcher is always actively involved in the research process. When applying this

to TA, this means that themes are developed through analysis, rather than before, and these are reflexively thought about throughout the research process. This researcher reflexivity ensures rigour and validity of the research, facilitated by using a critical realist perspective. Additionally, critical realists who are using TA are encouraged to reflect on the validity of their codes and themes. Using TA with a critical realism lense also means that multiple researchers do not have to code the data to make it valid, and as such TA can be undertaken as a solo researcher in a rigorous way.

3.5 Methodological Rigour

During data collection and analysis, steps were taken to ensure methodological rigour. The data was collected as a team, with the primary supervisor querying the interview questions and asking for justification for what would be asked. The same process was employed with the data analysis when justification was sought for the methods used. The results obtained and the themes that were developed were evaluated and discussed by the entire research team. I was the sole interviewer for the data collection to ensure the consistency of the nature and delivery of the questions.

In the next section, the ethical implications of the research will be considered.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

Throughout the research process, several ethical considerations were noted, which will be outlined in this section.

Ethical approval was received from Swansea University's Ethics Committee, whereby the research methods and aims were outlined. Consent was obtained from all 20 participants verbally at the start of the interview, and this was recorded. Written consent forms were also sent out, and 17/20 participants signed and returned them. The 3/20 who did not return them all cited technological issues and reiterated this in the recorded interview, where they all acknowledged having read the form and offered their consent verbally. All participants in this research were adults and were able to provide their consent. Before the interviews, all participants were made aware that they were able to withdraw from the interview at any time and that they did not have to answer any questions they did not want to.

3.6.1 Confidentiality and Anonymity

Before the interview, the participants were all told that the research findings would be anonymous and that there would be nothing featured that could identify them, such as their name, organisations, nationality, or location in the write up of the thesis or papers for publication. The participants were also aware that the research could be published online, both as part of my PhD thesis, and in academic journals. The fact that their identities would not be published in relation to this was reiterated during conversations about this.

When participants had been selected, information sheets about the research with key details such as anonymity, were distributed. This information was given to participants before they agreed whether to take part in the research. Details of the research were outlined in the information given, including what the study was looking at and why they had been selected. Contact details were given to ensure any questions could be answered. It was highlighted that any participation was entirely voluntary. This was done to ensure that any participation was free from potential coercion. Once initial contact had been made, I refrained from contacting them again unless they agreed to be interviewed. This was to prevent any potential feelings of coercion. Follow up emails were only sent to arrange times and dates for interviews once they had agreed to participate in the research.

The interviews were recorded on Zoom and downloaded onto my password protected laptop. Only the research team named on the ethics application could access this raw data. The research team took the handling of this data very seriously and worked to ensure that high standards were maintained in order to ensure the anonymity of the participants was respected.

The interviews took place in the first supervisor's empty locked office and I conducted the interviews alone. This was selected as the best location for the interviews to ensure that I would not be disturbed or overheard during the interviews and to ensure anonymity for the participants.

3.6.2 Breaching Ethical Principles

During this research, the ethical principle of anonymity was abided by to ensure that ethical standards were maintained throughout. It must be noted however that there are some cases within research that means it is necessary to breach these principles.

A potential reason for breaching ethical principles is when criminality is suspected or uncovered. If this were to occur, the principle of anonymity afforded to participants would have to be considered by the research team. In this case, I would first report this to my supervisory team, and then discussions about whether to report this further would be had. Further opinions from Swansea University's Ethics Committee may also be sought. Any evidence could then be handed over to the relevant authorities. Following proper procedures would be vital to ensure that the breaches of ethical principles such as anonymity would be justified. However, this was not relevant in my research and no criminality was found or suspected.

Another possible justification for breaching ethical principles would have been if evidence of an ADRV or integrity issue was uncovered. This would be particularly poignant if there were concerns to a participants' or others' health. Here, researchers may have had an obligation ensuring participant anonymity, but also a moral obligation to report the integrity issue to the appropriate authority. If this had occurred, I would have discussed this with the research team and then made an informed decision about what to do. Examples of what to do could include a more general report of the issue, without naming anyone which could ease the pressure to breach anonymity. Further consideration would have been given if it was thought that a participant or others detailed by a participant were at risk of serious harm, such as to their health. Thought would have gone to the best interests of the participants, while also recognition given to the fact that the participants are autonomous adults. Details and contact details of support avenues would have also been considered in these situations. However, no evidence of integrity issues was uncovered during interviews.

The methodology used for this research has been outlined above. The next chapters present the results and discussion from my research, starting with setting out the current integrity landscape.

Chapter Four - The Current Integrity Landscape

4.1. Chapter Introduction

Sport integrity organisations are in place to protect sport from integrity issues. Examples of these organisations are integrity units and agencies, anti-doping organisations, integrity branches of sports governing bodies, and organisations who offer integrity services to sports federations. Before ethical issues within sports integrity can be analysed, it is pertinent to map out the current integrity landscape. This allows for understanding into what is presently going on within the integrity system. Asking Integrity Officers who are currently employed within integrity organisations and have vast experiences within the field, as well seeing day to day what is going on within the industry, allows for first hand experiences to be explored. Furthermore, seeking Athlete Representative views, as they are embedded in the system and directly affected by the rules and regulations in place in the integrity system, allows for insight from sports' main stakeholder. Gaining both these perspectives will aid with mapping out the current landscape, and as directed by Chappell (2014a) hearing real-life experiences supports the ethical insights and analysis throughout this thesis. Critical realism also allowed for greater detail to be accessed than what is seen on the surface.

Presently, there is a lack of research into the function of integrity organisations and what they are and should be doing. The research in this thesis provides an insight into this area, setting out the current integrity landscape, and offering suggestions about the direction it should take.

In this chapter, first participant responses are presented on the function of integrity organisations. Next, participant thoughts on what is going well within integrity, and what could be improved are outlined. Then, the key challenges facing integrity organisations are highlighted. These include: trust, resources, powers and evidence. Based on participant responses and the analysis within, this chapter suggests: integrity organisations should explore remits of integrity beyond just anti-doping; athlete voice should be strengthened within the current integrity system; intelligence and investigations could help improve the integrity system.

4.2 The Function of Integrity Organisations

4.2.1 Participant Responses

During interviews, participants were asked what they thought the functions of integrity organisations in sport were. Varying functions were described. In order to protect the anonymity

of the participants, their quotes have been summarised for the following section and not attributed so as not to identify them.

Participants who worked at NADOs detailed their functions in relation to anti-doping. One Integrity Officer stated that their NADO looks after all anti-doping related things in their country. This includes testing programmes, providing education, working as a point of contact between WADA and the country government. Another Integrity Officer described how they are responsible for the anti-doping policies in their location, working with the government, the Olympic Committee and national federations. They explained that they mainly focused on competitive athletes, but also do work with recreational athletes too. They also noted the obligations they have as a NADO that are stated by the World Anti-Doping Agency. Another Integrity Officer also noted that their organisation existed to carry out the provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code, including education, testing and monitoring. They summarised the function of their organisation as going after athletes who allegedly violated the 11 anti-doping rules.

An Integrity Officer who worked for an organisation who offered integrity services to sports detailed what they do, stating that they have a large global workforce with many languages. They highlighted their access to tools and techniques to uncover integrity issues in sport and stated that their pitch to sports would be that setting up an integrity unit in a federation is very expensive as they would have to hire staff and tools, whereas they could ask the participant's organisation when they needed help and they already had everything needed ready to go. The organisation could launch investigations globally, including interviews, surveillance, working with human sources and mobile phone analysis (a power later discussed in depth in this thesis). They also conduct work online such as open-source research. They stressed that all of the work offered is very much within the legal framework of the country and the limitations of what each sport allows in their rules.

Integrity organisations that focused on integrity issues beyond just anti-doping had different responses from participants. One Integrity Officer stated that the two main pillars of their organisation were currently anti-doping and anti-corruption, and the function of the organisation was to ensure integrity of the sport under those two pillars. Another Integrity Officer stated that the function of their organisation was to uphold and protect the integrity of their sport. They went on to explain that if there were violations that broke the rules of their

sport, then it was their job to investigate and prosecute people. They also noted that their job was to improve and protect their sport, and to make it harder for people to cheat and violate the integrity of the sport.

Another Integrity Officer stated that the broad aim of their organisation was to ensure sport is conducted on a level playing field and with integrity, and the main aim of that is to ensure that the spectator and fan confidence in the sport is continued, because without integrity in the sport you have no interest from fans and spectators. They stated that they thought there was a top line about maintaining fairness, a level playing field and integrity to ensure the confidence of the public that a sport is run fairly. A different Integrity Officer stated that the function of an integrity organisation is to keep sport fair, clean and safe, and that overarches all the integrity elements that they have in the unit.

Another Integrity Officer stated that an integrity organisation is there to safeguard sport in its broadest sense from whatever the 'attack'. They suggested the attack to an organisation could be corruption or doping and that it also includes safeguarding and the administration of sport, as well as the competition side. Overall, they stated it was to ensure no malfeasance in sport and while different integrity setups have different rules and responsibilities, broadly speaking, they are there to safeguard the sports.

As apparent from the participants' responses, there are varying types of integrity organisations, with differing functions. Integrity Officer 12 offered an explanation about the different types of organisations, saying:

'There are three governance models for integrity start-ups in sport... [one is] everything in the pyramid, integrity is managed inside the Federation or the organisation by an integrity team, but it is not in any way independent of the functions of the organisation so ultimately the competition side and the commercial side reports up the chain and at some point, they meet with one person and that person therefore has an inherent conflict interest between commercial and competition dynamics and integrity dynamics. So I am firmly of the view that that model is not a good model... [two is] a unit model...which are notionally operationally independent. They might have a supervising board. They may have a degree of separation of buildings and access and things like that, but they are legally

not independent of the sport, so the people who work there are still employed by the governing body and legally it's still governing bodies that charge the players. And then finally we have [the third model which is] legally independent of the sport, its own legal personality and it has its own board and it takes a decision on who to charge, when to charge, what charges to bring and so on' (IO12).

An example of the first model would be rugby, who manage integrity within the federation and do not have a separate organisation for it (World Rugby, 2024). An example of the second model is the Athletics Integrity Unit, who have some separation from World Athletics, but are not fully independent from the governing body (AIU, 2020a). An example of the third model is the International Tennis Integrity Unit, which is legally independent of the sport (ITIA, 2024).

As shown in this research, integrity organisations have varying functions, which largely depends on the remit of the organisation and which integrity issues they address. NADOs focus solely on anti-doping, with particular focus on anti-doping testing and education, uncovering the 11 ADRVs detailed in the WADA Code, and relationships with other organisations such as governments, other integrity organisations and WADA, the latter of whom with NADOs must liaise with to fulfil their obligations under WADA rules and regulations to maintain compliant. Other integrity organisations have the remit to focus on wider integrity issues, including corruption, sport manipulation, abuse and harassment. The main functions of integrity organisations are to uphold the integrity of sport, to investigate and sanction integrity violations, to improve and protect sport. Other functions include ensuring fairness and a level playing field in sport and a safe environment. A key concept highlighted is the need to safeguard sport from integrity threats.

Athlete Representatives also offered their views on what integrity organisation functions should be. Athletes are directly affected by integrity organisations, therefore, it is vital that they are listened to and their views are considered. Athlete Representative four stated:

‘The main function [of integrity organisations] should be consistency and visibility. It's no good having an anti-doping agency that turns up two weeks a year and does a great big flurry of stuff two weeks a year because no - athletes aren't stupid, and I'm not saying that all athletes are trying to con the system either... I think consistency and visibility are there to help the honest athlete to remind them that

they need to be there. But it's also there to help the honest athlete in terms of if you get a situation where in a sport somebody knows that the only time somebody will turn up is in the championship final, and you know your team is not going to make it to the championship final, so why would you bother?... So you need to have that consistency. And the visibility is really important. It's important for me as an athlete to be able to turn round and say anybody who competes with me knows the system I come out of is reliable' (AR4).

This Athlete Representative highlights the importance that athletes place on key factors such as consistency and visibility. The importance of being able to prove they are clean is cited and this relies on integrity organisations being reliable and having a proven track record of acting with integrity. Athlete Representative three acknowledged that differences between organisations affects their functions, stating that they preferred to see organisations who had a wider remit to cover all integrity issues, 'From my personal perspective I prefer to see something like the AIU because I think it's far more all-encompassing... there's a lot more going on than just anti-doping... So for me I'd love to see [anti-doping organisations] go that direction... it depends on their remit they've got is the short answer' (AR3).

While anti-doping is a key integrity threat facing sport, as mentioned throughout this thesis, there are other integrity issues that also require attention. Integrity organisations that have wider remits than just anti-doping can benefit from shared resources and knowledge. However, barriers to this include funding and resources, which are discussed in more depth throughout this thesis.

Athlete Representative one shared their view that integrity organisations have strengths and weaknesses, saying 'They're [integrity organisations] multifaceted, and that's part of their genius and part of the issues that they face' (AR1).

Athlete Representatives assess the function of integrity organisations as wide ranging. A preference is seen for a broader remit, covering all integrity issues, to be more encompassing and to tackle more integrity threats than just anti-doping. This is because there are integrity issues beyond just doping which affect athletes and sport, as these currently have less attention within sports integrity. For example, every country has a NADO, but not every country has a dedicated body to handle other integrity issues, nor is there a global integrity body at present.

Athletes highlight the need for organisations to be consistent, visible and transparent in order to both catch those who are committing integrity violations, but also to help clean athletes, both by keeping their sport free from integrity issues and to show that they are part of a transparent system and can prove their own commitment to clean sport.

While the expansion of anti-doping organisations into more integrity issues would undoubtedly be a good thing - the more integrity issues being combated the better - whether it is NADOs that should be responsible for this is up for debate. NADOs already have vast workloads, with Integrity Officers in this research noting that their obligations and workloads are increasing over time. Moreover, it was noted by some Integrity Officers that smaller NADOs are already struggling with their obligations and resources. Increasing workload for NADOs, many of whom already are working to tight budgets and are feeling pressure on resources, may not be the solution. Instead, ways to combat other integrity issues may have to be sought elsewhere. This could include more sports and/or countries setting up dedicated integrity units that are equipped to handle integrity issues, with specially trained staff and resources to handle this. Examples of these include Sports Integrity Australia and the Finnish Centre for Integrity in Sports. However, as resources are already a challenge for current integrity organisations, more needs to be done to address this and find workable solutions. Gaining buy-in from sport governing bodies and from those who fund integrity operations is key. Educating senior officials in the sport about the dangers of integrity issues, and the consequences of not taking the threats seriously, such as losing fan and sponsor engagement, is needed. Furthermore, work to ensure that smaller integrity organisations and organisations who have historically struggled for funding are appropriately equipped is needed to ensure that sports integrity is on a level footing globally. This thesis recognises the immense challenge that this poses, and the enormous time and resources this will take.

Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives have described a number of functions of integrity units, with a key focus on protecting sport from integrity issues. Next, what is going well and what could be improved will be explored.

4.3 What is Going Well and What Could Be Improved?

Athlete Representatives shared their thoughts on what integrity organisations are doing well. When asked in the interview if there were things that integrity organisations were doing well, Athlete Representative Three answered, 'Yes is the short answer' (AR3).

Athlete Representative One shared their thoughts:

‘There’s a lot that they [integrity organisations] are doing well... I think we are doing as a community I think we're doing a pretty decent job of catching cheaters. I think there's always more work that can be done... I think education has changed drastically in the last seven years. It's got much better. It's a lot more available. It's becoming much more professional, and by that I mean driven by people that know education, and so that makes it more relevant and more available and accessible... Targeted testing, we used to just test for numbers, well we've got to do 100 tests, let's just randomly test 100 people. It's a lot more targeted. It's a lot more intelligent’ (AR1).

In line with this response, anti-doping education has changed in recent times. In 2021, the first WADA International Standard for Education came into effect, aiding ADOs to develop their education programs and allowing WADA to regulate anti-doping education policy (WADA, 2021e). The introduction of this International Standard meant that integrity organisations enhanced their anti-doping education work to meet WADA requirements, and education budgets increased due to this (Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, 2023). However, despite this Athlete Representative stating that the system was doing well at catching cheaters, positive doping tests remain low, with WADA 2022 testing figures at 0.77% (WADA, 2024a). This was an issue highlighted by another Athlete Representative: ‘I think there are flaws. The prevalence thing is interesting because when I was looking at it you get about a 2% positive rate on tests. I don't think anyone believes that there's only 2% of professional athletes are using [drugs], so the cynicism about what the anti-doping is doing is probably in some ways that there's an element of truth in it’ (AR4).

Integrity Officer Seven also raised an issue with the low numbers of positive tests within the anti-doping system:

‘We talk about 0.65%, something like that, that's an AAF meaning that it's just that a substance is found in the body. It doesn't mean that it's an ADRV, if you look into ADRVs then actually you talk about 0.3%. So what you are saying is if you - if I

give you 120 million, which is around what costs 240,000 tests per year. I give you 120 million and then you come back and say I have a strategy perfect plan for 120 million I catch 0.3%. I think you would find no boss in the world who would say that's actually really good, go ahead with it. Then there was the discussion: does it mean that perhaps we don't have so many dopers, perhaps it works that with the tests there is a deterrent of doping? But there are studies that say at least that we have around 20 to 30, I mean it varies, but at least more than 0.1 or 0.3%, therefore we have a gap. So how can we solve the gap?' (IO7).

The issue of low numbers of athletes being uncovered as doping, despite higher suggestions by previous literature and participants in this research will be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis.

Athlete Representative Five stated their views on the structures within the integrity system and how these could be harmful, saying 'The burdens of proof when it comes to sports, they're not the same as in criminal justice. So you can have a code, a code of conduct, a code of ethics, anything that should be built with the participation of affected people so you're able to properly sanction people, and those investigations, they must be done in a respectful way. That's what I don't see' (AR5).

This highlights the position that athletes can find themselves in in the integrity system, with burdens of proof that can be at lower thresholds than in the criminal justice system. Athletes are considered guilty until they can prove they are innocent when they are charged with an ADRV. In most cases in the criminal system, the accused are innocent until proven guilty. However, there are some situations where this reversal of presumption of innocence applied within legal proceedings, such as traffic offences like speeding (Brown, 2023). The 2021 WADC states that the standard of proof is 'comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made. This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt' (WADA 2019a, p. 26).

The former President of the European Elite Athletes Association Yves Kummer once summarised the issue of burdens of proof within the anti-doping system by stating 'paedophiles and criminals on probation have more rights than athletes' (Kummer, 2009). One reason the

rules are written in this way is due to the principle of strict liability. Within the WADC, strict liability is defined as ‘The rule which provides that under Article 2.1 and Article 2.2, it is not necessary that intent, Fault, Negligence, or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be demonstrated by the Anti-Doping Organization in order to establish an anti-doping rule violation’ (WADA, 2019a, p. 176). Strict liability ensures that athletes are held responsible for substances found in their system. For Articles 2.3-2.11, the anti-doping organisation would have to have sufficient evidence that an ADRV has occurred before they charged the accused. When a doping control test shows that an athlete has a prohibited substance in their sample, then this provides proof that the athlete has ingested a prohibited substance – knowingly or not. This means that there is potential for them to benefit from any performance enhancement benefits of this substance, as well as potentially damage their health and violate the spirit of sport – the three key reasons substances and methods are banned. Without strict liability, it would be difficult for integrity organisations to prove that an athlete has intentionally doped without further evidence than the doping control test. Athletes could simply claim they did not know how a prohibited substance was found in their sample. However, the doping control test provides evidence that an athlete has a prohibited substance in their sample. If this was unintentional, then they need to prove how this was the case. While the principle can appear harsh, it appears the best option to sanction doping, as without it, it would be incredibly difficult for integrity organisations to ever sanction any athletes for doping. Regardless of how a prohibited substance got into an athlete’s sample, intentional or not, there is still a strong likelihood that they will benefit from some performance enhancing benefits that gives them an unfair advantage over clean athletes. Furthermore, an ADRV does not always equate to a sanction. For example, in June 2024, USADA announced that track and field athlete Erriyon Knighton received no period of ineligibility after a positive test, accepting the explanation of contaminated meat (USADA, 2024).

Some Athlete Representatives noted concerns with the integrity system and how it could be applied differently globally. One suggested that relationships between athletes and integrity organisations could be conflicted, before stating that if they catch people committing integrity issues then there is and should be a conflict there:

‘There were a lot of other countries that I’ve come across, where I would have shared training camps with and things like that with them, [athletes from other countries] they’re very much like we return one hour [for whereabouts information]

and I don't think that works really well for the athletes or for the agency. In the [anti-doping] agency I think it's good for them to have a better relationship with them, and it's less adversarial' (AR4).

Within this Athlete Representative's response, they suggest that athletes from other countries do not take their anti-doping responsibilities as seriously as themselves and athletes from their own country. They state that improving athlete and anti-doping agency relationships could improve the system for both parties.

The concern that the integrity system is not applied consistently globally was echoed by Athlete Representative One:

'I'm really supportive of the idea of having a universal system and applying it fairly to athletes all over the world. But obviously not every athlete in the world is treated in exactly the same way, it changes from country to country, from sport to sport. Whether you're a high-performance athlete or a recreational, all these things sort of get thrown into the mix. And so then, when it drops down to sports, in their anti-doping programs, or to NADOs and their anti-doping programs, obviously I think they should be bringing those rules to play. They need to be applying those rules. They need to be making sure that we're working or that they're working for clean sport, that we're discouraging people from cheating, that we're educating athletes, so that they know the rules, and they can make the best decisions possible. But you also, unfortunately, you want them out there catching cheaters. There's always going to be a small percentage of athletes that are going to break the rules. And so you want your anti-doping agencies to be out there testing athletes, nowadays investigating and making sure that the people that are in it for the wrong reasons, and trying to get ahead, not on an even playing field, are being caught' (AR1).

Athlete Representative One also raised opinions on global differences, acknowledging reasons why the system might differ:

'In different parts of the world, athletes are still able to come from those parts of the world, turn up at major events and excel, and then sort of disappear, and it's life changing for them, no doubt. And the issue is that for us athletes, and you know for

me, anti-doping might be a really big issue. But when you come from a poor country, having one podium finish with prize money can change your life. And you're not going back to a country maybe with a social welfare system and so there's all these different priorities and pushes and pulls on athletes around the world that make athletes vulnerable and make the opportunities that come out of winning immensely rewarding' (AR1).

Athlete Representatives stating concerns that the integrity system is not universal echoes a concern raised in previous research that whereabouts is not working effectively globally (Efverström et al., 2016). This concern was reiterated in research by Overbye (2016) where athletes thought that the testing system in other countries was unprofessional, not frequent enough, and allow athletes who were doping to go unpunished. Furthermore, US athletes considered anti-doping programs outside of the US to be less effective in one study (USADA, 2017), and another study found British athletes viewed testing as less stringent in countries other than their own (Bloodworth & McNamee, 2010). Duiven et al's study (2015) stated that some Dutch elite athletes questioned the integrity of the anti-doping system outside of the Netherlands. More work could be done within the anti-doping system in order to ensure that policies and regulations are harmonised. In order to increase perceived legitimacy of the anti-doping system, athletes want to know that others they are competing against are tested as frequently as they are. Organisations working together to increase capacity of nations and sports that are struggling with their ability to test athletes, by increasing knowledge but also sharing how they access resources and funds could aid with this. Furthermore, transparency of the testing processes such as publishing statistics on how many athletes from different countries are tested could aid with this. One Integrity Officer shared their view that integrity organisations should work together more in this way, saying 'Ultimately, anti-doping is a team game. From a [country] perspective, [redacted] funds us. I can spend that wherever I like, and what I mean is, I can justify spending that in [another country], on [another country's athletes], because if we can get [another country's athletes] clean then [Integrity Officer's country] athletes benefit, because we compete against them all the time' (IO14).

Athlete Representative One acknowledged that despite some things being done well, others need improvement, 'I think there are a lot of good things that are happening but it's always a system that needs to be improved... across the board' (AR1). They further elaborated on this by saying:

‘I think if you look at any part of anti-doping it needs to be improved...I think sometimes it's little things, and sometimes something catastrophic goes wrong, and it's a big thing that needs to change... The Russian saga hit the headlines in 2015 and that really moved the whole thing around signatory compliance and Code compliance, and that really fast forwarded all that like bringing investigations online, the importance of having independent investigations, the importance of being able to investigate and not just having anti-doping investigations... There's good and there's bad and it just needs to be watched over, it needs to have a balance, and it needs to be regulated’ (AR1).

This highlights the balance that needs to be struck in the integrity system, a common theme throughout this research. Furthermore, a sentiment raised throughout interviews is the fact that the integrity system often waits for a crisis (such as the Russian doping scandal or the gymnastics abuse scandal) before change is implemented. This has also been seen more recently - in March 2024 WADA stated that they wanted anti-doping rules to be updated to allow for further powers to investigate athlete support personnel, following the case that saw Kamila Valieva receive a four-year ban after testing positive for a banned substance aged 15. Despite being a minor at the time of the positive test, she currently remains the only person sanctioned in this case (Sport Resolutions, 2024).

Athlete Representative Five expressed concerns that people who are harmed by integrity issues aren't being supported:

‘When you sanction a perpetrator, this is very important. But it doesn't mean that you're providing justice to the people that were harmed or that you're dismantling the violent environment. So from what I see when it comes to safeguarding, they don't engage people in the process, and when they do, it's based on tokenism like he was the survivor, share your story, and that's it’ (AR5).

Athlete Representative five offered their suggestions on what could be done to improve the system:

‘What is lacking is remedy, like no one profits from disclosing the case of harassment and abuse. It's the opposite. We lose money because we need to pay for lawyers. We need to pay for psychological treatment. We stop training. And if we have a sponsor, we lose the sponsor. So financial compensation needs to be considered as well’ (AR5).

Athlete Representative Four highlighted the need for support for athletes in the system due to the complexities involved:

‘There does need to be something there for an athlete so that they can turn round and go ‘okay can I talk to somebody? Is there somebody I can talk to?’ Because there are complexities in the system... I think it would be a good thing if people have a place to go to get sort of non-judgmental advice to help them out’ (AR4).

Athlete Representative Five offered further suggestions:

‘I think there are a lot of things that we can do, like be open to criticism, bring affected people, like people who are affected by the anti-doping, people who are affected by harassment and abuse, people who are affected by match fixing because to consider that someone's going fix the match just because they want to make money. It's not just that, it's not as simple. And that's when it comes also we need to start from the marginalised. So we need to bring minorities like disabled people, LBGTQ people, gender equity, it all works together... I don't think that no one has the solution yet. But there are ways and also cross-sector learning that we should do, in order to try to come up with something. One thing that we have been noticing with the [redacted] is that those safe sport units and integrity units, they understand that what they should do is investigating and sanctioning, and sometimes for prevention. So when you try to talk to them about remedy and trauma-informed and support and so on, it's almost like they close the door’ (AR5).

These responses call for involving people affected by integrity issues more in the integrity system. Listening to these voices gains their perspectives and could improve the system by using their experiences to ensure they are better supported and understand the reality of those affected. Cross sector learning is also highlighted as a way to learn more about what works in

other fields, and to bring those techniques to integrity. As integrity in sport is a relatively new field, with WADA only being created 25 years ago, using the expertise of others could enhance integrity. This Athlete Representative also highlights that some organisations are unwilling to work with them to provide solutions to people affected by integrity issues, which is a key concern from an athlete rights standpoint and further work on how to rectify this should be done.

Athlete Representatives in this research have highlighted aspects of the integrity system that they think are working well. These include integrity education becoming more relevant, available and accessible, catching those who are committing integrity violations, and targeted testing and intelligence. Athlete Representatives also suggested aspects where the integrity system could be improved. Support for athletes affected by integrity violations needs to be improved, including remedies such as financial support and advice about the complexities of the integrity system. Issues around burdens of proof, and the rules and regulations used to sanction those who commit integrity violations also concern athletes.

A particular concern surrounds the global differences in integrity issues, with Athlete Representatives raising concerns that not all athletes are treated the same way in the integrity system globally. Previous research has called for a more harmonised integrity system. This included calls for international harmonisation of anti-doping policy (Woolway et al., 2020), as well as a need for anti-doping organisations to be able to share anti-doping knowledge more effectively (Marclay et al., 2013). The IOC has also stated that sanctions for integrity breaches need to be harmonised (IOC, 2018) e.g., across countries and organisations. Consistency across sports is also suggested, which could be facilitated by uniform regulations and sanctions (Kuwelker et al, 2022). However, a key challenge to this is local laws, regulations and customs which all affect which rules can be implemented.

Suggestions to improve the integrity system for athletes include bringing people affected by integrity issues and minority groups together to facilitate cross-sector learning, as well as listening to experts in the field. Ways to catch more people who are cheating, including improving the number of athletes caught doping, would also improve the system for athletes to ensure sport with less integrity issues.

The research in this thesis offers further parallels with previous literature. Efverström et al. (2016) stated challenges athletes within the anti-doping system faced. These challenges include difficulties submitting their whereabouts information, concerns about being unavailable for testing based on their whereabouts information and feeling monitored due to the whereabouts system. Additionally, athletes cited concerns with their privacy when providing doping samples, and that athletes who doped were going unpunished (Efverström et al., 2016). These privacy concerns appear justified when the nature of anti-doping control tests is considered, as they involve a doping control officer or chaperone having to witness the athlete provide a urine sample (WADA, 2024b), ergo a level of privacy is compromised. However, for anti-doping tests to effectively operate, a breach of athlete privacy is needed e.g., to ensure samples aren't tampered with. Concerns that athletes who dope are going unpunished are more difficult to verify. It is currently unknown exactly how many athletes are doping, however, the fact that athletes feel as if more are doping than are being caught highlights an issue within the system.

Athlete Representative Two shared their thoughts on how the integrity system could be improved, providing an example of where listening to athlete voice has led to positive changes for athletes:

‘I think the first thing is hearing the athletes' experience... By hearing the athlete experience, I really mean the whole athlete community, not only handpicked selected representatives of athletes in terms of the athlete commission for example, that is created at WADA and the IOC, and also those who have chosen to exercise the right to organise and have chosen to be represented through a union, and that hasn't happened so far, and I think that is a huge gap in sports governance’ (AR2).

As evidenced by the above quote, Athlete Representatives see athlete commissions as a positive step to allow athlete voice to be heard. A further suggestion is athlete unions and that they could aid athletes. However, while there are currently many athlete panels and commissions set up, their effectiveness is questionable. One Athlete Representative said, ‘Some of the other commission members wouldn't do anything’ (AR3). Effective ways to engage athletes and have their voice heard are needed. Other participants also called for athletes to be represented within sports integrity. Integrity Officer 11 acknowledged the need to listen to athletes: ‘The solution here of course is always look from an athlete point of view, and as such to engage with athletes, with Athlete Representatives et cetera and that's the current theme for a few years already, to

improve the athletes voice' (IO11). However, this will only work if integrity organisations work with and listen to athlete trade unions. A project titled Strengthening Athlete Power in Sport (SAPiS) (2023) found from a survey of Athlete Representatives, between 15 and 20% shared that they are not formally involved in decision-making processes within the organisation for which they represent athletes, they are unable to propose their ideas and agendas, are not provided with decision making process information, and they are not able to appeal policies, rules or decisions that affect athletes directly. Furthermore, involving athletes within decision making processes cannot guarantee that athletes can influence policy (SAPiS, 2023).

Integrity Officer 15 also highlighted the importance of listening to athletes, and they outline the issues they saw with the current integrity system, offering their perspective on how to improve the system:

‘We all know what they [integrity organisations] do, but it's not what they should be doing, in my opinion, at least... When I think of anti-doping, something that is being against something. I would think that instead of just going after something, allowing something to happen and then going after people that are doing that, we should be creating the material conditions for that not to happen. I think this is what being against something should be and that would go through obviously reviewing the kinds of substances that are prohibited, educating athletes, taking their lived realities into consideration. Because let's take the cross-contamination cases for example, you have most of these organisations, the NADOs and now the IFs, the coaches, NGBs, everyone knows that anyone out can be testing positive because of a contaminated supplement is going to tell the athletes, just don't take supplements. Just don't take anything. But we know how difficult it is for you to get all the nutrients, all the calories depending on the sport, how hard you're training, how your body works so athletes do take supplements. So it's not the athletes that need to change their routines and their realities to avoid something like this, I think the system has to adapt to make their lives easier in a way. Of course, we don't want them to cheat the sport, or to win something not in a legitimate way. But also, I don't think we need to be making their lives so difficult as we are right now’ (IO15).

Both Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives state that listening to athletes is vital. This includes taking athletes’ realities into consideration. Listening to athlete voice, hearing how

they and others are affected by the integrity system, is necessary to its improvement. Athletes are the people who are most directly affected by the integrity system. They must abide by the rules in order to participate in sport. Therefore, work needs to be done to incorporate their voice and views to be reflected in policy. This research shows that athletes have concerns, and these concerns need to be understood and discussed by those working in integrity organisations. However, the key function of integrity organisations must be remembered in these discussions and that is to protect sport from integrity threats. This in turn protects athletes from integrity threats and ensures that they can compete in sport that is free from integrity threat. Therefore, some athlete views may have to be ignored in order to achieve this - it may not be possible to both listen to athletes completely and keep sport free from integrity threats. For example, athletes in the past have spoken out against the whereabouts system, where they must provide their location for one hour a day, every day, and have stated privacy concerns with this (Efverström et al., 2016). However, the alternative to the whereabouts system would be that there would be athletes who would not be tested outside of competition as if integrity organisations did not know where they were, then it would be a lot harder to test them. Alternatively, integrity organisations could go in the other direction, and ask athletes to share their location via GPS rather than manually report, which could raise more privacy issues. Both scenarios appear worse than the current whereabouts system. Additionally, while the whereabouts system can appear unfair, it reasonably appears to be the best solution we have for testing athletes outside of competition. In this case, athlete concerns and unhappiness with the whereabouts system is the price they have to pay for out of competition testing and competing in cleaner sport. Consideration must go to the athlete voice, but not at all costs. Thought also has to be given to have best to protect sport from integrity threats, which will in turn help athletes by allowing for safe and clean sport. A large problem stemming from this reasoning comes from athlete concerns that despite privacy worries and invasive methods such as demands for their personal devices and information, integrity organisations are still failing to catch those who are committing integrity violations. As previously mentioned in this thesis, within anti-doping, testing numbers appear lower than the numbers who are suspected to be doping at the elite level, suggesting that integrity organisations are failing to catch a large percentage of dopers. Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives in this research also both highlight low positive test numbers in anti-doping to be an issue, arguing that it is common knowledge that the numbers of athletes doping are in fact higher than the positive test figures reflect. The need to catch more people doping than the system currently does is vital. Not just testing for numbers is highlighted as a solution, with methods such as intelligence-led testing

and investigations cited as an alternative. Furthermore, other integrity issues within sport persist, with athletes still facing abuse and harassment, and competition manipulation a key threat to sport. If invasive methods that athletes do not agree with are in place and yet wrongdoing is going unpunished, then athletes have a right to be frustrated with the system and to demand better for themselves. Work needs to be done to make the integrity system more efficient at catching wrongdoing, while listening to athletes' concerns and working with them to improve the system. Using intelligence and investigations within integrity could be a solution to some of the issues noted. This will be further explored later in this thesis. On this issue, a balance ought to be struck, and athletes' views sought and considered. It is suggested that the current integrity system is assessed, that athlete views are taken into consideration, and policies are implemented based on a balance of athletes' views and the goal of sport free from integrity issues.

Integrity Officer Seven raised an issue with testing within the anti-doping system:

'The problem with testing is that it's very transparent so everyone knows exactly when to get tested, when I can expect to get tested, and nowadays, with all the doctors they can arrange in a way that you go under the radar of testing, of positive testing results' (IO7).

