(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited

Tidoni, Emmanuele; Merritt, Avena; Adeyemi, Elizabeth; Scandola, Michele; Tree, Jeremy; Riggs, Kevin; George, David

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106191

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(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited

Emmanuele Tidoni, Avena Merritt, Elizabeth Adeyemi, Michele Scandola, Jeremy Tree

, Kevin Riggs, David George

Cognition, Volume: 262, Start page: 106191

Swansea University Author: Jeremy Tree

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DOI (Published version): 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106191

Abstract

When observing individuals in action, we often infer their goals and intentions. Yet, in situations where actions are ambiguous and could be either intentionally generated or not, there is a tendency to perceive these actions as internally driven. This intentionality bias is influenced by individual...

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Published in:	Cognition
ISSN:	0010-0277
Published:	Elsevier BV 2025
Online Access:	Check full text
URI:	https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa69567

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spelling	2025-06-09T17:01:19.4167535 v2 69567 2025-05-24 (Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited 373fd575114a743d502a979c6161b1ad 0000-0001-6000-8125 Jeremy Tree Jeremy Tree true false 2025-05-24 PSYS When observing individuals in action, we often infer their goals and intentions. Yet, in situations where actions are ambiguous and could be either intentionally generated or not, there is a tendency to perceive these actions as internally driven. This intentionality bias is influenced by individual differences in schizotypal cognitive style.In this study, we examined how healthy individuals distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions when perceiving actions of a finger attached to a pulling device. Participants reported to use different strategies to infer intentionality (e.g., action onset, perceived movement speed, hand and finger posture) and tended to attribute more intentionality to actions where the posture of the finger aligned with the final goal of the action (i.e., a bent finger pushing a button was perceived more intentional than a straight finger doing the same action). Moreover, the perceived action intentionality varied depending on the individual schizotypal cognitive style. The tendency to perceive the action as intentional when it was done with a bent finger rather than a straight finger decreased as the participants' schizotypal scores increased.These findings suggest that intentionality attribution is not based on processes that automatically infer intentions as the primary cause of human actions. Rather than being an intentional bias, we believe that attributing and denying intentions requires the coherent integration of high- and low-level cognitive processes modulated by individual differences. Journal Article Cognition 262 106191 Elsevier BV 0010-0277 Action observation; Intentionality bias; Intentionality attribution; Other-agency 1 9 2025 2025-09-01 10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106191 COLLEGE NANME Psychology School COLLEGE CODE PSYS Swansea University Another institution paid the OA fee 2025-06-09T17:01:19.4167535 2025-05-24T20:41:52.0159606 Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences School of Psychology Emmanuele Tidoni 1 Avena Merritt 2 Elizabeth Adeyemi 3 Michele Scandola 4 Jeremy Tree 0000-0001-6000-8125 5 Kevin Riggs 6 David George 7 69567__34438__fc2dc645f9d840c7a527903c1ad8a3ad.pdf 69567.VoR.pdf 2025-06-09T16:59:35.8993961 Output 3765682 application/pdf Version of Record true © 2025 The Authors. This is an open access article under the CC BY license. true eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
title	(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited
spellingShingle	(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited Jeremy Tree
title_short	(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited
title_full	(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited
title_fullStr	(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited
title_full_unstemmed	(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited
title_sort	(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited
author_id_str_mv	373fd575114a743d502a979c6161b1ad
author_id_fullname_str_mv	373fd575114a743d502a979c6161b1ad_***_Jeremy Tree
author	Jeremy Tree
author2	Emmanuele Tidoni Avena Merritt Elizabeth Adeyemi Michele Scandola Jeremy Tree Kevin Riggs David George
format	Journal article
container_title	Cognition
container_volume	262
container_start_page	106191
publishDate	2025
institution	Swansea University
issn	0010-0277
doi_str_mv	10.1016/j.cognition.2025.106191
publisher	Elsevier BV
college_str	Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id	facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_top_title	Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
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hierarchy_parent_title	Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
department_str	School of Psychology{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Psychology
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description	When observing individuals in action, we often infer their goals and intentions. Yet, in situations where actions are ambiguous and could be either intentionally generated or not, there is a tendency to perceive these actions as internally driven. This intentionality bias is influenced by individual differences in schizotypal cognitive style.In this study, we examined how healthy individuals distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions when perceiving actions of a finger attached to a pulling device. Participants reported to use different strategies to infer intentionality (e.g., action onset, perceived movement speed, hand and finger posture) and tended to attribute more intentionality to actions where the posture of the finger aligned with the final goal of the action (i.e., a bent finger pushing a button was perceived more intentional than a straight finger doing the same action). Moreover, the perceived action intentionality varied depending on the individual schizotypal cognitive style. The tendency to perceive the action as intentional when it was done with a bent finger rather than a straight finger decreased as the participants' schizotypal scores increased.These findings suggest that intentionality attribution is not based on processes that automatically infer intentions as the primary cause of human actions. Rather than being an intentional bias, we believe that attributing and denying intentions requires the coherent integration of high- and low-level cognitive processes modulated by individual differences.
published_date	2025-09-01T05:30:18Z
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(Un)intentionality bias in action observation revisited

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