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The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning

S.M. Amadae, Daniel Lempert

Journal of Economic Methodology, Volume: 22, Issue: 4, Pages: 462 - 478

Swansea University Author: S.M. Amadae

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DOI (Published version): 10.1080/1350178X.2015.1024880

Abstract

This article argues that contrary to the selfish gene idea popularized by Richard Dawkins, given the diverse encounters organisms faced throughout their evolutionary history, that team reasoning potentially would be viability. Opposing the conventional wisdom, this opens the possibility that members...

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Published in: Journal of Economic Methodology
Published: Taylor Francis 2015
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa40170
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spelling 2018-08-17T09:24:14.2464294 v2 40170 2018-05-15 The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning 9e4a01e93bf5f0d15b071bc9a9fa3c32 S.M. Amadae S.M. Amadae true false 2018-05-15 APC This article argues that contrary to the selfish gene idea popularized by Richard Dawkins, given the diverse encounters organisms faced throughout their evolutionary history, that team reasoning potentially would be viability. Opposing the conventional wisdom, this opens the possibility that members of species could cooperate in a mixture of games including Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and Hi Lo. The paper builds on Richard Bacharach's theory of team reasoning and presents a replicator dynamic model to construct an analytic model argument. Journal Article Journal of Economic Methodology 22 4 462 478 Taylor Francis team reasoning; rational choice; replicator dynamic; individual maximization; evolutionary viability; rationality; ludic ecology; Prisoner’s dilemma 11 5 2015 2015-05-11 10.1080/1350178X.2015.1024880 COLLEGE NANME Politics, Philosophy and International Relations COLLEGE CODE APC Swansea University 2018-08-17T09:24:14.2464294 2018-05-15T14:28:13.5727455 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations S.M. Amadae 1 Daniel Lempert 2
title The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning
spellingShingle The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning
S.M. Amadae
title_short The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning
title_full The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning
title_fullStr The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning
title_full_unstemmed The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning
title_sort The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning
author_id_str_mv 9e4a01e93bf5f0d15b071bc9a9fa3c32
author_id_fullname_str_mv 9e4a01e93bf5f0d15b071bc9a9fa3c32_***_S.M. Amadae
author S.M. Amadae
author2 S.M. Amadae
Daniel Lempert
format Journal article
container_title Journal of Economic Methodology
container_volume 22
container_issue 4
container_start_page 462
publishDate 2015
institution Swansea University
doi_str_mv 10.1080/1350178X.2015.1024880
publisher Taylor Francis
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
document_store_str 0
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description This article argues that contrary to the selfish gene idea popularized by Richard Dawkins, given the diverse encounters organisms faced throughout their evolutionary history, that team reasoning potentially would be viability. Opposing the conventional wisdom, this opens the possibility that members of species could cooperate in a mixture of games including Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and Hi Lo. The paper builds on Richard Bacharach's theory of team reasoning and presents a replicator dynamic model to construct an analytic model argument.
published_date 2015-05-11T03:51:08Z
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score 11.012678

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