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The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning

S.M. Amadae, Daniel Lempert

Journal of Economic Methodology, Volume: 22, Issue: 4, Pages: 462 - 478

Swansea University Author: S.M. Amadae

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DOI (Published version): 10.1080/1350178X.2015.1024880

Abstract

This article argues that contrary to the selfish gene idea popularized by Richard Dawkins, given the diverse encounters organisms faced throughout their evolutionary history, that team reasoning potentially would be viability. Opposing the conventional wisdom, this opens the possibility that members...

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Published in: Journal of Economic Methodology
Published: Taylor Francis 2015
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa40170
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Abstract: This article argues that contrary to the selfish gene idea popularized by Richard Dawkins, given the diverse encounters organisms faced throughout their evolutionary history, that team reasoning potentially would be viability. Opposing the conventional wisdom, this opens the possibility that members of species could cooperate in a mixture of games including Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and Hi Lo. The paper builds on Richard Bacharach's theory of team reasoning and presents a replicator dynamic model to construct an analytic model argument.
Keywords: team reasoning; rational choice; replicator dynamic; individual maximization; evolutionary viability; rationality; ludic ecology; Prisoner’s dilemma
College: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Issue: 4
Start Page: 462
End Page: 478