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Recognition and social freedom / Paddy McQueen

European Journal of Political Theory, Start page: 147488511987185

Swansea University Author: Paddy McQueen

Abstract

In this paper I develop an account of social freedom grounded in intersubjective recognition, which I term the “normative authorisation” account. According to this model, a person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal who can engage in justificatory dialogue with other soc...

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Published in: European Journal of Political Theory
ISSN: 1474-8851 1741-2730
Published: 2019
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa52051
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first_indexed 2019-09-24T14:19:24Z
last_indexed 2020-12-02T04:11:10Z
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spelling 2020-12-01T14:10:00.1546903 v2 52051 2019-09-24 Recognition and social freedom 4e2ee88771eac4a88ad1bc294afec919 0000-0001-9696-8654 Paddy McQueen Paddy McQueen true false 2019-09-24 APC In this paper I develop an account of social freedom grounded in intersubjective recognition, which I term the “normative authorisation” account. According to this model, a person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal who can engage in justificatory dialogue with other social agents about the appropriateness of her reasons for action. I contrast this with Axel Honneth’s theory of social freedom, which I label the “self-realisation” account. Within this model, the affirmative recognition of others is required in order to achieve a positive relation-to-self and hence freedom. I highlight several issues with this account, which challenge the relationship Honneth draws between social recognition and freedom. I demonstrate that the normative authorisation account avoids these problems. I also show how it captures some basic features of our everyday, normative interactions. Finally, I suggest that the account fits well with recent work on epistemic injustice. Specifically, it shows that establishing the social conditions of freedom requires ensuring epistemically-just social relations. In sum, the normative authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory of social freedom that fits well with wider accounts of justice and freedom. It represents the most promising way of construing social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition. Journal Article European Journal of Political Theory 147488511987185 1474-8851 1741-2730 Axel Honneth; recognition; relational autonomy; Robert Pippin; social freedom 31 12 2019 2019-12-31 10.1177/1474885119871856 COLLEGE NANME Politics, Philosophy and International Relations COLLEGE CODE APC Swansea University 2020-12-01T14:10:00.1546903 2019-09-24T08:19:08.4322280 College of Arts and Humanities Political and Cultural Studies Paddy McQueen 0000-0001-9696-8654 1 0052051-08102019170644.pdf 52051.pdf 2019-10-08T17:06:44.9770000 Output 137045 application/pdf Accepted Manuscript true 2019-10-07T00:00:00.0000000 true eng 55 Claire Burnes 0000-0001-7381-7845 claire.burnes@Swansea.ac.uk
title Recognition and social freedom
spellingShingle Recognition and social freedom
Paddy, McQueen
title_short Recognition and social freedom
title_full Recognition and social freedom
title_fullStr Recognition and social freedom
title_full_unstemmed Recognition and social freedom
title_sort Recognition and social freedom
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author_id_fullname_str_mv 4e2ee88771eac4a88ad1bc294afec919_***_Paddy, McQueen
author Paddy, McQueen
author2 Paddy McQueen
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publishDate 2019
institution Swansea University
issn 1474-8851
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doi_str_mv 10.1177/1474885119871856
college_str College of Arts and Humanities
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description In this paper I develop an account of social freedom grounded in intersubjective recognition, which I term the “normative authorisation” account. According to this model, a person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal who can engage in justificatory dialogue with other social agents about the appropriateness of her reasons for action. I contrast this with Axel Honneth’s theory of social freedom, which I label the “self-realisation” account. Within this model, the affirmative recognition of others is required in order to achieve a positive relation-to-self and hence freedom. I highlight several issues with this account, which challenge the relationship Honneth draws between social recognition and freedom. I demonstrate that the normative authorisation account avoids these problems. I also show how it captures some basic features of our everyday, normative interactions. Finally, I suggest that the account fits well with recent work on epistemic injustice. Specifically, it shows that establishing the social conditions of freedom requires ensuring epistemically-just social relations. In sum, the normative authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory of social freedom that fits well with wider accounts of justice and freedom. It represents the most promising way of construing social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition.
published_date 2019-12-31T04:07:52Z
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