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Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency / Jonathan James, Phillip Lawler

Economics Letters, Volume: 113, Issue: 1, Pages: 8 - 11

Swansea University Authors: Jonathan James, Phillip Lawler

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Abstract

The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.

Published in: Economics Letters
ISSN: 0165-1765
Published: Elsevier 2011
Online Access: Check full text

URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa6943
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Abstract: The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.
College: School of Management
Issue: 1
Start Page: 8
End Page: 11