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Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates

Sajid Chaudhry, Stefanie Kleimeier

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money

Swansea University Author: Sajid Chaudhry

Abstract

This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrowers and a syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selecti...

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Published in: Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Published: 2015
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa21878
first_indexed 2015-06-02T02:09:26Z
last_indexed 2020-07-15T12:36:19Z
id cronfa21878
recordtype SURis
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spelling 2020-07-15T11:50:02.3694139 v2 21878 2015-06-01 Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates 7738ea30b6a22ee7676e5b15e1c42ebb Sajid Chaudhry Sajid Chaudhry true false 2015-06-01 CBAE This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrowers and a syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers. Journal Article Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money Syndicated loans, syndicate structure, information asymmetry, reputation. 31 12 2015 2015-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Management School COLLEGE CODE CBAE Swansea University 2020-07-15T11:50:02.3694139 2015-06-01T16:47:07.2088456 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Accounting and Finance Sajid Chaudhry 1 Stefanie Kleimeier 2
title Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
spellingShingle Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
Sajid Chaudhry
title_short Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
title_full Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
title_fullStr Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
title_full_unstemmed Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
title_sort Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates
author_id_str_mv 7738ea30b6a22ee7676e5b15e1c42ebb
author_id_fullname_str_mv 7738ea30b6a22ee7676e5b15e1c42ebb_***_Sajid Chaudhry
author Sajid Chaudhry
author2 Sajid Chaudhry
Stefanie Kleimeier
format Journal article
container_title Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
publishDate 2015
institution Swansea University
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Accounting and Finance{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Accounting and Finance
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description This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrowers and a syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.
published_date 2015-12-31T04:57:17Z
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score 11.096913

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