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Journal article 1149 views 210 downloads

The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences

Jukka Snell

European Law Journal, Volume: 22, Pages: 157 - 179

Swansea University Author: Jukka Snell

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DOI (Published version): 10.1111/eulj.12165

Abstract

The article analyses trade-offs between sovereignty, mass politics, and EMU, employing Rodrik’s paradox of globalisation. The logic of EMU is incompatible with sovereignty and mass politics – only two of the three can coexist. It is argued that three different answers to the trilemma can be observed...

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Published in: European Law Journal
ISSN: 1351-5993
Published: 2016
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa24903
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first_indexed 2015-11-28T01:57:57Z
last_indexed 2018-02-09T05:05:09Z
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spelling 2017-08-03T11:27:11.7466547 v2 24903 2015-11-27 The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences 888cbfaec56853b3709dec388b0948f1 Jukka Snell Jukka Snell true false 2015-11-27 LAWD The article analyses trade-offs between sovereignty, mass politics, and EMU, employing Rodrik’s paradox of globalisation. The logic of EMU is incompatible with sovereignty and mass politics – only two of the three can coexist. It is argued that three different answers to the trilemma can be observed in the EU practice. In the initial EMU integration was limited to safeguard mass politics and sovereignty. Member States were free to set economic policies in response to domestic mass politics. This proved unsustainable. During the crisis democracy was sacrificed to bolster integration while sovereignty was maintained. Rules on fiscal discipline and macroeconomic imbalances constrain mass politics, and non-democratic institutions have acquired more prominent roles. Finally, long term plans for a genuine EMU envisage the strengthening of integration and moving the locus of democracy to the EU level, while weakening sovereignty. The analysis carries implications. If national courts insist on sovereignty and democracy, the likely consequence is an unworkable EMU, damaging the output legitimacy of the EU. The model adopted in the crisis reinforces the elite-nature of the EU, undermines democracy at the national level, and may bolster political extremism. This leaves the task of building the preconditions for democracy at the European level. Journal Article European Law Journal 22 157 179 1351-5993 27 1 2016 2016-01-27 10.1111/eulj.12165 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eulj.12165/abstract COLLEGE NANME Law COLLEGE CODE LAWD Swansea University 2017-08-03T11:27:11.7466547 2015-11-27T11:50:16.8893706 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law Jukka Snell 1 0024903-01042016111328.docx snell-trilemma-edited-final.docx 2016-04-01T11:13:28.3830000 Output 117271 application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Accepted Manuscript true 2018-01-27T00:00:00.0000000 true
title The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences
spellingShingle The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences
Jukka Snell
title_short The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences
title_full The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences
title_fullStr The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences
title_full_unstemmed The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences
title_sort The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences
author_id_str_mv 888cbfaec56853b3709dec388b0948f1
author_id_fullname_str_mv 888cbfaec56853b3709dec388b0948f1_***_Jukka Snell
author Jukka Snell
author2 Jukka Snell
format Journal article
container_title European Law Journal
container_volume 22
container_start_page 157
publishDate 2016
institution Swansea University
issn 1351-5993
doi_str_mv 10.1111/eulj.12165
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law
url http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eulj.12165/abstract
document_store_str 1
active_str 0
description The article analyses trade-offs between sovereignty, mass politics, and EMU, employing Rodrik’s paradox of globalisation. The logic of EMU is incompatible with sovereignty and mass politics – only two of the three can coexist. It is argued that three different answers to the trilemma can be observed in the EU practice. In the initial EMU integration was limited to safeguard mass politics and sovereignty. Member States were free to set economic policies in response to domestic mass politics. This proved unsustainable. During the crisis democracy was sacrificed to bolster integration while sovereignty was maintained. Rules on fiscal discipline and macroeconomic imbalances constrain mass politics, and non-democratic institutions have acquired more prominent roles. Finally, long term plans for a genuine EMU envisage the strengthening of integration and moving the locus of democracy to the EU level, while weakening sovereignty. The analysis carries implications. If national courts insist on sovereignty and democracy, the likely consequence is an unworkable EMU, damaging the output legitimacy of the EU. The model adopted in the crisis reinforces the elite-nature of the EU, undermines democracy at the national level, and may bolster political extremism. This leaves the task of building the preconditions for democracy at the European level.
published_date 2016-01-27T03:29:35Z
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