No Cover Image

E-Thesis 403 views 160 downloads

Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis. / Andrew J Bloodworth

Swansea University Author: Andrew J Bloodworth

Abstract

It is commonly thought that exercise improves both our health and well-being. Indeed, prominent psychological researchers argue that exercise which makes us feel good necessarily enhances well-being. Their research employs a subjective conception of well-being, understood in terms of life-satisfacti...

Full description

Published: 2007
Institution: Swansea University
Degree level: Doctoral
Degree name: Ph.D
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42677
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
first_indexed 2018-08-02T18:55:17Z
last_indexed 2019-10-21T16:48:15Z
id cronfa42677
recordtype RisThesis
fullrecord <?xml version="1.0"?><rfc1807><datestamp>2018-08-22T16:07:56.9572596</datestamp><bib-version>v2</bib-version><id>42677</id><entry>2018-08-02</entry><title>Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.</title><swanseaauthors><author><sid>aaee4d575dfd587efd1155ff41a925e5</sid><ORCID>NULL</ORCID><firstname>Andrew J</firstname><surname>Bloodworth</surname><name>Andrew J Bloodworth</name><active>true</active><ethesisStudent>true</ethesisStudent></author></swanseaauthors><date>2018-08-02</date><abstract>It is commonly thought that exercise improves both our health and well-being. Indeed, prominent psychological researchers argue that exercise which makes us feel good necessarily enhances well-being. Their research employs a subjective conception of well-being, understood in terms of life-satisfaction and affect. Conversely, I argue that pleasure, enjoyment and desire-fulfilment do not necessarily enhance well-being. Subjective judgements of well-being can be mistaken. Exercise is of merely instrumental value in preserving functionings and capabilities that constitute well-being. This understanding of well-being draws extensively upon Nussbaum's capabilities approach. The biomedical case for the health benefits of exercise excludes subjective valuing, presupposing a dichotomy between objective scientific fact and subjective value. Health is understood in naturalistic terms, focusing upon the absence of disease and illness. In contrast, I argue health cannot be isolated from those functionings and capabilities constitutive of well-being which entangle fact and value. To be healthy is to be in a bodily and mental state that ensures the capability to function in valuable ways. Rejecting the fact/value dichotomy paves the way for reflection upon those values central to well-being. I argue for an objective list theory of well-being, in which listed constituents, such as affiliation and play, are considered valuable independent of possibly flawed subjective valuations. The human body, however, is not merely a vessel for listed values. Griffin elevates our rational nature over our animality in proposing his theory of well-being. His theory appears distant from some of our most central concerns as embodied human beings. Ageing, disease and illness mark some of the ways in which our bodies limit our capabilities. The capabilities and functionings proposed in Nussbaum's approach reflect both our animal and rational nature. In conclusion, I argue that exercise offers one important way in which to preserve the physical preconditions of these valuable functionings and capabilities.</abstract><type>E-Thesis</type><journal/><journalNumber></journalNumber><paginationStart/><paginationEnd/><publisher/><placeOfPublication/><isbnPrint/><issnPrint/><issnElectronic/><keywords>Philosophy.</keywords><publishedDay>31</publishedDay><publishedMonth>12</publishedMonth><publishedYear>2007</publishedYear><publishedDate>2007-12-31</publishedDate><doi/><url/><notes/><college>COLLEGE NANME</college><department>Public Health and Policy Studies</department><CollegeCode>COLLEGE CODE</CollegeCode><institution>Swansea University</institution><degreelevel>Doctoral</degreelevel><degreename>Ph.D</degreename><apcterm/><lastEdited>2018-08-22T16:07:56.9572596</lastEdited><Created>2018-08-02T16:24:30.0866121</Created><path><level id="1">Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences</level><level id="2">School of Health and Social Care - Public Health</level></path><authors><author><firstname>Andrew J</firstname><surname>Bloodworth</surname><orcid>NULL</orcid><order>1</order></author></authors><documents><document><filename>0042677-02082018162513.pdf</filename><originalFilename>10807446.pdf</originalFilename><uploaded>2018-08-02T16:25:13.3170000</uploaded><type>Output</type><contentLength>7116462</contentLength><contentType>application/pdf</contentType><version>E-Thesis</version><cronfaStatus>true</cronfaStatus><embargoDate>2018-08-02T16:25:13.3170000</embargoDate><copyrightCorrect>false</copyrightCorrect></document></documents><OutputDurs/></rfc1807>
