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Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. / Mark Davies
Swansea University Author: Mark Davies
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"This dissertation mainly concentrates on Thomas Nagel's 1974 paper "What is it like to be a bat?" I examine some of the key ideas and concepts that are contained in this paper, which are chiefly concerned with the phenomenon of consciousness. In the first chapter, I try to ascer...
Published: |
2001
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Institution: | Swansea University |
Degree level: | Master of Philosophy |
Degree name: | M.Phil |
URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42271 |
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2018-08-31T15:06:55.0971500 v2 42271 2018-08-02 Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. 8f3c2d6481104f433feaa5df315c2761 NULL Mark Davies Mark Davies true true 2018-08-02 "This dissertation mainly concentrates on Thomas Nagel's 1974 paper "What is it like to be a bat?" I examine some of the key ideas and concepts that are contained in this paper, which are chiefly concerned with the phenomenon of consciousness. In the first chapter, I try to ascertain what Nagel meant by his use of the phrase "what it is like", as there seems to be a number of different construals of this phrase in his "bat" paper. In examining Nagel's use of the phrase "what it is like", I mainly use the ideas of H.O. Mounce, D.Z. Phillips and J. Biro. In the latter part of chapter one, I examine the so-called Ability Theory of Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis, whose origin, I believe, is contained in one particular construal that Nagel gives to the phrase "what it is like". In the second chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of a subjective point of view, and what this involves in relation to subjectivity and consciousness. Mainly using the ideas of Kathleen Wider, I also try to ascertain whether Nagel's conception of the subjective point of view leads to epistemic solipsism, and if it does, what this means for Nagel's views on consciousness, e.g., whether they conflict with the views of Wittgenstein (on which question I utilise a key distinction made by David Chalmers). This leads me to examine the relationship between subjectivity and solipsism, and whether the latter can be avoided whenever one takes the former seriously. In the third and final chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of the objective point of view, and his views on the effect that this viewpoint has on the phenomenon of consciousness, e.g., whether science will succeed in providing a reductive explanation of conscious experience. E-Thesis Philosophy. 31 12 2001 2001-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Political and Cultural Studies COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Master of Philosophy M.Phil 2018-08-31T15:06:55.0971500 2018-08-02T16:24:28.6513889 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Mark Davies NULL 1 0042271-02082018162441.pdf 10797979.pdf 2018-08-02T16:24:41.3500000 Output 4140594 application/pdf E-Thesis true 2018-08-02T16:24:41.3500000 false |
title |
Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. |
spellingShingle |
Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. Mark Davies |
title_short |
Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. |
title_full |
Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. |
title_fullStr |
Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. |
title_sort |
Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. |
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8f3c2d6481104f433feaa5df315c2761 |
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8f3c2d6481104f433feaa5df315c2761_***_Mark Davies |
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Mark Davies |
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Mark Davies |
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2001 |
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"This dissertation mainly concentrates on Thomas Nagel's 1974 paper "What is it like to be a bat?" I examine some of the key ideas and concepts that are contained in this paper, which are chiefly concerned with the phenomenon of consciousness. In the first chapter, I try to ascertain what Nagel meant by his use of the phrase "what it is like", as there seems to be a number of different construals of this phrase in his "bat" paper. In examining Nagel's use of the phrase "what it is like", I mainly use the ideas of H.O. Mounce, D.Z. Phillips and J. Biro. In the latter part of chapter one, I examine the so-called Ability Theory of Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis, whose origin, I believe, is contained in one particular construal that Nagel gives to the phrase "what it is like". In the second chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of a subjective point of view, and what this involves in relation to subjectivity and consciousness. Mainly using the ideas of Kathleen Wider, I also try to ascertain whether Nagel's conception of the subjective point of view leads to epistemic solipsism, and if it does, what this means for Nagel's views on consciousness, e.g., whether they conflict with the views of Wittgenstein (on which question I utilise a key distinction made by David Chalmers). This leads me to examine the relationship between subjectivity and solipsism, and whether the latter can be avoided whenever one takes the former seriously. In the third and final chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of the objective point of view, and his views on the effect that this viewpoint has on the phenomenon of consciousness, e.g., whether science will succeed in providing a reductive explanation of conscious experience. |
published_date |
2001-12-31T03:52:38Z |
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11.021648 |