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Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. / Mark Davies

Swansea University Author: Mark Davies

Abstract

"This dissertation mainly concentrates on Thomas Nagel's 1974 paper "What is it like to be a bat?" I examine some of the key ideas and concepts that are contained in this paper, which are chiefly concerned with the phenomenon of consciousness. In the first chapter, I try to ascer...

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Published: 2001
Institution: Swansea University
Degree level: Master of Philosophy
Degree name: M.Phil
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42271
first_indexed 2018-08-02T18:54:18Z
last_indexed 2019-10-21T16:47:31Z
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spelling 2018-08-31T15:06:55.0971500 v2 42271 2018-08-02 Thomas Nagel and Consciousness. 8f3c2d6481104f433feaa5df315c2761 NULL Mark Davies Mark Davies true true 2018-08-02 "This dissertation mainly concentrates on Thomas Nagel's 1974 paper "What is it like to be a bat?" I examine some of the key ideas and concepts that are contained in this paper, which are chiefly concerned with the phenomenon of consciousness. In the first chapter, I try to ascertain what Nagel meant by his use of the phrase "what it is like", as there seems to be a number of different construals of this phrase in his "bat" paper. In examining Nagel's use of the phrase "what it is like", I mainly use the ideas of H.O. Mounce, D.Z. Phillips and J. Biro. In the latter part of chapter one, I examine the so-called Ability Theory of Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis, whose origin, I believe, is contained in one particular construal that Nagel gives to the phrase "what it is like". In the second chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of a subjective point of view, and what this involves in relation to subjectivity and consciousness. Mainly using the ideas of Kathleen Wider, I also try to ascertain whether Nagel's conception of the subjective point of view leads to epistemic solipsism, and if it does, what this means for Nagel's views on consciousness, e.g., whether they conflict with the views of Wittgenstein (on which question I utilise a key distinction made by David Chalmers). This leads me to examine the relationship between subjectivity and solipsism, and whether the latter can be avoided whenever one takes the former seriously. In the third and final chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of the objective point of view, and his views on the effect that this viewpoint has on the phenomenon of consciousness, e.g., whether science will succeed in providing a reductive explanation of conscious experience. E-Thesis Philosophy. 31 12 2001 2001-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Political and Cultural Studies COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Master of Philosophy M.Phil 2018-08-31T15:06:55.0971500 2018-08-02T16:24:28.6513889 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Mark Davies NULL 1 0042271-02082018162441.pdf 10797979.pdf 2018-08-02T16:24:41.3500000 Output 4140594 application/pdf E-Thesis true 2018-08-02T16:24:41.3500000 false
title Thomas Nagel and Consciousness.
spellingShingle Thomas Nagel and Consciousness.
Mark Davies
title_short Thomas Nagel and Consciousness.
title_full Thomas Nagel and Consciousness.
title_fullStr Thomas Nagel and Consciousness.
title_full_unstemmed Thomas Nagel and Consciousness.
title_sort Thomas Nagel and Consciousness.
author_id_str_mv 8f3c2d6481104f433feaa5df315c2761
author_id_fullname_str_mv 8f3c2d6481104f433feaa5df315c2761_***_Mark Davies
author Mark Davies
author2 Mark Davies
format E-Thesis
publishDate 2001
institution Swansea University
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
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description "This dissertation mainly concentrates on Thomas Nagel's 1974 paper "What is it like to be a bat?" I examine some of the key ideas and concepts that are contained in this paper, which are chiefly concerned with the phenomenon of consciousness. In the first chapter, I try to ascertain what Nagel meant by his use of the phrase "what it is like", as there seems to be a number of different construals of this phrase in his "bat" paper. In examining Nagel's use of the phrase "what it is like", I mainly use the ideas of H.O. Mounce, D.Z. Phillips and J. Biro. In the latter part of chapter one, I examine the so-called Ability Theory of Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis, whose origin, I believe, is contained in one particular construal that Nagel gives to the phrase "what it is like". In the second chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of a subjective point of view, and what this involves in relation to subjectivity and consciousness. Mainly using the ideas of Kathleen Wider, I also try to ascertain whether Nagel's conception of the subjective point of view leads to epistemic solipsism, and if it does, what this means for Nagel's views on consciousness, e.g., whether they conflict with the views of Wittgenstein (on which question I utilise a key distinction made by David Chalmers). This leads me to examine the relationship between subjectivity and solipsism, and whether the latter can be avoided whenever one takes the former seriously. In the third and final chapter, I examine Nagel's concept of the objective point of view, and his views on the effect that this viewpoint has on the phenomenon of consciousness, e.g., whether science will succeed in providing a reductive explanation of conscious experience.
published_date 2001-12-31T13:31:09Z
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score 11.102871

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