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ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS

Yohan Pelosse Orcid Logo

Swansea University Author: Yohan Pelosse Orcid Logo

Abstract

This article investigates a two-player sequential contests where the incumbentchooses not only her effort, but also privately determines the impacts of effortsaffecting whether she will be the (strong/weak) ’favourite’ or ’underdog’ (’types’).In this setting, we study the incumbent’s endogenous sign...

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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa71995
first_indexed 2026-05-31T08:59:08Z
last_indexed 2026-05-31T08:59:08Z
id cronfa71995
recordtype SURis
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spelling v2 71995 2026-05-31 ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS 455a04210e95a07e6fbea54f2cc4d6be 0000-0001-8546-918X Yohan Pelosse Yohan Pelosse true false 2026-05-31 SOSS This article investigates a two-player sequential contests where the incumbentchooses not only her effort, but also privately determines the impacts of effortsaffecting whether she will be the (strong/weak) ’favourite’ or ’underdog’ (’types’).In this setting, we study the incumbent’s endogenous signalling strategy throughBayesian persuasion and effort strategy. In our main results, we identify a largeclass of contests where the incumbent’s equilibrium behavior is to randomize overthe players’ relative strengths and commit to a signaling policy through which sherenders the challenger uncertain of his own actual type. We prove the existence ofpartially revealing equilibria where the incumbent achieves some payoffs higherthan in any equilibria of the benchmark sequential contest by persuading thechallenger to follow her messages. Working paper 0 0 0 0001-01-01 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University Not Required NONE 2026-05-31T09:59:06.3922188 2026-05-31T09:42:26.3977661 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Social Sciences - Economics Yohan Pelosse 0000-0001-8546-918X 1
title ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
spellingShingle ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
Yohan Pelosse
title_short ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
title_full ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
title_fullStr ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
title_full_unstemmed ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
title_sort ENDOGENOUS STRENGTH ASYMMETRY and SIGNALLING in SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
author_id_str_mv 455a04210e95a07e6fbea54f2cc4d6be
author_id_fullname_str_mv 455a04210e95a07e6fbea54f2cc4d6be_***_Yohan Pelosse
author Yohan Pelosse
author2 Yohan Pelosse
format Working paper
institution Swansea University
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Social Sciences - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Social Sciences - Economics
document_store_str 0
active_str 0
description This article investigates a two-player sequential contests where the incumbentchooses not only her effort, but also privately determines the impacts of effortsaffecting whether she will be the (strong/weak) ’favourite’ or ’underdog’ (’types’).In this setting, we study the incumbent’s endogenous signalling strategy throughBayesian persuasion and effort strategy. In our main results, we identify a largeclass of contests where the incumbent’s equilibrium behavior is to randomize overthe players’ relative strengths and commit to a signaling policy through which sherenders the challenger uncertain of his own actual type. We prove the existence ofpartially revealing equilibria where the incumbent achieves some payoffs higherthan in any equilibria of the benchmark sequential contest by persuading thechallenger to follow her messages.
published_date 0001-01-01T09:59:08Z
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score 11.106693

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