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Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study. / Sohrab Alavinia

Swansea University Author: Sohrab Alavinia

Abstract

Understanding the intellectual competition facing a philosopher gives a clearer sense of the depth of his work. This thesis is concerned with the reactions of Wittgenstein and Quine to Russell's foundationalism in epistemology. In particular it is concerned with the foundations of mathematics....

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Published: 1997
Institution: Swansea University
Degree level: Doctoral
Degree name: Ph.D
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42790
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That is why the study of the Wittgensteinian account of mathematical truth goes beyond the limits of reflection on mathematics and extends to the philosophy of language and logic. The claim is that contrary to the framework of thought of both Russell and Quine, there is no language / reality dichotomy. Russell's search for indubitable foundations of knowledge and in particular his attempt to establish the foundations of mathematics in logic is misguided. The very supposition that mathematics needs foundations is an illusion. It is an attempt to transcend the bounds of sense. The epistemological riddles faced by Russell and Quine disappear in the later Wittgensteinian understanding of the matter. They collapse into logical insights. Following modern debates in epistemology, Russell is looking for a proof of the 'external world'. This traditional line of thought continues in Quine's notion of 'The myth of physical objects'. Though Quine's naturalized epistemology is a reaction against foundationalism, the dichotomy in question, still remains. This is finally disposed of, by Wittgenstein's later conception of language. To complete the layout of the discussions; it is demonstrated that the idea of the alleged dichotomy lies behind the arguments of Einstein, Hilbert and all of the logical positivists. Instead of pursuing the source of necessity of a pr/or/propositions in the world or in the mind, we may explore the function of such propositions. Once their role has been properly grasped, the very disturbing epistemological riddles disappear. The absolute certainty of the propositions of logic and mathematics resides in the role that they play in our practice of inference and calculation. According to Russell's account in Principia Mathematica it is a fundamental law of logic that the proposition 'Q' follows from the proposition 'P &amp; (P -- Q)'. But what does this 'following' consist in? There is nothing in reality that provides a foundation for this inference. Logical and mathematical propositions define the techniques of inference and calculation. There is no foundation for our techniques that could justify them from the point of view of a non-participant in the practice. That is why it makes no sense to doubt logical or mathematical propositions. Russell's total loss of the 'objective world' is the inevitable outcome of his understanding of the problem. His scepticism concerning the ordinary empirical judgements is against the mastery of a technique in the practice of describing the world. Without that technique, we would be unable to think or to use language. Our certainty concerning these judgements is a practical certainty that shows how the expressions of our language are used. 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spelling 2018-08-31T15:09:59.0543142 v2 42790 2018-08-02 Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study. 8f22acecdfc464f8de787797e3968210 NULL Sohrab Alavinia Sohrab Alavinia true true 2018-08-02 Understanding the intellectual competition facing a philosopher gives a clearer sense of the depth of his work. This thesis is concerned with the reactions of Wittgenstein and Quine to Russell's foundationalism in epistemology. In particular it is concerned with the foundations of mathematics. Wittgenstein's conception of language is the deep source of his philosophy of mathematics. That is why the study of the Wittgensteinian account of mathematical truth goes beyond the limits of reflection on mathematics and extends to the philosophy of language and logic. The claim is that contrary to the framework of thought of both Russell and Quine, there is no language / reality dichotomy. Russell's search for indubitable foundations of knowledge and in particular his attempt to establish the foundations of mathematics in logic is misguided. The very supposition that mathematics needs foundations is an illusion. It is an attempt to transcend the bounds of sense. The epistemological riddles faced by Russell and Quine disappear in the later Wittgensteinian understanding of the matter. They collapse into logical insights. Following modern debates in epistemology, Russell is looking for a proof of the 'external world'. This traditional line of thought continues in Quine's notion of 'The myth of physical objects'. Though Quine's naturalized epistemology is a reaction against foundationalism, the dichotomy in question, still remains. This is finally disposed of, by Wittgenstein's later conception of language. To complete the layout of the discussions; it is demonstrated that the idea of the alleged dichotomy lies behind the arguments of Einstein, Hilbert and all of the logical positivists. Instead of pursuing the source of necessity of a pr/or/propositions in the world or in the mind, we may explore the function of such propositions. Once their role has been properly grasped, the very disturbing epistemological riddles disappear. The absolute certainty of the propositions of logic and mathematics resides in the role that they play in our practice of inference and calculation. According to