This suggests that new ways to implement testing procedures should be explored. Newer ideas such as intelligence led testing could be one way that this is done. This is further outlined by Integrity Officer three who highlighted issues that need solving, and offered suggestions for improvement:

'You've got a lot of benefits from the deterrent elements of providing [doping] samples. But actually we need to take a more measured approach to it. So, collecting intelligence, how can we crack the nut? Well maybe one of the solutions would be that we for example, if you came to my office said, 'look, [name], I'm an athlete I've been doping the last 3 years. I want to tell you about it, the individuals that encouraged me to do this, the pressure that I'm under to take the substance. I want to get out of this cycle, but I can't do it because I'm stuck in it and I'll lose my sponsor.' So currently if somebody says that to me the rules say, the WADA rules say that I've got to say, 'right. Okay, well give us all the information, and instead

of getting a 4 year, I'll try and get substantial assistance. You'll get a two-year ban but everyone will probably know that you're given substantial assistance because you'll get a two-year ban and you still going to get banned. So are you still happy to come in next time, are your friends happy to come in and give me information as well?' Of course not. Who the hell in their right mind is going to do that? So conversely, you end up in this same situation where we become quite limited, really, in our ability to collect intelligence in that particular area. So we're just looking at other violations, other potential rule violations outside of doping within our sport, where maybe we could start to utilise that system more, where we could potentially identify an offender and approach them and say, right, we've got evidence in relation to that... But ultimately the reason why I want to get this conversation going globally is that if we joined up a little bit more, joined forces, then we could invest in having a separate entity of some description that could potentially start to collect intelligence and then feed it out to the community' (IO3).

Ways of working with athletes who want to report their own part in wrongdoing should be explored, as Integrity Officers expressed concerns that they do not currently have meaningful incentives to do so, as this would still see them heavily sanctioned e.g., a small reduction in sentence and public disclosure of their sanction. This has been echoed by WADA, who have expressed the wish to further explore ways to protect the anonymity of those who provide substantial assistance, as currently their sanctions still have to be made publicly available, and a reduction can indicate that they have provided information (Rowbottom, 2021). Athletes have supported the idea of facilitating further ways to protect those who report wrongdoing (Barkoukis et al., 2021) but more work is needed to ensure this (Rowbottom, 2021). However, it is not immediately clear how this could be done. An issue raised was that someone who has committed an integrity offence, but no longer wants to be involved in it, cannot easily break the cycle by reporting it to an integrity organisation and giving information such as others who have been facilitating the wrongdoing, without getting a large sanction themselves. For example, someone who has been doping but no longer wants to, cannot tell their NADO about this and provide the names of who dealt them the drugs, who taught them how to dope, who introduced them to the idea, who else they know doing this, without implicating themselves. If they anonymously provide the information, it is treated with less regard by Integrity Officers and the sanction against those who have committed wrongdoing is harder to prove. Also, if they named someone e.g., their coach, it is likely that integrity organisations would use this

intelligence to inform anti-doping testing and so that coach's athletes could get tested as result, which could lead to the reporting person being tested as a result of their own intelligence. Additionally, those who do blow the whistle can face their own sanctions, such as in the case of Steve Magness, who alerted USADA to the ADRVs of Alberto Salazar (USADA, 2019; WADA, 2021h). When this came to light, WADA encouraged USADA to charge Magness with his own ADRVs, something USADA resisted doing. However, it could be argued that those who commit wrongdoing should be sanctioned for their actions. But, if an athlete has been coerced into doping for example, how much responsibility should they hold? Here, work needs to be done to ascertain whether a balance can be struck between encouraging people to come forward with information about integrity violations, particularly with information that can help wider personnel beyond the athletes e.g., those facilitating and encouraging the doping, and sanctioning all those who commit integrity breaches. One way to combat the difficulties in this area could be allowing for reporting persons and their sanctions to remain anonymous. Currently if someone gets substantial assistance, then their own sanction is reduced and it is obvious that they have provided assistance, which is a deterrent for many who do not want others to know they have reported due to the fear of repercussions. However, not disclosing sanctions for those who have provided assistance poses an issue, as the integrity system should strive for transparency, and this is vital to gain athlete and other stakeholder trust, and so not disclosing sanctions could harm this. Here, reporting persons' trust has to be balanced against the trust of the system.

Integrity Officer 15 highlighted disparities in the integrity system that they saw existed between organisations:

‘[Small integrity organisation] doesn't have as much political power when it comes to WADA. So because [large integrity organisation] is [a big contributor] financially, because of that, they can afford to criticise WADA, to stand up for what they believe sometimes, and that makes them stronger. That makes them a little bit more autonomous in a way... But with [small integrity organisation] what I remember was that everything that the organisation was doing was just trying to remain in compliance. So obviously, you have a system that was developed having very specific countries in mind. And now that they just came up with this blanket policy that a lot of countries in the global South, or even smaller countries in Europe, Asia, and other countries, even North America, they now just have to

struggle to implement [the WADA Code], and if they don't, they just get suspended. And what I've noticed talking to people in smaller organisations is that they are all the time just trying to do things so WADA is happy. They don't have enough time, energy, and resources, or personnel, to just question the things that are not working for them. They're not given the freedom to try and come up with a program, an anti-doping program that makes sense to their realities, their geography, and all those things. And they don't have a voice in the decision-making processes. You'd be surprised by how many times we'd sent questions, suggestions and they are just disregarded. They're never taken into consideration, WADA will just do what they want to do. And yeah, we just have to accept. And that is very sad' (IO15).

This raises an important point about the differences between integrity organisations. As each organisation will get their funding from different sources, this means that there can be huge disparities between the budgets that organisations are operating on. This can affect aspects such as how many people they can hire and the talent they can attract based on the salaries they are able to offer. Inevitably, this will affect the volume and quality of work they are able to do.

Integrity Officer One was also critical of the current integrity system and the frameworks:

'The overall international anti-doping system is almost not fit for purpose. It's extremely clunky, extremely unthoughtful and way behind the curve in what athletes can do, and can take, and how they can take whatever they're doing, taking, using a substance, very, very far behind the Code. And trying to squeeze the best possible anti-doping approach to our athletes out of a system which is almost nearly not fit for purpose is extremely challenging... There are no overarching international bodies for integrity related themes and matters in sport. And so this is left to international federations to deal with. Some more are rising up to the idea of integrity organisations...What is the sanctioning frameworks for the manipulation of competitions, for sexual abuse, for age manipulation, for technical cheating?... Anti-doping has long, for over 20 years, had a functioning framework which everybody understands. And the temptation is to migrate what we do in anti-doping, we will migrate to other integrity things when we have a prosecution. That's not necessarily the right answer' (IO1).

This response highlights a call for further regulation that could unify the way integrity issues beyond anti-doping are dealt with. Unifying such matters could contribute to a leveller global playing field, something Athlete Representatives in this research have called for. Steps already taken by integrity organisations to tackle issues beyond just doping, such as sport competition manipulation, include forming specialist integrity units to investigate and sanction wrongdoing, running programs for athletes to educate them on the dangers of integrity issues, and making integrity issues disciplinary offences in their rules and regulations (Serby, 2015). While these are positive steps, the research in this thesis suggests there are areas for improvement. Moreover, critics of WADA, such as Møller (2016), suggest that the low number of athletes caught doping indicates that harmonisation and equality that WADA strives for are not achieved. However, the paper does acknowledge that it does not account for the challenges, obstacles and difficulties that staff at anti-doping organisations deal with on a day-to-day basis (Møller, 2016). This is a gap in the literature that the research in this thesis is aiming to achieve - that by interviewing those who are working directly within integrity organisations, an account for their realities can be made and analysed.

Integrity Officers in this research also highlighted the need for integrity organisations to work together more, and they express concerns about the different challenges facing small and larger integrity organisations. The anti-doping system not being fit for purpose, with current methods being far behind dopers, was also cited as a concern in this research. This response parallels results from Hard (2009) who argued that anti-doping rules need to be reconsidered and the resources must be used in the most efficient and effective ways possible, being informed by real life experiences (Hard, 2009), which means listening to athletes within the system. Woolway et al. (2020) has also called for increased legitimacy of the anti-doping system for athletes, to make it more effective and equal. They also state that regulations and how they are implemented need to be harmonised globally (Woolway et al., 2020), another finding of the current research in this thesis.

Furthermore, a lack of global framework for sanctioning integrity issues other than doping, with no overarching international bodies, is an issue that requires attention. This suggestion is something that could progress sports integrity and ensure that more wrongdoing is sanctioned. Furthermore, uniting the system globally would ensure fairness and parity across the board and enhance trust for athletes and other stakeholders, who could be certain that their sport, and the competitors from different countries, are subject to the same rules as them. However, as

previously noted, resources and funding are a key opposition to this mission, and without adequate supplies of both, this goal will not become a reality.

Athlete Representatives and Integrity Officers outlined their views and experiences on the current integrity landscape. The next section explores some of the reasons why the landscape might be like this by asking Integrity Officers the challenges they face. This allows this research to take into account the realities Integrity Officers are facing.

4.4 Challenges

In order to enhance understanding of why there are issues within the integrity system, Integrity Officers in this research were asked during their interviews the challenges they faced. While there appears to be much to improve within the integrity system, integrity organisations are battling their own challenges, which may contribute to the issues that the integrity system is facing. The four main challenges identified were: trust, resources, powers and evidence, and these are discussed below.

4.4.1 Trust

Lack of trust in integrity organisations from athletes and others involved in sport was noted by Integrity Officers as a challenge. One Integrity Officer stated: ‘the biggest challenge of all is building trust’ (IO3) and another shared: ‘people don't feel comfortable talking to [integrity organisations]’ (IO15). Integrity Officer Six offered further elaboration: ‘If you look across sports, the participants in the sport can often be quite cynical about the administrators and those who regulate the sport because they're not part of it. But obviously you need that buy-in, that collaboration from the participants in the sport for success in anti-corruption and integrity management. So I think that's probably the key challenge is, how do you get the participants to collaborate and feel that it's really necessary for the health of the sport?’ (IO6). One Integrity Officer also noted the lack of trust from senior individuals in their organisation and the effect it had on them: ‘I think I was probably a little naive not to get a commitment from the senior people to funding the [organisation] correctly... From my perspective it's quite isolating not having the backing of the people at the top’ (IO10).

Integrity Office three also noted a distinct lack of buy-in and the challenges associated with this:

‘We've still got people that don't really see the benefit of having integrity within the sport. So people say, ‘Well yeah but integrity, why do we need to spend this kind of money on integrity? And why do we spend this kind of money on this kind of governance stuff, we don’t really need it. People are all right, getting on and doing the job. We'd rather use the money for the sport.’ They’re thinking more around buying more equipment, getting more media publicity out there. So I think one of the challenges is trying to change that mindset, so that people understand when we say integrity is the foundation of the sport... The fact that if you lose that integrity in the sport, and essentially you lose that concept of competition. You lose that trust. And with that, of course, you lose all the sponsorship deals, you lose your fanbase... To try and get this message across that you need a good governance structure, you need a good integrity capability, I can see why that's really difficult for those people to try and get those things in place’ (IO3)

It was suggested that integrity organisations are seen as the police, with an Integrity Officer explaining: ‘the main challenge we have is that players view us as police’ (IO2) and this was also highlighted by an Athlete Representative who said: ‘they [integrity organisations] are basically seen as the police’ (AR3). Athletes being hesitant to speak out about wrongdoing was highlighted, with one Integrity Officer saying: ‘athletes that will hardly speak out although it is an obligation as per the [organisation] disciplinary regulations [is a challenge]’ (IO9) and another stating: ‘Athletes do not really come out [and report integrity issues]’ (IO4). Integrity Officer 3 offered an explanation into the lack of trust from athletes: ‘an athlete that's performing at any level, but in particular the highest level of the sport internationally, their general feel from our kind of questioning is that if they were to speak to us and that was to get out, that would destroy their career, because people wouldn't trust them and they wouldn’t get support and they'd lose trust. So it's a really big deal for them’ (IO3).

Trust is a key challenge facing Integrity Officers, with athletes and other stakeholders unwilling to talk to Integrity Officers and a lack of buy-in seen across sports integrity, at all levels. Integrity organisations are seen by athletes as the police, and athletes are concerned that by talking to integrity organisations, their careers could suffer and they could lose the trust of others in their sport. Independence and transparency could help to build trust in sports integrity. This parallels research that suggests a key barrier to preventing integrity issues is the unwillingness for participants within sport to speak up about wrongdoing, especially against

members of their own team, and that fear and the risks of reporting led athletes to not report (Moriconi & De Cima, 2020).

One Athlete Representative highlighted how independence and transparency could increase trust: ‘Acknowledging the limitations of independence is super important, no one is 100% independent... Integrity units, they are related to the sports governing bodies to some extent and I don't see that as a problem, as long as they work to get the trust of the community, and they acknowledge the limitations. I think that being transparent is super important’ (AR5). Other Integrity Officers supported this, with one saying: ‘Independence is key’ (IO1), another stating, ‘You need to have some degree of separation from the International Federation’ (IO10), and another highlighted a positive of being independent: ‘This is the good thing with being independent, I can say whatever I want to say’ (IO7).

The lack of independence of some integrity organisations was highlighted by Athlete Representatives and Integrity Officers in this research. Transparency is needed by integrity organisations about how decisions are made and by whom. For example, if integrity operations remain within a governing body, there may be conflicts of interests surrounding integrity issues and other operations such as commercial. Integrity organisations who are operationally independent from sports governance argue that this is a better integrity model. This could also increase trust and help integrity organisations make the best decisions ethically, rather than being influenced by what might be best for the sport. Ensuring a level of independence for integrity functions appears key to combating integrity issues, and in turn could enhance trust in the system.

4.4.2 Resources

Another challenge highlighted by Integrity Officers was access to resources. One Integrity Officer explained: ‘I'd say budget is the biggest one [challenge], people not having the money or investing the money in proper resources, proper people. Pursuing integrity issues can be a very expensive thing’ (IO5), and another stating: ‘Sports integrity units are usually poorly resourced unless there's some injection of investment, usually from a major competition’ (IO6). One Integrity Officer further highlighted the issue: ‘Funding and resources - if I'm not been given the right funding and resources, it's having an indirect impact on what I can do’ (IO10), and another stated: ‘Other challenges are the under resourcing of integrity operations by the

sports, spending the minimum they can get away with if you like whilst taking the revenue' (IO12).

Smaller organisations in particular noted specific challenges, with one Integrity Officer explaining: 'Without having the funding, investigations take a hell of a long time and people are starting to get pretty disillusioned with it and I understand why people make complaints because I have to do investigations, compliance, education, ad hoc advice to different departments, governance matters and I find it very challenging to manage my time and prioritise investigations... I end up spending a lot of my time just apologising, which is not good. And people just constantly threaten to drop charges or go to the media and nobody within the Federation seems to take that seriously, which is problematic' (IO10). Another Integrity Officer highlighted the lack of voice smaller integrity organisations have: 'For the smaller [organisations] the challenge would be that they have smaller budgets and they just have to figure out how to be doing everything that WADA requires them to do, and now it's implementing a new education program... When they were making the ABP module mandatory, [small integrity organisation] does not have a science department. So now they had to go after another [organisation] that would have scientists to be analysing, they were having to hire an external ABPU to look into the athletes' biological passports, but that of course makes communication more difficult, because it's not all in house the way [organisation] can do... it's a lot of small things' (IO15).

Lack of resources is another challenge facing integrity organisations with Integrity Officers citing small budgets and a lack of funding and investments as challenges facing their operations and limiting what they can do. This affects their operations and potential means they are catching less people who are committing integrity violations. This is a particular challenge for small and newer integrity organisations. As noted previously, more work needs to be done to get buy-in from those funding integrity organisations, such as education and awareness campaigns.

4.4.3 Powers

The powers integrity organisations had access to was cited as a challenge. Some Integrity Officers were frustrated with their lack of powers, and others were more satisfied. One Integrity Officer explained: 'There is one major challenge, I think that all investigations or all [organisations] will be facing and that is the limitation of power that we have' (IO4) and another

stated: 'We've got no proper powers to require the provision of information' (IO14). An Integrity Officer shared 'The powers issue is a challenge' (IO1), and another said: 'We don't have really any power' (IO7). Others were less certain, for example when Integrity Officer 11 was asked if there were more powers they'd want, they replied: 'No - well sometimes we're a bit frustrated' (IO11). They further elaborated by sharing personnel difficulties: '[The organisation has] no former police experience. We have had that, we have had [redacted] different people who did that and they all left after a few years, because they got a little bit frustrated with the lack of leverage that we have in anti-doping. You know we can always ask the athletes to talk to us but we can never force them and they were used to doing that and they were missing it' (IO11).

The powers that integrity organisations have is a contentious issue. Many Integrity Officers complained about a lack of powers, which affected their ability to investigate integrity issues and gain evidence that constitutes as adequate proof in order to sanction wrongdoing. There is also a lack of consistency of powers between organisations, with organisations who have different powers responsible for athletes who will be directly competing against each other. The lack of consistency with powers appears to be an issue, for example, there are some parallel integrity organisations operating in different countries but with athletes competing against each other that have different powers available to them. This finding highlights the results from Kuwelker et al. (2022) which called for consistency across sports, including uniform regulations and sanctions. The issue of powers is further discussed in chapter seven of this thesis.

4.4.4 Evidence

Obtaining adequate evidence to lead to sanctioning of integrity issues was highlighted as a challenge. One Integrity Officer explained: 'Getting quality information [is a challenge] and not just '[name] is doping'. Because that would be like 60, 70% of what we get. And then once you have a very good indication of what's happening, if you do believe that tip is credible, then you have to rely on testing, because unless you have non analytical evidence, and oftentimes we receive the information and even if it's like very detailed from a credible source, if we don't have evidence then you have to wait until the analytical evidence appears, and that would be trying to test that person but you know how testing works for anti-doping, you have to be very lucky to test them in the right time, on the right day for them to return a positive test' (IO15). Integrity Officer nine stated: 'Evidence gathering [is a challenge] because we need to have very

solid files to be able to open disciplinary cases. Because confession is something that is very rare. Whistleblower reports are difficult to be brought as evidence and so that is definitely something that is complicated to gather some sufficient pieces of evidence to then have the case in front of the judicial body' (IO9). One Integrity Officer stated, 'For some types of integrity violation the legal thresholds are quite challenging' (IO1) and another shared 'When it comes to athletes, there's not much that we have to prosecute them, because it is not a criminal investigation. So that brings about a lot of - a number of limitations for us to proceed, and it all starts from also gathering intelligence or information, and then going all the way to the investigation... So yes, legally speaking, that might have some privacy problems. But then I think there are ways that we might come to balance' (IO4).

Gaining adequate and quality evidence to prove integrity violations is another challenge faced by integrity organisations. Confessions of guilt are rare, and even evidence from reporting persons can be difficult to verify and is not enough evidence to alone prove wrongdoing. This can mean integrity organisations face limitations in sanctioning people for wrongdoing if they cannot prove integrity violations. Under the 2021 WADC, the anti-doping organisation has the burden of proving that an ADRV has occurred (WADA, 2021a). Additional powers for integrity organisations could assist with gathering more evidence, however, there are concerns from athletes about whether this is the right thing to do, alongside ethical concerns such as those for athlete privacy and consent. This is further discussed in a later chapter of this thesis.

4.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the current landscape of sports integrity, highlighting areas that are going well, and aspects that could be improved. Interview responses from Integrity Officers who work in the field and Athlete Representatives ensures findings that reflect the reality of the current sports integrity landscape.

4.5.1 Recommendations

Integrity organisations should explore remits of integrity issues beyond just doping, which has dominated the integrity sphere historically. To do this, acknowledgement to the challenges of funding and resources must be given, especially for small and newer integrity organisations for whom this is a particular challenge. To aid with this, buy-in must be gained from those who are funding integrity organisations - they must be educated on the dangers that integrity issues pose to athletes and the sport, and on the consequences of not taking the threats seriously, such as

losing fan and sponsor engagement. Additionally, bringing people affected by integrity issues and minority groups together to facilitate cross-sector learning, as well as listening to experts in the field will enhance the system. Listening to athlete voice is also needed, as they are most affected by being direct recipients of the integrity system and are bound by its regulations, however, this cannot be at all costs, and work to balance the issues facing integrity alongside athlete voice is needed. A global framework for sanctioning athletes in different integrity issues beyond doping is needed. Uniting the system globally would ensure fairness and parity across the board and enhance trust for athletes and other stakeholders. However, it is recognised the immense challenge that this poses, and the enormous time and resources this will take.

Whilst improving the integrity system, including listening to athletes and those who have experience of working within it, is vital, attention must be given to the challenges that integrity organisations are facing. Meaningful solutions to these challenges should be sought, acknowledging the realistic position that the integrity system, and each integrity organisation, finds themselves in. This involves integrity organisations taking athlete views into consideration, and policies should be implemented based on a balance of athletes' views and the goal of sport free from integrity issues. Regular meetings between athlete represented groups (such as commissions, unions and/or associations) and integrity organisations is vital to this and can allow both groups to express their reasonings and thoughts around key policy areas.

All of the integrity organisations represented by the participants in this research appear to have the function of protecting sport from integrity issues. However, as identified by the participants, both Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives alike, there is more work to be done to ensure that sport is effectively fighting integrity threats to the best of its ability. One way to do this is with new and improved systems and regulations, such as using intelligence and investigations to better uncover wrongdoing. This will be explored in the next chapter.

Chapter Five - The Use of Intelligence and Investigation Within Sports Integrity

5.1 Chapter Introduction

In order to tackle the integrity issues noted in this thesis, the use of intelligence and investigations has been mentioned as an important method through the interviews in this research. Also noted throughout these interviews is that historically, anti-doping has focused on random testing as a way to catch those who are doping. However, participants in this research have cited this as an inefficient method of catching those who are doping. While testing must play an important part in this, low positive testing figures in contrast to literature and general consensus from those working in the integrity system, show that testing alone is not enough, as evidenced by previous quotes presented in this thesis. Furthermore, testing cannot provide the evidence for other integrity issues such as competition manipulation, abuse and corruption. Therefore other methods must be employed alongside testing to aid with the identification of integrity issues within sport.

There is a lack of information and literature outlining what an investigation within sports integrity looks like, and the intelligence that may be used. Knowing what is occurring can allow for ethical analysis of any issues. Therefore, a key aim of this thesis was to find out what intelligence and investigations within sport integrity is, and how these methods are used. At the outset of this research, the research team had concerns that this information may not be shared by participants. This was in part due to the lack of information available, and due to the fact that some organisations may want to keep some methods private to ensure they are not exploited by those looking to commit integrity violations. However, this research was able to uncover great detail about what intelligence and investigations can look like within sports integrity. As directed by Chappell (2014a), part of undertaking ethical research involves getting into the detail of what the problem is (in this case what intelligence and investigations are). The issue must be fully described in order to undertake an ethical analysis. This chapter details what intelligence and investigations within sports integrity are and how they are used, offering novel insights. This descriptive chapter can be used to inform the rest of the thesis and to aid with analysis of the ethical issues.

This chapter concludes with a suggestion that collaborative work between all facets of integrity, including intelligence and investigations, education and testing is needed. Attention must also be paid to athlete concerns with investigations, and Integrity Officers' challenges.

5.2 Intelligence in Investigations

Understanding what intelligence is and how it is used was a key aim of this research. The AIU states that intelligence and investigations plays a part in their operations: ‘Traditional approaches to uncovering cheating have often proven to be inadequate and that’s why the AIU made the strategic choice of investing heavily in our investigations and intelligence capability’ (AIU, 2021, p.2). WADA also note their commitment to the approach, stating: ‘It is now fully recognized that gathering insights, intelligence and information followed by a rigorous investigative approach is one way the Agency and its partners will catch more of those who attempt to undermine the values of fair play and sportsmanship’ (WADA, 2018, p.62).

This section explores how intelligence is used within sports integrity, including where the intelligence comes from, how it is obtained and how it is put to use. Next, investigations are assessed and it is outlined how they are done - as evidenced by interviews with Integrity Officers - and the challenges that are faced are highlighted. In this section, Athlete Representatives also outline their views on investigations and how they affect athletes. This allow for the uncovering of greater depth than is publicly available currently.

5.2.1. What is Intelligence?

The International Testing Agency (ITA) describes their process as ‘gathering, assessment and analysis of information to produce intelligence’ (ITA, 2021, para. 3). Intelligence involves gathering information, in a similar way that research does. Both intelligence and research involve the assessment and analysis of the information, however, the tools and methods used to do this differ. Intelligence is graded and analysed through practical methods in the field, such as those seen in law enforcement, whereas research data is analysed through academic methods. Furthermore, intelligence is an on-going process and is used as a tool in investigations; its purpose is to gather and analyse information in order to respond to threats (in this case, integrity issues in sport). Additionally, intelligence is a term used within sport integrity investigations and is familiar to those working within the field, many of whom have a law enforcement background. Research is done to answer specific questions and often relies on a philosophical underpinning and academic techniques.

The interviews undertaken for this research sought to understand what intelligence is used within sports integrity investigations. Participants outlined their experiences and thoughts.

One Integrity Officer stated: ‘Intelligence is usually the assessment of information. So it becomes intelligence when you not only get the information, but can corroborate or add other elements of other information’ (IO7). Another explained ‘When we use the word intelligence, what you're trying to do is you're trying to convert what your various strands of intelligence are into usable corroborative evidence’ (IO8).

Another Integrity Officer stated their dislike of the term, before explaining what they considered intelligence to be: ‘It's [intelligence] an overworked, overused term that induces and inculcates attitudes of mind which I think are wide of the mark... Information is collected and when you fuse different pieces of information together from a variety of different sources, you probably then can create an intelligence product because you've added value to one piece of information by collecting another piece of information, and then another piece. And you're then collecting intelligence, especially if all of those collection avenues are somehow, or at least one of them, is based around some form of confidential collection mechanism, i.e., not necessarily immediately obviously evidential’ (IO1).

This highlights the importance of being careful about the terminology that is used within sports integrity. However, intelligence is a widely used term within the field. Thus, understanding what it means should be a priority. The above quotes have set out what some Integrity Officers in sports integrity consider intelligence to be.

The information and intelligence sources that the participants in this research mentioned are compiled in the below list:

- Social media
- Media
- Anti-Doping Administration and Management System (ADAMs)
- Whereabouts
- Doping control forms
- Performance data
- Athlete Biological Passport data
- Reporting and human sources
- Information and objects that can be seized
- Government departments
- Interviews

- Open-source research: information freely available online
- Financial records
- Associations: friends, family, colleagues
- Betting data.

These sources will be discussed in further detail in this section.

Integrity Officers further detailed information or intelligence that could be used for investigations. One stated: ‘If we’re conducting an investigation, we’ll look at social media, we’ll look at ADAMs [Anti-Doping Administration and Management System], whereabouts or we’ll look at doping control forms, or we’ll look at other media, other performances, we’ll look at biological information from sample analysis. We’ll develop confidential sources. We will look at imagery of any sort. If we have the powers and they’re appropriate, we will acquire electronic devices, and then analyse electronic devices. So many of those methodologies and mechanisms and media by which we collect stuff constitute an intelligence output and sometimes not an evidential output’ (IO1). This highlights the various sources of information that can be used to aid in investigations. Furthermore, intelligence doesn’t necessarily provide evidence. Instead, it can build a picture of the landscape or issue, which can assist investigations.

An Integrity Officer offered more specific details about where information and intelligence could come from:

‘For intelligence, I’m putting science as intel [intelligence], you’ve got science is all about identifying markers and knowing when to test athletes because it was suspicious based on blah blah blah, that’s just a form of intel versus human source intelligence. As in complaints made or whistleblower complaints made. So it’s all intel... So you’ve got your sciences, you’ve got your humans, you’ve got your intel coming in on themes and what have you from customs, or health, or [government departments] is looked at from time to time. But they’re just indicators, that’s your pure intel, that’s an indicator of where you might want to look in the future. It doesn’t give you any evidence, but all of that and like any intel program, the key is to take all the snippets, assess them, make something of them. Your doping control forms, God the amount of data we hold internally, you know it can be 12 forms.

What stuff is on there, your whereabouts stuff and athlete changes, athlete locations, all that sort of stuff. There's so much, so much, so much there, data internally, science, internally, externally, government agencies, sports, sporting results, you know, competition results. All of that. If you can get all that, if you can get your arms around all of that. So we're just working currently with [redacted] to look at that data, that big data piece to say what do we have, what else can we add to it and what can we actually do with it?' (IO14).

This highlights the emphasis that integrity organisations place in data, and how key it is to be able to understand it and link it together. To do this, the right people with the skills to do this are needed. This response also shows the amount of information and data that an organisation can draw upon to aid with investigations. However, to fully utilise this, staff need to understand the importance of each piece of information, and how to fit it together to ultimately prove an integrity offence has been committed. The data project mentioned that is looking at how the data can be best used is an important step and hopefully other integrity organisations will be able to learn from the findings of this.

Another Integrity Officer also outlined the use of other sources of information, explaining 'There's other sources internally that we use, that includes all the reports, forms that we have, ADAMS [Anti-Doping Administration and Management System] is one resource, lots of information we get. And then we also have informants or whistleblowers that we gradually develop. And we also use another platform... It's pretty much based on WADA's Speak Up platform through which anybody can raise a complaint. So using these sources, we gather information and then we try to analyse it and then develop it into an intelligence product' (IO4).

A general theme from the above responses details that intelligence is created when information is received and then analysed, piecing it together with other information to create a clearer picture.

Interviews were cited as a way to obtain more information for investigations. One Integrity Officer summarised how their organisation uses interviews within anti-doping investigations stating: 'Every time an athlete tests positive, or not, is under investigation, presumably at some point they will be asked for their side of the story. They'll put that in writing. How much of that can be fact checked? Is there anything in there that is wrong or conversely, completely correct.

And you are showing them that they are 100% right, that this is an accident, this is a misunderstanding or whatever, and you can prove that through the verified photographs, documents, whatever' (IO5). Another Integrity Officer explained 'The investigators might decide to sit down and interview the players, might be face to face or online' (IO2). This highlights the need to verify information that is obtained. For example, interviews need to be fact checked, with additional information needed to corroborate (or disprove) what has been said, which can be done with things such as additional documents or photographs that have been verified.

Other information used to support investigations includes media and social media. One Integrity Officer stated 'The investigation part is more at this moment, mainly focused on social media and all other media outlets' (IO11) and another said 'The big thing we're always looking for is adverse media, reputation risks, financial risks, security risks. That could be in news articles. It could be across social media. It could be in databases. So we're just very skilled at being able to find all of that information and put it together very succinctly into reports or charts, or and then feeding back, ultimately, it's feeding back information' (IO5). An Integrity Officer explained 'So to give you some examples, if we're conducting an investigation, we'll look at social media... we'll look at other media' (IO1).

Another Integrity Officer stated, 'So open sources are those that are readily accessible that includes social media reports, social media profiles of athletes, and anything that is publicly accessible to us that we can get information from without breaking the law' (IO4). When asked whether they thought it was ethical to use social media profiles of athletes, given that many rely on them as avenues to secure sponsorships and to build their profile, the Integrity Officer replied 'I think using this is ethical, I think maybe there might be some ethical challenges, but it is all within the law, and athletes themselves, they do know... Well that's also in a way a presumption, but they do know that some or everyone is looking at the profile. That's the point of making it public, you have a choice that you can, I know, select a reduced number of people who it can be restricted with, but they make it open for a specific purpose. And in that sense, I don't think that looking at athletes, social media profiles could be unethical, because it's also legal. And in a way, athletes are presenting it themselves' (IO4). Another Integrity Officer also offered their thoughts on the issue, saying 'I think everyone has to be aware that if you posted something on social media it's accessible to many people. And depending on your privacy settings might be accessible to everyone. If you're not doing anything wrong, you're unlikely to

incriminate yourself with regards to an anti-corruption investigation. But I suppose it is difficult, because the amount of times you get people request to follow you or send you a friend request, you have no idea who they are. It is difficult because I think for them, obviously famous and high profile some of them, so they might get a lot of it, but they have to be very conscious that they have to know who' (IO2).

Integrity Officers have outlined that they use social media to assist in investigations. However, this raises a number of issues. Firstly, many athletes rely on social media for sponsorship and brand deals, and this can be a way of providing an income for them to pay for their sporting careers. While some sports are very well paid, such as men's football at the highest level and Formula 1, there are many athletes who are poorly paid as athletes, and so sponsorship and brand deals are a vital part of their income. Social media plays a part in this and companies use social media data (such as followers, engagement) to make decisions about brand deals. This often means that athletes have public profiles to ensure maximum engagement. If athletes require their social media to be public for financial reasons, then integrity organisations using this data for investigations, (and when athletes may not be aware of this), may present a conflict. Furthermore, if athletes do not know that this data can be used and is being used by integrity organisations then there may be a further issue. On the other hand, athletes know that their profiles are public and that anyone can access them if they choose these settings. Private settings can be selected, even if this comes at the cost of sponsors etc, and athletes may have to choose between their privacy and elements that can go against this. One solution is to educate athletes on investigations so they are aware of the techniques that could be used. This could also act as a deterrent. However, it could be argued that this may make investigations less effective as those who want to cheat will be more equipped with methods used and could instead just be more careful about their use of social media, meaning this is one less tool for investigators for information. While the use of social media in investigations could be considered a privacy invasion, it is considered justifiable due to how useful of a tool it is for uncovering integrity violations, and given that the ultimate aim of integrity organisations is to detect, deter and sanction integrity breaches.

One Integrity Officer outlined why social media could be useful in competition manipulation investigations involving betting, explaining 'We go and do open-source research on them [the person who is being investigated]. A lot of it's done on social media. We basically try and find any links between the [athlete], the [official], and the better, because we suggest that the better

might be involved in the match fixing themselves. And so if we can find any sort of ties there that aids the investigation. Because we're not like a government agency, we don't have access to police files or anything like that. So a lot of the research is open source. There are tools you can use to aid that and make it a lot easier. And it's not just limited to social media' (IO2). Another Integrity Officer stated 'We can very quickly have Player A and Better B and show online that they're Facebook friends or appear in photographs with one another, and if one is betting on the other then they've all clearly intentionally broken the rules' (IO5).

However, aspects such as using the fact that two people are connected on social media or are photographed together as proof in match-fixing investigations could be questioned. Clear, robust guidelines setting out the proof needed in these cases could assist with this.

In the above responses, Integrity Officers have highlighted how useful social media can be in investigations. It should be reinforced with an earlier point that it is unlikely that social media posts alone could provide evidence but would instead play a part of the wider intelligence picture and could be used to support other information and evidence. Presumably things like people being connected on social media and photographed together would also fall under this category.

Open-source research was highlighted as a way to obtain information to assist in investigations. One Integrity Officer highlighted that their organisation specialised in open-source research and outlined more of the processes used:

'The thing we specialise in, we can do everything to some extent, our specialty is sort of open-source research or open-source intelligence. So it's stuff that is freely available online. But it's just about putting the pieces together of what's there. So if you had an individual, how much information can you find out about that individual? Where do they work? Where have they previously worked? Who are their close friends, close associates, family members, colleagues. If you look at an athlete, where do they train? Who do they train with? Who do they interact with online? What businesses do they own? Yeah, if you look at owners, sponsors, we look at red flags, we look at sanctions, we look at financial concerns. We look at adverse media. The big thing we're always looking for is adverse media, reputation risks, financial risks, security risks. That could be in news articles. It could be across

social media. It could be in databases. So we're just very skilled at being able to find all of that information and put it together very succinctly into reports or charts, and then feeding back, ultimately, it's feeding back information. From very basic to very complex, working out associations between people so like when it comes to specific sporting integrity threats it would be whatever helps that case. So for doping investigations they're quite broad, so I always say if you look at the world anti-doping code, testing positive is only one of 11 violations... The other 10 are all non-analytical violations, all should be driven by intelligence. They are about trafficking, possessing, working with coaches and doctors who are suspended, about whistleblowing, it's about all these other topics which you can gather intelligence on. Looking at past cases, looking at whereabouts, failures. Where is an athlete? Are they lying when they produce statements?' (IO5).

This also shows the power of obtaining information that can fit with other pieces, like piecing together a puzzle with parts of information. The importance of open-source research is important to note. This involves accessing information that is freely available online, such as from media reports, social media, existing databases. A challenge cited by participants in this research has been lack of resources to tackle integrity issues and thus open-source research could aid with this as it is something that even organisations with small intelligence and investigations budgets can access. While there are tools and techniques that can aid with this, most integrity organisations would be able to conduct open-source research with computers and internet connection. However, as noted in this response, having the expertise to be able to piece together the information, analyse it and assess what it means is key. Open-source research is also something that is easier for organisations to share with each other, as it is publicly available. As opposed to intelligence that you may get from a human source that may not be able to be shared without compromising that person or due to confidentiality agreements, if information is publicly available then that can be shared, and this is a way that integrity organisations could work together to help sport tackle integrity issues.

