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Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties

Nicole Bolleyer, Siim Trumm Orcid Logo, Susan A. Banducci

European Journal of Political Research, Volume: 52, Issue: 2, Pages: 237 - 263

Swansea University Author: Siim Trumm Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02068.x

Abstract

Which parties represented in the European Parliament are able to extract regular donations from their MEPs' salaries and how big are these donations respectively? In the literature on party finances, there has been a lack of attention paid to the use of salaries of elected representatives as a...

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Published in: European Journal of Political Research
Published: 2013
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa23321
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spelling 2016-04-16T19:46:49.5935709 v2 23321 2015-09-15 Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties c1a51e60fa144fc233c7e44771c772f6 0000-0002-2508-3346 Siim Trumm Siim Trumm true false 2015-09-15 APC Which parties represented in the European Parliament are able to extract regular donations from their MEPs' salaries and how big are these donations respectively? In the literature on party finances, there has been a lack of attention paid to the use of salaries of elected representatives as a source of funding. This is surprising given that the national headquarters of many parties in Europe regularly collect 'party taxes': a fixed (and often significant) share of their elected representatives' salaries. This paper, in filling this gap, theoretically specifies two sets of party characteristics that account for the presence of a taxing rule and the level of the tax respectively. The presence of a tax depends on the basic ‘acceptability’ of such an internal obligation which rests on a mutually beneficial financial exchange between parties’ campaign finance contributions to their Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and MEPs’ salary donations to their parties. The level of the tax, in contrast, depends on the level of intra-organizational compliance costs and parties’ capacity to cope with these costs. Three factors are relevant to this second stage: MEPs’ ideological position, the size of the parliamentary group and party control over candidate nomination. Our framework is tested through a selection model applied to a unique dataset covering the taxing practices in parties across the European Union member states. Journal Article European Journal of Political Research 52 2 237 263 Party funding, intra-party dynamics, informal party practices, parliamentary pay, party-state relations 31 12 2013 2013-12-31 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02068.x COLLEGE NANME Politics, Philosophy and International Relations COLLEGE CODE APC Swansea University 2016-04-16T19:46:49.5935709 2015-09-15T16:39:32.4090876 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Nicole Bolleyer 1 Siim Trumm 0000-0002-2508-3346 2 Susan A. Banducci 3
title Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
spellingShingle Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
Siim Trumm
title_short Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
title_full Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
title_fullStr Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
title_full_unstemmed Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
title_sort Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
author_id_str_mv c1a51e60fa144fc233c7e44771c772f6
author_id_fullname_str_mv c1a51e60fa144fc233c7e44771c772f6_***_Siim Trumm
author Siim Trumm
author2 Nicole Bolleyer
Siim Trumm
Susan A. Banducci
format Journal article
container_title European Journal of Political Research
container_volume 52
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container_start_page 237
publishDate 2013
institution Swansea University
doi_str_mv 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02068.x
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
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description Which parties represented in the European Parliament are able to extract regular donations from their MEPs' salaries and how big are these donations respectively? In the literature on party finances, there has been a lack of attention paid to the use of salaries of elected representatives as a source of funding. This is surprising given that the national headquarters of many parties in Europe regularly collect 'party taxes': a fixed (and often significant) share of their elected representatives' salaries. This paper, in filling this gap, theoretically specifies two sets of party characteristics that account for the presence of a taxing rule and the level of the tax respectively. The presence of a tax depends on the basic ‘acceptability’ of such an internal obligation which rests on a mutually beneficial financial exchange between parties’ campaign finance contributions to their Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and MEPs’ salary donations to their parties. The level of the tax, in contrast, depends on the level of intra-organizational compliance costs and parties’ capacity to cope with these costs. Three factors are relevant to this second stage: MEPs’ ideological position, the size of the parliamentary group and party control over candidate nomination. Our framework is tested through a selection model applied to a unique dataset covering the taxing practices in parties across the European Union member states.
published_date 2013-12-31T03:27:57Z
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