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The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place

Phil Reed Orcid Logo

Behavior & Philosophy, Volume: 50, Pages: 20 - 38

Swansea University Author: Phil Reed Orcid Logo

Abstract

The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, ill...

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Published in: Behavior & Philosophy
ISSN: 1053-8348
Published: Published by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies 2023
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa61895
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title The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place
spellingShingle The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place
Phil Reed
title_short The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place
title_full The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place
title_fullStr The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place
title_full_unstemmed The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place
title_sort The concept of intensionality in the work of Ullin T. Place
author_id_str_mv 100599ab189b514fdf99f9b4cb477a83
author_id_fullname_str_mv 100599ab189b514fdf99f9b4cb477a83_***_Phil Reed
author Phil Reed
author2 Phil Reed
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publishDate 2023
institution Swansea University
issn 1053-8348
publisher Published by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies
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hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
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url https://behavior.org/journals/Current%20Volumes/
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description The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises non-scientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.
published_date 2023-01-01T06:43:54Z
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