An Integrity Officer highlighted an issue with open-source research explaining 'You have to rely on open-source research a lot. And obviously not everything's there. And athletes who are really trying to cheat the system, they won't be talking and posting about these things online, they've developed their own methods of doing things and just evading' (IO15). The powers that integrity organisations have are varied and those with more limited powers have to rely on

things like open-source research far more than organisations with extended powers. This is shown by an Integrity Officer who highlighted that their lack of powers meant that open-source research was a valuable resource, saying ‘We don't really have power, which means we are like a private person. So it's like you, Julia, you want to investigate, you have all the rights that we have. So mainly, it's open-source’ (IO7). This is one quote of many that highlights the challenges and struggles some organisations face when they have few or no powers to assist them with investigating. This makes investigations challenging and can limit how much organisations can do when investigating integrity violations. The topic of powers in investigations is discussed in more depth in chapter seven.

An Integrity Officer outlined how open-source research could be used to assist investigations with specialist personnel, stating ‘We have in our [organisation] a open source specialised person, so we are looking at various sources to most of the time incorporate some suspicions that we have already’ (IO9) and another explained the importance of training staff by saying ‘We continuously educate, not just once, we continuously educate them. We train them on open-source courses’ (IO1). While it was noted earlier that a test does not exist for other integrity issues in the same way that it does for doping, there are similarities, as explained by an Integrity Officer who said ‘If you are match fixing, there is a 100% traceable data point. You have placed bets on a match somewhere’ (IO5). This can provide evidence to prove wrongdoing if the evidence and that data can be uncovered.

When investigating cases related to betting, Integrity Officers suggested that relationships with betting operators are necessary. An Integrity Officer stated ‘The betting markets are a better way to detect or identify those unusual runs of play or unusual outcomes of races or games. Because betting markets are like financial markets, they are quite predictable. So when there's unpredictability or volatility, there's an indicator that something's wrong, then investigations can take place from that... The starting point with other sports of talking to athletes and players about what happened in that piece of play, I don't think it's the most effective starting point. Intelligence-led approach, especially looking at betting markets, is more effective’ (IO6). In direct contrast to this, another Integrity Officer stated that they thought reporting persons (further explored in the next chapter) were the most important asset in investigations. This shows the difference in integrity issues and how they are investigated, and how different intelligence can be useful for different integrity issues. This could also be considered true for different sports, countries and integrity organisations.

Another Integrity Officer highlighted an issue they saw with betting data intelligence, saying ‘I think a problem is the overreliance in match fixing on betting data to be the intelligence for investigations, and what I mean by that is anomalous betting patterns that in my view is a single source of data and probably sophisticated criminals spread their bet in a way that doesn't trigger the alerts so you're sort of catching the people that are amateurs or not very good and I think that's a problem as well’ (IO12). This echoes an issue often highlighted with doping, that those who dope are always one step ahead of the integrity organisations trying to catch them. The point is further reinforced through the words of WADA’s former Director General, David Howman, who was once quoted to say, ‘It is very easy to catch the dopey doper. The sophisticated doper is becoming harder to detect and that's a big challenge for the anti-doping movement’ (Gibson, 2012, para. 25). With intelligence and investigations cited as a method to potentially catch more who are doping, new and innovative ways also need to be considered for wider integrity issues to catch those who are trying to commit wider integrity infractions but who have found ways to stay ahead of the current system and avoid being detected.

An Integrity Officer provided information about how their organisation used betting information as intelligence, stating ‘We've got connections with a number of gambling regulators around the world and when a betting activity marker throws a flag in one area, we've got mechanisms to share that with the globally appropriate partners, so all of that information forms part of our intelligence picture for corruption in sport for betting related means’ (IO13).

Integrity Officer Two stated that betting data and relationships was their best source of intelligence, explaining ‘So probably specific to us as the [organisation], we receive most of our alerts of corruption through the betting industry. So we have a betting liaison officer, and we also work with betting regulation organisations. And they send us when they see unexpected movements or patterns in the betting industry, which then we initiate investigations off of. I suppose the challenge that we have is, on the corruption side of it, this is our main form of intelligence in terms of match fixing... so this is purely on the anti-corruption side. So we'll get very high-level information come in from the betting operators and we then initiate the investigation’ (IO2).

One Integrity Officer stated:

‘There’s two types of sources or intelligence from betting. It’s the betting operators themselves which is an individualistic arrangement with the various betting operators or it can be a group relationship with the people like the IBIA [International Betting Integrity Association]... The second in relation to betting is the monitoring of the global betting markets themselves and most of the top sports will have a relationship with a monitoring company... The difference between that intelligence and the intelligence you can get from a betting operator, betting operator will be what we called account level. It will be suspicious accounts that they’ve seen and they’ve got concerns about those particular people, where is a monitoring company they are just talking about fluctuations in the global betting markets or the national betting markets where they see something not quite right and will then flag that to you, to the sport to then try to approach a particular betting officer to watch what has been seen.... You need a relationship between sports and betting to understand, to know when there’s something wrong’ (IO8).

Strong relationships are highlighted as key to effective intelligence gathering. However, sometimes there are regulations and laws that do not allow the sharing of data. This can limit how much can be shared and affect investigations. One Integrity Officer noted that they had worked on a large integrity case for multiple partners, however, they were unable to fully share what they had uncovered with all of them due to the regulations in place and the confidentiality agreements that their organisation had with the integrity organisations they worked for. Ways to facilitate a more collaborative approach to intelligence sharing should be explored. This was supported by another Integrity Officer who said, ‘If we joined up a little bit more, joined forces, then we could invest in having a separate entity of some description that could potentially start to collect intelligence and then feed it out to the community’ (IO3).

Integrity Officers noted that performance data could be used as intelligence, stating ‘If we notice that someone has been performing extraordinarily well recently and has peaks in performance, we’re paying attention to all these things, and we wouldn’t immediately call those like investigations or open an investigation in these cases. But we’ll definitely be like keeping that person on our radars’ (IO15), and another explaining ‘We’re investigating the path of using performance analysis as a means of evidence because today it’s not something that is really recognised or usable... we are investigating the performance analysis... to try to bring some research and scientific basis for such to be used as a means of evidence’ (IO9). Performance

analysis as information has been previously studied by Hopker et al. (2020; 2018). This is done by monitoring athletes' performance over time and noting any major improvements or changes (Hopker et al., 2020; 2018). This method could be used alongside other tools e.g., the ABP (Hopker et al, 2020), and could be used to inform aspects such as testing strategies, rather than as evidence to definitively prove an athlete is doping.

Once the integrity organisation has the intelligence, it then has to be decided what to do with it. One Integrity Officer detailed their organisations' processes, saying:

'We use that [intelligence] directly to inform our testing program, we use it to inform our education program... We get the complaint or intel [intelligence] saying that you are taking drugs of some description. So we've got a bunch of options. In the olden days we would have just come out and put a test on you, an out of comp test. Knock on the door, test you, or possibly wait till you're actually racing in a local race, and then surprise you with a tester and take a sample. And that would be you sanctioned. And we kind of went, okay, that's one approach. And that's the specific testing as a specific result on intel. We now say with that intel, where does the problem lie?... And as a whole there are a few different options. Now, we're saying, actually, let's change our education program... But all of a sudden we've got different tools and different options based on the same bit of intel, but it requires the intel person to really understand the power of the intel, and how to bring it together. So this intel, and that's a single source intel. If you put together 3 or 4 bits of intel... It's how you deal with that. So it's impacting our education. It's impacting our comms. It's impacting our engagement, and of course, our testing. But they're all different options. They're different tools to respond to the intel rather than just a single way. So it makes us better at what we're doing, investigations in the same way' (IO14).

This highlights the different approaches that can be taken, and the thoughts that integrity organisations can have once they have the intelligence. The challenge is then using that effectively to help combat wrongdoing in sport. While using education instead of testing may appear to suggest that there are people cheating and not sanctioned, if an integrity organisation cannot prove that a sanction has taken place, then education appears to be another tool to aid prevention. Additionally, doping tests are expensive so this can help to save costs. This is where

increased intelligence and investigations capacity is being cited as useful by the participants in this research, as it can help to provide the evidence to prove sanctions.

Another intelligence source that is important to note is reports which come from human sources. This is discussed in greater depth separately in the next chapter in this thesis.

This section has outlined how intelligence is used within investigations. The next section details how investigations are conducted.

5.3 Investigations

5.3.1 Integrity Officer Perspectives

As evidenced in the previous section, intelligence plays a key role in investigations. This section provides further details about how investigations within sports integrity are undertaken.

Integrity Officer One detailed their thoughts on investigations, saying ‘What constitutes an investigation? Well, when does an interesting piece of information where someone says ‘I think someone's doping’ become an investigation? Well for us, it's quite late on in the process. We would rather conduct preliminary information gathering and see if, at the point of sufficient information gathering, which is probably short of an interview of someone, definitely short of seizing, or not seizing, but requiring them to hand over an electronic device. But at some point we will say, okay, this constitutes the need to do a proper investigation, and then we may invoke some of our additional powers, such as issuing a demand to attend an interview, issuing a demand to hand over devices. But we try and use those powers sparingly if we can because we get better outcomes by requesting people to cooperate with us, which is a better approach’ (IO1). This highlights the line that integrity organisations can draw before investigations are officially opened. Preliminary information is first gathered, which can then lead to an investigation being opened. One Integrity Officer noted that they were careful when officially decided to call something an investigation, explaining ‘This flow from intel [intelligence] to investigation, to decision, to start proceedings, to proceedings itself, and what we found with WADA and the Code in fact, whilst something is called intelligence, we as a [organisation] have a choice about whether we can grade the intelligence, we can assess the intelligence. We can decide whether it's valuable or not, we can decide whether to action it or not. Once we start an investigation, if there's evidence of doping, we are required under the code to start proceedings. And so we have a choice in the intel phase. We have no choice when we get to

the investigation phase. So we're really careful about that move from intel into investigations' (IO14). This highlights the decisions that integrity organisations face when opening investigations and the regulations they are bound by. While Integrity Officers have suggested that regulations, such as WADA's investigative regulations, can impact operations, they are in place for a reason, and could actually help athletes who want sport free from integrity organisations. By providing clear guidance, this can ensure that proper practice is maintained and that all organisations have to abide by the same rules.

An Integrity Officer went into detail about how a sport competition manipulation investigation would be conducted, explaining:

'A typical match fixing investigation would start with some intelligence to indicate a match had been fixed. That is normally a betting alert on that match, but it could be some form of whistleblowing type thing that is very uncommon, so most likely to be an alert from the betting industry that there is suspicious betting on a match. So in [sport] that in itself would probably not trigger an investigation, that would be filed for intelligence purposes and if the player, so I'll say the loser is the suspect, if the loser wasn't known to the [organisation] then the chances are that that would just be recorded. If there was another match where the same player within a short period of time then at some point, you come to the stage where you say right we are going to be investigating now. For efficiency reasons what tends to happen is that the intelligence team will track players of interest, there will be considerable numbers of these, and then look for tournament where there are going to be a reasonable number of players of interest at the tournament so then investigators can deploy and if you like take on a number of investigations all at the same time what normally happens next is that the player is told that they are - so the investigators they are flying to Majorca and they're going to interview five or six players in Majorca, who have all appeared in multiple match alerts. What would typically happen would be they would not tell anyone they are coming and then the players would be asked by the officials to gather somewhere in the player lounge or something ostensibly for a briefing or something like that and then the investigators will explain that they are under investigation, and then we'll take their phones and laptops which they're allowed to do under the codes that the players have agreed to sign, like you need to sign this thing before the interview and they would take the

images on the phones and laptops, and then essentially they would forensically analyse, and you're trying to prove a link between the player and the cartel or the organisers of the match fixing that you're paying the player to do this, and you need to show that link to get over the eventual proof test and the players then interviewed and obviously they may confess at this point, but we are potentially at the point where the player might be able to offer substantial assistance, or we might try and persuade them to tell us about other players or other people who are corrupting the game in exchange for a reduced sanction so that is how a match fixing investigation would work. A file is made, it goes to the legal team at the [organisation], if the legal team believes that there is the likelihood of a conviction in a hearing they will recommend to the chief executive that the player is charged and the chief executive will agree and then the legal team tries to plan the defence and maybe the player is provisionally suspended at that point pending a hearing, so that would be a typical match fixing investigation' (IO12).

Here the processes of an investigation are outlined and it highlights how many people can be involved. This can cause issues for some integrity organisations who have small budgets and resources, and this is later discussed in this chapter. In the above response it is stated that reports are uncommon, and thus do not often provide information for investigations. Instead, for match-fixing, suspicious betting alerts are used to inform integrity organisations of the potential for issues. It is important to note that this participant states that one suspicious betting alert is not enough to trigger an investigation. Instead, it is stored and used to build a picture e.g., if multiple suspicious betting alerts are flagged about a player. This would then lead an integrity organisation to interview the athlete, to gain their side of the story. This is noted by another participant as being an important piece of intelligence as interviews with athletes (and others) in investigations can then be fact-checked and used to build the intelligence picture. The participant in the above response notes that for budget reasons, investigators will go to places where multiple people who are being investigated can be interviewed. This is important to note as budget and resources were cited by multiple participants in this research as being a key challenge. If integrity organisations do not have the resources to interview athletes and others for investigations then the quality of these investigations may suffer. Alternatives may be sought e.g., phone or online interviews. However, as stated in the above response, the element of surprise of gathering players for other reasons, and then interviewing them, demanding objects and information such as their phones which can contain evidence, would be helpful to

investigators. If they cannot be there in person to demand phones etc, then this could give those under investigation time to dispose of evidence and source alternative phones or devices to hand over. Therefore, this response highlights the importance of adequate budgets for integrity organisations to be able to send investigators to meet people who they are investigating in person, and how investigations may suffer if this is not provided. Another vital point made in this response is the need for proof, from multiple sources. This can come from interviews, information and objects that have been demanded, as well as suspicious betting alerts. Without this evidence and proof, integrity violations cannot be sanctioned.

Another Integrity Officer detailed an investigation in their organisation, saying,

‘We'll get very high-level information come in from the betting operators and we then initiate the investigation. So that moves in a way that we'll do research on the players to check our database to see if we have any existing intelligence on the two players. Also, checking the [officials]. With regards to the anti-corruption, a lot of the corruption or match fixing attempts occurs at a lower level of [sport]. Simply because it's easier to bribe players at that level. It's easy to get away with the corruption. At the high level, I think there's too much risk for players and then there's too much publicity and too much money. So this is all generally at a lower level [sport], still professional but we'll do the research on the players with regards to our database, we'll grab [related information]... So that's like a general process that's ongoing at the start with the investigation... So other things I would have done would have been a bit of open-source research as well into the players if there's anything online that might be of interest in investigation. As the investigation develops and more time goes on, we might be able to get customer level information from the betting operators with regards to the betters. Now, this is something really of interest with regards to the anti-corruption side of it so we can see, you know, we don't always get customer level data, sometimes it's redacted which becomes difficult. You might get a name and a year if it's redacted, whereas if you get customer level data you get full name, address, date of birth, email address, we then go and do open-source research on them. A lot of it's done on social media. So we can see, we basically try and find any links between the players, the [official], and the better, because we suggest that the better might be involved in the match fixing themselves. And so if we can find any sort of ties there that aids the investigation...

The investigators might decide to sit down and interview the players, might be face to face or online. But they're more willing to travel out to meet them to meet them face to face. If they're on site, then we have the ability to take their phone and download the contents of their phone. So this is a massive source of intel [intelligence] obviously. And then we have a team of they're called integrity analysts. And they'll go through the phone download, there's very strict regulations on what you can go through and what you can't go through and what you can use, what you can't use... So they'll go through and then that's often where there's some, I think a lot of the evidence comes from. They can see messages or group chats talking about bets they're putting on or the point the outcome of the match that they want, and how they're going to secure that. So we try and build a network of intelligence, basically. Our current database is massive. So it's not always new people who come to light. There's occasionally bigger findings, such as some that you might be able to link to organised crime. So we've had a few of those and that's obviously a much bigger investigation and we can often work with police or Interpol, Europol' (IO2).

This response once again points to the importance of building up a picture of information and using intelligence to get a clearer idea of the integrity issues that are occurring. Multiple participants suggested that information is pieced together, with each piece forming part of the puzzle. The more information that you are able to get, the clearer picture you can build, and the more likely that you be able to provide enough evidence to prove wrongdoing. A big part of what integrity organisations have to do is to find links, such as between athletes and other people who could be connected to the case. With match-fixing, it will rarely happen alone, and so it is vital to find others who are involved. The above response noted that organised crime can play a part in match-fixing, and here additional partners such as law enforcement can be worked with. However, other participants have noted that often law enforcement can be hesitant to get involved, which can restrict investigations. This is seen in responses such as, 'You can't always rely on law enforcement' (IO3). Therefore, integrity organisations need their own intelligence and investigation capacities to uncover evidence to sanction wrongdoing. This can be hampered by the aforementioned challenges, such as budgets and resources. One solution to this is for integrity organisations to work together. This is noted by an Integrity Officer, who said 'I think it would be best if everyone gets along. That includes all stakeholders, athletes and coaches and everyone and only then I think we can actually win the fight against doping. I think

that's one of the biggest challenges that we face' (IO4). However, this can be prevented by data protection regulations, as one participant noted, 'If I collect information from one anti-doping organisation, I can't just give it to another, because of the contract I have with the first' (IO5). Ways for integrity organisations to share information and intelligence further could assist investigations across sport.

These responses detail how investigations within sports integrity can work. Information and intelligence leads to investigations being opened. Integrity Officers were keen to highlight that when something is officially classified as an investigation is carefully managed, with regulations driving this.

How investigations are conducted have been outlined, next Athlete Representative views on investigations are presented.

5.3.2 Athlete Views on Integrity Investigations

Athlete Representatives shared their knowledge and experiences of athletes who have been through integrity investigations. Athletes can be investigated for their part in wrongdoing, such as if they are doping, or commit other integrity infractions.

An Athlete Representative outlined their knowledge and views regarding athletes being investigated for wrongdoing in sport, explaining:

'I think it's incredibly difficult. The process is difficult. The timelines are difficult. Athletes, our entire sort of wellbeing, and who you are is often tied up into the sport that you do. And if the investigation, or a positive test is preventing you from training or competing or training with your teammates or whatever, those are massive repercussions. There's a lot of uncertainty from athletes, because obviously you're under investigation. You can't really contribute anywhere. So you're at the whimsy of the ADO and how quickly they can work through whatever their investigation is and I think that's an incredibly unsettling time for athletes and I think it should be incumbent upon anti-doping organisations to where they can be really clear with athletes around what they're doing, how long it's going to take and making sure that athletes have some sort of well-being support in that space... I

think there's good and there's bad but yes, I do think that athletes need to be supported' (AR1).

This highlights how difficult it can be for athletes who are investigated. Athletes can be impacted by integrity investigations that can disrupted their wellbeing and take them away from their jobs, teammates and income. As noted in the response, investigations can take a long time and athletes can be left in the dark about the processes and how long they may take, therefore it is important that organisations are upfront and clear with athletes, which could support their wellbeing. However, if they have committed wrongdoing, then it could be argued that it should not be an easy process to go and that the wrongdoing should be uncovered. This is highlighted by one Athlete Representative who said, 'If they catch [dopers] it's plenty adversarial, and it should be' (AR4). On the other hand, athletes who have committed wrongdoing are still human beings and deserving of rights throughout the process. Furthermore, some athletes who are investigated may not be guilty of what they are accused of. This once again ignites the debate around athletes' rights and the fact that the anti-doping system presumes them to be guilty, rather than the innocent until proven guilty process seen in the criminal system.

An Athlete Representative also highlights the processes of ADOs, stating 'You're at the whimsy of the ADO' (AR1), highlighting how slow processes can affect athletes. This is particularly important if an athlete is found to not have committed wrongdoing at the end of an investigation, as if they are suspended they are unable to compete, train with their group etc, and therefore lose time from their career, which as an athlete is usually short already. Athlete Representative One also argued for more support for athletes who are subject to investigations, which was echoed by other Athlete Representatives in this research.

The lack of transparency in investigations is noted by Athlete Representative One. On one hand, increased transparency of investigations may help increase trust in the integrity system, the lack of which has been noted in this thesis as a key challenge facing sports integrity. On the other hand, forewarning people about investigations may lead to the loss of key evidence e.g., if someone knows they are being investigated they could delete key messages or get a backup phone to hand over to the authorities in the event of a demand. Confidentiality of investigations is also key and is a key ethical principle that must be respected.

Another Athlete Representative outlined a case that they were aware of involving an athlete

who they competed against who was investigated for an ADRV, saying 'I do have one of my competitors who is currently serving a ban for whereabouts failure. And he's very resentful about it, very, very resentful about it, and says, you know what was I meant to do? I don't have all the details. The details I have would indicate to me that you know, particularly with a whereabouts failure, it can happen that somebody gets one missed test. Certainly, if you got a second missed test you would be - I personally would be making sure that the first contact on my phone was the anti-doping text number. So I don't understand that... I think it's very hard to get into the heads of people who are on the wrong side of an anti-doping violation' (AR4). This response shows the range of emotions an athlete can feel during an investigation, including resentment. Athletes can lose their careers as a result of these investigations and so it must be noted the effect that this could have on them. Additionally, if they already think the processes are difficult or unfair, such as highlighted in previous research, this could magnify these feelings. Such research includes Overbye and Wagner (2014) who surveyed over 645 elite athletes from Denmark representing 40 sports and found low levels of trust in the effectiveness of the anti-doping system, with those who have personal experiences of administrative procedures distrusting these processes the most (Overbye & Wagner, 2013, 2014).

Another Athlete Representative outlined their experiences of speaking to athletes who had been through doping investigations, saying:

'It is seen as a quite challenging environment to be in and it's serious if you are caught taking a substance or if you test positive for something or if there's a whereabouts violation, three whereabouts violations, and the organisations do get very serious about that. From my experience speaking to athletes when they are dealing with the [organisation] of this world it is serious and you start getting legal letters which as athletes you don't normally have to deal with day to day, so I think it's uncomfortable for athletes. From my experience and hearing cases where like social drug abuse before it was reduced to a three month ban when it was a bit longer athletes were obviously like I've been caught for taking cocaine say and I'm being absolutely hammered by [organisation], I'm not receiving any support, so I think, thankfully I've never had to go through this, but it sounds like it's quite a scary, isolating, challenging period for people to have to go through and I can completely see that if you're caught for the use of a substance you're going to be banned from your sport, and it's going to be incredibly stressful... For your initial

question of ‘what is it like for an athlete?’ They [integrity organisation] are basically seen as the police’ (AR3).

This response once again highlights the difficult nature of investigations, suggesting that these processes are unfamiliar to athletes. This could heighten the distress felt by athletes going through investigations, due to the lack of knowledge about what is going on. Educating athletes on the processes of the investigations could aid with this and could occur once they have been notified that an investigation has begun. This could include someone sitting down with the athlete to fully explain what is happening and why, as well as additional resources explaining the processes to help them understand. Having a contact who the athletes can ask questions of would also help, and this relates to the support that previous Athlete Representatives have called for. WADA have an ‘Anti-Doping Ombuds, which operates independently of them, and is described as a ‘free, neutral, and confidential resource for athletes with questions or concerns about anti-doping issues’ (WADA, 2023b, para 1). Other organisations could mirror this, including for integrity issues beyond anti-doping.

Investigations have been described as ‘scary, isolating, challenging’ (AR3), and therefore providing support, as well as organisations acknowledging these stressors, could aid athletes within the system. However, as this is a serious topic, with integrity infractions having wide ranging effects on sports and the people involved, including other athletes, it could be argued that serious measures need to be taken to combat this.

The other type of investigations that athletes can be a part of are when they have reported wrongdoing that has been committed against themselves, and then they are part of the investigation e.g., as a witness or survivor. This can bring challenges, such as an onus on them to recount their experiences publicly, and the potential for re-traumatisation.

An Athlete Representative offered their perspectives on this situation, detailing their knowledge and experience of athletes who had been through abuse and doping investigations, saying: ‘The experience of athletes is very much a re-traumatisation. It's often a very legalistic procedure. They feel isolated, retraumatized, not believed, very much questioned and in most of the cases, it has been a very dragging, a very demanding process that took a lot of effort. They don't feel safe to speak out because of the sport specific structures’ (AR2). This response highlights how difficult investigations can be for athletes. By coming forward and speaking about what has

happened, athletes can be re-traumatised and have to re-live the experiences. Furthermore, investigations and sanctions for perpetrators can take a long time, which can make the experiences worse for athletes and prolong their pain. As noted, it can also be effort intensive and demanding, with structures within sport making it difficult to speak out. Such structures could include federations who want to protect their sport, and do not want negative press about their organisations, as well as survivors not being believed.

The Athlete Representative continued, 'We talk about anti-doping and a big integrity issue where athletes are put in a systemic disadvantage so the reversal of the burden of proof is only one aspect of it but strict liability then the problem around even getting evidence to prove your own, basically to prove that you are not guilty that the substance entered your system without your knowledge without your fault is something where athletes are in a very structural disadvantage because for example, experts that are appointed by WADA can't be named as experts for the athletes in the procedure, so that creates really a lot of disadvantage on top of it' (AR2). This response notes several difficulties athlete can have within the integrity system. Athletes having to prove how a substance entered their body in anti-doping cases means that they are considered guilty until they can prove they are innocent, rather than innocent until proven guilty as is seen in many legal systems. This led to the former President of the European Elite Athletes Association Yves Kummer saying, 'paedophiles and criminals on probation have more rights than athletes' (Kummer, 2009). However, if athletes did not have to prove this, then they would always be able to claim contamination or accidental ingestion and the system may struggle to sanction anyone.

The Athlete Representative raised another point about athlete experiences, saying, 'The athletes are basically left alone throughout the whole process without any support, despite the clear evidence of how much psychological and mental distress that this is really causing so we have seen in the past really athletes took their own life because they couldn't handle it anymore. I mean we have to also understand that sport is part of their identity, their personality. They are under threat that all of this is being taken away from them, probably without their fault at all... I think this constant pressure braided through the intervention into private spheres by doping controls that is causing additional also a layer of distress. It is kind of limiting also, the benefits of private life in terms of there are always the whereabouts have to be communicated, there is no spontaneous change or very limited spontaneous change possible' (AR2). The lack of support and help offered to athletes during investigations is here shown as a challenge for

athletes. The rules that govern integrity are complex and athletes have numerous responsibilities. While all athletes should receive anti-doping and integrity education, the standard of this education varies globally and between sports and will also rest on the athlete's own support system. Regulations, such as the whereabouts system, which have been discussed previously in this thesis, has been highlighted by this participant as adding stress to athletes. However, the whereabouts system is widely accepted as being a necessary part of out of competition anti-doping testing and without it integrity organisations would find it difficult to test athletes when they are not competing. As athletes who dope know they will be tested in competition, it remains vital that integrity organisations can test them outside of this, in order to have the highest chance of catching them at a time when they are doping. The unpredictability of out of competition doping controls is a part of this, as well as a deterrent.

While budgets and resources have been cited as a challenge for integrity organisations from the Integrity Officers in this research, Athlete Representative Two also notes that athletes face these challenges too, explaining, 'They [athletes] are also struggling financially to even get justice to prove their innocence because the procedure is very costly. The lawyers are very costly and there is very limited availability of legal aid as well so I would say that adds to the distress' (AR2). Athletes have previously stated the high cost of integrity investigations when they are fighting to prove their innocence. For example, British cyclist Lizzy Banks estimated that she spent £40,000 trying to prove that she did not intentional ingest prohibited substances after returning a positive doping test (Cary, 2024). For athletes who genuinely accidentally ingest prohibited substances, this high financial cost, alongside the aforementioned emotional cost, appear to be too high. However, the rules must be in place in order to sanction integrity issues, and athletes are taught via education how to minimise risks e.g. not betting on their own sport or sharing insider information, as well as avoiding supplements if possible or minimising risks with Informed Sport products.

From these responses some key challenges identified for athletes are: re-traumatisation, isolation, not being believed, overly legal processes, demanding and time intensive procedures, not feeling safe to speak out, stress, frustration, and fear. Work must be done to mitigate these issues in any way that can be done. If this is not acted upon, then it could prevent others speaking out in the future. Smits et al. (2017) suggests that certain behaviours become normalised if not reported, as seen within their investigation on abusive coaching practices.

Another Athlete Representative outlined what it was like for an athlete they knew of who reported wrongdoing, and the process of the investigation that followed, saying ‘It’s a rollercoaster... So it’s the whole victim blaming process... The process took 10 years. It was not in sports because there was nothing... They were just so harmed throughout the entire process. And there was no care whatsoever to understand how that should be mitigated. So [the] experience was honestly the worst... It was a huge mess’ (AR5). The Athlete Representative also offered some solutions that they thought would make the investigation processes easier for athletes who have reported the wrongdoing, stating ‘I think it should be clear if someone wants to go through the process, how long this is going to take, what it might look like if they want to withdraw, what are the consequences, to explain everything. And most of all, you need to make sure that this person is not in a state of crisis. You cannot start a process in a state of crisis, that’s very harmful. I mean, a process will be harmful no matter what. But if the survivor in a state of crisis cannot start it. And you need to interrupt’ (AR5). This response echoes previous quotes from other participants who outline that investigations can be time consuming, which can affect athletes. It also highlights the re-traumatisation of those who are part of investigations, as well as the fact that the ‘victims’ can be blamed throughout the process. This Athlete Representative suggests tangible improvements that could be made to investigations such as support and explanation for those going through them and knowing what to do in times of crisis. Engaging athletes and Athlete Representatives on how this can be done would enhance the investigation processes for both athletes who are involved in them as survivors and for those who are being investigated for their own wrongdoing.

This section has outlined how investigations are done, offering Integrity Officer and athlete perspectives and experiences. The next section looks at whether intelligence and investigations are a good investment for sports integrity.

5.4 Is Intelligence and Investigations a Good Investment in Sports Integrity?

The topic of intelligence and investigations and how they are used within sports integrity has been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. This section assesses whether these techniques are a good investment for sports integrity, drawing upon Integrity Officers experiences and perspectives.

One Integrity Officer was certain that intelligence and investigations was a much-needed approach within sports integrity, replying when asked if it was a good investment: ‘It’s the only

one isn't it?'(IO8). They further explained their perspective, saying 'I remember when sports didn't invest in it... There was a lot of naivety among sports in that they thought they could control betting, which they can't. So some were just trying to ignore the fact that there was betting going on in the sport, others were trying to do something, but didn't know what to do. So most sports now have that investment... It's just not an option for a sport not to invest in as many different intelligent sources as it has got to deal with it' (IO8). This highlights the importance that some within sports integrity place on intelligence and investigations.

An Integrity Officer outlined how it is a priority for their organisation, saying 'Our focus is to have an intelligence led programme. That's the goal that we're moving towards. It's not easy. It's extremely hard to work out how to do that and what intelligence to use and where to even collect that intelligence. But that's definitely something we are prioritising' (IO2), and another Integrity Officer stated the importance of intelligence and investigations, saying:

'For me, I and I [intelligence and investigations], if you're serious about integrity, if you're serious about sport, you have to have a robust well-funded I and I proportionate to your risk and your income and everything, but you're not going to get ahead of things, you're not even going to get level with the people who are looking to corrupt sport in whatever way that might be if you don't have a good I and I program and you haven't built the right relationships with other people who can plug into your I and I system and you do need it to be technology lead I honestly believe... To me I and I should be at least on a par with education because you can use it in a proactive way not just reactive way. Those two things are on a similar level but it's really going to cost you more to do the I and I so in terms of funding you know most of your funding should go to I and I. You have to have organisational buy-in, you have to have a certain amount of patience' (IO10).

These responses show the difficulties that organisations can face when thinking about intelligence and investigations, such as resources and buy-in, both general challenges cited by integrity organisations in a previous chapter. As noted by this Integrity Officer, intelligence and investigations can be difficult to set up and work out how best to use them. However, as noted by the previous quote in this section, by not investing in this, sports integrity can suffer. Additionally, this approach could allow for more returns for organisations e.g., catching more people committing integrity violations in the long run, therefore it should be carefully

considered. By maintaining sports integrity, this can help bring in and maintain sponsors and fans, which can financially aid sports, therefore the initial investment of intelligence and investigations may pay off. However, this could be difficult for smaller integrity organisations, and those who are not well funded. If organisations do not have the resources e.g., the staff who can deal with the intelligence and appropriately conduct investigations, then this approach may not aid them. Additionally, when organisations already have obligations e.g., to WADA to remain compliant, intelligence and investigations may just not be a priority for them. This is where information sharing, within the confines of applicable regulations and laws, could aid all sports integrity organisations.

Another Integrity Officer stated:

‘For me it’s [intelligence and investigations] the most efficient and effective way of doing anti-doping and not just investigations, but all aspects of anti-doping. Testing is only as good as the intelligence behind it. Knowing when, where, who, and how to test people all requires intelligence, so just randomly allocating tests throughout the year does not work, and has shown to not work... If the intention is to catch the number of people who are taking to these substances, the only way is to improve it is to know who you should be testing out this pool, so, rather than doing randomly, doing it more targeted, knowing when they are more likely to have substances in their system so depending on the sport, depending on the substance, depending on what they need... So who, when, where, knowing that given the resources of certain agencies that they know that going to certain places in the world, they know they will not get tested... Every aspect of the doping process is made more efficient by intelligence and then also therefore makes it cheaper. It makes it more flexible. You’re more effective doing 100 intelligence led tests than 1000 random tests so that’s infinitely cheaper testing wise, because testing is the most expensive thing in the process, so that money can be saved elsewhere and put into I and I’ (IO5).

Another Integrity Officer shared their view that intelligence and investigation can aid within the anti-doping system and cut costs, saying ‘I think I and I as such can really help develop the entire anti-doping process. Testing costs a lot of money, takes a major chunk of the finances. And I think intelligence, using intelligence led testing can really help us minimise the costs and improve the impact of our testing process’ (IO4). These responses highlight the importance that

intelligence can have on the rest of the function that integrity organisations have e.g., testing. Cost has been mentioned previously and this response shows that intelligence can aid with the high costs. Testing is expensive, with a large percentage of integrity organisations' budgets being spent on it. However, if this process can be made more efficient by using intelligence, then this could help with some of the pressure organisations are feeling on resources. However, many organisations have utilised intelligence and investigations over the last several years, and yet anti-doping testing figures remain low, as does the sanctioning of other integrity issues. This shows there may be more work to be done to ensure this method is working effectively and benefitting the system as a whole.

An Integrity Officer explained why the approach is useful for integrity issues beyond doping, saying 'It's a pretty strong consensus that all investigations have to be intelligence led because the ones that sort of appear in front of you as integrity or corruption breaches are so few. People aren't usually reporting corruption. You don't just see it. So there has to be an intelligence-led approach to better understand it, and deal with it by taking intelligence-led approach you deal with those problems at an earlier stage before they become a bit more pervasive with the number of participants, number of players, the impact on teams, etc., or wider impact on sport' (IO6). This highlights a key point which was also echoed by other participants and will be discussed in more depth later in the thesis: people tend not to report wrongdoing to integrity organisations if they experience or witness it. This means that intelligence gathering can help organisations to uncover information, and potentially evidence, that isn't being reported. When low levels of reporting is seen, then other ways to access information about wrongdoing have to be found, and intelligence and investigations can do this. This response also highlighted that accessing this information early, hopefully before integrity issues affect athletes and the sport, could be key to this approach. However, for the integrity system to be more effective, reporting must be encouraged as a key part of intelligence gathering.

Conversely, an Integrity Officer outlined their thoughts on why intelligence and investigations aren't the solution some in the industry class it as, saying 'They keep talking about in some of these conferences that I go to, and especially with people that are working in the industry, they're just very frustrated about the numbers that the [anti-doping] tests are returning because they cost so much, and I see that instead of trying to do testing more intelligently or more strategically, they have just decided that since we're not catching athletes with testing, then intelligence and investigations must be the way to go. The non-analytical evidence must be the

way for us to fight doping. But then you don't really, because it's harder to find evidence. And yeah, then you end up because you don't have the budget to carry out the type of program' (IO15). Evidence and resources are frequently cited as challenges to both the integrity system, and to the use of intelligence and investigations. This response from an Integrity Officer highlights opposition to intelligence and investigation being the ultimate solution. Instead, it must work hand in hand with other parts of the system, such as testing and education.

5.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has detailed how intelligence and investigations are being used within sports integrity. Interviewing 15 Integrity Officers who have worked in the field has allowed a unique insight into how intelligence and investigations are used. A comprehensive list of information and intelligence sources for investigations has been detailed, alongside how investigations are conducted to uncover integrity issues.

