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Evil and Collective Moral Failures

Gideon Calder Orcid Logo

Moral Evil in Practical Ethics, Issue: 1, Pages: 129 - 144

Swansea University Author: Gideon Calder Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.4324/9780429455926

Abstract

Most debates about evil centre on the applicability of the term to individuals’ actions, their motives and effects. Might collective moral failures – where the malignant intentions of specific individuals cannot by themselves account for the scale of the harms involved – be designated as ‘evil’? I f...

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Published in: Moral Evil in Practical Ethics
ISBN: 978-1138316041
Published: Abingdon and New York Routledge 2018
Online Access: https://www.routledge.com/Moral-Evil-in-Practical-Ethics/Harrosh-Crisp/p/book/9781138316041
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa45231
first_indexed 2018-10-26T04:17:37Z
last_indexed 2020-12-16T04:05:37Z
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spelling 2020-12-15T13:49:22.2617181 v2 45231 2018-10-25 Evil and Collective Moral Failures 7a50a4eeeb5c00bad3acd160cf138a8e 0000-0002-5668-1824 Gideon Calder Gideon Calder true false 2018-10-25 SOSS Most debates about evil centre on the applicability of the term to individuals’ actions, their motives and effects. Might collective moral failures – where the malignant intentions of specific individuals cannot by themselves account for the scale of the harms involved – be designated as ‘evil’? I first defend collective moral failure as a distinct category. I then argue that such phenomena cannot be sufficiently accounted for in terms of the malignant intentions of individuals. I then consider and reject three ways of claiming that evil must be individuated (and so inapplicable to collective moral failures). I then argue that for evil to be a predicate of such events, it must be locatable in social situations, relations or structures – but as something to be explained, rather than itself an explanation. Handled with due care, such a deflationary conception of evil may play a role in our understanding of, and response to, collective moral failures. Book chapter Moral Evil in Practical Ethics 1 129 144 Routledge Abingdon and New York 978-1138316041 evil, social structures, agency 28 8 2018 2018-08-28 10.4324/9780429455926 https://www.routledge.com/Moral-Evil-in-Practical-Ethics/Harrosh-Crisp/p/book/9781138316041 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University 2020-12-15T13:49:22.2617181 2018-10-25T20:09:58.4087028 Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences School of Health and Social Care - Public Health Gideon Calder 0000-0002-5668-1824 1
title Evil and Collective Moral Failures
spellingShingle Evil and Collective Moral Failures
Gideon Calder
title_short Evil and Collective Moral Failures
title_full Evil and Collective Moral Failures
title_fullStr Evil and Collective Moral Failures
title_full_unstemmed Evil and Collective Moral Failures
title_sort Evil and Collective Moral Failures
author_id_str_mv 7a50a4eeeb5c00bad3acd160cf138a8e
author_id_fullname_str_mv 7a50a4eeeb5c00bad3acd160cf138a8e_***_Gideon Calder
author Gideon Calder
author2 Gideon Calder
format Book chapter
container_title Moral Evil in Practical Ethics
container_issue 1
container_start_page 129
publishDate 2018
institution Swansea University
isbn 978-1138316041
doi_str_mv 10.4324/9780429455926
publisher Routledge
college_str Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
department_str School of Health and Social Care - Public Health{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Health and Social Care - Public Health
url https://www.routledge.com/Moral-Evil-in-Practical-Ethics/Harrosh-Crisp/p/book/9781138316041
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description Most debates about evil centre on the applicability of the term to individuals’ actions, their motives and effects. Might collective moral failures – where the malignant intentions of specific individuals cannot by themselves account for the scale of the harms involved – be designated as ‘evil’? I first defend collective moral failure as a distinct category. I then argue that such phenomena cannot be sufficiently accounted for in terms of the malignant intentions of individuals. I then consider and reject three ways of claiming that evil must be individuated (and so inapplicable to collective moral failures). I then argue that for evil to be a predicate of such events, it must be locatable in social situations, relations or structures – but as something to be explained, rather than itself an explanation. Handled with due care, such a deflationary conception of evil may play a role in our understanding of, and response to, collective moral failures.
published_date 2018-08-28T05:42:02Z
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