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Conference Paper/Proceeding/Abstract 724 views 69 downloads

On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues

Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni

AAMAS 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, Pages: 260 - 268

Swansea University Author: Xiuyi Fan

Abstract

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentatio...

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Published in: AAMAS 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
ISBN: 978-1-4503-4239-1
Published: Singapore 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems 2016
Online Access: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2936924.2936964
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa39374
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last_indexed 2020-07-23T18:59:07Z
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spelling 2020-07-23T14:19:34.9258667 v2 39374 2018-04-11 On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues a88a07c43b3e80f27cb96897d1bc2534 Xiuyi Fan Xiuyi Fan true false 2018-04-11 Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents' behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information. Conference Paper/Proceeding/Abstract AAMAS 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems 260 268 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems Singapore 978-1-4503-4239-1 argumentation, dialogues, games 9 5 2016 2016-05-09 https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2936924.2936964 COLLEGE NANME COLLEGE CODE Swansea University 2020-07-23T14:19:34.9258667 2018-04-11T19:14:38.5139193 Xiuyi Fan 1 Francesca Toni 2 39374__8704__081d3c33762b4797949eccfc3678c1ec.pdf 39374.pdf 2018-04-23T14:09:59.7830000 Output 818413 application/pdf Version of Record true 2018-04-23T00:00:00.0000000 true eng
title On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues
spellingShingle On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues
Xiuyi Fan
title_short On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues
title_full On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues
title_fullStr On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues
title_full_unstemmed On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues
title_sort On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues
author_id_str_mv a88a07c43b3e80f27cb96897d1bc2534
author_id_fullname_str_mv a88a07c43b3e80f27cb96897d1bc2534_***_Xiuyi Fan
author Xiuyi Fan
author2 Xiuyi Fan
Francesca Toni
format Conference Paper/Proceeding/Abstract
container_title AAMAS 2016 Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
container_start_page 260
publishDate 2016
institution Swansea University
isbn 978-1-4503-4239-1
publisher 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
url https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2936924.2936964
document_store_str 1
active_str 0
description Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents' behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information.
published_date 2016-05-09T03:50:00Z
_version_ 1763752437587378176
score 11.012678

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