When considering critical realism, the three concepts of experiences, events and causal mechanisms have been seen through this chapter. The experiences, that is that perceptions of intelligence and investigations by Integrity Officers, have been outlined. This has highlighted the events that are occurring, and how they are perceived by the Integrity Officers, such as how integrity investigations are conducted and how intelligence is used. The causes, the things that produce events, have been assessed, such as why intelligence-led investigations are needed within sport integrity. Intelligence and investigations within sports integrity is seen as a vital part of progressing the field. Historically, integrity has relied on random anti-doping tests and largely ignored other integrity issues, which participants in this research view as not being the most effective or efficient way to conduct integrity matters. Therefore, new approaches are needed to prevent and sanction integrity issues, and intelligence and investigations are seen as a way to do this. The challenges stated by Integrity Officers in this research impacts how these investigations can be conducted and effects their overall effectiveness. Furthermore, the challenges that athletes state, such as a lack of support, will be influenced by the Integrity Officer challenges. For example, Integrity Officers state that resources and budgets are a challenge, therefore this will limit their ability to offer support in investigations, something that athletes call for. By considering Integrity Officer and Athlete Representatives experiences, assessing how these cause events to occur, and analysing the causes that produce these events, such as a lack of resources, critical realism has been utilised to provide novel perspectives on how intelligence and investigations are currently used within sport integrity.

5.5.1 Recommendations

Athlete Representatives offered their views on investigations, highlighting how difficult it is for athletes who are investigated for integrity issues and for those who are part of investigations e.g., as survivors or witnesses. More support is needed for both of these groups of athletes, as well as greater transparency on the processes.

The challenges outlined in this section, such as resources, finances, and staffing, have to be acknowledged and solutions worked upon. These could include ways to facilitate information sharing between organisations, and support on how to implement intelligence and investigations for organisations who are particularly struggling with these challenges e.g., smaller integrity organisations and those who receive little funding.

Intelligence and investigations should work with the rest of the procedures in the integrity system, such as education and anti-doping testing. By working collaboratively, all parts of the system can help each other. However, key challenges to the use of intelligence and investigations remain. These include whether athlete rights are being respected and whether these processes are working for athletes. Athlete Representatives state that athletes involved in investigations find them difficult and lack support. Further challenges include difficulty in obtaining adequate evidence. Low positive doping tests have been cited by many Integrity Officers in this research for necessitating the use of intelligence and investigations, however, despite the employment of this method over the recent years, the figures remain low. Greater use of these methods over time, including if smaller and less well funded organisations are supported in their use of intelligence and investigations, could aid with justification, alongside, working to ensure the methods support athlete rights.

This chapter has assessed the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity. One aspect of this which was acknowledged was the use of reporting as an intelligence method. The next chapter explores this method.

Chapter Six – Reporting as Intelligence

6.1 Chapter Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter on intelligence and investigations within sports integrity, reporting can be a source of information or intelligence that can help guide an investigation and provide evidence to prove integrity violations.

Views on how useful reporting and reporting persons are differed between the participants of this research. Furthermore, there are ethical issues that the use of reporting persons raises such as whether reporting anonymously should be permitted, whether they are and should be protected, and whether athletes and other persons in sport have an obligation to report wrongdoing. This chapter assesses the usefulness of reporting within sports integrity, drawing upon Integrity Officers' view and perspectives. Next, the issues of whether reporting should be anonymous or not, whether reporting persons are adequately protected, and whether athletes have an obligation to report, are analysed. This chapter suggests that both anonymous and non-anonymous methods of reporting are needed. Additionally, more needs to be done to support and protect athletes and others who report integrity offences.

6.2 What is Reporting in Sports Integrity?

Reporting wrongdoing in sport is encouraged by integrity organisations. In this research, Integrity Officers refer to those who report wrongdoing as various names including: reporting persons, confidential sources and whistleblowers. The reporting can differ from a one-off anonymous tip to a confidential source that interacts with the integrity organisation multiple times with their identity known. The terminology used was discussed in interviews with the Integrity Officers and will be further explored in this section.

WADA defines a Confidential Source as: 'a natural or legal person that has made a disclosure to WADA' (WADA, 2021, p.3). WADA has two levels of Confidential Source. The first level is an informant who can be anyone from someone who anonymously makes a disclosure once, to a known person who has interacted with WADA multiple times. The second level is a whistleblower. An informant transforms into a whistleblower when they have a whistleblower agreement with WADA in place. Here, they formally record their rights and responsibilities, and they can be afforded further protections (WADA, 2021). The British Horseracing Authority, responsible for integrity issues in the sport, define whistleblowing as 'the act of reporting any actions or events within an organisation's control involving danger, risk,

malpractice, or wrongdoing' (BHA, 2023, para 3). Previous academic literature refers to reporting persons as 'whistleblowers,' (e.g., Moriconi et al., 2020; Verschuuren, 2020; Newman et al., 2022). The next section discusses the differing terminologies.

6.2.1 Terminology

As mentioned above, the terminology around reporting can differ. Multiple participants stated their dislike for the word whistleblower, such as Integrity Officer One who said 'Whistleblowers, a word I don't particularly... no one should be categorising sports confidential sources as whistleblowers. It's a mischaracterization and leads down all sorts of wrong paths... So confidential sources which we way prefer as opposed to another overused and under understood term whistleblowers' (IO1).

Another Integrity Officer explained the difference between whistleblowers and confidential sources and why their organisation was moving away from the term, saying 'I think whistleblowers and sources are quite separate and different. I think there's a long-established consensus that whistleblowing policies and processes, are unnecessary. Actually, in [location] we didn't call it whistleblowing. Whistleblowing has some negative connotations. It's just not a very nice word to use, either in a corporate environment or a sport, and it often attracts disgruntled people, in an organisation or a sport who want to blow the whistle for reasons of their own dissatisfaction, either with the organisation of the sport or the outcome of events. People who just don't think something is right and are disgruntled by it. So that's why I think the whistleblowing policy and language is historical again, and sport should move on from it' (IO6).

In general, the participants in this research seemed keen to move away from the term whistleblower, due to the negative connotations it can be associated with. Reporting persons and confidential sources were preferred and these appear more encompassing. In this chapter's discussion and analysis, the term reporting person will be used to describe anyone who reports wrongdoing, covering a wide range of different ways people can report wrongdoing. This can be from a single anonymous report, to multiple exchanges with an integrity organisation to help them gather more information, up to sources (reporting persons who have a formal agreement with an integrity organisation). In the quotes from participants, their own terms will remain unchanged from what they said verbatim to ensure their voice is accurately represented.

The terminology used within sports integrity around reporting persons has been outlined. The next section looks at the processes that are used to facilitate the reporting.

6.2.2 Reporting Processes

During their interviews, many participants outlined the reporting processes that their organisations used and offered their views on them. The description of these processes, from Integrity Officers who work in the field and use these processes everyday, offers greater insight into how reporting within sports integrity works. This insight can then be used to fuel the analysis later in the chapter. Furthermore, hearing Integrity Officer perspectives on them offers greater understanding than is publicly available e.g., from integrity organisations' websites.

6.2.2.1 Reporting Mechanisms

Integrity organisations have reporting mechanisms and systems - ways that people can report wrongdoing or suspicions. These were detailed in data collection interviews with the Integrity Officers.

An Integrity Officer explained their organisations' reporting processes, saying:

'We have a software where everything comes in, and right now we have so you can either call, mail them, email them like from either an email - usually some people just create this fake names, emails to send information to us or on our website you can get this web form, web submission form where you can be anonymous or identify yourself and submit that to us...All this information, once we receive it, I create tip records in this platform we have [redacted] so we can track that. And then that's where I'll be able to link this athlete, or the person, the individual, to prior cases or to competitions, check their testing history, everything is connected there, and most of these tips would just be closed out as non-actionable. But in the future, if you keep receiving tips on the same person over the years or months, you can just collect bits and pieces of information, and eventually have some like a stronger case there. Obviously tips, it wouldn't be a reason to charge someone with a violation. But it's just a reason to be adjusting a testing strategy, things like that' (IO15).

The reports received are recorded and stored, which can be used within investigations if necessary. In this organisation, reports can be done via phone, email, and online form. This

Integrity Officer notes that ‘most of these tips would just be closed out as non-actionable’ (IO15) suggesting that a lot of the information isn’t useful, something which was also noted by other Integrity Officers in this research. Another point to note in this response is how reports alone are not enough to charge someone with a violation. Instead, they are used to inform, and sometimes start off, investigations. They can provide additional information to build an intelligence picture and can also guide an investigation to further evidence. All reports need to be assessed in order to understand their meaning and accuracy.

Another Integrity Officer explained ‘We use another platform that's called [redacted]... It's pretty much based on WADA’s Speak Up platform through which anybody can raise a complaint’ (IO4).

An Integrity Officer explained their organisations’ systems in place, saying ‘We have a reporting mechanism system in place, our online platform which is also available in the form of an app so that's our main sort of channel, let's say to encourage people to speak out... Whistleblower systems need to be in place, but they're not always used. We will receive for example on this platform a lot of complaints because it's public so complaints from fans or you know unhappy spectators, so we have some triage to do and we do this internally... There will be an internal review to measure the credibility of the message’ (IO9). This response and others shows the importance of verifying the reports. This supports the previous response by detailing that a report on its own would not be enough evidence to prove a sanction and additional information must be used to corroborate information from reports received. Additionally, another Integrity Officer explained the difficulties with reporting mechanisms, saying:

‘The reality is that you generally are only getting very low-level information. You're not getting the individuals generally, unless they've got an axe to grind. You’re not getting any intelligence on individuals committing serious crime or criminality. But it's a must that you have that kind of safety net there, that you have that reporting line. So in our sport, we have a couple of reporting lines accessible through the website, and I think they are pretty easy to use and easy to explain, we’ve got them in multiple languages. And also there's another option that you use a telephone if somebody wants to provide information verbally, and that's all good. The reality is we don't get a great deal of information through those means. And we’ve got people ringing up, saying, oh, I just got a bit of suspicion about this or you know messages.

Generally, it's because they've got an axe to grind about something, or they want to cause somebody a little bit of grief' (IO3).

These responses echo a previous participants' suggestion that not all information is useful, which is further discussed in the next section. The participant suggests that some reports can be vindictive. This highlights the importance of corroborating all reports and ensuring that what has been reported is genuine and true. This is explained by an Integrity Officer who detailed the process of beginning an investigation after information is received from a report, saying,

'We receive something from a whistleblower through our hotline. Then the [department], the first thing that they do is to assess the information and to assess the person. So the information, what is it all about? Is this very vague, is it hearsay? Is it very concrete? How did the person get the information? And then the informant, if it's not anonymous, what is the motivation? Does the person have access? How did it retrieve the information? So it's an overall assessment and evaluation. And then at the end of this there is an assessment, or hypothesis from the team, saying it's likely true or no, no, it's very vague, it's hearsay, it's just perhaps a competitor that wants to defame someone. Then, when this is done, it comes to a triage process, meaning then they meet, so not the informants, but the confidential source handler meets then the investigator and the analysts and provides the case. And then this group decides whether it's a case for us, or we should share it with others, because it's another jurisdiction and then the analyst goes over it and tries to corroborate the allegations, so goes into the databases, open source whatever is available, even some interviews. And then, when the analyst comes back with, okay, we have either gaps that need to be filled and then perhaps goes back to the informant's handler or yeah, it's good, we can go to the overt phase, meaning then the investigator develops a strategy investigation strategy. And with that is then in the team all together they develop a strategy of how to investigate that case. And this is where, then, my role comes into play, then they have to propose an investigation project and then propose what they want to do, how they want to do and if it gets signed by me, then they can go ahead' (IO7).

This outlines the procedure that occurs within this Integrity Officer's organisations when information is received from a report, and how that is dealt with. Multiple steps and people are

involved, highlighting once again how the use of intelligence and investigations can be a resource intensive process, which can disproportionately affect smaller and under-resourced organisations. This is highlighted by other integrity organisations who were more critical of the systems they had in place, with one Integrity Officer saying ‘We don't have a good reporting mechanism apart from the doping where we use the ITA's [International Testing Agency] for that. So we don't have a proper independent system, confidential reporting. We don't have any of that at the moment, it's just a [redacted] email address’ (IO10). Given the importance that many Integrity Officers in this research place on reporting, not having an independent, confidential reporting system appears to be an issue. This could discourage athletes from reporting if they are unsure of how their report will be used and handled. However, as previously noted, this is an issue that affects disproportionately organisations with smaller budgets and manpower, with resources needed to be spent elsewhere e.g., testing, or to ensure they are compliant with WADA.

The types of reporting mechanisms that people can report integrity issues or suspicions mentioned by Integrity Officers in this research include: phone calls, phone messages (e.g. WhatsApp, text, Signal), email, web forms, apps, external reporting mechanisms (e.g. using the ITA's functions).

6.2.2.2 Sources

Alongside the reporting mechanisms described above, some integrity organisations used sources (otherwise known as whistleblowers, human sources or confidential sources) to aid with investigations. These are typically defined by dialogue with integrity organisations, rather than one-off reports. The Integrity Officers interviewed for this research detailed more about how they are used within sports integrity.

One Integrity Officer explained:

‘Confidential Sources are used in the same way that any intelligence is used... It feeds the intelligence and the process that we would go out and speak to people, just to learn more information... Confidentiality would obviously be held very tightly, but obviously trust has to be earned. But people might tell you stuff, whether it's a secret or not, that is not available online. And it's particularly known amongst athletes, maybe, or against certain teams... So then you would assess that the

information is reliable or not and they might be able to give you even further evidence. Like, a first-hand account, I knew this, I knew X. So that's how we might gather information. Then the way we would treat it is incredibly sensitive. It is secured, only known by one or two people, who that person is, who that source is, and if we were to ever use it in a report, or whatever, or to feedback someone, it would be completely anonymized, and we would use like similar to like the police like an intelligence grading system. So it would be how closely you trust the source, plus if they're proven so there's a difference between me speaking to a colleague of 20 years and a stranger I mean on the street in terms of their level of trust and their reliability, and how over time they've proven it to be useful, so that might go to the report of I trust the human source with close authority on the subject says X, Y and Z. Or we might choose not to do it at all and everything is assessed for threat and things' (IO5).

This response notes the proactive nature of some intelligence gathering work, where integrity organisations will go out and speak to people in order to gain information. Furthermore, it is highlighted that all the information that is obtained is held securely, and assessed based on how likely it is to be true. Trust is mentioned by this participant and this can raise an important point about reporting. With every report, there is a need to work out how accurate the report is. The report could be inaccurate, either due to the reporting person deliberately making a false report, or due to a mistake or misinterpretation. An aspect integrity organisations must pay attention to is how do they know reports are true? This response mentions sources that they trust and have proven true in the past. Furthermore, additional evidence is needed to back up the claims. This could come from other intelligence sources mentioned in chapter five. This response also mentions how important it is to be careful with reports where the information is only known by very few people. This is because if the information is used e.g., in a public hearing, then it can be obvious who has reported that and that person may be at risk, such as at risk of retaliation. This is something the Athlete Representatives in the interviews mentioned was a barrier for athletes when reporting. This research shows that Integrity Officers are taking this into account, however due to the Athlete Representative responses, it is not clear that they are communicating this to athletes. Telling athletes that they are protected and how, such as anonymising reports and not disclosing certain information, could enhance athlete confidence to report wrongdoing.

Another Integrity Officer explained how their organisation works with sources, saying ‘We never ever talk to anybody who doesn't know that we're [organisation]. So we talk to people overtly and up front. But something that they may tell us or wish to tell us is confidential, so they're a confidential source. It's much more effective than sitting back waiting for a whistleblower to walk through your front door’ (IO1). Again, a proactive approach is noted here, which appears key, alongside being upfront with the sources. This may help facilitate trust and encourage people to report and become sources.

This Integrity Officer further explained how sources could work with their organisations and the regulations that were in place, saying ‘The point about confidential sources is that we can target a particular person because they were at an event or something else. Or we will use someone who's stepped forward because they want to talk to us about various things. But all of them, all of them, are not paid. All of them know they're talking to the [organisation]. Some of them and their stuff, they know will become evidential, and we tell them that right from the get go. Some of their stuff will never be evidential, and we use it for lead purposes in our investigative work, as part of a confidential agreement. So they will pass us this information knowing we can only use it to further an investigation. We can't use whatever they told us as a piece of evidence in the case’ (IO1). This relates to others stating that certain pieces of intelligence are not used as evidence. This tactic may be used in order to facilitate trust, but also to protect the source e.g., if only a few people know the piece of information that is reported, then using this as evidence in a public hearing could put the source at risk. So not disclosing this as evidence but using it as intelligence to further an investigation can be one way organisations work with sources, and could facilitate trust, as well as encouraging them to report further, if they are satisfied the integrity organisation will protect and support them. However, it is noted that confidentiality and anonymity cannot be absolutely guaranteed, and this is further discussed in the later section on protecting reporting persons in this chapter.

An Integrity Officer highlighted the importance of interacting with sources, saying

‘The information that we have of any real substance is generally through interaction with individuals. So, we might attend an event and the team might have a chat with individuals. You give them a bit of an overview around the unit and all the rest of it. And then, sometimes you get people approaching afterwards saying can we just have a chat with you about this. Or you'll get an email then following up from that

so people aren't trying to hide from us. You know they're providing email so you can see who it is, given the name saying just want to mention this, so I've got a bit of concern about this coach... We'd use them [reporting persons] to kick off investigations... You want the human intelligence source, it's gold dust' (IO3).

Presence at events appears to be a key way that integrity organisations are using to engage with people in the sport, and to encourage reporting of wrongdoing. Being present and showing athletes and others who an integrity organisation is could facilitate trust and show that there are humans behind the reporting mechanisms, who will act upon the reports, take them seriously and protect the reporter.

Sources have been detailed by Integrity Officers to be used in various ways including: approaching people to speak to e.g., at events, developing reporting persons into confidential sources via signed agreements, targeting specific individuals e.g. because they were involved in a certain event or situation. The next section assesses how useful reporting persons are perceived as by Integrity Officers.

6.2.3 Usefulness

There was a disparity in views among Integrity Officer participants regarding the usefulness of reporting persons in sports integrity investigations. Many Integrity Officers saw them in a positive light, with one describing them as 'The biggest asset' (IO7) and another stating, 'You want the human intelligence source, it's gold dust... They're a really valuable source of intelligence... We still get some of the best intelligence through human intelligence' (IO3). One Integrity Officer stated that building a relationship with a reporting person was the best strategy: 'It's much more effective than sitting back waiting for a whistleblower to walk through your front door' (IO1).

While some Integrity Officers interviewed were adamant of the need for using reporting persons, others were less sure, with one Integrity Officer stating, 'I don't really think they [reporting persons] play a major role in the investigations' (IO4) and another explaining, 'Confidential Sources are not as effective an approach... I think integrity units can rely on it. And it's not the best indicator of a problem. The people who take that approach or are involved are often not the most reliable, I mean those informants themselves' (IO6).

This indicates a lack of trust from Integrity Officers. This in part could be explained by Integrity Officers expressing views that reporting can provide poor quality information. Integrity Officers supported the notion that a lot of intelligence from reporting isn't useful, with one Integrity Officer stating, 'Most of these tips would just be closed out as non-actionable' (IO15). An issue raised by Integrity Officers was the tension between needing these functions but not getting much information through these reporting channels, with one explaining 'The reality is that you generally are only getting very low-level information. You're not getting the individuals generally unless they've got an axe to grind. You're not getting any intelligence on individuals committing serious crime or criminality. But it's a must that you have that kind of safety net there, that you have that reporting line' (IO3) and another stating 'There's not much information that we get through this channel... Whistleblower systems need to be in place but they're not always used' (IO9). Poor quality or lack of information is a frustration to integrity organisations, who can often be resource-stretched.

The varied opinions from Integrity Officers about the usefulness of reporting shows the differences in their value and use across sports integrity. This may affect how they are protected and utilised across organisations. While some Integrity Officers interviewed have expressed questions over the usefulness of reporting, literature suggests that athletes and others involved in sport do not feel as if they are able to speak out about and report wrongdoing (Erickson et al., 2017). Overall, the finding of this research highlighted varying views of Integrity Officers on the usefulness of reporting persons, ranging from being the most useful asset, to not being used in investigations. Reporting persons are generally seen in this study as useful for sport integrity investigations. However, literature suggests there are challenges associated, such as not knowing how to report doping, loyalty to teammates, and doping cultures (Whitaker et al., 2014; Ohl et al., 2015). These challenges could prevent athletes from reporting and result in integrity organisations not having access to vital information.

Integrity Officers have detailed their experiences and perspectives on reporting within sports integrity. The next section analyses whether reporting should be anonymous or not.

6.3 Should Reporting be Anonymous?

During the data collections interviews, varying opinions from Integrity Officers about whether reporting should be anonymous or not were expressed. This section assesses both options.

An Integrity Officer explained how most of their reporting was done anonymously, saying ‘I think most of the tips that we receive would be anonymous... Most of our tip sources are just reporting them via this anonymous form or text message, and we try to communicate with them. But they just don't feel comfortable identifying themselves’ (IO15). This response highlights a key barrier that athletes, and others, can face when considering reporting. Not feeling comfortable to report could be for many reasons. Previous research has suggested that a lack of protection against retaliation is a barrier to reporting, with athletes stating that they should be protected against this (Barkoukis, 2021). This barrier is echoed in several studies (Moriconi & de Cima, 2020; Rehg et al., 2008; Teo & Caspersz, 2011). Miller and Gordon (2014) explored reasons why reporting persons may not be fully honest. This includes fear of embarrassment, worry of retaliation from those they are implicating, personal losses they could face, legal issues against them, the possibility of harming another, and implicating themselves in the wrongdoing (Miller & Gordon, 2014).

One Integrity Officer highlighted the importance of being able to report wrongdoing anonymously, saying ‘It is very important to have the anonymous option and some use it’ (IO11). However, they shared a drawback on someone reporting anonymously, explaining that some who reports anonymously cannot continue the conversation ‘Someone who only really uses the website once, they virtually never give all the information that you need to act on it, so it's always better to try and get a conversation going’ (IO11). Having a function that allows for wrongdoing to be reported anonymously means that those who are hesitant to report e.g., for fear of retaliation or their own sanction, may feel more comfortable to report. However, as this response highlights, this limits integrity organisations’ ability to follow up on the report and potentially seek clarification and further information.

Other Integrity Officers shared their thoughts as to why reporting of integrity concerns should not be anonymous. One Integrity Officer said ‘There's, in some sports, the ability to report anonymously but that has its drawbacks. It [reporting] should be encouraged but you prefer the reporting mechanisms to be open so you're protecting the sport’ (IO8). They further explained their thoughts, saying:

‘Someone from sport will say ‘I know of a fixed match, but I don't want my name connected with any of that’ and they give you details of the match. Now of course we will listen to that person but anonymous reporting is very difficult to corroborate

what is being said if the person doesn't want to give evidence or whatever... But the difficulty with anonymous reporting on corruption in sport is it could be vindictive by the person making those reports. So you have to have a way of knowing what the person is telling has got a semblance of truth... So some of the athlete commissions, people that represent athletes, they are pushing big-time for anonymity amongst participants. Sports bodies themselves will try to only use that path in extreme circumstances like if there's some vulnerability to the witnesses, there's fear of retribution. But reporting mechanisms you really need to encourage the people to come forward to give evidence' (IO8).

This response highlights the difficulties that anonymous reporting can pose, namely the inability to follow up reports, and gain further evidence to corroborate them. However, if anonymous reporting was stopped, then this could prevent people reporting altogether due to the barriers previously spoken about.

Another Integrity Officer also suggested that anonymous reporting makes it more difficult for integrity organisations to verify information, saying 'Obviously, if they [the reporting person] want to remain anonymous, you wouldn't be like naming your source in a hearing, or anything like that, but it just adds credibility to the tip because you know where that person is coming from, if you know, because, let's say I receive a tip and this anonymous person telling me that you're using growth hormone that is coming from your competition just like a fellow swimmer that wants to see you more tested, or something like that, or someone that suspects your good results but doesn't necessarily have good information on you. So yeah, knowing who they are, definitely adds some credibility to the tip' (IO15). Increased credibility is an argument for non-anonymous reports, due to the greater likelihood of being able to verify them. This is important as other Integrity Officers have noted that reporting is unlikely to be enough evidence for a sanction but could instead be a vital piece of the puzzle needed to prove wrongdoing.

This research highlights that athletes are still hesitant to report wrongdoing, a fact that some Integrity Officers are aware of. This is despite WADA adding an Article into the 2021 WADC which aims to protect against retaliation - Article 2.11 of the WADC: Acts by an Athlete or Other Person to Discourage or Retaliate Against Reporting to Authorities (WADA, 2019a). WADA states that Article 2.11 was added to the WADC to highlight their commitment to not tolerating retaliation against reporting persons (WADA, 2022c). This is one way WADA have

sought to protect reporting persons, however, despite this it appears more work needs to be done.

In this section, Integrity Officers have offered arguments for anonymous and non-anonymous reporting, with a preference seen to non-anonymous. This thesis argues that both have their place in the integrity system, and it is vital that both methods are available to athletes and others who are reporting integrity violations and suspicions. Anonymous reporting is needed to encourage people to report who may be hesitant for reasons such as fear of retaliation or fear of implicating themselves in the wrongdoing. If the option to report anonymously did not exist then this could reduce the amount of reporting, something that Integrity Officers have highlighted as already low. Reporting mechanisms often highlight that no piece of information is too small. Therefore, any reporting, including anonymous, should be encouraged as even small pieces of information could help in investigations and provide new leads etc. Allowing for anonymous reporting can facilitate a level of trust in the system and can mean that those reporting may share more than if they were not anonymous. Therefore, it is vital that this method of reporting is offered.

However, non-anonymous reporting is another important aspect of the integrity system and should be encouraged where possible for the reasons cited by Integrity Officers in this study. Being about to communicate with the person who has reported can lead to further conversations which can allow integrity organisations to potentially gain further information on the report. This can lead to additional information and intelligence, which can assist in investigations and hopefully provide evidence to sanction the wrongdoing reported. Without this further communication it can be more difficult to corroborate reports and gain additional information that is needed. Furthermore, if someone reports and provides contact details, then an update on their report could be provided and this could help enhance trust in the system if people see that their reports are being followed up on and enacted upon.

A notable case involving reporting was the doping allegations that surrounded renowned track and field coach Alberto Salazar. His assistant coach, Steve Magness reported what he thought were questionable doping practices. His report included admittance of his own use of a prohibited method, which USADA promised not to charge him for in exchange for the information on Salazar. Magness' report led to Salazar being charged with multiple ADRVs (WADA, 2021h; USADA, 2019). However, WADA encouraged USADA to charge Magness

for his own ADRV. USADA refused due to the fear that it would discourage future reporting from coming forward (WADA, 2021h). This partly stems from the principles of trust and distrust, two competing notions that Ullmann-Margalit (2004) outline are not exhaustive, but they are exclusive; one cannot trust and distrust someone, at the same time, about the same matter. If USADA went back on their promise not to charge Magness, they risk a diffusion of distrust within the athletic community, undermining the role of reporting within anti-doping. However, WADA states that all persons who commit an ADRV should be charged for signatories to be compliant with the WADC and to facilitate trust in the system (WADA, 2021f). The appeal panel in Salazar's case noted that they did not expect USADA to facilitate any action against Magness, both in terms of charging him with an ADRV or assisting anyone else to (CAS, 2021). The panel also stated that they had 'very serious concerns that issues of procedural fairness, at the least, could arise' (CAS, 2021, p113). This situation leaves Magness as not sufficiently protected against any further action, despite USADA stating that they do not wish him to face any consequences. This leaves Magness in a vulnerable situation where he has helped USADA greatly by providing information that initiated sanctions to be brought against Salazar but calls into question WADA's commitment to reporting persons, something that will likely discourage further reporting persons from speaking about other infringements of anti-doping policy due to the fear that they will not be adequately protected. While it could be argued that charging Magness will maintain trust in the anti-doping system by ensuring the Code is complied with (WADA, 2021h), this likely comes at the expense of the reporting process, where individuals have not been adequately protected throughout the process when policy states otherwise. USADA contends that without reporting, cases such as Salazar's would not move forward (WADA, 2021h). Thus, reporting persons ought to be prioritised to better ensure trust in the process and encourage more people to come forward with information on integrity matters. Magness could have reported anonymously, however there is no guarantee that this would have prevented his own ADRV from coming to light.

Both anonymous and non-anonymous reporting appear needed within the integrity system, and athletes and other persons within sport should be offered both options. However, a lack of substantial reports was cited as a challenge by Integrity Officers in this research, with a common view expressed that most reports are not useful. Thus, solutions to address this must be sought. Another key challenge this research has highlighted is that athletes do not trust integrity organisations. This could be a significant barrier as to why reporting is scarce, as if athletes do not trust integrity organisations, then they are not going to feel comfortable reporting

wrongdoing to them. To combat these issues, this thesis has the following recommendations. Integrity organisations should highlight to their stakeholders the reporting process, including that there are people behind the reporting mechanisms who will act upon the reports, rather than the reports just being lost in a system. This could reassure reporting persons that their reports will be acted upon and could help increase trust in the process. It should be outlined to stakeholders how reporting persons are reported, including anonymity, confidentiality, secure reporting systems, and Article 2.11 of the WADC. This could help ensure that people know their information will be treated correctly and that risks such as retaliation are reduced. Furthermore, athletes and others should be educated on what integrity issues within sport look like. Many athletes are only aware of doping being using drugs, whereas there are 11 ADRVs for them to be aware of and to potentially report, as well as many integrity issues that they could experience. If they are aware of what wrongdoing looks like, then they are more likely to be able to report it. Increased education around reporting appears key, and this can be used alongside other communication techniques such as messages about reporting on social media, in newsletters, at events and at the bottom on web pages containing information that athletes and others involved in the sport may visit.

This section has discussed whether reporting should be anonymous. The next section looks at whether reporting persons are protected within the integrity system.

6.4 Are Reporting Persons Adequately Protected?

Discussions in this chapter have outlined how reporting is used within sports integrity, assessing the processes and analysing whether reporting should be anonymous. Another key question is whether reporting persons are protected. The participants in this research gave varying views, with differences seen between Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives, with the Athlete Representative more likely to believe they are not protected.

The importance of protecting reporting persons is highlighted by one Integrity Officer who stated, ‘The ultimate importance of human sources is their protection’ (IO5).

Integrity Officers outlined what their organisations did to protect reporting persons. One stated ‘We would never do anything that would compromise that [protection]. If only 4 people in a room know something then obviously we’re not going to talk about that to anyone else, because then it’s very clear that information came from one of those 4 people’ (IO5). Another Integrity

Officer explained ‘So we have a policy in place which itself is confidential and it’s as much about what we don’t do, or what we won’t do, as it is about what we do, and that’s very important indeed because it kind of deflated anybody’s perceptions about confidential sources, and what it all means and so on. It deflates it completely into a very straightforward objective policy, stripping away any kind of mystique or whatever, and laying out very clearly what we will do and what we won’t do’ (IO1). Being upfront with those who wish to report was cited as a method used by some integrity organisations, with one Integrity Officer saying ‘It’s not deeply sexy and spy-like, we never ever talk to anybody who doesn’t know that we’re the [organisation]. So we talked to people overtly and up front. But something that they may tell us or wish to tell us is confidential’ (IO1). Another Integrity Officer had a similar approach, explaining ‘They [the reporting person] know how we operate so they know that when they provide information it’s kept in absolute confidence’ (IO3). These responses highlight that some integrity organisations employ transparency when working with reporting persons. This transparency may help reporting persons to feel more protected, as if they are aware of the procedures then they may feel more confident with the reporting processes.

Providing anonymity is one way integrity organisations seek to protect reporting persons, with one Integrity Officer outlining how their organisations did this, saying ‘Even if you know their identities, if they ask to remain anonymous that’s just what we do. We protect their identities as best as we can, and we have, like a few athletes, a few coaches, managers, people that we’ve been working with for years. And but I think, yeah, most of our tip sources are just reporting them via this like anonymous form or text message, and we try to communicate with them... even if you’re not planning on – obviously, if they want to remain anonymous, you wouldn’t be like naming your source in a hearing, or anything like that’ (IO15).

However, another Integrity Officer stated that anonymity cannot be guaranteed, explaining ‘What we can offer people is confidentiality throughout the process so particularly with some of the safe sport cases, it only really matters when it comes to the hearing, the tribunal hearing or a decision because everybody tends to do you know even if you’re trying to keep things confidential, they tend to know roughly who it is because it’s a small community. But we will never offer anything more than that because we can’t do you know as I say we’re not a police force, we cannot offer anonymity, we can’t’ (IO10). As discussed earlier in the chapter, a lack of anonymity may mean that some individuals are hesitant to report wrongdoing. Furthermore, it may harm some sports or countries more than others, as if some are stating that they can

provide anonymity, whereas others are saying they cannot, then there may be a difference in willingness to report. This also relates back to funding and resources as a challenge. One Integrity Officer said ‘We don’t even have a secure reporting platform... We don’t have a good reporting mechanism apart from the doping where we use the ITA’s for that. So we don’t have a proper independent system, confidential reporting. We don’t have any of that at the moment, it’s just a [redacted] email address’ (IO10). These responses suggest that they are unable to offer anonymity due to a lack of staff and resources to do this. Once again, this thesis calls for meaningful ways for imbalances to be addressed across organisations. However, smaller organisations may have smaller budgets for a reason e.g., for niche sports or small population sizes therefore less athletes, and additional extra resources could in fact be more needed elsewhere e.g., to ensure they remain compliant with WADA. Consideration to each organisation and their unique position may be needed, alongside work as to whether any help can be provided. Even the largest integrity organisations may be struggling with resources and financials, with sports and governments often wanting to invest money elsewhere.

Another Integrity Officer acknowledged that the protections their organisation offers weren’t completely robust but every effort is taken, saying ‘When we get that information and that whistleblower type information, we have the tools and the legislative establishment to handle that properly so that people are protected. There are high levels of protection where it can be offered. It’s hard to say that someone will be protected from any information forever because it might be that the information can be identified back to them and no one else so when you get to a stage in court or in criminal hearing like that then it may well be that may be disclosed then but certainly our aim is to have confidential reporting mechanisms that do protect human resources and whatever other source of information that might come through, so we have an obligation and there’s an expectation of government that this will be taken seriously’ (IO13). This offers a more realistic explanation of protections offered, with acknowledgement given to the fact that reporting persons may not be able to be protected forever. This may mean that potential reporting persons are put off from reporting, however, being upfront and honest is a better approach, and this can prepare reporting persons for the reality, and allow them to adjust their report accordingly e.g., by not providing identifying details. While reporting persons seek to be protected, knowing the reality, that it cannot be absolute but every effort is taken, may build trust in the long run. This still may not be enough to encourage reporting however.

One Integrity Officer outlined how they treat reporting information, explaining:

‘The way we would treat it is incredibly sensitive. It is secured, only known by one or two people, who that person is, who that source is, and if we were to ever use it in a report, or whatever, or to feedback someone, it would be completely anonymized, and we would use like similar to like the police like an intelligence grading system... If I collect information from one organisation, I can’t just give it to another, because of the contract I have with the first. I can encourage the first to have a word with a second and say you might want to have a word with them. I’ve had it where we’ve worked on cases for multiple partners without them knowing it and it’s going to be frustrating because we know that if they all got in a room they would help each other, but they don’t want to get in a room’ (IO5).

Ways to minimise the number of people handling reports is be one way to protect reporting persons, as the less people that know, the more protected they may feel. However, the inability to share information can have both pros and cons. For reporting persons, they may feel more protected that their reports are not shared beyond the organisations who they report to and this may aid with trust. However, as noted by the Integrity Officer, it may aid organisations to share information if they are working on the same integrity violation, however, being unable to do so due to data protection regulations this could limit what is able to be done.

Some Athlete Representatives believed protections were in place for reporting persons, with one stating, ‘I think there is a reasonable amount of protection there’ (AR4) and another saying, ‘I’m not aware of any issues in terms of breaking confidentiality or breaking anonymity in terms of whistleblowing’ (AR3).

