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Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

Konstantinos Matakos, Riikka Savolainen Orcid Logo, Orestis Troumpounis, Janne Tukiainen, Dimitrios Xefteris

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, Volume: 2, Issue: 4, Pages: 883 - 916

Swansea University Author: Riikka Savolainen Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1086/731286

Abstract

By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a po...

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Published in: Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics
ISSN: 2832-9368 2832-9376
Published: University of Chicago Press 2024
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa65736
Abstract: By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.
Keywords: Electoral systems; ideological heterogeneity; party cohesion; proportional representation; regression discontinuity design
College: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Funders: This research is funded by the European Union (Tukiainen, European Research Council, INTRAPOL, grant 101045239).
Issue: 4
Start Page: 883
End Page: 916