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“Speaking on Morality’s Behalf: When One Should Remain Silent, And Why”
Mark Evans
Sincerity in Politics and International Relations, Start page: 1
Swansea University Author: Mark Evans
Abstract
In 'Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn The Terrorists?’, G.A. Cohen claims that one’s condemnatory ‘moral voice’ – one’s position as an articulator of what morality says in criticism of someone – is ‘silenced’ in two types of situation even when what one says in those situ...
| Published in: | Sincerity in Politics and International Relations |
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| Published: |
LOndon
Routledge
2014
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| URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa413 |
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| Abstract: |
In 'Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn The Terrorists?’, G.A. Cohen claims that one’s condemnatory ‘moral voice’ – one’s position as an articulator of what morality says in criticism of someone – is ‘silenced’ in two types of situation even when what one says in those situations is indeed what morality has to say about them: when the critic is similarly guilty of that which she condemns, and when the critic has some degree of responsibility herself for that which she condemns. This phenomenon, virtually undiscussed in much contemporary analytic moral philosophy, is a crucial feature in the pragmatics of moral discourse and therefore warrants thorough investigation. This paper begins this task by proposing that ‘silencing’ arises in these instances insofar as the critic herself lacks a sufficiently sincere commitment to morality, thereby failing to acquire the personal moral authority necessary for the criticism to be successful. The analysis has implications for understanding the dynamics of the moral exchange between critic and criticised, helping to substantiate what should be understood by the ‘silencing’ metaphor and to identify some of the conditions under which the integrity of moral discourse may be upheld.The paper begins by describing the two types of situation in which Cohen claims 'silencing' occurs: (a) where an agent is responsible for something relevantly similar to that for which she is criticising someone else (which allows the latter to offer in a 'silencing' riposte what can be called a 'tu quoque response'); (b) where an agent has significant direct responsibility for causing that for which she is condemning someone else (which allows the latter to offer in a 'silencing' riposte what can be called a 'co-responsibility' response). Some considerations are offered as to why these phenomena in moral discourse have received comparatively scant attention in analytic philosophy and the claim that they are merely instances of 'hypocrisy' is rejected as an inadequate account of 'silencing' . 'Silencing' is explained via an account of moral discourse as 'commissive': to engage in moral criticism implies that one is committed to respecting morality oneself, and 'silencing' occurs when putative moral critics are not in fact committed to respecting morality themselves. The account is explained in detail by way of comparisons and contrasts with an ethic of care.Having explained why 'failed' moral critics should be 'silent', the paper then considers when they should be 'silent' - when, that is, their criticism fails. What degree of moral imperfection renders a moral critic justifiably liable to the tu quoque riposte? What degree of co-responsibility renders a moral critic liable to the co-responsibility riposte? Unsurprisingly, perhaps, no clear answers can be given to these questions but this does not provide grounds for rejecting the commissive theory of moral discourse. In explanation of this final contention, and to indicate why the theory does not imply that justifiably 'silenced' critics must always and necessarily have remained literally silent, the paper describes successful moral discourse in terms of an ongoing quest for moral knowledge and self-knowledge on the part of sincere moral discursants. The political relevance of this analysis is indicated as an illustration of its practical import. |
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| Keywords: |
morality sincerity hypocrisy moral responsibility |
| College: |
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Start Page: |
1 |