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Narrow content in the philosophy of mind. / Mark Davies

Swansea University Author: Mark Davies

Abstract

My thesis examines the notion of narrow content in the philosophy of mind. Narrowcontent is defined as a type of mental state that is shared between internal physicalduplicates in Twin Earth-type thought experiments. In these thought experiments,changes in the physical and/or social environments of...

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Published: 2009
Institution: Swansea University
Degree level: Doctoral
Degree name: Ph.D
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa43049
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last_indexed 2019-10-21T16:48:56Z
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spelling 2018-08-17T12:50:45.0385479 v2 43049 2018-08-02 Narrow content in the philosophy of mind. 5abfe2a34bcf6e04b8d69162ea433550 NULL Mark Davies Mark Davies true true 2018-08-02 My thesis examines the notion of narrow content in the philosophy of mind. Narrowcontent is defined as a type of mental state that is shared between internal physicalduplicates in Twin Earth-type thought experiments. In these thought experiments,changes in the physical and/or social environments of the duplicates are usually takento have the result that the contents of certain of the duplicates’ mental states, e.g.,beliefs, etc., are different. The upshot of this is that intemalism with regards tomental content seems to be refuted, as the duplicates concerned share an identity ofinternal physical properties, then if intemalism about mental content is true, theirmental states should also be content-identical. However, despite this possibility, itseems to me that there is still a strong intuition that the duplicates in these TwinEarth-type situations do share type-identical mental states which can be individuatedby the states’ narrow content. The aim of the thesis is to examine several of the mostpopular construals of narrow content in the literature, to ascertain whether there is aconstrual that provides an adequate narrow content. To help with this task I suggestthree conditions of adequacy that a narrow content must satisfy in order to beconsidered adequate. I then choose my favoured construal and give a version of itwhich will hopefully be seen as an improvement on the other construals (by satisfyingall the adequacy conditions). It will be argued that my version of the narrow contentconstrual will provide, not just an adequate narrow content, at least in relation to asubject’s perceptual experience, but perhaps also necessary and sufficient conditionsfor a mental state, such as a perceptual belief, to have the specific content that it has. E-Thesis Philosophy of mind 31 12 2009 2009-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Psychology COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Doctoral Ph.D 2018-08-17T12:50:45.0385479 2018-08-02T16:24:31.1630108 Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences School of Psychology Mark Davies NULL 1 0043049-02082018162542.pdf 10821439.pdf 2018-08-02T16:25:42.6430000 Output 11136532 application/pdf E-Thesis true 2018-08-02T16:25:42.6430000 false
title Narrow content in the philosophy of mind.
spellingShingle Narrow content in the philosophy of mind.
Mark Davies
title_short Narrow content in the philosophy of mind.
title_full Narrow content in the philosophy of mind.
title_fullStr Narrow content in the philosophy of mind.
title_full_unstemmed Narrow content in the philosophy of mind.
title_sort Narrow content in the philosophy of mind.
author_id_str_mv 5abfe2a34bcf6e04b8d69162ea433550
author_id_fullname_str_mv 5abfe2a34bcf6e04b8d69162ea433550_***_Mark Davies
author Mark Davies
author2 Mark Davies
format E-Thesis
publishDate 2009
institution Swansea University
college_str Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
department_str School of Psychology{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Psychology
document_store_str 1
active_str 0
description My thesis examines the notion of narrow content in the philosophy of mind. Narrowcontent is defined as a type of mental state that is shared between internal physicalduplicates in Twin Earth-type thought experiments. In these thought experiments,changes in the physical and/or social environments of the duplicates are usually takento have the result that the contents of certain of the duplicates’ mental states, e.g.,beliefs, etc., are different. The upshot of this is that intemalism with regards tomental content seems to be refuted, as the duplicates concerned share an identity ofinternal physical properties, then if intemalism about mental content is true, theirmental states should also be content-identical. However, despite this possibility, itseems to me that there is still a strong intuition that the duplicates in these TwinEarth-type situations do share type-identical mental states which can be individuatedby the states’ narrow content. The aim of the thesis is to examine several of the mostpopular construals of narrow content in the literature, to ascertain whether there is aconstrual that provides an adequate narrow content. To help with this task I suggestthree conditions of adequacy that a narrow content must satisfy in order to beconsidered adequate. I then choose my favoured construal and give a version of itwhich will hopefully be seen as an improvement on the other construals (by satisfyingall the adequacy conditions). It will be argued that my version of the narrow contentconstrual will provide, not just an adequate narrow content, at least in relation to asubject’s perceptual experience, but perhaps also necessary and sufficient conditionsfor a mental state, such as a perceptual belief, to have the specific content that it has.
published_date 2009-12-31T03:54:09Z
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score 11.036706

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