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Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus. / Maria Paz C Felton

Swansea University Author: Maria Paz C Felton

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to develop an alternative account of how justice as fairness can be delivered. My general proposition is that if justice as fairness is to be regarded as a realistic utopia, some alterations need to be made into the argument about the possibilities of its realization of...

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Published: 2006
Institution: Swansea University
Degree level: Doctoral
Degree name: Ph.D
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42460
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spelling 2018-08-02T16:24:29.3221945 v2 42460 2018-08-02 Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus. 605c43e2c3dc2ef773699a2e6e3191ae NULL Maria Paz C Felton Maria Paz C Felton true true 2018-08-02 The purpose of this thesis is to develop an alternative account of how justice as fairness can be delivered. My general proposition is that if justice as fairness is to be regarded as a realistic utopia, some alterations need to be made into the argument about the possibilities of its realization offered by Rawls. The main problem comes from the idea of overlapping consensus and its association with stability. A crucial working conjecture is that we need overlapping consensus neither to stabilize justice as fairness, nor to justify it. My alterations to Rawls's argument also originate as a result of two theoretical burdens within political liberalism: its notion of stability and its account of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Both ideas have been inadequately problematized, and therefore demand significant revision. The idea of stability needs to be revised because of its exclusive focus on questions of moral coherence at the expense of more relevant aspects such as institutional and political stability. The account of reasonable pluralism also needs to be revised because it is both too narrow and significantly unfocused. A crucial consequence that follows from these revisions is that, in order to preserve institutional stability under the conditions of pluralism, we need to render the stability of institutions separately from the coherence of citizens' overall moralities. These two conceptual revisions lead me to effect three alterations into Rawls's argument. In particular I show that: 1) constitutional consensus is necessary, but not yet sufficient, for stability of the required kind, 2) political justification is necessary and sufficient for the right kind of justification, and 3) overlapping consensus is part of moral, not political, justification and, therefore, not required for a political project such as Rawls's. E-Thesis Political science. 31 12 2006 2006-12-31 COLLEGE NANME Political and Cultural Studies COLLEGE CODE Swansea University Doctoral Ph.D 2018-08-02T16:24:29.3221945 2018-08-02T16:24:29.3221945 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Maria Paz C Felton NULL 1 0042460-02082018162456.pdf 10798168.pdf 2018-08-02T16:24:56.1870000 Output 6501863 application/pdf E-Thesis true 2018-08-02T16:24:56.1870000 false
title Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus.
spellingShingle Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus.
Maria Paz C Felton
title_short Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus.
title_full Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus.
title_fullStr Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus.
title_full_unstemmed Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus.
title_sort Is justice as fairness a realistic utopia? A critical examination of Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus.
author_id_str_mv 605c43e2c3dc2ef773699a2e6e3191ae
author_id_fullname_str_mv 605c43e2c3dc2ef773699a2e6e3191ae_***_Maria Paz C Felton
author Maria Paz C Felton
author2 Maria Paz C Felton
format E-Thesis
publishDate 2006
institution Swansea University
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
document_store_str 1
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description The purpose of this thesis is to develop an alternative account of how justice as fairness can be delivered. My general proposition is that if justice as fairness is to be regarded as a realistic utopia, some alterations need to be made into the argument about the possibilities of its realization offered by Rawls. The main problem comes from the idea of overlapping consensus and its association with stability. A crucial working conjecture is that we need overlapping consensus neither to stabilize justice as fairness, nor to justify it. My alterations to Rawls's argument also originate as a result of two theoretical burdens within political liberalism: its notion of stability and its account of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Both ideas have been inadequately problematized, and therefore demand significant revision. The idea of stability needs to be revised because of its exclusive focus on questions of moral coherence at the expense of more relevant aspects such as institutional and political stability. The account of reasonable pluralism also needs to be revised because it is both too narrow and significantly unfocused. A crucial consequence that follows from these revisions is that, in order to preserve institutional stability under the conditions of pluralism, we need to render the stability of institutions separately from the coherence of citizens' overall moralities. These two conceptual revisions lead me to effect three alterations into Rawls's argument. In particular I show that: 1) constitutional consensus is necessary, but not yet sufficient, for stability of the required kind, 2) political justification is necessary and sufficient for the right kind of justification, and 3) overlapping consensus is part of moral, not political, justification and, therefore, not required for a political project such as Rawls's.
published_date 2006-12-31T03:53:00Z
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score 11.021648

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