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The Question of Comparison

Ida Petretta Orcid Logo

The American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume: 68, Issue: 4, Pages: 893 - 928

Swansea University Author: Ida Petretta Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1093/ajcl/avab003

Abstract

Comparison is a key component of legal reasoning. We move merrily from like to like within the doctrine of precedent. We invoke comparison whenever we distinguish or apply a case. This Article begins by elucidating how comparison is present in law. The Article shows how law cannot function without c...

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Published in: The American Journal of Comparative Law
ISSN: 0002-919X 2326-9197
Published: Oxford University Press (OUP) 2020
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa62680
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first_indexed 2023-02-17T17:50:47Z
last_indexed 2023-04-20T03:22:58Z
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spelling v2 62680 2023-02-17 The Question of Comparison 5df5332c3e24126826edba1940b3561d 0000-0001-8492-2595 Ida Petretta Ida Petretta true false 2023-02-17 LAWD Comparison is a key component of legal reasoning. We move merrily from like to like within the doctrine of precedent. We invoke comparison whenever we distinguish or apply a case. This Article begins by elucidating how comparison is present in law. The Article shows how law cannot function without comparison, and how the legal world skips over the central role comparison plays in these matters. The Article explores the literature on legal comparison and draws on insights from philosophy, comparative law, and anthropology to better understand comparison in practice. This Article argues that while we are entangled in the questions of sameness and difference, of finding the function and tying together, we are still not asking the question of comparison. What is function and how is it related to comparison? Inspired by James Tully’s writings, the Article explores the aspectival views of the legal world suggested by the different games of comparison. The Article draws on Stephen Mulhall’s work on Wittgenstein’s seeing as, aspect dawning, and aspect blindness to further ask about our relationship to comparison. The Article shows how mainstream comparisons are ontic comparisons that think togetherness through the comparatist. The comparatist steers the belonging together and (un)makes the meaning of all things in mainstream comparison. The argument builds on earlier work by Igor Stramignoni, showing how the Western legal tradition is within a kind of Heideggerian calculative thinking. The Article explores the possibility of other kinds of comparison through Stramignoni’s poetic comparisons. This Article calls on us to slow down our comparisons and begin to question comparison itself. Journal Article The American Journal of Comparative Law 68 4 893 928 Oxford University Press (OUP) 0002-919X 2326-9197 31 12 2020 2020-12-31 10.1093/ajcl/avab003 COLLEGE NANME Law COLLEGE CODE LAWD Swansea University 2023-07-17T14:24:43.6121434 2023-02-17T10:40:40.9572454 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law Ida Petretta 0000-0001-8492-2595 1 62680__26620__ac7007c433134fe7bccd4c1bf8ba7774.pdf 62680_VoR.pdf 2023-02-17T18:03:04.2350512 Output 319932 application/pdf Version of Record true This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC BY license true eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
title The Question of Comparison
spellingShingle The Question of Comparison
Ida Petretta
title_short The Question of Comparison
title_full The Question of Comparison
title_fullStr The Question of Comparison
title_full_unstemmed The Question of Comparison
title_sort The Question of Comparison
author_id_str_mv 5df5332c3e24126826edba1940b3561d
author_id_fullname_str_mv 5df5332c3e24126826edba1940b3561d_***_Ida Petretta
author Ida Petretta
author2 Ida Petretta
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container_title The American Journal of Comparative Law
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doi_str_mv 10.1093/ajcl/avab003
publisher Oxford University Press (OUP)
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department_str Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law
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description Comparison is a key component of legal reasoning. We move merrily from like to like within the doctrine of precedent. We invoke comparison whenever we distinguish or apply a case. This Article begins by elucidating how comparison is present in law. The Article shows how law cannot function without comparison, and how the legal world skips over the central role comparison plays in these matters. The Article explores the literature on legal comparison and draws on insights from philosophy, comparative law, and anthropology to better understand comparison in practice. This Article argues that while we are entangled in the questions of sameness and difference, of finding the function and tying together, we are still not asking the question of comparison. What is function and how is it related to comparison? Inspired by James Tully’s writings, the Article explores the aspectival views of the legal world suggested by the different games of comparison. The Article draws on Stephen Mulhall’s work on Wittgenstein’s seeing as, aspect dawning, and aspect blindness to further ask about our relationship to comparison. The Article shows how mainstream comparisons are ontic comparisons that think togetherness through the comparatist. The comparatist steers the belonging together and (un)makes the meaning of all things in mainstream comparison. The argument builds on earlier work by Igor Stramignoni, showing how the Western legal tradition is within a kind of Heideggerian calculative thinking. The Article explores the possibility of other kinds of comparison through Stramignoni’s poetic comparisons. This Article calls on us to slow down our comparisons and begin to question comparison itself.
published_date 2020-12-31T14:24:39Z
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