One Athlete Representative explained further ‘I hope I’m right in believing this is there in the [location] we have policies and procedures that would ensure anonymity and confidentiality when reporting, but that is absolutely not the perception of what other athletes across the globe think of their reporting structures, and that’s not just anti-doping’ (AR3). This highlights some uncertainty from athletes over the protection of reporting persons. Another Athlete Representative highlighted the differences that can exist in the global integrity system, saying ‘Especially people from the global South, where there’s different dynamics when it comes to the power imbalances and as the [organisation] sometimes we just try to get, you know, allocate some funding to those people, or even take those people out of the country. So it’s a broken

system 100%' (AR5). When considering the protection of reporting persons, attention must be paid to circumstances that may be affecting their experiences such as locations, sports and cultures. These things may affect how reporting is dealt with and athlete perceptions. One way for organisations to overcome potential barriers such as these is to enact transparent reporting mechanisms, such as some of those outlined by some Integrity Officers. If athletes and others are aware of the protections (or even lack of) in place, then they can make a more informed decision about reporting and can understand what will happen when they do. Failure to be clear about how reporting persons are protected could deter reporting. Additionally, an Athlete Representative has highlighted how power imbalances can affect reporting, and therefore integrity organisations must recognize if these exist in their jurisdictions and take steps to address them in order to encourage reporting.

Another Athlete Representative explained 'We have supported a number of individuals coming forward disclosing abuse where we also saw again the kind of structural problems in sports governance that very often those people that you are reporting to you are the ones in charge or with close ties to the abuser with incentives not to take action, and then more generally the links between national federations and international federations result, very often, in even more harm where international federations intervened, disclosed the reporting which then basically resulted again in death threats to the whistleblowers' (AR2). This response highlights the dangers of reports not being held confidentially, and this will undoubtedly deter other reporting persons if such serious consequences can come from reporting. This highlights the importance of confidentiality and why reporting persons should be protected.

Athlete Representative explained the effect that reporting can have on athletes, with one saying 'They just go through the trauma... They are retaliated... We've been in contact with some whistleblowers. They are 100% traumatised. And they even lose their jobs' (AR5). This showcases the effect that reporting can have on athletes and shows why these processes should be carefully managed. Some Integrity Officers outlined steps they take to prevent some of these issues, however, the fact that an Athlete Representative has highlighted issues such as retaliation and traumatisation shows that not enough is being done to protect all reporting persons.

Another Athlete Representative shared '[Some athletes] are not aware that if you do report that you're going to remain confidential and anonymous so there's massive concerns on that and massive issues around that' (AR3) and one said:

'The whistleblower can whistle blow, and can have no consequences for them with their federation but it can have a consequence for them in the coach deciding whether they're the next person in line to be selected or not, and in some ways there are so many individual items that go into a successful athlete that it's almost guaranteed that something will fall by the wayside as a result. Your coach might decide not to work with you. Your National Federation might decide that person's trouble. Your International Federation might decide we're not going to support them as much as we want, your national funding agency might... So it's quite difficult to protect people when there are so many different aspects coming in... Once it comes out it may not be a direct impact, but it is problematic in some ways. So it is a problem. It is something that needs to be worked on' (AR4).

Beyond effects such as retaliation and traumatisation, other indirect effects can come from reporting. These include being treated differently by others in sport as a result. This is also highlighted in previous literature. The 'code of silence' has been discussed, such as Whitaker et al. (2014b) who report that athletes state that loyalty to their teammates prevents them from speaking out. Ohl et al., (2015) report that doping cultures exist within cycling that meant athletes would protect others and feel inclined to dope themselves. Moreover, within recreational Welsh Rugby Union, players were given the 'heads up' by coaches, that doping officials were due to turn up at training or matches, effectively protecting doped athletes (Cox et al., 2022). This paints a rather bleak picture when clean sport is considered, highlighting various challenges for those seeking to attain an ideal of clean sport and underlining the importance of reporting more generally. Previous recommendations have been made by athletes, including making sure that the way that reporting can be done is trustworthy and reliable e.g., available in the user's native language and that it is clear how to use it, and that the reporting process, e.g. who has the reports and how they are processed, is transparent (Barkoukis et al., 2022). Being told the progress of the investigation into their report could also mean the process is more credible and it is also vital that the system is independently evaluated regularly in order to ensure the effectiveness of the process (Barkoukis et al., 2022).

Kambhampati and Star (2021) recommend that the emotional well-being of reporting persons should be addressed, due to the emotional toll of witnessing doping. This is already seen outside of sport, for example, the national whistleblowing law in Tunisia provides psychological assistance and legal aid, and this could be employed within sports integrity (Chalouat et al., 2019). It is further suggested that WADA should have independent trained staff who can inform reporting persons about emotional support (Kambhampati & Star, 2021), which has been essential in the public sector (Vandekerckhove & Lewis, 2012).

WADA have previously questioned how to protect reporting persons who have committed an ADRV as currently these sanctions are published publicly, therefore if an athlete is shown to have a reduced sentence then it can be apparent that they have aided WADA. Here, ‘tactical actions’ are being developed by WADA, with further work needed to protect valuable assets (Rowbottom, 2021).

The responses in this research that criticised or were unsure of the protection of reporting persons in this thesis primarily came from Athlete Representatives, rather than Integrity Officers. This suggests that athletes and those working in integrity have differing opinions on the realities of reporting. On the issue of reporting, Athlete Representatives in this research outline issues that athletes face when reporting wrongdoing, and state that they do not feel protected as athletes face retaliation, re-traumatisation and can face negativity from others within sport. Integrity Officers on the other hand appear to feel as if they are taking steps to protect reporting persons. This imbalance needs addressing in order to facilitate reporting best practices, with dialogue between both party crucial to this in order for integrity organizations to understand athletes’ perspectives and challenges, and vice versa.

One Athlete Representative offered some solutions, including how athletes can be supported, saying:

‘I think what really needs to happen is building those support structures, so I think it takes a lot of courage of individuals in this current system to come forward so what we need to change is creating trust by support and belief. So I think what needs to be done very quickly, it’s really establishing access to trauma informed support, psychological support, financial support. So very often those individuals are struggling because they can no longer exercise their profession, but then also legal

support to really pinpoint them to the most effective procedures if they want to pursue them, to raise awareness and to complain and to achieve justice so that needs to happen. I think simultaneously on the national domestic level, but also on the international one because where the domestic fail, the global mechanisms need to work basically as a fallback as a default mechanism. So I think support is the first step and then what we need to create or what needs to be created is independent investigations – and again, trauma informed survivor centred investigation processes, and mechanisms that then feed into adjudication, remedy and by remedy I think that is a whole bouquet of different things. It's first like the procedural element, but then we are also talking about for those survivors of non-recent abuse to be able to access compensation for the emotional, psychological, physical damage they suffered and the damage of their career' (AR2).

Reporting persons expose themselves to a certain level of vulnerability when they provide information related to integrity issues, and it takes courage for these individuals to step forward. This response highlights the courage that reporting can take and suggests trust must be nurtured with support and belief. From the responses, it is clear that proper ways to protect reporting persons and to act on the information is needed. Transparency is employed by Integrity Officers in this study to encourage reporting, however, this does not appear enough, as noted by Integrity Officers who expressed the wish for more to work with, and the hesitancy for sources to come forward with information. To address barriers and challenges uncovered in this research, as well as in existing literature (Whitaker et al., 2014b; Ohl et al., 2015), further support for reporting persons is needed. This could include tailored support for reporting persons, including trauma-informed support, as well as psychological, legal and/or financial support if needed. Trauma-informed support means being aware of the trauma that those being supported have experienced and working to prevent re-traumatisation. Furthermore, attention to geographical location, and other factors, such as sex of Integrity Officers, may be needed, particularly with sensitive integrity issues such as abuse and harassment. The importance of independent investigations is highlighted. It is vital that investigations are not affected by bias or the want to protect the sport, its image or anyone involved. Compensation is another solution offered by an Athlete Representative. This would help support athletes. A key challenge to this would be where the compensation would come from, with organisations already admitting to resources challenges. However, compensation for those affected is a clear way to help athletes. It has also been seen previously, for example, in the abuse case within US gymnastics, the US justice

department agreed to pay \$138.7m to the survivors of the abuse of the former national gymnastics team doctor, Larry Nassar (Debusmann, 2024).

In this thesis, challenges identified by Integrity Officers in this research include: i) unhelpful information, ii) lack of reporting, iii) lack of reporting persons to work with. The challenges cited by Athlete Representatives (include: i) lack of protection and support when reporting, ii) death threats, iii) power imbalances, iv) retaliation, v) re-traumatisation, and vi) lack of anonymity and confidentiality.

The differences in the challenges seen in this research and previous literature could be attributed to different populations and methods of the research studies. The in-depth interviews of this research aided in gaining detailed descriptions of issues, such as the challenges associated with reporting wrongdoing. In line with critical realism, this also allowed the research to understand participants as they interpret and navigate their social structures and reality, and crucial decision points that they come across (Archer, 2003). The research in this thesis interviewed Integrity Officers, offering a different perspective to studies gaining the athlete perspective. Both groups are vital to understand their perspectives, and the Athlete Representatives in this study identified different challenges than the Integrity Officers. This is important to note as gaining that athlete perspective could in fact aid the Integrity Officers with encouraging reporting as if they understand the challenges and barriers athletes face when they report, then they could seek to support and protect them, potentially easing some of the challenges and thus facilitating further reports. Consequently, if athletes were informed that detailed reports were useful to integrity organisations, and that they could help with sanctioning those who committed integrity violations, as well as the fact that integrity organisations will do everything they can to protect reporting persons, then this could encourage athletes to report.

Considering the challenges reporting persons face, Miller and Gordon (2014) state that it is important to ask what reasons a reporting person might have for not being fully honest when questioning their reliability. Reasons for dishonesty can include fear of embarrassment, worry of retaliation from those they are implicating, personal losses they could face, legal issues against them, the possibility of harming another, and implicating themselves in the wrongdoing (Miller & Gordon, 2014). Furthermore, attention must be paid to the low risk-reward ratio that reporting persons face, which can deter them from reporting (Kambhampati & Star, 2021).

Changing the culture, and how reporting persons are seen - that they are solving a problem, rather than causing one - could be key (Richardson & McGlynn, 2011).

6.5 Do Athletes Have an Obligation to Report Integrity Issues?

This chapter has highlighted the importance of reporting in sports integrity. However, as acknowledged, there are barriers and challenges to reporting (e.g., fear of retaliation, lack of protection). This leads to the question – do athletes have a moral obligation to report wrongdoing?

Some sports integrity organisations have conditions in their regulations that those involved in sport must report wrongdoing. For example, in the International Tennis Integrity Agency's Tennis Anti-Corruption Program, it is outlined to players that they must report any corruption offences they have knowledge of, or if they are approached for corruption purposes (ITIA, 2024). Any failure to comply with these reporting obligations constitutes a corruption offence and can lead to sanctions. Hessert (2020) notes that in 2016, 11% of the Tennis Integrity Unit's (TIU, now the ITIA) sanctions were convicted for not reporting or not cooperating with the TIU, a number which increased to 20% in 2017, 40% in 2018 and over 50% in 2019 (Hessert, 2020). Hessert (2020) also suggests that the reporting obligations seen within sport are rarely found in any other investigative procedures beyond sport.

On one hand, it could be argued that it is an athletes' obligation to report wrongdoing and integrity issues within sport if they encounter it. Reporting wrongdoing has tangible benefits, and has previously been shown to 'clean up' sport. This is evidenced by reporting persons who have been labelled 'heroes' by WADA (WADA, 2020d, para.5), and other high-profile examples of reporting persons, such as Yuliya and Vitaly Stepanov, who revealed doping in Russian Athletics, have been celebrated (WADA, 2020d). By reporting knowledge and suspicions of wrongdoing, this could lead to increased sanctioning of those committing integrity violations, and make sport cleaner and safer.

However, the barriers to reporting must be acknowledged. 'Codes of silence' have been detailed in academic literature as a barrier to reporting. This is described as when players and teammates decline to report information and protect others who they know have been involved in integrity issues (Moriconi et al., 2020). Whitaker et al., (2014b) suggest that while athletes might

disagree with doping, they did not always know how to report such behaviours, with some participants suggesting that loyalty to their teammates prevented them from speaking out.

Furthermore, the research in this thesis has highlighted that athletes do not feel protected when reporting wrongdoing. If athletes who report wrongdoing face further negative consequences (such as threats against them, the loss of their place on teams, retaliation, re-traumatisation) then they may consider integrity issues in sport the price that they pay for not facing the negative consequences of reporting. This shows that it is vital for reporting persons to be protected and supported.

Professor Richard McLaren, the author of the McLaren report which detailed the Russian doping scandal, has argued that athletes are duty-bound to report knowledge of doping (Homewood, 2017). However, McLaren also acknowledges that organisations must build the trust of athletes for this approach to work (Homewood, 2017). Trust has been cited as a key challenge by Integrity Officers in my research, with integrity organisations finding that athletes do not trust them and the integrity system.

McLaren suggests that proving that stringent confidentiality procedures are in place will increase athlete trust in reporting, stating ‘If you are going to encourage people to come forward and speak up, we must have strict and rigorous confidentiality. That trust must be established. [Athletes] must be convinced that they can be and will be protected’ (Homewood, 2017, para. 5). Further suggestions by McLaren include better education and the building of trust relationships in the sport. Furthermore, integrity organisations have a responsibility to conduct proper investigations when reports are received (Homewood, 2017).

These suggestions from McLaren echo a response from a participant in this research who stated, ‘There’s this prevention pillar [of sport integrity], which includes making the stakeholders aware of the rules, making them aware of how they can be approached from [integrity] purposes and making them aware of how they must react’ (IO9). However, as noted by Integrity Officer responses in this research, the confidentiality can be difficult to maintain in certain circumstances, such as if only a small number of people are privy to the information. This is a key barrier to reporting persons coming forward.

To encourage reporting, several issues must first be addressed. This includes finding ways to overcome the barriers to reporting. Firstly, ensuring proper protections for athletes are in place is vital. This can be done by ensuring confidentiality of reporting, with secure reporting mechanisms (such as the ITA's REVEAL reporting platform) and ensuring staff are properly trained in handling sensitive data. Athletes should then be educated on how they are protected, and this could encourage reporting. Organisations should also work on ways to earn the trust of athletes. Offering protections when reporting is one way, and working on the relationships to build the trust, showing ways that are acting with integrity such as following up on reports, providing feedback to the reporter where they can and outlining cases where reports have led to sanctions.

Athletes do have an obligation to report integrity issues within sport and encouraging this will ensure that more integrity issues are highlighted and lead to safer, cleaner sport. However, attention must be paid to the barriers to reporting, such as lack of protections and retaliation. Solutions to prevent these must be sought, including protecting reporting athletes with secure, confidential reporting mechanisms, educating athletes on how they are protected, and working with athletes to increase trust.

6.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has assessed the use of reporting within sports integrity. Reporting processes and mechanisms were outlined in order to fully describe the current landscape. General consensus is that reporting persons play a part within integrity, with many Integrity Officers stating they are useful, while some did not consider them useful due to the lack of meaningful information that is reported. A key finding of this chapter was that Athlete Representatives state that athletes do not feel supported or protected when reporting, whereas Integrity Officers feel as if measures are in place to facilitate reporting.

Using critical realism allows the research to develop further understanding of the contexts and mechanisms that interact to produce outcomes. In this chapter the specific settings of the integrity organisations provide the context, with the processes of reporting within integrity investigations being the mechanisms. These interact to produce the outcomes of ethical reporting processes. While on the surface, from publicly available information and integrity organisations' websites, communications etc, it appears as if processes are in place to facilitate safe reporting of integrity issues, this research has been able to access further perceptions, such

as from Athlete Representatives who state athletes do not feel comfortable when reporting wrongdoing. Furthermore, this research has accessed underlying mechanisms in place that could explain why athletes do not feel supported when they report. These include fear of retaliation and wider consequences that could come from reporting. This research also found that some Integrity Officers did not think that reporting was a useful intelligence method, however, when this is considered alongside the fact that athletes don't feel safe or supported to report, then this could help provide some solutions to both sets of problems. If Integrity Officers work to support and protect athletes who have something to report, and do this alongside athletes by educating and communicating with them, then they are likely to see the quality of reports increase, which will aid their investigations. Critical realism has allowed this research to access more detail below the surface than has previously been presented.

6.6.1 Recommendations

Recommendations are provided within chapter conclusions in order to showcase how these recommendations have stemmed from the research findings.

Reporting should be encouraged with both anonymous and non-anonymous options available. Anonymous options are needed to encourage people to report who might not otherwise, and to offer some protection against retaliation. Furthermore, anonymous reporting can allow reporting persons to feel more comfortable and trusting in the processes. Non-anonymous reporting should also be encouraged where possible to allow for extended conversations, which can increase credibility and help integrity organisations verify information. Both methods are needed within organisations. Barriers to this may include resources, which could limit organisations' ability to have these procedures in place.

Reporting persons need protection as participants in this research, as well as previous literature, suggests that reporting persons can face retaliation and negative treatment from others in sport. Athlete Representatives in this research were more likely to consider athletes to not be protected when reporting, whereas many Integrity Officers considered adequate protections to be in place. Both parties need to work together to understand each other's perspectives. This gap in understanding could be bridged via education. For example, Integrity Officers could work within organisations to produce education packages on reporting integrity issues. This education could include key topics such as how and where to report, as well as detailing to athletes how they are protected when reporting. Ways integrity organisations protect athletes

include secure reporting systems and the ability to report anonymously. Furthermore, ways athletes can protect themselves can be highlighted, such as not reporting from a device provided by an employer or when using an Intranet connection.

In order to better support reporting persons, stakeholders in sport should be educated on reporting processes. This may help increase trust in reporting and highlight ways reporting persons are protected. Education should reinforce the importance of sport free from integrity issues and highlight what integrity issues in sport look like so that it is known what to report. Avoiding re-traumatisation of reporting persons where possible should be prioritised. Furthermore, this may mean future reporting persons are more confident to come forward.

Independent and trauma informed survivor centred investigation processes should be employed. Speaking to athletes and others who have been through investigations and asking how these could be managed better to support them is one step that could be taken. Working with Athlete Representatives and organisations who routinely support athletes could also aid with this, as well as working with experts who have experience in trauma informed investigations. Furthermore, integrity organisations should employ trained staff (or train in house) who can support reporting persons appropriately and offer or signpost relevant support. Trust and reassurance that the reporting person will be treated seriously appears essential for the future success of reporting programs, something that Integrity Officers ought to seek to foster and build within the integrity community.

Regulations that can support reporting persons across integrity organisations should be explored and implemented. Further work should be done on assessing the need and logistics of global integrity units to further support and protect reporting persons. As doping cultures and integrity issues are deep-rooted and embedded within the fabric of some sporting communities, interventions and educational sessions ought to be considered to target and engage with members of these communities.

This chapter has assessed the use of reporting persons within sports integrity. The next chapter analyses the powers within sports integrity investigations.

Chapter Seven – Powers in Investigations

7.1 Chapter Introduction

The power to demand athletes' objects and information is afforded to some sports integrity organisations. Objects can include devices such as phones, laptops and tablets. Information can be itemised bank statements and phone bills, and access to social media accounts. Refusal to hand over these objects or information can lead to sanctions, including bans from sport (World Athletics, 2023).

In this section, how these rules are used, and how they differ across organisations, is described, with Integrity Officer perspectives put forward. Athlete opinions are also presented, with a range of views seen. Then, the following ethical issues are analysed:

- i. could these rules be considered coercive?
- ii. does athlete opinion on these rules matter?
- iii. are these powers proportionate?

This chapter argues that the rules are coercive offers. Furthermore, athlete opinions should be considered as the results show unease at the rules, from both Athlete Representatives and Integrity Officers. Ultimately, the powers currently employed are not wholly proportionate for use within sports integrity.

7.2 Information and Object Demand Powers and Procedures

Examples of these demand rules can be found in some sports' regulations.

The World Athletics Anti-Doping Rules (World Athletics, 2023) state:

‘Without limiting the foregoing, pursuant to Rule 5.7.4, the Head of the Integrity Unit may require an Athlete or other Person to:

- (a) attend before the Integrity Unit for an interview, or to answer any question, or to provide a written statement setting out their knowledge of any relevant facts and circumstances;
- (b) provide (or procure to the best of their ability the provision by any third party) for inspection, extraction, copying and/or downloading any records or data or files in hardcopy or electronic format, that the Head of the Integrity Unit reasonably believes may contain relevant information (such as itemised telephone bills, bank

statements, ledgers, notes, files, correspondence, emails, messages, servers, cloud data, cloud services);

include provide (or procure to the best of their ability the provision by any third party) for inspection, extraction, copying and/or downloading any Electronic Devices and/or Electronic Services in or on which the Head of the Integrity Unit reasonably believes relevant information may be stored;

(d) provide full and unlimited access to their premises for the purpose of securing information, records, articles or things the subject of a Demand;

include provide passwords, login credentials, multi/two-factor authentication, and other information required to access electronically stored data that is the subject of a Demand' (World Athletics, 2023, p.30).

World Athletics Anti-Doping Rules also set out consequences for refusal: 'Athletes and other Persons must cooperate fully with investigations conducted pursuant to this Rule 5 (and in cases of refusal or failure to do so without compelling justification, Rule 12 shall apply)' (World Athletics, 2023, p.29).

Rule 12 of the World Athletics Anti-Doping Rules states:

'Disciplinary proceedings may be brought against the Athlete or other Person before the Disciplinary Tribunal and they may be provisionally suspended (or may accept a voluntary suspension) pending the outcome of such proceedings. If after considering the matter the Disciplinary Tribunal finds that there has been a refusal or failure without compelling justification to comply with these Anti-Doping Rules, or that the Athlete or other Person has engaged in offensive conduct towards a Doping Control official or other Person involved in Doping Control, then it will impose such sanctions and subject to such conditions as it sees fit (which may include, without limitation, a period during which the Athlete or other Person shall not be eligible to participate in the sport of Athletics and Disqualification of the Athlete's results, with all resulting consequences including the forfeiture of titles, awards, medals, points and prize money)' (World Athletics, 2023, p.70).

These rules are not unique to athletics, with sports (such as tennis (ITIA, 2023a; 2023b), cricket (International Cricket Council, 2024), biathlon (Biathlon Integrity Unit, 2021)) increasingly seeing the value in these powers for investigative methods.

During the interviews for the research in this thesis, participants shared their knowledge of how these rules are used within sports integrity. Integrity Officer Eight stated:

‘The sports that I work with I am currently encouraging them to have within their rules the ability to take peoples electronic devices. All sports do that by saying ‘if you want to participate in sports, we make it a rule of the sports that if you want to participate, you have to cooperate with any investigations and you have to provide your mobile phone’’ (IO8).

Of the 15 Integrity Officers interviewed for the research, approximately two thirds had these powers available to use within their organisation. Some participants had these powers but could not use them, due to not having the technology available for example to get information off phones, and there were some Integrity Officers who had not yet used them, as they were not satisfied that an investigation had yet reached the threshold to warrant that. Of the Officers who did not have the powers, some expressed their wish to have them, whereas others were happy with the powers they did have. The range of powers, application and views are further discussed later in the chapter.

Throughout the interviews, Integrity Officers provided further insight into the processes used, as detailed by Integrity Officer Three:

‘For us the intelligence case, first of all, would have to be strong. We need a good intelligence case and the searching of the phone, for example, using the phone as an example, we need to be very specific. So I want to know for the investigator, first of all, why do you think there’s evidence on that phone or intelligence? What part of the phone do you think that information, where do you think it’s held, what’s the violation that you’re looking at? And if we didn’t see or collect that phone from that individual, what are the other options that we’ve got to collect that same information? What’s the impact on everybody else? Because you’re looking at information, not just relative to the individual,

but you know WhatsApp messages, or Signal messages, or whatever through the whole community. There's a process that we go through, so there's a safeguarding process that we go through to make sure that it's used in the right way, because the other thing is, of course, in sport if the individual fails to comply with the demand, then the individual could be banned. So it's a massive deal isn't it' (IO3).

Integrity Officer Eight outlined a similar approach:

'In terms of taking phones from athletes, at the moment what I would say is that we have a strict criteria of doing it. We will not do it as what they called, you'll have heard the word, fishing exercise. If we've got an athlete in front of us or an administrator or whatever who someone said that they are involved in match fixing or whatever, I would not take that phone from them unless I've got strong evidence that they have been involved in something already' (IO8).

Learning more about how these rules are implemented can aid with elevating some concerns. Integrity Officers have stated that they have guidelines set out to follow. However, there is no mandated framework (e.g., in anti-doping from WADA) that organisations have to follow. Thus, while Integrity Officers are stating that they do have a criteria to follow, these are not publicly available for scrutiny, and it is not clear the process that going into drawing up these criteria. For example, were they written with a view to making investigator's lives easier, such as aiding to uncover evidence, and has any consideration been given to athlete rights or thoughts to whether this is proportionate for use in sport integrity? The interviews in this research uncovered that a number of investigators within sports integrity are former law enforcement. When considering critical realism, it is important to be able to conceptualise how people act in situations and how their social structures shaped this. In this situation, this means acknowledging the different social structures that shape what former law enforcement officers bring to sports integrity. These individuals bring expertise from law enforcement that is valuable for sports integrity. They also are used to powers that are different to those uses in sports integrity and the offences are also different. In law enforcement, officers are investigating crimes, whereas in sports integrity, while there are some integrity offences which are criminal in nature, not all of them are. Therefore, it stands to reason that the powers used within law enforcement are not always proportionate for sports integrity offences, particularly where there

are no criminal elements. The above response mentions that ‘strong evidence’ is needed before demanding objects and information, but it is not clear what the evidence needed is, or if there are criteria set out to assist with this.

Integrity Officer Ten also stated that these rules cannot be used without strong evidence:

‘Now what you can’t do is we don’t go fishing. I don’t just send out a general request for people’s handsets. They wouldn’t get some hearsay and then say let’s seize his phone. They would get a betting record or they will get the document. It’s kind of like filling in the missing pieces of the puzzle rather than the early stage, the sort of starting trying to gather information. It’s like we’re missing this piece to build the case and the only way we might find it is if it’s on a mobile device, it’s on a WhatsApp, an email account, a betting account or whatever it might be’ (IO10).

Integrity Officers stating that there must be strong justification to use these rules, and that they cannot be implemented without a strong level of suspicion and evidence already present, may help with acceptance of these rules. However, when discussing the application of demand rules, Athlete Representative one stated:

‘As we know from recent history, not everyone in this [sports integrity] space is a good person... If I turn up in [location] and [organisation] seizes my computer and my phone, how long are they going to have that for? When do they have to return it? We rely pretty heavily on our computers and phones and everything. Are they going to delete everything once they’ve found that there’s nothing there?... I definitely don’t think we have adequate rules in place for that... I think we just need to be careful, and we need protection from it’ (AR1).

Despite Integrity Officers stating the precautions that are taken with these rules, Athlete Representatives still state hesitations. Attention should be given to whether integrity organisations are doing enough to communicate how and why these rules are used, which could help athletes understand them and potentially accept them. This is evidenced by an Athlete Representative who explained that when they heard the explanation for why an organisation might use these rules, they further understood, while acknowledging that athletes may still not be happy: ‘I could see from their [the integrity organisation] point that it would be really useful.

Obviously if you're the athlete on the receiving end of that you're not going to be happy' (AR3). Athlete thoughts and concerns on these powers are analysed in greater depth later in the chapter.

Integrity Officers in this research shared further details about their use. Integrity Officer One highlights how careful their organisation is when using these powers:

'We're very scrupulous about the invocation and the implementation of such powers. So, for example, with electronic data, we are obliged to introduce such things as acquiring electronic data and searching through it, we're obliged to use very tight date ranges for certain information, evidence, and anything outside of those date ranges we're not allowed to exploit on phones, on laptops. We have to only exploit information or look at information, analyse information where a key word that's relevant to the investigation appears on the athlete's device. Anything else we have no interest in, but we also have no right to delve into' (IO1).

Integrity Officer Eight provided further insight into how organisations are trying to balance these powers:

'What we've started doing now is getting downloads and I'm getting very technical now but what I will say is that we won't take images because we can triage out what we take from the phones, so we don't take images or do that. Sometimes the difficulty is because very often people take screenshots of their betting slips and send them to each other and so you don't know where you're going to go. But it's just being respectful and not over the top' (IO8).

This response highlights a challenge facing Integrity Officers when using these powers – that regulations that they have in place mean that they cannot access images on phones they have demanded for investigations, however, these can contain key pieces of evidence, such as betting slips. This also differs from powers that other integrity organisations have, as other Integrity Officers interviewed mentioned that they were able to download images from devices. Here, a global framework that integrity organisations could refer to when using demand rules would allow for more uniform rules and aid with parity globally and across sports.

Another Integrity Officer shared how they thought athletes were protected, saying:

‘There are safe guards in place within the [organisation] where the seizing of, seizing is the wrong word, the request that the player surrenders their phone and details has to be authorised within the [organisation], so the investigations team would request it and it has to go again to the legal team to approve it and that is independently audited once a year that process and that audit reports to the supervisory board that the procedures are being followed, and that only whether there is a real suspicion of a match fixing offence is the request from the investigators authorised by the legal team... It is built-in to protect athletes from vexatious or inappropriate requests to surrender the phones and what have you, and of course those safeguards mean that you would only be able to do that if you are suspected with reasonable grounds that you had fixed a match or you had been participating in fixing a match, so there is a real convincing sense that the player is involved and that because we would have to prove the link, because obviously say that the match that the person [redacted – spot fixing example] and there was anomalous betting on that and you go to hearing and the person is going to say I’m playing [sport]’ (IO12).

This response details that multiple people have to sign off requests for demands for objects and information, including the legal team. This Integrity Officer notes that this is to protect athletes from abuse of the rules. This response also highlights the need for evidence in integrity cases, such as match fixing, where it is vital to prove links between suspicious betting and the alleged action the athlete has done to facilitate match fixing. The measures detailed in this response, such as having multiple people from different departments sign off demand requests and strong evidence being needed before objects and information are demanded appear to consider athlete rights. However, it should be noted that this is just how one organisation does it, and therefore it cannot be assumed that all organisations have these procedures in place.

The Integrity Officer provided further details about their organisations use of demand rules, saying

‘You need to respect the players and it’s only used when necessary, but when it is necessary, it’s necessary to safeguard the sport. And part of the education program is all about why is this all necessary and why is it important to athletes that the sport

is protected. The rules every year go to the player councils, and the player councils agree them, set any changes and the rules. Any proposals to get the [organisation] more powers, player councils see all that and they have to agree it, so it's done essentially with consent now' (IO12).

This response argues that demand rules are needed in order to safeguard sport from integrity offences. Furthermore, this Integrity Officer says that this sport consults their athlete council on any proposed changes to regulations. However, from conversations with Athlete Representatives in this research, this is not true for every sport or integrity organisation. The Integrity Officer states that by the rules going to athlete councils and them agreeing to them, this constitutes as consent. However, individual athletes could argue that consent of athlete councils does not constitute as their own consent. Furthermore, the way that the regulations are written for many sports mean that athletes have to agree to the rules or they can't play the sport. This offer is further discussed in the next section.

This section has offered an insight into how the rules are implemented and facilitates better understanding to allow for further analysis in the next sections, supported by participant responses. This includes issues raised in the above quote, such as athlete consent.

7.2.1 Concerns With Demand Powers

As highlighted above, some Integrity Officers who were interviewed were adamant that proper procedures were followed. This does not mean, however, that they were without concerns. Some Integrity Officers admitted there are issues with using them within sports investigations.

Integrity Officer Eight admits, 'This is a massively controversial and challenging area. You know when you're taking someone's mobile phone from them and doing what you're doing. It's invasive. It is invasive and I can't definitively say to you, it's the right thing to do' (IO8).

Integrity Officer 12 stated their concerns with these rules:

'I've always thought in the lead up, because obviously these rules have been brought into different sports over a period of time, it's never sat easily with me is what I will say from the outset. I would be very sort of sympathetic to the argument that this is not right fundamentally' (IO12).

Integrity Officer Two shared their reservations with the powers: ‘I would feel extremely uncomfortable giving my phone over to be looked into, not that I do anything wrong, but it’s your entire life on your phone. So I understand there are massive ethical concerns’ (IO2).

The above quotes from Integrity Officers show that there is concern about the use of the demand rules. These participants are responsible for enforcing the rules and can use the demand powers, and yet some express unease at their use. This feeds into the discussion later in the chapter about whether these rules are proportionate to use in sports integrity.

Despite some Integrity Officers expressing concerns for these rules, as a group they largely defended them for their usefulness of gathering evidence within investigations. On the other hand, Athlete Representatives who were interviewed highlighted their concerns.

Athlete Representative Three suggested athlete unhappiness with the rules: ‘Obviously if you’re the athlete on the receiving end of that you’re not going to be happy’ (AR3) and Athlete Representative Five expressed concerns, saying ‘This is absurd... It’s like a restriction of your freedom’ (AR5).

Athlete Representative Four stated issues with sanctioning athletes if they did not cooperate with these demands: ‘I don’t think you can really force things like that on athletes and make a negative finding on the basis of them not having provided [objects and information]’ (AR4).

The above quotes from Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives offer an introduction to the implementation and the various views on rules that allow for demands of objects and information from athletes. This foundation allows for deeper understanding to support the analysis that follows in the rest of the chapter. In the next section, the ethical issue of whether these rules can be considered coercive is explored.

7.3 Could These Rules be Considered Coercive?

The mandatory nature of these rules, with little option for athlete refusal, poses an ethical dilemma. Athletes have to sign up to regulations in order to play their sport, including these rules that mean they have to surrender their devices, objects and information if they are asked

to for an investigation. If they do not comply, they can face a sanction, including a ban from sport.

For example, World Athletics Anti-Doping rules state:

‘Subject to Rule 5.7.8, an Athlete or other Person must comply with a Demand in such reasonable period of time as determined by the Head of the Integrity Unit and set out in the Demand. Each Athlete or other Person waives and forfeits any rights, defences and privileges provided by any law in any jurisdiction to withhold any information, record, article or thing requested in a Demand or otherwise not to cooperate with an investigation.... In case of a refusal or failure by an Athlete or other Person to comply immediately with the Demand, Rule 12 shall apply and any attempted or actual damage, alteration, destruction or hiding of such information, record, article or thing upon receipt of or after the Demand shall constitute an independent violation of Rule 2.5 (Tampering or Attempted Tampering)’ (World Athletics, 2023, p.31).

The above rules demonstrate the difficult position athletes are put in. They have to sign up to these rules in order to compete as an athlete. This means that if they do not think the rules are fair or right, then they either have to choose between not being an athlete or signing up to rules they do not agree with. While athletes give consent in a way when signing up to sport regulations, there are questions surrounding the level of this consent.

Integrity Officer 12 laid out their views on the choice that athletes face, suggesting that there are limited issues with this approach: ‘I mean obviously this is a voluntary thing so players don’t have to sign it but then they are free to play [sport] outside of the structure of professional [sport] so you know in practice there’s not a lot of issues there’ (IO12). However, despite Integrity Officer 12 stating that there isn’t an issue with the approach, the little choice left to athletes – comply or quit – does pose an ethical issue surrounding these rules. If athletes have to sign up to these rules, and don’t have a choice to refuse them other than not being an athlete anymore, then this isn’t much of a choice.

Integrity Officer Two, on the other hand, acknowledged the ethical dilemma that athletes face in relation to these rules:

‘I mean, it is a big ethical concern. And obviously, the players consent to it when they sign up to be a professional [sport] player, because it’s written in the [organisations’ rules]. But because the choice isn’t really there, they sign up or they can’t be a professional player, I understand that completely... I understand there are massive ethical concerns’ (IO2).

The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy defines coercion as having the power to violate, or threaten to violate, someone’s rights, or as a proposition to violate normative obligations (Anderson, 2023). Coercers are agents who get others, the coercee, to do/not do something, and this diminishes the coercee’s freedom and violates their rights (Anderson, 2023). Beauchamp and Childress (2013) state that coercion only exists if one person uses force or threats to control another, that is credible, intentional and severe.

While coercion is usually cited to involve threats, there is debate about whether offers can be coercive. Offers that cannot be reasonably refused and that potentially reflect large power imbalances or injustices between parties could be considered coercive offers (Anderson, 2023). Zimmerman (1981) argued that coercion can come in the form of threats and offers, and when assessing whether an offer is coercive, it should be taken into account whether the one making the offer is ‘actively hindering the coercee from obtaining a situation for herself that would be better than the situation the coercer proposes’ (Anderson, 2023, para 56).

If the offer means that poor offers are still the best available, then the coercion can lie in the prevention of those at the receiving end of the offer from improving their situation or gaining another better offer from somewhere else (Anderson, 2023).