spelling 2018-08-22T16:07:56.9572596 v2 42677 2018-08-02 Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis. aaee4d575dfd587efd1155ff41a925e5 NULL Andrew J Bloodworth Andrew J Bloodworth true true 2018-08-02 It is commonly thought that exercise improves both our health and well-being. Indeed, prominent psychological researchers argue that exercise which makes us feel good necessarily enhances well-being. Their research employs a subjective conception of well-being, understood in terms of life-satisfaction and affect. Conversely, I argue that pleasure, enjoyment and desire-fulfilment do not necessarily enhance well-being. Subjective judgements of well-being can be mistaken. Exercise is of merely instrumental value in preserving functionings and capabilities that constitute well-being. This understanding of well-being draws extensively upon Nussbaum's capabilities approach. The biomedical case for the health benefits of exercise excludes subjective valuing, presupposing a dichotomy between objective scientific fact and subjective value. Health is understood in naturalistic terms, focusing upon the absence of disease and illness. In contrast, I argue health cannot be isolated from those functionings and capabilities constitutive of well-being which entangle fact and value. To be healthy is to be in a bodily and mental state that ensures the capability to function in valuable ways. Rejecting the fact/value dichotomy paves the way for reflection upon those values central to well-being. I argue for an objective list theory of well-being, in which listed constituents, such as affiliation and play, are considered valuable independent of possibly flawed subjective valuations. The human body, however, is not merely a vessel for listed values. Griffin elevates our rational nature over our animality in proposing his theory of well-being. His theory appears distant from some of our most central concerns as embodied human beings. Ageing, disease and illness mark some of the ways in which our bodies limit our capabilities. The capabilities and functionings proposed in Nussbaum's approach reflect both our animal and rational nature. In conclusion, I argue that exercise offers one important way in which to preserve the physical preconditions of these valuable functionings and capabilities. E-Thesis Philosophy. 31 12 2007 2007-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Public Health and Policy Studies COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Doctoral Ph.D 2018-08-22T16:07:56.9572596 2018-08-02T16:24:30.0866121 Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences School of Health and Social Care - Public Health Andrew J Bloodworth NULL 1 0042677-02082018162513.pdf 10807446.pdf 2018-08-02T16:25:13.3170000 Output 7116462 application/pdf E-Thesis true 2018-08-02T16:25:13.3170000 false
title Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.
spellingShingle Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.
Andrew J Bloodworth
title_short Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.
title_full Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.
title_fullStr Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.
title_full_unstemmed Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.
title_sort Exercise, health and well-being: A philosophical analysis.
author_id_str_mv aaee4d575dfd587efd1155ff41a925e5
author_id_fullname_str_mv aaee4d575dfd587efd1155ff41a925e5_***_Andrew J Bloodworth
author Andrew J Bloodworth
author2 Andrew J Bloodworth
format E-Thesis
publishDate 2007
institution Swansea University
college_str Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
department_str School of Health and Social Care - Public Health{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Health and Social Care - Public Health
document_store_str 1
active_str 0
description It is commonly thought that exercise improves both our health and well-being. Indeed, prominent psychological researchers argue that exercise which makes us feel good necessarily enhances well-being. Their research employs a subjective conception of well-being, understood in terms of life-satisfaction and affect. Conversely, I argue that pleasure, enjoyment and desire-fulfilment do not necessarily enhance well-being. Subjective judgements of well-being can be mistaken. Exercise is of merely instrumental value in preserving functionings and capabilities that constitute well-being. This understanding of well-being draws extensively upon Nussbaum's capabilities approach. The biomedical case for the health benefits of exercise excludes subjective valuing, presupposing a dichotomy between objective scientific fact and subjective value. Health is understood in naturalistic terms, focusing upon the absence of disease and illness. In contrast, I argue health cannot be isolated from those functionings and capabilities constitutive of well-being which entangle fact and value. To be healthy is to be in a bodily and mental state that ensures the capability to function in valuable ways. Rejecting the fact/value dichotomy paves the way for reflection upon those values central to well-being. I argue for an objective list theory of well-being, in which listed constituents, such as affiliation and play, are considered valuable independent of possibly flawed subjective valuations. The human body, however, is not merely a vessel for listed values. Griffin elevates our rational nature over our animality in proposing his theory of well-being. His theory appears distant from some of our most central concerns as embodied human beings. Ageing, disease and illness mark some of the ways in which our bodies limit our capabilities. The capabilities and functionings proposed in Nussbaum's approach reflect both our animal and rational nature. In conclusion, I argue that exercise offers one important way in which to preserve the physical preconditions of these valuable functionings and capabilities.
published_date 2007-12-31T03:53:26Z
_version_ 1763752653698891776
score 11.012678

Similar Items