Journal article 39 views
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports
Abacus
Swansea University Author: Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh
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Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between board co-option and the obfuscation of financial disclosures in a comprehensive sample of 9,620 10-K filings by 1,076 U.S.-listed firms between 1996 and 2018. Our empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses that board co-option partly explain...
Published in: | Abacus |
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ISSN: | 0001-3072 1467-6281 |
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Wiley
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URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa67607 |
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v2 67607 2024-09-09 Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports eefe2792c8eed5b49feede33981dfa53 0000-0002-5761-931X Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh true false 2024-09-09 CBAE This study investigates the relationship between board co-option and the obfuscation of financial disclosures in a comprehensive sample of 9,620 10-K filings by 1,076 U.S.-listed firms between 1996 and 2018. Our empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses that board co-option partly explains the obfuscation of financial reports. Ex-post tests reveal that the co-option effect is most pronounced in firms led by less-able managers and is attenuated in the presence of a female CEO. Our findings are consistent with a stakeholder-agency perspective as they suggest that board capture weakens the ability of directors to discharge their fiduciary duties, particularly the provision of readable financial statements to stakeholders. Our results are robust to the use of alternative co-option measures, obfuscation metrics, model specifications, and potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, we contribute to the growing literature on financial statement readability by underscoring the critical role of effective monitoring in shaping the quality of firms' communication with stakeholders. Our results have important implications for governance regulation and policy. Journal Article Abacus Wiley 0001-3072 1467-6281 0 0 0 0001-01-01 COLLEGE NANME Management School COLLEGE CODE CBAE Swansea University Not Required 2024-09-09T08:15:14.0327901 2024-09-09T08:11:23.6257056 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Accounting and Finance Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh 0000-0002-5761-931X 1 Tanveer Hussain 2 Geofry Areneke 3 Jacob Agyemang 4 |
title |
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports |
spellingShingle |
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh |
title_short |
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports |
title_full |
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports |
title_fullStr |
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports |
title_full_unstemmed |
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports |
title_sort |
Co-opted boards and the obfuscation of financial reports |
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eefe2792c8eed5b49feede33981dfa53 |
author_id_fullname_str_mv |
eefe2792c8eed5b49feede33981dfa53_***_Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh |
author |
Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh |
author2 |
Tunyi Tunyi Abongeh Tanveer Hussain Geofry Areneke Jacob Agyemang |
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Journal article |
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Abacus |
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Swansea University |
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0001-3072 1467-6281 |
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Wiley |
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Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
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Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
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School of Management - Accounting and Finance{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Accounting and Finance |
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description |
This study investigates the relationship between board co-option and the obfuscation of financial disclosures in a comprehensive sample of 9,620 10-K filings by 1,076 U.S.-listed firms between 1996 and 2018. Our empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses that board co-option partly explains the obfuscation of financial reports. Ex-post tests reveal that the co-option effect is most pronounced in firms led by less-able managers and is attenuated in the presence of a female CEO. Our findings are consistent with a stakeholder-agency perspective as they suggest that board capture weakens the ability of directors to discharge their fiduciary duties, particularly the provision of readable financial statements to stakeholders. Our results are robust to the use of alternative co-option measures, obfuscation metrics, model specifications, and potential endogeneity concerns. Overall, we contribute to the growing literature on financial statement readability by underscoring the critical role of effective monitoring in shaping the quality of firms' communication with stakeholders. Our results have important implications for governance regulation and policy. |
published_date |
0001-01-01T08:15:13Z |
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1809701785763315712 |
score |
11.028798 |