Russell's account in Principia Mathematica it is a fundamental law of logic that the proposition 'Q' follows from the proposition 'P & (P -- Q)'. But what does this 'following' consist in? There is nothing in reality that provides a foundation for this inference. Logical and mathematical propositions define the techniques of inference and calculation. There is no foundation for our techniques that could justify them from the point of view of a non-participant in the practice. That is why it makes no sense to doubt logical or mathematical propositions. Russell's total loss of the 'objective world' is the inevitable outcome of his understanding of the problem. His scepticism concerning the ordinary empirical judgements is against the mastery of a technique in the practice of describing the world. Without that technique, we would be unable to think or to use language. Our certainty concerning these judgements is a practical certainty that shows how the expressions of our language are used. The function of these judgements makes the question of establishing their ground out of place. E-Thesis Philosophy.;Epistemology.;Philosophy of science. 31 12 1997 1997-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Political and Cultural Studies COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Doctoral Ph.D 2018-08-31T15:09:59.0543142 2018-08-02T16:24:30.4921985 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Sohrab Alavinia NULL 1 0042790-02082018162522.pdf 10807566.pdf 2018-08-02T16:25:22.1130000 Output 4764427 application/pdf E-Thesis true 2018-08-02T16:25:22.1130000 false
title Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study.
spellingShingle Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study.
Sohrab Alavinia
title_short Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study.
title_full Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study.
title_fullStr Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study.
title_full_unstemmed Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study.
title_sort Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein in pursuit of truth: A comparative study.
author_id_str_mv 8f22acecdfc464f8de787797e3968210
author_id_fullname_str_mv 8f22acecdfc464f8de787797e3968210_***_Sohrab Alavinia
author Sohrab Alavinia
author2 Sohrab Alavinia
format E-Thesis
publishDate 1997
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hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
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description Understanding the intellectual competition facing a philosopher gives a clearer sense of the depth of his work. This thesis is concerned with the reactions of Wittgenstein and Quine to Russell's foundationalism in epistemology. In particular it is concerned with the foundations of mathematics. Wittgenstein's conception of language is the deep source of his philosophy of mathematics. That is why the study of the Wittgensteinian account of mathematical truth goes beyond the limits of reflection on mathematics and extends to the philosophy of language and logic. The claim is that contrary to the framework of thought of both Russell and Quine, there is no language / reality dichotomy. Russell's search for indubitable foundations of knowledge and in particular his attempt to establish the foundations of mathematics in logic is misguided. The very supposition that mathematics needs foundations is an illusion. It is an attempt to transcend the bounds of sense. The epistemological riddles faced by Russell and Quine disappear in the later Wittgensteinian understanding of the matter. They collapse into logical insights. Following modern debates in epistemology, Russell is looking for a proof of the 'external world'. This traditional line of thought continues in Quine's notion of 'The myth of physical objects'. Though Quine's naturalized epistemology is a reaction against foundationalism, the dichotomy in question, still remains. This is finally disposed of, by Wittgenstein's later conception of language. To complete the layout of the discussions; it is demonstrated that the idea of the alleged dichotomy lies behind the arguments of Einstein, Hilbert and all of the logical positivists. Instead of pursuing the source of necessity of a pr/or/propositions in the world or in the mind, we may explore the function of such propositions. Once their role has been properly grasped, the very disturbing epistemological riddles disappear. The absolute certainty of the propositions of logic and mathematics resides in the role that they play in our practice of inference and calculation. According to Russell's account in Principia Mathematica it is a fundamental law of logic that the proposition 'Q' follows from the proposition 'P & (P -- Q)'. But what does this 'following' consist in? There is nothing in reality that provides a foundation for this inference. Logical and mathematical propositions define the techniques of inference and calculation. There is no foundation for our techniques that could justify them from the point of view of a non-participant in the practice. That is why it makes no sense to doubt logical or mathematical propositions. Russell's total loss of the 'objective world' is the inevitable outcome of his understanding of the problem. His scepticism concerning the ordinary empirical judgements is against the mastery of a technique in the practice of describing the world. Without that technique, we would be unable to think or to use language. Our certainty concerning these judgements is a practical certainty that shows how the expressions of our language are used. The function of these judgements makes the question of establishing their ground out of place.
published_date 1997-12-31T03:53:39Z
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