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Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency

Jonathan James Orcid Logo, Phillip Lawler

Economics Letters, Volume: 113, Issue: 1, Pages: 8 - 11

Swansea University Authors: Jonathan James Orcid Logo, Phillip Lawler

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DOI (Published version): 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.001

Abstract

The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.

Published in: Economics Letters
ISSN: 0165-1765
Published: Elsevier 2011
Online Access: Check full text

URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa6943
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spelling 2013-11-05T11:45:12.3928138 v2 6943 2012-01-29 Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3 0000-0001-8947-7857 Jonathan James Jonathan James true false fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe Phillip Lawler Phillip Lawler true false 2012-01-29 ECON The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent. Journal Article Economics Letters 113 1 8 11 Elsevier 0165-1765 31 12 2011 2011-12-31 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.001 COLLEGE NANME Economics COLLEGE CODE ECON Swansea University 2013-11-05T11:45:12.3928138 2012-01-29T15:32:52.2000000 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Economics Jonathan James 0000-0001-8947-7857 1 Phillip Lawler 2
title Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
spellingShingle Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
Jonathan James
Phillip Lawler
title_short Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
title_full Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
title_fullStr Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
title_full_unstemmed Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
title_sort Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
author_id_str_mv fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3
fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe
author_id_fullname_str_mv fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3_***_Jonathan James
fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe_***_Phillip Lawler
author Jonathan James
Phillip Lawler
author2 Jonathan James
Phillip Lawler
format Journal article
container_title Economics Letters
container_volume 113
container_issue 1
container_start_page 8
publishDate 2011
institution Swansea University
issn 0165-1765
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.001
publisher Elsevier
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Economics
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description The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.
published_date 2011-12-31T03:08:35Z
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score 11.016235

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