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‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’

Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov

Ratio Juris, Volume: 24, Issue: 3, Pages: 284 - 303

Swansea University Author: Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov

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DOI (Published version): 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00485.x

Abstract

Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status a...

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Published in: Ratio Juris
Published: in Ratio Juris 2011
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa5109
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last_indexed 2018-02-09T04:31:08Z
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spelling 2014-03-24T13:13:03.5450450 v2 5109 2011-10-01 ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’ 6dbd693e537ece98e6999449784e69de Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov true false 2011-10-01 LLPC Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status accorded to morality in debates about the grounds of law. The claim I seek to advance is that very often judicial engagement with morality is not different in kind to judicial engagement with other diverse objects of legal reasoning. What the comparison tends to show is that instances of “moral reasoning” in law do not obviously challenge our account of the grounds of law. Rather these instances can be viewed as central case examples of legal reasoning. Conventional grounds of law are left untouched. Journal Article Ratio Juris 24 3 284 303 in Ratio Juris 8 8 2011 2011-08-08 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00485.x COLLEGE NANME Legal Practice & Graduate Diploma Law COLLEGE CODE LLPC Swansea University 2014-03-24T13:13:03.5450450 2011-10-01T00:00:00.0000000 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov 1
title ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’
spellingShingle ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’
Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
title_short ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’
title_full ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’
title_fullStr ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’
title_full_unstemmed ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’
title_sort ‘The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?’
author_id_str_mv 6dbd693e537ece98e6999449784e69de
author_id_fullname_str_mv 6dbd693e537ece98e6999449784e69de_***_Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
author Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
author2 Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
format Journal article
container_title Ratio Juris
container_volume 24
container_issue 3
container_start_page 284
publishDate 2011
institution Swansea University
doi_str_mv 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00485.x
publisher in Ratio Juris
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law
document_store_str 0
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description Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status accorded to morality in debates about the grounds of law. The claim I seek to advance is that very often judicial engagement with morality is not different in kind to judicial engagement with other diverse objects of legal reasoning. What the comparison tends to show is that instances of “moral reasoning” in law do not obviously challenge our account of the grounds of law. Rather these instances can be viewed as central case examples of legal reasoning. Conventional grounds of law are left untouched.
published_date 2011-08-08T03:06:03Z
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score 11.012678

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