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3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective. / James Richard Keith Mackley

Swansea University Author: James Richard Keith Mackley

Abstract

The European 3G mobile phone spectrum administrations, which took place between 1999 and 2002, used a variety of different methods for allocating licences. The total value of licence fees raised by auctions tended to be significantly higher than those achieved in countries which adopted a 'beau...

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Published: 2009
Institution: Swansea University
Degree level: Doctoral
Degree name: Ph.D
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42487
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last_indexed 2018-08-03T10:10:17Z
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spelling 2018-08-02T16:24:29.4314045 v2 42487 2018-08-02 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective. 7a25293b17ff84c0c64a519d1fc09720 NULL James Richard Keith Mackley James Richard Keith Mackley true true 2018-08-02 The European 3G mobile phone spectrum administrations, which took place between 1999 and 2002, used a variety of different methods for allocating licences. The total value of licence fees raised by auctions tended to be significantly higher than those achieved in countries which adopted a 'beauty contest' approach for assessing bidders. Post-administration, many of the licence-winning firms experienced financial distress. There were suggestions at the time that the firms that won licences through auction procedures had suffered a 'winner's curse'. There was a certain amount of support for this proposition; licence winners across Europe delayed the roll-out of 3G network infrastructure and, in a number of cases, handed back their licences or had them revoked. By pooling data across European spectrum administrations, this thesis presents an empirical analysis of how much was paid for licences and who won them. The analysis provides evidence for the proposition that administrators raised considerably higher revenues with auctions than was the case with beauty contests. In addition to this, the analysis also finds that a number of key revenue-raising factors were out of the control of the administering authorities. The second part of this thesis seeks to identify a winner's curse through a comparative event study of the German auction and the Swedish beauty contest. This analysis provides clear support to the proposition that some firms that won licences through auction procedures suffered a winner's curse. The final part of the thesis examines the role of regulation and regulatory bargaining in the mobile telecommunications industry. Through the application of real option theory, it can be shown that a high licence fee can cause delay in network infrastructure investment. A simple two stage Nash bargaining model can then be used to show how this may affect regulatory behaviour. E-Thesis Electrical engineering. 31 12 2009 2009-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Economics COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Doctoral Ph.D 2018-08-02T16:24:29.4314045 2018-08-02T16:24:29.4314045 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Economics James Richard Keith Mackley NULL 1 0042487-02082018162458.pdf 10801717.pdf 2018-08-02T16:24:58.3700000 Output 15735615 application/pdf E-Thesis true 2018-08-02T16:24:58.3700000 false
title 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective.
spellingShingle 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective.
James Richard Keith Mackley
title_short 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective.
title_full 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective.
title_fullStr 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective.
title_full_unstemmed 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective.
title_sort 3rd generation (3G) mobile telecommunication services :Examining the effect of spectrum licence administration procedures on investment, pricing, and the regulatory environment from a national and pan-European perspective.
author_id_str_mv 7a25293b17ff84c0c64a519d1fc09720
author_id_fullname_str_mv 7a25293b17ff84c0c64a519d1fc09720_***_James Richard Keith Mackley
author James Richard Keith Mackley
author2 James Richard Keith Mackley
format E-Thesis
publishDate 2009
institution Swansea University
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Economics
document_store_str 1
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description The European 3G mobile phone spectrum administrations, which took place between 1999 and 2002, used a variety of different methods for allocating licences. The total value of licence fees raised by auctions tended to be significantly higher than those achieved in countries which adopted a 'beauty contest' approach for assessing bidders. Post-administration, many of the licence-winning firms experienced financial distress. There were suggestions at the time that the firms that won licences through auction procedures had suffered a 'winner's curse'. There was a certain amount of support for this proposition; licence winners across Europe delayed the roll-out of 3G network infrastructure and, in a number of cases, handed back their licences or had them revoked. By pooling data across European spectrum administrations, this thesis presents an empirical analysis of how much was paid for licences and who won them. The analysis provides evidence for the proposition that administrators raised considerably higher revenues with auctions than was the case with beauty contests. In addition to this, the analysis also finds that a number of key revenue-raising factors were out of the control of the administering authorities. The second part of this thesis seeks to identify a winner's curse through a comparative event study of the German auction and the Swedish beauty contest. This analysis provides clear support to the proposition that some firms that won licences through auction procedures suffered a winner's curse. The final part of the thesis examines the role of regulation and regulatory bargaining in the mobile telecommunications industry. Through the application of real option theory, it can be shown that a high licence fee can cause delay in network infrastructure investment. A simple two stage Nash bargaining model can then be used to show how this may affect regulatory behaviour.
published_date 2009-12-31T05:52:16Z
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score 11.100739

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