Journal article 1344 views 383 downloads
Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives
Piotr Korczak,
Xicheng Liu 
Journal of Empirical Finance, Volume: 27, Pages: 116 - 129
Swansea University Author:
Xicheng Liu
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DOI (Published version): 10.1016/j.jempfin.2013.10.010
Abstract
Previous studies show that corporate executives tend to liquidate equity incentives when equity-based compensation vests. This undermines long-term incentives and destroys shareholders value. It is suggested that the unwinding incentives can be limited when the firm adopts a minimum executive shareh...
| Published in: | Journal of Empirical Finance |
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| Published: |
2013
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| Online Access: |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539813000777 |
| URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa21940 |
| Abstract: |
Previous studies show that corporate executives tend to liquidate equity incentives when equity-based compensation vests. This undermines long-term incentives and destroys shareholders value. It is suggested that the unwinding incentives can be limited when the firm adopts a minimum executive shareholding policy. We provide the first evidence of the effectiveness of such policies. Using data for UK FTSE 350 companies, we find that executives whose shareholding is below the policy minimum retain more newly vested equity, and the incentives to retain shares decreases when executive shareholdings are above the policy minimum. We also find higher firm valuations when executive share ownership increases relative to the minimum holdings required. Our results have important implications for the debate on executive remuneration regulations. |
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| Item Description: |
"Available online 6 November 2013" |
| Keywords: |
Managerial shareholding, compensation |
| College: |
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Start Page: |
116 |
| End Page: |
129 |