Conference Paper/Proceeding/Abstract 204 views
Assume but Verify: Deductive Verification of Leaked Information in Concurrent Applications
Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Swansea University Author: Mukesh Tiwari
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DOI (Published version): 10.1145/3576915.3623141
Abstract
We consider the problem of specifying and proving the security of non-trivial, concurrent programs that intentionally leak information. We present a method that decomposes the problem into (a) proving that the program only leaks information it has declassified via assume annotations already widely u...
Published in: | Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
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ISBN: | 979-8-4007-0050-7 |
Published: |
New York, NY, USA
ACM
2023
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URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa65925 |
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Abstract: |
We consider the problem of specifying and proving the security of non-trivial, concurrent programs that intentionally leak information. We present a method that decomposes the problem into (a) proving that the program only leaks information it has declassified via assume annotations already widely used in deductive program verification; and (b) auditing the declassifications against a declarative security policy. We show how condition (a) can be enforced by an extension of the existing program logic SecCSL, and how(b) can be checked by proving a set of simple entailments. Part of the challenge is to define respective semantic soundness criteria and to formally connect these to the logic rules and policy audit. We support our methodology in an auto-active program verifier, which weapply to verify the implementations of various case study programs against a range of declassification policies. |
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College: |
Faculty of Science and Engineering |
Funders: |
This research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Navy, OfficeofNavalResearch, under award N62909-18-1-2049.
This material is based upon work supported by the Commonwealth of Australia Defence Science and Technology Group, Next Generation Technologies Fund (NGTF) Naumann was supported in part by NSF award CNS-1718713. |