Essays on Corporate Governance

TRAN, THI

doi:10.23889/SUthesis.59515

E-Thesis 413 views

Essays on Corporate Governance / THI TRAN

Swansea University Author: THI TRAN

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DOI (Published version): 10.23889/SUthesis.59515

Abstract

This thesis includes three empirical studies on the topic of corporate governance in developed and emerging markets The first chapter investigates risk-taking behaviour across subsidiaries of U.S. multi-bank holding companies after a subsidiary-level manager is promoted to the multi-bank holding com...

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Published:	Swansea 2020
Institution:	Swansea University
Degree level:	Doctoral
Degree name:	Ph.D
Supervisor:	Talavera, Oleksandr ; Gedikli, Cigdem
URI:	https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa59515
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first_indexed	2022-03-07T12:16:50Z
last_indexed	2022-03-08T04:28:40Z
id	cronfa59515
recordtype	RisThesis
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spelling	2022-03-07T12:21:18.8137964 v2 59515 2022-03-07 Essays on Corporate Governance 9b666cf0d3eb8fd8114de65207bd7b6e THI TRAN THI TRAN true false 2022-03-07 This thesis includes three empirical studies on the topic of corporate governance in developed and emerging markets The first chapter investigates risk-taking behaviour across subsidiaries of U.S. multi-bank holding companies after a subsidiary-level manager is promoted to the multi-bank holding companies-level chief executive officer (CEO). Results suggest that CEO-linked bank subsidiaries take more risks compared to their non-linked counterparts. Such effect is more pronounced when CEOs carry on their employment status with respects to the associated subsidiaries post-turnover. The risk-taking practices at linked banks persist over the years following CEOs succession. The second chapter examines the predictive power of a large set of the determinants of CEO compensation by employing a machine learning tool - the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Lasso). We find that, out of twenty-six determinants of CEO compensation gathering from literature, a group of six factors have little or no impact in driving CEO total compensation, including CEO gender, firm return on assets, diversification, risk, corporate governance e-index and board size. These results are robust to alternative methods to choose tuning parameter including elastic net, cross-validation or square-root lasso. The last chapter looks at the impact of Soviet-minded directors on Ukrainian banks performance and risk-taking behaviour. Results suggest that banks are safer in the presence of Soviet directors on board. With respects to performance, there is no evidence to show that Soviet directors have a significant impact on performance of Ukrainian banks. Further analysis reveals that the risk adverseness of Soviet directors stems from their personal value towards risk-taking action in work and business. E-Thesis Swansea 6 5 2020 2020-05-06 10.23889/SUthesis.59515 Due to Embargo and/or Third Party Copyright restrictions, this thesis is not available via this service. COLLEGE NANME COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Talavera, Oleksandr ; Gedikli, Cigdem Doctoral Ph.D 2022-03-07T12:21:18.8137964 2022-03-07T12:13:15.2099897 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Accounting and Finance THI TRAN 1
title	Essays on Corporate Governance
spellingShingle	Essays on Corporate Governance THI TRAN
title_short	Essays on Corporate Governance
title_full	Essays on Corporate Governance
title_fullStr	Essays on Corporate Governance
title_full_unstemmed	Essays on Corporate Governance
title_sort	Essays on Corporate Governance
author_id_str_mv	9b666cf0d3eb8fd8114de65207bd7b6e
author_id_fullname_str_mv	9b666cf0d3eb8fd8114de65207bd7b6e_***_THI TRAN
author	THI TRAN
author2	THI TRAN
format	E-Thesis
publishDate	2020
institution	Swansea University
doi_str_mv	10.23889/SUthesis.59515
college_str	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id	facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id	facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str	School of Management - Accounting and Finance{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Accounting and Finance
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description	This thesis includes three empirical studies on the topic of corporate governance in developed and emerging markets The first chapter investigates risk-taking behaviour across subsidiaries of U.S. multi-bank holding companies after a subsidiary-level manager is promoted to the multi-bank holding companies-level chief executive officer (CEO). Results suggest that CEO-linked bank subsidiaries take more risks compared to their non-linked counterparts. Such effect is more pronounced when CEOs carry on their employment status with respects to the associated subsidiaries post-turnover. The risk-taking practices at linked banks persist over the years following CEOs succession. The second chapter examines the predictive power of a large set of the determinants of CEO compensation by employing a machine learning tool - the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Lasso). We find that, out of twenty-six determinants of CEO compensation gathering from literature, a group of six factors have little or no impact in driving CEO total compensation, including CEO gender, firm return on assets, diversification, risk, corporate governance e-index and board size. These results are robust to alternative methods to choose tuning parameter including elastic net, cross-validation or square-root lasso. The last chapter looks at the impact of Soviet-minded directors on Ukrainian banks performance and risk-taking behaviour. Results suggest that banks are safer in the presence of Soviet directors on board. With respects to performance, there is no evidence to show that Soviet directors have a significant impact on performance of Ukrainian banks. Further analysis reveals that the risk adverseness of Soviet directors stems from their personal value towards risk-taking action in work and business.
published_date	2020-05-06T04:16:53Z
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score	11.012678

Essays on Corporate Governance / THI TRAN

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