Rules that require those under investigation by sports integrity organisations to hand over their objects and information could be considered coercive offers based on the above criteria. Only by no longer being elite athletes can athletes refuse to accept the rules, leaving athletes to choose between their careers and rules they may not be happy with. This argument is further enhanced by the fact that athletes interviewed for this research have stated their unhappiness with the rules.

It is also suggested by Zimmerman (1981) that when the offering party is in a stronger bargaining position than the receiving party, then the offering party can use this to their advantage and could engage in exploitation. This is particularly feasible when the offering party has a relative monopoly position, for example over employment opportunities. Thus, offers made by parties who have a superior bargaining position can be exploitative, which can connect threats and coercion, as the coercion can be used to foster or keep those bargaining advantages (Anderson, 2023). This can be applied to sports organisations who offer athletes the chance to have a professional career in their sport, on the condition that they accept their integrity rules and regulations. As previously stated, if athletes do not agree, then they cannot compete in their sport. This provides sports organisations with a stronger bargaining position.

McGregor (1988) stated that a condition of having enough bargaining power to coerce is that the receiving party is dependent on the offering party in some way, for example that there aren't any other options. Another condition is whether the offering party has influence over if significant loss occurs to the receiving party such as life, health or security. If the stronger party takes advantage of these conditions, then this is coercion, not just exploitation (Anderson, 2023).

This can include athletes, as not accepting the rules and leaving the sport would mean losing their career, and potentially income. Athletes often view their sport as much more than just their career – it can also be who they are. This is highlighted by Athlete Representative One: 'Athletes, our entire wellbeing and who you are is often tied up into the sport that you do' (AR1).

White (2017) notes that at times we can consider coercion as problematic, even if the threat of the coercion is something that would not be wrong to do. This can relate to the discussed powers as the stand-alone premise of demanding objects and information from those who are suspected of wrongdoing, in order to gain evidence to prove this, may not be wrong or illegal to do, but whether it is ethically right in this context is debatable. If these rules are proportionate for use in sport is discussed later in this chapter.

Hessert (2020) considers these rules coercive and details the choice that athletes face: accept the rules or leave sport, defining them as 'compulsory acceptance of sports regulations' (Hessert, 2020, p.149). In order to justify coercive measures within sport integrity

investigations, they must be deemed necessary, reasonable and proportionate ‘based on the principle of proportionality applicable in sports disciplinary proceedings’ (Hessert, 2020, p. 151; CAS, 2006). In the 2005 CAS case between FIFA and WADA, proportionality is cited as requiring ‘the sanctioning body not only to evaluate the individual misconduct and the impact on the sanction on the athlete, but also to take the overall goal and the need for a uniform and harmonised concept in the fight against doping into account’ (CAS, 2006, p36).

Hessert (2020) states that athlete rights have to be weighed against integrity organisation interests to investigate and sanction wrongdoing. As evidence is difficult to acquire, these rules could be classed as necessary, however, it’s concluded that they are not proportionate (Hessert, 2020). Hessert (2020) argues that sports federations can have more powers than state authorities when it comes to investigating, as sports organisations can use coercive power and forgo warrants, whereas law enforcement could not. While sports federations cite difficulties in gathering adequate evidence to prove integrity violations and gain sanctions as justification for these powers, this does not allow for the deprivation of athlete rights. Furthermore, coercive measures and the low threshold for obtaining information from athletes means that these powers could be misused if organisations had a hard time gathering intelligence. Athlete rights could be considered breached by these rules, including their right to remain silent and to not self-incriminate. Breaching these rights is not compatible with fairness, especially as the information that is seized from athletes could be shared with law enforcement and then used in criminal proceedings. Hessert (2020) concludes that the above means that these powers are ‘disproportionate to the objective of the fight against match-fixing, doping or unethical behaviour’ (Hessert, 2020, p.152).

Examples of athletes facing coercion are detailed in the book *Coerced: Work Under Threat of Punishment* by Erin Hatton (2020). This argues that athletes can face economic coercion, where they face the threat of losing income, as well as status coercion, the threat of losing employment status. Status coercion is further defined as an employer controlling wages, working conditions as well as a workers’ ability to gain future employment. It can be seen anywhere an employer ‘has power over a worker’s social position – not their immediate income but their status in society’ (Hatton, 2020, p.16). It can be particularly evident in total institutions, where someone’s status as their occupation, such as athlete, is just as important, or even more important, than their income. Hatton states that status coercion occurs at three levels: 1) cultural, 2) institutional, 3) and individual. ‘Its foundation is laid in the realm of culture, the realm in

which narratives are circulated (and contested) about why some groups – despite their labour – are not ‘real workers’ and therefore require extra regulation, surveillance and discipline. Such ideas are operationalised at the institutional level’ (Hatton, 2020, p.26).

A case culminating in 2019 ruled that professional athletes in the UK were not entitled to employee rights. Jess Varnish, a cyclist who competed for Great Britain, was involved in an employment case between herself and British cycling. Varnish started legal proceedings following her omission from the British Cycling team for the 2016 Olympic Games, claiming that it was because she had criticised her coaches. Her argument was formed on her assertion that she was an employee of British Cycling and UK Sport, and was therefore entitled to legal protections, such as sick pay, a pension, as well as the right to sue for unfair dismissal. British Cycling and UK Sport countered that national lottery funding is more similar to a university grant, and therefore athletes should not be afforded the same employment rights. The judge presiding over the case ruled that Varnish was not an employee or worker, and therefore could not claim for unfair dismissal, sex discrimination or detriment that occurred from being a whistleblower against the organisations (Ingle, 2019). This case highlights the issues that athletes face, including fewer employment rights due to not being seen as ‘real workers’. Furthermore, asking athletes to agree to rules, such as handing over their phones if they are investigated, as well as rules that athletes have voiced concerns about previously such as the whereabouts system, could be considered even more problematic when it is considered that athletes do not have the same employment rights afforded in other jobs. Yet, athletes are subject to more stringent rules and regulations, but their rights do not appear to be adequately protected. Møller (2016) has previously argued that WADA rely on the fact that athletes are not employees in the way we are used to and are therefore not afforded the same protections as other professionals in fields outside of sport.

However, there are also benefits for athletes not being considered employees. For example, in the UK, athletes who receive funding from the National Lottery’s Athlete Performance Awards are able to do this tax-free (British Athletics, 2020). The downside does mean that they don’t receive other benefits and rights employees do though. The non-employee status of athletes may also provide them with more flexibility and choice (e.g., working with multiple sponsors) and could offer increased independence for athletes.

Within institutions, employers enact powers on workers bodies ‘through individual-level actions’ (Hatton, 2020, p.26). Coercion is used to compel compliance, as the penalties for not complying are too severe (Hatton, 2020). This includes athletes losing their careers for not agreeing to demand rules. Hatton (2020) also notes a theme of athletes being told that they are privileged to be in their positions and as such they should not complain. These attitudes can be used to silence and shame athletes. Alongside this, athletes who are portrayed as privileged can also be seen as vulnerable and in need of protection from possible corruption, which can be used as justification for policing their behaviour. Furthermore, athletes’ unclear status as whether they are workers or not means that some consider them to not be able to be exploited because they are not workers – if being an athlete is seen as not ‘real’ work, then this can be used to justify not giving them employee rights such as the right to safe working conditions and collective bargaining. This in turn can be used to justify the need for extra regulation, surveillance and discipline. By framing athletes as in need of supervision and discipline, alongside narratives of athletes being privileged, this allows those in charge to exert significant punitive power over athletes, and cements status coercion (Hatton, 2020).

Integrity Officer One asserted their view that athletes were privileged and therefore should accept the rules in sports integrity investigations:

‘Well, the way it works in a regulatory way is an athlete is bound by the rules that we all sign up to, and we work to. So they know very well that those are the rules, and if you don’t know very well they are the rules, if and by the time they’ve done something wrong, then they will be told that they are the rules by us, but also by a lawyer, if they want to get a lawyer. You know they want to be in our world, they want to be an international athlete. They sign up to a certain set of rules which causes certain set of obligations, and they also get a certain amount of high end privileges if they’re an international athlete, not given to them by us, but just simply because they are, because they’ve acquired them for themselves and well done, and that’s all really good, but they also sign up to a number of obligations’ (IO1).

Labour surveillance can lead to status coercion (Hatton, 2020). In workplaces where superiors have the powers to punish, modes of subjugation, where the aim is for actions to bring workers under control, coincide with superiors’ coercive actions, reinforcing each other’s effects and improving the power of the superiors and ensuring workers are more vulnerable. Where

surveillance is used on workers, such as regulation and monitoring actions and bodies, this allows workers' missteps to be punished, and these punishments ensure compliance through coercion (Hatton, 2020). 'Surveillance and regulation – as relatively routine forms of worker subjugation – can quickly lead to the more expansive and severe punishments of status coercion' (Hatton, 2020, p.102). The aim of the subjugation is to dominate and control workers, and to exploit them by extracting surplus value from their labour (Hatton, 2020).

An argument could be made that many workers can feel as if their bosses have unreasonable power over them or do not care about them on a personal level. These workers are more likely to be subject to economic coercion, whereby they can lose their income due to their bosses' powers. However, for athletes, their superiors have access to tools, such as surveillance (e.g. in the whereabouts system and within investigations) and coercive offers (e.g. object and information seizure rules), and this means that their vulnerability is amplified by status coercion, and they can lose more than just their income due to this – they may also lose their careers and not be able to find other employment as athletes. If a worker cannot leave their job and find a similar role in their expertise, then they have less options, and this gives their superiors great power. This is true for athletes if they cannot compete in their sport as a professional athlete. Superiors' powers go beyond just economic consequences, to include control over their workers' social status, as well as their rights. The extensive consequences of the coercion differentiates the subjugation in athlete labour regimes from other jobs. Furthermore, athletes who face pervasive surveillance and regulation can feel out of control in relation to their identities, bodies and futures (Hatton, 2020).

Integrity Officer 15 shared their views on these rules and expressed concern for athletes facing the choice between acceptance or sanctions:

'It's a whole new level of – I don't want to use the word invasion, but I think it would be that in a way, because as an athlete you're never being asked permission for that [demand rules]. You're never being told that the possibility that that might happen even exists, you know you have to pee in a cup, or people will draw your blood for exams once in a while, but having to check your bank account, submit statements, phone records and all that that's never discussed until they see themselves in a situation like this. Sometimes they cannot afford a good defence.

So then, like what happens they either do that or the organisation can say they just did not cooperate with investigations, and that's a violation in itself' (IO15).

The above quote summaries the difficult position athletes find themselves in. They either comply with rules they might be unhappy with or they have to leave the sport. This could be considered a coercive offer.

However, Anderson (2023) states that coercion is not always unjustified. This raises an interesting point: just because these demands could be considered coercive offers, does it mean that we shouldn't use them? These rules are in place in order to help combat wrongdoing in sport. This includes serious wrongdoing such as doping and match fixing, where clean athletes are often the victims in these situations, losing out on money and adulation that they rightfully deserve. Furthermore, a key rationale of the WADA Code is to protect athlete health (WADA, 2019a). Beauchamp and Childress (2013) state that coercion can be occasionally justified, as seen in public health and law enforcement.

The Athlete Representatives who were interviewed in this research, all of whom had never personally been subject to investigations themselves, were still adamant that those athletes who are investigated should be supported throughout. At the end of the day, athletes are still human beings, and those who do commit wrongdoing still deserve to have their rights considered and respected, in the same way that criminals do in the legal system.

Furthermore, only a small percentage of athletes will ever be affected by these rules. It is only those that are suspected of wrongdoing that will be issued with such demands. This raises the question of whether the coercive offer is more acceptable, due to the fact that the demands will only be issued in rare circumstances. However, the coercive offer still affects all athletes. Even if most athletes will not be subject to investigations and issued with demands for their information and objects, they still have to agree to coercive offers when they become athletes in professional sport. They cannot choose to refuse the offer that they might be subject to these demands without leaving the sport. The broad nature of these offers, affecting all athletes within sports with these rules, means that the coercive offer itself could be considered unacceptable.

While the use of these rules is contentious, Integrity Officers state difficulties in investigations and gaining adequate evidence with necessitating them. The next section explores athletes'

views on object and information seizure rules, and Integrity Officer perspectives on why they are needed.

7.4 Does Athlete Opinion on These Rules Matter?

The issue of whether object and information seizure rules are coercive facilitates debate over whether they should be applied in sport. Athletes are the key stakeholders in sport and are the people most affected by the rules.

The Strengthening Athlete Power in Sport (SAPiS) project notes that athletes are central to sport and without them there would be no fans to cheer on sport, no sporting revenue and sport as an industry would no longer exist. However, despite this, athletes often do not have a voice or any say in key decisions that affect them (SAPiS, 2023).

SAPiS (2023) conducted a survey of 146 Athlete Representatives from 122 different organisations. The report stated that the majority of Athlete Representatives who completed the survey believed that they were making ‘a meaningful contribution to the needs of athletes’ (SAPiS, 2023, p. 9). Concerns were raised about the election/appointment processes of Athlete Representatives, such as the competitiveness, and whether this process is doing on competences and knowledge or not. While participants stated that they did feel as if they could speak out about things that affected athletes, 15-20% responded that they weren’t formally part of decision-making processes within the organisation that they represented athletes, that they were not informed about these processes, that they could not set agendas or propose ideas, and that they were unable to appeal things that affected athletes directly. Thus, a suggestion of this research is that in order to improve athlete representation, ways to further involve them in decision making and how they can exert influence should be explored (SAPiS, 2023).

Responses from athletes seen earlier in this chapter, and further statements below, highlight a key ethical question that will be explored in this chapter: if athletes aren’t happy with these rules, haven’t adequately been consulted, and potentially aren’t protected from abuse of these rules, should they be used in sports integrity investigations? Essentially, does athlete opinion on these rules matter?

Athlete Representatives interviewed in this research have stated their views on these powers, which include unhappiness with the use of these rules. Key concerns include lack of consultation, awareness and protection from abuse of these rules.

Athlete Representative One expressed concerns with whether athletes have agreed to these rules:

‘Anti-doping organisations start this [investigative] process, and they suddenly run into this wall where they realise that they can’t get information. They can’t subpoena someone. They can’t force someone to hand over information and then they look at law enforcement and law enforcement has all these powers, and that’s one of the reasons why law enforcement is effective in these areas. The issue then becomes, you have a lot of anti-doping organisations that are trying different ways to get these powers and the issue from my side is that athletes aren’t necessarily agreeing to this. We haven’t necessarily had a conversation with athletes around whether they are happy with these powers’ (AR1).

The response highlights concerns from Athlete Representatives that athletes have not agreed to the investigative powers sports integrity organisations are using, and that they haven’t been consulted on them. Further concerns centred around protecting athletes from abuse of these powers, with Athlete Representative One stating:

‘I don’t know if we have the protections in place to prevent abuse in that space at the moment. I don’t think the [WADA] Code at the moment is set up well enough for WADA to, as the global regulator, to regulate this space. And that’s what I would like to see. I guess a corresponding regulation from WADA or oversight from WADA to make sure that these things aren’t being abused, that athletes do have a level of protection. Because yeah, as we know from recent history, not everyone in this space is a good person. And without having that oversight that’s what I would expect in a Western country is that you lose this right but you gain this right. It’s that balance. And I’m concerned at the moment that that doesn’t happen’ (AR1).

These above statements, coupled with athlete unhappiness stated earlier in the chapter, paints a picture of dissatisfaction from Athlete Representatives about these rules. Athletes, who are central to sport as without them it would not exist, have raised concerns about powers seen within sports investigations. Integrity Officers, on the other hand, those who are working in the sport and implementing policy, state that these rules are a useful tool in investigations.

This is evidenced by Integrity Officer Eight:

‘[Object and information seizure rules are] the most significant area of finding what you’re looking for. A lot of the cases that I deal with, by the time we get to a disciplinary hearing, there’s very little they can do or say because we found all the WhatsApp messages, the images of betting, the transfer of the money from their bank account to the betting operators’ (IO8).

The usefulness and need for these rules is supported by Integrity Officer Five, while acknowledging concerns for athletes:

‘It is very effective because looking at particularly for match fixing but also any sort of integrity, it’s where you go from intelligence to evidence. Text messages between people arranging to fix an event, and they arranging to bet on something, arranging to purchase drugs is evidence, and that is the ultimate aim of an investigation. So for an investigator it’s a great tool. From an investigative point of view I love it, and I would, you know, have as much information as possible. But then, obviously from an athlete perspective I completely understand why the harvesting of all this data might be of concern to them. So I guess I don’t really know if I have an opinion on it, but it’s more, you know, as an investigator I will always want as much information as is allowed’ (IO5).

Integrity Officer Four highlights an issue echoed by many Integrity Officers – that evidence within investigations is challenging to acquire, and these rules can aid with that process:

‘When it comes to athletes, there’s not much that we have to – how do I say – maybe prosecute them, because it is not a criminal investigation. So that brings about a lot of – a number of limitations for us to proceed, and it all starts from also gathering

intelligence or information, and then going all the way to the investigation. And I think this becomes important, because of this problem that we lack the resources to gather information. And this being such a niche area becomes more difficult. So yes, legally speaking, that might have some privacy problems. But then I think there are ways that we might come to balance' (IO4).

Integrity Officer Nine supported this point, that lack of evidence necessitates these rules: 'It goes back to the evidence issue, if an athlete is saying I have nothing to do with this why would I give you my phone and that's a difficult burden and we don't have that many solutions' (IO9).

Gathering adequate evidence is a key challenge that was identified by Integrity Officers during interviews. Rules, such as issuing demands for objects and information to those suspected of wrongdoing, can provide evidence that allows them to prove this wrongdoing, and lead to a sanction. This in turn would lead to sport with less wrongdoing, and athletes or other persons who have committed this, appropriately sanctioned. Without these powers, these sanctions may not be possible. However, athlete rights need to be thought of in this process, as acknowledged by Athlete Representative Two: 'When we talk specifically about match fixing also acknowledging that without access to bank accounts it's practically impossible to really reconstruct what happened, but again this needs to be counterbalanced also with the rights of the athletes' (AR2).

As noted by some Integrity Officers, these rules are a significant power available to integrity organisations. This means that they need to be carefully used. While Integrity Officers attempted to defend these powers, and some Integrity Officers who did not have these powers, expressed that they'd like them, when stacked up against athlete views their arguments can pale in comparison. The Athlete Representatives spoken to voiced their concerns and called for athletes to be consulted on the matter. While one Integrity Officer stated in interview that the rules went to their sports' Athlete Representatives, it is not clear if that has occurred in other sports where these powers have been interviewed. Asking athletes their thoughts on these rules appears a good place to start to incorporate athlete voice, and facilitate buy-in.

Integrity Officer Seven stated that they asked their organisation for these powers, and this request was declined: 'I ask, on behalf of our department, to get more power on that. And it

was declined from it. The appetite is not there from the stakeholders that we get access to their systems, for instance' (IO7).

This shows that there is some concern within sport about these powers, as also evidenced by the fact that not all integrity organisations that are running investigations into wrongdoing have these powers. If there were no ethical concerns, wouldn't all integrity organisations have these powers?

While Integrity Officer Seven does not currently have these powers, they set out their reasons for wanting them, citing evidence as a key motivator, as highlighted by other Integrity Officers, while also acknowledging the need to consider athlete rights:

'I would love to have this power. This is what I meant with we have no power. And this is where we see the threshold, when you bring forward a case to CAS, for instance, or to bring a case to panel, the level or the threshold of bringing evidence is quite high, so you need to bring a lot of evidence in order to prove that the athlete has committed a violation. But the power that you have in order to achieve or to gain this is very low. So how do you want me – for instance, an athlete provides you evidence of certificates of that you know that there was a plasma infusion by a doctor. How do you expect me to investigate it if I have not the right to access the evidence, and to see whether it's perhaps faked, etc or you know that it was a conversation on the mobile phone where you know this activity was planned. It's this balance of what is expected nowadays. And when you go to CAS, you need to be very prepared. Of course, it needs to be always considered for the rights of the athletes, but it is not unusual, so it is possible. So therefore, I highly support the idea of having this power, and I would love to have this power, because it would help us with many case that we cannot investigate because we are end of the road and we know there's more in the data system or whatever' (IO7).

This once again highlights the need for adequate evidence to help prove wrongdoing and is a key argument for the use of these rules.

Others who did not have these powers, were more accepting of not having them, such as Integrity Officer 11, 'Sometimes we're a bit frustrated. Sometimes we are a bit frustrated at the

[redacted – other organisations with more powers], but we are a different [redacted – organisation] so we have made different decisions in the past’ (IO11).

Integrity Officer 14, whose organisation did not explicitly have these powers, highlighted an important argument against stopping athletes playing sport:

‘I would like to be able to require athletes to cooperate with us on a voluntary basis, and if they don’t volunteer to do it, then they leave the sport. That’s the deal. The problem is, you come hard against the fact that sport is seen as a human right, that’s debatable to some degree. But we do know from a country perspective, sport is vital for community, and it’s vital for health, and it’s vital for happiness. And if you can get community health and happiness, our justice results get better, and our academic results get better, and our work results you know in everything. So it’s – I can’t take that singular view and take sport away from the rest of society and say it’s a choice to play sport, because actually, we need people playing sport. So it’s a two-way choice’ (IO14).

This point highlights that there are larger consequences at play with these powers. Most organisations who have these powers also have rules stating that athletes who do not cooperate can be banned from their sport. This means potentially taking away an athletes’ job, their livelihood, their income, not to mention the sense of self that many athletes often feel tied to their sport. This is particularly relevant when considering if these rules are coercive. Athlete Representative One stated the importance of their careers to athletes:

‘Who you are is often tied up into the sport that you do. And if the investigation, or a positive test is preventing you from training, or competing, or training with your teammates or whatever, those are massive repercussions’ (AR1).

These powers aren’t just a tool for investigators, they affect athletes and their lives in a very real way. This highlights the need for athletes to be consulted on these rules.

A point of discussion is how much athletes’ voices should be listened to in integrity. While they are the key players in sport, most are not regulators with in-depth understanding of how sports governance works. What if, for example, athletes overwhelmingly said that they didn’t want

doping banned in sport – should the athlete voice be listened to then? Thought to harm that these substances could cause would have to be considered, and balanced alongside autonomy, but as the main stakeholder in sport it could be argued that the athlete voice deserves to be heard. Athletes are the people who are competing in the sport, without whom sport would not exist. Consulting athletes on matters that directly affect them is the first step to facilitating athlete voice in the integrity system. Athlete panels and commissions have become increasingly popular and these should be nurtured to ensure their effectiveness. To ensure these are well-functioning, steps can be taken such as: providing members with benefits and services (e.g., welfare and legal advice); clear goals and objectives should be set; democratic elections of Athlete Representatives; clear and regular communication between athletes and organisations; and operational independence from organisations (SAPiS, 2023). Once athlete voice has been sought, then decisions on how their views can be enacted, and an open dialogue between athletes and Integrity Officers will enhance this. Only once a wide range of athlete views has been recorded can conversations about if and how they can be incorporated into integrity policy, but without first knowing what athletes want, then change cannot be enacted.

Integrity Officer Three highlights an important point, that if building athlete trust is an issue, then powers such as these need to be carefully considered:

‘One of the things that we’re looking at from the outset, one of the big challenges, is building trust, and we’ve got to be able to do that in a way which builds a deep trust and I think that it’s easy to look at some of the rules, because, again coming from my background, that was a wow that’s pretty significant, actually demanding somebody hands over their mobile phone, their life on it for, you to download and start going through. I mean, that’s some massive intrusion, privacy’ (IO3).

Many Integrity Officers stated in interviews that building trust and getting buy-in from athletes and other stakeholders was a challenge. Implementing rules that athletes have stated they are unhappy with is not going to help with facilitating trust and buy-in. Instead, consulting athletes on these rules, listening to their views and implementing changes that they are supportive of, could assist with this.

Integrity Officer 15 highlights the need to listen to the athlete voice and for the integrity system to represent athletes: ‘How can you expect athletes to believe in a system that has never worked

in their favour, that does not take their realities into consideration, that was not built by them and for them?’ (IO15).

The range of views voiced highlights the ethical tensions of these powers, and points to the need for universal rules on matters such as these, to ensure fair policies for athletes globally. Hypothetically, if an athlete in one country or sport where the integrity organisations have powers to seizure devices and information is sanctioned because of these rules, but an athlete in a different country or sport, where these rules are not yet in place, cannot be sanctioned even if they have committed the same ADRV. This does not present a level playing field in sport. A key aim of the WADA Code is to ensure harmonisation across anti-doping, and yet the difference in implementation of these rules appear to go against this. It should however be noted that there are some objections to harmonisation that cannot be overcome, such as legal matters pertaining to different nations. If athlete trust and buy-in is to be gained in the sports integrity system, then athlete voice must be listened to. Furthermore, unifying the rules and powers globally with a clear framework for integrity organisations to follow could enhance credibility, as well as ensuring proper oversight of these rules to ensure athletes are protected against abuse.

7.5 Are These Rules Proportionate?

This chapter has explored rules that allow sports organisations to issue demands for athletes’ objects and information, including personal devices such as phones and laptops, if they are suspected of wrongdoing. As shown in this chapter, there are wide ranging opinions on these rules. Athletes stating their concerns and unhappiness with the rules, alongside the potential for them to be classed as a coercive offer, leads to the questions of whether they are proportionate for use in sports integrity investigations.

Rules such as seizing objects and information are powers usually reserved for law enforcement investigating crimes. While there can be a criminal element to wrongdoing in sport e.g., doping is illegal in some countries and match fixing can involve a criminality, it is not always a crime. For example, someone who tests positive for a substance that they accidentally ingested, a situation one Integrity Officer said these rules had been used in, is not equitable with someone who is systematically fixing matches as part of a criminal network. Integrity Officer Six stated during interview: ‘People cheating at sports aren’t usually criminals, they’re people cheating at sports’ (IO6).

Integrity Officer 15 echoed this view and expressed sympathy for the athletes and the unique demands of elite sport: ‘Doping, that doesn’t happen in a vacuum. It’s not because they’re bad people or cheaters, or just want to win at all costs. They’re part of a system. They’re part of a culture that encourages winning at all costs’ (IO15).

Very few, if any, careers have such demands. Outside of elite sport, if a superior was to ask for a workers’ object, such as their personal phone, in order to investigate suspected wrongdoing in the workplace, it is unlikely that it would be accepted. However, athletes are expected to accept this, and as established earlier in the chapter, through coercive offers.

Hessert (2020) argues that these rules breach athlete rights, and that this is not compatible with fairness. Furthermore, it is argued that they are disproportionate for sports integrity, such as doping, match-fixing and unethical behaviour (Hessert, 2020).

While Integrity Officers interviewed for this thesis generally argued that these rules were necessary, some were more hesitant. Integrity Officer Ten shared their reservations:

‘I’ve always thought in the lead up, because obviously these rules have been brought into different sports over a period of time, it’s never sat easily with me is what I will say from the outset. And as a [job] who tends to be sort of more sympathetic to athletes always... I would be very sort of sympathetic to the argument that this is not right fundamentally’ (IO10).

Integrity Officer Eight stated their support for the rules and that they encouraged sports they worked with to adopt them in their regulations, however, they would not definitively defend them: ‘It is invasive and I can’t definitively say to you it’s the right thing to do’ (IO8).

When asked if they thought these rules were justifiable, one Integrity Officer replied: ‘No. Not really’ (IO15). They provided further insight into their views on the rules and whether they are justifiable or proportionate for sports integrity, saying:

‘I don’t think we can justify having that [demand rules] for athletes using substances. I think it’s important if we’re trying to protect athletes from abusive coaches or doctors that are prescribing them stuff that they don’t even know what

effect that's going to have in their bodies. So if we're trying to – if we have their well-being in mind when we're investigating doctors or let's say, compounding pharmacy that is adding stuff to their supplements that are not even like allowed for human consumption in their country, then yes, I think that having some extra resource to assist in the events, in the investigation, makes sense. But not if we're going after athletes. Yeah, not just because of their results or their competitions, then no' (IO15).

Despite investigators stating their want for as many powers as possible for use within investigations, the above quotes show that some hesitancy from Integrity Officers exists. This, combined with athlete unhappiness at the rules, shows that unanimous approval for these powers does not exist.

Furthermore, as highlighted by Integrity Officers in this research, usually those attempting to dope or fixing competitions etc are not criminals breaking the law, they are athletes essentially cheating, usually in order to get better at their sport, and/or for financial gain. When equated with wrongdoing in other areas, such as a student cheating on an exam to score a better mark, or an academic breaking the guidelines of their ethical approval to gain better results in their research, with both situations gaining adulation and other potential benefits that athletes might get for doping or cheating. In this situation of the student or academic, the powers to demand their objects or information in order to investigate this wrongdoing does not exist, nor would it likely be accepted, and so why should athletes have to accept these rules in their profession?

One argument could be that sport is an exceptionally high stakes business, in which a lot of money is invested. Several interviewees brought up the fact that for athletes, one major win in their career could change their life. For example, in athletics, the winners of the 2023 Boston Marathon took home £121,300 and a further £40,400 was offered for a course record (Latham-Coyle, 2023). Match-fixing can also bring high financial rewards. This makes integrity offences in sport particularly attractive. The incentives for cheating in a test or breaking ethical approval are unlikely to directly bring such great rewards.

Ultimately, due to the nature of the offer made to athletes – that it could be considered coercive as athletes have no other options to be elite athletes if they do not accept – the fact that this is the workplace for athlete and these rules would not be accepted within other workplaces, and

that most wrongdoing by athletes is not criminal in nature, the powers to demand objects and information from athletes for investigations does not appear proportionate. Further issues with these rules include athletes' inability to refuse the demand, and not having the right to stay silent or self-incriminate, a particular issue when these rights are afforded to them in legal situations, and if a sports investigation without these rights uncovers criminality, this evidence could be passed onto law enforcement. World Athletics Anti-Doping Rules explicitly state that athletes being investigated for wrongdoing forfeit rights, defences and privileges normally afforded to them in legal situations (World Athletics, 2023, p.31).

A compromise could be that these demands are only used in specific circumstances. These could include suspected criminality that is also breaking sports rules, and for the severest levels of wrongdoing in sport.

One Integrity Officer detailed times where their organisation has used these powers for athletes using prohibited substances and refuted that this is a proportionate use of the rules. Thus, using them for more severe offences, could be a solution that allows Integrity Officers to gain the evidence they need to prosecute severe wrongdoing, such as doping scandals or widespread corruption or abuse, while protecting athlete rights.

While it is acknowledged that these powers are useful tools for investigators who cite difficulties in gaining adequate evidence, this must be balanced against athletes' rights. These powers are not proportionate for investigating lower-level wrongdoing in sport, especially as athletes must choose to accept them or not be athletes anymore. While adequate evidence is a clear challenge, there are other methods available to investigators. Some of these methods would be even more extreme, and would not be accepted, such as chipping athletes. Others are fairer to athletes, such as interviewing them with a lawyer available to them. This serves as a point to show that there is a spectrum of methods available that would aid investigators, however, the rules cannot just be about what is best for investigators and integrity units. Athletes are a key part of sport, and their rights, along with their views and voice, must be considered. This research has shown that athletes are both unaware, and widely unhappy with the use of these rules. Furthermore, some Integrity Officers also show unease at their use. Athletes must be listened to, and further dialogue between them and integrity organisations is needed to ensure harmonisation and facilitate the shared goal of sport free from wrongdoing, and to enhance athlete buy-in.

7.6 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the powers available to integrity organisations to investigate wrongdoing, with particular focus on the rules that allow some integrity organisations to demand objects and information during investigations.

As noted in the chapter, these powers differ between organisations. Most Integrity Officers are keen to have powers such as demand rules, with many of those who do not currently have them expressing their desire for them. Some are most content with the powers (or lack of) that they currently have, and others are not using the powers due to not considering a case to have warranted them yet or due to lack of resources to be able to.

Athlete Representatives raised concerns with the use of these rules, including lack of protection from abuse, the lack of consultation of athletes and the lack of agreement and consent from athletes. This is important to note when considering that demand rules could be considered coercive offers, due to the fact that athletes either have to accept the rules or cannot be elite athletes.

Referring to the levels of critical realism (Scott, 2005; Fletcher, 2017), this chapter has gone beyond the empirical level comprising of the experiences that can be seen and measured e.g., publicly available regulations on the powers that integrity organisations have. The actual level has been accessed and events that occur in the real world have been detailed by the participants in this research. When considering the real level, which consists of causal mechanisms and deeper lying structures, the ethical analysis has allowed this thesis to explore this. When considering the results of this research, athlete unhappiness with the demand rules, as explained by the Athlete Representative participants, is a key finding. This is valid, and concerns, particularly around lack of consent and consultation, should be listened to. Critical realism can help us understand the underlying mechanisms that can lead to events, such as these rules being implemented despite athlete concerns with them. The Integrity Officer participants in this research have shared the challenges within investigations that they face, such as gathering necessary evidence to prove wrongdoing. In the view of the Integrity Officers in this research, these challenges mean that powers to tackle this are needed and leads to explanations as to why the rules are implemented.

7.6.1 Recommendations

While not all athletes will be issued with demands, athletes should still be aware that they are a possibility. By being properly informed and educated they can then be fully aware of their rights, and furthermore it may also act as a deterrent to those considering wrongdoing, in a similar way that doping tests can. Oversight of these rules, and further consideration to the coercive nature of the offers, is needed to ensure that athletes are protected from abuse, and that their rights are respected.

A further issue raised in this chapter is the disparity between how the rules are used between countries and sports. This can present a lack of a level playing field for athletes. While further work needs to be done with athletes to ascertain the correct application of these powers, work also needs to be done to unify the rules globally. This in turn will make them fairer, as everyone will be working to the same standards, and it will be evident what is right and wrong use of these rules, and how they can be applied fairly and consistently.

These rules do not appear wholly proportionate for use in sports integrity investigations, however there may be situations where they are justified for use e.g., in doping scandals or widespread abuse. Oversight of these rules is needed. For example, in the anti-doping sphere, this could come from WADA. Athlete Representative One expressed concerns that these demands are not properly encased within the WADA Code. There needs to be clear guidelines of the use of these powers and in which situations they are proportionate to be used in, and this should be extended to wider integrity organisations. This will ensure that the rules are applied more fairly, and that athletes are more protected from abuse of these rules.

More rights for athletes, such as equivalent to those seen in legal investigations, could be explored in further research.

This chapter has analysed the powers used within sports integrity investigations. The next chapter analyses whether we can justify the methods currently used within sports integrity.

Chapter Eight – Does Integrity in its Current Form Justify the Investigative Methods Used?

8.1 Chapter Introduction

Sports uses many methods to detect and deter integrity issues. Some of these have been spoken about in this thesis, such as investigative methods, including powers that allow for demands of information and objects, and the use of reporting persons. The use of these investigative methods has been analysed in chapter seven. Other methods used include anti-doping testing and the whereabouts system employed in anti-doping, and have been discussed in previous literature.

This chapter ethically analyses whether the methods that are currently used within sports integrity can be justified, arguing that they are not wholly proportionate.

8.1.1 Anti-Doping Methods

While there is a dearth of academic literature surrounding the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity, there is a range of research outlining ethical issues with methods used within anti-doping, such as anti-doping testing and the whereabouts system.

Anti-doping tests involve a doping control officer or chaperone having to witness the athlete provide a urine sample (WADA, 2024b). An early study looking at the impact of anti-doping control tests on athletes assessed the opinions of 500 intercollegiate athletes, 26% of whom called the urine test upsetting, 36% classed their first urine test as humiliating and 47% called it embarrassing (Coombs & Coombs, 1991). A more recent study analysed the responses of Danish elite athletes and found that 23.9% felt that their privacy was infringed by doping control tests in their home and 15.3% considered their personal integrity to be violated when someone watches them provide their sample (Elbe & Overbye, 2014). However, almost all athletes in the study (98%) considered anti-doping tests to be necessary (Elbe & Overbye, 2014). These studies highlight some key issues with anti-doping control tests, namely the invasion of privacy of having someone watch athletes provide a urine sample and the access to their personal homes.

The whereabouts system, whereby athletes must provide their personal details and a one-hour time slot where they can be tested everyday (WADA, 2015), also has been raised in

previous literature. Whereabouts has previously been described as reducing the joy of elite sport by one in four Norwegian athletes (Hanstad & Loland, 2009). Another study found that only 43% of athletes agreed that the whereabouts system was needed for an effective anti-doping system (Hanstad et. Al, 2009). The whereabouts system has been criticised on the grounds of violations to athletes' privacy, and the effect that it has on athletes, such as anxieties which reduce their enjoyment of sport (Waddington, 2010). Furthermore, practical difficulties of having to give advance notice of where they are going to be have been cited (Waddington, 2010), as well as technical difficulties with the Anti-Doping Administration & Management System (ADAMS). MacGregor et al. (2013) concluded that the whereabouts system could be a breach of athletes' rights under European law and therefore in conflict with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) Article 8, especially when it is considered how few dopers are caught.

