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Depositor market discipline: New evidence from selling failed banks

Philip Molyneux, Vineet Upreti Orcid Logo, Tim Zhou Orcid Logo

International Review of Financial Analysis, Volume: 89, Start page: 102767

Swansea University Authors: Vineet Upreti Orcid Logo, Tim Zhou Orcid Logo

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Abstract

This paper studies depositor behavior following the acquisition of failed banks by healthy banks in FDIC-supervised transactions. Using a US bank branch-based dataset spanning 2007 to 2014 we find that failed bank depositors discipline acquiring banks post-resolution. This appears to be related to f...

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Published in: International Review of Financial Analysis
ISSN: 1057-5219
Published: Elsevier BV 2023
Online Access: Check full text

URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa63754
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Abstract: This paper studies depositor behavior following the acquisition of failed banks by healthy banks in FDIC-supervised transactions. Using a US bank branch-based dataset spanning 2007 to 2014 we find that failed bank depositors discipline acquiring banks post-resolution. This appears to be related to features of the acquiring banks' asset quality and loan composition, but it may also be linked to irrational desciplinary behavior or post acquisition integration issues. We also find some evidence that depositor market discipline may have an impact on the competitive fetaures of local banking markets post resolution.
Keywords: FDIC, Banks, Resolution, Market discipline, Depositors
College: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Funders: Swansea University
Start Page: 102767