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Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour

Md Al Mamun Orcid Logo, Sabri Boubaker Orcid Logo, Abdul Ghafoor Orcid Logo, Muhammad Tahir Suleman

British Journal of Management

Swansea University Author: Sabri Boubaker Orcid Logo

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Abstract

Given that marriage transforms people, with wide-ranging and long-lasting impacts, we examine the role of CEOs' marital status on firms' cash holdings behaviour. Using a large sample of US-listed firms, we find that single CEOs stockpile more cash than their married counterparts do. Our fi...

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Published in: British Journal of Management
ISSN: 1045-3172 1467-8551
Published: Wiley 2023
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa64811
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last_indexed 2023-11-23T16:43:59Z
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spelling v2 64811 2023-10-24 Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour 43999fff86cd8a29f4815fb4dfa47729 0000-0002-6416-2952 Sabri Boubaker Sabri Boubaker true false 2023-10-24 BAF Given that marriage transforms people, with wide-ranging and long-lasting impacts, we examine the role of CEOs' marital status on firms' cash holdings behaviour. Using a large sample of US-listed firms, we find that single CEOs stockpile more cash than their married counterparts do. Our finding is robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics, CFO influence, tackling endogeneity concerns and using alternative measures of cash. Moreover, we show that exogenous CEO turnover resulting in appointments of single (married) CEOs increases (decreases) cash holdings. Additional results show that single-CEO firms practise a more conservative payout policy and save more cash from operating and financing cash flows. Consistent with agency theory, single CEOs extract more compensation from the accumulated cash, leading to a lower value of cash holdings. External corporate governance mechanisms mitigate the relationship between single CEOs and cash holdings. Our results show that single-CEO firms are more prone to agency problems. Journal Article British Journal of Management Wiley 1045-3172 1467-8551 9 5 2023 2023-05-09 10.1111/1467-8551.12732 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12732 COLLEGE NANME Accounting and Finance COLLEGE CODE BAF Swansea University 2023-12-22T08:05:03.0473879 2023-10-24T16:14:14.0632726 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Accounting and Finance Md Al Mamun 0000-0002-6540-9195 1 Sabri Boubaker 0000-0002-6416-2952 2 Abdul Ghafoor 0000-0003-2128-210x 3 Muhammad Tahir Suleman 4
title Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour
spellingShingle Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour
Sabri Boubaker
title_short Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour
title_full Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour
title_fullStr Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour
title_full_unstemmed Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour
title_sort Is Marriage a Turning Point? Evidence from Cash Holdings Behaviour
author_id_str_mv 43999fff86cd8a29f4815fb4dfa47729
author_id_fullname_str_mv 43999fff86cd8a29f4815fb4dfa47729_***_Sabri Boubaker
author Sabri Boubaker
author2 Md Al Mamun
Sabri Boubaker
Abdul Ghafoor
Muhammad Tahir Suleman
format Journal article
container_title British Journal of Management
publishDate 2023
institution Swansea University
issn 1045-3172
1467-8551
doi_str_mv 10.1111/1467-8551.12732
publisher Wiley
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Accounting and Finance{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Accounting and Finance
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12732
document_store_str 0
active_str 0
description Given that marriage transforms people, with wide-ranging and long-lasting impacts, we examine the role of CEOs' marital status on firms' cash holdings behaviour. Using a large sample of US-listed firms, we find that single CEOs stockpile more cash than their married counterparts do. Our finding is robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics, CFO influence, tackling endogeneity concerns and using alternative measures of cash. Moreover, we show that exogenous CEO turnover resulting in appointments of single (married) CEOs increases (decreases) cash holdings. Additional results show that single-CEO firms practise a more conservative payout policy and save more cash from operating and financing cash flows. Consistent with agency theory, single CEOs extract more compensation from the accumulated cash, leading to a lower value of cash holdings. External corporate governance mechanisms mitigate the relationship between single CEOs and cash holdings. Our results show that single-CEO firms are more prone to agency problems.
published_date 2023-05-09T08:05:03Z
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score 11.01232