Houlihan (2014) argued that athletes would be more likely to comply with an anti-doping system if they understood the clear moral basis for it. Furthermore, there will be greater appetite for it if the rules are seen as reasonable, fairly enforced and reasonably implemented (Houlihan, 2014). Athletes' viewing the anti-doping system as not abiding by these grounds suggests that the system is problematic and ergo lacks legitimacy in their eyes (Waddington, 2010).

An Integrity Officer in this research acknowledged the concerns that athletes could have with the integrity system, saying 'I can understand from an athlete perspective that it [the anti-doping system] can be very invasive, giving your whereabouts for an hour every day. But I guess that the line has to be drawn somewhere of the give and take' (IO5). Another Integrity Officer spoke about the ethical challenges within the anti-doping system, and spoke about why the rules are needed, saying 'I think there are many ethical challenges that we face in the entire anti-doping process. The whereabouts system is one major challenge where you have to give your information three months in advance. That is obviously a challenge to their [athletes'] privacy. Investigations, we're using social media, all of this. But eventually, I think, from a sporting perspective, if we just keep sport in mind, doping is wrong... I think fundamentally since it [doping] is against the rules, it's wrong. And we don't really have to go to the other justifications... Sometimes we might cross some lines that might be ethically wrong, but overall, I think it is for the

best' (IO4). These responses highlight the balance that needs to be struck between protecting athlete rights and ensuring integrity in sport.

One participant in this research shared their thoughts on anti-doping methods, and offered some solutions, saying 'I see it in our organisation, our budget grows every year because we have more obligations and we also ask more and more from the athletes themselves and I always say, of course it starts with the doping controls to urinate under supervision, and then we wanted to draw blood as well and then we wanted information on where they are on the whereabouts and the current whereabouts system I think for me, it is on the line or perhaps a little bit above or beyond it what we can ask from athletes. It is getting too much. The solution here of course is always look from an athlete point of view, and as such to engage with athletes, with Athlete Representatives et cetera and that's the current theme for a few years already, to improve the athletes voice' (IO11). This response from an Integrity Officer highlights their view that the current regulations are getting too much for athletes, which, combined with low numbers of positive tests, indicates an area of concern within the anti-doping system. Working with athletes is cited as a response to this by this participant, which reinforces calls for athlete voice to be listened to made throughout this thesis.

8.1.2 Investigative methods

While issues with other aspects of the integrity system have been outlined in previous literature, there is little work on the investigative methods used. The research in this thesis has sought to address this gap.

Chapter seven of this thesis focused on rules that allow some integrity organisations to demand objects and information from athletes and other persons if they are subject to integrity investigations. These methods were described by Athlete Representative participants as 'a restriction of your freedom' (AR5), with the Athlete Representatives interviewed largely displaying unhappiness at the rules. Furthermore, Integrity Officers in this research also expressed their unease at the rules and how they are and can be used. Hessert (2020) classed the rules as coercive and disproportionate for use in sports integrity.

The use of reporting persons was discussed in this thesis in chapter six. Here, Athlete Representative participants outlined their thoughts on the lack of protections for athletes who chose to report wrongdoing, and the negative consequences they could face such as retaliation and re-traumatisation.

A further investigative method which has only recently started to be employed in sports integrity is the use of voice analysis. This is described as a screening and risk assessment intelligence tool (Defreitas, 2023). Athletes or others involved in sport answer several yes or no questions and their voice is analysed during the screening to ascertain whether their answers are low, medium or high risk. This method has been cited as successful in aiding with investigations into integrity issues, both in finding those responsible for the violations and for helping to eliminate athletes who are not (Defreitas, 2023). The method of voice analysis was only mentioned by one participant in my research. Their organisation did not employ this method, but they pointed to organisations and cases which did. In reference to this investigative method, this Integrity Officer stated ‘The concern is that it can be abused in the wrong hands’ (IO10), suggesting that some organisations or individuals may use it unethically. For the purpose of this thesis, while it was not explored in depth in the data collection interviews, it is highlighted here as a potentially ethically problematic investigative method, for athlete privacy and consent reasons, that, alongside other methods mentioned, needs assessment as to whether they are justifiable for use in sports integrity.

As highlighted in this section, sports integrity has a range of methods and regulations in place that can provide potential ethical issues for athletes, such as privacy concerns, practical concerns, and questions over whether they are protected from abuse of the methods in place. Assessment is needed for whether these methods and regulations are justifiable for use within sports integrity. The next sections will analyse this issue, with particular focus on the investigative methods which have been the subject of this thesis and are largely unexplored within wider literature.

8.2 How Important is Sport?

At the heart of the matter of which methods are appropriate for use within sports integrity is the key component – sport. Participants were asked during interviews why integrity in sport matters. This was the final question of each interview and was an apt way to

conclude the varied and insightful discussions. These responses can contribute to the overall debate of whether sports integrity can justify the methods employed. The key themes were: society, fairness, health, believing results and the 'right thing to do'. Each theme is presented in its own section below. For each theme, results are presented, followed by analysis.

8.2.1 Society

Participants in this research argued that sport and integrity within sport is important for society as a whole. One participant stated, 'Sport is so important for society. Sport is so important from top to bottom in terms of all the things I've said: physical, criminal, justice, education, academic, work, happiness, health, multi-generationally. It brings people together. It's just everything' (IO14) and another said 'Sport is something very important for us as human beings... If you look at a global scale, sport is more than just sport. Sport is in society one of the most important, integral things that you can do with your kids' (IO7).

Participants outlined why sport was vital, with one saying 'Sport is really important. I think sport has a certain power that a lot of other things in our society doesn't have' (AR1) and another stated 'What people underplay is how big sport is in people's lives... Sport is so important in people's lives... Some people wake up every day and all they do is think about their particular sport' (IO8). An Integrity Officer explained, 'You could say in the grand scheme of things, that sport is quite trivial. It's just playing games... But sport matters to a lot of people, in a lot of places in the world' (IO5), and another said 'Sport can be so much. I keep saying that one thing that frustrates me a lot with sport the way it is right now is because I think it has the potential to lead the change, because we know that all the problems that we see in sport right now they're not particular to sport, they're just reflecting problems we have in our society. But it could be changing the game. It could be leading by example, it could be doing things differently' (IO15).

One Integrity Officer stated '[Sport] provides so many benefits to populations and governments are well aware of that you know for many in [location] it's better, very beneficial to have an active population and to encourage people to get involved in sport that is run in an ethical way is a big part of that' (IO13) and another said 'Sport plays such a large part in society in a time when society probably struggles for rays of light and all

that. To have sport there is fairly significant, but more importantly, to have a sport which is clean of wrongdoers and as pure as possible is really important' (IO3).

Integrity Officers have argued that sport and sport integrity are vital for society. One Integrity Officer noted that sport could be considered trivial and just playing games. It can be easy to trivialise sport down to a bit of fun, or consider athletes privileged for 'playing games' for a living. However, sport is important for a large number of people. For athletes, sport is their career, and athletes can often associate what they do with who they are. For fans, it can provide entertainment and enjoyment. For recreation, sport can provide health and social benefits. Sport extends beyond just the elite level, and for many it is a form of exercise to aid with physical and mental health, and at grassroot levels it can teach children key lessons such as teamwork, fairness and respect.

However, while the benefits of sport have been highlighted, there are also aspects of sport that are less beneficial. These include the high risk of injury and illness, and in extreme cases, worse. Furthermore, as highlighted throughout this thesis, integrity violations are occurring, and if people are looking to sport for good, then they are also seeing the bad. Sport is not entirely good, nor is it immune from integrity issues. Both the good, and the bad, should be considered.

On balance, the benefits of sport outweigh the negatives. Sport undoubtedly has a positive effect on society, as evidenced by the participant responses in this research, and integrity is needed to maintain this positive effect on society and ensure it continues to outweigh the bad. While sport needs to maintain integrity for it continue to be able to be a positive force, how we conduct integrity operations, such as using intelligence and investigations, also needs to be done ethically and with integrity.

8.2.2 Fairness

The participants in this research highlighted fairness as an important notion of sport and sport integrity. Fairness is defined by the Council for Europe's Code of Sports Ethics as 'practising a sport while faithfully respecting the rules of competition, and to providing everyone with an equal chance of taking part in sport' (Council for Europe, 2010, para. 16).

One Athlete Representative stated, ‘There’s this huge money and life changing contracts and life changing podiums out there for people, and to have people deprived of that because someone’s not following the same rules that you’re following, or someone has been given a medical foot up that you can’t get, I find that deeply unfair’ (AR1) and another said ‘It’s [sports integrity] about the fairness of the competition’ (AR2).

One Integrity Officer highlighted why they thought fairness was important, saying, ‘For everyone to have a fair chance to win, to compete, to make a living out of sport, to demonstrate their talents, to change their own lives, their families’ lives to inspire us’ (IO15) and another acknowledged the demands that integrity rules can place on athletes ‘I think you’d be more than happy to submit to all the integrity demands in terms of our side to actually have a level playing field in terms of that’ (IO2).

Another Athlete Representative highlighted that fairness is not always guaranteed, saying ‘I think it’s giving people the opportunity to compete on a level playing field as we can get to, acknowledging that it is never a level playing field because people always going to be coming from different social, economic backgrounds, just completely different places in their lives’ (AR3).

While fairness is an ideal that sport and integrity should be striving towards, as noted by Athlete Representative Three in the above quote, sport can be inherently unfair. Firstly, locational differences mean that sport can be an uneven playing field. Where an athlete is born affects what resources and support they have available to them, and can even affect which sport they play. Moreover, locational differences can affect an athletes’ chance at competing at top level competition. For some, resources and finances can mean that an athlete cannot attend competitions. Another issue is in countries where the competition is too fierce e.g., in track and field only a maximum of three athletes can be selected per country for individual events at the Olympic Games. One country could have the top four athletes in the world, and yet the fourth will not compete at the Olympics due to these rules. These rules are in place to ensure that the larger and best funded countries do not take all of the places at the Olympics which would be considered unfair, however, they still create an unfairness that some of the best athletes in the world cannot compete. In this case, one unfairness has to supersede the other.

As previously noted in this thesis, sport can be a financially lucrative business. For athletes at the top, there is a lot of money to be earned in wages and sponsorship. For example, in 2023 footballer Cristiano Ronaldo topped Forbes' World's Highest-Paid Athletes list, earning a total of \$138 million, with \$46 million of that made from on-field earnings, and \$90 million off the field (Forbes, 2023). This highlights some of the great sums of money that can be involved in elite sport. However, in contrast, in 2024 the BBC released result of their study of elite British sports women, with more than three quarters of the athletes surveyed stating that earned less than £30,000 a year from sport, six in ten earning less than £20,000 and more than four in ten earning less than £10,000 (Grey & Oxley, 2024). This shows the large disparity in earning in sport, with differences seen across sports, gender and individual marketability, and can represent an unfairness with some athletes making life changing money and others making nothing at all.

Furthermore, as this research has highlighted, there are differences in how integrity rules are implemented globally. Previous research has called for a more harmonised integrity system, including increased international harmonisation of anti-doping policy (Woolway et al., 2020), and the need for anti-doping organisations to be able to share anti-doping knowledge more effectively (Marclay et al., 2013). The IOC has also called for sanctions for integrity breaches to be harmonised (IOC, 2018). Consistency across sports is also suggested by Kuwelker et al. (2022), which could be facilitated by uniform regulations and sanctions. However, a key challenge to this is local laws, regulations and customs which all affect which rules can be implemented. Within this research, Athlete Representatives have raised concerns that not all athletes are treated the same way in the integrity system globally. This includes how demand powers are used, with not all countries and organisations having access to these powers.

Sport and the sports integrity system can be unfair. It is vital that those working within sports integrity strive for fairness. Ways to increase fairness within sports integrity include a suggestion that has already been made within this thesis: the global harmonisation of investigative powers and the use of demand rules, to ensure that rules are applied fairly across sports and countries and that athletes competing against each other are subject to the same powers. By unifying the rules, this would make them more justifiable by ensuring fairness and parity, and would ensure methods, such as intelligence and investigations, are used more ethically.

8.2.3 Health

Some Athlete Representatives in this research highlighted health as an important factor.

One participant said, 'It's [sport] supposed to be a healthy endeavour. We're supposed to be trying to encourage each other. We're trying to be supportive of each other while competing. Part of that is not doing damage. It's very easy for things to run out of control. You can make very small situations where things [such as doping] become standard be standard behaviour. They then become embedded very quickly' (AR4) and another stated, 'I think at the end of the day, it is a health issue so when we speak about, for example, doping, it's around athletes' health as well' (AR2).

Another Athlete Representative acknowledged a debate around health, saying 'I don't know if I'd always say high level sport is healthy, but it's definitely far more healthy than the alternative which is just opening the doors and allowing doping' (AR1).

The 2021 WADA Code has at the core of its rationale an emphasis on the preservation of athlete health. The elevated status of health as a rationale for anti-doping has arisen in part from a European Court of Human Rights Judgement (ECHR, 2017) defending the current WADA mandated approach to out of competition doping control testing as protecting the health of those involved, against the claim of significant privacy invasion. These policies are justified on paternalist grounds as promoting the health of athletes. It can be argued that as a global regulator for anti-doping, WADA is aware of aspects that can affect athletes, such as doping and the detriment to athletes' health, and therefore they should be able to be paternalistic in their policy decisions. However, critics of paternalism state that it is unacceptable and that only a well-informed person can decide what is best for themselves (Ross et al., 2012).

Autonomy is something else to consider. Autonomy can be defined as the ability to live and make decisions that are aligned with one's motives, free from external influence or forces (Chistman, 2020). It could be argued that not allowing athletes to use certain methods and substances which are prohibited in sport is restricting their autonomy. However, this limitation of autonomy could be classed as proportionate when the negative health effects detailed previously that integrity offences can have on athletes, as well as

the fact that not only do issues like doping affect sport, but they could also be a public health concern if allowed (McVeigh & Begley, 2017), are considered.

When considering the methods used within sports integrity, it is useful to remember that athlete health is an important factor and justification for sports integrity regulations. Athlete health is important, and so if powers, such as demand powers, can aid with protecting this, then this could strengthen the argument for their use.

8.2.4 Believing Results

Participants expressed the need for results to be believed in sport. Integrity issues such as sport competition manipulation and doping can make it difficult for results of competitions to be believed.

One Athlete Representative said, ‘I think we’re all better off if we can believe the results, and aspire to be those people and have our children and communities look up to them as well’ (AR1) and an Integrity Officer stated ‘I wouldn’t bother going to watch a [sport] match, if I knew the result had already been predetermined by some guys making loads of money out of it. Even if the result is not determined, because you often get in play betting, which is the main focus of a lot of the corruptors now, if you know that something’s predetermined before it’s played, it’s just takes away from the magic of the sport and the last-minute drama, or any sort of drama that can happen in it. I think it also takes away from the hard work of the players’ (IO2).

The importance of believing what you see was explained by one participant, who said ‘It matters that it [sport] has integrity, and it matters that what you see on TV or you watch live is real, whether it’s fixed or doping or cheating or the athletes are being abused or harassed or whatever, that what you’re watching is safe, is correct, is true and that it can be believed’ (IO5) and another said ‘If I want to go and watch something that’s predetermined or isn’t a true picture then I’ll go to the theatre, I’ll go to the cinema’ (IO10).

One Integrity Officer highlighted the consequences of losing fan belief, saying ‘Fans and customers – why go and watch a game if you know it’s going to be fixed... If levels of integrity aren’t maintained on a certain consistency, public confidence drops off and then

spectators decrease drastically and interest in the sport decreases. And if interest in the sport decreases, investment decreases and sports atrophy' (IO6) and another explained 'Sports that people don't trust very quickly lose public confidence, lose the player confidence. People want to know that what they're watching is a true competition on a level playing field between two elite teams or two elite athletes or a group of athletes, they want to be absolutely as confident as they can that this is a true outcome and once the sport loses that it loses not just credibility, but it loses its value in every sense, so without integrity there is no sport' (IO12). Others echoed these points, with one Integrity Officer saying, 'If you take football, for many people football is life to them and if they see that something is wrong with that then the fan base is just devastated, the sport loses credibility' (IO8) and another stated 'If you've got an elite level cheats through sport, people will stop watching the Olympics' (IO14).

An Integrity Officer summarised the issue, saying 'We just want the results to be legitimate' (IO15).

Integrity Officers have highlighted why integrity in sport is needed for fans, athletes, and other stakeholders to be able to believe the results. The loss of this can lead to decreased fan and sponsor engagement. In general, public interest is high in sport. This is evidenced by the vast sums of money involved, as sport relies on people watching, both in person and on television/streaming, as well as buying merchandise, supporting athletes' ventures and paying to participate e.g., in sports clubs. The broadcasting rights for the Premier League were bought for £6.7 billion for the period 2025-2029 (McCaskill, 2023), highlighting the vast sums of money involved in some sports broadcasting.

While proving that sport is free from integrity violations is an aim for integrity organisations, in practice this is difficult to demonstrate. To do so, we must first catch and sanction those who commit integrity violations. Therefore, it is in the very act of cleaning up sport that it can appear that sport is riddled with integrity issues. The more people who are sanctioned for integrity issues, the more it can appear as if sport has a problem. Although, it is vital that we do catch those who commit wrongdoing and sanction them appropriately in order to ensure integrity issues can be eradicated from sport. However, it is unlikely that sport will ever be fully free from integrity violations as there will always be people who want to cheat and the incentive to do so, such as the vast

amounts of money that can be available for winning, as well as the adulation that medals etc can bring, will always incentivise those who are willing to cheat. However, this does not mean that we should stop sanctioning or attempting to catch those who are committing integrity violations. Instead, innovative ways to catch more people who are committing integrity violations, such as the use of intelligence and investigations, should be developed to ensure athlete, fan, sponsor and other stakeholder trust.

8.2.5 The 'Right Thing to Do'

Several participants in this research suggested that protecting integrity in sport is the 'right thing to do.'

One participant said 'Protecting that [integrity] for the greater good, I think, is really important... The need to keep sport as clean as possible is a really honourable thing to do, and I think it's the right thing to do' (AR1), another stated 'If there wasn't a way of protecting the integrity of that sport it would be devastating...It matters because sport is so important' (IO8) and one explained 'For a clean athlete, it's so important for them that they know that there is someone who takes care of them and makes sure that the competition is fair because that's what it's all about, it's not only to win gold, medals or whatever it's about what we believe sport is and it should be clean' (IO7).

While the sentiment in these quotes is in line with many responses from participants, it must be acknowledged that these views belong to the participants in this research and may not necessarily be shared by others in sport. The participants in this research are passionate about sports integrity, as evidenced by their career choices, and by their willingness to participate in this research. Therefore, while this research has uncovered novel insights into the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity, and key ethical issues have been analysed in this thesis, there are no participants featured who think that integrity in sport is unimportant. For example, there is academic literature that suggests doping should be allowed in sport (e.g., Savulescu, 2004), and practical work to ensure that this becomes a reality e.g., the Enhanced Games, which will allow athletes to take performance enhancing substances. Instead, this thesis focussed on anti-doping and integrity policy, and those who work within this regulated space, rather than outside of it. Furthermore, opinions and experiences can also differ globally and culturally, and not everyone may agree that sport needs stringent integrity rules, even those who work within

the field. Even Athlete Representatives in this research who express unhappiness at some areas of the integrity system, e.g., the powers that organisations have to investigate, overall they all still believe that integrity in sport and measures to protect this are needed. Therefore, while my participants have claimed that integrity in sport is the ‘right thing’ and the arguments in this thesis largely concur with these views, it is acknowledged that not everyone will agree with this sentiment. Future research could explore this further, including engaging with athletes and professionals who desire less stringent integrity measures, and finding out why, and whether practical implementations can be enacted from this if there is enough consensus e.g. a competition with no integrity rules, such as the Enhanced Games.

8.2.6 Interim Conclusion

Participants in this research have shared their thoughts on why sport and integrity in sport is vital: protecting the integrity of sport is important because sport is important. Sport matters because it provides enjoyment to those taking part and spectating; it can bring people together; it can provide community; it is important for younger generations to teach them life lessons (such as respect, teamwork, fairness, how to cope with loss, competition) and provide role models for them; and it is important for society with benefits such as for physical and mental health, education and work. Because of all these aspects, it is important that integrity is in place in sports, in order to protect the vast benefits sport can provide. Participants suggested that sports integrity matters because: it is vital for fairness; respect for self and others is important; without it, confidence of athletes, fans and sponsors can be lost; it can provide a safe environment for sport to be in; it can make sport accessible, equal and diverse; it can provide a level playing field; athlete health can be protected and safety assured; and cheating can decrease participation. Without integrity, key benefits of sport, such as those outlined in this section, can be lost.

Opposing discussions have also been presented, such as the negatives of sport e.g. injury and illness, sport being inherently unfair, the paternalist nature of health as a rationale for anti-doping measures, the difficulties in proving that results should be believed, the effect of integrity issues on children in sport, the lack of enjoyment that can affect athletes and fans, and the questions surrounding whether it is universally agreed that sports integrity is the ‘right thing.’

Overall, participants have argued that integrity is a vital part of sport. Considering all arguments, this thesis is in agreement that sports integrity is necessary and an important part of sport.

This section has outlined why sport and integrity within sport is important. This will be used to aid with the analysis to answer whether the methods currently used within sports integrity are justifiable.

8.3 Athlete Rights in the Integrity System

In order to assess whether investigative methods are justified, it is necessary to assess the current athlete rights within the integrity system.

WADA have an Athletes' Anti-Doping Rights Act which aims to set out athlete rights clearly, in an accessible and universally applicable way (WADA, 2019b). WADA state that a purpose of the WADC and WADA Program is to "protect the athletes' fundamental right to participate in doping-free sport and thus promote and protect health, fairness and equal opportunity for athletes worldwide... Making sure that athletes have rights, that athletes are aware of those rights, and can exercise those rights is vital to the success of clean sport" (WADA, 2019b, paras 2-3). The Act was formed in consultation with athletes (WADA, 2019b).

A right set out in the Act is medical treatment and protection of health rights, with WADA stating that a right athletes have is to be free from pressure to dope that could harm their mental or physical health (WADA, 2019b). However, this appears a difficult right for WADA to aim to guarantee. Athletes face pressures from many sources to dope, including the idea that their competitors are doping, their associations, stages of their careers, injuries and illnesses, to name a few. Protecting health rights, and the right to medical treatment, is more tangibly assured, by the implementation of TUEs.

WADA contend that athletes also have the right to justice, which includes rights to be heard. Fair hearings include that they take place within a reasonable time frame, by a hearing panel that is fair, impartial and operationally independent. Furthermore, timely reasoned decision should be given, with explanations of the decision, and the right to

appeal offering the same rights (WADA, 2019b). However, athletes have spoken out about these rights not being respected, e.g., recently tennis players have complained of lengthy anti-doping processes (Jurejko, 2024). Furthermore, there are grey areas within integrity policy that allows for a degree of interpretation, as well as situations that can make it difficult to prove whether doping has occurred or not. This was outlined by an Integrity Officer who highlighted current issues with athlete rights in the integrity system, saying ‘I feel sorry for the athletes who genuinely take contaminated substances, or are given drugs by a coach without them knowing because the system assumes guilt and you have to then prove innocence which is the opposite to how you know the rest of society works. But then if it worked the other way, then it wouldn’t work, without strict liability, how without that data point, without that specific proof, you can’t prove that someone intentionally took something in the privacy of their own home with malice. They’re very unlikely. I mean you can with enough investigations and evidence you might be able to. Or if people are completely sloppy’ (IO5). An Athlete Representative echoed these sentiments, saying:

‘Athletes are put at a systemic disadvantage. So the reversal of the burden of proof is only one aspect of it but strict liability then the problem around even getting evidence to prove your own, basically to prove that you are not guilty that the substance entered your system without your knowledge, without your fault is something where athletes are in a very structural disadvantage’ (AR2).

A further example can be seen if an athlete tests positive for a substance and their defence is meat contamination as it can be difficult to prove whether this is genuinely the case or not. To compare the cases of two US track and field athletes, Erriyon Knighton and Shelby Houlihan, both athletes tested positive for prohibited substances and claimed contaminated meat was the source of their positive test. Knighton had his explanation accepted and received no ban from sport (Kearns, 2024), Houlihan on the other hand received a four-year ban (AIU, 2021e). Individual circumstances will have no doubt affected these decisions, but these examples serve as a point to show the difficulties and complexities that can accompany the anti-doping system and may lead to athletes feeling as if their right to justice has not been upheld. When considering the right to justice, these participant responses and real-life cases show that this right can be difficult to respect within the anti-doping system e.g., due to strict liability, athletes who accidentally consume

a prohibited substance may still face a lengthy ban from sport if they are unable to prove how they ingested it. However, without strict liability, athletes would be able to use contamination etc as a defence, even if they deliberately ingested a substance. By ensuring the system can sanction those who do deliberately use prohibited substances and methods, this could be considered justice for athletes.

WADA also state that athletes have the right to accountability. They state that this means any ADO that holds jurisdiction over them shall be accountable for their actions (or lack of) and athletes can report any compliance concerns (WADA, 2019b). While the regulations and compliance systems set out by WADA do ensure some accountability for ADOs, this research has highlighted ways that athletes are unhappy with the current integrity system, and this may lead to athletes feeling as if not enough is being done to ensure this accountability. The recent doping case involving swimming has led to questions around accountability of ADOs, including WADA. In 2021, seven months prior to the Olympic Games in Tokyo, 23 Chinese swimmers tested positive for a prohibited substance. The China Anti-Doping Agency (Chinada) rules that this was a result of unintentional ingestion of the substance via contamination at a training camp, and the swimmers received no sanctions. WADA was notified of this decision in June 2021 and did not appeal the decision. This case was not made publicly available at the time, and only came to light in 2024 after a media investigation (Skelton, 2024). USADA responded to the case by calling for a truly independent investigation, seeking answers and accountability (USADA, 2024b). WADA commissioned a report to look into their handling of the case, following which USADA stated, “The WADA report issued by Mr. Cottier today [9th July 2024] provides athletes and the world with some additional information, but unfortunately, still leaves most of the critical questions unanswered when it comes to WADA allowing China to sweep 23 positive tests for a potent performance-enhancing drug under the carpet. This is unsurprising since WADA itself handpicked the investigator and set the extremely limited scope of the investigation, preventing a meaningful review” (USADA, 2024c, para.1). In this case, it appears accountability is lacking and there remains questions surrounding the case from ADOs, such as USADA, and athletes alike. These questions include why this case was not made publicly available at the time, why no sanctions were imposed and the principle of strict liability not upheld, why the defence of contamination was accepted and what evidence was accepted for this, and why WADA decided not to appeal this decision. This last

question is particularly poignant when considering WADA's history of appealing decisions e.g., a recent case involving British cyclist Lizzy Banks saw UKAD decide to not sanction her following a positive doping test, finding her at no fault or negligence. WADA subsequently decided to appeal (UKAD, 2024). While WADA have attempted to answer some of these questions (WADA, 2024c), concern from athletes and ADOs still persists. In reference to the case, Matthew Graham, the Head of World Players (an athlete union) said, "Longstanding systemic issues have plagued the anti-doping movement. Athletes have faced unjust processes and sanctions, while officials have not been held to account, and there has been a lack of meaningful athlete involvement in the global anti-doping system. The response to this scandal must address fundamental root causes, not just symptoms, if WADA is to assert any legitimacy as a steadfast regulator of global anti-doping policy" (World Players, 2024, para. 3). While WADA cite accountability of ADOs as a key right for athletes, recent cases such as this show that this right is not currently being upheld to the standard some ADOs, other stakeholders in sport, and athletes would like.

Rights for reporting persons are also laid out in the Act. These include athletes having the right to access anonymous or confidential reporting mechanisms, and this right to report includes doing so and not being subjected to threats or intimidation, and they have the right to not be retaliated against when reporting (WADA, 2019b). However, participants in my research have said that anonymity cannot be guaranteed. For example, if only a few people know the information that has been reported, or if it is from a small sport or community, then confidentiality cannot always be protected. Furthermore, Athlete Representatives in this research have said that athletes don't feel protected from retaliation etc, and as such, this right in WADA's Act is not being upheld.

In the Act, there are further rights detailed which are not globally followed by all in anti-doping and don't currently fall under the WADC or International Standards. They are, however, rights that athletes encourage all anti-doping organisations to ensure are provided to athletes. This includes the right to participate in decision making and governance (WADA, 2019b). However, a concern raised in this thesis is that athletes aren't being consulted on decision and governance matters, which is supported by previous research (SAPiS, 2023). This includes a concern from an Athlete Representative that even when Athlete Representative processes (such as athlete panels and commissions) are in place,

they are not always effective and participation can be inactive by some members. Furthermore, Athlete Representatives raised concerns that on matters such the implementation of demand rules, they hadn't been consulted. This evidences a clear gap between WADA's aims of athlete rights, and the reality seen within this research. One Athlete Representative highlighted their concerns that athlete rights weren't be respected currently, saying 'It's becoming concerning to me that there's a lack of balance and maybe a lack of discussion, because it seems to be happening that we all seem to want something, but the way that we're getting there isn't the most transparent or fairest way to do it... Sometimes that 'catch ya' sort of mentality. Sometimes it feels like athletes are also the enemy' (AR1). This highlights how athletes can feel within the integrity system and the concerns around their rights.

In addition to the rights which have been discussed in this section, participants have argued throughout this thesis that athlete rights, such as privacy, consent, the right to a fair investigation, and protection when reporting, are important and need protecting. Athlete Representatives raised concerns that athletes are seen as the enemy, and that there is a lack of balance and discussion currently. They also suggested that athlete rights are human rights, and that the integrity system can tend to protect organisations, and not the athletes. Other rights mentioned include the fact that athletes are seen as guilty until they can prove they are innocent, the principle of strict liability, and disadvantages during proceedings. A key point that is important to remember is that there is no sport without athletes. Therefore, it is vital that their rights are respected, and that integrity organisations and athletes work together to improve the system for athletes and to ensure their rights are protected and respected. At present, Athlete Representatives in this research suggest that athlete rights are not respected. These aforementioned rights are breached in pursuit of sport free from integrity issues.

While WADA setting out athlete rights within an Act is a positive step to ensure these rights are respected, this research, along with actual doping cases, show that this is not always the reality. This work has reinforced Chappell's (2014a) suggestion that philosophical and ethical insights need to be supported by real-life examples and analogies, and my use of interviews of Integrity Officer and Athlete Representatives, and the drawing on cases, demonstrates this.

This section has set out athlete rights within the integrity system and analysed whether they are currently respected. This can help inform the next section, which assesses whether the current methods are justifiable.

8.4 Are the Current Methods Justifiable?

As outlined in this chapter, and throughout this thesis, a range of methods are used by integrity organisations to uncover, investigate, sanction and prevent integrity violations.

In order to assess whether these methods are justifiable, the interests of athletes and integrity organisations need to be weighed against each other. Athletes are seeking to compete in their sport and to protect their rights. When subject to investigations, they are further seeking to protect these rights and looking to defend themselves. Integrity organisations have the aim of protecting sport from integrity violations. This includes prosecuting athletes (and others who break the rules) for any integrity breaches. During this analysis, the interests and rights of both groups will be considered.

Firstly, two quotes are offered from participants, one from an Integrity Officer and another from an Athlete Representative. These responses during interview highlight the thoughts of those working within sports integrity.

One Integrity Officer considered the question of whether it is proportionate to have the investigative methods used, saying ‘Is it proportionate to have these rules and such like to deal with? Well, yeah, it probably is actually. But it needs to be managed in a really careful way with proper safeguards of people who understand the repercussions. But it’s needed because you can’t always rely on law enforcement’ (IO3).

An Athlete Representative offered a solution as to how the methods could be justified, explaining ‘I think at the end of the day to justify, to legitimise the systems, it needs the athletes and their representatives to be involved, and to be part of the discussion and to have a say in those decisions, and we see that the most sophisticated, most legitimate solutions are found exactly by that, through social dialogue through the social partners’ (AR2).

These quotes, along with those already presented in this chapter, will fuel the analysis of whether these methods are justifiable.

8.4.1 Evidence

Throughout this thesis, challenges facing integrity organisations have been outlined. One of these challenges that was cited frequently by the Integrity Officers in this research is the challenge of gathering sufficient evidence that is needed to prove that integrity violations have occurred. This challenge is more significant for organisations who have limited powers, such as those who do not have demand rules. However, some Integrity Officers who did have these powers still noted that evidence gathering was a challenge. As many investigators within sports integrity are ex-police officers, the comparison to the powers within sports integrity being less than law enforcement was common.

As Integrity Officers working in sports integrity have highlighted evidence gathering as a key challenge, there is an argument that the investigative methods currently employed are a solution to this. Regulations such as demand rules can provide integrity organisations with evidence to prove wrongdoing, such as text messages showing arrangements to fix a match, obtained from a demand for an athlete's mobile phone. This is a tangible way that evidence to prove integrity violations can be gained.

However, evidence cannot be gained by any means necessary, and thought to athletes' rights must be given. There are other ways evidence could be obtained, such as tapping an athletes' phone without their knowledge, and yet this is not a method widely employed within sports integrity currently. Thought must be given to these methods to assess their use and consider how athletes are impacted. For many, objects such as mobile phones are personal, and contain things such as private conversations, e.g., with partners and family. While an athlete may have an understanding that their phone can be demanded by an integrity organisation, the contacts in their phone will not, and thus thought to who else could be impacted by these methods that could be classed as heavy-handed must also be considered.

8.4.2 Sanctions

The investigative powers used within sports integrity varies widely between organisations, depending on factors such as the country they are in and whether their

board wishes to approve certain powers. Some integrity organisations are able to work with law enforcement, while others are not. During this research, several Integrity Officers noted that while they have partnerships to work with law enforcement, it could be difficult to get them involved. Furthermore, not all integrity violations within sport are criminal in nature, therefore it is not always (if at all) proportionate for law enforcement to be involved in sports integrity investigations.

A key argument for the use of the methods currently used is that fact that they can directly lead to sanctions. As mentioned in the previous section on evidence, they can provide evidence for cases, which can lead to sanctions and to individuals who have committed integrity violations to be punished and potentially leave sport. Low percentages of positive doping tests and few sanctions of other integrity issues in sport, in opposition to views that integrity issues are far more common, have frequently been cited throughout this thesis. This indicates that more needs to be done to sanction those committing integrity violations. Investigative methods such as those mentioned, which are relatively new methods for sports integrity, can aid with this, and Integrity Officers in this research believe that they will be a positive force for cleaning up sports integrity and leading to more sanctions.

However, despite the introduction of these methods, positive doping testing numbers remain low. The latest testing figures from WADA are from 2022 where 0.71% of all tests were positive (WADA, 2024a). This is a slight improvement from the 2021 figures of 0.65% (WADA, 2023c) and the 2020 figures of 0.67% (WADA, 2021g) (both of which could have been affected by COVID-19), and yet it is a decrease from the 2019 figures of 0.97% and the 2018 figures of 1.05% (WADA, 2020e). The 2023 testing figures are not currently available and perhaps these would provide different answers and show more athletes than 1% are testing positive, however without this data to hand, assumptions cannot be made. For 2020, WADA also published an ADRV report which stated that 149,758 samples were collected. The report detailed that from the 0.67% of samples (1,007 samples) that were positive, only 66% of these (672 samples) led to ADRVs. Additionally, 263 non-analytical findings were confirmed (ADRVs that did not come from a positive doping control test), meaning that in total 935 ADRVs were confirmed for 2020 (WADA, 2023d). It is worth noting that the figures from 2020 may have been affected by COVID-19. Marginal increases and decreases over the years aside, the

available figures from the last few years are undoubtedly low. This is especially poignant when it is considered that some academic literature suggests that doping at elite levels could be as high as 39% (De Hon et al., 2015). Therefore, some Integrity Officers are suggesting that these investigative methods could help catch more of those who are cheating, and yet positive doping tests remain low and other integrity violations sanctions are still scarce. Furthermore, athlete rights, such as privacy and consent, are still being breached despite lack of evidence of the effectiveness of these methods. Integrity Officers in this research have argued that strong investigative powers are needed, but it is not evident as to whether this is translating into more integrity violation sanctions. Furthermore, this research has highlighted that athletes are unhappy with the use of these methods and are uncertain about whether they are protected. So, not only do the rules appear to not be aiding with catching more people who commit integrity violations, they are also in use against athlete wishes and with a lack of athlete consultation and discussion. Therefore, it appears difficult to justify investigative methods when they can seem ineffective (as evidenced by low positive test numbers and sanctions for other integrity offences, in opposition to consensus by participants in this research and wider literature that integrity violations are in fact higher) and opposed by athletes.

