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Social preferences on networks

Sarah Rezaei Orcid Logo, Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utz Weitzel, Bastian Westbrock Orcid Logo

Journal of Public Economics, Volume: 234, Start page: 105113

Swansea University Author: Bastian Westbrock Orcid Logo

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Abstract

Social preferences are a powerful determinant of human behavior. We study their behavioral implications within the context of a network game. A key feature of our game is the existence of multiple equilibria that widely differ in terms of their payoff distributions. Determining which equilibrium is...

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Published in: Journal of Public Economics
ISSN: 0047-2727
Published: Elsevier BV 2024
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa67534
Abstract: Social preferences are a powerful determinant of human behavior. We study their behavioral implications within the context of a network game. A key feature of our game is the existence of multiple equilibria that widely differ in terms of their payoff distributions. Determining which equilibrium is most plausible is thus a key concern. We show that introducing social preferences into the game can resolve the problem of equilibrium multiplicity. However, the selected equilibria do not necessarily yield more efficient or egalitarian payoff distributions. Rather, they just reinforce the inequality that is already inherent in a network structure. We validate these predictions in an experiment and discuss their implications for managerial practice and behavior in larger networks.
Keywords: Social preferences, Network games, Public goods
College: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Start Page: 105113