However, the use of percentage positive doping control tests figures may be misleading. An advantage of investigative methods, such as the demand rules, are that they can prove that doping has occurred without a positive test, as well as evidence for other integrity issues that do not have 'tests' in the same way. For example, for match fixing, it can be difficult to prove that it has occurred without bank statements to see that money has exchanged hands, and text messages to prove that it has been arranged. The anti-doping testing figures are still important, however, as they are tangible data that provides an overview of whether the anti-doping system is working or not, and shows how many athletes are being caught doping through anti-doping control tests. Moreover, intelligence and investigations is used to inform testing plans, and therefore if it is an effective method, this should lead testing regimes to catch more dopers, which it appears is not presently occurring.

8.4.3 Athlete Rights in Investigations

When debating important issues, such as fundamental human rights of athletes, it should be remembered that the backdrop of all these discussions is sport. Sport is considered by

some unimportant, trivial even, seen as athletes playing games or just kicking a ball around a field. When compared with vital topics of discussion such as basic human rights, it can appear difficult to justify using such invasive methods as the ones discussed and violating athlete rights, all just for sport.

However, as highlighted earlier in this chapter, supported by responses from participants, sport is important for a number of reasons, including health, enjoyment and life skills. By extension, this makes the integrity of sport important, and this needs protecting in order to protect sport and all of its benefits. The rules that govern sport are a core foundation of what makes it sport. For example, in football the offside rule is a vital part of the sport. It is in place for a reason. This includes the same as rules that are in place for sports integrity - they are part of sport. For the offside rule, there are athletes who have been wronged by decisions surrounding it (e.g., incorrect calls that have led to goals not standing that could have won players the match), in the same way that athletes who lose to others who have doping have been wronged. In football, advances have been made to improve calls around the offside rule, such as the introduction of Video Assistant Referee (VAR), which was introduced with the key aim of assisting with referee decisions. In the same wave, sports integrity must continue to strive for improvement, with the introduction of new methods that could help catch more people who are committing integrity violations. The increased use of intelligence and investigations is an example of this, and new and innovative ideas are needed to allow the system to progress and improve.

The importance of sport has been established, however, it should not be forgotten that athletes are the most important stakeholder in sport. Without athletes, there would be no sport. Therefore, if the methods used are harming athletes and their rights, then it must be questioned whether these methods should be used at all. As earlier established, some methods within the integrity system and investigations can breach athlete rights such as privacy and consent. Athletes have also raised concerns with the rules, such as whether they are adequately protected from abuse of the methods employed. Throughout this thesis, a call for athlete voice to be heard more in the integrity system and for athletes and integrity organisations to work more closely together has been made. This would enhance the system for both groups, and lead to better protection and respect of athlete rights and their voice, and an enhanced integrity system with more satisfied athletes. This research has shown that currently athletes feel as if their voice is not properly attended to. This is

evidenced by their lack of consultation and influence in policy decisions. Way to improve this include integrity organisations being willing to have open dialogue with athletes and Athlete Representatives. Furthermore, recruiting former athletes into sports integrity organisations allows for the athlete experience and voice to be represented.

However, when athlete rights are considered against the right for athletes to compete in sport free from integrity issues, it could be argued that both of these things cannot be absolute. If we want to ensure sport is free from integrity issues, then some athlete rights may have to be breached in pursuit of this. An example of this is anti-doping testing, whereby athlete privacy is breached when they have to provide a urine sample in front of a watching doping control officer. However, if we want to test for prohibited substances, a urine test is a way to do this. If the athlete is not watched when providing the sample then this can lead to tampering with the sample or could allow someone else to provide the sample for the athlete. In this case, athlete rights of privacy are breached, however, it is widely accepted as a trade-off for anti-doping testing. The same could be argued for investigative methods. While athlete privacy may be breached when demand rules are used to seize athlete phones, or consent overridden when athletes have to sign up for these rules or not be athletes anymore, they could be considered the price for methods which are aiming to combat sports integrity violations. The key question is whether sport free from integrity issues is more important than athletes' rights. When it is considered that these methods are not necessarily considered effective in cleaning up sport, then it becomes more difficult to justify overriding athlete rights for this cause.

8.4.4 The Unique Demands of Sport

Much has been said about the importance of sport and athletes' central role in this. For many elite athletes, their sport is their career. Indeed, it has been noted by participants of this research that often athletes see their sport as so much more than this, and it can play a large part in who they are. The investigative methods used within sports integrity have been described as invasive and threatening to athlete rights. Some Integrity Officers in this research noted that they were uneasy with some of the methods used, such as the demand rules, and that they themselves would not be comfortable if they were used on themselves. Athlete Representatives noted widespread unhappiness at the use of these rules, and in very few other careers would these investigative methods be accepted. Law enforcement have equal and further powers, however, they are investigating criminal acts.

Most people are able to go to their job without the expectation that their phone or bank records could be demanded, even if they did something wrong and were subject to an investigation into their misconduct at their job. It is unlikely that these methods would be accepted in other professions, as noted by Integrity Officers stating their discomfort at if they were subject to these rules. As argued in the earlier chapter, it is considered proportionate to use these methods for severe situations, such as if criminality is suspected, or for the most serious levels of wrongdoing in sport such as widespread abuse or doping scandals. However, for cheating in sport, equivalent with if someone in another profession did something wrong in their job, these methods are disproportionate.

However, as noted throughout the thesis, sport, and being an athlete, is not a normal career. There is a high level of importance placed on sport, and it is also a financially lucrative business, with many elite athletes benefiting from this in earnings and sponsorships. It could be argued that athletes cannot expect a 'normal' job and life. This draws comparisons with actors – those who star in high budget blockbusters cannot reasonably expect the same level of privacy as someone with a 'normal' job that is not in the public eye. For example, actors must interact with the media and the public to promote their work, and to ensure people engage with it, and ultimately spend money on it. It will be acknowledged by actors that they have a public job and one that there is heightened interest in. Therefore, there will be reduced privacy due to this. While actors still retain their fundamental human right to privacy, this is not expected at all costs, due to their jobs. The same could be said for athletes, of whom there is increased interest in, due to the interest in their sport. If sport is important and valued, then so are athletes, however, due to this there may be trade-offs, such as some loss of privacy of being in the public eye. The reduction of some rights can extend to sports integrity, due to the importance of sport and sports integrity and the unique demands of athletes' careers. It must be noted however that athletes, like actors, are entitled to their human rights still, such a privacy, but this must be balanced with the demands of the job, with recognition given and action taken when breaches to these rights can no longer be justified.

8.4.5 Sporting and Global Differences

A key issue, brought up by both Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives in this research, is the fact that investigative methods differ between integrity organisations. This represents an unfairness to athletes, as an athlete could be competing against someone

who is subject to different powers and regulations to them. If the investigative powers being discussed as so important to sports integrity, it begs the question as to why all integrity organisations do not yet have them. Furthermore, if they are so crucial for collecting evidence, then it creates an unfairness to athletes, both those who are investigated, and clean athletes who may have to compete against athletes who commit integrity violations. An athlete in a sport may be sanctioned by their NADO who has high levels of investigative powers, and therefore can obtain the evidence to sanction that athlete as they can prove the wrongdoing. However, an athlete from a different country where their NADO does not have these rules may be committing an integrity violation, but their NADO does not have the powers to prove this, and so they are able to continue competing, creating an unfair playing field. Despite this, there are likely athletes competing currently in jurisdictions who do have these powers and they are still not being caught. However, this does not mean that this should be accepted, and the ambition should be to catch all persons committing integrity violations, while considering the rights of athletes.

Considering the current disparity in powers, the solution appears to be first to consider whether these powers are justifiable, and then to implement appropriate investigative regulations in a unified way globally. Organisations who currently have these powers are going to use any tools available to them to investigate, and they are unlikely to give up these powers. Several Integrity Officers in this research noted that while they were uneasy about some of the powers they had, ultimately, they were going to use whatever tools they have available to them to investigate integrity violations. Others stated that while they had the powers, they hadn't used them yet due to consideration to athlete rights.

A framework is needed which sets out exactly how these rules should be used, the thresholds which have to be met before they can be implemented, and the situations which are appropriate for their use (such as the previously suggested integrity issues with suspected criminality, doping scandals, widespread corruption or abuse). This collaborative piece of work needs integrity organisations to work together to agree on the exact guidelines for these frameworks. In line with a key theme of this thesis, athletes should be consulted and their voice should be represented in this policy. For integrity organisations, this could involve consulting a wide range of athlete panels and

commissions, as well as gaining further input e.g., via surveys and outreach work at events.

This work could also be overseen by a global integrity organisation. In the same way WADA regulates anti-doping, the results of this research highlight a clear gap in sports integrity, where global unification and oversight is needed, and a global integrity organisation could help to achieve this. Acknowledgement is given to the vast undertaking this would be, and the immense resources it would require. Ultimately though, it would address a gap in the field, and in the long term, the initial investment would pay off, in exchange for sport with fewer integrity issues and regulations that can help sports organisations maintain integrity and fairness. In the short term, WADA could set out a framework for use of these rules within anti-doping. This could then be amended for use for other integrity issues by integrity organisations.

An independent, global integrity organisation could also aid with this, and oversee the creation and implementation of such framework. For anti-doping, WADA is there to regulate the field, however, no such organisation exists to regulate wider sports integrity issues global. This research highlights a clear gap in sports integrity and argues that global unification and oversight is needed. A global integrity organisation would help to achieve this.

While this appears an obvious solution to some of the problems set out in this thesis, the idea still comes with its own challenges and difficulties. Firstly, the creation and initial set up of this organisation would require immense resources and planning. However, learning from how WADA was created and set up could aid with this process and lessons from what went well throughout that process and what could have been improved can be used. Additionally, who is responsible for this organisation is another clear challenge. One solution could be that WADA expands its remit to encompass other integrity issues. WADA already has the infrastructure of a global integrity organisation set up, and so this could expand to tackle other integrity issues than anti-doping. If this is not seen as feasible for a long-term solution, then in the short term, WADA could set out a framework for use of investigative rules within anti-doping. This could then be amended by other organisations for different integrity issues. However, using doping as a template for other integrity issues could be seen as problematic, as all integrity issues differ and how they

are investigated can vary. Another solution would be the creation of a new body, that has the support and funding of existing bodies, such as WADA, the IOC and existing sports integrity organisations.

Ultimately, this is an idea worth further exploring and investing in, as it would address a clear gap in the field. Additionally, in the long term, the initial investment would pay off and give yield to sport that has fewer integrity issues, and regulations that can aid sports organisations to maintain integrity and fairness.

8.4.6 Interim Conclusion

When considering whether the investigative methods currently used within sports integrity are justifiable, there are several points to consider. Firstly, the clear need for evidence, the potential for these methods to assist with sanctioning, and the importance of sport and therefore integrity are arguments for these methods. However, the breaching of athlete rights, the impact of the methods on athletes' careers and lives, and the current inequality in how these methods are implemented across the integrity system are reasons why these methods may not be justified.

On balance, the investigative methods currently in use cannot be wholly justified. This is due to the breaches of athlete rights, as demonstrated within this chapter on the analysis of WADA's Athlete Rights Act, and the findings from this research which shows that athletes are largely unhappy with the use of some rules (such as demand regulations), and do not think that they have been adequately consulted or protected from abuse of these methods. Athletes are central to sport, and when the importance of sports is considered, then the key stakeholders – the athletes – and their rights must be at the forefront of policy decisions. That being said, there is a key need within the integrity system for innovative ways to catch those who are committing integrity violations. The low positive test numbers in anti-doping and the lack of sanctions in other integrity issues shows that more needs to be done, in a system where many, including the participants in this research, believe that more wrongdoing is present than is currently sanctioned. Intelligence and investigations can provide ways to sanction more wrongdoing. However, this needs to be carefully managed and implemented. Currently, regulations on methods such as the powers organisations have differed between integrity organisations. In order to create a more level playing field, and fairness for athletes, unified regulations should be written

and enacted. Furthermore, more consideration for these powers, such as the demand rules is needed and it must be ascertained in which exact situations it is proportionate to use these methods within sport integrity. Such situations demand rules could be proportionate include: wide-spread doping such of a country, sport or team e.g., the Russian doping scandal; or systematic integrity violations, such as if it's identified that a sport or country has a wide scale sport competition manipulation, abuse or corruption issue e.g. the widespread abuse seen in gymnastics across multiple countries or the corruption previously seen in football. These are situations that involve intentional, systematic actions to commit integrity offences. This differs from situations such as testing positive for a prohibited substance from a contaminated supplement, which could be the result of inaction, or carelessness, rather than an intentional act to cheat for personal gain. Therefore, it is these intentional, systematic situations that extended powers should be available for integrity organisations to use, and here they are proportionate to the harm caused. Athletes must be consulted in these processes, and attention to the athlete voice must be given. Assurances from integrity organisations to how athletes are protected from abuse of the methods is needed and this should be communicated clearly to athletes.

As mentioned at the start of this thesis, anti-doping can often dominate the integrity discussion. This is in part due to the establishment of WADA, a global body that oversees anti-doping. No such body exists currently for wider sports integrity matters globally across sports. Therefore, a key challenge to implementing these regulations in a globally unified manner is the lack of an authority to oversee this. WADA could work on this and enforce it for NADOs and Ifs, who already have regulations to follow to stay compliant with WADA. However, many sports integrity organisations (such as sports integrity units) write their own rules (approved by boards etc) and therefore can implement these investigative methods if they wish. Organisations could work together to implement unified regulations. However, resources and time would provide key challenges to this. Further challenges to global implementation include some countries having government and law enforcement support for further investigative powers, whereas others cannot, or have not tried to, obtain these. This thesis acknowledges these challenges to the recommendation of unified regulations. A solution posed is the creation of an independent integrity governing body. This could either be a new body, founded with support of integrity organisations, or another option is that WADA could expand to oversee other integrity matters than just anti-doping.

8.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has analysed whether the investigative methods currently used within sports integrity are justifiable. These investigative methods such as demand powers join other contentious methods currently used in sports integrity such as anti-doping testing and the whereabouts system. While previous academic work has been done to analyse these previous methods, particularly in anti-doping, there is a dearth of research into investigative methods and intelligence. This chapter (and thesis) has attempted to address this gap.

As highlighted by the participants in this research, sport is important for a number of reasons, and protecting the integrity of sport is vital to continuing to foster those benefits of sport. Participants also stated the importance of athlete rights for sport, and that they need protecting as athletes are the central stakeholder for sport. Athletes and integrity organisations must work together to ensure athlete rights are respected and protected.

Critical realism pushes us to ask what causes certain patterns and findings. Throughout the thesis, work has been done to gain an understanding of how intelligence and investigations are used within sport and how this effects athletes and others within the integrity sphere. By exploring why sport is important to the participants in this research, a deeper understand of why integrity measures are needed is gained and underlying causes can be analysed. Critical realism recognises that reality exists unconnected from our knowledge of it and that this knowledge is imperfect and does not represent absolute trust. Instead, the knowledge in this chapter, and thesis, is constructed from the experiences detailed in the participant interviews, which is moulded by their perspectives, experiences, and what they believe.

This chapter has considered why sport, and integrity within sport, is important. By using critical realism, this has allowed this thesis to uncover underlying mechanisms that are at play. For this chapter, these underlying mechanisms include accounting for the fact of how important sport is, especially to the people working within this space, as shown by the participants in this research. Believing that sport is important and worth protecting from integrity issues, leads the participants in this research to act in ways that they see fit to do this, which includes contentious methods, such as demand rules. This is also shaped

by participant experiences, such as the fact that a number of people working within intelligence and investigations within sports integrity are former law enforcement, and therefore bring these experiences, and methods, that they are used to, across to sports integrity.

8.6.1 Recommendations

This chapter concludes that the current methods are not wholly proportionate for use within sports integrity. Unified regulations, such as a framework for how these powers can and should be used, would assist with some of the issues raised. This could be overseen and implemented by a global integrity body.

This chapter has analysed whether the current investigative methods used within sports integrity are justifiable. The next chapter offers a conclusion to the thesis.

Chapter Nine – Conclusion

This thesis has outlined how intelligence and investigations are used within sports integrity and analysed the implementation of these methods. The use of intelligence and investigations warrants further attention, with particular focus on athlete voice needed. This concluding chapter offers a summary of the issues highlighted previously and provides recommendations based on the analysis presented throughout this thesis.

9.1 Summary

Sport has long grappled with the issue of how to protect itself from the various integrity issues that present themselves as threats. There is general consensus from those in the field, as evidenced by the participants in this research, that there are more people committing integrity violations than are currently being caught and sanctioned. This has led the integrity system to seek new ways to fight these integrity threats, such as intelligence and investigative methods.

This research aimed to assess the ethics of the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity. This was achieved by outlining how intelligence and investigation are currently being used, and analysing the ethical issues that arise from this, as outlined below.

For this ethical analysis, a social scientific exploration of the issue was employed. This drew upon Chappell (2014a) who argues that ethical insights need to be supported by real-life examples and analogies. Chappell rejects the notion of employing just one traditional moral theory, instead arguing for a wider ethical outlook. Chappell suggest that to understand a situation, we must experience it, and if this is not possible then we must find ways to capture all the details of the experience. This guided the research methodology to semi-structured interviews, to allow for an in-depth understanding of intelligence and investigations from those who work in this space, and those who represent athletes who could be subject to intelligence-led investigations. This allowed me to be fully immersed in the problem, gaining answers to key questions and issues by asking those with real-life experience of the matters. The conclusions this thesis reaches are facilitated by these real-life examples.

Critical realism can allow research to go beyond descriptions and look for explanations (Tikly, 2015). The semi-structured interviews in this research allowed me to understand the participants' experiences and perspectives and see how they interpreted and navigated their social structures and realities in relation to the use of intelligence and investigations within sports integrity. When considering the three levels to critical realism, (Scott, 2005; Fletcher, 2017), the empirical level, of experiences that can be seen and measured have been outlined in this thesis, with reference to publicly available information on integrity organisations and the previous literature. The actual levels, with objects and events occurring in the real world, has been researched through qualitative methods, via the semi-structured interviews with individuals who work within integrity organisations and Athlete Representatives with knowledge and experiences of integrity investigations. The real level of causal mechanisms and deeper lying structures has highlighted causal mechanisms through analysis, and this informs the recommendations below. In this thesis, the experiences, events and causes have been discussed. The experiences, how the participants perceive things, such as their experiences of how integrity investigations are conducted and experiences by athletes, have been detailed. The events that occur in the world and are perceived by the agents, such as Integrity Officers conducting the investigations. The causes, the things that produce events, such as the need for evidence to prove wrongdoing necessitates investigative powers and the fear of retaliation that prevents athletes from reporting wrongdoing, have been proposed via ethical analysis. Critical realism has allowed for understanding of the data, from the participants' experiences of events, and has allowed this thesis to offer explanations into the causes that bring about these events and experiences outlined in the below summary.

The collected data was analysed via thematic analysis. Taking a critical realist position for thematic analysis means the data doesn't show a clear and direct reflection of reality, but instead a mediated reflection of reality is accessed. This means that it is the participants' perception of their reality which is seen, and this is shaped by their experiences and perceptions. These realities are interpreted by the thematic analysis, alongside my own perceptions as a researcher. Critical realism thematic analysis has allowed for interpretation of the data which is grounded in the participants' experiences, which speaks to their situated realities and the limits of their worlds.

This research uncovered multiple findings of note, which are detailed below. Presently, there are a range of integrity organisations, such as sports integrity units, NADOs,

integrity agencies, and integrity companies who provide integrity services to other organisations. Anti-doping organisations have historically dominated the field with most countries having a NADO in order to stay compliant with WADA. Increasingly however, there is a move to expanding these organisations to address other integrity issues beyond just anti-doping. This is evidenced by New Zealand's NADO shifting their focus in 2024 from anti-doping alone to also address other integrity issues (New Zealand Drug Free Sport, 2024). This follows similar moves from Sports Integrity Australia and the Finnish Centre for Integrity in Sports.

This research aimed to assess the function of integrity units. Athlete Representatives in this research expressed their preference for organisations in sport that cover wider integrity issues beyond just anti-doping. The shift that we are beginning to see shows that the field is beginning to take threats to sports integrity more seriously.

While expansion of integrity organisations should be the goal to ensure that sports integrity is at the forefront of sporting priority, challenges such as funding and resources must also be acknowledged. These will be particularly relevant for smaller organisations who already face these challenges within their current remits. All integrity organisations represented by the participants in this research state that their function is to protect sport from integrity issues. The participants, both Integrity Officers and Athlete Representatives, all agree that there is more work to be done to ensure that sport is effectively managing the threats to sports integrity. One such suggestion is the use of intelligence and investigations, which has proved increasingly popular as a method to better investigate integrity issues.

This thesis has presented a detailed outline of how intelligence and investigations are used within sports integrity, with the aim of assessing what ethical investigations look like and how the intelligence and information used within them can be done so ethically. This was supported by the interviews of 15 Integrity Officers from different integrity organisations, giving a vast overview and highlighting differences within the field. The sources of information and intelligence used for investigations provided novel detail into how this method works to uncover and sanction integrity issues.

Athlete Representatives highlighted the difficulties for athletes who are investigated for integrity issues, as well as for those involved in investigations such as witnesses or victims. Integrity Officers outlined the challenges that they faced in relation to investigations, such as resources, finances and staffing, all of which were also highlighted as general challenges facing the integrity system, alongside trust and difficulties obtaining adequate evidence. Buy-in must be gained from those who are funding integrity organisations. To assist with this, education on the integrity issues and the dangers that they can pose to sport could be provided. Furthermore, the consequences, such as loss of athlete, fan and sponsor engagement, should be highlighted. This dialogue should be personalised to each organisation, with focus on their particular challenges in order to ensure maximum effectiveness. The realistic position of each organisation, and the country or sport they govern, should be acknowledged and used to help plan and implement funding strategies.

A key source of intelligence used within investigations into integrity issues is reporting persons. This thesis outlined the reporting processes and mechanisms currently in place, with the aim of assessing the ethical considerations that reporting integrity issues can pose. General consensus was that reporting plays an important role in sports integrity, with many Integrity Officers highlighting how useful reporting persons are to investigations. Some Integrity Officers did not consider them useful due to the low levels of meaningful information they provide. This is particularly seen within reporting channels that integrity organisations have, where most reports are low-level information of wrongdoing or unusable in investigations. Due to this, non-anonymous reporting is encouraged by some Integrity Officers, as this allows for extended conversations and can allow integrity organisations to follow up and verify reports, as well as provide feedback. Anonymous reporting mechanisms are still needed though as these can encourage people to report who might otherwise not feel comfortable to, such as for reasons of retaliation or punishment of their own wrongdoing. Anonymous reporting can lead to increased trust in the process.

Athlete Representatives in this research highlighted concerns that reporting persons were not adequately protected, while Integrity Officers were more likely to assess that there are adequate protections in place. While athletes have an obligation to report any knowledge of integrity issues within sport to help provide sport free from integrity issues,

acknowledgement to the barriers that athletes can face in relation to reporting must be given. These include fear of retaliation and lack of perceived protections. To combat this, integrity organisations must have policies in place to protect reporting persons, and measures such as secure reporting platforms that offer confidentiality and the option of anonymity, alongside staff who are trained to handle the sensitive data. These measures should also be communicated effectively to athletes.

This thesis aimed to assess the powers that are available to integrity organisations and analyse whether the use of these powers is appropriate for sports integrity purposes. Integrity organisations have varying powers in order to investigate integrity violations. Particular focus has been placed on powers that allow integrity organisations to demand objects and information from those being investigated for integrity violations. In general, Integrity Officers supported these rules and many wanted more powers to investigate wrongdoing. Some Integrity Officers did display unease at the use of these powers. Athlete Representatives raised concerns with the use of demand rules, particularly with the lack of consultation, protection, agreement and consent from athletes. These rules could be considered coercive offers, due to the fact that athletes have to accept the rules in order to be elite athletes. A further issue with demand rules is the disparity in how they are used, differing between country and sports. Work to bridge these differences must be done, alongside work to ensure athlete rights are being respected. While the use of these rules does not appear wholly proportionate for use in sports integrity investigations, there may be situations where their use could be justified e.g., doping scandals, cheating with suspected criminality, widespread abuse cases.

This thesis considered an overarching question: whether the investigative methods currently used in sports integrity are justifiable. The participants in this research argued that sport is important for a number of reasons, such as health, enjoyment and life skills. Protecting the integrity of sport is vital for continuing to foster these benefits. A key part of this is protecting athletes' rights as the central stakeholder to sport.

There are several reasons that participants in this research stated that the investigative methods are needed – the fact that evidence is needed to prove wrongdoing and to sanction integrity issues, and this can be difficult to otherwise obtain, and the importance of sport and integrity. However, when these measures pose a threat to athlete rights, as

well as impacting their careers and lives, coupled with the current inequality of how these methods are used across organisations, there are questions over whether the methods can be justified.

This thesis concludes that the investigative methods currently in use cannot be wholly justified, due to the breaches to athlete rights and the fact that Athlete Representatives in this research express concerns and unhappiness with the use of these rules, including lack of protections and consultation. However, there may be some situations where these methods are justifiable, and further work is needed by integrity organisations to assess what these situations are, and how they can be implemented in a unified manner. This would result in a framework which sets out exactly how these rules should be used, the thresholds which have to be met before they can be implemented, and the situations which are appropriate for their use (such as integrity offences with suspected criminality, doping scandals, widespread corruption or abuse) laid out. Athletes should be consulted as part of this process and their voice should be represented in this policy, with steps taken to ensure their rights are protected. For integrity organisations, this could involve consulting a wide range of athlete panels and commissions, as well as gaining further input e.g., via surveys and outreach work at events. A collaborative project between multiple integrity organisations to lay out a framework could be the first step. Challenges to this include a lack of a global integrity organisation that could oversee this, as well as funding and resources barriers.

Previous academic literature has addressed questions surrounding key ethical issues, particularly within the anti-doping system. There is a growing body of literature about sport competition manipulation, however, this is still a growing field when compared to the established anti-doping literature available. There is limited research available on matters such as abuse, harassment and corruption within sport. A key gap in the literature is the lack of research into intelligence and investigations and how they are used within sports integrity. Moreover, there is a lack of information available about this method from integrity organisations themselves. As a relatively new tool at the disposal of integrity organisations, it is vital that this is assessed, in particular in relation to the impact it can have on athletes and their rights. The research in this thesis has aimed to address these gaps. This has been done by clearly outlining how intelligence and investigations are currently being used, and highlighting potential ethical issues that arise from this.

Speaking to Athlete Representatives has ensured that the athlete voice has been attended to, and this has been vital in drawing conclusions, such as the fact that more dialogue between athletes and integrity organisations is needed, and the athlete voice must be listened to. Furthermore, issues that Integrity Officers seem to be unaware of have been highlighted, such as Athlete Representatives saying that athletes do not feel protected when reporting, whereas Integrity Officers state they consider protections to be in place. Highlighting issues such as this can allow both parties to work together to gain greater understanding.

9.2 Recommendations

Considering the research presented and analysed in this thesis, the following recommendations are suggested:

Athlete voice must be listened to within the integrity system. This research has highlighted several areas that athletes have concerns with, including the implementation of demand powers without the consultation of athletes and perceived lack of protections from these rules, as well as lack of protections when reporting integrity issues. Integrity organisations should listen to athlete concerns and opinions, and work to alleviate them, such as through enhanced dialogue and education. This education should include integrity organisations conveying to athletes the steps that they take to ensure confidentiality when handling reports (e.g., secure reporting systems, experts handling this data), and how they protect athletes (e.g., not disclosing information that only very few people know, not implicating reporting persons when following up on reports). Furthermore, education should include steps reporting persons can take to protect themselves, such as not providing identifying detailing if they wish to remain anonymous, not reporting via intranet connections or via a device provided by an employer. Athletes should also be educated on the investigative powers that are available to integrity organisations. While only a small percentage of athletes will ever be subject to an investigation, it is still vital that athletes are informed and educated on them so they are aware of their rights. Furthermore, it can also act as a deterrent to those considering wrongdoing.

Implementing policy changes in partnership with athletes will also assist with attending to athlete voice. Athletes are the group most affected by the integrity system, as they must

abide by the regulations for their careers, and therefore they deserve a voice in the way sport is governed. This research highlighted that some Athlete Representatives thought current ways to represent athletes are not working, and so solutions to ensure the athlete voice is meaningfully heard are needed. However, it is acknowledged in this thesis that athlete voice cannot be listened to at all costs, and athlete voice and rights must be balanced against the needs of sports integrity. To do this, athletes and integrity organisations must work together to ensure athlete rights are respected and protected while maintain integrity in sport. This includes dialogue between integrity organisations and athletes. For example, UKAD has an athlete commission to represent athlete community views (UKAD, 2022). Other NADOs and integrity organisations should look to employ a similar model. However, resources and finances will be a clear barrier to this, particularly for smaller organisations. Independence of athlete commissions, committees and councils should be guaranteed and athletes representatives should be given assurances that they are able to freely present their opinions and experiences, even if this goes against the organisation they are reporting.

Moreover, ways to engage athlete voice beyond just the current Athlete Representatives should be sought. Athlete Representatives are individuals who are already interested in athlete issues and are keen to represent athletes. While these voices are necessary with sport and sport integrity, voices who are not initially inclined to take on these roles should also be sought. This could be done through surveys (which can represent a smaller time commitment than an Athlete Representative role), as well as engaging with athletes at competitions to seek their views. Furthermore, education sessions are an opportunity for integrity organisations to communicate further with athletes and seek their opinions. Athletes are mandated to take education sessions on anti-doping and other integrity issues, therefore integrity organisations should capitalise on these opportunities where athletes are gathered and use them as a chance to broaden the dialogue between athletes and integrity organisations.

Listening to athletes who have been directly affected by integrity issues is vital. Seeking advice from experts in the field, as well as encouraging cross-sector learning, e.g., bringing in ex law enforcement to help with investigations, can also help the relatively new field of sports integrity grow and improve. Attention must be given to the challenges that integrity organisations are facing, which have been highlighted in this thesis, and

meaningful solutions to these challenges should be sought, acknowledging the realistic positions that the integrity system, and each integrity organisation, is in. Some solutions to these challenges have been suggested throughout this thesis, however, there is further research and work to be explored. For example, this thesis has suggested that increased dialogue between athletes and integrity organisations would enhance trust e.g., if integrity organisations can explain how they are protecting athletes, then this would alleviate some concerns by athletes that they are not protected. However, until this is implemented, it cannot be measured if this is a solution to the issue. Moreover, more may need to be done to actually protect reporting persons in practice.

Athlete Representatives in this research highlighted the difficulties that athletes face when they are subject to investigations, and when they are part of investigations e.g., as a victim or witness. More support is needed for both of these groups of athletes, and this was widely called for by the Athlete Representatives. Despite the clear want for sport free from integrity issues, athletes who commit integrity violations themselves are still athletes and human beings, who it is argued deserve support and guidance even if they are under investigation. Greater transparency on investigation processes is also called for by the Athlete Representatives to aid with this and integrity organisations should publish investigation standards to set out how investigations are being conducted ethically. Support should be provided by integrity organisations. For example, Sport Integrity Australia offers free independent and confidential counselling to athletes who have been notified of ADRVs and have an ADRV handbook which acts as a guide for athletes (Sport Integrity Australia, 2024). Other integrity organisations should employ similar steps to support athletes in the integrity system.

Athlete Representatives in this research also highlighted the need for greater protection of reporting persons, as they can face retaliation and negative treatment from others in sport. On the whole, Athlete Representatives were more likely to think that athletes were not protected when reporting, whereas Integrity Officers were more likely to consider that adequate protections were in place. Both groups should work together to understand each other's perspectives. For Integrity Officers, this would highlight areas not previously considered and would provide greater understanding as to the barriers to reporting. This would help improve reporting systems and procedures by incorporating athlete voice into them. For athletes, this would provide greater understanding as to how they are protected

and would present an opportunity for them to communicate their concerns. This could be done via education sessions and in communications with athletes e.g., emails, newsletters, social media. Working with athletes would also increase their trust of integrity organisations – a key challenge raised in this research – and would encourage increased reporting and cooperation in the integrity system as a whole.

When considering reporting procedures, re-traumatisation of reporting persons should be avoided where possible, with steps taken to minimise this at least. Independent, trauma informed, survivor centred investigation processes should be employed, with these solutions suggested by the Athlete Representatives in this research. This means that investigations should employ practices which recognise and accommodate for the potential trauma of those involved, and survivors should be carefully considered throughout, with steps taken to minimise re-traumatisation and harm. Staff in integrity organisations who are working with reporting persons and the reports should be fully trained to support reporting persons appropriately, and able to offer or signpost relevant support, as well as being clear on how to protect reporting persons and what needs to be done to ensure their protection. Reassurance that reporting persons will be supported, protected and that reports will be followed up on is essential for improving the reporting systems. This will help to build the trust of reporting persons which is vital for success. Investigation policies should be updated to reflect these considerations. Further work is needed on assessing the logistics of global integrity units to further support and protect reporting persons. Doping cultures, integrity issues and cultures that discourage reporting can be deep-rooted and embedded within the fabric of some sporting communities, and therefore interventions and education sessions should be enacted to target and engage with members of these communities to create change that can facilitate safe reporting of wrongdoing.

Currently, investigative powers that integrity organisations have differ. In order to create a leveller playing field for athletes and foster fairness, unified regulations should be written and enacted. Outlining this, in the form of a framework that all integrity organisations have to follow when using these powers such as demand rules, would also help ensure athlete rights are protected. During this process, it should be outlined exact situations where these powers, such as demand rules, can be used. This thesis has highlighted some such situations, which include: integrity offences where criminality is

suspected; wide-spread doping such of a country, sport or team e.g. the Russian doping scandal; or systematic integrity violations, such as if it's identified that a sport or country has a wide scale sport competition manipulation, abuse or corruption issue e.g. the widespread abuse seen in gymnastics across multiple countries, or the corruption previously seen in football. Furthermore, this framework should detail the thresholds which have to be met before they can be implemented e.g., the levels of evidence that are needed before powers such as demand rules can be used. Athletes should play a key part in this process and their voice should be represented in policy. Ways to ensure this would involve integrity organisations consulting a wide range of athlete panels and commissions, as well as gaining further input e.g., via surveys and outreach work at events. A unified framework for integrity organisations to follow when using demand rules will minimise abuse of these rules. Furthermore, if this process involves consulting athletes these steps will address the key concerns from Athlete Representatives in this research that they have not been consulted and are not protected when these rules are implemented, and the dialogue and collaboration should improve athlete satisfaction with these powers.

Further work should be done to find solutions to ethical issues such as the coercive offers that underpin investigative rules. Athletes are coerced into offers to accept demand rules, as they can either choose to accept them or not be athletes competing in sport at the top level. This is ethically unacceptable and concerns were raised by Athlete Representatives in this research that they hadn't been consulted on these rules, that they weren't happy with their implementation and that they were not protected from abuse. Integrity Officers also displayed unease at the use of these rules within sports integrity. Athletes must be consulted further and formally by integrity organisations, and attention to athlete voice given. It should be properly outlined how demand rules are used, in which situations, and what organisations are doing to ensure they are not abused. Assurances should be outlined as to how athletes are protected from abuse of these methods and how these methods are implemented by integrity organisations, with proper oversight and regulations outlined. This could include oversight of these rules e.g., from an independent organisation, as well as ensuring that multiple people approve the use of these rules in each case.

The creation of a global integrity organisation to oversee integrity matters throughout sport would assist with some of these recommendations. In the same way that WADA

oversees anti-doping, a global integrity organisation would help to regulate wider integrity issues. This would aid in the unification of investigative powers across countries and organisations. It would also provide oversight and ensure that rules are applied fairly, and that athlete rights are protected. Furthermore, a global framework for sanctioning athletes and others for integrity issues other than anti-doping is needed, and the creation of this organisation would help with this. Uniting the integrity system globally would ensure fairness and parity across the board and enhance trust for athletes.

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